opinion
stringlengths 349
204k
| instruction
stringclasses 163
values | question
stringclasses 160
values | choices
sequencelengths 0
311
| answer
sequencelengths 1
1
| task
stringclasses 157
values |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IN RE WHITAKER
No. 93-9220.
Decided October 11, 1994
Per Curiam.
Pro se petitioner Fred Whitaker filed a petition for writ of mandamus and requests permission to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 39. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, we deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Petitioner is allowed until November 1, 1994, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and to submit a petition for a writ of prohibition in compliance with Rule 33 of the Rules of this Court. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
Since 1987, petitioner has filed 23 claims for relief, including 18 petitions for certiorari, 9 of which have been filed in the last three Terms. That total also includes five petitions for extraordinary writs filed since June 1992. We have denied all of the petitions without recorded dissent. We have also denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8 for the last two petitions in which he has sought extraordinary relief. In re Whitaker, 511 U. S. 1105 (1994); In re Whitaker, 506 U. S. 983 (1992).
Petitioner’s current claim involves a civil action brought in the Alameda, California, Superior Court against Lake Merritt Lodge & Residence, alleging damages of $2 in illegal taxes. His legal arguments here are just as frivolous as those he has made in previous petitions.
Although petitioner has exhibited frequent filing patterns with respect to petitions for writ of certiorari, we limit our sanctions at this time to the type of relief requested today— styled as petitions for extraordinary writs. We have imposed similar sanctions in the past. See, e. g., In re Anderson, 511 U. S. 364 (1994); In re Demos, 500 U. S. 16 (1991); In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991); In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989). As we concluded in Sindram:
“The goal of fairly dispensing justice ... is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests. Pro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources because they are not subject to the financial considerations — filing fees and attorney’s fees — that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions. The risks of abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation. In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system.” 498 U. S., at 179-180 (citation omitted).
Rule 39.8 provides: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ. | What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction? | [
"cert",
"appeal",
"bail",
"certification",
"docketing fee",
"rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument",
"injunction",
"mandamus",
"original",
"prohibition",
"stay",
"writ of error",
"writ of habeas corpus",
"unspecified, other"
] | [
7
] | sc_jurisdiction |
Herman Avery GUNDY, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES
No. 17-6086
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued October 2, 2018
Decided June 20, 2019
Sarah Baumgartel, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey B. Wall, Deputy Solicitor General, Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Sonja M. Ralston, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, David T. Goldberg, Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court, Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, Sarah Baumgartel, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., Yuanchung Lee, Barry D. Leiwant, Edward S. Zas, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Justice KAGAN announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice SOTOMAYOR join.
The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government. This case requires us to decide whether 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), enacted as part of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), violates that doctrine. We hold it does not. Under § 20913(d), the Attorney General must apply SORNA's registration requirements as soon as feasible to offenders convicted before the statute's enactment. That delegation easily passes constitutional muster.
I
Congress has sought, for the past quarter century, to combat sex crimes and crimes against children through sex-offender registration schemes. In 1994, Congress first conditioned certain federal funds on States' adoption of registration laws meeting prescribed minimum standards. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, § 170101, 108 Stat. 2038, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 et seq. (1994 ed.). Two years later, Congress strengthened those standards, most notably by insisting that States inform local communities of registrants' addresses. See Megan's Law, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, note following 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994 ed., Supp. II). By that time, every State and the District of Columbia had enacted a sex-offender registration law. But the state statutes varied along many dimensions, and Congress came to realize that their "loopholes and deficiencies" had allowed over 100,000 sex offenders (about 20% of the total) to escape registration. See H. R. Rep. No. 109-218, pt. 1, pp. 20, 23-24, 26 (2005) (referring to those sex offenders as "missing" or "lost"). In 2006, to address those failings, Congress enacted SORNA. See 120 Stat. 590, 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq .
SORNA makes "more uniform and effective" the prior "patchwork" of sex-offender registration systems. Reynolds v. United States , 565 U.S. 432, 435, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012). The Act's express "purpose" is "to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children" by "establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for [their] registration." § 20901. To that end, SORNA covers more sex offenders, and imposes more onerous registration requirements, than most States had before. The Act also backs up those requirements with new criminal penalties. Any person required to register under SORNA who knowingly fails to do so (and who travels in interstate commerce) may be imprisoned for up to ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
The basic registration scheme works as follows. A "sex offender" is defined as "an individual who was convicted of" specified criminal offenses: all offenses "involving a sexual act or sexual contact" and additional offenses "against a minor." 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(1), (5)(A), (7). Such an individual must register-provide his name, address, and certain other information-in every State where he resides, works, or studies. See §§ 20913(a), 20914. And he must keep the registration current, and periodically report in person to a law enforcement office, for a period of between fifteen years and life (depending on the severity of his crime and his history of recidivism). See §§ 20915, 20918.
Section 20913-the disputed provision here-elaborates the "[i]nitial registration" requirements for sex offenders. §§ 20913(b), (d). Subsection (b) sets out the general rule: An offender must register "before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement" (or, if the offender is not sentenced to prison, "not later than [three] business days after being sentenced"). Two provisions down, subsection (d) addresses (in its title's words) the "[i]nitial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b)." The provision states:
"The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter ... and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b)."
Subsection (d), in other words, focuses on individuals convicted of a sex offense before SORNA's enactment-a group we will call pre-Act offenders. Many of these individuals were unregistered at the time of SORNA's enactment, either because pre-existing law did not cover them or because they had successfully evaded that law (so were "lost" to the system). See supra, at 2121 - 2122. And of those potential new registrants, many or most could not comply with subsection (b)'s registration rule because they had already completed their prison sentences. For the entire group of pre-Act offenders, once again, the Attorney General "shall have the authority" to "specify the applicability" of SORNA's registration requirements and "to prescribe rules for [their] registration."
Under that delegated authority, the Attorney General issued an interim rule in February 2007, specifying that SORNA's registration requirements apply in full to "sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of that Act." 72 Fed. Reg. 8897. The final rule, issued in December 2010, reiterated that SORNA applies to all pre- Act offenders. 75 Fed. Reg. 81850. That rule has remained the same to this day.
Petitioner Herman Gundy is a pre-Act offender. The year before SORNA's enactment, he pleaded guilty under Maryland law for sexually assaulting a minor. After his release from prison in 2012, Gundy came to live in New York. But he never registered there as a sex offender. A few years later, he was convicted for failing to register, in violation of § 2250. He argued below (among other things) that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized the Attorney General to "specify the applicability" of SORNA's registration requirements to pre-Act offenders. § 20913(d). The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected that claim, see 695 Fed.Appx. 639 (2017), as had every other court (including eleven Courts of Appeals) to consider the issue. We nonetheless granted certiorari.
583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1260, 200 L.Ed.2d 416 (2018). Today, we join the consensus and affirm.
II
Article I of the Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." § 1. Accompanying that assignment of power to Congress is a bar on its further delegation. Congress, this Court explained early on, may not transfer to another branch "powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." Wayman v. Southard , 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825). But the Constitution does not "deny[ ] to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality [that enable it] to perform its function[s]." Yakus v. United States , 321 U.S. 414, 425, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress may "obtain[ ] the assistance of its coordinate Branches"-and in particular, may confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws. Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 372, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). "[I]n our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems," this Court has understood that "Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Ibid. So we have held, time and again, that a statutory delegation is constitutional as long as Congress "lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform." Ibid. (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States , 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928) ; brackets in original).
Given that standard, a nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost ends) with statutory interpretation. The constitutional question is whether Congress has supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegee's use of discretion. So the answer requires construing the challenged statute to figure out what task it delegates and what instructions it provides. See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Assns. , Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (construing the text of a delegation to place constitutionally adequate "limits on the EPA's discretion"); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC , 329 U.S. 90, 104-105, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946) (interpreting a statutory delegation, in light of its "purpose[,] factual background[, and] context," to provide sufficiently "definite" standards). Only after a court has determined a challenged statute's meaning can it decide whether the law sufficiently guides executive discretion to accord with Article I. And indeed, once a court interprets the statute, it may find that the constitutional question all but answers itself.
That is the case here, because § 20913(d) does not give the Attorney General anything like the "unguided" and "unchecked" authority that Gundy says. Brief for Petitioner 37, 45. The provision, in Gundy's view, "grants the Attorney General plenary power to determine SORNA's applicability to pre-Act offenders-to require them to register, or not, as she sees fit, and to change her policy for any reason and at any time." Id., at 42. If that were so, we would face a nondelegation question. But it is not. This Court has already interpreted § 20913(d) to say something different-to require the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. See Reynolds , 565 U.S. at 442-443, 132 S.Ct. 975. And revisiting that issue yet more fully today, we reach the same conclusion. The text, considered alongside its context, purpose, and history, makes clear that the Attorney General's discretion extends only to considering and addressing feasibility issues. Given that statutory meaning, Gundy's constitutional claim must fail. Section 20913(d)'s delegation falls well within permissible bounds.
A
This is not the first time this Court has had to interpret § 20913(d). In Reynolds , the Court considered whether SORNA's registration requirements applied of their own force to pre-Act offenders or instead applied only once the Attorney General said they did. We read the statute as adopting the latter approach. But even as we did so, we made clear how far SORNA limited the Attorney General's authority. And in that way, we effectively resolved the case now before us.
Everything in Reynolds started from the premise that Congress meant for SORNA's registration requirements to apply to pre-Act offenders. The majority recounted SORNA's "basic statutory purpose," found in its text, as follows: "the 'establish[ment of] a comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex] offenders' that includes offenders who committed their offenses before the Act became law." 565 U.S. at 442, 132 S.Ct. 975 (quoting § 20901 ; emphasis and alterations in original; citation omitted). That purpose, the majority further noted, informed SORNA's "broad[ ]" definition of "sex offender," which "include[s] any 'individual who was convicted of a sex offense.' " Id., at 442, 132 S.Ct. 975 (quoting § 20911(1) ; emphasis added). And those two provisions were at one with "[t]he Act's history." Id., at 442, 132 S.Ct. 975. Quoting statements from both the House and the Senate about the sex offenders then "lost" to the system, Reynolds explained that the Act's "supporters placed considerable importance upon the registration of pre-Act offenders." Ibid. In recognizing all this, the majority (temporarily) bonded with the dissenting Justices, who found it obvious that SORNA was "meant to cover pre-Act offenders." Id., at 448, 132 S.Ct. 975 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And indeed, the dissent emphasized that common ground, remarking that "the Court acknowledges" and "rightly believes" that registration of pre-Act offenders was "what the statute sought to achieve." Id., at 448-449, 132 S.Ct. 975.
But if that was so, why had Congress (as the majority held) conditioned the pre-Act offenders' duty to register on a prior "ruling from the Attorney General"? Id., at 441, 132 S.Ct. 975. The majority had a simple answer: "[I]nstantaneous registration" of pre-Act offenders "might not prove feasible," or "[a]t least Congress might well have so thought." Id., at 440-441, 443, 132 S.Ct. 975. Here, the majority explained that SORNA's requirements diverged from prior state law. See id. , at 440, 132 S.Ct. 975 ; supra, at 2121 - 2122. Some pre-Act offenders (as defined by SORNA) had never needed to register before; others had once had to register, but had fulfilled their old obligations. And still others (the "lost" or "missing" offenders) should have registered, but had escaped the system. As a result, SORNA created a "practical problem[ ]": It would require "newly registering or reregistering a large number of pre-Act offenders."
Reynolds , 565 U.S. at 440, 132 S.Ct. 975 (internal quotation marks omitted). And attached to that broad feasibility concern was a more technical one. Recall that under SORNA "a sex offender must initially register before completing his 'sentence of imprisonment.' " Id., at 439, 132 S.Ct. 975 (quoting § 20913(b) ); see supra, at 2122. But many pre-Act offenders were already out of prison, so could not comply with that requirement. That inability raised questions about "how[ ] the new registration requirements applied to them." 565 U.S. at 441, 132 S.Ct. 975. "Congress['s] solution" to both those difficulties was the same: Congress "[a]sk[ed] the Department of Justice, charged with responsibility for implementation, to examine [the issues] and to apply the new registration requirements accordingly." Ibid.
On that understanding, the Attorney General's role under § 20913(d) was important but limited: It was to apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders as soon as he thought it feasible to do so. That statutory delegation, the Court explained, would "involve[ ] implementation delay." Id., at 443, 132 S.Ct. 975. But no more than that. Congress had made clear in SORNA's text that the new registration requirements would apply to pre-Act offenders. See id., at 442-445, 132 S.Ct. 975. So (the Court continued) "there was no need" for Congress to worry about the "unrealistic possibility" that "the Attorney General would refuse to apply" those requirements on some excessively broad view of his authority under § 20913(d). Id., at 444-445, 132 S.Ct. 975. Reasonably read, SORNA enabled the Attorney General only to address (as appropriate) the "practical problems" involving pre-Act offenders before requiring them to register. Id., at 440, 132 S.Ct. 975. The delegation was a stopgap, and nothing more.
Gundy dismisses Reynolds 's relevance, but his arguments come up short. To begin, he contends that Reynolds spoke "tentative[ly]"-with "might[s], may[s], or could[s]"-about Congress's reasons for enacting § 20913(d). Reply Brief 11; see supra, at 2124 (quoting such phrases). Gundy concludes from such constructions-which are indeed present-that the Court was "not offering a definitive reading of the statute." Reply Brief 11. But the Court used those locutions to convey not its own uncertainty but Congress's. The point of the opinion was that Congress had questions about how best to phase SORNA's application to pre-Act offenders, so gave the Attorney General flexibility on timing. The "mights, mays, and coulds" were there to describe the legislative mindset responsible for § 20913(d), and thus formed part of the Court's own-yes, "definitive"-view of that provision's meaning. Anticipating that explanation, Gundy falls back on the claim that the Court's account of Congress's motivations "cannot supply the intelligible principle Congress failed to enact into law." Id., at 12 (citing Whitman , 531 U.S. at 473, 121 S.Ct. 903 ). But the Court in Reynolds did not invent a standard Congress omitted. Rather, the Court read the statute to contain a standard-again, that the Attorney General should apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. And as the next part of this opinion shows, in somewhat greater detail than Reynolds thought necessary, we read the statute in the same way.
B
Recall again the delegation provision at issue. Congress gave the Attorney General authority to "specify the applicability" of SORNA's requirements to pre-Act offenders. § 20913(d). And in the second half of the same sentence, Congress gave him authority to "prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders ... who are unable to comply with" subsection (b)'s initial registration requirement. Ibid. What does the delegation in § 20913(d) allow the Attorney General to do?
The different answers on offer here reflect competing views of statutory interpretation. As noted above, Gundy urges us to read § 20913(d) to empower the Attorney General to do whatever he wants as to pre-Act offenders: He may make them all register immediately or he may exempt them from registration forever (or he may do anything in between). See Brief for Petitioner 41-42; supra, at 2123 - 2124. Gundy bases that argument on the first half of § 20913(d), isolated from everything else-from the second half of the same section, from surrounding provisions in SORNA, and from any conception of the statute's history and purpose. Reynolds took a different approach (as does the Government here), understanding statutory interpretation as a "holistic endeavor" which determines meaning by looking not to isolated words, but to text in context, along with purpose and history. United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd. , 484 U.S. 365, 371, 108 S.Ct. 626, 98 L.Ed.2d 740 (1988).
This Court has long refused to construe words "in a vacuum," as Gundy attempts. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury , 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). "It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife , 551 U.S. 644, 666, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U.S. 302, 321, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) ("[R]easonable statutory interpretation must account for both the specific context in which ... language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole" (internal quotation marks omitted)). And beyond context and structure, the Court often looks to "history [and] purpose" to divine the meaning of language. Maracich v. Spears , 570 U.S. 48, 76, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). That non-blinkered brand of interpretation holds good for delegations, just as for other statutory provisions. To define the scope of delegated authority, we have looked to the text in "context" and in light of the statutory "purpose." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States , 319 U.S. 190, 214, 216, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted); see American Power & Light , 329 U.S. at 104, 67 S.Ct. 133 (stating that the delegation at issue "derive[d] much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background and the statutory context"). In keeping with that method, we again do so today.
So begin at the beginning, with the "[d]eclaration of purpose" that is SORNA's first sentence. § 20901. There, Congress announced (as Reynolds noted, see supra, at 2123 - 2124) that "to protect the public," it was "establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the registration" of "sex offenders and offenders against children." § 20901. The term "comprehensive" has a clear meaning-something that is all-encompassing or sweeping. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 467 (2002) ("covering a matter under consideration completely or nearly completely"); New Oxford American Dictionary 350 (2d ed. 2005) ("complete; including all or nearly all elements or aspects of something"). That description could not fit the system SORNA created if the Attorney General could decline, for any reason or no reason at all, to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders. After all, for many years after SORNA's enactment, the great majority of sex offenders in the country would be pre-Act offenders. If Gundy were right, all of those offenders could be exempt from SORNA's registration requirements. So the mismatch between SORNA's statement of purpose and Gundy's view of § 20913(d) is as stark as stark comes. Responding to that patent disparity, Gundy urges us to ignore SORNA's statement of purpose because it is "located in the Act's preface" rather than "tied" specifically to § 20913(d). Brief for Petitioner 46. But the placement of such a statement within a statute makes no difference. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 220 (2012). Wherever it resides, it is "an appropriate guide" to the "meaning of the [statute's] operative provisions." Id., at 218. And here it makes clear that SORNA was supposed to apply to all pre-Act offenders-which precludes Gundy's construction of § 20913(d).
The Act's definition of "sex offender" (also noted in Reynolds , see supra, at 2124) makes the same point. Under that definition, a "sex offender" is "an individual who was convicted of a sex offense." § 20911(1). Note the tense: "was," not "is." This Court has often "looked to Congress' choice of verb tense to ascertain a statute's temporal reach," including when interpreting other SORNA provisions. Carr v. United States , 560 U.S. 438, 447-448, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010) (holding that because SORNA "sets forth [its] travel requirement in the present tense," the statute's criminal penalties do not apply to a person whose interstate travel predated enactment); see, e.g., United States v. Wilson , 503 U.S. 329, 333, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) ; Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. , 484 U.S. 49, 57, 108 S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). Here, Congress's use of the past tense to define the term "sex offender" shows that SORNA was not merely forward-looking. The word "is" would have taken care of all future offenders. The word "was" served to bring in the hundreds of thousands of persons previously found guilty of a sex offense, and thought to pose a current threat to the public. The tense of the "sex offender" definition thus confirms that the delegation allows only temporary exclusions, as necessary to address feasibility issues. Contra Gundy, it does not sweep so wide as to make a laughingstock of the statute's core definition.
The Act's legislative history backs up everything said above by showing that the need to register pre-Act offenders was front and center in Congress's thinking. (Once again, the Reynolds majority noted this history, but Justice Scalia's dissent thought that was gilding the lily. See supra, at 2124, and n. 1. He had a point, but we can't resist.) Recall that Congress designed SORNA to address "loopholes and deficiencies" in existing registration laws. See supra, at 2121 - 2122. And no problem attracted greater attention than the large number of sex offenders who had slipped the system. According to the House Report, "[t]he most significant enforcement issue in the sex offender program is that over 100,000 sex offenders" are " 'missing,' meaning that they have not complied with" then-current requirements.
H. R. Rep. No. 109-218, at 26. There is a "strong public interest," the Report continued, in "having [those offenders] register with current information to mitigate the risks of additional crimes against children." Id., at 24. Senators struck a similar chord in the debates preceding SORNA's passage, repeatedly stressing that the new provisions would capture the missing offenders. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. 15338 (2006) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("The penalties in this bill should be adequate to ensure that [the 100,000 missing offenders] register"); id., at 13050 (statement of Sen. Frist) ("Every day that we don't have this national sex offender registry, these missing sex predators are out there somewhere"). Imagine how surprising those Members would have found Gundy's view that they had authorized the Attorney General to exempt the missing "predators" from registering at all.
With that context and background established, we may return to § 20913(d). As we have noted, Gundy makes his stand there (and there only), insisting that the lonesome phrase "specify the applicability" ends this case. See supra, at 2126. But in so doing, Gundy ignores even the rest of the section that phrase is in. Both the title and the remaining text of that section pinpoint one of the "practical problems" discussed above: At the moment of SORNA's enactment, many pre-Act offenders were "unable to comply" with the Act's initial registration requirements. § 20913(d) ; Reynolds , 565 U.S. at 440, 132 S.Ct. 975 ; see supra, at 2124 - 2125. That was because, once again, the requirements assumed that offenders would be in prison, whereas many pre-Act offenders were on the streets. In identifying that issue, § 20913(d) itself reveals the nature of the delegation to the Attorney General. It was to give him the time needed (if any) to address the various implementation issues involved in getting pre-Act offenders into the registration system. "Specify the applicability" thus does not mean "specify whether to apply SORNA" to pre-Act offenders at all, even though everything else in the Act commands their coverage. The phrase instead means "specify how to apply SORNA" to pre-Act offenders if transitional difficulties require some delay. In that way, the whole of § 20913(d) joins the rest of SORNA in giving the Attorney General only time-limited latitude to excuse pre-Act offenders from the statute's requirements. Under the law, he had to order their registration as soon as feasible.
And no Attorney General has used (or, apparently, thought to use) § 20913(d) in any more expansive way. To the contrary. Within a year of SORNA's enactment (217 days, to be precise), the Attorney General determined that SORNA would apply immediately to pre-Act offenders. See Interim Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 ; supra, at 2122 - 2123. That rule has remained in force ever since (save for a technical change to one of the rule's illustrative examples). See Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 81850. And at oral argument here, the Solicitor General's office-rarely in a hurry to agree to limits on the Government's authority-acknowledged that § 20913(d) does not allow the Attorney General to excuse a pre-Act offender from registering, except for reasons of "feasibility." Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. We thus end up, on close inspection of the statutory scheme, exactly where Reynolds left us. The Attorney General's authority goes to transition-period implementation issues, and no further.
C
Now that we have determined what § 20913(d) means, we can consider whether it violates the Constitution. The question becomes: Did Congress make an impermissible delegation when it instructed the Attorney General to apply SORNA's registration requirements to pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible? Under this Court's long-established law, that question is easy. Its answer is no.
As noted earlier, this Court has held that a delegation is constitutional so long as Congress has set out an "intelligible principle" to guide the delegee's exercise of authority. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. , 276 U.S. at 409, 48 S.Ct. 348 ; see supra, at 2123. Or in a related formulation, the Court has stated that a delegation is permissible if Congress has made clear to the delegee "the general policy" he must pursue and the "boundaries of [his] authority." American Power & Light , 329 U.S. at 105, 67 S.Ct. 133. Those standards, the Court has made clear, are not demanding. "[W]e have 'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.' " Whitman , 531 U.S. at 474-475, 121 S.Ct. 903 (quoting Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 416, 109 S.Ct. 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Only twice in this country's history (and that in a single year) have we found a delegation excessive-in each case because "Congress had failed to articulate any policy or standard" to confine discretion. Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 373, n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 647 (emphasis added); see A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States , 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935) ; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan , 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935). By contrast, we have over and over upheld even very broad delegations. Here is a sample: We have approved delegations to various agencies to regulate in the "public interest." See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. , 319 U.S. at 216, 63 S.Ct. 997 ; New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States , 287 U.S. 12, 24, 53 S.Ct. 45, 77 L.Ed. 138 (1932). We have sustained authorizations for agencies to set "fair and equitable" prices and "just and reasonable" rates. Yakus , 321 U.S. at 422, 427, 64 S.Ct. 660 ; FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co. , 320 U.S. 591, 64 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed. 333 (1944). We more recently affirmed a delegation to an agency to issue whatever air quality standards are "requisite to protect the public health." Whitman , 531 U.S. at 472, 121 S.Ct. 903 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) ). And so forth.
In that context, the delegation in SORNA easily passes muster (as all eleven circuit courts to have considered the question found, see supra, at 2122 - 2123). The statute conveyed Congress's policy that the Attorney General require pre-Act offenders to register as soon as feasible. Under the law, the feasibility issues he could address were administrative-and, more specifically, transitional-in nature. Those issues arose, as Reynolds explained, from the need to "newly register[ ] or reregister[ ] 'a large number' of pre-Act offenders" not then in the system. 565 U.S. at 440, 132 S.Ct. 975 ; see supra, at 2124 - 2125. And they arose, more technically, from the gap between an initial registration requirement hinged on imprisonment and a set of pre- Act offenders long since released. See 565 U.S. at 441, 132 S.Ct. 975 ; see supra, at 2124 - 2125. Even for those limited matters, the Act informed the Attorney General that he did not have forever to work things out. By stating its demand for a "comprehensive" registration system and by defining the "sex offenders" required to register to include pre-Act offenders, Congress conveyed that the Attorney General had only temporary authority. Or again, in the words of Reynolds , that he could prevent "instantaneous registration" and impose some "implementation delay." 565 U.S. at 443, 132 S.Ct. 975. That statutory authority, as compared to the delegations we have upheld in the past, is distinctly small-bore. It falls well within constitutional bounds.
Indeed, if SORNA's delegation is unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional-dependent as Congress is on the need to give discretion to executive officials to implement its programs. Consider again this Court's long-time recognition: "Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives." Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 372, 109 S.Ct. 647 ; see supra , at 2123. Or as the dissent in that case agreed: "[S]ome judgments ... must be left to the officers executing the law." 488 U.S. at 415, 109 S.Ct. 647 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see Whitman , 531 U.S. at 475, 121 S.Ct. 903 ("[A] certain degree of discretion[ ] inheres in most executive" action (internal quotation marks omitted)). Among the judgments often left to executive officials are ones involving feasibility. In fact, standards of that kind are ubiquitous in the U.S. Code. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-2(a) (providing that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development "shall require, to the greatest extent feasible, the employment of new and improved technologies, methods, and materials in housing construction[ ] under [HUD] programs"); 47 U.S.C. § 903(d)(1) (providing that "the Secretary of Commerce shall promote efficient and cost-effective use of the spectrum to the maximum extent feasible" in "assigning frequencies for mobile radio services"). In those delegations, Congress gives its delegee the flexibility to deal with real-world constraints in carrying out his charge. So too in SORNA.
It is wisdom and humility alike that this Court has always upheld such "necessities of government." Mistretta , 488 U.S. at 416, 109 S.Ct. 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see ibid. ("Since Congress is no less endowed with common sense than we are, and better equipped to inform itself of the 'necessities' of government; and since the factors bearing upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political ... it is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law"). We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
As to that point, the dissent criticized the majority only for basing its view in part on legislative history. 565 U.S. at 448, n., 132 S.Ct. 975 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The dissent found the majority's excursion into history "quite superfluous" given that the "text of the Act itself makes clear that Congress sought" to ensure the registration of all pre-Act offenders. Ibid. In reaching that conclusion, the dissent relied on the Act's express statement of purpose and its "sex offender" definition. See infra , at 2126 - 2128.
Once again, the dissent agreed with the Court that § 20913(d) could not sensibly be read to give the Attorney General any greater power. "[I]t is simply implausible," the dissent concluded, "that the Attorney General was given discretion to determine whether coverage of pre-Act offenders (one of the purposes of the Act) should exist." 565 U.S. at 450, 132 S.Ct. 975 (opinion of Scalia, J.). The dissent parted ways with the Court only in interpreting § 20913(d) to provide the Attorney General with even less authority.
Gundy tries to dispute that simple fact, but fails. He points to changes that Attorneys General have made in guidelines to States about how to satisfy SORNA's funding conditions. See Brief for Petitioner 32-33. But those state-directed rules are independent of the only thing at issue here: the application of registration requirements to pre-Act offenders. Those requirements have been constant since the Attorney General's initial rule, as the guidelines themselves affirm. See 73 Fed. Reg. 38046 (2008) ; 76 Fed. Reg. 1639 (2011). Indeed, the guidelines to States are issued not under § 20913(d) at all, but under a separate delegation in § 20912(b). See 73 Fed. Reg. 38030 ; 76 Fed. Reg. 1631.
Even Gundy conceded at oral argument that if the statute means what we have said, it "likely would be constitutional." Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. That is why all of his argument is devoted to showing that it means something else.
Justice KAVANAUGH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Justice ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
The Constitution confers on Congress certain "legislative [p]owers," Art. I, § 1, and does not permit Congress to delegate them to another branch of the Government. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns. , Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). Nevertheless, since 1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments and has upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant to extraordinarily capacious standards. See ibid .
If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.
Because I cannot say that the statute lacks a discernable standard that is adequate under the approach this Court has taken for many years, I vote to affirm.
Justice GORSUCH, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.
The Constitution promises that only the people's elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that design. It purports to endow the nation's chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens. Yes, those affected are some of the least popular among us. But if a single executive branch official can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that mean for the next?
Today, a plurality of an eight-member Court endorses this extraconstitutional arrangement but resolves nothing. Working from an understanding of the Constitution at war with its text and history, the plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before us and insists there is nothing wrong with Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney General. But Justice ALITO supplies the fifth vote for today's judgment and he does not join either the plurality's constitutional or statutory analysis, indicating instead that he remains willing, in a future case with a full Court, to revisit these matters. Respectfully, I would not wait.
I
For individuals convicted of sex offenses after Congress adopted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) in 2006, the statute offers detailed instructions. It requires them "to provide state governments with (and to update) information, such as names and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender registries." The law divides offenders into three tiers based on the seriousness of their crimes: Some must register for 15 years, others for 25 years, and still others for life. The statute proceeds to set registration deadlines: Offenders sentenced to prison must register before they're released, while others must register within three business days after sentencing. The statute explains when and how offenders must update their registrations. And the statute specifies particular penalties for failing to comply with its commands. On and on the statute goes for more than 20 pages of the U.S. Code.
But what about those convicted of sex offenses before the Act's adoption? At the time of SORNA's enactment, the nation's population of sex offenders exceeded 500,000, and Congress concluded that something had to be done about these "pre-Act" offenders too. But it seems Congress couldn't agree what that should be. The treatment of pre-Act offenders proved a "controversial issue with major policy significance and practical ramifications for states." Among other things, applying SORNA immediately to this group threatened to impose unpopular and costly burdens on States and localities by forcing them to adopt or overhaul their own sex offender registration schemes. So Congress simply passed the problem to the Attorney General. For all half-million pre-Act offenders, the law says only this, in 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) :
"The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter ... and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offender."
Yes, that's it. The breadth of the authority Congress granted to the Attorney General in these few words can only be described as vast. As the Department of Justice itself has acknowledged, SORNA "does not require the Attorney General" to impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders "within a certain time frame or by a date certain; it does not require him to act at all." If the Attorney General does choose to act, he can require all pre-Act offenders to register, or he can "require some but not all to register." For those he requires to register, the Attorney General may impose "some but not all of [SORNA's] registration requirements," as he pleases. And he is free to change his mind on any of these matters "at any given time or over the course of different [political] administrations." Congress thus gave the Attorney General free rein to write the rules for virtually the entire existing sex offender population in this country-a situation that promised to persist for years or decades until pre-Act offenders passed away or fulfilled the terms of their registration obligations and post-Act offenders came to predominate.
Unsurprisingly, different Attorneys General have exercised their discretion in different ways. For six months after SORNA's enactment, Attorney General Gonzales left past offenders alone. Then the pendulum swung the other direction when the Department of Justice issued an interim rule requiring pre-Act offenders to follow all the same rules as post-Act offenders. A year later, Attorney General Mukasey issued more new guidelines, this time directing the States to register some but not all past offenders. Three years after that, Attorney General Holder required the States to register only those pre-Act offenders convicted of a new felony after SORNA's enactment. Various Attorneys General have also taken different positions on whether pre-Act offenders might be entitled to credit for time spent in the community before SORNA was enacted.
These unbounded policy choices have profound consequences for the people they affect. Take our case. Before SORNA's enactment, Herman Gundy pleaded guilty in 2005 to a sexual offense. After his release from prison five years later, he was arrested again, this time for failing to register as a sex offender according to the rules the Attorney General had then prescribed for pre-Act offenders. As a result, Mr. Gundy faced an additional 10-year prison term-10 years more than if the Attorney General had, in his discretion, chosen to write the rules differently.
II
A
Our founding document begins by declaring that "We the People ... ordain and establish this Constitution." At the time, that was a radical claim, an assertion that sovereignty belongs not to a person or institution or class but to the whole of the people. From that premise, the Constitution proceeded to vest the authority to exercise different aspects of the people's sovereign power in distinct entities. In Article I, the Constitution entrusted all of the federal government's legislative power to Congress. In Article II, it assigned the executive power to the President. And in Article III, it gave independent judges the task of applying the laws to cases and controversies.
To the framers, each of these vested powers had a distinct content. When it came to the legislative power, the framers understood it to mean the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons-the power to "prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated," or the power to "prescribe general rules for the government of society."
The framers understood, too, that it would frustrate "the system of government ordained by the Constitution" if Congress could merely announce vague aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its goals. Through the Constitution, after all, the people had vested the power to prescribe rules limiting their liberties in Congress alone. No one, not even Congress, had the right to alter that arrangement. As Chief Justice Marshall explained, Congress may not "delegate ... powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative." Or as John Locke, one of the thinkers who most influenced the framers' understanding of the separation of powers, described it:
"The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said we will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to make laws for them."
Why did the framers insist on this particular arrangement? They believed the new federal government's most dangerous power was the power to enact laws restricting the people's liberty. An "excess of law-making" was, in their words, one of "the diseases to which our governments are most liable." To address that tendency, the framers went to great lengths to make lawmaking difficult. In Article I, by far the longest part of the Constitution, the framers insisted that any proposed law must win the approval of two Houses of Congress-elected at different times, by different constituencies, and for different terms in office-and either secure the President's approval or obtain enough support to override his veto. Some occasionally complain about Article I's detailed and arduous processes for new legislation, but to the framers these were bulwarks of liberty.
Nor was the point only to limit the government's capacity to restrict the people's freedoms. Article I's detailed processes for new laws were also designed to promote deliberation. "The oftener the measure is brought under examination," Hamilton explained, "the greater the diversity in the situations of those who are to examine it," and "the less must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest."
Other purposes animated the framers' design as well. Because men are not angels and majorities can threaten minority rights, the framers insisted on a legislature composed of different bodies subject to different electorates as a means of ensuring that any new law would have to secure the approval of a supermajority of the people's representatives. This, in turn, assured minorities that their votes would often decide the fate of proposed legislation. Indeed, some even thought a Bill of Rights would prove unnecessary in light of the Constitution's design; in their view, sound structures forcing "[a]mbition [to] ... counteract ambition" would do more than written promises to guard unpopular minorities from the tyranny of the majority. Restricting the task of legislating to one branch characterized by difficult and deliberative processes was also designed to promote fair notice and the rule of law, ensuring the people would be subject to a relatively stable and predictable set of rules. And by directing that legislating be done only by elected representatives in a public process, the Constitution sought to ensure that the lines of accountability would be clear: The sovereign people would know, without ambiguity, whom to hold accountable for the laws they would have to follow.
If Congress could pass off its legislative power to the executive branch, the "[v]esting [c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution," would "make no sense." Without the involvement of representatives from across the country or the demands of bicameralism and presentment, legislation would risk becoming nothing more than the will of the current President. And if laws could be simply declared by a single person, they would not be few in number, the product of widespread social consensus, likely to protect minority interests, or apt to provide stability and fair notice. Accountability would suffer too. Legislators might seek to take credit for addressing a pressing social problem by sending it to the executive for resolution, while at the same time blaming the executive for the problems that attend whatever measures he chooses to pursue. In turn, the executive might point to Congress as the source of the problem. These opportunities for finger-pointing might prove temptingly advantageous for the politicians involved, but they would also threaten to " 'disguise ... responsibility for ... the decisions.' "
The framers warned us against permitting consequences like these. As Madison explained, " '[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates.' " The framers knew, too, that the job of keeping the legislative power confined to the legislative branch couldn't be trusted to self-policing by Congress; often enough, legislators will face rational incentives to pass problems to the executive branch. Besides, enforcing the separation of powers isn't about protecting institutional prerogatives or governmental turf. It's about respecting the people's sovereign choice to vest the legislative power in Congress alone. And it's about safeguarding a structure designed to protect their liberties, minority rights, fair notice, and the rule of law. So when a case or controversy comes within the judicial competence, the Constitution does not permit judges to look the other way; we must call foul when the constitutional lines are crossed. Indeed, the framers afforded us independence from the political branches in large part to encourage exactly this kind of "fortitude ... to do [our] duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution."
B
Accepting, then, that we have an obligation to decide whether Congress has unconstitutionally divested itself of its legislative responsibilities, the question follows: What's the test? Madison acknowledged that "no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary." Chief Justice Marshall agreed that policing the separation of powers "is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry." Still, the framers took this responsibility seriously and offered us important guiding principles.
First, we know that as long as Congress makes the policy decisions when regulating private conduct, it may authorize another branch to "fill up the details." In Wayman v. Southard , this Court upheld a statute that instructed the federal courts to borrow state-court procedural rules but allowed them to make certain "alterations and additions." Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between those "important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself," and "those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act ... to fill up the details." The Court upheld the statute before it because Congress had announced the controlling general policy when it ordered federal courts to follow state procedures, and the residual authority to make "alterations and additions" did no more than permit courts to fill up the details.
Later cases built on Chief Justice Marshall's understanding. In In re Kollock , for example, the Court upheld a statute that assigned the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the responsibility to design tax stamps for margarine packages. Later still, and using the same logic, the Court sustained other and far more consequential statutes, like a law authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to adopt rules regulating the "use and occupancy" of public forests to protect them from "destruction" and "depredations." Through all these cases, small or large, runs the theme that Congress must set forth standards "sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain" whether Congress's guidance has been followed.
Second, once Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct, it may make the application of that rule depend on executive fact-finding. Here, too, the power extended to the executive may prove highly consequential. During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, Britain and France each tried to block the United States from trading with the other. Congress responded with a statute instructing that, if the President found that either Great Britain or France stopped interfering with American trade, a trade embargo would be imposed against the other country. In Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States , this Court explained that it could "see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion [to impose an embargo] either expressly or conditionally , as their judgment should direct." Half a century later, Congress likewise made the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge depend on a finding by the Secretary of War that the bridge wouldn't interfere with navigation of the East River. The Court held that Congress "did not abdicate any of its authority" but "simply declared that, upon a certain fact being established, the bridge should be deemed a lawful structure, and employed the secretary of war as an agent to ascertain that fact."
Third, Congress may assign the executive and judicial branches certain non-legislative responsibilities. While the Constitution vests all federal legislative power in Congress alone, Congress's legislative authority sometimes overlaps with authority the Constitution separately vests in another branch. So, for example, when a congressional statute confers wide discretion to the executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if "the discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of executive power." Though the case was decided on different grounds, the foreign-affairs-related statute in Cargo of the Brig Aurora may be an example of this kind of permissible lawmaking, given that many foreign affairs powers are constitutionally vested in the president under Article II. Wayman itself might be explained by the same principle as applied to the judiciary: Even in the absence of any statute, courts have the power under Article III "to regulate their practice."
C
Before the 1930s, federal statutes granting authority to the executive were comparatively modest and usually easily upheld. But then the federal government began to grow explosively. And with the proliferation of new executive programs came new questions about the scope of congressional delegations. Twice the Court responded by striking down statutes for violating the separation of powers.
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States , the Court considered a statute that transferred to the President the power "to approve 'codes of fair competition' " for slaughterhouses and other industries. But Congress offered no meaningful guidance. It did not, for example, reference any pre-existing common law of fair competition that might have supplied guidance on the policy questions, as it arguably had done earlier with the Sherman Act. And it did not announce rules contingent on executive fact-finding. Nor was this assigned power one that anyone thought might inhere in the executive power. Proceeding without the need to convince a majority of legislators, the President adopted a lengthy fair competition code written by a group of (possibly self-serving) New York poultry butchers.
Included in the code was a rule that often made it a federal crime for butchers to allow customers to select which individual chickens they wished to buy. Kosher butchers such as the Schechters had a hard time following these rules. Yet the government apparently singled out the Schechters as a test case; inspectors repeatedly visited them and, at times, apparently behaved abusively toward their customers. When the Schechters finally kicked the inspectors out, they were greeted with a criminal indictment running to dozens of counts. After a trial in which the Schechters were found guilty of selling one allegedly "unfit" chicken and other miscellaneous counts, this Court agreed to hear the case and struck down the law as a violation of the separation of powers. If Congress could permit the President to write a new code of fair competition all his own, Justice Cardozo explained, then "anything that Congress may do within the limits of the commerce clause for the betterment of business [could] be done by the President ... by calling it a code. This is delegation running riot."
The same year, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan , the Court struck down a statute that authorized the President to decide whether and how to prohibit the interstate transportation of " 'hot oil,' " petroleum produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of state-set quotas. As in Schechter Poultry , the law provided no notice to regulated parties about what the President might wind up prohibiting, leading the Court to observe that Congress "ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no standard, ha[d] laid down no rule." The Court explained that the statute did not call for the executive to "ascertai[n] the existence of facts to which legislation is directed." Nor did it ask the executive to " 'fill up the details' " "within the framework of the policy which the legislature has sufficiently defined." "If [the statute] were held valid," the Court continued, "it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its law-making function."
After Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining , Congress responded by writing a second wave of New Deal legislation more "[c]arefully crafted" to avoid the kind of problems that sank these early statutes. And since that time the Court hasn't held another statute to violate the separation of powers in the same way. Of course, no one thinks that the Court's quiescence can be attributed to an unwavering new tradition of more scrupulously drawn statutes. Some lament that the real cause may have to do with a mistaken "case of death by association" because Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining happened to be handed down during the same era as certain of the Court's now-discredited substantive due process decisions. But maybe the most likely explanation of all lies in the story of the evolving "intelligible principle" doctrine.
This Court first used that phrase in 1928 in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States , where it remarked that a statute "lay[ing] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the [executive official]
is directed to conform" satisfies the separation of powers. No one at the time thought the phrase meant to effect some revolution in this Court's understanding of the Constitution. While the exact line between policy and details, lawmaking and fact-finding, and legislative and non-legislative functions had sometimes invited reasonable debate, everyone agreed these were the relevant inquiries. And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an "intelligible principle," it seems plain enough that he sought only to explain the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them. Tellingly, too, he wrote the phrase seven years before Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining , and it did nothing to alter the analysis in those cases, let alone prevent those challenges from succeeding by lopsided votes.
There's a good argument, as well, that the statute in J. W. Hampton passed muster under the traditional tests. To boost American competitiveness in international trade, the legislation directed the President to " 'investigat[e]' " the relative costs of production for American companies and their foreign counterparts and impose tariffs or duties that would " 'equalize' " those costs. It also offered guidance on how to determine costs of production, listing several relevant factors and establishing a process for interested parties to submit evidence. The President's fact-finding responsibility may have required intricate calculations, but it could be argued that Congress had made all the relevant policy decisions, and the Court's reference to an "intelligible principle" was just another way to describe the traditional rule that Congress may leave the executive the responsibility to find facts and fill up details.
Still, it's undeniable that the "intelligible principle" remark eventually began to take on a life of its own. We sometimes chide people for treating judicial opinions as if they were statutes, divorcing a passing comment from its context, ignoring all that came before and after, and treating an isolated phrase as if it were controlling. But that seems to be exactly what happened here. For two decades, no one thought to invoke the "intelligible principle" comment as a basis to uphold a statute that would have failed more traditional separation-of-powers tests. In fact, the phrase sat more or less silently entombed until the late 1940s. Only then did lawyers begin digging it up in earnest and arguing to this Court that it had somehow displaced (sub silentio of course) all prior teachings in this area.
This mutated version of the "intelligible principle" remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was plucked. Judges and scholars representing a wide and diverse range of views have condemned it as resting on "misunderst[ood]
historical foundations." They have explained, too, that it has been abused to permit delegations of legislative power that on any other conceivable account should be held unconstitutional. Indeed, where some have claimed to see "intelligible principles" many "less discerning readers [have been able only to] find gibberish." Even Justice Douglas, one of the fathers of the administrative state, came to criticize excessive congressional delegations in the period when the intelligible principle "test" began to take hold.
Still, the scope of the problem can be overstated. At least some of the results the Court has reached under the banner of the abused "intelligible principle" doctrine may be consistent with more traditional teachings. Some delegations have, at least arguably, implicated the president's inherent Article II authority. The Court has held, for example, that Congress may authorize the President to prescribe aggravating factors that permit a military court-martial to impose the death penalty on a member of the Armed Forces convicted of murder-a decision that may implicate in part the President's independent commander-in-chief authority. Others of these cases may have involved laws that specified rules governing private conduct but conditioned the application of those rules on fact-finding-a practice that is, as we've seen, also long associated with the executive function.
More recently, too, we've sought to tame misunderstandings of the intelligible principle "test." In Touby v. United States , the Court considered a provision of the Controlled Substances Act that allowed the Attorney General to add a substance to a list of prohibited drugs temporarily if he determined that doing so was " 'necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.' " Notably, Congress required the Attorney General, before acting, to consider the drug's " 'history and current pattern of abuse,' " the " 'scope, duration, and significance of [that] abuse,' " and " '[w]hat, if any, risk there is to the public health.' " In approving the statute, the Court stressed all these constraints on the Attorney General's discretion and, in doing so, seemed to indicate that the statute supplied an "intelligible principle" because it assigned an essentially fact-finding responsibility to the executive. Whether or not one agrees with its characterization of the statute, in proceeding as it did Touby may have at least begun to point us back in the direction of the right questions. To determine whether a statute provides an intelligible principle, we must ask: Does the statute assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider and the criteria against which to measure them? And most importantly, did Congress, and not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle the Constitution demands.
While it's been some time since the Court last held that a statute improperly delegated the legislative power to another branch-thanks in no small measure to the intelligible principle misadventure-the Court has hardly abandoned the business of policing improper legislative delegations. When one legal doctrine becomes unavailable to do its intended work, the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional system sometimes shift the responsibility to different doctrines. And that's exactly what's happened here. We still regularly rein in Congress's efforts to delegate legislative power; we just call what we're doing by different names.
Consider, for example, the "major questions" doctrine. Under our precedents, an agency can fill in statutory gaps where "statutory circumstances" indicate that Congress meant to grant it such powers. But we don't follow that rule when the "statutory gap" concerns "a question of deep 'economic and political significance' that is central to the statutory scheme." So we've rejected agency demands that we defer to their attempts to rewrite rules for billions of dollars in healthcare tax credits, to assume control over millions of small greenhouse gas sources, and to ban cigarettes. Although it is nominally a canon of statutory construction, we apply the major questions doctrine in service of the constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative power by transferring that power to an executive agency.
Consider, too, this Court's cases addressing vagueness. "A vague law," this Court has observed, "impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis." And we have explained that our doctrine prohibiting vague laws is an outgrowth and "corollary of the separation of powers." It's easy to see, too, how most any challenge to a legislative delegation can be reframed as a vagueness complaint: A statute that does not contain "sufficiently definite and precise" standards "to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to ascertain" whether Congress's guidance has been followed at once presents a delegation problem and provides impermissibly vague guidance to affected citizens. And it seems little coincidence that our void-for-vagueness cases became much more common soon after the Court began relaxing its approach to legislative delegations. Before 1940, the Court decided only a handful of vagueness challenges to federal statutes. Since then, the phrase "void for vagueness" has appeared in our cases well over 100 times.
Nor have we abandoned enforcing other sides of the separation-of-powers triangle between the legislative, executive, and judiciary. We have not hesitated to prevent Congress from "confer[ring] the Government's 'judicial Power' on entities outside Article III." We've forbidden the executive from encroaching on legislative functions by wielding a line-item veto. We've prevented Congress from delegating its collective legislative power to a single House. And we've policed legislative efforts to control executive branch officials. These cases show that, when the separation of powers is at stake, we don't just throw up our hands. In all these areas, we recognize that abdication is "not part of the constitutional design." And abdication here would be no more appropriate. To leave this aspect of the constitutional structure alone undefended would serve only to accelerate the flight of power from the legislative to the executive branch, turning the latter into a vortex of authority that was constitutionally reserved for the people's representatives in order to protect their liberties.
III
A
Returning to SORNA with this understanding of our charge in hand, problems quickly emerge. Start with this one: It's hard to see how SORNA leaves the Attorney General with only details to fill up. Of course, what qualifies as a detail can sometimes be difficult to discern and, as we've seen, this Court has upheld statutes that allow federal agencies to resolve even highly consequential details so long as Congress prescribes the rule governing private conduct. But it's hard to see how the statute before us could be described as leaving the Attorney General with only details to dispatch. As the government itself admitted in Reynolds , SORNA leaves the Attorney General free to impose on 500,000 pre-Act offenders all of the statute's requirements, some of them, or none of them. The Attorney General may choose which pre-Act offenders to subject to the Act. And he is free to change his mind at any point or over the course of different political administrations. In the end, there isn't a single policy decision concerning pre-Act offenders on which Congress even tried to speak, and not a single other case where we have upheld executive authority over matters like these on the ground they constitute mere "details." This much appears to have been deliberate, too. Because members of Congress could not reach consensus on the treatment of pre-Act offenders, it seems this was one of those situations where they found it expedient to hand off the job to the executive and direct there the blame for any later problems that might emerge.
Nor can SORNA be described as an example of conditional legislation subject to executive fact-finding. To be sure, Congress could have easily written this law in that way. It might have required all pre-Act offenders to register, but then given the Attorney General the authority to make case-by-case exceptions for offenders who do not present an " 'imminent hazard to the public safety' " comparable to that posed by newly released post-Act offenders. It could have set criteria to inform that determination, too, asking the executive to investigate, say, whether an offender's risk of recidivism correlates with the time since his last offense, or whether multiple lesser offenses indicate higher or lower risks than a single greater offense.
But SORNA did none of this. Instead, it gave the Attorney General unfettered discretion to decide which requirements to impose on which pre-Act offenders. The Attorney General's own edicts acknowledge the considerable policy-making powers he enjoys, describing his rules governing pre-Act offenders as " 'of fundamental importance to the initial operation of SORNA, and to its practical scope ... since [they] determin[e] the applicability of SORNA's requirements to virtually the entire existing sex offender population.' " These edicts tout, too, the Attorney General's "discretion to apply SORNA's requirements to sex offenders with pre-SORNA convictions if he determines (as he has) that the public benefits of doing so outweigh any adverse effects." Far from deciding the factual predicates to a rule set forth by statute, the Attorney General himself acknowledges that the law entitles him to make his own policy decisions.
Finally, SORNA does not involve an area of overlapping authority with the executive.
Congress may assign the President broad authority regarding the conduct of foreign affairs or other matters where he enjoys his own inherent Article II powers. But SORNA stands far afield from any of that. It gives the Attorney General the authority to "prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights" of citizens are determined, a quintessentially legislative power.
Our precedents confirm these conclusions. If allowing the President to draft a "cod[e] of fair competition" for slaughterhouses was "delegation running riot," then it's hard to see how giving the nation's chief prosecutor the power to write a criminal code rife with his own policy choices might be permissible. And if Congress may not give the President the discretion to ban or allow the interstate transportation of petroleum, then it's hard to see how Congress may give the Attorney General the discretion to apply or not apply any or all of SORNA's requirements to pre-Act offenders, and then change his mind at any time. If the separation of powers means anything, it must mean that Congress cannot give the executive branch a blank check to write a code of conduct governing private conduct for a half-million people.
The statute here also sounds all the alarms the founders left for us. Because Congress could not achieve the consensus necessary to resolve the hard problems associated with SORNA's application to pre-Act offenders, it passed the potato to the Attorney General. And freed from the need to assemble a broad supermajority for his views, the Attorney General did not hesitate to apply the statute retroactively to a politically unpopular minority. Nor could the Attorney General afford the issue the kind of deliberative care the framers designed a representative legislature to ensure. Perhaps that's part of the reason why the executive branch found itself rapidly adopting different positions across different administrations. And because SORNA vested lawmaking power in one person rather than many, it should be no surprise that, rather than few and stable, the edicts have proved frequent and shifting, with fair notice sacrificed in the process. Then, too, there is the question of accountability. In passing this statute, Congress was able to claim credit for "comprehensively" addressing the problem of the entire existing population of sex offenders (who can object to that?), while in fact leaving the Attorney General to sort it out.
It would be easy enough to let this case go. After all, sex offenders are one of the most disfavored groups in our society. But the rule that prevents Congress from giving the executive carte blanche to write laws for sex offenders is the same rule that protects everyone else. Nor is it hard to imagine how the power at issue in this case-the power of a prosecutor to require a group to register with the government on pain of weighty criminal penalties-could be abused in other settings. To allow the nation's chief law enforcement officer to write the criminal laws he is charged with enforcing-to " 'unit[e]' " the " 'legislative and executive powers ... in the same person' "-would be to mark the end of any meaningful enforcement of our separation of powers and invite the tyranny of the majority that follows when lawmaking and law enforcement responsibilities are united in the same hands.
Nor would enforcing the Constitution's demands spell doom for what some call the "administrative state." The separation of powers does not prohibit any particular policy outcome, let alone dictate any conclusion about the proper size and scope of government. Instead, it is a procedural guarantee that requires Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing our nation's course on policy questions like those implicated by SORNA. What is more, Congress is hardly bereft of options to accomplish all it might wish to achieve. It may always authorize executive branch officials to fill in even a large number of details, to find facts that trigger the generally applicable rule of conduct specified in a statute, or to exercise non-legislative powers. Congress can also commission agencies or other experts to study and recommend legislative language. Respecting the separation of powers forecloses no substantive outcomes. It only requires us to respect along the way one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual liberty found in our Constitution.
B
What do the government and the plurality have to say about the constitutional concerns SORNA poses? Most everyone, the plurality included, concedes that if SORNA allows the Attorney General as much authority as we have outlined, it would present "a nondelegation question." So the only remaining available tactic is to try to make this big case "small-bore" by recasting the statute in a way that might satisfy any plausible separation-of-powers test. So, yes, just a few years ago in Reynolds the government represented to this Court that SORNA granted the Attorney General nearly boundless discretion with respect to pre-Act offenders. But now , faced with a constitutional challenge, the government speaks out of the other side of its mouth and invites us to reimagine SORNA as compelling the Attorney General to register pre-Act offenders "to the maximum extent feasible." And, as thus reinvented, the government insists, the statute supplies a clear statement of legislative policy, with only details for the Attorney General to clean up.
But even this new dream of a statute wouldn't be free from doubt. A statute directing an agency to regulate private conduct to the extent "feasible" can have many possible meanings: It might refer to "technological" feasibility, "economic" feasibility, "administrative" feasibility, or even "political" feasibility. Such an "evasive standard" could threaten the separation of powers if it effectively allowed the agency to make the "important policy choices" that belong to Congress while frustrating "meaningful judicial review." And that seems exactly the case here, where the Attorney General is left free to make all the important policy decisions and it is difficult to see what standard a court might later use to judge whether he exceeded the bounds of the authority given to him.
But don't worry over that; return to the real world. The bigger problem is that the feasibility standard is a figment of the government's (very recent) imagination.
The only provision addressing pre-Act offenders, § 20913(d), says nothing about feasibility. And the omission can hardly be excused as some oversight: No one doubts that Congress knows exactly how to write a feasibility standard into law when it wishes. Unsurprisingly, too, the existence of some imaginary statutory feasibility standard seemed to have escaped notice at the Department of Justice during the Attorney General's many rulemakings; in those proceedings, as we have seen, the Attorney General has repeatedly admitted that the statute affords him the authority to "balance" the burdens on sex offenders with "public safety interests" as and how he sees fit.
Unable to muster a feasibility standard from the only statutory provision addressing pre-Act offenders, the plurality invites us to hunt in other and more unlikely corners. It points first to SORNA's "[d]eclaration of purpose," which announces that Congress, "[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children ... establishes a comprehensive national system for the registration of those offenders." But nowhere is feasibility mentioned here either. In fact, this provision doesn't purport to guide the Attorney General's discretion at all. Instead, it simply declares what Congress believed the rest of the statute's enacted provisions had already "establishe[d]," without the need for any action by the Attorney General. And by now surely we must all agree that broad and sweeping statements like these about "a statute's 'basic purpose' are ... inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration." While those adopting SORNA might have declared that they hoped and wished for a "comprehensive national system," the fact remains that the law they actually adopted for pre-Act offenders leaves everything to the Attorney General. Hopes and dreams are not laws.
Besides, even if we were to pretend that § 20901 amounted to a directive telling the Attorney General to establish a "comprehensive national system" for pre-Act offenders, the plurality reads too much into the word "comprehensive." Comprehensive coverage does not mean coverage to the maximum extent feasible. "Comprehensive" means "having the attribute of comprising or including much; of large content or scope," "[i]nclusive of; embracing," or "[c]ontaining much in small compass; compendious." So, for example, a criminal justice system may be called "comprehensive" even though many crimes go unpursued. And SORNA itself contains all sorts of coverage exceptions for post-Act offenders yet claims to comprehensively address them. In the same way, no reason exists why SORNA might not also claim to address pre-Act offenders "comprehensively" even though the Attorney General is free to exercise his discretion to forgo registration for some, many, or maybe all of them. The statute still "comprehensively" addresses these persons by indicating they must abide whatever rules an Attorney General may choose. In all these ways, SORNA might be said to address sex offenders past, present, and future in a way that "compris[es] or includ[es] much," and that is "of large content or scope," but in a way that nevertheless delegates important policy decisions to the executive branch.
Finding it impossible to conscript the statute's declaration of purpose into doing the work it needs done, the government and plurality next ask us to turn to SORNA's definition of " 'sex offender.' " They emphasize that SORNA defines a "sex offender" as " 'an individual who was convicted of a sex offense' "-and, they note, pre-Act offenders meet this definition. Because pre-Act offenders fall within the definition of "sex offender[s]," the government and plurality continue, it follows that the Attorney General must ensure all of them are registered and subject to SORNA's demands.
That much, however, does not follow. To say that pre-Act sex offenders fall within the definition of "sex offenders" is merely a truism: Yes, of course, these people have already been convicted of sex offenses under state law. But whether these individuals are also subject to federal registration requirements is a different question entirely. And as we have seen, the only part of the statute that speaks to pre-Act sex offenders- § 20913(d) -makes plain that they are not automatically subject to all the Act's terms but are left to their fate at the hands of the Attorney General. Look at it this way: If the statute's definitional section were really enough to command the registration of all sex offenders, the Act would have had no need to proceed to explain, as it does at great length, when post- Act sex offenders must register and when they need not.
If that argument won't work, the plurality points us to § 20913(d)'s second clause, which grants the Attorney General the authority "to prescribe rules for the registration of ... sex offenders ... who are unable to comply" with the Act's initial registration requirements. According to the plurality, this language suggests that Congress expected the Attorney General to register pre-Act offenders to the maximum extent feasible. But, of course, this clause, too, says nothing of the sort. And the authority provided under § 20913(d)'s first clause-which gives the Attorney General the blanket authority "to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter"-is additional to the authority granted under the second clause. So not only does the Attorney General have the authority to prescribe rules for the registration of pre-Act offenders under the second clause, he is free to specify which statutory requirements he does and does not wish to apply under the first clause. Far from suggesting a maximalist approach then, the second clause read in light of the first only serves to underscore the breadth of the Attorney General's discretion.
With so little in statutory text to work with, the government and the plurality "can't resist" highlighting certain statements from the Act's legislative history. But "legislative history is not the law." Still less can committee reports or statements by individual legislators be used "to muddy clear statutory language" like that before us. And even taken on their own terms, these statements do no more than confirm that some members of Congress hoped and wished that the Attorney General would exercise his discretion to register at least some pre-Act offenders. None of these snippets mentions a "feasibility" standard, and none can obscure the absence of such a standard in the law itself.
That leaves the plurality and the government to try to fish its feasibility standard from our decision in Reynolds . But Reynolds would make a difference only if it bound us as a matter of stare decisis to adopt an interpretation inconsistent with the statute's terms. And, of course, it does no such thing. The government and the plurality submit that Reynolds was premised on an understanding that Congress intended the statute to apply to pre-Act offenders to the maximum extent feasible. To support their reading they point to Reynolds ' surmise that Congress "may well have thought [that there could be] practical problems" with applying SORNA to pre-Act offenders and for that reason left their registration obligations to be sorted out by the Attorney General. But speculation about some of Congress's motives in adopting § 20913(d) aside, Reynolds plainly understood the statute itself as investing the Attorney General with sole power to decide whether and when to apply SORNA's requirements to pre-Act offenders.
*
Nothing found here can come as a surprise. In Reynolds , the government told this Court that SORNA supplies no standards regulating the Attorney General's treatment of pre-Act offenders. This Court agreed, and everyone proceeded with eyes open about the potential constitutional consequences; in fact, the dissent expressly warned that adopting such a broad construction of the statute would yield the separation-of-powers challenge we face today. Now, when the statute faces the chopping block, the government asks us to ignore its earlier arguments and reimagine (really, rewrite) the statute in a new and narrower way to avoid its long-predicted fate. No wonder some of us are not inclined to play along.
The only real surprise is that the Court fails to make good on the consequences the government invited, resolving nothing and deferring everything. In a future case with a full panel, I remain hopeful that the Court may yet recognize that, while Congress can enlist considerable assistance from the executive branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may never hand off to the nation's chief prosecutor the power to write his own criminal code. That "is delegation running riot."
Reynolds v. United States , 565 U.S. 432, 434, 132 S.Ct. 975, 181 L.Ed.2d 935 (2012).
34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20915(a).
§ 20913(b).
§ 20913(c).
§ 20913(e).
Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 993, 999-1000 (2010).
Id. , at 1003-1004.
Brief for United States in Reynolds v. United States , O. T. 2011, No. 106549, p. 23.
Id. , at 24.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See, e.g. , 72 Fed. Reg. 8894 (2007) ; 73 Fed. Reg. 38030 (2008) ; 76 Fed. Reg. 1639 (2011).
28 CFR § 72.3 (2007) ; 72 Fed. Reg. 8894.
See 73 Fed. Reg. 38030.
See 76 Fed. Reg. 1639.
Compare 73 Fed. Reg. 38036 (no credit given) with 75 Fed. Reg. 81851 (full credit given).
The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
Fletcher v. Peck , 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) ; see also J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration § 22, p. 13 (1947) (Locke, Second Treatise); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 44 (1765).
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark , 143 U.S. 649, 692, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294 (1892).
Wayman v. Southard , 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43, 6 L.Ed. 253 (1825).
Locke, Second Treatise § 141, at 71.
The Federalist No. 48, at 309-312 (J. Madison).
Id. , No. 62, at 378. See also id ., No. 73, at 441-442 (Hamilton); Locke, Second Treatise § 143.
The Federalist No. 73, at 443.
Id. , No. 51, at 322 (Madison); D. Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility 29 (1993) (Schoenbrod).
The Federalist No. 51, at 322. See also id. , No. 84, at 515 (Hamilton).
Id. , No. 62, at 378-380.
Schoenbrod 99; see also The Federalist No. 50, at 316 (Madison).
Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 340 (2002).
The Federalist No. 47, at 303 (Madison); id. , No. 62, at 378 (same).
Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1463, 1478 (2015). See also B. Iancu, Legislative Delegation: The Erosion of Normative Limits in Modern Constitutionalism 87 (2012).
The Federalist No. 47, at 302 (Madison). Accord, 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, at 142; see also Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern Administrative State, 40 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 147, 153 (2016).
The Federalist No. 78, at 470.
Id. , No. 37, at 228 (Madison).
Wayman , 10 Wheat. at 46.
Id. , at 31, 43.
165 U.S. 526, 532, 17 S.Ct. 444, 41 L.Ed. 813 (1897).
United States v. Grimaud , 220 U.S. 506, 522, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911). See also Buttfield v. Stranahan , 192 U.S. 470, 496, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525 (1904) ; ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co. , 224 U.S. 194, 210, 215, 32 S.Ct. 436, 56 L.Ed. 729 (1912).
Yakus v. United States , 321 U.S. 414, 426, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388, 3 L.Ed. 378 (1813) (emphasis added).
Miller v. Mayor of New York , 109 U.S. 385, 393, 3 S.Ct. 228, 27 L.Ed. 971 (1883).
See Loving v. United States , 517 U.S. 748, 768, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) ; id. , at 776, 116 S.Ct. 1737 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. , 299 U.S. 304, 320, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) ; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance? 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1260 (1985).
10 Wheat. at 43.
295 U.S. 495, 521-522, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935).
See State Oil Co. v. Khan , 522 U.S. 3, 21, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) ; National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States , 435 U.S. 679, 688, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 55 L.Ed.2d 637 (1978) ; Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355 (1954).
See A. Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression 214-225 (2007).
Schechter Poultry , 295 U.S. at 553, 55 S.Ct. 837 (concurring opinion).
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan , 293 U.S. 388, 415, 418, 430, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935).
Id. , at 426, 55 S.Ct. 241.
Id. , at 426, 55 S.Ct. 241 (quoting Wayman , 10 Wheat. at 43 ); 293 U.S. at 429, 55 S.Ct. 241.
Id. , at 430, 55 S.Ct. 241.
M. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War: The Court-Packing Crisis of 1937, p. 424 (2002).
J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 133 (1980).
276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928).
Id. , at 401, 48 S.Ct. 348.
Id. , at 401-402.
But see Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads , 575 U.S. 43, ----, ----, and n. 4, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1247, 1249, and n. 4, 191 L.Ed.2d 153 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).
See, e.g. , Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 442 U.S. 330, 341, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979).
See, e.g. , Lichter v. United States , 334 U.S. 742, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948) (upholding a statute authorizing the executive to define " 'excessive profits' " earned by military contractors on the basis that the statute contained an " 'intelligible principle' ").
Association of American Railroads , 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1249 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). See also n. 62, infra (collecting sources).
Lawson, 88 Va. L. Rev., at 329. See also Mistretta v. United States , 488 U.S. 361, 415-417, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ely, supra , at 132 ("[B]y refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic"); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale L. J. 575, 583 (1972) ("[T]he delegation doctrine retains an important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by administrative agencies"); Michigan Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne , 525 F.3d 23, 34 (CADC 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("[The majority] conjures standards and limits from thin air to construct a supposed intelligible principle") (collecting cases); Schoenbrod, 83 Mich. L. Rev., at 1231 ("[T]he [intelligible principle] test has become so ephemeral and elastic as to lose its meaning"); Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 443, 446 (1977) ("[T]he requirement of defined standards has ... become all but a vestigial euphemism"); P. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 378 (2014) ("[T]he notion of an 'intelligible principle' sets a ludicrously low standard for what Congress must supply"); M. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 138-139 (1995); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 Law & Contemp. Prob., pt. 2, pp. 46, 50-51 (Summer 1976); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 1127-1128, and n. 33 (1977).
"Washington, D. C., is filled with lobbyists for every special interest that is trying to make a fast buck out of some piece of the public domain.... In the thirties and forties I had viewed the creation of an agency as the solution of a problem. I learned that agencies soon became spokesmen for the status quo, that few had the guts to carry through the reforms assigned to them. I also realized that Congress defaulted when it left it up to an agency to do what the 'public interest' indicated should be done. 'Public interest' is too vague a standard to be left to free-wheeling administrators. They should be more closely confined to specific ends or goals." W. Douglas, Go East, Young Man 216-217 (1974).
Loving , 517 U.S. at 771-774, 116 S.Ct. 1737.
See, e.g. , Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co. , 490 U.S. 212, 215, 219-220, 109 S.Ct. 1726, 104 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989) (statute directing Secretary of Transportation to establish pipeline safety user fees " 'sufficient to meet the costs of [specified] activities' " but not " 'exceed[ing] 105 percent of the aggregate of appropriations made for such fiscal year for activities to be funded by such fees' ").
500 U.S. 160, 166, 111 S.Ct. 1752, 114 L.Ed.2d 219 (1991).
Ibid.
See, e.g. , McDonald v. Chicago , 561 U.S. 742, 758, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause instead of the Privileges or Immunities Clause).
United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001).
King v. Burwell , 576 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2480, 2488-2489, 192 L.Ed.2d 483 (2015).
Ibid.
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573 U.S. 302, 324, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014).
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S. 120, 159-160, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000).
Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ; see Kolender v. Lawson , 461 U.S. 352, 358, n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) ; Sessions v. Dimaya , 584 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1226-1228, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Id ., at ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct., at 1212-1213 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).
Yakus , 321 U.S. at 426, 64 S.Ct. 660.
Stern v. Marshall , 564 U.S. 462, 484, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) ; Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. , 514 U.S. 211, 225-226, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995).
Clinton v. City of New York , 524 U.S. 417, 449, 118 S.Ct. 2091, 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998).
INS v. Chadha , 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983).
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561 U.S. 477, 496-497, 130 S.Ct. 3138, 177 L.Ed.2d 706 (2010) ; Lucia v. SEC , 585 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2044, 201 L.Ed.2d 464 (2018).
Clinton , 524 U.S. at 452, 118 S.Ct. 2091 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Cf. Touby , 500 U.S. at 166, 111 S.Ct. 1752.
75 Fed. Reg. 81850 (quoting 72 Fed. Reg. 8896 ).
75 Fed. Reg. 81850.
The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Hamilton); see also Part II-A, supra .
Schechter Poultry , 295 U.S. at 552-553, 55 S.Ct. 837 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
Panama Refining , 293 U.S. at 430, 55 S.Ct. 241.
The Federalist No. 47, at 302.
Ante , at 2123 - 2124.
Ante, at 2129 - 2130.
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute , 448 U.S. 607, 676, 685-686, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. §§ 1310(b)(2)(C), 1383b(e)(2)(B) ; 20 U.S.C. § 3509 ; 49 U.S.C. § 24201(a)(1).
75 Fed. Reg. 81851-81852.
34 U.S.C. § 20901. See also ante , at 2126 - 2127.
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates , 508 U.S. 248, 261, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (emphasis deleted).
3 Oxford English Dictionary 632 (2d ed. 1989).
See, e.g. , 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911(7)(A)-(B), (8), 20915(a), (b)(1).
Ante , at 2127 - 2128.
Ibid.
Ante , at 2128.
See ante , at 2127 - 2128.
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis , 584 U.S. ----, ---- (2018) (slip op., at 23).
Milner v. Department of Navy , 562 U.S. 562, 572, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011).
Reynolds , 565 U.S. at 440-441, 132 S.Ct. 975.
Id. , at 445, 132 S.Ct. 975 (holding that "the Act's registration requirements do not apply to pre-Act offenders until the Attorney General so specifies"); id. , at 439, 132 S.Ct. 975 (rejecting argument that any SORNA requirements apply to pre-Act offenders "before the Attorney General validly specifies" they do); id. , at 440-441, 132 S.Ct. 975 (observing that the Attorney General might conclude that "different federal registration treatment of different categories of pre-Act offenders" is "warranted").
See id. , at 450, 132 S.Ct. 975 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Schechter Poultry , 295 U.S. at 553, 55 S.Ct. 837 (Cardozo, J., concurring). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
10
] | sc_certreason |
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF THIBODAUX.
No. 398.
Argued April 2, 1959.
Decided June 8, 1959.
J. Raburn Monroe argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were /. Blanc Monroe, Monte M. Lemann, Malcolm L. Monroe and Andrew P. Carter.
Louis Fenner Claiborne argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Remy Chiasson.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed a petition for expropriation in one of the Louisiana District Courts, asserting a taking of the land, buildings, and equipment of petitioner Power and Light Company. Petitioner, a Florida corporation, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District.of Louisiana on the basis of diversity of citizenship. After a .pre-trial conference in which various aspects of the case were discussed, the district judge, on his own motion, ordered that “Further proceedings herein, therefore, will be stayed until the Supreme Court of Louisiana has been afforded an opportunity to interpret Act 111 of 1900,” the authority on which the city's expropriation order was based. 153 F. Supp. 515, 517-518. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the procedure adopted by the district judge was not available in an expropriation proceeding, and that in any event no exceptional circumstances were present to justify the procedure even if available. 255 F. 2d 774. We granted certiorari, 358 U. S. 893, because of the importance of the question in the judicial enforcement of the power of eminent domain under diversity jurisdiction.
In connection with the first decision in which a closely divided Court considered and upheld jurisdiction over an eminent domain proceeding removed to the federal courts on the basis of diversity of citizenship, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 257, Mr. Justice Holmes made the following observation:
“The fundamental fact is that eminent domain is a prerogative of the State, which on the one hand may be exercised in any way that the State thinks fit, and on the other may not be exercised except by an authority which the State confers.”
While this was said in the dissenting opinion, the distinction between expropriation proceedings and ordinary diversity cases, though found insufficient to restrict diversity jurisdiction, remains a relevant and important consideration in the appropriate judicial administration of such actions in the federal courts.
We have increasingly recognized the wisdom of slaying actións in the federal courts pending determination by a state court of decisive issues of state law. Thus in Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 499, it was said:
“Had we or they [the lower court judges] no choice in the matter but to decide what is the law of the state, we should hésitatVlong before rejecting their forecast of Texas law. But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination.”
On the other hand, we have held that the mere difficulty of state law does not justify a federal court’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favor of state court action. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 236. But where the issue touched upon the relationship of City to State, Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U. S. 168, or involved the scope of a previously uninterpreted state statute which, if applicable, was of questionable constitutionality, Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 220, 229, we have required District Courts, and not merely sanctioned an exercise of their discretionary power, to stay their proceedings pending the submission of the state law question to state determination.
These prior cases have been cases in equity, but they did not apply a technical rule of equity procedure. They reflect a deeper policy derived from our federalism. We have drawn upon the judicial discretion of the chancellor to decline jurisdiction over a part or all of a case brought before him. See Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., supra. Although an eminent domain proceeding is deemqd for certain purposes of legal classification a “suit at common, law,” Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 375-376, it is of a special and peculiar nature. Mr. Justice Holmes set forth one differentiating characteristic of eminent domain: it is intimately involved with sovereign prerogative. And when, as here, a city’s power to condemn is challenged, a further aspect of sovereignty is introduced. A determination of the nature and extent of delegation of the power of eminent domain concerns the apportionment of governmental powers between City and State. The issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation interpreted in local settings. The considerations that prevailed in conventional equity suits for avoiding the hazards of serious disruption by federal courts of state government or needless friction between state and federal authorities are similarly appropriate in a state eminent domain proceeding brought in, or removed to, a federal court.
The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when his familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a.disputed state statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively — the courts of the State under whose statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised — rather than himself make a .dubious and tentative forecast. This course does not constitute abnegation of judicial duty. On the contrary, it is a wise and productive discharge of it. There is only postponement of decision for its best fruition. Eventually the District Court will award compensation ,if the taking is sustained. If for some reason a declaratory judgment is not promptly sought from the state courts and obtained within a reasonable time, the District Court, having retained complete control of the litigation, will doubtless assert it to decide also the question of the meaning of the state statute. The justification for this power, to be exercised within the indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective competence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State.
It would imply an unworthy conception of the federal judiciary to give weight to the suggestion that acknowledgment of this power will tempt some otiose or timid judge to shuffle off responsibility. “Such apprehension implies a lack of discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U. S. 180, 185. Procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a .federal judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character in whom may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of. judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal.
In light of these considerations, the immediate situation quickly falls into place. In providing on his own motion for a stay in this case, an experienced district judge was responding in a sensible way to a quandary about the power of the City of Thibodaux into which he was placed by an opinion of the Attorney General of Louisiana in which it was concluded that in a strikingly similar case a Louisiana city did not have the power here claimed by the City. A Louisiana statute apparently seems to grant such a power. But that statute has never been interpreted, in respect to a situation like that before the judge, by the Louisiana courts and it would not be the first time that the authoritative tribunal has found in a statute less than meets the outsider’s eye. Informed local courts may find meaning not discernible to the outsider. The consequence of allowing this to come to pass would be that this case would be the only case in which the Louisiana statute is construed as we would, construe it, whereas the rights of all''other litigants would be thereafter governed -by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana quite different from ours.
Caught between the language of an old but uninterpreted statute and the pronouncement of the Attorney General of Louisiana, the district judge determined to solve his conscientious perplexity by directing utilization of the legal resources of Louisiana for a prompt ascertainment of meaning through the only tribunal whose interpretation could be controlling — the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The District Court was thus exercising a fair and well-considered judicial discretion in staying proceedings pending the institution of a declaratory judgment action and subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the stay order of the district Court reinstated. We assume that both,parties will cooperate in taking prompt and effective steps to secure a declaratory judgment under the Louisiana Declaratory Judgment Act, La. Rev. Stat., 1950, Tit. 13, §-§ 4231-4246, and a review of that judgment by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. By retaining the case the District Court, of course, reserves power to take such steps as may be necessary for the just disposition of the litigation should anything prevent a prompt state court determination.
Reversed.
In the petition for certiorari there was also raised the question of the appealability of the District Court’s order. In our grant of the writ we eliminated this question by limiting the scope of review. 358 U. S. 893.
The issue in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, is, of course, decisively different from the issue now before 'the Court. Here the issue is whether an experienced district judge, especially conversant with Louisiana law, who, when troubled with the construction which Louisiana courts may give to a Louisiana statute, himself initiates the taking of appropriate measures for securing construction of this doubtful and unsettled statute, (and not at all in response to any alleged attempt by petitioner to delay a decision by that judge), should be jurisdictionally disabled from seeking the controlling light of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The issue in Winter Haven was not that. It was whether jurisdiction must be surrendered to the state court. At the very outset of his opinion Mr. Chief Justice Stone stated this issue:
“The question is whether the Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal from the judgment of the District Court, rightly declined to exercise its jurisdiction on the ground that decision of the case on the merits turned on questions of Florida constitutional and statutory law which the decisions of the Florida courts had left in a state of uncertainty.” 320 U. S., at 229.
In Winter Haven the Court of Appeals directed the action to be dismissed. In this case the Court of Appeals .denied a conscientious exercise by the federal district judge of his discretionary power merely to stay disposition of a retained case until he could get controlling light from the state court. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
2
] | sc_respondent |
BROWN, SECRETARY OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. CHOTE
No. 71-1583.
Argued February 22, 1973
Decided May 7, 1973
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Henry O. Ullerich, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Iver E. Skjeie, Assistant Attorney General.
Philip Elman, by appointment of the Court, 409 U. S. 1035, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.
Melvin L. Wulf, Sanford, J. Rosen, Marguerite Buckley, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, and Laurence R. Sperber filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 on direct appeal from a three-judge district court in the Northern District of California. The court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 when appellee called into question the constitutionality of those provisions of the California Elections Code which require candidates in a primary election to pay a filing fee prior to having their names listed on the primary ballot. Cal. Elections Code §§ 6552 and 6553 (Supp. 1973). Under these provisions, candidates for the Federal House of Representatives must pay $425 (1% of the annual salary of the office); candidates for the Federal Senate must pay $850 (2% of the salary of the office). Those wishing to run for statewide offices must pay similar fees ranging in amount from $192 for State Assemblyman (1% of the annual salary) to $982 for Governor (2% of the annual salary). Other portions of the California Elections Code, not challenged in the present suit, require prospective candidates to file with appropriate state officials a declaration of candidacy and sponsor certificates. Cal. Elections Code §§ 6490-6491, 6494-6495 (1961 and Supp. 1973).
Appellee commenced this class action on March 3,1972. He moved, and was granted permission by, a single district judge, to proceed in forma pauperis and as his own attorney. In his complaint, appellee asserted that he wished to become a candidate for the Federal House of Representatives from the 17th District of California, and had taken the following steps to place his name in nomination in the June 6, 1972, California primary election. On February 17, 1972, appellee called the Registrar of Voters of Santa Clara County, an official designated by state law to dispense those forms necessary to place a name in nomination. Appellee was purportedly told.by the Registrar or a member of his office that he was required to pay $425 in advance in order to secure blank copies of the necessary papers. According to appellee, the Registrar’s Office also advised him that the papers would be delivered in exchange for a worthless check.
Appellee proceeded immediately to the Registrar’s Office where he presented a personal check for $425 and requested copies of the necessary forms. Across the face of the check, appellee had typed “Written under protest for filing fee.” The Registrar issued the requisite papers to appellee and informed him that his check would be forwarded to the California Secretary of State when his completed papers were submitted. Subsequently, a Deputy Secretary of State informed appellee that his name would not be placed on the ballot if his check was not honored.
Citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), appellee asserted that California’s filing-fee system was unconstitutional since it barred indigents, such as himself, from seeking elective office and from voting for the candidate of his choice. In addition to requesting declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, appellee moved the District Court to issue a preliminary injunction so as to allow him to participate as a candidate in the upcoming primary. Under state law, the final date on which appellee could submit nominating papers for that primary was March 10, 1972, one week away.
Because of the impending filing deadline, the District Court proceeded quickly to set the case for argument. On March 3, 1972, the same date on which the suit was filed, the single District Judge to whom the case was assigned entered an order requiring appellant to show cause why interlocutory relief should not be granted. The State was given five days in which to respond. It was not until March 7 that the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit was notified of the application for a three-judge court. On March 8, he designated the judges who were to compose the panel. On the same day, the court convened and heard oral argument. Because of the speed with which the case had developed, neither the court nor appellee had an opportunity prior to the hearing to consider appellant’s return to the order to show cause, the only paper which the State had been able to prepare.
On March 9, 1972, one day after oral argument and one day before the deadline for filing nomination papers, the District Court granted appellee’s motion for a preliminary injunction, stating:
“Since no . . . showing has been made by the State, concerning either the necessity, the purpose or the reasonableness of the filing fee statutes in question, we conclude that within the rationale and holding of Bullock [v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972)], plaintiff may prevail on the merits and that, absent a preliminary injunction, his constitutional right may be irreparably lost.” 342 F. Supp. 1353, 1355— 1356. (Emphasis added.)
Under the terms of the preliminary injunction, the State was required to allow appellee and others similarly situated to place their names on the ballot without paying the required fee, so long as they were otherwise eligible for the applicable state or federal office and had deposited with an appropriate state official an affidavit attesting to their indigency.
The State appealed directly to this Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Its Jurisdictional Statement posed two questions:
“Under the decision of this Court in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134 (1972), when a state statute requiring a candidate’s filing fee of one per cent (1%) of the first year’s salary for the office is challenged on Equal Protection grounds does the ‘rational basis’ or ‘close scrutiny’ standard of judicial review apply?
“Do California Elections Code sections 6552 and 6553 deny voters or indigent prospective candidates equal protection of the laws?”
Thus, the State of California, for reasons not clear to us in light of the limited record, asked the Court to address itself to the ultimate merits of appellee’s constitutional claim, a question which the District Court did not reach. In the present posture of the case, there is no occasion to consider any issues beyond those addressed by the District Court.
The issuance of the requested preliminary injunction was the only action taken by the District Court. In determining whether such relief was required, that court properly addressed itself to two relevant factors: first, the appellee’s possibilities of success on the merits; and second, the possibility that irreparable injury would have resulted, absent interlocutory relief. As the District Court opinion clearly evidences, issuance of the injunction reflected the balance which that court reached in weighing these factors and was not in any sense intended as a final decision as to the constitutionality of the challenged statute. In the exigent circumstances, the grant of extraordinary interim relief was a permissible choice; but on the very limited record before the District Court a decision on the merits would not have been appropriate.
In reviewing such interlocutory relief, this Court may only consider whether issuance of the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion. Alabama v. United States, 279 U. S. 229 (1929); United States v. Corrick, 298 U. S. 435 (1936); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia, 278 U. S. 322 (1929); National Fire Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Thompson, 281 U. S. 331 (1930). In light of the arguments presented by appellee and the fact that appellee’s opportunity to be a candidate would have been foreclosed, absent some relief, we cannot conclude that the court’s action was an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the action taken by the District Court in granting interim relief.
In doing so, we intimate no view as to the ultimate merits of appellee’s contentions. The record in this case clearly reflects the limited time which the parties had to assemble evidence and prepare their arguments. While the District Court’s swift action is understandable in view of the deadline which it faced, the resulting record was simply insufficient to allow that court to consider fully the grave, far-reaching constitutional questions presented.
The specific deadline which led the District Court to grant equitable relief has now passed. Nothing precludes appellee from seeking a trial on the merits, if he chooses to proceed. The case is therefore remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed and remanded.
The State denies that such advice was ever communicated to appellee. In an affidavit submitted to the District Court, the Registrar of Voters of Santa Clara County stated that it was the policy of his office not to distribute the required forms to anyone who represented to the Registrar that the check submitted was worthless. The Registrar further stated that, to his knowledge, neither he nor anyone in his office had ever informed appellee that forms would be issued upon presentation of a worthless check.
When the case was argued before the District Court, appellee claimed that he had also told the Registrar or a member of his office that the account on which the cheek was drawn did not contain sufficient funds to cover it. However, this fact is not alleged in the complaint.
Appellant submitted to the District Court an affidavit from the Deputy Secretary of State to whom appellee had spoken, disputing appellee’s claim that he had been informed that his name would not be placed on the ballot if his cheek was not honored.
Although the June 6 primary election has passed, the question raised is one “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Consequently, the case is not moot. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969).
We have granted certiorari in No. 71-6852, Lubin v. Allison, post, p. 964, in order to consider conflicts in holdings regarding the constitutionality of state filing-fee statutes. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
SANCHEZ-LLAMAS v. OREGON
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON
No. 04-10566.
Argued March 29, 2006
Decided June 28, 2006
Peter Gartlan argued the cause for petitioner in No. 04-10566. With him on the briefs were Donald Francis Donovan, Carl Micarelli, and Catherine M. Amirfar. Mark T. Standi argued the cause for petitioner in No. 05-51. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey A. Lamken and John C. Kiyonaga.
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for respondent in No. 04-10566. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Peter Shepherd, Deputy Attorney General, and Erik Wasmann and Benjamin R. Hartman, Assistant Attorneys General. William E. Thro, State Solicitor General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent in No. 05-51. With him on the brief were Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald N. Regnery and Courtney M. Malveaux, Associate State Solicitors General, William C. Mims, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Marla Graff Decker, Deputy Attorney General.
Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents in both cases. On the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, and Robert J. Erickson.
Together with No. 05-51, Bustillo v. Johnson, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both eases were filed for the Republic of Honduras et al. by Paul R. Q. Wolfson and Asim Bhansali; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Matthew D. Roberts; for Bar Associations et al. by Kevin R. Sullivan, William J. Aceves, and Jenny S. Martinez; and for L. Bruce Laingen et al. by Daniel C. Malone.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 04-10566 were filed for the Government of the United Mexican States by Sandra L. Babcock; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Thomas H. Speedy Rice.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 05-51 were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco and Jeffrey L. Bleich; and for the Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project et al. by Seth A. Tucker.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in both eases were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by R. Ted Cruz, Solicitor General of Texas, Greg Abbott, Attorney General, Barry R. McBee, First Assistant Attorney General, Don Clemmer, Deputy Attorney General, and Kristofer S. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Carl C. Danberg of Delaware, Charles J. Crist, Jr., of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Paul G. Summers of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Rob McKenna of Washington, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and for Professors of International Law et al. by Paul B. Stephan, Samuel Estreicher, and Eugene Theroux.
Kent S. Scheidegger filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Foundation as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 04-10566.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the European Union et al. by S. Adele Shank and John B. Quigley; for the Alliance Defense Fund by William Wagner and Benjamin W. Bull; for Former United States Diplomats by Harold Hongju Koh; for the International Court of Justice Experts by Lori Fisler Damrosch and Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.; and for Law Professors by John F. Stanton and Helen K. Michael.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 77, 100-101, T. I. A. S. No. 6820, addresses communication between an individual and his consular officers when the individual is detained by authorities in a foreign country. These consolidated cases concern the availability of judicial relief for violations of Article 36. We are confronted with three questions. First, does Article 36 create rights that defendants may invoke against the detaining authorities in a criminal trial or in a postconviction proceeding? Second, does a violation of Article 36 require suppression of a defendant’s statements to police? Third, may a State, in a postconviction proceeding, treat a defendant’s Article 36 claim as defaulted because he failed to raise the claim at trial? We conclude, even assuming the Convention creates judicially enforceable rights, that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36, and that a State may apply its regular rules of procedural default to Article 36 claims. We therefore affirm the decisions below.
I
A
The Vienna Convention was drafted in 1963 with the purpose, evident in its preamble, of “contributing] to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems.” 21 U. S. T., at 79. The Convention consists of 79 articles regulating various aspects of consular activities. At present, 170 countries are party to the Convention. The United States, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the Convention in 1969. Id., at 77.
Article 36 of the Convention concerns consular officers’ access to their nationals detained by authorities in a foreign country. The article provides that “if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.” Art. 36(l)(b), id., at 101. In other words, when a national of one country is detained by authorities in another, the authorities must notify the consular officers of the detainee’s home country if the detainee so requests. Article 36(l)(b) further states that “[t]he said authorities shall inform the person concerned [L e., the detainee] without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.” Ibid. The Convention also provides guidance regarding how these requirements, and the other requirements of Article 36, are to be implemented:
“The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” Art. 36(2), ibid.
Along with the Vienna Convention, the United States ratified the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol or Protocol), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U. S. T. 325, T. I. A. S. No. 6820. The Optional Protocol provides that “[disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice [(ICJ)],” and allows parties to the Protocol to bring such disputes before the ICJ. Id., at 326. The United States gave notice of its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol on March 7, 2005. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
B
Petitioner Moisés Sanchez-Llamas is a Mexican national. In December 1999, he was involved in an exchange of gunfire with police in which one officer suffered a gunshot wound in the leg. Police arrested Sanchez-Llamas and gave him warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), in both English and Spanish. At no time, however, did they inform him that he could ask to have the Mexican Consulate notified of his detention.
Shortly after the arrest and Miranda warnings, police interrogated Sanchez-Llamas with the assistance of an interpreter. In the course of the interrogation, Sanchez-Llamas made several incriminating statements regarding the shootout with police. He was charged with attempted aggravated murder, attempted murder, and several other offenses. Before trial, Sanchez-Llamas moved to suppress the statements he made to police. He argued that suppression was warranted because the statements were made involuntarily and because the authorities had failed to comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to trial, and Sanchez-Llamas was convicted and sentenced to 2OV2 years in prison.
He appealed, again arguing that the Vienna Convention violation required suppression of his statements. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 191 Ore. App. 399, 84 P. 3d 1133 (2004). The Oregon Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that Article 36 “does not create rights to consular access or notification that are enforceable by detained individuals in a judicial proceeding.” 338 Ore. 267, 276, 108 P. 3d 573, 578 (2005) (en banc). We granted certiorari. 546 U. S. 1001 (2005).
C
Petitioner Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was with several other men at a restaurant in Springfield, Virginia, on the night of December 10, 1997. That evening, outside the restaurant, James Merry was struck in the head with a baseball bat as he stood smoking a cigarette. He died several days later. Several witnesses at the scene identified Bustillo as the assailant. Police arrested Bustillo the morning after the attack and eventually charged him with murder. Authorities never informed him that he could request to have the Honduran Consulate notified of his detention.
At trial, the defense pursued a theory that another man, known as “Sirena,” was responsible for the attack. Two defense witnesses testified that Bustillo was not the killer. One of the witnesses specifically identified the attacker as Sirena. In addition, a third defense witness stated that she had seen Sirena on a flight to Honduras the day after the victim died. In its closing argument before the jury, the prosecution dismissed the defense theory about Sirena. See App. in No. 05-51, p. 21 (“This whole Sirena thing, I don’t want to dwell on it too much. It’s very convenient that Mr. Sirena apparently isn’t available”). A jury convicted Bustillo of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.
After his conviction became final, Bustillo filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. There, for the first time, he argued that authorities had violated his right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. He claimed that if he had been advised of his right to confer with the Honduran Consulate, he “would have done so without delay.” App. in No. 05-51, at 60. Moreover, the Honduran Consulate executed an affidavit stating that “it would have endeavoured to help Mr. Bustillo in his defense” had it learned of his detention prior to trial. Id., at 74. Bustillo insisted that the consulate could have helped him locate Sirena prior to trial. His habeas petition also argued, as part of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that his attorney should have advised him of his right to notify the Honduran Consulate of his arrest and detention.
The state habeas court dismissed Bustillo’s Vienna Convention claim as “procedurally barred” because he had failed to raise the issue at trial or on appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 05-51, p. 43a. The court also denied Bustillo’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ruling that his belated claim that counsel should have informed him of his Vienna Convention rights was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and also meritless under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). App. in No. 05-51, at 132. In an order refusing Bustillo’s petition for appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia found “no reversible error” in the habeas court’s dismissal of the Vienna Convention claim. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 05-51, at la. We granted certiorari to consider the Vienna Convention issue. 546 U. S. 1001 (2005).
II
We granted certiorari as to three questions presented in these cases: (1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2) whether suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim at trial.
As a predicate to their claims for relief, Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo each argue that Article 36 grants them an individually enforceable right to request that their consular officers be notified of their detention, and an accompanying right to be informed by authorities of the availability of consular notification. Respondents and the United States, as amicus curiae, strongly dispute this contention. They argue that “there is a presumption that a treaty will be enforced through political and diplomatic channels, rather than through the courts.” Brief for United States 11; ibid, (quoting Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 598 (1884) (a treaty “ ‘is primarily a compact between independent nations,’ ” and “ ‘depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it’”)). Because we conclude that Sanchez-Llamas and Bustillo are not in any event entitled to relief on their claims, we find it unnecessary to resolve the question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals enforceable rights. Therefore, for purposes of addressing petitioners’ claims, we assume, without deciding, that Article 36 does grant Bustillo and Sanchez-Llamas such rights.
A
Sanchez-Llamas argues that the trial court was required to suppress his statements to police because authorities never told him of his rights under Article 36. He refrains, however, from arguing that the Vienna Convention itself mandates suppression. We think this a wise concession. The Convention does not prescribe specific remedies for violations of Article 36. Rather, it expressly leaves the implementation of Article 36 to domestic law: Rights under Article 36 are to “be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.” Art. 36(2), 21 U. S. T., at 101. As far as the text of the Convention is concerned, the question of the availability of the exclusionary rule for Article 36 violations is a matter of domestic law.
It would be startling if the Convention were read to require suppression. The exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely American legal creation. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (the exclusionary rule “is unique to American jurisprudence”). More than 40 years after the drafting of the Convention, the automatic exclusionary rule applied in our courts is still “universally rejected” by other countries. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 375, 399-400 (2001); see also Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U. S. 217, 226 (1996) (postratification understanding “traditionally considered” as an aid to treaty interpretation). It is implausible that other signatories to the Convention thought it to require a remedy that nearly all refuse to recognize as a matter of domestic law. There is no reason to suppose that Sanchez-Llamas would be afforded the relief he seeks here in any of the other 169 countries party to the Vienna Convention.
For good reason then, Sanchez-Llamas argues only that suppression is required because it is the appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation under United States law, and urges us to require suppression for Article 36 violations as a matter of our “authority to develop remedies for the enforcement of federal law in state-court criminal proceedings.” Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 04-10566, p. 11.
For their part, the State of Oregon and the United States, as amicus curiae, contend that we lack any such authority over state-court proceedings. They argue that our cases suppressing evidence obtained in violation of federal statutes are grounded in our supervisory authority over the federal courts—an authority that does not extend to state-court proceedings. Brief for Respondent in No. 04-10566, pp. 42-43; Brief for United States 32-34; see McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 341 (1943) (suppressing evidence for violation of federal statute requiring persons arrested without a warrant to be promptly presented to a judicial officer); Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957) (suppressing evidence for violation of similar requirement of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a)); Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 (1958) (suppressing evidence obtained incident to an arrest that violated 18 U. S. C. § 3109). Unless required to do so by the Convention itself, they argue, we cannot direct Oregon courts to exclude Sanchez-Llamas’ statements from his criminal trial.
To the extent Sanchez-Llamas argues that we should invoke our supervisory authority, the law is clear: “It is beyond dispute that we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 438 (2000); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 221 (1982) (“Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension”). The cases on which Sanchez-Llamas principally relies are inapplicable in light of the limited reach of our supervisory powers. Mallory and McNabb plainly rest on our supervisory authority. Mallory, supra, at 453; McNabb, supra, at 340. And while Miller is not clear about its authority for requiring suppression, we have understood it to have a similar basis. See Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 31 (1963).
We also agree with the State of Oregon and the United States that our authority to create a judicial remedy applicable in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself. Under the Constitution, the President has the power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.” Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The United States ratified the Convention with the expectation that it would be interpreted according to its terms. See 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 325(1) (1986) (“An international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”). If we were to require suppression for Article 36 violations without some authority in the Convention, we would in effect be supplementing those terms by enlarging the obligations of the United States under the Convention. This is entirely inconsistent with the judicial function. Cf. The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71 (1821) (Story, J.) (“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of judicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty”).
Of course, it is well established that a self-executing treaty binds the States pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, and that the States therefore must recognize the force of the treaty in the course of adjudicating the rights of litigants. See, e. g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 (1880). And where a treaty provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no issue of intruding on the constitutional prerogatives of the States or the other federal branches. Courts must apply the remedy as a requirement of federal law. Cf. 18 U. S. C. § 2515; United States v. Giordano, 416 U. S. 505, 524-525 (1974). But where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.
Sanchez-Llamas argues that the language of the Convention implicitly requires a judicial remedy because it states that the laws and regulations governing the exercise of Article 36 rights “must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ... are intended,” Art. 36(2), 21 U. S. T., at 101 (emphasis added). In his view, although “full effect” may not automatically require an exclusionary rule, it does require an appropriate judicial remedy of some kind. There is reason to doubt this interpretation. In particular, there is little indication that other parties to the Convention have interpreted Article 36 to require a judicial remedy in the context of criminal prosecutions. See Department of State Answers to Questions Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li, No. 97-2034 etc., p. A-9 (Oct. 15, 1999) (“We are unaware of any country party to the [Vienna Convention] that provides remedies for violations of consular notification through its domestic criminal justice system”).
Nevertheless, even if Sanchez-Llamas is correct that Article 36 implicitly requires a judicial remedy, the Convention equally states that Article 36 rights “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.” Art. 36(2), 21 U. S. T., at 101. Under our domestic law, the exclusionary rule is not a remedy we apply lightly. “[0]ur cases have repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s ‘costly toll’ upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.” Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 364-365 (1998). Because the rule’s social costs are considerable, suppression is warranted only where the rule’s “ ‘remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.’” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 908 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974)).
We have applied the exclusionary rule primarily to deter constitutional violations. In particular, we have ruled that the Constitution requires the exclusion of evidence obtained by certain violations of the Fourth Amendment, see Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U. S. 687, 694 (1982) (arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655-657 (1961) (unconstitutional searches and seizures), and confessions exacted by police in violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination or due process, see Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 435 (failure to give Miranda warnings); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, 568 (1958) (involuntary confessions).
The few cases in which we have suppressed evidence for statutory violations do not help Sanchez-Llamas. In those cases, the excluded evidence arose directly out of statutory violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests. McNdbb, for example, involved the suppression of incriminating statements obtained during a prolonged detention of the defendants, in violation of a statute requiring persons arrested without a warrant to be promptly presented to a judicial officer. We noted that the statutory right was intended to “avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime,” 318 U. S., at 344, and later stated that McNabb was “responsive to the same considerations of Fifth Amendment policy that . . . face[d] us ... as to the States” in Miranda, 384 U. S., at 463. Similarly, in Miller, we required suppression of evidence that was the product of a search incident to an unlawful arrest. 357 U. S., at 305; see California v. Hodari D, 499 U. S. 621, 624 (1991) (“We have long understood that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 'unreasonable . . . seizures’ includes seizure of the person”).
The violation of the right to consular notification, in contrast, is at best remotely connected to the gathering of evidence. Article 36 has nothing whatsoever to do with searches or interrogations. Indeed, Article 36 does not guarantee defendants any assistance at all. The provision secures only a right of foreign nationals to have their consulate informed of their arrest or detention—not to have their consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement authorities cease their investigation pending any such notice or intervention. In most circumstances, there is likely to be little connection between an Article 36 violation and evidence or statements obtained by police.
Moreover, the reasons we often require suppression for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations are entirely absent from the consular notification context. We require exclusion of coerced confessions both because we disapprove of such coercion and because such confessions tend to be unreliable. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U. S. 341, 347 (1981). We exclude the fruits of unreasonable searches on the theory that without a strong deterrent, the constraints of the Fourth Amendment might be too easily disregarded by law enforcement. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 (1960). The situation here is quite different. The failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely, with any frequency, to produce unreliable confessions. And unlike the search-and-seizure context—where the need to obtain valuable evidence may tempt authorities to transgress Fourth Amendment limitations—police win little, if any, practical advantage from violating Article 36. Suppression would be a vastly disproportionate remedy for an Article 36 violation.
Sanchez-Llamas counters that the failure to inform defendants of their right to consular notification gives them “a misleadingly incomplete picture of [their] legal options,” Brief for Petitioner in No. 04-10566, p. 42, and that suppression will give authorities an incentive to abide by Article 36.
Leaving aside the suggestion that it is the role of police generally to advise defendants of their legal options, we think other constitutional and statutory requirements effectively protect the interests served, in Sanchez-Llamas’ view, by Article 36. A foreign national detained on suspicion of crime, like anyone else in our country, enjoys under our system the protections of the Due Process Clause. Among other things, he is entitled to an attorney, and is protected against compelled self-incrimination. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896) (“[A]ll persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by” the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). Article 36 adds little to these “legal options,” and we think it unnecessary to apply the exclusionary rule where other constitutional and statutory protections—many of them already enforced by the exclusionary rule—safeguard the same interests Sanchez-Llamas claims are advanced by Article 36.
Finally, suppression is not the only means of vindicating Vienna Convention rights. A defendant can raise an Article 36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to police. If he raises an Article 36 violation at trial, a court can make appropriate accommodations to ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent possible, the benefits of consular assistance. Of course, diplomatic avenues—the primary means of enforcing the Convention— also remain open.
In sum, neither the Vienna Convention itself nor our precedents applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of Sanchez-Llamas’ statements to police.
B
The Virginia courts denied petitioner Bustillo’s Article 36 claim on the ground that he failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500, 504 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U. S. 614, 621 (1998). There is an exception if a defendant can demonstrate both “cause” for not raising the claim at trial, and “prejudice” from not having done so. Massaro, supra, at 504. Like many States, Virginia applies a similar rule in state postconviction proceedings, and did so here to bar Bustillo’s Vienna Convention claim. Normally, in our review of state-court judgments, such rules constitute an adequate and independent state-law ground preventing us from reviewing the federal claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991). Bustillo contends, however, that state procedural default rules cannot apply to Article 36 claims. He argues that the Convention requires that Article 36 rights be given “‘full effect’” and that Virginia’s procedural default rules “prevented any effect (much less ‘full effect’) from being given to” those rights. Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-51, p. 35 (emphasis deleted).
This is not the first time we have been asked to set aside procedural default rules for a Vienna Convention claim. Respondent Johnson and the United States persuasively argue that this question is controlled by our decision in Breard v. Greene, 523 U. S. 371 (1998) (per curiam). In Breard, the petitioner failed to raise an Article 36 claim in state court— at trial or on collateral review—and then sought to have the claim heard in a subsequent federal habeas proceeding. Id., at 375. He argued that “the Convention is the ‘supreme law of the land’ and thus trumps the procedural default doctrine.” Ibid. We rejected this argument as “plainly incorrect,” for two reasons. Ibid. First, we observed, “it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.” Ibid. Furthermore, we reasoned that while treaty protections such as Article 36 may constitute supreme federal law, this is “no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural default apply.” Id., at 376. In light of Breard’s holding, Bustillo faces an uphill task in arguing that the Convention requires States to set aside their procedural default rules for Article 36 claims.
Bustillo offers two reasons why Breará does not control his case. He first argues that Breard’s holding concerning procedural default was “unnecessary to the result,” Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-51, at 45, because the petitioner there could not demonstrate prejudice from the default and because, in any event, a subsequent federal statute—the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,110 Stat. 1214—superseded any right the petitioner had under the Vienna Convention to have his claim heard on collateral review. We find Bustillo’s contention unpersuasive. Our resolution of the procedural default question in Breará was the principal reason for the denial of the petitioner’s claim, and the discussion of the issue occupied the bulk of our reasoning. See 523 U. S., at 375-377. It is no answer to argue, as Bustillo does, that the holding in Breará was “unnecessary” simply because the petitioner in that case had several ways to lose. See Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 331, 340 (1928).
Bustillo’s second reason is less easily dismissed. He argues that since Breará, the ICJ has interpreted the Vienna Convention to preclude the application of procedural default rules to Article 36 claims. The LaGrand Case (F. R. G. v. U. S.), 2001 I. C. J. 466 (Judgment of June 27) (LaGrand), and the Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (Avena), were brought before the ICJ by the governments of Germany and Mexico, respectively, on behalf of several of their nationals facing death sentences in the United States. The foreign governments claimed that their nationals had not been informed of their right to consular notification. They further argued that application of the procedural default rule to their nationals’ Vienna Convention claims failed to give “full effect” to the purposes of the Convention, as required by Article 36. The ICJ agreed, explaining that the defendants had procedurally defaulted their claims “because of the failure of the American authorities to comply with their obligation under Article 36.” LaGrand, supra, at 497, ¶ 91; see also Avena, supra, at 57, ¶ 113. Application of the procedural default rule in such circumstances, the ICJ reasoned, “prevented [courts] from attaching any legal significance” to the fact that the violation of Article 36 kept the foreign governments from assisting in their nationals’ defense. LaGrand, supra, at 497, ¶ 91; see also Avena, supra, at 57, ¶ 113.
Bustillo argues that LaGrand and Avena warrant revisiting the procedural default holding of Breard. In a similar vein, several amici contend that “the United States is obligated to comply with the Convention, as interpreted by the ICJ.” Brief for ICJ Experts 11 (emphasis added). We disagree. Although the ICJ’s interpretation deserves “respectful consideration,” Breard, supra, at 375, we conclude that it does not compel us to reconsider our understanding of the Convention in Breard.
Under our Constitution, “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” is “vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Art. Ill, § 1. That “judicial Power ... extend[s] to . . . Treaties.” Id., § 2. And, as Chief Justice Marshall famously explained, that judicial power includes the duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law “is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,” headed by the “one supreme Court” established by the Constitution. Ibid.; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 378-379 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“At the core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts’ independent responsibility—independent from its coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several States— to interpret federal law”). It is against this background that the United States ratified, and the Senate gave its advice and consent to, the various agreements that govern referral of Vienna Convention disputes to the ICJ.
Nothing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts. The ICJ’s decisions have “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case,” Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 59, 59 Stat. 1062, T. S. No. 993 (1945) (emphasis added). Any interpretation of law the ICJ renders in the course of resolving particular disputes is thus not binding precedent even as to the ICJ itself; there is accordingly little reason to think that such interpretations were intended to be controlling on our courts. The ICJ’s principal purpose is to arbitrate particular disputes between national governments. Art. 1, id., at 1055 (ICJ is “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”); see also Art. 34, id., at 1059 (“Only states [i e., countries] may be parties in cases before the Court”). While each member of the United Nations has agreed to comply with decisions of the ICJ “in any case to which it is a party,” United Nations Charter, Art. 94(1), 59 Stat. 1051, T. S. No. 993 (1945), the Charter’s procedure for noncompliance— referral to the Security Council by the aggrieved state— contemplates quintessential^ international remedies, Art. 94(2), ibid.
In addition, “[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.” Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 187, 194 (1961). Although the United States has agreed to “discharge its international obligations” in having state courts give effect to the decision in Avena, it has not taken the view that the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 is binding on our courts. President Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005), App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin v. Dretke, O. T. 2004, No. 04-5928, p. 9a. Moreover, shortly after Avena, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol concerning Vienna Convention disputes. Whatever the effect of Avena and LaGrand before this withdrawal, it is doubtful that our courts should give decisive weight to the interpretation of a tribunal whose jurisdiction in this area is no longer recognized by the United States.
LaGrand and Avena are therefore entitled only to the “respectful consideration” due an interpretation of an international agreement by an international court. Breard, 523 U. S., at 375. Even according such consideration, the ICJ’s interpretation cannot overcome the plain import of Article 36. As we explained in Breará, the procedural rules of domestic law generally govern the implementation of an international treaty. Ibid. In addition, Article 36 makes clear that the rights it provides “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State” provided that “full effect... be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” Art. 36(2), 21 U. S. T., at 101. In the United States, this means that the rule of procedural default—which applies even to claimed violations of our Constitution, see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982)—applies also to Vienna Convention claims. Bustillo points to nothing in the drafting history of Article 36 or in the contemporary practice of other signatories that undermines this conclusion.
The IC J concluded that where a defendant was not notified of his rights under Article 36, application of the procedural default rule failed to give “full effect” to the purposes of Article 36 because it prevented courts from attaching “legal significance” to the Article 36 violation. LaGrand, 2001 I. C. J., at 497-498, ¶¶ 90-91. This reasoning overlooks the importance of procedural default rules in an adversary system, which relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and present them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate time for adjudication. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief”). Procedural default rules are designed to encourage parties to raise their claims promptly and to vindicate “the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.” Massaro, 538 U. S., at 504. The consequence of failing to raise a claim for adjudication at the proper time is generally forfeiture of that claim. As a result, rules such as procedural default routinely deny “legal significance”—in the Avena and LaGrand sense—to otherwise viable legal claims.
Procedural default rules generally take on greater importance in an adversary system such as ours than in the sort of magistrate-directed, inquisitorial legal system characteristic of many of the other countries that are signatories to the Vienna Convention. “What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is . . . the presence of a judge who does not (as an inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 181, n. 2 (1991). In an inquisitorial system, the failure to raise a legal error can in part be attributed to the magistrate, and thus to the state itself. In our system, however, the responsibility for failing to raise an issue generally rests with the parties themselves.
The ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36 is inconsistent with the basic framework of an adversary system. Under the ICJ’s reading of “full effect,” Article 36 claims could trump not only procedural default rules, but any number of other rules requiring parties to present their legal claims at the appropriate time for adjudication. If the state’s failure to inform the defendant of his Article 36 rights generally excuses the defendant’s failure to comply with relevant procedural rules, then presumably rules such as statutes of limitations and prohibitions against filing successive habeas petitions must also yield in the face of Article 36 claims. This sweeps too broadly, for it reads the “full effect” proviso in a way that leaves little room for Article 36’s clear instruction that Article 36 rights “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.” Art. 36(2), 21 U. S. T., at 101.
Much as Sanchez-Llamas cannot show that suppression is an appropriate remedy for Article 36 violations under domestic law principles, so too Bustillo cannot show that normally applicable procedural default rules should be suspended in light of the type of right he claims. In this regard, a comparison of Article 36 and a suspect’s rights under Miranda disposes of Bustillo’s claim. Bustillo contends that applying procedural default rules to Article 36 rights denies such rights “full effect” because the violation itself—-1 e., the failure to inform defendants of their right to consular notification—prevents them from becoming aware of their Article 36 rights and asserting them at trial. Of course, precisely the same thing is true of rights under Miranda. Police are required to advise suspects that they have a right to remain silent and a right to an attorney. See Miranda, 384 U. S., at 479; see also Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 435. If police do not give such warnings, and counsel fails to object, it is equally true that a suspect may not be “aware he even had such rights until well after his trial had concluded.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-51, at 35. Nevertheless, it is well established that where a defendant fails to raise a Miranda claim at trial, procedural default rules may bar him from raising the claim in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 (1977).
Bustillo responds that an Article 36 claim more closely resembles a claim, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence—a type of claim that often can be asserted for the first time only in postconviction proceedings. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U. S. 74, 83, n. 9 (2004). The analogy is inapt. In the case of a Brady claim, it is impossible for the defendant to know as a factual matter that a violation has occurred before the exculpatory evidence is disclosed. By contrast, a defendant is well aware of the fact that he was not informed of his Article 36 rights, even if the legal significance of that fact eludes him.
Finally, relying on Massaro v. United States, 538 U. S. 500 (2003), Bustillo argues that Article 36 claims “are most appropriately raised post-trial or on collateral review.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-51, at 39. Massaro held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised for the first time in a proceeding under 28 U. S. C. § 2255. That decision, however, involved the question of the proper forum for federal habeas claims. Bustillo, by contrast, asks us to require the States to hear Vienna Convention claims raised for the first time in state postconviction proceedings. Given that the Convention itself imposes no such requirement, we do not perceive any grounds for us to revise state procedural rules in this fashion. See Dickerson, supra, at 438.
We therefore conclude, as we did in Breará, that claims under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may be subjected to the same procedural default rules that apply generally to other federal-law claims.
* * *
Although these cases involve the delicate question of the application of an international treaty, the issues in many ways turn on established principles of domestic law. Our holding in no way disparages the importance of the Vienna Convention. The relief petitioners request is, by any measure, extraordinary. Sanchez-Llamas seeks a suppression remedy for an asserted right with little if any connection to the gathering of evidence; Bustillo requests an exception to procedural rules that is accorded to almost no other right, including many of our most fundamental constitutional protections. It is no slight to the Convention to deny petitioners’ claims under the same principles we would apply to an Act of Congress, or to the Constitution itself.
The judgments of the Supreme Court of Oregon and the Supreme Court of Virginia are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
In its entirety, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention states:
“1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
“(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
“(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
“(e) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
“2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are intended.” 21 U. S. T., at 100-101.
Bustillo’s habeas petition also presented newly acquired evidence that tended to cast doubt on his conviction. Most notably, he produced a secretly recorded videotape in which Sirena admitted killing Merry and stated that Bustillo had been wrongly convicted. App. in No. 05-51, at 38, 54. In addition, Bustillo argued that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose that on the night of the crime, police had questioned a man named “Julio C. Osorto,” who is now known to be the same man as “Sirena.” The police report concerning the encounter stated that Sirena appeared to have ketchup on his pants. Bustillo contends that these stains might in fact have been the victim’s blood. The Commonwealth disputes this. The state habeas court found “no evidence of any transfer of the victim’s blood to the assailant,” and concluded that the undisclosed encounter between police and Sirena was not material under Brady. App. in No. 05-51, at 167.
See Declaration of Ambassador Maura A. Harty, Annex 4 to Counter-Memorial of the United States in Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. No. 128, p. A386, ¶ 41 (Oct. 25, 2003) (Harty Declaration) (“With the possible exception of Brazil, we are not aware of a single country that has a law, regulation or judicial decision requiring that a statement taken before consular notification and access automatically must be excluded from use at trial” (footnote omitted)). According to the Harty Declaration, the American Embassy in Brazil has been advised that Brazil considers consular notification to be a right under the Brazilian Constitution. Neither the declaration nor the parties point to a case in which a Brazilian court has suppressed evidence because of a violation of that right.
In a few cases, as several amici point out, the United Kingdom and Australia appear to have applied a discretionary rule of exclusion for violations of domestic statutes implementing the Vienna Convention. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26, and n. 9; Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 16-23. The dissent similarly relies on two cases from Australia, post, at 394 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (citing Tan Seng Kiah v. Queen (2001) 160 F. L. R. 26 (Crim. App. N. Terr.) and Queen v. Tan [2001] W. A. S. C. 275 (Sup. Ct. W. Aus. in Crim.)), where consular notification rights are governed by a domestic statute that provides rights beyond those required by Article 36 itself. See Crimes Act, No. 12, 1914, §23p (Australia). The Canadian case on which the dissent relies, post, at 394-395, denied suppression, and concerned only the court’s general discretionary authority to exclude a confession “whose admission would adversely affect the fairness of an accused’s trial.” Queen v. Partak [2001] 160 C. C. C. 3d 553, ¶ 61 (Ont. Super. Ct. of J.).
The dissent, in light of LaGrand and Avena, “would read Breard . . . as not saying that the Convention never trumps any procedural default rule.” Post, at 389 (opinion of Breyer, J.). This requires more than “reading an exception into Breard’,s language,” post, at 390, amounting instead to overruling Breard’s plain holding that the Convention does not trump the procedural default doctrine. While the appeal of such a course to a Breard dissenter may be clear, see 523 U. S., at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting), “respectful consideration” of precedent should begin at home.
The dissent’s extensive list of lower court opinions that have “looked to the ICJ for guidance,” post, at 384-385, is less impressive than first appears. Many of the cited opinions merely refer to, or briefly describe, ICJ decisions without in any way relying on them as authority. See, e. g., Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F. 2d 929, 932, 935 (CADC 1988); Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Secretary of Interior, 790 F. 2d 965, 967 (CA1 1986); Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F. 2d 745, 748 (CADC 1979); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F. 2d 848, 849 (CADC 1976); Rogers v. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A., 278 F. 2d 268, 273, n. 3 (CADC 1960) (Fahy, J., dissenting). Others cite ICJ opinions alongside law review articles for general propositions about international law. See, e. g., McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F. 3d 346, 352 (CADC 1995); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166, 1180, 1184 (CADC 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting); Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F. 2d 1176, 1187, n. 14 (CA7 1980) (per curiam); United States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d 862, 869 (CA5 1979). Moreover, all but two of the cited decisions from this Court concern technical issues of boundary demarcation. See post, at 384.
The dissent would read the ICJ’s decisions to require that procedural default rules give way only where “the State is unwilling to provide some other effective remedy, for example (if the lawyer acts incompetently in respect to Convention rights of which the lawyer was aware) an ineffective-assistanee-of-counsel claim.” Post, at 388 (opinion of Breyer, J.). But both LaGrand and Avena indicate that the availability of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not an adequate remedy for an Article 36 violation. See LaGrand Case (F. R. G. v. U. S.), 2001 I. C. J. 466, 497, ¶ 91 (Judgment of June 27) (requiring suspension of state procedural default rule even though “United States courts could and did examine the professional competence of counsel assigned to the indigent LaGrands by reference to United States constitutional standards”); see also Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12, 63, ¶ 134 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
To the extent the dissent suggests that the ICJ’s decisions could be read to prevent application of procedural default rules where a defendant’s attorney is unaware of Article 36, see post, at 387-388 (opinion of Breyer, J.), this interpretation of the Convention is in sharp conflict with the role of counsel in our system. “Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not ‘cause’ because the attorney is the petitioner’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must ‘bear the risk of attorney error.’” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 753 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 488 (1986)). Under our system, an attorney’s lack of knowledge does not excuse the defendant’s default, unless the attorney’s overall representation falls below what is required by the Sixth Amendment. In any event, Bustillo himself does not argue that the applicability of procedural default rules hinges on whether a foreign national’s attorney was aware of Article 36. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 05-51, p. 38 (“A lawyer may not, consistent with the purposes of Article 36, unilaterally forfeit a foreign national’s opportunity to communicate with his consulate”). In fact, Bustillo has conceded that his “attorney at trial was aware of his client’s rights under the Vienna Convention.” App. in No. 05-51, at 203, n. 5. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"involuntary confession",
"habeas corpus",
"plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise",
"retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)",
"search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)",
"search and seizure, vehicles",
"search and seizure, Crime Control Act",
"contempt of court or congress",
"self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)",
"Miranda warnings",
"self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution",
"right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)",
"line-up",
"discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)",
"double jeopardy",
"ex post facto (state)",
"extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous",
"extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence",
"extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom",
"extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)",
"extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance",
"extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)",
"extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity",
"confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous",
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: assault",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous",
"jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)",
"speedy trial",
"miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)"
] | [
32
] | sc_issue_1 |
HODGSON et al. v. MINNESOTA et al.
No. 88-1125.
Argued November 29, 1989
Decided June 25, 1990
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Brennan, J., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI, in which O’Connor, J., joined, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 458. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 461. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 479. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Scalia, JJ., joined, post, p. 480.
Janet Benshoof argued the cause for petitioners in No. 88-1125 and respondents in No. 88-1309. With her on the briefs were Rachel N. Pine, Lynn M. Paltrow, Kathryn Kolbert, John A. Powell, William Z. Pentelovitch, and Rebecca A. Palmer.
John R. Tunheim, Chief Deputy Attorney General of Minnesota, argued the cause for respondents in No. 88-1125 and petitioners in No. 88-1309. With him on the briefs were Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, Catharine F. Haukedahl, Solicitor General, Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and John B. Galus, Special Assistant Attorney General.
Together with No. 88-1309, Minnesota et al. v. Hodgson et al.. also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Psychological Association et al. by Donald V. Bersoff and Mark D. Schneider; and for the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’rith et al. by Kenneth J. Bialkin, Peggy L. Kerr, Meyer Eisenberg, Justin J. Finger, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Steven M. Freeman, Jill L. Kahn, and Li via D. Thompson.
Clarke D. Forsythe and Kent Masterson Brown filed a brief for the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Stephen J. Marzen, and Steven R. Valentine; for the State of Louisiana et al. by William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General of Louisiana, Jenifer Schaye and Meredith H. Lieux, Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Ann P. Levert, Thomas A. Rayner, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, William L. Webster, Attorney General of Missouri, and Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania; for 274 Organizations in Support of Roe v. Bade by Kathleen M. Sullivan, Susan R. Estrich, Barbara Jordan, and Estelle H. Rogers; for the American Academy of Medical Ethics by Joseph W. Dellapenna; for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Elizabeth H. Esty, Ann E. Allen, Stephan E. Lawton, Laurie R. Rockett, and Joel I. Klein; for the American Family Association, Inc., by Peggy M. Coleman; for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights et al. by Nancy J. Gannon and Thomas W. Strahan; for the Center for Population Options et al. by John H. Henn; for the Elliot Institute for Social Sciences Research et al. by Stephen R. Kaufmann; for Focus on the Family et al. by H. Robert Shoivers; for the Knights of Columbus by Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., Kevin J. Hasson, and Carl A. Anderson; for the Luthern Church-Missouri Synod by Philip E. Draheim; for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr.; for the United States Catholic Conference by Mark E. Chopko; for Representative Christopher H. Smith et al. by Mr. Bopp; for Members of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by Maura K. Quinlin and Philip J. Murren; for 13 Individual Members of the Panel on Adolescent Pregnancy and Childbearing or the Committee on Child Development Research and Public Policy by Hannah E. M. Lieberman and Pamela H. Anderson; and for James Joseph Lynch, Jr., pro se.
Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, an opinion with respect to Part III in which Justice Brennan joins, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI in which Justice O’Connor joins, and a dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII.
A Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. §§ 144.343(2) — (Y) (1988), provides, with certain exceptions, that no abortion shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours after both of her parents have been notified. In subdivisions 2-4 of the statute the notice is mandatory unless (1) the attending physician certifies that an immediate abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death and there is insufficient time to provide the required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in writing; or (3) the woman declares that she is a victim of parental abuse or neglect, in which event notice of her declaration must be given to the proper authorities. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held these provisions unconstitutional. In No. 88-1309, we granted the State’s petition to review that holding. Subdivision 6 of the same statute provides that if a court enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same notice requirement shall be effective unless the pregnant woman obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed. By a vote of 7 to 3, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of subdivision 6. In No. 88-1125, we granted the plaintiffs’ petition to review that holding.
For reasons that follow, we now conclude that the requirement of notice to both of the pregnant minor’s parents is not reasonably related to legitimate state interests and that subdivision 2 is unconstitutional. A different majority of the Court, for reasons stated in separate opinions, concludes that subdivision 6 is constitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety is affirmed.
I
The parental notice statute was enacted in 1981 as an amendment to the Minors’ Consent to Health Services Act. The earlier statute, which remains in effect as subdivision 1 of § 144.343 and as § 144.346, had modified the common-law requirement of parental consent for any medical procedure performed on minors. It authorized “[a]ny minor” to give effective consent without any parental involvement for the treatment of “pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other drug abuse.” The statute, unlike others of its age, applied to abortion services.
The 1981 amendment qualified the authority of an “un-emancipated minor” to give effective consent to an abortion by requiring that either her physician or an agent notify “the parent” personally or by certified mail at least 48 hours before the procedure is performed. The term “parent” is defined in subdivision 3 to mean “both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living.” No exception is made for a divorced parent, a noncustodial parent, or a biological parent who never married or lived with the pregnant woman’s mother. The statute does provide, however, that if only one parent is living, or “if the second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort,” notice to one parent is sufficient. It also makes exceptions for cases in which emergency treatment prior to notice “is necessary to prevent the woman’s death,” both parents have already given their consent in writing, or the proper authorities are advised that the minor is a victim of sexual or physical abuse. The statute subjects a person performing an abortion in violation of its terms to criminal sanctions and to civil liability in an action brought by any person “wrongfully denied notification.”
Subdivision 6 authorizes a judicial bypass of the two-parent notice requirement if subdivision 2 is ever “temporarily or permanently” enjoined by judicial order. If the pregnant minor can convince “any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction” that she is “mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion,” or that an abortion without notice to both parents would be in her best interest, the court can authorize the physician to proceed without notice. The statute provides that the bypass procedure shall be confidential, that it shall be expedited, that the minor has a right to court-appointed counsel, and that she shall be afforded free access to the court “24 hours a day, seven days a week.” An order denying an abortion can be appealed on an expedited basis, but an order authorizing an abortion without notification is not subject to appeal.
The statute contains a severability provision, but it does not include a statement of its purposes. The Minnesota Attorney General has advised us that those purposes are apparent from the statutory text and that they “include the recognition and fostering of parent-child relationships, promoting counsel to a child in a difficult and traumatic choice, and providing for notice to those who are naturally most concerned for the child’s welfare.” The District Court found that the primary purpose of the legislation was to protect the well-being of minors by encouraging them to discuss with their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies. It also found that the legislature was motivated by a desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies. The Attorney General, however, disclaims any reliance on this purpose.
II
This litigation was commenced on July 30, 1981, two days before the effective date of the parental notification statute. The plaintiffs include two Minnesota doctors who specialize in obstetrics and gynecology, four clinics providing abortion and contraceptive services in metropolitan areas in Minnesota, six pregnant minors representing a class of pregnant minors, and the mother of a pregnant minor. Plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and various provisions of the Minnesota Constitution.
Based on the allegations in their verified complaint, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of subdivision 2 of the statute. After a hearing, the court entered a preliminary injunction which still remains in effect. App. 31. The District Court refused, however, to rule on the validity of the judicial bypass procedure in advance of trial.
In 1986, after a 5-week trial, the District Court concluded that both the two-parent notification requirement and the 48-hour waiting period were invalid. It further concluded that the definition of the term “parent,” which is carried over into the notification requirement, was not severable from the remainder of the statute. The court declared the entire statute unconstitutional and enjoined the defendants from enforcing it.
A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court first held that a compulsory notification requirement is invalid if it does not provide the pregnant minor with the option of an alternative court procedure in which she can demonstrate either her maturity or that performance of an abortion without notification would be in her best interests. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 88-1125, p. 62a. Second, relying heavily on the findings of the District Court concerning the impact of a two-parent notice requirement on families in which the parents are divorced, separated, or unmarried, the panel also concluded that the unconstitutional notification requirement could not be saved by the judicial bypass. The court reasoned that a mature minor and her custodial parent are in a better position than a court to determine whether notifying the noncustodial parent would be in the child’s best interests and that they should not be forced to submit to a “Hobson’s choice” between an unconstitutional notice requirement and a burdensome court bypass.’ The panel further held that the two-parent notice requirement was not severable.
The panel opinion was vacated, and the Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc. 853 F. 2d 1452 (CA8 1988). The court unanimously and summarily rejected the State’s submission that the two-parent notice requirement was constitutional without any bypass procedure. Id., at 1456-1457. The majority concluded, however, that subdivision 6 of the statute was valid. It agreed with the District Court that the development of a full factual record may demonstrate that a facially valid statute is “unconstitutional in operation,” id., at 1459, and that “the . . . detailed factual findings concerning the general difficulties of obtaining an abortion in Minne-' sota and the trauma of the bypass procedure, compared to its effectiveness, raise considerable questions about the practi-' cal wisdom of this statute.” Ibid. In the majority’s opinion, however, those questions were for the legislature to consider because the statute served valid state interests: the interest in “‘encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child,”’ as well as the independent interest of the parents in the upbringing of their children.
After noting that the State did not challenge the District Court’s findings, id., at 1462, the court concluded that these findings placed undue emphasis on one-parent and no-parent households. For even though the two-parent notice requirement may not further the interests of the pregnant minor in such cases, the rights of “best-interest” and mature minors were nevertheless protected by the bypass procedure. More importantly, “as applied to all pregnant minors, regardless of their family circumstances, the district court did not consider whether parental and family interests (as distinguished from the interests of the minor alone) justified the two-parent notice requirement.” Id., at 1463. The court wrote:
“The district court enjoined the entire statute because of the impact of the two-parent notice requirement primarily upon one group of pregnant minors, without considering the effect of the bypass, or the parental and family interests which have been recognized by the Supreme Court. In concentrating upon the impact of the statute on the pregnant minor not living with both parents, and on the mature or non best-interest pregnant minor, the district court gave only limited consideration to the 50% or more pregnant minors who live with both parents and to pregnant minors who are immature and whose best interests may require parental involvement. The district court’s determination that an undue burden on the one group renders the statute unconstitutional for all is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision that a notice-consent/bypass procedure plainly serves important state interests and is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests. . . . Considering the statute as a whole and as applied to all pregnant minors, the two-parent notice requirement does not unconstitutionally burden the minor’s abortion right.” Id., at 1464-1465 (citation omitted).
The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that the 48-hour waiting period imposed a significant burden on the minor’s abortion right, finding that the waiting period could run concurrently with the scheduling of an appointment for the procedure. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the District Court without reaching the question of severability.
In dissent, two members of the court criticized the majority for ignoring “the evidence amassed in a five-week trial,” for relying on the judicial bypass procedure “to uphold an unconstitutional two-parent notification requirement,” and for creating “a new right, apparently of constitutional dimension, for non-custodial parents to receive notice of their minor children’s activities.” Id., at 1466. One of the dissenters joined a third dissenter in expressing the opinion that “a single-parent notification requirement would withstand constitutional challenge.” Id., at 1472. We granted certiorari, 492 U. S. 917 (1989).
Ill
There is a natural difference between men and women: Only women have the capacity to bear children. A woman’s decision to conceive or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 316-318 (1980); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 685, 687 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 639-640 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153 (1973); id., at 168-170 (Stewart, J., concurring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 502-503 (1965) (White, J., concurring in judgment). That Clause, as interpreted in those cases, protects the woman’s right to make such decisions independently and privately, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 598-600, and n. 23 (1977), free of unwarranted governmental intrusion.
“Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 642 (1979) (Bellotti II) (opinion of Powell, J.).
As we stated in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976), the right to make this decision “do[es] not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.” Thus, the constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant minors as well as adult women.
In cases involving abortion, as in cases involving the right to travel or the right to marry, the identification of the constitutionally protected interest is merely the beginning of the analysis. State regulation of travel and of marriage is obviously permissible even though a State may not categorically exclude nonresidents from its borders, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 631 (1969), or deny prisoners the right to marry, Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987). But the regulation of constitutionally protected decisions, such as where a person shall reside or whom he or she shall marry, must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the individual has made. Cf. Turner v. Safley, supra; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967). In the abortion area, a State may have no obligation to spend its own money, or use its own facilities, to subsidize nontherapeutic abortions for minors or adults. See, e. g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977); cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 608-511 (1989); id., at 523-524 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). A State’s value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion may provide adequate support for decisions involving such allocation of public funds, but not for simply substituting a state decision for an individual decision that a woman has a right to make for herself. Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause would be a nullity. A state policy favoring childbirth over abortion is not in itself a sufficient justification for overriding the woman’s decision or for placing “obstacles — absolute or otherwise — in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.” Maher, 432 U. S., at 474; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 315-316.
In these cases the State of Minnesota does not rest its defense of this statute on any such value judgment. Indeed, it affirmatively disavows that state interest as a basis for upholding this law. Moreover, it is clear that the state judges who have interpreted the statute in over 3,000 decisions implementing its bypass procedures have found no legislative intent to disfavor the decision to terminate a pregnancy. On the contrary, in all but a handful of cases they have approved such decisions. Because the Minnesota statute unquestionably places obstacles in the pregnant minor’s path to an abortion, the State has the burden of establishing its constitutionality. Under any analysis, the Minnesota statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not reasonably related to legitimate state interests. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S., at 97; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S., at 704 (opinion of Powell, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 194-195, 199 (1973).
IV
The Court has considered the constitutionality of statutes providing for parental consent or parental notification in six abortion cases decided during the last 14 years. Although the Massachusetts statute reviewed in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), and Bellotti II required the consent of both parents, and the Utah statute reviewed in H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981), required notice to “the parents,” none of the opinions in any of those cases focused on the possible significance of making the consent or the notice requirement applicable to both parents instead of just one. In contrast, the arguments in these cases, as well as the extensive findings of the District Court, are directed primarily at that distinction. It is therefore appropriate to summarize these findings before addressing the constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period or the two-parent notification requirement, particularly since none of the findings has been challenged in either this Court or the Court of Appeals.
Approximately one out of every two marriages ends in divorce. 648 F. Supp. 756, 768 (Minn. 1986). Unrebutted evidence indicates that only 50% of minors in the State of Minnesota reside with both biological parents. Ibid.; App. 125-126. This conclusion is substantially corroborated by a study indicating that 9% of the minors in Minnesota live with neither parent and 33% live with only one parent. 648 F. Supp., at 768.
The District Court found — on the basis of extensive testimony at trial — that the two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful effects on both the minor and the custodial parent when the parents were divorced or separated. Relations between the minor and absent parent were not reestablished as a result of the forced notification, thereby often producing disappointment in the minor “when an anticipated reestablishment of her relationship with the absent parent d[id] not occur.” Id., at 769. Moreover, “[t]he reaction of the custodial parent to the requirement of forced notification is often one of anger, resentment and frustration at the intrusion of the absent parent,” ibid., and fear that notification will threaten the custody rights of the parent or otherwise promote intrafamily violence. Tragically, those fears were often realized:
“Involuntary involvement of the second biological parent is especially detrimental when the minor comes from an abusive, dysfunctional family. Notification of the minor’s pregnancy and abortion decision can provoke violence, even where the parents are divorced or separated. Studies have shown that violence and harassment may continue well beyond the divorce, especially when children are involved.
“. . . Furthermore, a mother’s perception in a dysfunctional family that there will be violence if the father learns of the daughter’s pregnancy is likely to be an accurate perception.” Ibid.
The District Court further found:
“Twenty to twenty-five percent of the minors who go to court either are accompanied by one parent who knows and consents to the abortion or have already told one parent of their intent to terminate their pregnancy. The vast majority of these voluntarily informed parents are women who are divorced or separated from spouses whom they have not seen in years. Going to court to avoid notifying the other parent burdens the privacy of both the minor and the accompanying parent. The custodial parents are angry that their consent is not sufficient and fear that notification will bring the absent parent back into the family in an intrusive and abusive way.” Ibid.
The District Court also found that the two-parent notification requirement had adverse effects in families in which the minor lives with both parents. These effects were particularly pronounced in the distressingly large number of cases in which family violence is a serious problem. The court found that many minors in Minnesota “live in fear of violence by family members” and “are, in fact, victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence.”’ The District Court found that few minors can take advantage of the exception for a minor who declares that she is a victim of sexual or physical abuse because of the obligation to report the information to the authorities and the attendant loss of privacy. See Findings 46 and 47, 648 F. Supp., at 764. This concern about family violence helps to explain why the District Court found that in many instances the requirement that both parents be notified actually impairs family communication. Minors who otherwise would inform one parent were unwilling to do so when such notification likely would also involve the parent in the torturous ordeal of explaining to a court why the second parent should not be notified. The court found:
“Minors who ordinarily would notify one parent may be dissuaded from doing so by the two-parent requirement. A minor who must go to court for authorization in any event may elect not to tell either parent. In these instances, the requirement that minors notify both biological parents actually reduces parent-child communication.” Id,., at 769.
The great majority of bypass petitions are filed in the three metropolitan counties in Minnesota, where courts schedule bypass hearings on a regular basis and have in place procedures for hearing emergency petitions. Id., at 762. Courts in the nonmetropolitan areas are acquainted with the statute and, for the most part, apply it conscientiously, but a number of counties are served by judges who are unwilling to hear bypass petitions. Id., at 763. Aside from the unavoidable notification of court officials, the confidentiality of minors has been maintained. Ibid.
During the period between August 1, 1981, and March 1, 1986, 3,573 judicial bypass petitions were filed in Minnesota courts. All but 15 were granted. The judges who adjudicated over 90% of these petitions testified; none of them identified any positive effects of the law. The court experience produced fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among minors, causing some who were mature, and some whose best interests would have been served by an abortion, to “forego the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry to term.” Finding 44, 648 F. Supp., at 763. Among parents who supported their daughters in the bypass proceedings, the court experience evoked similar reactions.
Scheduling petitions in the Minnesota court typically required minors to wait only two or three days for hearings. The District Court found, however, that the statutory waiting period of 48 hours was frequently compounded by a number of other factors that “commonly” created a delay of 72 hours, id., at 764-765, and, “in many cases” a delay of a week or more in effecting a decision to terminate a pregnancy. Id., at 765. A delay of that magnitude increased the medical risk associated with the abortion procedure to “a statistically significant degree.” Finding 43, 648 F. Supp., at 763. While recognizing that a mandatory delay following the notice to a minor's parent served the State's interest in protecting pregnant minors, the court found that that interest could be served by a shorter waiting period. Id., at 779-780.
At least 37 witnesses testified to the issue whether the statute furthered the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors. Only two witnesses testified that a two-parent notification statute did minors more good than harm; neither of these witnesses had direct experience with the Minnesota statute. Summarizing its findings on the question whether the statute as a whole furthered the State’s interests, the District Court wrote:
“Of the remaining witnesses who spoke to the issue whether Minn. Stat. § 144.343 effectuates the State’s interest in protecting pregnant minors, all but four of these are personally involved in the statute’s implementation in Minnesota. They are judges, public defenders, guardians ad litem, and clinic counselors. None of these witnesses testified that the statute has a beneficial effect upon the minors whom it affects. Some testified the law has a negligible [ejffect upon intra-family communication and upon the minors’ decision-making process. Others testified the statute has a deleterious effect on the well-being of the minors to whom it applies because it increases the stress attendant to the abortion decision without creating any corresponding benefit. Thus five weeks of trial have produced no factual basis upon which this court can find that Minn. Stat. § 144.343(2) — (7) on the whole furthers in any meaningful way the state’s interest in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family integrity.” Id., at 775.
Focusing specifically on the statutory requirement that both parents be notified, the District Court concluded:
“The court finds that this requirement places a significant burden upon pregnant minors who do not live with both parents. Particularly in these cases, notification of an abusive, or even a disinterested, absent parent has the effect of reintroducing that parent’s disruptive or unhelpful participation into the family at a time of acute stress. Similarly, the two-parent notification requirement places a significant obstacle in the path of minors in two parent homes who voluntarily have consulted with one parent but not with the other out of fear of psychological, sexual, or physical abuse toward either the minor or the notified parent. In either case, the alternative of going to court to seek authorization to proceed without notifying the second parent introduces a traumatic distraction into her relationship with the parent whom the minor has notified. The anxiety attending either option tends to interfere with and burden the parent-child communication the minor voluntarily initiated with the custodial parent.
. . Indeed, 20 to 25% of minors seeking judicial authorization to proceed with an abortion without parental notification are accompanied to court by one parent, or at least have obtained the approval of one parent. In these cases the necessity either to notify the second parent despite the agreement of both the minor and the notified parent that such notification is undesirable, or to obtain a judicial waiver of the notification requirement, distracts the minor and her parent and disrupts their communication. Thus the need to notify the second parent or to make a burdensome court appearance actively interferes with the parent-child communication voluntarily initiated by the child, communication assertedly at the heart of the State’s purpose in requiring notification of both parents. In these cases, requiring notification of both parents affirmatively discourages parent-child communication.” Id., at 777-778.
V
Three separate but related interests — the interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and the interest of the family unit — are relevant to our consideration of the constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period and the two-parent notification requirement.
The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 634-639 (opinion of Powell, J.); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166-167 (1944). That interest, which justifies state-imposed requirements that a minor obtain his or her parent’s consent before undergoing an operation, marrying, or entering military service, see Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 603-604 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 102-103 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), extends also to the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. Although the Court has held that parents may not exercise “an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto” over that decision, Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74, it has never challenged a State’s reasonable judgment that the decision should be made after notification to and consultation with a parent. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 510-511; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 428, n. 10, 439 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 409-410; Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 640-641 (opinion of Powell, J.); Danforth, 428 U. S., at 75. As Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, pointed out in his concurrence in Danforth:
“There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child.” Id., at 91.
Parents have an interest in controlling the education and upbringing of their children but that interest is “a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 257 (1983); see also Parham, 442 U. S., at 602 (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *447; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *190); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). The fact of biological parentage generally offers a person only “an opportunity ... to develop a relationship with his offspring.” Lehr, 463 U. S., at 262; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But the demonstration of commitment to the child through the assumption of personal, financial, or custodial responsibility may give the natural parent a stake in the relationship with the child rising to the level of a liberty interest. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972); Lehr, 463 U. S., at 261; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 157-160 (1989) (White, J., dissenting); cf. Caban, 441 U. S., at 393, n. 14. But see Michael H., 491 U. S., at 123-127 (plurality opinion).
While the State has a legitimate interest in the creation and dissolution of the marriage contract, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 205 (1888), the family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and education of children and the intimacies of the marital relationship which is protected by the Constitution against undue state interference. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233-234 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 495-496 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 551-552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 335-336 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Michael H., 491 U. S., at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 618-620 (1984); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S., at 639-640. The family may assign one parent to guide the children’s education and the other to look after their health. “The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.” Parham, 442 U. S., at 603. We have long held that there exists a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S., at 166. Thus, when the government intrudes on choices concerning the arrangement of the household, this Court has carefully examined the “governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); id., at 507, 510-511 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
A natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children free from undue state interference. As Justice White explained in his opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972):
“The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923), ‘basic civil rights of man,’ Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942), and ‘[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,’ May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 533 (1953). ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’ Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).” Id., at 651.
VI
We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor wait 48 hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an abortion would reasonably further the legitimate state interest in ensuring that the minor’s decision is knowing and intelligent. We have held that when a parent or another person has assumed “primary responsibility” for a minor’s well-being, the State may properly enact “laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 639 (1968). To the extent that subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute requires notification of only one parent, it does just that. The brief waiting period provides the parent the opportunity to consult with his or her spouse and a family physician, and it permits the parent to inquire into the competency of the doctor performing the abortion, discuss the religious or moral implications of the abortion decision, and provide the daughter needed guidance and counsel in evaluating the impact of the decision on her future. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F. 2d 1532, 1552 (CA7 1985) (Coffey, J., dissenting), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U. S. 171 (1987).
The 48-hour delay imposes only a minimal burden on the right of the minor to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Although the District Court found that scheduling factors, weather, and the minor’s school and work commitments may combine, in many cases, to create a delay of a week or longer between the initiation of notification and the abortion, 648 F. Supp., at 765, there is no evidence that the 48-hour period itself is unreasonable or longer than appropriate for adequate consultation between parent and child. The statute does not impose any period of delay once a court, acting in loco parentis, or the parents express their agreement that the minor is mature or that the procedure would be in her best interest. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted and the record reveals, the 48-hour waiting period may run concurrently with the time necessary to make an appointment for the procedure, thus resulting in little or no delay.
VII
It is equally clear that the requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any legitimate state interest. The usual justification for a parental consent or notification provision is that it supports the authority of a parent who is presumed to act in the minor’s best interest and thereby assures that the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and deliberate. To the extent that such an interest is legitimate, it would be fully served by a requirement that the minor notify one parent who can then seek the counsel of his or her mate or any other party, when such advice and support is deemed necessary to help the child make a difficult decision. In the ideal family setting, of course, notice to either parent would normally constitute notice to both. A statute requiring two-parent notification would not further any state interest in those instances. In many families, however, the parent notified by the child would not notify the other parent. In those cases the State has no legitimate interest in questioning one parent’s judgment that notice to the other parent would not assist the minor or in presuming that the parent who has assumed parental duties is incompetent to make decisions regarding the health and welfare of the child.
Not only does two-parent notification fail to serve any state interest with respect to functioning families, it dis-serves the state interest in protecting and assisting the minor with respect to dysfunctional families. The record reveals that in the thousands of dysfunctional families affected by this statute, the two-parent notice requirement proved positively harmful to the minor and her family. The testimony at trial established that this requirement, ostensibly designed for the benefit of the minor, resulted in major trauma to the child, and often to a parent as well. In some cases, the parents were divorced and the second parent did not have custody or otherwise participate in the child’s upbringing. App. 244-245; id,., at 466; id., at 115. In these circumstances, the privacy of the parent and child was violated, even when they suffered no other physical or psychological harm. In other instances, however, the second parent had either deserted or abused the child, id., at 462, 464, had died under tragic circumstances, id., at 120-121, or was not notified because of the considered judgment that notification would inflict unnecessary stress on a parent who was ill. Id., at 204, 465. In these circumstances, the statute was not merely ineffectual in achieving the State’s goals but actually counterproductive. The focus on notifying the second parent distracted both the parent and minor from the minor’s imminent abortion decision.
The State does not rely primarily on the best interests of the minor in defending this statute. Rather, it argues that, in the ideal family, the minor should make her decision only after consultation with both parents who should naturally be concerned with the child’s welfare and that the State has an interest in protecting the independent right of the parents “to determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their children.” Minn. Br. 26. Neither of these reasons can justify the two-parent notification requirement. The second parent may well have an interest in the minor’s abortion decision, making full communication among all members of a family desirable in some cases, but such communication may not be decreed by the State. The State has no more interest in requiring all family members to talk with one another than it has in requiring certain of them to live together. In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977), we invalidated a zoning ordinance which “slie[ed] deeply into the family itself,” id., at 498, permitting the city to “standardiz[e] its children— and its adults — by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.” Id., at 506. Although the ordinance was supported by state interests other than the State’s interest in substituting its conception of family life for the family’s own view, the ordinance’s relation to those state interests was too “tenuous” to satisfy constitutional standards. By implication, a state interest in standardizing its children and adults, making the “private realm of family life” conform to some state-designed ideal, is not a legitimate state interest at all. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S., at 399-400 (right to establish a home and bring up children may not be interfered with by legislative action which is without “reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect”).
Nor can any state interest in protecting a parent’s interest in shaping a child’s values and lifestyle overcome the liberty interests of a minor acting with the consent of a single parent or court. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (1979); Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976). In Danforth, the majority identified the only state interest in requiring parental consent as that in “the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental authority” and held that that state interest was insufficient to support the requirement that mature minors receive parental consent. The Court summarily concluded that “[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.” Id., at 75. It follows that the combined force of the separate interest of one parent and the minor’s privacy interest must outweigh the separate interest of the second parent.
In Bellotti I and Bellotti II, we also identified the difference between parental interests and the child’s best interest. Although the District Court invalidated the Massachusetts statute there under review on the grounds that it permitted a parent or the court, acting in loco parentis, to refuse consent based on the parent’s own interests, the state attorney general argued that the parental right consisted “ ‘exclusively of the right to assess independently, for their minor child, what will serve that child’s best interest.’” 428 U. S., at 144. Because we believed that the attorney general’s interpretation “would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge,” id., at 148, we ordered the District Court to certify the state-law question to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id., at 151-152. On review in this Court for the second time, after the Supreme Judicial Court stated unambiguously that the “good cause” standard required the judge to grant consent to an abortion found to be in the minor’s best interest, 443 U. S., at 630, 644 (opinion of Powell, J.), we confirmed that such a construction satisfied “some of the concerns” about the statute’s constitutionality, id., at 644, and thereby avoided “much of what was objectionable in the statute successfully challenged in Danforth,” id., at 645. Indeed, the constitutional defects that Justice Powell identified in the statute — its failure to allow a minor who is found to be mature and fully competent to make the abortion decision independently and its requirement of parental consultation even when an abortion without notification would be in the minor’s best interests — are predicated on the assumption that the justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in the abortion decision rests entirely on the best interests of the child. Id., at 651.
Unsurprisingly, the Minnesota two-parent notification requirement is an oddity among state and federal consent provisions governing the health, welfare, and education of children. A minor desiring to enlist in the armed services or the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) need only obtain the consent of “his parent or guardian.” 10 U. S. C. §§ 505(a), 2104(b)(4), 2107(b)(4). The consent of “a parent or guardian” is also sufficient to obtain a passport for foreign travel from the United States Department of State, 22 CFR §51.27 (1989) (emphasis added), and to participate as a subject in most forms of medical research, 45 CFR §§46.404, 46.405 (1988). In virtually every State, the consent of one parent is enough to obtain a driver’s license or operator’s permit. The same may be said with respect to the decision to submit to any medical or surgical procedure other than an abortion. Indeed, the only other Minnesota statute that the State has identified which requires two-parent consent is that authorizing the minor to change his name. Tr. of Oral Arg. 30, 32; Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 88-1309, p. 5 (citing Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (1988)). These statutes provide testimony to the unreasonableness of the Minnesota two-parent notification requirement and to the ease with which the State can adopt less burdensome means to protect the minor’s welfare. Cf. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456, 464 (1988); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S., at 98. We therefore hold that this requirement violates the Constitution.
VIII
The Court holds that the constitutional objection to the two-parent notice requirement is removed by thé judicial bypass option provided in subdivision 6 of the Minnesota statute. I respectfully dissent from that holding.
A majority of the Court has previously held that a statute requiring one parent’s consent to a minor’s abortion will be upheld if the State provides an ‘“alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests.’” Planned Parenthood Assn, of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 505 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). Indeed, in Bellotti II, four Members of the Court expressed the same opinion about a statute requiring the consent of both parents. See 443 U. S., at 643-644 (opinion of Powell, J.). Neither of those precedents should control our decision today.
In Bellotti II, eight Members of the Court joined the judgment holding the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional. Thus, the Court did not hold that the judicial bypass set forth in that statute was valid; it held just the opposite. Moreover, the discussion of the minimum requirements for a valid judicial bypass in Justice Powell’s opinion was joined by only three other Members of the Court. Indeed, neither the arguments of the parties, nor any of the opinions in the case, considered the significant difference between a statute requiring the involvement of both parents in the abortion decision and a statute that merely requires the involvement of one. Thus, the doctrine of stare decisis does not require that the standards articulated in Justice Powell’s opinion be applied to a statute that mandates the involvement of both parents.
Unlike Bellotti II, the judgment in Ashcroft sustained the constitutionality of the statute containing a judicial bypass as an alternative to the requirement of one parent’s consent to a minor’s abortion. The distinctions between notice and consent and between notification of both parents rather than just one arguably constitute a sufficient response to an argument resting on stare decisis. Further analysis is necessary, however, because, at least on the surface, the consent requirement would appear to be more onerous than a requirement of mere notice.
The significance of the distinction between a statute requiring the consent of one parent and a statute requiring notice to both parents must be tested by the relationship of the respective requirements to legitimate state interests. We have concluded that the State has a strong and legitimate interest in providing a pregnant minor with the advice and support of a parent during the decisional period. A general rule requiring the minor to obtain the consent of one parent reasonably furthers that interest. An exception from the general rule is necessary to protect the minor from an arbitrary veto that is motivated by the separate concerns of the parent rather than the best interest of the child. Cf. Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S., at 604-608. But the need for an exception does not undermine the conclusion that the general rule is perfectly reasonable — just as a rule requiring the consent of either parent for any other medical procedure would surely be reasonable if an exception were made for those emergencies in which, for example, a parent might deny lifesaving treatment to a child on religious grounds. See id., at 602-603.
For reasons already set forth at length, a rule requiring consent or notification of both parents is not reasonably related to the state interest in giving the pregnant minor the benefit of parental advice. The State has not called our attention to, nor am I aware of, any other medical situation in Minnesota or elsewhere in which the provision of treatment for a child has been conditioned on notice to, or consent by, both parents rather than just one. Indeed, the fact that one-parent consent is the virtually uniform rule for any other activity which affects the minor’s health, safety, or welfare emphasizes the aberrant quality of the two-parent notice requirement.
A judicial bypass that is designed to handle exceptions from a reasonable general rule, and thereby preserve the constitutionality of that rule, is quite different from a requirement that a minor — or a minor and one of her parents — must apply to a court for permission to avoid the application of a rule that is not reasonably related to legitimate state goals. A requirement that a minor acting with the consent of both parents apply to a court for permission to effectuate her decision clearly would constitute an unjustified official interference with the privacy of the minor and her family. The requirement that the bypass procedure must be invoked when the minor and one parent agree that the other parent should not be notified represents an equally unjustified governmental intrusion into the family’s decisional process. When the parents are living together and have joint custody over the child, the State has no legitimate interest in the communication between father and mother about the child. “[Wjhere the parents are divorced, the minor and/or custodial parent, and not a court, is in the best position to determine whether notifying the non-custodial parent would be in the child’s best interests.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 88-1125, p. 69a. As the Court of Appeals panel originally concluded, the “minor and custodial parent, ... by virtue of their major interest and superior position, should alone have the opportunity to decide to whom, if anyone, notice of the minor’s abortion decision should be given.” Ibid, (citation omitted). I agree with that conclusion.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Subdivision 1 of § 144.348 presently provides:
“Any minor may give effective consent for medical, mental and other health services to determine the presence of or to treat pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other drug abuse, and the consent of no other person is required."
The statute permits the health professional treating the minor to notify parents only when a failure to do so would jeopardize the minor's health. Minn. Stat. $ 144.346 (1988).
See Haw. Rev. Stat. §577A-2 (1976); Mo. Rev. Stat. §431.062 (Supp. 1971). See generally Pilpel & Zuekerman, Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in Abortion, Society and the Law 275, 279-280 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).
Although there is no statutory definition of emancipation in Minnesota, see Streitz v. Streitz, 363 N. W. 2d 135, 137 (Minn. App. 1985), we have no reason to question the State’s representation that Minn. Stat. §§ 144.341 and 144.342 (1988) apply to the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. Brief for Respondents in No. 88-1125, p. 2, n. 2. Those sections provide that a minor who is living separate and apart from her parents or who is either married or has borne a child may give effective consent to medical services without the consent of any other person.
The notification statute also applies to a woman for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed because of a finding of incompetency. § 144.343(2). This portion of the statute is not challenged in this case.
Subdivision 2 provides:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13.02, subdivision 8, no abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemaneipated minor .... until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the manner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4.
“(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of the parent and delivered personally to the parent by the physician or an agent.
“(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at the usual place of abode of the parent with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee which means postal employee can only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee. Time of delivery shall be deemed to occur at 12 o’clock noon on the next day on which regular mail delivery takes place, subsequent to mailing.”
The Minnesota statute is the most intrusive in the Nation. Of the 38 States that require parental participation in the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy, 27 make express that the participation of only one parent is required. An additional three States, Idaho, Tennessee, and Utah, require an unmarried minor to notify “the parents or guardian” but do not specify whether “parents” refers to either member of the parental unit or whether notice to one parent constitutes constructive notice to both. See Idaho Code §18-609(6) (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-15-202(f) (Supp. 1989); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2) (1990). In contrast, Arkansas does require an unmarried minor to notify both parents but provides exceptions where the second parent “cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort,” or a parent’s “whereabouts are unknown,” the parent has not been in contact with the minor’s custodial parent or the minor for at least one year, or the parent is guilty of sexual abuse. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-16-802, 20-16-808 (Supp. 1989). Delaware requires the consent only of parents who are residing in the same household; if the minor is not living with both of her parents, the consent of one parent is sufficient. Del. Code. Ann., Tit. 24, § 1790(b)(3) (1987). Illinois law does not require the consent of a parent who has deserted the family or is not available. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, *181-54(3) (1989). Kentucky requires an unmarried minor to obtain the consent of a legal guardian or “both parents, if available,” but provides that if both parents are not available, the consent of the available parent shall suffice. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 311.732(2)(a), (b) (Michie 1990). Under Massachusetts law, an unmarried minor need obtain the consent of only one parent if the other parent “is unavailable to the physician within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner,” or if the parents are divorced and the other parent does not have custody. Mass. Gen. Laws § 112:12S (1988). Mississippi law requires only the consent of the parent with primary custody, care, and control of the minor if the parents are divorced or unmarried and living apart and, in all other cases, the consent of only one parent if the other parent is not available in a reasonable time or manner. Miss. Code Ann. §41-41-53(2) (Supp. 1989). Finally, North Dakota requires only the consent of the custodial parent if the parents are separated and divorced, or the legal guardian if the minor is subject to guardianship. N. D. Cent. Code §14-02.1-03.1 (1981).
Subdivision 3 provides, in part:
“For purposes of this section, ‘parent’ means both parents of the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort, or the guardian or conservator if the pregnant woman has one.”
Subdivision 4 provides:
“No notice shall be required under this section if:
“(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman’s medical record that the abortion is necessary to prevent the woman’s death and there is insufficient time to provide the required notice; or
“(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or persons who are entitled to notice; or
“(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section 626.556. Notice of that declaration shall be made to the proper authorities as provided in section 626.556, subdivision 3.”
Under Minn. Stat. § 626.556 (1988), if the minor declares that she is the victim of abuse, the notified physician or physician’s agent must report the abuse to the local welfare or law enforcement agency within 24 hours, §§626.556(3)(a), (3)(e), whereupon the welfare agency “shall immediately conduct an assessment and offer protective social services for purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and preserving family life whenever possible.” § 626.556(10)(a). If the agency interviews the victim, it must notify the parent of the fact of the interview at the conclusion of the investigation unless it obtains a court order. § 626.556(10)(c). Individuals who are subjects of the investigation have a right of access to the record of the investigation. §626.556(11).
Subdivision 5 provides:
“Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a person wrongfully denied notification. A person shall not be held liable under this section if the person establishes by written evidence that the person relied upon evidence sufficient to convince a careful and prudent person that the representations of the pregnant woman regarding information necessary to comply with this section are bona fide and true, or if the person has attempted with reasonable diligence to deliver notice, but has been unable to do so.”
Subdivision 6 provides:
“If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or enjoined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced as though the following paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c) of that subdivision; provided, however, that if such temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have full force and effect, without being modified by the addition to the following substitute paragraph which shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction or restraining order is again in effect.
“(c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the notification of one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the pregnant women is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that the pregnant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion without such notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman’s best interests would be served thereby.
“(ii) Such a pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf, and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for her. The court shall, however, advise her that she has a right to court appointed counsel, and shall, upon her request, provide her with such counsel.
“(iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shall be confidential and shall be given such precedence over other pending matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without delay so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman. A judge of the court who conducts proceedings under this section shall make in writing specific factual findings and legal conclusions supporting the decision and shall order a record of the evidence to be maintained including the judge’s own findings and conclusions.
“(iv) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any such pregnant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing an abortion without notification. An order authorizing an abortion without notification shall not be subject to appeal. No filing fees shall be required of any such pregnant woman at either the trial or the appellate level. Access to the trial court for the purposes of such a petition or motion, and access to the appellate courts for purposes of making an appeal from denial of the same, shall be afforded such a pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven days a week.”
Brief for Petitioner in No. 88-1309, p. 4 (hereinafter Minn. Br.); see also id., at 8-9.
“The Minnesota legislature had several purposes in mind when it amended Minn. Stat. § 144.343 in 1981. The primary purpose was to pro-teet the well-being of minors by encouraging minors to discuss with their parents the decision whether to terminate their pregnancies. Encouraging such discussion was intended to achieve several salutory results. Parents can provide emotional support and guidance and thus forestall irrational and emotional decision-making. Parents can also provide information ■ concerning the minor’s medical history of which the minor may not be aware. Parents can also supervise post-abortion care. In addition, parents can support the minor’s psychological well-being and thus mitigate adverse psychological sequelae that may attend the abortion procedure.” 648 F. Supp. 756, 765-766 (Minn. 1986).
The District Court’s finding 59 reads as follows:
“The court finds that a desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies also motivated the legislature. Testimony before a legislative committee considering the proposed notification requirement indicated that influential supporters of the measure hoped it ‘would save lives’ by influencing minors to carry their pregnancies to term rather than aborting.” Id., at 766.
“‘The court also found that a desire to dissuade minors from choosing to terminate their pregnancies also motivated the legislature. Finding 59, Hodgson Appendix 25a. This finding was based on no more than the testimony before a legislative committee of some supporters of the act who hoped it ‘would save lives.’ There is no direct evidence, however, that this was the motive of any legislator.” Minn. Br. 4, n. 2.
On January 23, 1985, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendants on several of the plaintiffs’ claims, but reserved ruling on the constitutionality of subdivision 6 as applied until after trial.
“Where the underlying notification provision is unconstitutional because with respect to children of broken families it fails to further the state’s significant interests, however, a mature minor or minor whose best interests are contrary to notifying the non-custodial parent is forced to either suffer the unconstitutional requirement or submit to the burdensome court bypass procedure. Such a Hobson’s choice fails to further any significant interest. Just as there must be a constitutional judicial alternative to a notice requirement, so there must be a constitutional notice or consent alternative to the court bypass.
“The second reason for our conclusion that the court bypass procedure does not save the two-parent notification requirement is that where the parents are divorced, the minor and/or custodial parent, and not a court, is in the best position to determine whether notifying the non-custodial parent would be in the child’s best interests. In situations where the minor has a good relationship with the non-custodial parent but the custodial parent does not, there is nothing to prevent the minor from consulting with the non-custodial parent if she so desires. The minor and custodial parent, however, by virtue of their major interest and superior position, should alone have the opportunity to decide to whom, if anyone, notice of the minor’s abortion decision should be given." App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 88-1125, pp. 68a-69a (citations omitted).
The panel did not reach the question of the constitutionality or sev-erability of the mandatory 48-hour waiting period. A concurring judge agreed with the panel that a requirement that a pregnant minor seeking an abortion notify a noncustodial parent could not withstand constitutional scrutiny and was not saved by a court bypass procedure. Id., at 72a.
853 F. 2d, at 1460, quoting from Justice Powell’s opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 640-641 (1979) (Bellotti II).
The court also suggested that the statute furthered the “state interest in providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential medical and other information to a physician,” 853 F. 2d, at 1461, but the State has not argued here that that interest provides an additional basis for upholding the statute.
'The court also rejected the argument that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause by singling out abortion as the only pregnancy-related medical procedure requiring notification. Id.. at 1466. The equal protection challenge is not renewed here.
See n. 14, supra.
The District Court found:
“During the period for which statistics have been compiled, 3,573 bypass petitions were filed in Minnesota courts. Six petitions were withdrawn before decision. Nine petitions were denied and 3,558 were granted.” Finding No. 55, 648 F. Supp., at 765.
Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 72-75 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (1979); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 439-442 (1983); and Planned Parenthood Assn, of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, 490-493 (1983); id., at 505 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
The Utah statute reviewed in Matheson required the physician to “[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2) (1990). Unlike the Minnesota statute under review today, the Utah statute did not define the term “parents.” The statute is ambiguous as to whether the term refers to each parent individually or rather to the parental unit, which could be represented by either the mother or the father, and neither the argument nor the discussion in Matheson indicated that notice to both parents was required. State law, to the extent it addresses the issue, is to the contrary: Although Utah law provides that a noncustodial parent retains the right to consent to marriage, enlistment, and the performance of major medical or surgical treatment, the right to notice of the minor's abortion is not among the parent’s specific residual rights and duties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(13) (Supp. 1989).
The figures are not dissimilar to those throughout the Nation. See, e. g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13 (“It is estimated that by age 17, 70 percent of white children born in 1980 will have spent at least some time with only one parent, and 94 percent of black children will have lived in one-parent homes") (citing Hofferth, Updating Children’s Life Course, 47 J. Marriage and Fam. 93 (1985)).
“Studies indicating that family violence occurs in two million families in the United States substantially underestimate the actual number of such families. In Minnesota alone, reports indicate that there are an average of 31,200 incidents of assault on women by their partners each year. Based on these statistics, state officials suggest that the ‘battering’ of women by their partners ‘has come to be recognized as perhaps the most frequently committed violent crime in the state’ of Minnesota. These numbers do not include incidents of psychological or sexual abuse, low-level physical abuse, abuse of any sort of the child of a batterer, or those incidents which are not reported. Many minors in Minnesota live in fear of violence by family members; many of them are, in fact, victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence. It is impossible to accurately assess the magnitude of the problem of family violence in Minnesota because members of dysfunctional families are characteristically secretive about such matters and minors are particularly reluctant to reveal violence or abuse in their families. Thus the incidence of such family violence is dramatically underreported.” 648 F. Supp., at 768-769.
“Minors who are victims of sexual or physical abuse often are reluctant to reveal the existence of the abuse to those outside the home. More importantly, notification to government authorities creates a substantial risk that the confidentiality of the minor’s decision to terminate her pregnancy will be lost. Thus, few minors choose to declare they are victims of sexual or physical abuse despite the prevalence of such abuse in Minnesota, as elsewhere.” Id., at 764.
As one of the guardians ad litem testified: “We have had situations reported to me by my other guardians as well as teenagers that I talked to myself who have said that they will consider telling one parent, usually mom, sometimes dad, but since they would have to go to court anyway, because they are absolutely sure they don’t want the other parent to know, they don’t tell either one.” App. 239 (Testimony of Susanne Smith).
See n. 21, supra.
One testified that minors found the bypass procedure “ ‘a very nerve-racking experience,’” Finding 60, 648 F. Supp., at 766; another testified that the minor’s “‘level of apprehension is twice what I normally see in court.’ ” Ibid. A Massachusetts judge who heard similar petitions in that State expressed the opinion that “going to court was ‘absolutely’ traumatic for minors ... ‘at a very, very difficult time in their lives.’” Ibid. One judge stated that he did not “perceive any useful public purpose to what I am doing in these cases” and that he did not “see anything that is being accomplished that is useful to anybody.” Testimony of Gerald C. Martin, App. in No. 86-5423 (CA8), pp. A-488-A-489.
The public defenders and guardians ad litem gave similar testimony. See Testimony of Cynthia Daly (public defender), App. 187 (bypass “was another hoop to jump through and a very damaging and stress-producing procedure that didn’t do any good”); Testimony of Susanne Smith (guardian ad litem), id., at 234 (“The teenagers that we see in the guardian’s office are very nervous, very scared. Some of them are terrified about court processes. They are often exhausted. . . . They are upset about and tell us that they are upset about the fact that they have to explain very intimate details of their personal lives to strangers. They talk about feeling that they don’t belong in the court system, that they are ashamed, embarrassed and somehow that they are being punished for the situation they are in”); Testimony of Heather Sweetland (public defender), App. in No. 86-5423 (CA8), p. A-585 (“Most of the women that are my clients in these hearings are scared .... Some of them will relax slightly but the majority of them are very nervous”).
Doctor Hodgson, one of the plaintiffs in this case, testified that when her minor patients returned from the court process, “some of them are wringing wet with perspiration. They’re markedly relieved, many of them. They — they dread the court procedure often more than the actual abortion procedure. And it — it’s frequently necessary to give them a sedative of some kind beforehand.” App. 468.
According to the testimony at trial, parents who participated in the bypass procedure — many of whom had never before been in court — were “real upset” about having to appear in court, id., at 167, and were “angry, they were worried about their kid and they were nervous too.” Id., at 186.
“pr0perly understood . . . the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.” Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 638-639 (opinion of Powell, J.).
See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 394-396 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815, 825-826, n. 23 (1988) (plurality opinion).
Under common-law principles, one parent has authority to act as agent for the other in matters of their child’s upbringing and education. See E. Spencer, Law of Domestic Relations 432 (1911); T. Reeve, Law of Baron and Femme 295 (1816).
“Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 551-552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Far more than contraceptives, at issue in Poe and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), the married couple has a well-recognized interest in protecting the sanctity of their communications from undue interference by the State. See, e. g., Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 223 (1839) (“This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those domestic relations, that constitute the basis of civil society; and which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest relations of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence”); 2 W. Best, Principles of Law of Evidence 994-995 (1st Am. ed. 1876); 1 S. Greenleaf, Law of Evidence 286-287 (12th ed. 1866); 1 M. Phillips, Law of Evidence 69-80 (3d ed. 1849).
The record contains the telephone training manual of one clinic which contemplates that notification will be made on the date the patient contacts the clinic to arrange an abortion so that the appointment can be scheduled for a few days later. Since that clinic typically has a 1- to 2-day backlog, App. 146-147, the statutory waiting period creates little delay.
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S., at 449, upon which the plaintiffs rely, is not to the contrary. There we invalidated a provision that required that mature women, capable of consenting to an abortion, wait 24 hours after giving consent before undergoing an abortion. The only legitimate state interest asserted was that the “woman’s decision be informed.” Id., at 450. We decided that “if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give her written informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision." Id., at 450-451. By contrast, in this case, the State asserts a legitimate interest in protecting minor women from their own immaturity. As we explain in the text, the right of the minor to make an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy is not defeated by the 48-hour waiting period. It is significant that the statute does not impose a waiting period if a substitute competent decisionmaker— a parent or court — gives affirmative consent to the abortion.
The most common reason for not notifying the second parent was that that parent was a child- or spouse-batterer, App. 204, and notification would have provoked further abuse. For example, Judge Allen Oleisky, whose familiarity with the Minnesota statute is based on his having heard over 1,000 petitions from minors, id., at 154, testified that battering is a frequent crime in Minnesota, that parents seek an exemption from the notification requirement because they have been battered or are afraid of assault, and that notification of the father would “set the whole thing off again in some cases.” Id., at 166-167. See also id., at 237, 245, 339. That testimony is confirmed by the uncontradicted testimony of one of plaintiffs’ experts that notice of a daughter's pregnancy "would absolutely enrage [a batterer]. It would be much like showing a red cape to a bull. That kind of information just plays right into his worst fears and his most vulnerable spots. The sexual jealousy, his dislike of his daughter going out with anybody else, would make him very angry and would probably create severe abuse as well as long term communication difficulties." Id., at 194 (testimony of Lenore Walker).
Justice Kennedy recognizes that parental rights are coupled with parental responsibilities, post, at 483, and that “a State [may] legislate on the premise that parents, as a general rule, are interested in their children’s welfare and will act in accord with it,” post, at 485. That, of course, is precisely our point. What the State may not do is legislate on the generalized assumptions that a parent in an intact family will not act in his or her child's best interests and will fail to involve the other parent in the child’s upbringing when that involvement is appropriate.
See, e. g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 8 (state law typically allows a minor parent — whatever her age — to consent to the health care of her child); Brief for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici Curiae 25 (“In areas that do not deal with sexuality or substance abuse, states require, at most, a single parent’s consent before performing medical procedures on a minor”). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. SHEEHAN
No. 78-344.
Decided December 4, 1978
Per Curiam.
Petitioner, the Union Pacific Railroad Co., discharged respondent for violating one of its employee work rules. Respondent thereupon began an action in state court alleging wrongful discharge and denial of a fair hearing. While that claim was pending in state court, we decided Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U. S. 320 (1972), overruling Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630 (1941). Andrews held that a railroad employee alleging a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement must submit such a dispute to the National Railroad Adjustment Board for resolution in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§ 151-188. Following our decision in Andrews, respondent and Union Pacific stipulated to dismissal of the state-court suit and the case was dismissed without prejudice. Respondent then instituted a proceeding before the Adjustment Board. After full written submissions by both parties and two hearings, the Adjustment Board dismissed respondent’s claim because he had failed to file his appeal to the Adjustment Board within the time limits prescribed by the collective-bargaining agreement.
After the Adjustment Board dismissed his claim, respondent filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, seeking an order directing the Adjustment Board to hear the merits of his case, or, in the alternative, for reinstatement and a money judgment. Jurisdiction in the District Court was based upon § 3 First (q) of the Act, 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (q). Respondent claimed that the time requirements of the collective-bargaining agreement were tolled during the pendency of his state-court action and that the Adjustment Board should be required to hear and decide his claim on the merits. While admitting that respondent had “persuasively argued for tolling the time limits,” the District Court nonetheless affirmed the Adjustment Board’s order and awarded summary judgment to petitioner. The court held that respondent had failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the grounds for reversal of an Adjustment Board decision set forth in § 153 First (q), and that there was no “legal principle under which it [could] grant [respondent] relief without violating the provisions of the Railway Labor Act.” 423 F. Supp. 324, 329 (1976).
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court and remanded the case to the Adjustment Board. 576 F. 2d 854 (1978). At the beginning of its opinion, the court stated:
“The real issue here is whether the Board’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction because of non-compliance with the limitations in the modified collective bargaining agreement deprived Sheehan of his due process rights.
“We conclude the Board’s failure to address the merits of plaintiff Sheehan’s claim denied him due process. . . .” Id., at 855-856.
The court then canvassed prior decisions concerning the Railway Labor Act, and recognized that these cases had established that the scope of judicial review of Adjustment Board decisions is “among the narrowest known to the law.” Nonetheless, the court believed it “possible” that the extent of judicial review of “purely legal issues” decided by the Adjustment Board should be re-examined in light of the “implications arising from, and the developments since” our decision in Andrews. 576 F. 2d, at 856. The court then concluded as follows:
“As the district court noted, a persuasive argument can be made for the tolling of time limits. The court in Andrews expressed the view that an agreement under the Railway Labor Act was a federal contract governed and enforceable by federal law in the federal courts. . . . The applicability of equitable tolling to the agreement in question is not in doubt. While we do not pass on the merits of the tolling issue, we hold the failure of the Board to consider tolling under these circumstances deprived Sheehan of an opportunity to be heard in violation of his right to due process.” Id., at 857.
If the Court of Appeals’ remand was based on its view that the Adjustment Board had failed to consider respondent’s equitable tolling argument, the court was simply mistaken. The record shows that respondent tendered the tolling claim to the Adjustment Board, which considered it and explicitly rejected it. App. to Pet. for Cert. 22. If, on the other hand, the Court of Appeals intended to reverse the Adjustment Board's rejection of respondent’s equitable tolling argument, the court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction to review decisions of the Adjustment Board.
Judicial review of Adjustment Board orders is limited to three specific grounds: (1) failure of the Adjustment Board to comply with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act; (2) failure of the Adjustment Board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corruption. 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (q). Only upon one or more of these bases may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment Board. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U. S., at 325; Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 373 U. S. 33, 38 (1963). There is no suggestion of fraud or corruption here. And the Adjustment Board certainly was acting within its jurisdiction and in conformity with the requirements of the Act by determining the question of whether the time limitation of the governing collective-bargaining agreement was tolled by the filing of respondent’s state-court action. Respondent does not contend otherwise. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that respondent simply failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the grounds for review set forth in § 153 First (q).
Characterizing the issue presented as one of law, as the Court of Appeals seemed to do here, does not alter the availability or scope of judicial review: The dispositive question is whether the party’s objections to the Adjustment Board’s decision fall within any of the three limited categories of review provided for in the Railway Labor Act. Section 153 First (q) unequivocally states that the “findings and order of the [Adjustment Board] shall be conclusive on the parties” and may be set aside only for the three reasons specified therein. We have time and again emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says. See, e. g., Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co., 382 U. S. 257, 263 (1965); Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville B. Co., supra, at 38; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, 616 (1969). And nothing in our opinion in Andrews suggests otherwise. The determination by the Adjustment Board that respondent had failed to file his appeal within the time limits prescribed by the governing collective-bargaining agreement is one which falls within the above-quoted language precluding judicial review.
A contrary conclusion would ignore the terms, purposes and legislative history of the Railway Labor Act. In enacting this legislation, Congress endeavored to promote stability in labor-management relations in this important national industry by providing effective and efficient remedies for the resolution of railroad-employee disputes arising out of the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements. See Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co., supra; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, supra; Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 (1950). The Adjustment Board was created as a tribunal consisting of workers and management to secure the prompt, orderly and final settlement of grievances that arise daily between employees and carriers regarding rates of pay, rules and working conditions. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, supra, at 611; Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v Burley, 327 U S. 661, 664 (1946). Congress considered it essential to keep these so-called “minor” disputes within the Adjustment Board and out of the courts. Trainmen v. Chicago, R. & I. R. Co., 353 U. S. 30, 40 (1957). The effectiveness of the Adjustment Board in fulfilling its task depends on the finality of its determinations. Normally finality will work to the benefit of the worker: He will receive a final administrative answer to his dispute; and if he wins, he will be spared the expense and effort of time-consuming appeals which he may be less able to bear than the railroad. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, supra, at 613-614. Here, the principle of finality happens to cut the other way. But evenhanded application of this principle is surely what the Act requires.
The Adjustment Board determined that respondent had not filed his appeal within the time requirements of the collective-bargaining agreement. That decision is final and binding upon the parties, and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals had authority to disturb it. The motion of the respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are therefore granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur in the result.
Section 153 First (q) provides, in pertinent part:
“If any employee or group of employees, or any carrier, is aggrieved by the failure of any division of the Adjustment Board to make an award in a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of the terms of an award or by the failure of the division to include certain terms in such award, then such employee or group of employees or carrier may file in any United States district court in which a petition under paragraph (p) could be filed, a petition for review of the division’s order. . . . The court shall have jurisdiction to affirm the order of the division, or to set it aside, in whole or in part, or it may remand the proceedings to the division for such further action as it may direct. On such review, the findings and order of the division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the division may be set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded to the division, for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division’s jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making the order. The judgment of the court shall be subject to review as provided in sections 1291 and 1254 of title 28.”
The Court of Appeals rejected respondent’s request for attorney’s fees because 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (q), the section on which jurisdiction in the District Court was premised, does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees. 576 F. 2d, at 857-858. In his brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari, respondent urges this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of attorney’s fees and to award him attorney’s fees incurred in this Court and the courts below. The question whether the Court of Appeals correctly rejected respondent’s claim for attorney’s fees is not properly before the Court since respondent did not file a cross-petition for certiorari. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U. S. 548, 560 n. 11 (1976); see Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 381 n. 4 (1970). And we reject respondent’s request for attorney’s fees in this Court. He bases his claim for fees in this Court upon 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (p). Without passing upon the propriety of respondent’s reliance on subsection (p), it is sufficient to state that this subsection authorizes an award of attorney’s fees only if the “petitioner shall finally prevail” and that in view of our holding today, respondent has failed to triumph.
In support of its dismissal of respondent’s appeal, the Adjustment Board stated:
“Nor do we agree with [respondent] that the time limits did not commence running until the Utah court dismissed claimant’s breach of contract suit in November, 1972. Filing of the civil suit did not have the effect of obviating the time limits in the [collective-bargaining] Agreement. When claimant decided to pursue his remedies with this Board he was obligated to do so in the manner prescribed in the applicable Agreement in effect on the property. Since he failed to comply with the time limits of the Agreement, we have no standing to decide the merits of the claim and we are constrained to dismiss the claim for non compliance [sic] with the applicable time limits.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 22. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
159
] | sc_petitioner |
MU’MIN v. VIRGINIA
No. 90-5193.
Argued February 20, 1991
Decided May 30, 1991
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’ConnoR, Scalia, and SouteR, JJ., joined. O’ConnoR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 432. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in all but Part IV of which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 433. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 448.
John H. Blume, by appointment of the Court, 498 U. S. 936, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Mark E. Olive.
John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, H. Lane Kneedler, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Stephen D. Ro-senthal, Deputy Attorney General, Jerry P. Slonaker, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General.
Kenneth M. Mogill filed a brief for the National Jury Project as ami-cus curiae urging reversal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Dawud Majid Mu’Min was convicted of murdering a woman in Prince William County, Virginia, while out of prison on work detail, and was sentenced to death. The case engendered substantial publicity, and 8 of the 12 venireper-sons eventually sworn as jurors answered on voir dire that they had read or heard something about the case. None of those who had read or heard something indicated that they had formed an opinion based on the outside information, or that it would affect their ability to determine petitioner’s guilt or innocence based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Petitioner contends, however, that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because the trial judge refused to question further prospective jurors about the specific contents of the news reports to which they had been exposed. We reject petitioner’s submission.
Mu’Min was an inmate at the Virginia Department of Corrections’ Haymarket Correctional Unit serving a 48-year sentence for a 1973 first-degree murder conviction. On September 22, 1988, he was transferred to the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) Headquarters in Prince William County and assigned to a work detail supervised by a VDOT employee. During his lunch break, he escaped over a perimeter fence at the VDOT facility and made his way to a nearby shopping center. Using a sharp instrument that he had fashioned at the VDOT shop, Mu’Min murdered and robbed Gladys Nopwasky, the owner of a retail carpet and flooring store. Mu’Min then returned to his prison work crew at the VDOT, discarding his bloodied shirt and the murder weapon near the highway.
About three months before trial, petitioner submitted to the trial court, in support of a motion for a change of venue, 47 newspaper articles relating to the murder. One or more of the articles discussed details of the murder and investigation, and included information about petitioner’s prior criminal record, App. 963-969, the fact that he had been rejected for parole six times, id., at 923, 942, accounts of alleged prison infractions, id., at 921, 931, 942, details about the prior murder for which Mu’Min was serving his sentence at the time of this murder, id., at 948, 951, a comment that the death penalty had not been available when Mu’Min was convicted for this earlier murder, id., at 948, and indications that Mu’Min had confessed to killing Gladys Nopwasky, id., at 975. Several articles focused on the alleged laxity in the supervision of work gangs, id., at 922-924, 930-931, and argued for reform of the prison work-crew system, id., at 974. The trial judge deferred ruling on the venue motion until after making an attempt to seat a jury, Joint Appendix 8-15 (J. A.).
Shortly before the date set for trial, petitioner submitted to the trial judge 64 proposed voir dire questions, id., at 2-7, and filed a motion for individual voir dire. The trial court denied the motion for individual voir dire; it ruled that voir dire would begin with collective questioning of the ve-nire, but the venire would be broken down into panels of four, if necessary, to deal with issues of publicity, id., at 16-17. The trial court also refused to ask any of petitioner’s proposed questions relating to the content of news items that potential jurors might have read or seen.
Twenty-six prospective jurors were summoned into the courtroom and questioned as a group, id., at 42-66. When asked by the judge whether anyone had acquired any information about the alleged offense or. the accused from the news media or from any other source, 16 of the potential jurors replied that they had, id., at 46-47. The prospective jurors were not asked about the source or content of prior knowledge, but the court then asked the following questions:
“Would the information that you heard, received, or read from whatever source, would that information af-féct your impartiality in this case?
“Is there anyone that would say what you’ve read, seen, heard, or whatever information you may have acquired from whatever the source would affect your impartiaiity so that you could not be impartial?
“Considering what the ladies and gentlemen who have answered in the affirmative have heard or read about this case, do you believe that you can enter the Jury box with an open mind and await until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion or conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?
“. . . In view of everything that you’ve seen, heard, or read, or any information from whatever source that you’ve acquired about this case, is there anyone who believes that you could not become a Juror, enter the Jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?” Id., at 47-48.
One of the 16 panel members who admitted to having prior knowledge of the case answered in response to these questions that he could not be impartial, and was dismissed for cause, id., at 48-49. Petitioner moved that all potential jurors who indicated that they had been exposed to pretrial publicity be excused for cause, id., at 68. This motion was denied, id., at 69, as was petitioner’s renewed motion for a change of venue based on the pretrial publicity, id., at 71.
The trial court then conducted further voir dire of the prospective jurors in panels of four, id., at 72-94. Whenever a potential juror indicated that he had read or heard something about the case, the juror was then asked whether he had formed an opinion and whether he could nonetheless be impartial. None of those eventually seated stated that he had formed an opinion or gaye any indication that he was biased or prejudiced against the defendant. All swore that they could enter the jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case was presented before reaching a conclusion as to guilt or innocence.
If any juror indicated that he had discussed the case with anyone, the court asked follow-up questions to determine with whom the discussion took place and whether the juror could have an open mind despite the discussion. One juror who equivocated as to whether she could enter the jury box with an open mind was removed sua sponte by the trial judge, id., at 90. One juror was dismissed for cause because she was not “as frank as she could [be]” concerning the effect of her feelings toward members of the Islamic Faith and toward defense counsel, id., at 81. One juror was dismissed because of her inability to impose the death penalty, id., at 86-87, while another was removed based upon his statement that upon a finding of capital murder, he could not consider a penalty less than death, App. 339-341. The prosecution and the defense each peremptorily challenged 6 potential jurors, and the remaining 14 were seated and sworn as jurors (two as alternates). Petitioner did not renew his motion for change of venue or make any other objection to the composition of the jury. Of the 12 jurors who decided petitioner’s case, 8 had at one time or another read or heard something about the case. None had indicated that he had formed an opinion about the case or would be biased in any way.
The jury found petitioner guilty of capital murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death. After taking the matter under advisement and reviewing a presentence report, the trial judge accepted the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Mu’Min to death. Mu’Min appealed, contending that he was entitled to a new trial as a result of the judge’s failure to permit the proposed voir dire questions. By a divided vote, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his conviction and sentence, finding that, while a criminal defendant may properly ask on voir dire whether a juror has previously acquired any information about the case, the defendant does not have a constitutional right to explore the content of the acquired information. Rather, an accused is only entitled to know whether the juror can remain impartial in light of the previously obtained information. 239 Va. 433, 443, 389 S. E. 2d 886, 893 (1990). We granted certiorari, 498 U. S. 894 (1990), and now affirm.
Our cases dealing with the requirements of voir dire are of two kinds: those that were tried in federal courts, and are therefore subject to this Court’s supervisory power, see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S. 182 (1981); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U. S. 308 (1931); and Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408 (1895); and those that were tried in state courts, with respect to which our authority is limited to, enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U. S. 28 (1986); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976); and Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973).
A brief review of these cases is instructive. In Connors, we said:
“[A] suitable inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issues to be tried. That inquiry is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the same rule must be applied in criminal cases.” 158 U. S., at 413.
In Aldridge v. United States, supra, counsel for a black defendant sought to have the Court put a question to the jury as to whether any of them might be prejudiced against the defendant because of his race. We held that it was reversible error for the Court not to have put such a question, saying “[t]he Court failed to ask any question which could be deemed to cover the subject.” Id., at 311. More recently, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra, we held that such an inquiry as to racial or ethnic prejudice need not be made in every case, but only where the defendant was accused of a violent crime and the defendant and the victim were members of different racial or ethnic groups. We said:
“Because the obligation to empanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to conduct the voir dire.” Id., at 189.
Three of our cases dealing with the extent of voir dire examination have dealt with trials in state courts. The first of these was Ham v. South Carolina, supra. In that case, the defendant was black and had been active in the civil rights movement in South Carolina; his defense at trial was that enforcement officers were “out to get him” because of his civil rights activities, and that he had been framed on the charge of marijuana possession of which he was accused. He requested that two questions be asked regarding racial prejudice and one question be asked regarding prejudice against persons, such as himself, who wore beards. We held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the court to ask “either of the brief, general questions urged by the petitioner” with respect to race, id., at 527, but rejected his claim that an inquiry as to prejudice against persons with beards be made, “[g]iven the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting voir dire . . . .” Id., at 528.
In Ristaino v. Ross, supra, we held that the Constitution does not require a state-court trial judge to question prospective jurors as to racial prejudice in every case where the races of the defendant and the victim differ, but in Turner v. Murray, supra, we held that in a capital case involving a charge of murder of a white person by a black defendant such questions must be asked.
We enjoy more latitude in setting standards for voir dire in federal courts under our supervisory power than we have in interpreting the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to voir dire in state courts. But two parallel themes emerge from both sets of cases: First, the possibility of racial prejudice against a black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice; second, the trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire. As we said in Rosales-Lopez, supra:
“Despite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge’s function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.” Id., at 188.
Petitioner asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment requires more in the way of voir dire with respect to pretrial publicity than our cases have held that it does with respect to racial or ethnic prejudice. Not only must the court “cover the subject,” Aldridge, supra, at 311, but it must make precise inquiries about the contents of any news reports that potential jurors have read. Petitioner argues that these “content” questions would materially assist in obtaining a jury less likely to be tainted by pretrial publicity than one selected without such questions. There is a certain commonsense appeal to this argument.
Undoubtedly, if counsel were allowed to see individual jurors answer questions about exactly what they had read, a better sense of the juror’s general outlook on life might be revealed, and such a revelation would be of some use in exercising peremptory challenges. But, since peremptory challenges are not required by the Constitution, Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 81, 88 (1988), this benefit cannot be a basis for making “content” questions about pretrial publicity a constitutional requirement. Such questions might also have some effect in causing jurors to reevaluate their own answers as to whether they had formed any opinion about the case, but this is necessarily speculative.
Acceptance of petitioner’s claim would require that each potential juror be interrogated individually; even were the interrogation conducted in panels of four jurors, as the trial court did here, descriptions of one juror about pretrial publicity would obviously be communicated to the three other members of the panel being interrogated, with the prospect that more harm than good would be done by the interrogation. Petitioner says that the questioning can be accomplished by juror questionnaires submitted in advance at trial, but such written answers would not give counsel or the court any exposure to the demeanor of the juror in the course of answering the content questions. The trial court in this case expressed reservations about interrogating jurors individually because it might, make the jurors feel that they themselves were on trial. While concern for the feelings and sensibilities of potential jurors cannot be allowed to defeat inquiry necessary to protect a constitutional right, we do not believe that “content” questions are constitutionally required.
Whether a trial court decides to put questions about the content of publicity to a potential juror or not, it must make the same decision at the end of the questioning: is this juror to be believed when he says he has not formed an opinion about the case? Questions about the content of the publicity to which jurors have been exposed might be helpful in assessing whether a juror is impartial. To be constitutionally compelled, however, it is not enough that such questions might be helpful. Rather, the trial court’s failure to ask these questions must render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799 (1975).
Aldridge was this Court’s seminal case requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice, and the opinion makes clear that in reaching that result we relied heavily on a unanimous body of state-court precedents holding that such an inquiry should be made. 283 U. S., at 311-313. On the subject of pretrial publicity, however, there is no similar consensus, or even weight of authority, favoring petitioner’s position. Among the state-court decisions cited to us by the parties, not only Virginia, but South Carolina, State v. Lucas, 285 S. C. 37, 39-40, 328 S. E. 2d 63, 64-65, cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1012 (1985), Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Burden, 15 Mass. App. 666, 674, 448 N. E. 2d 387, 393 (1983), and Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Dolhancryk, 273 Pa. Super. 217, 222, 417 A. 2d 246, 248 (1979), have refused to adopt such a rule. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Davis, 583 F. 2d 190, 196 (1978), the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. 2d 340, 375-376 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 970 (1973), and the Ninth Circuit, Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F. 2d 627, 639 (1968), have held that in some circumstances such an inquiry is required. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has held that it is not. United States v. Montgomery, 772 F. 2d 733, 735-736 (1985). The Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits appear to take an intermediate position. United States v. Poludniak, 657 F. 2d 948, 956 (CA8 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Weigand v. United States, 455 U. S. 940 (1982); United States v. Haldeman, 181 U. S. App. D. C. 254, 288-289, 559 F. 2d 31, 65-66 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Ehrlichman v. United States, 431 U. S. 933 (1977). Even those Federal Courts of Appeals that have required such an inquiry to be made have not expressly placed their decision on constitutional grounds.
As noted above, our own cases have stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias. Particularly with respect to pretrial publicity, we think this primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense. The judge of that court sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect and brings to his evaluation of any such claim his own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that paight influence a juror. The trial court, of course, does not impute his own perceptions to the jurors who are being examined, but these perceptions should be of assistance to it in deciding how detailed an inquiry to make of the members of the jury venire.
Petitioner relies heavily on our opinion in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), to support his position. In that case, we held that pretrial publicity in connection with a capital trial had so tainted the jury pool in Gibson County, Indiana, that the defendant was entitled as a matter of federal constitutional law to a change of venue to another county. Our opinion in that case details at great length the extraordinary publicity that attended the defendant’s prosecution and conviction for murder.
“[A] barrage of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed against [the defendant] during the six or seven months preceding his trial. . . . [T]he newspapers in which the stories appeared were delivered regularly to approximately 95% of the dwellings in Gibson County and . . . the Evansville radio and TV stations, which likewise blanketed that county, also carried extensive newscasts covering the same incidents.” Id., at 725.
Two-thirds of the jurors actually seated had formed an opinion that the defendant was guilty, and acknowledged familiarity with material facts and circumstances of the case. Id., at 728. Although each of these jurors said that he could be impartial, we concluded:
“With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt.” Ibid.
We believe that this case is instructive, but not in the way petitioner employs it. It did not deal with any constitutional requirement of voir dire inquiry, and it is not clear from our opinion how extensive an inquiry the trial court made. But the contrast between that case and the present one is marked. In Irvin, the trial court excused over half of a panel of 430 persons because their opinions of the defendant’s guilt were so fixed that they could not be impartial, and 8 of the 12 jurors who sat had formed an opinion as to guilt. In the present case, 8 of the 12 jurors who sat answered that they had read or heard something about the case, but none of those 8 indicated that he had formed an opinion as to guilt, or that the information would affect his ability to judge petitioner solely on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.
A trial court’s findings of juror impartiality may “be overturned only for ‘manifest error.’” Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025, 1031 (1984) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, supra, at 723). In Patton, we acknowledged that “adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can- be impartial should not be believed,” 467 U. S., at 1031, but this is not such a case. Had the trial court in this case been confronted with the “wave of public passion” engendered by pretrial publicity that occurred in connection with Irvin’s trial, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might well have required more extensive examination of potential jurors than it undertook here. But the showings are not comparable; the cases differ both in the kind of community in which the coverage took place and in extent of media coverage. Unlike the community involved in Irvin, the county in which petitioner was tried, Prince William, had a population in 1988 of 182,537, and this was one of nine murders committed in the county that year. It is a part of the metropolitan Washington statistical area, which has a population of over 3 million, and in which, unfortunately, hundreds of murders are committed each year. In Irvin, news accounts included details of the defendant’s confessions to 24 burglaries and six murders, including the one for which he was tried, as well as his unaccepted offer to plead guilty in order to avoid the death sentence. They contained numerous opinions as to his guilt, as well as opinions about the appropriate punishment. While news reports about Mu’Min were not favorable, they did not contain the same sort of damaging information. Much of the pretrial publicity was aimed at the Department of Corrections and the criminal justice system in general, criticizing the furlough and work-release programs that made this and other crimes possible. Any killing that ultimately results in a charge of capital murder will engender considerable media coverage, and this one may have engendered more than most because of its occurrence during the 1988 Presidential campaign, when a similar crime committed by a Massachusetts inmate became a subject of national debate. But, while the pretrial publicity in this case appears to have been substantial, it was not of the same kind or extent as that found to exist in Irvin.
Petitioner also relies on the Standards for Criminal Justice 8-3.5 (2d ed. 1980) promulgated by the American Bar Association. These Standards require interrogation of each juror individually with respect to “what the prospective juror has read and heard about the case,” “[i]f there is a substantial possibility that individual jurors will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material. ” These Standards, of course, leave to the trial court the initial determination of whether there is such a substantial possibility. But, more importantly, the Standards relating to voir dire are based on a substantive rule that renders a potential juror subject to challenge for cause, without regard to his state of mind, if he has been exposed to and remembers “highly significant information” or “other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible in evidence.” That is a stricter standard of juror eligibility than that which we have held the Constitution to require. Under the ABA Standard, answers to questions about content, without more, could disqualify the juror from sitting. Under the constitutional standard, on the other hand, “[t]he relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.” Patton, supra, at 1035. Under this constitutional standard, answers to questions about content alone, which reveal that a juror remembered facts about the case, would not be sufficient to disqualify a juror. “It is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” Irvin, 366 U. S., at 722.
The ABA Standards, as indicated in our previous discussion of state and federal court decisions, have not commended themselves to a majority of the courts that have considered the question. The fact that a particular rule may be thought to be the “better” view does not mean that it is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141 (1973).
The voir dire examination conducted by the trial court in this case was by no means perfunctory. The court asked the entire venire of jurors four separate questions about the effect on them of pretrial publicity or information about the case obtained by other means. One juror admitted to having formed a belief as to petitioner’s guilt and was excused for cause. The trial court then conducted further voir dire in panels of four, and each time an individual juror indicated that he had acquired knowledge about the case from outside sources, he was asked whether he had formed an opinion; none of the jurors seated indicated that he had formed an opinion. One juror who equivocated as to her impartiality was excused by the trial court on its own motion. Several other jurors were excused for other reasons. It is quite possible that if voir dire interrogation had revealed one or more jurors who had formed an opinion about the case, the trial court might have decided to question succeeding jurors more extensively.
Voir dire examination serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges. In Aldridge and Ham we held that the subject of possible racial bias must be “covered” by the questioning of the trial court in the course of its examination of potential jurors, but we were careful not to specify the particulars by which this could be done. We did not, for instance, require questioning of individual jurors about facts or experiences that might have led to racial bias. Petitioner in this case insists, as a matter of constitutional right, not only that the subject of possible bias from pretrial publicity be covered — which it was — but that questions specifically dealing with the content of what each juror has read be asked. For the reasons previously stated, we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach this far, and that the voir dire examination conducted by the trial court in this case was consistent with that provision. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is accordingly
Affirmed.
The articles had been published between September 26, 1988, and January 14, 1989. More than half of them appeared in the Potomac News, a daily paper with circulation of only 25,000, and the remainder were printed in the Washington Post and several other local newspapers. See App. in No. 890899 (Sup. Ct. Va.) 921-975 (App.).
The court approved 24 of the proposed questions, but did not allow the following questions regarding the content of what jurors had read or heard about the case (J. A. 17-41):
“32. What have you seen, read or heard about this case?
“33. From whom or what did you get this information?
“34. When and where did you get this information?”
“38. What did you discuss?”
“41. Has anyone expressed any opinion about this case to you?
“42. Who? What? When? Where?”
The trial court did ask several of the requested questions concerning prior knowledge of the case:
“31. Have you acquired any information about this case from the newspapers, television,-conversations, or any other source?”
“35. Have you discussed this case with anyone?
“36. With whom?
“37. When and where?”
In Silverthorne, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that jurors should be interrogated as to the contents of the news reports which they had read. But in the later case of United States v. Polizzi, 500 F. 2d 856 (1974), cert. denied sub nom. Emprise Corp. v. United States, 419 U. S. 1120 (1975), that court held that the pretrial publicity in that case had not been substantial enough to require extended interrogation. It pointed out that in Silverthorne, there had been over 300 articles about the defendant, there had been radio and television coverage, and he had testified before the Senate Committee on Government Operations; out of a panel of 65 potential jurors, all had been exposed to some publicity, and 19 had been excused because they had formed an opinion. And in United States v. Giese, 597 F. 2d 1170 (CA9), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 979 (1979), that court again distinguished Silverthorne, commenting that a trial court’s own observation must be its guide to the effect of pretrial publicity. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the court in which the case originated. Consider the District of Columbia as a state. | What is the state of the court in which the case originated? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
54
] | sc_caseoriginstate |
UNITED STATES v. URSERY
No. 95-345.
Argued April 17, 1996
Decided June 24, 1996
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 292. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 297. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 297.
Michael R. Dreeben argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Miguel A. Estrada, Kathleen A. Felton, and Joseph Douglas Wilson.
Jeffry K. Finer argued the cause for respondents in No. 95-346. With him on the briefs were Jeffrey Steinborn, David Michael, and E. E. Edwards III.
Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for respondent in No. 95-345. With him on the brief were Donald M. Falk and Lawrence J. Emery, by appointment of the Court, 516 U. S. 1109.
Together with No. 95-346, United States v. $105,089,23 in United States Currency et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Connecticut et al. by John M. Bailey, Chief State’s Attorney of Connecticut, and Mary H. Lesser, Assistant State’s Attorney, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Pamela Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Cur-ran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T Poritz of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Pedro R. Pierluisi of Puerto Rico, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony Condon of South Carolina, Mark W. Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jan Graham of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Christine 0. Gregoire of Washington, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; for the County of San Ber-nardino, California, et al. by Dennis L. Stout, Dee R. Edgeworth, Michael J. Yraceburn, Phillip R. Urie, and Armando G. Cuellar, Jr.; for the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office et al. by Jack O’Malley, Renee Goldfarb, and Janet Powers Doyle; and for the Thirty-nine Counties of the State of Washington by Norm Maleng, Barbara A. Mack, David Bruneau, Arthur Curtis, Allen C. Nielson, Russ Hauge, Jeremy Randolf, John Ladenburg, Jim Sweetser, James L. Nagle, and Jeffrey C. Sullivan.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Susan N. Herman, Gerard E. Lynch, and Steven R. Shapiro; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard M. Wein-traub, and Bernard J. Farber; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Richard J. Troberman and David B. Smith; and for Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety et al. by Henry M. Jasny.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In separate cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the Government from both punishing a defendant for a criminal offense and forfeiting his property for that same offense in a separate civil proceeding. We consolidated those cases for our review, and now reverse. These civil forfeitures (and civil forfeitures generally), we hold, do not constitute “punishment” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
I
No. 95-345: Michigan Police found marijuana growing adjacent to respondent Guy Ursery’s house, and discovered marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a grow light within the house. The United States instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the house, alleging that the property was ' subject to forfeiture under 84 Stat. 1276, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), because it had been used for several years to facilitate the unlawful processing and distribution of a controlled substance. Ursery ultimately paid the United States $13,250 to settle the forfeiture claim in full. Shortly before the settlement was consummated, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana, in violation of § 841(a)(1). A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 63 months in prison.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by a divided vote reversed Ursery’s criminal conviction, holding that the conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 59 F. 3d 568 (1995). The court based its conclusion in part upon its belief that our decisions in United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), meant that any civil forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) constitutes punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ursery, in the court’s view, had therefore been “punished” in the forfeiture proceeding against his property, and could not be subsequently criminally tried for violation of 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1).
No. 95-349: Following a jury trial, Charles Wesley Arlt and James Wren were convicted of: conspiracy to aid and abet the manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846; conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 371; and numerous counts of money laundering, in violation of § 1956. The District Court sentenced Arlt to life in prison and a 10-year term of supervised release, and imposed a fine of $250,000. Wren was sentenced to life imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release.
Before the criminal trial had started, the United States had filed a civil in rem complaint against various property seized from, or titled to, Arlt and Wren, or Payback Mines, a corporation controlled by Arlt. The complaint alleged that each piece of property was subject to forfeiture both under 18 U. S. C. § 981(a)(1)(A), which provides that “[a]ny property . .. involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of” §1956 (the money-laundering statute) “is subject to forfeiture to the United States”; and under 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(6), which provides for the forfeiture of (i) “[a]ll... things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for” illegal drugs, (ii) “all proceeds traceable to such an exchange,” and (iii) “all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate” a federal drug felony. The parties agreed to defer litigation of the forfeiture action during the criminal prosecution. More than a year after the conclusion of the criminal trial, the District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment in the civil forfeiture proceeding.
Arlt and Wren appealed the decision in the forfeiture action, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the forfeiture violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 33 F. 3d 1210 (1994), amended 56 F. 3d 41 (1995). The court’s decision was based in part upon the same view as that- expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Ursery’s case — that our decisions in Halper, supra, and Austin, supra, meant that, as a categorical matter, forfeitures under §§ 981(a)(1)(A) and 881(a)(6) always constitute “punishment.”
We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari in each of the two cases, and we now reverse. 516 U. S. 1070 (1996).
II
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Arndt.. 5. The Clause serves the function of preventing both “successive punishments and . . . successive prosecutions.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696 (1993), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969). The protection against multiple punishments prohibits the Government from “ ‘punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense.’” Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 396 (1995) (emphasis deleted), quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938).
In the decisions that we review, the Courts of Appeals held that the civil forfeitures constituted “punishment,” making them subject to the prohibitions of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Government challenges that characterization of the forfeitures, arguing that the courts were wrong to conclude that civil forfeitures are punitive for double jeopardy purposes.
A
Since the earliest years of this Nation, Congress has authorized the Government to seek parallel in rem civil forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions based upon the same underlying events. See, e. g., Act of July 31,1789, ch. 5, § 12, 1 Stat. 39 (goods unloaded at night or without a permit subject to forfeiture and persons unloading subject to criminal prosecution); § 25, id., at 43 (persons convicted of buying or concealing illegally imported goods subject to both monetary fine and in rem forfeiture of the goods); § 34, id., at 46 (imposing criminal penalty and in rem forfeiture where person convicted of relanding goods entitled to drawback); see also The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14-15 (1827) (“Many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty”); cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 683 (1974) (discussing adoption of forfeiture statutes by early Congresses). And, in a long line of cases, this Court has considered the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to civil forfeitures, consistently concluding that the Clause does not apply to such actions because they do not impose punishment.
One of the first cases to consider the relationship between the Double Jeopardy Clause and civil forfeiture was Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U. S. 577 (1931). In Various Items, the Waterloo Distilling Corporation had been ordered to forfeit a distillery, warehouse, and denaturing plant, on the ground that the corporation had conducted its distilling business in violation of federal law. The Government conceded that the corporation had been convicted of criminal violations prior to the initiation of the forfeiture proceeding, and admitted that the criminal conviction had been based upon “the transactions set forth . . . as a basis for the forfeiture.” Id., at 579. Considering the corporation’s argument that the forfeiture action violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, this Court unanimously held that the Clause was inapplicable to civil forfeiture actions:
“[This] forfeiture proceeding ... is m rem. It is the property which is proceeded against, and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against, convicted, and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense. The provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in respect of double jeopardy does not apply.” Id., at 581 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In reaching its conclusion, the Court drew a sharp distinction between in rem civil forfeitures and in personam civil penalties such as fines: Though the latter could, in some circumstances, be punitive, the former could not. Ibid. Referring to a case that was decided the same day as Various Items, the Court made its point absolutely clear:
“In United States v. La Franca, [282 U. S.] 568, we hold that, under § 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act, a civil action to recover taxes, which in fact are penalties, is punitive in character and barred by a prior conviction of the defendant for a criminal offense involving the same transactions. This, however, is not that case, but a proceeding in rem to forfeit property used in committing an offense.” Id., at 580.
Had the Court in Various Items found that a civil forfeiture could constitute a “punishment” under the Fifth Amendment, its holding would have been quite remarkable. As that Court recognized, “[a]t common law, in many cases, the right of forfeiture did not attach until the offending person had been convicted and the record of conviction produced.” Ibid. In other words, at common law, not only was it the case that a criminal conviction did not bar a civil forfeiture, but, in fact, the civil forfeiture could not be instituted unless a criminal conviction had already been obtained. Though this Court had held that common-law rule inapplicable where the right of forfeiture was “created by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the exchequer,” The Palmyra, supra, at 14, it never had suggested that the Constitution prohibited for statutory civil forfeiture what was required for common-law civil forfeiture. For the Various Items Court to have held that the forfeiture was prohibited by the prior criminal proceeding would have been directly contrary to the common-law rule, and would have called into question the constitutionality of forfeiture statutes thought constitutional for over a century. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 327-328 (1936) (Evidence of a longstanding legislative practice “goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality of the practice”).
Following its decision in Various Items, the Court did not consider another double jeopardy case involving a civil forfeiture for 40 years. Then, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232 (1972) (per curiam), the Court’s brief opinion reaffirmed the rule of Various Items. In Emerald Cut Stones, after having been acquitted of smuggling jewels into the United States, the owner of the jewels intervened in a proceeding to forfeit them as contraband. We rejected the owner’s double jeopardy challenge to the forfeiture, holding that “[i]f for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments.” 409 U. S., at 235. Noting that the forfeiture provisions had been codified separately from parallel criminal provisions, the Court determined that the forfeiture clearly was “a civil sanction.” Id., at 236. The forfeitures were not criminal punishments because they did not impose a second in personam penalty for the criminal defendant’s wrongdoing.
In our most recent decision considering whether a civil forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, we again affirmed the rule of Various Items. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984), the owner of the defendant weapons was acquitted of charges of dealing firearms without a license. The Government then brought a forfeiture action against the firearms under 18 U. S. C. § 924(d), alleging that they were used or were intended to be used in violation of federal law.
In another unanimous decision, we held that the forfeiture was not barred by the prior criminal proceeding. We began our analysis by stating the rule for our decision:
“Unless the forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable. The question, then, is whether a § 924(d) forfeiture proceeding is intended to be, or by its nature necessarily is, criminal and punitive, or civil and remedial.” 89 Firearms, supra, at 362 (citations omitted).
Our inquiry proceeded in two stages. In the first stage, we looked to Congress’ intent, and concluded that “Congress designed forfeiture under § 924(d) as a remedial civil sanction.” 465 U. S., at 363. This conclusion was based upon several findings. First, noting that the forfeiture proceeding was in rem, we found it significant that “[ajctions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon seizure of a physical object.” Ibid,, citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S., at 684. Second, we found that the forfeiture provision, because it reached both weapons used in violation of federal law and those “intended to be used” in such a manner, reached a broader range of conduct than its criminal analog. Third, we concluded that the civil forfeiture “furthered] broad remedial aims,” including both “discouraging unregulated commerce in firearms” and “removing from circulation firearms that have been used or intended for use outside regulated channels of commerce.” 89 Firearms, supra, at 364.
In the second stage of our analysis, we looked to “ ‘whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate’ Congress’ intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism,” 465 U. S., at 365, quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980). Considering several factors that we had used previously in order to determine whether a civil proceeding was so punitive as to require application of the full panoply of constitutional protections required in a criminal trial, see id., at 248, we found only one of those factors to be present in the § 924(d) forfeiture. By itself, however, the fact that the behavior proscribed by the forfeiture was already a crime proved insufficient to turn the forfeiture into a punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Hence, we found that the gun owner had “failed to establish by the ‘clearest proof’ that Congress has provided a sanction so punitive as to ‘transform] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.’” 89 Firearms, supra, at 366, quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956). We concluded our decision by restating that civil forfeiture is “not an additional penalty for the commission of a criminal act, but rather is a separate civil sanction, remedial in nature.” 89 Firearms, supra, at 366.
B
Our cases reviewing civil forfeitures under the Double Jeopardy Clause adhere to a remarkably consistent theme. Though the two-part analytical construct employed in 89 Firearms was more refined, perhaps, than that we had used over 50 years earlier in Various Items, the conclusion was the same in each case: In rem civil forfeiture is a remedial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in personam civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 392 (1958) (“In applying a provision like that of double jeopardy, which is rooted in history and is not an evolving concept..., a long course of adjudication in this Court carries impressive authority”).
In the cases that we currently review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized as much, concluding that after 89 Firearms, “the law was clear that civil forfeitures did not constitute ‘punishment’ for double jeopardy purposes.” 33 F. 3d, at 1218. Nevertheless, that court read three of our decisions to have “abandoned” 89 Firearms and the oft-affirmed rule of Various Items. According to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, through our decisions in United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989), Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993), and Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767 (1994), we “changed [our] collective mind,” and “adopted a new test for determining whether a nominally civil sanction constitutes ‘punishment’ for double jeopardy purposes.” 33 F. 3d, at 1218-1219. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit shared the view of the Ninth Circuit, though it did not directly rely upon Kurth Ranch. We turn now to consider whether Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch accomplished the radical jurisprudential shift perceived by the Courts of Appeals.
In Halper, we considered “whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute ‘punishment’ for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.” Halper, supra, at 436. Based upon his submission of 65 inflated Medicare claims, each of which overcharged the Government by $9, Halper was criminally convicted of 65 counts of violating the false-claims statute, 18 U. S. C. § 287 (1982 ed.), as well as of 16 counts of mail fraud, and was sentenced to two years in prison and fined $5,000. Following that criminal conviction, the Government successfully brought a civil action against Halper under 31 U. S. C. § 3729 (1982 ed. and Supp. II). The District Court hearing the civil action determined that Halper was liable to the Government for over $130,000 under §3729, which then provided for liability in the amount of $2,000 per violation, double the Government’s actual damages, and court costs. The court concluded that imposing the full civil penalty would constitute a second punishment for Halper’s already-punished criminal offense, however, and therefore reduced Halper’s liability to double the actual damages suffered by the Government and the costs of the civil action. The Government directly appealed that decision to this Court.
This Court agreed with the District Court’s analysis. We determined that our precedent had established no absolute and irrebuttable rule that a civil fine cannot be “punishment” under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Though it was well established that “a civil remedy does not rise to the level of ‘punishment’ merely because Congress provided for civil recovery in excess of the Government’s actual damages,” we found that our case law did “not foreclose the possibility that in a particular case a civil penalty ... may be so extreme and so divorced from the Government’s damages and expenses as to constitute punishment.” 490 U. S., at 442. Emphasizing the case-specific nature of our inquiry, id., at 448, we compared the size of the fine imposed on Halper, $130,000, to the damages actually suffered by the Government as a result of Halper’s actions, estimated by the District Court at $585. Noting that the fine was more than 220 times greater than the Government’s damages, we agreed with the District Court that “Halper’s $130,000 liability is sufficiently disproportionate that the sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of double jeopardy.” Id., at 452. We remanded to the District Court so that it could hear evidence regarding the Government’s actual damages, and could then reduce Halper’s liability to a nonpunitive level. Ibid.
In Austin, we considered whether a civil forfeiture could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed . . ..” Aware that Austin had sold two grams of cocaine the previous day, police searched his mobile home and body shop. Their search revealed small amounts of marijuana and cocaine, a handgun, drug paraphernalia, and almost $5,000 in cash. Austin was charged with one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, to which he pleaded guilty. The Government then initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against Austin’s mobile home and auto shop, contending that they had been “used” or were “intended for use” in the commission of a drug offense. See 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). Austin contested the forfeiture on the ground of the Excessive Fines Clause, but the District Court and the Court of Appeals held the forfeiture constitutional.
We limited our review to the question “whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures of property under 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).” Austin, supra, at 604. We began our analysis by rejecting the argument that the Excessive Fines Clause was limited solely to criminal proceedings: The relevant question was not whether a particular proceeding was criminal or civil, we determined, but rather was whether forfeiture under §§881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted “punishment” for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Austin, supra, at 610. In an effort to answer that question, we briefly reviewed the history of civil forfeiture both in this country and in England, see 509 U. S., at 611-618, taking a categorical approach that contrasted sharply with Halper’s case-specific approach to determining whether a civil penalty constitutes punishment. Ultimately, we concluded that “forfeiture under [§§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)] constitutes ‘payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,’ and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.” 509 U. S., at 622 (citation omitted).
In Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, supra, we considered whether a state tax imposed on marijuana was invalid under the Double Jeopardy Clause when the taxpayer had already been criminally convicted of owning the marijuana that was taxed. We first established that the fact that Montana had labeled the civil sanction a “tax” did not end our analysis. We then turned to consider whether the tax was so punitive as to constitute a punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Several differences between the marijuana tax imposed by Montana and the typical revenue-raising tax were readily apparent. The Montana tax was unique in that it was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was imposed only after the taxpayer had been arrested: Thus, only a person charged with a criminal offense was subject to the tax. We also noted that the taxpayer did not own or possess the taxed marijuana at the time that the tax was imposed. From these differences, we determined that the tax was motivated by a “ ‘penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.’ ” Id., at 781. Concluding that the Montana tax proceeding “was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution,” we affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment barring the tax. Id., at 784.
We think that the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch. None of those decisions purported to overrule the well-established teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms. Halper involved not a civil forfeiture, but a civil penalty. That its rule was limited to the latter context is clear from the decision itself, from the historical distinction that we have drawn between civil forfeiture and civil penalties, and from the practical difficulty of applying Halper to a civil forfeiture.
In Halper, we emphasized that our decision was limited to the context of civil penalties:
“What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused. The rule is one of reason: Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as ‘punishment’ in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government’s damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a second punishment.” 490 U. S., at 449-450 (emphasis added).
The narrow focus of Halper followed from the distinction that we have drawn historically between civil forfeiture and civil penalties. Since at least Various Items, we have distinguished civil penalties such as fines from civil forfeiture proceedings that are in rem. While a “civil action to recover . . . penaltie[s] is punitive in character,” and much like a criminal prosecution in that “it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against . . . and punished,” in an in rem forfeiture proceeding, “[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, and by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned.” Various Items, 282 U. S., at 580-581. Thus, though for double jeopardy purposes we have never balanced the value of property forfeited in a particular case against the harm suffered by the Government in that case, we have balanced the size of a particular civil penalty against the Government’s harm. See, e. g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S., at 154 (fines not “so unreasonable or excessive” as to transform a civil remedy into a criminal penalty); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943) (fine of $315,000 not so disproportionate to Government’s harm of $101,500 as to transform the fine into punishment). Indeed, the rule set forth in Halper developed from the teaching of Rex Trailer and Hess. See Halper, supra, at 445-447.
It is difficult to see how the rule of Halper could be applied to a civil forfeiture. Civil penalties are designed as a rough form of “liquidated damages” for the harms suffered by the Government as a result of a defendant’s conduct. See Rex Trailer, supra, at 153-154. The civil penalty involved in Halper, for example, provided for a fixed monetary penalty for each false claim count on which the defendant was convicted in the criminal proceeding. Whether a “fixed-penalty provision” that seeks to compensate the Government for harm it has suffered is “so extreme” and “so divorced” from the penalty’s nonpunitive purpose of compensating the Government as to be a punishment may be determined by balancing the Government’s harm against the size of the penalty. Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are designed to do more than simply compensate the Government. Forfeitures serve a variety of purposes, but are designed primarily to confiscate property used in violation of the law, and to require disgorgement of the fruits of illegal conduct. Though it may be possible to quantify the value of the property forfeited, it is virtually impossible to quantify, even approximately, the nonpunitive purposes served by a particular civil forfeiture. Hence, it is practically difficult to determine whether a particular forfeiture bears no rational relationship to the nonpunitive purposes of that forfeiture. Quite simply, the case-by-case balancing test set forth in Halper, in which a court must compare the harm suffered by the Government against the size of the penalty imposed, is inapplicable to civil forfeiture.
We recognized as much in Kurth Ranch. In that case, the Court expressly disclaimed reliance upon Halper, finding that its case-specific approach was impossible to apply outside the context of a fixed civil-penalty provision. Reviewing the Montana marijuana tax, we held that because “tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties, . . . Halper’s method of determining whether the exaction was remedial or punitive simply does not' work in the case of a tax statute.” Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S., at 784 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id,., at 786 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (Halper inapplicable outside of “‘fixed-penalty provisional’ ” that are meant “to recover the costs incurred by the Government for bringing someone to book for some violation of law”). This is not to say that there is no occasion for analysis of the Government’s harm. 89 Firearms makes clear the relevance of an evaluation of the harms alleged. The point is simply that Halper’s case-specific approach is inapplicable to civil forfeitures.
In the cases that we review, the Courts of Appeals did not find Halper difficult to apply to civil forfeiture because they concluded that its case-by-case balancing approach had been supplanted in Austin by a categorical approach that found a civil sanction to be punitive if it could not “fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose.” See Austin, 509 U. S., at 610; see also Halper, 490 U. S., at 448. But Austin, it must be remembered, did not involve the Double Jeopardy Clause at all. Austin was decided solely under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, a constitutional provision which we never have understood as parallel to, or even related to, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The only discussion of the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in Austin appears in a footnote that acknowledges our decisions holding that “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause has been held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings ... where the forfeiture could properly be characterized as remedial.” Austin, supra, at 608, n. 4. And in Austin we expressly recognized and approved our decisions in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232 (1972), and United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984). See Austin, supra, at 608, n. 4.
We acknowledged in Austin that our categorical approach under the Excessive Fines Clause was wholly distinct from the case-by-case approach of Halper, and we explained that the difference in approach was based in a significant difference between the purposes of our analysis under each constitutional provision. See Austin, supra, at 622, n. 14. It is unnecessary in a case under the Excessive Fines Clause to inquire at a preliminary stage whether the civil sanction imposed in that particular case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal. Because the second stage of inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause asks whether the particular sanction in question is so large as to be “excessive,” see Austin, 509 U. S., at 622-623 (declining to establish criteria for excessiveness), a preliminary-stage inquiry that focused on the disproportionality of a particular sanction would be du-plicative of the excessiveness analysis that would follow. See id., at 622, n. 14 (“[I]t appears to make little practical difference whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to all forfeitures ... or only to those that cannot be characterized as purely remedial,” because the Excessive Fines Clause “prohibits only the imposition of ‘excessive’ fines, and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered ‘excessive’ in any event”). Forfeitures effected under 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are subject to review for exces-siveness under the Eighth Amendment after Austin; this does not mean, however, that those forfeitures are so punitive as to constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy. The holding of Austin was limited to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and we decline to import the analysis of Austin into our double jeopardy jurisprudence.
In sum, nothing in Halper, Kurth Ranch, or Austin purported to replace our traditional understanding that civil forfeiture does not constitute punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Congress long has authorized the Government to bring parallel criminal proceedings and civil forfeiture proceedings, and this Court consistently has found civil forfeitures not to constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It would have been quite remarkable for this Court both to have held unconstitutional a well-established practice, and to have overruled a long line of precedent, without having even suggested that it was doing so. Halper dealt with in personam civil penalties under the Double Jeopardy Clause; Kurth Ranch with a tax proceeding under the Double Jeopardy Clause; and Austin with civil forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. None of those cases dealt with the subject of these cases: in rem civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C
We turn now to consider the forfeitures in these cases under the teaching of Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms. Because it provides a useful analytical tool, we conduct our inquiry within the framework of the two-part test used in 89 Firearms. First, we ask whether Congress intended proceedings under 21 U. S. C. § 881 and 18 U. S. C. § 981 to be criminal or civil. Second, we turn to consider whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to “persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding^] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature,” despite Congress’ intent. 465 U. S., at 366.
There is little doubt that Congress intended these forfeitures to be civil proceedings. As was the case in 89 Firearms, “Congress’ intent in this regard is most clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established for enforcing forfeitures under the statute[s].” Id., at 363. Both 21 U. S. C. § 881 and 18 U. S. C. § 981, which is entitled “Civil forfeiture,” provide that the laws “relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws . . . shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred” under §§881 and 981. See 21 U. S. C. § 881(d); 18 U. S. C. § 981(d). Because forfeiture proceedings under the customs laws are in rem, see 19 U. S. C. § 1602 et seq., it is clear that Congress intended that a forfeiture under § 881 or § 981, like the forfeiture reviewed in 89 Firearms, would be a proceeding in rem. Congress specifically structured these forfeitures to be impersonal by targeting the property itself. “In contrast to the in perso-nam nature of criminal actions, actions in rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon seizure of a physical object.” 89 Firearms, supra, at 363, citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 684.
Other procedural mechanisms governing forfeitures under §§ 881 and 981 also indicate that Congress intended such proceedings to be civil. Forfeitures under either statute are governed by 19 U. S. C. § 1607, which provides that actual notice of the impending forfeiture is unnecessary when the Government cannot identify any party with an interest in the seized article, and by § 1609, which provides that seized property is subject to forfeiture through a summary administrative procedure if no party files a claim to the property. And 19 U. S. C. § 1616, which governs the burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings under §§881 and 981, provides that once the Government has shown probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, then “the burden of proof shall lie upon [the] claimant.” In sum, “[b]y creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfeitures under [§§881 and 981], Congress has ‘indicate[d] clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal sanction.’ ” 89 Firearms, supra, at 363, quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 402 (1938).
Moving to the second stage of our analysis, we find that there is little evidence, much less the “ ‘clearest proof’ ” that we require, see 89 Firearms, supra, at 365, quoting Ward, 448 U. S., at 249, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U. S. C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7), and 18 U. S. C. § 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent to the contrary. The statutes involved in these cases are, in most significant respects, indistinguishable from those reviewed, and held not to be punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms.
Most significant is that § 981(a)(1)(A) and §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7), while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve important nonpunitive goals. Title 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(7), under which Ursery’s property was forfeited, provides for the forfeiture of “all real property . . . which is used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of” a federal drug felony. Requiring the forfeiture of property used to commit federal narcotics violations encourages property owners to take care in managing their property and ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal purposes. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 452 (1996) (“Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses ... by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable”); 89 Firearms, supra, at 364 (forfeiture “discourages unregulated commerce in firearms”); Calero-Toledo, supra, at 687-688. In many circumstances, the forfeiture may abate a nuisance. See, e. g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F. 2d 870 (CA2 1990) (forfeiting apartment building used to sell crack cocaine); see also Bennis, supra, at 452 (affirming application of Michigan statute abating car as a nuisance; forfeiture “prevent[s] further illicit use of” property); cf. 89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 364 (forfeiture “remov[ed] from circulation firearms that have been used or intended for use” illegally); Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U. S., at 237 (forfeiture “prevented forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States”).
The forfeiture of the property claimed by Arlt and Wren took place pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U. S. C. § 881(a)(6). Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ny property” involved in illegal money-laundering transactions. Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of “[a]ll . . . things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for” illegal drugs; “all proceeds traceable to such an exchange”; and “all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate” a federal drug felony. The same remedial purposes served by § 881(a)(7) are served by §§ 881(a)(6) and 981(a)(1)(A). Only one point merits separate discussion. To the extent that § 881(a)(6) applies to “proceeds” of illegal drug activity, it serves the additional nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not profit from their illegal acts.
Other considerations that we have found relevant to the question whether a proceeding is criminal also tend to support a conclusion that § 981(a)(1)(A) and §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7) are civil proceedings. See Ward, supra, at 247-248, n. 7, 249 (listing relevant factors and noting that they are neither exhaustive nor dispositive). First, in light of our decisions in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89 Firearms, and the long tradition of federal statutes providing for a forfeiture proceeding following a criminal prosecution, it is absolutely clear that in rem civil forfeiture has not historically been regarded as punishment, as we have understood that term under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, there is no requirement in the statutes that we currently review that the Government demonstrate scienter in order to establish that the property is subject to forfeiture; indeed, the property may be subject to forfeiture even if no party files a claim to it and the Government never shows any connection between the property and a particular person. See 19 U. S. C. § 1609. Though both §§ 881(a) and 981(a) contain an “innocent owner” exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Third, though both statutes may fairly be said to serve the purpose of deterrence, we long have held that this purpose may serve civil as well as criminal goals. See, e. g., 89 Firearms, supra, at 364; Calero-Toledo, 416 U. S., at 677-678. We recently reaffirmed this conclusion in Bennis v. Michigan, supra, at 452, where we held that “forfeiture . . . serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose.” Finally, though both statutes are tied to criminal activity, as was the case in 89 Firearms, this fact is insufficient to render the statutes punitive. See 89 Firearms, supra, at 365-366. It is well settled that “Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission,” Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399. By itself, the fact that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the “clearest proof” necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal.
We hold that these in rem civil forfeitures are neither “punishment” nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in No. 95-345, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in No. 95-346, are, accordingly, reversed.
It is so ordered.
The Government raises three other challenges to the decisions that we review. First, focusing on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in No. 95-345, the Government contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to prohibit a punishment imposed following a “jeopardy,” and that a civil forfeiture, regardless whether it is a “punishment,” is not a “jeopardy.” Thus, because Ursery had not been placed in “jeopardy” in the civil forfeiture proceeding against his house, the Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable to his criminal prosecution. Second, the Government argues that the civil forfeiture of property is not the same offense as a criminal prosecution, and therefore that the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense is not at issue here. Finally, the Government argues that a civil forfeiture action that is parallel and contemporaneous with a criminal prosecution should be deemed to constitute a single proceeding within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Because we conclude that the civil forfeitures involved in these cases do not constitute punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, see infra, at 292, we do not address those three arguments in this opinion.
Justice Stevens’ dissent is grounded in the different interpretation that he gives Halper. He finds that Halper announced “two different rules”: a general rule, applicable to all civil sanctions, useful for determining whether a sanction is “of a punitive character”; and a “narrower rule,” similar to our understanding of the case, that requires “an accounting of the Government’s damages and costs.” Post, at 308. Justice Stevens faults us in these cases for failing to apply the “general rule” of Halper.
The problem with Justice Stevens’ interpretation of Halper, of course, and therefore with his entire argument, is that Halper did not announce two rules. Nowhere in Halper does the Court set forth two distinct rules or purport to apply a two-step analysis. Justice Stevens finds his “general rule” in a dictum from Halper: “ ‘[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment.’” Post, at 306, quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989). But the discussion immediately following that dictum makes clear that it states not a new and separate test for whether a sanction is a punishment, but rather only a rephrasing of Justice Stevens’ “narrower” rule, i. e., the rule requiring an “accounting of the Government’s damages and costs.” Id., at 449.
“We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished . .. may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
“We acknowledge that this inquiry will not be an exact pursuit. In our decided eases we have noted that the precise amount of the Government’s damages and costs may prove to be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. . . . [I]t would be difficult if not impossible in many cases for a court to determine the precise dollar figure at which a civil sanction has accomplished its remedial purpose of making the Government whole, but beyond which the sanction takes on the quality of punishment.” Id., at 448-449 (emphasis added); see also id., at 449-451.
The “general rule” discovered by Justice Stevens in Halper would supplant, not mimic, see post, at 306, the rule of United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U. S. 354 (1984), and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U. S. 232 (1972). Whether a particular sanction “cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose” is an inquiry radically different from that we have traditionally employed in order to determine whether, as a categorical matter, a civil sanction is subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Yet nowhere in Halper does the Court purport to make such a sweeping change in the law, instead emphasizing repeatedly the narrow scope of its decision. Halper, supra, at 449 (announcing rule for “the rare case”). If the “general rule” of Justice Stevens were applied literally, then virtually every sanction would be declared to be a punishment: It is hard to imagine a sanction that has no punitive aspect whatsoever. Justice Stevens’ interpretation of Halper is both contrary to the decision itself and would create an unworkable rule inconsistent with well-established precedent.
Justice Stevens miseharaeterizes our holding. We do not hold that in rem civil forfeiture is per se exempt from the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See post, at 300-305. Similarly, we do not rest our conclusion in these cases upon the long-recognized fiction that a forfeiture in rem punishes only malfeasant property rather than a particular person. See post, at 313-316. That a forfeiture is designated as civil by Congress and proceeds in rem establishes a presumption that it is not subject to double jeopardy. See, e. g., 89 Firearms, 465 U. S., at 363. Nevertheless, where the “clearest proof” indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding, that forfeiture may be subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id., at 365. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
71
] | sc_caseorigin |
SANTA FE INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. v. GREEN et al.
No. 75-1753.
Argued January 18-19, 1977
Decided March 23, 1977
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV of which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., post, p. 480, and Stevens, J., post, p. 480, filed opinions concurring in part. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 480.
William R. Glendon argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert D. Larsen and Guy C. Quinlan.
Sidney Bender argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Aaron Lewittes.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case involves the reach and coverage of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in the context of a Delaware short-form merger transaction used by the majority stockholder of a corporation to eliminate the minority interest.
I
In 1936, petitioner Santa Fe Industries, Inc. (Santa Fe), acquired control of 60% of the stock of Kirby Lumber Corp. (Kirby), a Delaware corporation. Through a series of purchases over the succeeding years, Santa Fe increased its control of Kirby’s stock to 95%; the purchase prices during the period 1968-1973 ranged from $65 to $92.50 per share. In 1974, wishing to acquire 100% ownership of Kirby, Santa Fe availed itself of § 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law, known as the “short-form merger” statute. Section 253 permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that subsidiary, upon approval by the parent’s board of directors, and to make payment in cash for the shares of the minority stockholders. The statute does not require the consent of, or advance notice to, the minority stockholders. However, notice of the merger must be given within 10 days after its effective date, and any stockholder who is dissatisfied with the terms of the merger may petition the Delaware Court of Chancery for a decree ordering the surviving corporation to pay him the fair value of his shares, as determined by a court-appointed appraiser subject to review by the court. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, §§ 253, 262 (1975 ed. and Supp. 1976).
Santa Fe obtained independent appraisals of the physical assets of Kirby—land, timber, buildings, and machinery—and of Kirby’s oil, gas, and mineral interests. These appraisals, together with other financial information, were submitted to Morgan Stanley & Co. (Morgan Stanley), an investment banking firm retained to appraise the fair market value of Kirby stock. Kirby’s physical assets were appraised at $320 million (amounting to $640 for each of the 500,000 shares); Kirby’s stock was valued by Morgan Stanley at $125 per share. Under the terms of the merger, minority stockholders were offered $150 per share.
The provisions of the short-form merger statute were fully complied with. The minority stockholders of Kirby were notified the day after the merger became effective and were advised of their right to obtain an appraisal in Delaware court if dissatisfied with the offer of $150 per share. They also received an information statement containing, in addition to the relevant financial data about Kirby, the appraisals of the value of Kirby’s assets and the Morgan Stanley appraisal concluding that the fair market value of the stock was $125 per share.
Respondents, minority stockholders of Kirby, objected to the terms of the merger, but did not pursue their appraisal remedy in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Instead, they brought this action in federal court on behalf of the corporation and other minority stockholders, seeking to set aside the merger or to recover what they claimed to be the fair value of their shares. The amended complaint asserted that, based on the fair market value of Kirby’s physical assets as revealed by the appraisal included in the information statement sent to minority shareholders, Kirby’s stock was worth at least $772 per share. The complaint alleged further that the merger took place without prior notice to minority stockholders; that the purpose of the merger was to appropriate the difference between the “conceded pro rata value of the physical assets,” App. 103a, and the offer of $150 per share—to “freez[e] out the minority stockholders at a wholly inadequate price,” id., at 100a; and that Santa Fe, knowing the appraised value of the physical assets, obtained a “fraudulent appraisal” of the stock from Morgan Stanley and offered $25 above that appraisal “in order to lull the minority stockholders into erroneously believing that [Santa Fe was] generous.” Id., at 103a. This course of conduct was alleged to be “a violation of Rule 10b-5 because defendants employed a 'device, scheme, or artifice to defraud’ and engaged in an 'act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' ” Ibid. Morgan Stanley assertedly participated in the fraud as an accessory by submitting its appraisal of $125 per share although knowing the appraised value of the physical assets.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 391 F. Supp. 849 (SDNY 1975). As the District Court understood the complaint, respondents’ case rested on two distinct grounds. First, federal law was assertedly violated because the merger was for the sole purpose of eliminating the minority from the company, therefore lacking any justifiable business purpose, and because the merger was undertaken without prior notice to the minority shareholders. Second, the low valuation placed on the shares in the cash-exchange offer was itself said to be a fraud actionable under Rule 10b-5. In rejecting the first ground for recovery, the District Court reasoned that Delaware law required neither a business purpose for a short-form merger nor prior notice to the minority shareholders who the statute contemplated would be removed from the company, and that Rule 10b-5 did not override these provisions of state corporate law by independently placing a duty on the majority not to merge without prior notice and without a justifiable business purpose.
As for the claim that actionable fraud inhered in the allegedly gross undervaluation of the minority shares, the District Court observed that respondents valued their shares at a minimum of $772 per share, “basing this figure on the pro rata value of Kirby’s physical assets.” Id., at 853. Accepting this valuation for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the District Court further noted that, as revealed by the complaint, the physical asset appraisal, along with other information relevant to Morgan Stanley’s valuation of the shares, had been included with the information statement sent to respondents within the time required by state law. It thought that if “full and fair disclosure is made, transactions eliminating minority interests are beyond the purview of Rule 10b-5,” and concluded that the “complaint fail[ed] to allege an omission, misstatement or fraudulent course of conduct that would have impeded a shareholder’s judgment of the value of the offer.” Id., at 854. The complaint therefore failed to state a claim and was dismissed.
A divided Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. 533 P. 2d 1283 (1976). It first agreed that there was a double aspect to the case: first, the claim that gross undervaluation of the minority stock itself violated Rule 10b-5; and second, that “without any misrepresentation or failure to disclose relevant facts, the merger itself constitutes a violation of Rule 10b-5” because it was accomplished without any corporate purpose and without prior notice to the minority stockholders. Id., at 1285. As to the first aspect of the case, the Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court’s conclusion that the complaint did not allege a material misrepresentation or nondisclosure with respect to the value of the stock; and the court declined to rule that a claim of gross undervaluation itself would suffice to make out a Rule 10b-5 case. With respect to the second aspect of the case, however, the court fundamentally disagreed with the District Court as to the reach and coverage of Rule 10b-5. The Court of Appeals' view was that, although the Rule plainly reached material misrepresentations and nondisclosures in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was a necessary element of a Rule 10b-5 action; the Rule reached “breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure." Id., at 1287. The court went on to hold that the complaint, taken as a whole, stated a cause of action under the Rule:
“We hold that a complaint alleges a claim under Rule 10b-5 when it charges, in connection with a Delaware short-form merger, that the majority has committed a breach of its fiduciary duty to deal fairly with minority shareholders by effecting the merger without any justifiable business purpose. The minority shareholders are given no prior notice of the merger, thus having no opportunity to apply for injunctive relief, and the proposed price to be paid is substantially lower than the appraised value reflected in the Information Statement.” Id., at 1291.
See also id., at 1289.
We granted the petition for certiorari challenging this holding because of the importance of the issue involved to the administration of the federal securities laws. 429 U. S. 814 (1976). We reverse.
II
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act makes it “unlawful for any person ... to use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of [Securities and Exchange Commission rules]”; Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC under § 10 (b), prohibits, in addition to nondisclosure and misrepresentation, any “artifice to defraud” or any act “which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.” The court below construed the term “fraud” in Rule 10b-5 by adverting to the use of the term in several of this Court’s decisions in contexts other than the 1934 Act and the related Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. The Court of Appeals’ approach to the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 is inconsistent with that taken by the Court last Term in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185 (1976).
Ernst & Ernst makes clear that in deciding whether a complaint states a cause of action for “fraud” under Rule 10b-5, “we turn first to the language of § 10 (b), for ‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’ ” Id., at 197, quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). In holding that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 does not lie for mere negligence, the Court began with the principle that “[ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular section of the [1933 and 1934] Acts must . . . rest primarily on the language of that section,” 425 U. S., at 200, and then focused on the statutory language of § 10 (b)—“[t]he words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used in conjunction with ‘device or contrivance.’ ” Id., at 197. The same language and the same principle apply to this case.
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the use of the term “fraud” in Rule 10b-5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction, its interpretation would, like the interpretation rejected by the Court in Ernst & Ernst, “add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.” Id., at 199. But, as the Court there held, the language of the statute must control the interpretation of the Rule:
“Rule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the [Securities and Exchange] Commission under § 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is ‘ “the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.” ’. . . [The scope of the Rule] cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10 (b).” Id., at 212—214.
The language of § 10 (b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Nor have we been cited to any evidence in the legislative history that would support a departure from the language of the statute. “When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, . . . and when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute . . ." Id., at 214. Thus the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as “manipulative or deceptive” within the meaning of the statute.
III
It is our judgment that the transaction, if carried out as alleged in the complaint, was neither deceptive nor manipulative and therefore did not violate either § 10 (b) of the Act or Rule 10b-5.
As we have indicated, the case comes to us on the premise that the complaint failed to allege a material misrepresentation or material failure to disclose. The finding of the District Court, undisturbed by the Court of Appeals, was that there was no “omission” or “misstatement” in the information statement accompanying the notice of merger. On the basis of the information provided, minority shareholders could either accept the price offered or reject it and seek an appraisal in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Their choice was fairly presented, and they were furnished with all relevant information on which to base their decision.
We therefore find inapposite the cases relied upon by respondents and the court below, in which the breaches of fiduciary duty held violative of Rule 10b-5 included some element of deception. Those cases forcefully reflect the principle that “[§] 10 (b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively” and that the statute provides a cause of action for any plaintiff who “suffer[s] an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities . . ." Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 12-13 (1971). But the cases do not support the proposition, adopted by the Court of Appeals below and urged by respondents here, that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute and the Rule.
It is also readily apparent that the conduct alleged in the complaint was not “manipulative” within the meaning of the statute. “Manipulation” is “virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets.” Ernst & Ernst, 425 U. S., at 199. The term refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity. See, e. g., § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (prohibiting specific manipulative practices); Ernst & Ernst, supra, at 195, 199 n. 21, 205; Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., ante, at 43 (Rule 10b-6, also promulgated under § 10 (b), is “an antimanipulative provision designed to protect the orderliness of the securities market during distributions of stock” and “to prevent stimulative trading by an issuer in its own securities in order to create an unnatural and unwarranted appearance of market activity”); 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud § 7.3 (1975); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1541-1570 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id., at 3755-3763 (Supp. 1969). Section 10 (b)’s general prohibition of practices deemed by the SEC to be “manipulative”—in this technical sense of artificially affecting market activity in order to mislead investors—is fully consistent with the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act “‘to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Cains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180, 186 (1963). Indeed, nondisclosure is usually essential to the success of a manipulative scheme. 3 Loss, supra, at 1565. No doubt Congress meant to prohibit the full range of ingenious devices that might be used to manipulate securities prices. But we do not think it would have chosen this “term of art” if it had meant to bring within the scope of § 10 (b) instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary.
IV
The language of the statute is, we think, “sufficiently clear in its context” to be dispositive here, Ernst & Ernst, supra, at 201; but even if it were not, there are additional considerations that weigh heavily against permitting a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 for the breach of corporate fiduciary duty alleged in this complaint. Congress did not expressly provide a private cause of action for violations of § 10 (b). Although we have recognized an implied cause of action under that section in some circumstances, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., supra, at 13 n. 9, we have also recognized that a private cause of action under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act should not be implied where it is “unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress’ purposes” in adopting the Act. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, ante, at 41. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 431-433 (1964). As we noted earlier, supra, this page, the Court repeatedly has described the “fundamental purpose” of the Act as implementing a “philosophy of full disclosure”; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute. Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U. S. 375, 381-385 (1970). As in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 80 (1975), we are reluctant to recognize a cause of action here to serve what is “at best a subsidiary purpose” of the federal legislation.
A second factor in determining whether Congress intended to create a federal cause of action in these circumstances is “whether ‘the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., ante, at 40, quoting Cort v. Ash, supra, at 78. The Delaware Legislature has supplied minority shareholders with a cause of action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to recover the fair value of shares allegedly undervalued in a short-form merger. See supra, at 465-466. Of course, the existence of a particular state-law remedy is not dispositive of the question whether Congress meant to provide a similar federal remedy, but as in Cort and Piper, we conclude that “it is entirely appropriate in this instance to relegate respondent and others in his situation to whatever remedy is created by state law.” 422 U. S., at 84; ante, at 41.
The reasoning behind a holding that the complaint in this case alleged fraud under Rule 10b-5 could not be easily contained. It is difficult to imagine how a court could distinguish, for purposes of Rule 10b-5 fraud, between a majority stockholder’s use of a short-form merger to eliminate the minority at an unfair price and the use of some other device, such as a long-form merger, tender offer, or liquidation, to achieve the same result; or indeed how a court could distinguish the alleged abuses in these going private transactions from other types of fiduciary self-dealing involving transactions in securities. The result would be to bring within the Rule a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation. In addition to posing a “danger of vexatious litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5,” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 740, this extension of the federal securities laws would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law. Federal courts applying a “federal fiduciary principle” under Rule 10b-5 could be expected to depart from state fiduciary standards at least to the extent necessary to ensure uniformity within the federal system. Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden. As the Court stated in Cort v. Ash, supra: “Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.” 422 U. S., at 84 (emphasis added).
We thus adhere to the position that “Congress by § 10 (b) did not seek to regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.” Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S., at 12. There may well be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern mergers such as that challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied by judicial extension of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 to “cover the corporate universe.”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan dissents and would affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the majority and concurring opinions in the Court of Appeals, 533 F. 2d 1283 (CA2 1976).
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, provides in relevant part:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
“(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”
Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1976), provides:
“Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
“(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
“(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
“in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
App. 33a (merger information statement, considered by parties and court below as part of the amended complaint). Sante Fe controlled Kirby through its wholly owned subsidiary, Santa Fe Natural Resources, Inc., which owned the Kirby stock.
The merger became effective on July 31, 1974, and was accomplished in the following way. A new corporation, Forest Products, Inc., was organized as a Delaware corporation. The Kirby stock, together with cash, was transferred from Santa Fe’s wholly owned subsidiary (see n. 2, supra) to Forest Products in exchange for all of the Forest Products stock. The new corporation was then merged into Kirby, with Kirby as the surviving corporation. The cash transferred to Forest Products was used to make the purchase offer for the Kirby shares not owned by the Santa Fe subsidiary.
On August 21, 1974, respondents petitioned for an appraisal of their Kirby stock, but they withdrew that petition on September 9 and the next day commenced this lawsuit.
The figure of $772 per share was calculated as follows:
“The difference of $311,000,000 ($622 per share) between the fair market value of Kirby’s land and timber, alone, as per the defendants’ own appraisal thereof at $320,000,000 and the $9,000,000 book value of said land and timber, added to the $150 per share, yields a pro rata share of the value of the physical assets of Kirby of at least $772 per share. The value of the stock was at least the pro rata value of the physical assets.” App. 102a.
The complaint also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty under state law and asserted that the federal court had both diversity and pendent jurisdiction over this claim. The District Court found an absence of complete diversity of citizenship between the plaintiffs and defendants because of the defendant Morgan Stanley and refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction because it held that the complaint failed to state a claim under the federal securities laws. 391 F. Supp. 849, 855 (SDNY 1975).
The District Court also based its holding on the alternative ground that the injuries alleged in the complaint were not causally related to any deception by the majority shareholder:
“Assuming arguendo that the merger information statement did not constitute adequate disclosure, the amended complaint does not demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged deception and plaintiffs’ damages. Plaintiffs did not tender their shares for cancellation and payment pursuant to this merger plan. . . . From the outset, plaintiffs recognized the alleged deception and did not rely upon it.” 391 F. Supp., at 855.
The court concluded its discussion thus:
“Whether full disclosure has been made is not the crucial inquiry since it is the merger and the undervaluation which constituted the fraud, and not whether or not the majority determines to lay bare their real motives. If there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct.” 533 F. 2d, at 1292.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, the dismissal of the complaint against Morgan Stanley. As the Court of Appeals understood it, Morgan Stanley had not been charged with participating in the majority shareholder’s breach of fiduciary duty; it had been involved only in evaluation of the stock and the compilation of its report with respect thereto. The complaint contained “no allegation that Morgan Stanley & Co. engaged in any misrepresentation or nondisclosure such as would support its liability under Rule 10b-5 (2).” Ibid.
See n. 1, supra.
The Court of Appeals quoted passages from Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 306, 311 (1939) (where this Court upheld the disallowance of a bankruptcy claim of a controlling stockholder who violated his fiduciary obligation to the other stockholders), and from 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 187 (1853); the court also cited cases that quoted the passage from Mr. Justice Story’s treatise—Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122, 128 (1889) (a diversity suit to compel execution of a deed held in constructive trust), and SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180, 194 (1963) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits, as a “fraud or deceit upon any client,” a registered investment adviser’s failure to disclose to his clients his own financial interest in his recommendations). Although Capital Gains involved a federal securities statute, the Court’s references to fraud in the “equitable” sense of the term were premised on its recognition that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers. See id., at 191-192, 194. Moreover, the fraud that the SEC sought to enjoin in Capital Gains was, in fact, a nondisclosure.
The case for adhering to the language of the statute is even stronger here than in Ernst & Ernst, where the interpretation of Rule 10b-5 rejected by the Court was strongly urged by the Commission. See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., ante, p. 1, and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975) (rejecting interpretations of Rule 10b-5 urged by the SEC as amicus curiae). By contrast, the Commission apparently has not concluded that Rule 10b-5 should be used to reach “going private” transactions where the majority stockholder eliminates the minority at an allegedly unfair price. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5567 (Feb. 6, 1975), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 80,104 (proposing Rules 13e-3A and 13e-3B dealing with “going private” transactions, pursuant to six sections of the 1934 Act including § 10 (b), but stating that the Commission “has reached no conclusions with respect to the proposed rules”). Because we are concerned here only with § 10 (b), we intimate no view as to the Commission’s authority to promulgate such rules under other sections of the Act.
As the Court noted in Ernst & Ernst: “Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation.” 425 U. S., at 202. The only specific reference to § 10 in the Senate Report on the 1934 Act merely states that the section was “aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function.” S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
In addition to their principal argument that the complaint alleges a fraud under clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, respondents also argue that the complaint alleges nondisclosure and misrepresentation in violation of clause (b) of the Rule. Their major contention in this respect is that the majority stockholder’s failure to give the minority advance notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure, even though the Delaware short-form merger statute does not require such notice. Brief for Respondents 27. But respondents do not indicate how they might have acted differently had they had prior notice of the merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion of both courts below that under Delaware law they could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding is their sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger. Thus, the failure to give advance notice was not a material nondisclosure within the meaning of the statute or the Rule. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438 (1976).
The decisions of this Court relied upon by respondents all involved deceptive conduct as part of the Rule 10b-5 violation alleged. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972) (misstatements of material fact used by bank employees in position of market maker to acquire stock at less than fair value); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 9 (1971) (“seller [of bonds] was duped into believing that it, the seller, would receive the proceeds”). Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180 (1963) (injunction under Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to compel registered investment adviser to disclose to his clients his own financial interest in his recommendations).
We have been cited to a large number of cases in the Courts of Appeals, all of which involved an element of deception as part of the fiduciary misconduct held to violate Rule 10b-5. E. g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F. 2d 215, 220 (CA2 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 906 (1969) (majority stockholder and board of directors “were guilty of deceiving” the minority stockholders); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F. 2d 722, 733, 736, 737 (CA2 1972) (en banc) (Rule 10b-5 violation alleged on facts found “indistinguishable” from Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F. 2d 374 (CA2 1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 976 (1975) (scheme of market manipulation and merger on unfair terms, one aspect of which was misrepresentation); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F. 2d 865, 869 (CA3 1968) (“if a 'deception' is required in the present context [of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5], it is fairly found by viewing this fraud as though the 'independent' stockholders were standing in the place of the defrauded corporate entity,” where the board of directors passed a resolution containing at least two material misrepresentations and authorizing the sale of corporate stock to the directors at a price below fair market value); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F. 2d 819, 825 (CA5 1970) (derivative suit alleging that corporate officers used misleading proxy materials and other reports to deceive shareholders regarding a bogus employment contract intended to conceal improper payments to the corporation president and regarding purchases by the corporation of certain securities at excessive prices); Rekant v. Desser, 425 F. 2d 872, 882 (CA5 1970) (as part of scheme to cause corporation to issue Treasury shares and a promissory note for grossly inadequate consideration, corporate officers deceived shareholders by making affirmative misrepresentations in the corporation’s annual report and by failing to file any such report the next year). See Recent Cases, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1917, 1926 (1976) (stating that no appellate decision before that of the Court of Appeals in this case and in Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F. 2d 1277 (CA2), vacated and remanded for a determination of mootness, 429 U. S. 881 (1976), “had permitted a 10b-5 claim without some element of misrepresentation or nondisclosure”) (footnote omitted).
For example, some States apparently require a “valid corporate purpose” for the elimination of the minority interest through a short-form merger, whereas other States do not. Compare Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F. 2d 563 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 844 (1974) (merger arranged by controlling stockholder for no business purpose except to eliminate 15% minority stockholder violated Georgia short-form merger statute) with Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A. 2d 78 (1962) (Delaware short-form merger statute allows majority stockholder to eliminate the minority interest without any corporate purpose and subject only to an appraisal remedy). Thus to the extent that Rule 10b-5 is interpreted to require a valid corporate purpose for elimination of minority shareholders as well as a fair price for their shares, it would impose a stricter standard of fiduciary duty than that required by the law of some States.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L. J. 663, 700 (1974) (footnote omitted). Professor Cary argues vigorously for comprehensive federal fiduciary standards, but urges a “frontal” attack by a new federal statute rather than an extension of Rule 10b-5. He writes: “It seems anomalous to jig-saw every kind of corporate dispute into the federal courts through the securities acts as they are presently written.” Ibid. See also Note, Going Private, 84 Yale L. J. 903 (1975) (proposing the application of traditional doctrines of substantive corporate law to problems of fairness raised by “going private” transactions such as short-form mergers). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
165
] | sc_respondent |
CAPITAL SERVICE, INC. et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
No. 398.
Argued April 6, 1954.
Decided May 17, 1954.
Carl M. Gould argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Philip Elman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, George J. Bott, David P. Findling, Dominick L. Manoli and Norton J. Come.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner manufactures and distributes bakery products in California. A union sought unsuccessfully to organize its employees. Thereupon, the union sought to enlist the aid of purchasers and consumers of petitioner’s products. Agents of the union requested retail stores not to handle petitioner’s products and stated that if they continued to do so, a picket line would be set up. Some stores acquiesced; others did not. The union placed pickets at the entrances of the latter stores, with the result that many deliveries were interrupted and some employees of other employers refused to cross the picket lines.
Petitioner made two counter moves. First, it filed suit for an injunction against the union in the California courts. A few days later, it filed a charge of an unfair labor practice against the union with respondent. Each had as a basis the same conduct of the union.
On April 7, 1952, the California court issued a preliminary injunction against the union, banning all picketing of retail stores. On May 14, 1952, the Regional Director of respondent concluded, after investigation, that insofar as the conduct of the union involved merely an appeal to customers and to the public in general, it was lawful under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 49 Stat. 449, 61 Stat. 136, 29 TJ. S. C. § 151 et seq.; but that it was unlawful, insofar as it induced or encouraged employees of employers other than petitioner to refuse to perform services at the picketed places. The Regional Director, acting on behalf of the General Counsel, issued an unfair labor practice complaint against the union on that limited basis. On the same day, he petitioned the Federal District Court for an injunction restraining such conduct of the union, pending final adjudication by the Board, as required by § 10 (1) of the Act.
Simultaneously with the filing of the § 10 (1) petition against the union, the Board filed suit in the same District Court, asking that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing the state court injunction. The District Court concluded that the conduct of the union, in the respects stated, was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and that the action of the state court invaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board and the District Court. It accordingly granted the relief prayed for. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 204 F. 2d 848. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari limited to the following question:
“In view of the fact that exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter was in the National Labor Relations Board (Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485), could the Federal District Court, on application of the Board, enjoin Petitioners from enforcing an injunction already obtained from the State Court?” 346 U. S. 936.
I. The District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, because this is a “civil action or proceeding” arising under an Act of Congress “regulating commerce.” 28 U. S. C. § 1337. The National Labor Relations Act is a law “regulating commerce” (Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1); and here, as in American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 591, the rights asserted arise under that law.
II. In absence of a command of the Congress to the contrary, the power of the District Court to issue the injunction is clear. Federal courts seek to avoid needless conflict with state agencies and withhold relief by way of injunction where state remedies are available and adequate. See Alabama Commission v. Southern R. Co., 341 U. S. 341. But where Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, has vested a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter and the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of functions, the federal court may enjoin the state proceeding in order to preserve the federal right. See Public Utilities Commission v. Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456, 468-470; Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-511. Cf. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, supra, at 593-595. Congress, however, has provided that “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U. S. C. § 2283.
We do not stop to consider the many questions which have been propounded under this newly worded provision of the Code. One alone suffices for this case. For we conclude that the injunction issued by the District Court was “necessary in aid of its jurisdiction” and thus permitted under the exceptions specifically allowed by Congress.
The state court injunction restrains conduct which the District Court was asked to enjoin in the § 10 (1) proceeding brought in the District Court by the Board’s Regional Director against the union. In order to make the § 10 (1) power effective the Board must have authority to take all steps necessary to preserve its case. If the state court decree were to stand, the Federal District Court would be limited in the action it might take. If the Federal District Court were to have unfettered power to decide for or against the union, and to write such decree as it deemed necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, it must be freed of all restraints from the other tribunal. To exercise its jurisdiction freely and fully it must first remove the state decree. When it did so, it acted “where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.”
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 10 (1) reads as follows:
“Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A), (B), or (C) of section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any district court of the United States (including the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order Shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 8(b)(4)(D).” 61 Stat. 149, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (l).
Section 2283 took the place of former § 265 of the Judicial Code which provided:
“The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the • United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.”
In view of our ruling, we find it unnecessary to consider whether, apart from the specific exceptions contained in § 2283, the District Court was justified in enjoining this intrusion on an exclusive federal jurisdiction. Cf. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 510-511. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"federal-state ownership dispute (cf. Submerged Lands Act)",
"federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction",
"federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation. cf. state regulation of business. rarely involves union activity. Does not involve constitutional interpretation unless the Court says it does.",
"Submerged Lands Act (cf. federal-state ownership dispute)",
"national supremacy: commodities",
"national supremacy: intergovernmental tax immunity",
"national supremacy: marital and family relationships and property, including obligation of child support",
"national supremacy: natural resources (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)",
"national supremacy: pollution, air or water (cf. natural resources - environmental protection)",
"national supremacy: public utilities (cf. federal public utilities regulation)",
"national supremacy: state tax (cf. state tax)",
"national supremacy: miscellaneous",
"miscellaneous federalism"
] | [
1
] | sc_issue_10 |
RUBIN v. UNITED STATES
No. 79-1013.
Argued November 12, 1980
Decided January 21, 1981
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, RehNquist, and SteveNs, JJ., joined. BlaciímuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 431.
Louis Bender argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Sandor Frcmkel.
Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Sara Criscitelli, Ralph C. Ferrara, Jacob H. Stillman, and Elisse B. Walter.
Darrel E. Reed, Jr., and Richard K. Willard filed a brief for Bossier Bank & Trust Co. as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a loan is an “offer or sale” of a security under § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a).
I
Late in 1972, petitioner became vice president of Tri-State Energy, Inc., a corporation holding itself out as involved in energy exploration and production. At the time, Tri-State was experiencing serious financial problems. Petitioner approached Bankers Trust Co., a bank with which he had frequently dealt while he had been affiliated with an accounting firm. Bankers Trust initially refused a $5 million loan to Tri-State for operating a mine. Nevertheless, it lent TriState $50,000 on October 20, 1972, for 30 days with the understanding that if Tri-State could produce adequate financial information and sufficient collateral, additional financing might be available.
Petitioner assisted other officers of Tri-State in preparing a financial statement for submission to the bank. The balance sheet, which listed a net worth of $7.1 million, was false and misleading in several respects. Tri-State also submitted inflated projections of future earnings based in large measure on sham contracts and forged documentation. Subsequently, petitioner personally paid the loan officer $4,000 and another official $1,000 as inducements for further loans. Tri-State borrowed an additional $425,000 over a brief period. Ultimately, the loans were consolidated into a single demand note for $475,000, dated February 26, 1973.
Bankers Trust required collateral for each new loan; between October 20, 1972, and January 19, 1973, Tri-State pledged stock in six companies. The stocks were represented as being good, marketable, and unrestricted and valued at a total of approximately $1.7 million; in fact, they were practically worthless. Many shares were issued by “shell” companies. Most were simply “rented” — i. e., borrowed from the owner for a fee — to show to the bank or were otherwise restricted. In one instance, petitioner arranged for fictitious quotations to appear in a service reporting over-the-counter transactions and used by the bank in evaluating pledged securities; in another, Tri-State planted, through others, a fictitious advertisement in an overseas newspaper and showed it to the bank, representing it to be a quotation. Trading of one issue was suspended shortly after the pledge when the issuing company could not account for 900,000 shares of its stock; Tri-State replaced this collateral before Bankers Trust learned of the difficulty. Petitioner acted as Tri-State’s agent for most of these transactions.
A Justice Department request for information about TriState received February 28, two days after the consolidated note was signed, prompted Bankers Trust on March 5 to demand payment in full within three days. No payment of this demand was made, and in May another officer of TriState met with bank officials and tried to forestall foreclosure. After rejecting Tri-State’s request for a further loan, the bank sued on the note.
Bankers Trust also proceeded against petitioner personally as a guarantor of the loans. Petitioner signed a confession of judgment against himself in the amount of the unpaid loans, plus accrued interest, but thereafter filed a petition for bankruptcy. The bank recovered only about $2,500, plus interest and expenses, on its $475,000 loan.
Petitioner was indicted on three counts of violating and conspiring to violate various federal antifraud statutes, including § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a). Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, petitioner was convicted on the conspiracy count. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitioner raised several grounds, including whether a pledge of stock as collateral for a bank loan is an “offer or sale” under § 17 (a). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 609 F. 2d 51 (1979). We granted certiorari limited to the question whether such a pledge is an “offer or sale.” 445 U. S. 960 (1980).
II
Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
“(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
“(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
“(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a) (emphasis added).
Petitioner does not deny that he engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud through false representations to Bankers Trust concerning the stocks pledged; he does not deny that the shares were “securities” under the Act. Rather, he contends narrowly that these pledges did not constitute “offers” or “sales” under § 17 (a) of the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. To sustain this contention, petitioner argues that Tri-State deposited the stocks with the bank only as collateral security for a loan, not as a transfer or sale. From this he argues that the implied, power to dispose of the stocks could ripen into title and thereby constitute a “sale” only by effecting foreclosure of the various pledges, an event that could not occur without a default on the loans.
We begin by looking to the language of the Act. E. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). The terms “offer” and “sale” in § 17 (a) are defined in § 2 (3) of the Act:
“The term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term . . . 'offer’ shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.” 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3) (emphasis added).
Obtaining a loan secured by a pledge of shares of stock unmistakably involves a “disposition of [an] interest in a security, for value.” Although pledges transfer less than absolute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an “interest in a security.” The pledges contemplated a self-executing procedure under a power that could, at the option of the pledgee (the bank) in the event of a default, vest absolute title and ownership. Bankers Trust parted with substantial consideration — specifically, a total of $475,000— and obtained the inchoate but valuable interest under the pledges and concomitant powers. It is not essential under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction to be an “offer” or a “sale.” See, e. g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F. 2d 461, 466 (CA2), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976).
Ill
When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except “in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances.' ” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 187, n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930)). Accord, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 214, n. 33. No such circumstances are present here, for our reading of the statute is wholly consistent with the history and the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act, a model “blue sky” statute adopted in many states, defined “sale” in language almost identical to that now appearing in § 2 (3). In Cecil B. De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F. 2d 45 (1932), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed this provision of the model statute as adopted by California and held that the definition of “sale” embraced a pledge. Congress subsequently enacted the definition from the Uniform Act almost verbatim. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). See generally id., at 13; Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1933). Petitioner has cited nothing to suggest that Congress did not intend the broad scope that cases arising under the Uniform Act, such as Woolery, supra, had given the definition of “sale.” See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978).
Treating pledges as included among “offers” and “sales” comports with the purpose of the Act and, specifically, with that of § 17 (a). We frequently have observed that these provisions were enacted to protect against fraud and promote the free flow of information in the public dissemination of securities. E. g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 195. The economic considerations and realities present when a lender parts with value and accepts securities as collateral security for a loan are similar in important respect to the risk an investor undertakes when purchasing shares. Both are relying on the value of the securities themselves, and both must be able to depend on the representations made by the trans-feror of the securities, regardless of whether the transferor passes full title or only a conditional and defeasible interest to secure repayment of a loan.
Petitioner would have us interpret “offer” and “sale” in a way that not only is cramped but conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute and its purpose as well. We therefore hold that the pledges here were “offers” or “sales” under § 17 (a); accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The balance sheet listed an account receivable of $7.5 million and included a copy of a contract that purportedly formed the basis of this account. No such item existed, and the signature on the contract had been forged. Evidence also indicated that Tri-State had listed a fictitious tax liability to offset the fictitious asset. The statement also referred to over $264,000 cash on hand and coal worth $180,000. Both figures were exaggerated.
Subsequent loans were made on November 22 ($50,000), November 30 ($100,000), and December 6 ($275,000).
The pledges were 400,000 shares of American Leisure Corp. (October 20 — shell company; shares restricted); 2,000 shares of All States Life Insurance Co. (November 10 — nonmarketable; “rented” to show the bank but not owned by Tri-State); 20,000 shares of Marlin Investment Co. (November 22 — “rented” from a person who was told they would not be used as collateral); 100,000 shares of Management Dynamics, Inc. (December 6 — trading suspended; withdrawn as collateral); 175,000 shares of General Investment Corp. (December 19 — restricted); 50,000 shares of Satellite Systems Corp. (January 19 — restricted and “rented”; fictitious overseas advertisement planted).
Count 1 of the indictment charged petitioner and his codefendants with conspiring to violate 18 U. S. C. § 1014 (fraud in a bank loan application), 18 U. S. C. §1341 (mail fraud), and 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (wire fraud), as well as § 17 (a) (securities fraud). Counts 2 and 3 alleged substantive violations of § 17 (a) and 18 U. S. C. § 1014, respectively, against petitioner and some of the codefendants listed in the conspiracy count. Proceedings against petitioner were severed before trial. The Government agreed to dismiss the substantive charge of fraud in a bank loan application before the jury reached a verdict, and the jury acquitted petitioner of the substantive count of securities fraud.
The Court of Appeals divided over an evidentiary issue. It rejected petitioner’s argument regarding the scope of § 17 (a) without comment. See 609 F. 2d, at 66.
The misrepresentations at issue in this case related to the stocks themselves; petitioner does not allege that his conviction, insofar as it involved securities fraud under § 17 (a), was based on misrepresentations made about the financial condition of Tri-State itself. Thus, we need not decide whether misrepresentations or omissions involved in a securities transaction but not pertaining to thé securities themselves can form the basis of a violation of § 17 (a).
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Handbook and Proceedings 174 (1929) (Fourth and Final Draft) ("sale” defined to “include every disposition, or attempt to dispose of a security or interest in a security for value”).
To the extent that petitioner argues there was no need to protect pledgees, the very fact that Congress saw fit to afford such protection under the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, ends our inquiry, absent a contention, not present here, that the Constitution otherwise prohibits the means selected. “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
UNITED STATES v. DEBROW.
NO. 51.
Argued October 20, 1953.
Decided November 16, 1953.
John F. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Beatrice Rosenberg and Felicia H. Dubrovsky.
Ben F. Cameron argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were W. S. Henley, R. W. Thompson, Jr., Albert Sidney Johnston, Jr., W. W. Dent and T. J. Wills.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents here, defendants below, were charged by separate indictments with the crime of perjury, as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621. Each indictment read in material part as follows:
“[T]he defendant herein, having duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal, to wit: a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments known as the Subcommittee on Investigations, a duly created and authorized subcommittee of the United States Senate conducting official hearings in the Southern District of Mississippi, and inquiring in a matter then and there pending before the said subcommittee in which a law of the United States authorizes that an oath be administered, that he would testify truly, did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully, and contrary to said oath, state a material matter which he did not believe to be true . . .
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were sustained on the ground that the indictments did not allege the name of the person who administered the oath nor his authority to do so. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting, 203 F. 2d 699, and we granted certiorari, 345 U. S. 991, because of the importance of the question in the administration of federal criminal law.
An indictment is required to set forth the elements of the offense sought to be charged.
“The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, ‘and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in case any other proceedings are taken against him for a similar offence, whether the record shows with accuracy to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.’ Cochran and Sayre v. United States, 157 U. S. 286, 290; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 34.” Hagner v. United States, 285 U. S. 427, 431.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were designed to eliminate technicalities in criminal pleading and are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure. Rule 2, F. R. Crim. Proc. Rule 7 (c) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. ... It need not contain . . . any other matter not necessary to such statement. . . .”
The essential elements of the crime of perjury as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 1621 are (1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) taken before a competent tribunal, officer or person, and (3) a false statement wil-fully made as to facts material to the hearing. The indictments allege that the subcommittee of the Senate was a competent tribunal, pursuing matters properly before it, that in such proceeding it was authorized by a law of the United States to administer oaths, and that each defendant duly took an oath before such competent tribunal and wilfully testified falsely as to material facts.
The oath administered must be authorized by a law of the United States. This requirement is met by the allegations in the indictments that the defendants had “duly taken an oath.” “Duly taken” means an oath taken according to a law which authorizes such oath. See Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U. S. 233, 236. The name of the person who administered the oath is not an essential element of the crime of perjury; the identity of such person goes only to the proof of whether the defendants were duly sworn. Therefore, all the essential elements of the offense of perjury were alleged.
The source of the requirement that an indictment for perjury must aver the name and authority of the person who administered the oath is to be found in R. S. § 5396, 18 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 558. It may be worthy of note that this provision was expressly repealed by Congress in 1948, 62 Stat. 862, in the revision and recodification of Title 18. The House Committee on Revision of the Laws had the assistance of two special consultants who were members of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and who “rendered invaluable service in the technical task of singling out for repeal or revision the statutory provisions made obsolete by the new Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4.. In the tabulation of laws omitted and repealed by the revision, it is stated that R. S. § 5396 was repealed because “Covered by rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id., at A214.
The charges of the indictments followed substantially the wording of the statute, which embodies all the elements of the crime, and such charges clearly informed the defendants of that with which they were accused, so as to enable them to prepare their defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecutions for the same offense. It is inconceivable to us how the defendants could possibly be misled as to the offense with which they stood charged. The sufficiency of the indictment is not a question of whether it could have been more definite and certain. If the defendants wanted more definite information as to the name of the person who administered the oath to them, they could have obtained it by requesting a bill of. particulars. Rule 7 (f), F. R. Crim. Proc.
The indictments were sufficient, and the dismissal thereof was error. The judgments are
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
“Perjury generally.
“Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”
United States v. Debrow et al., U. S. D. C. S. D. Miss., Feb. 11, 1952 (unreported). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
182
] | sc_respondent |
WISSNER et al. v. WISSNER.
No. 119.
Argued December 6-7, 1949.
Decided February 6, 1950.
Carlos J. Badger argued the cause, for appellants. With him on the brief were W. Coburn Cook and Vernon F. Gant.
Leslie A. Cleary argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was William Zefj.
By special leave of Court, Morton Hollander argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison and Paul A. Sweeney.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are to determine whether the California community property law, as applied in this case, conflicts with certain provisions of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940; and if so, whether the federal law is consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The cause is here on appeal from the final judgment of a California District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of California having denied a hearing. Reading the opinion below as a decision that the federal statute was unconstitutional, we noted probable jurisdiction. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (1).
The material facts are not in dispute. Appellants are the parents, and appellee the widow, of Major Leonard O. Wissner, who died in India in 1945 in the service of the United States Army. He had enlisted in the Army in November 1942 and in January 1943 subscribed to a National Service Life Insurance policy in the principal sum of $10,000, which policy was in effect at the date of his death. The opinion below indicates that the decedent and appellee were estranged at the time he entered the Army or shortly thereafter. In January 1943 he requested his attorney to “get an insurance policy away” from appellee. After six months in the service decedent stopped the allotment to his wife, and in September 1943 expressed the wish that he “could find some way of forcing plaintiff to a settlement and a divorce.” It is not surprising, therefore, that, without the knowledge or consent of his wife, the Major named his mother principal and his father contingent beneficiary under his National Service Life Insurance policy. Since his death the United States Veterans’ Administration has been paying his mother the proceeds of the policy in monthly installments.
In 1947 the Major’s widow brought action against the appellants in the Superior Court for Stanislaus County, State of California, alleging that under California community property law she was entitled to one-hálf the proceeds of the policy. Appellants answered that their designation as beneficiaries was “final and conclusive as against any claimed rights” of appellee. The court found that the decedent and his widow had been married in 1930, and until the date of Major Wissner’s death had been legally domiciled there and subject to the state’s community property laws. Major Wissner’s army pay, which was held to be community property under California law, was the source of the premiums paid on the policy. But no claim was made for the premiums; the widow sought the proceeds of the insurance. The court concluded that, consistent with California law in the ordinary insurance case, the proceeds of this policy “were and are the community property” of the widow and the decedent, and entered judgment for appellee for one-half the amount of payments already received, plus interest, and required appellants to pay appellee one-half of all future payments “immediately upon the receipt thereof” by appellees or either thereof. The District Court of Appeal affirmed, 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P. 2d 837 (1949), holding that appellee had a “vested right” to the insurance proceeds, and the Supreme Court of California denied a hearing, one judge dissenting.
We are of the opinion that the decision below was incorrect. The National Service Life Insurance Act is the congressional mode of affording a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of the United States. A liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named beneficiary is everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan. Premiums are very low and are waived during the insured’s disability; costs of administration are borne by the United States; liabilities may be discharged out of congressional appropriations.
The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured “shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance [within a designated class], . . . and shall ... at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries . . . .” 38 U. S. C. § 802 (g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other. Pursuant to the congressional command, the Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured’s choice. He chose his mother. It is plain to us that the judgment of the lower court, as to one-half of the proceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the insurance money. We do not share appellee’s discovery of congressional purpose that widows in community property states participate in the payments under the policy, contrary to the express direction of the insured. Whether directed at the very money received from the Government or an equivalent amount, the judgment below nullifies the soldier’s choice and frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress. It cannot stand.
The judgment under review has a further deficiency so far as it ordered the diversion of future payments as soon as they are paid by the Government to the mother. At least in this respect, the very payments received under the policy are to be “seized,” in effect, by the judgment below. This is in flat conflict with the exemption provision contained in 38 U. S. C. § 454a, made a part of this Act by 38 U. S. C. § 816: Payments to the named beneficiary “shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. . . .”
We recognize that some courts have ruled that this and similar exemptions relating to pensions and veterans’ relief do not apply when alimony or the support of wife or children is in issue. See Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App. D. C. 350, 112 F. 2d 177 (1940); Tully v. Tully, 159 Mass. 91, 34 N. E. 79 (1893); Hodson v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 243 App. Div. 480, 278 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1935); In re Guardianship of Bagnall, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N. W. 2d 597 (1947), and cases therein cited. But cf. Brewer v. Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 239-241, 84 S. W. 2d 1022, 1040 (1933). We shall not attempt to epitomize a legal system at least as ancient as the customs of the Visigoths, but we must note that the community property principle rests upon something more than the moral obligation of supporting spouse and children : the business relationship of man and wife for their mutual monetary profit. See de Funiak, Community Property, § 11 (1943). Venerable and worthy as this community is, it is not, we think, as likely to justify an exception to the congressional language as specific judicial recognition of particular needs, in the alimony and support cases. Our view of those cases, whatever it may be, is irrelevant here. Further, Congress has provided in the National Service Life Insurance Act that the chosen beneficiary of the life insurance policy shall be, during life, the sole owner of the proceeds.
The constitutionality of the congressional mandate above expounded need not detain us long. Certainly Congress in its desire to afford as much material protection as possible to its fighting force could wisely provide a plan of insurance coverage. Possession of government insurance, payable to the relative of his choice, might well directly enhance the morale of the serviceman. The exemption provision is his guarantee of the complete and full performance of the contract to the exclusion of conflicting claims. The end is a legitimate one within the congressional powers over national defense, and the means are adapted to the chosen end. The Act is valid. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). And since the statute which made the insurance proceeds possible was explicit in announcing that the insured shall have the right to designate the recipient of the insurance, and that “No person shall have a vested right” to those proceeds, 38 U. S. C. § 802 (i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture. The federal statute establishes the fund in issue, and forestalls the existence of any “vested” right in the proceeds of federal insurance. Hence no constitutional question is presented. However “vested” her right to the proceeds of nongovernmental insurance under California law, that rule cannot apply to this insurance. Compare W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (1934); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934). See Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85 (1938); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U. S. 104 (1918).
The judgment below is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
54 Stat. 1008, as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 801 et seq. Amendments added in 1946, 60 Stat. 781, do not concern us here.
We assume the correctness of the lower court’s statement of state law. See also French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P. 2d 235 (1941). The view we take of this case makes it unnecessary to decide whether California is entitled to call army pay community property.
See Lobingier, An Historical Introduction to Community Property Law, 8 Nat. Univ. L. Rev. (No. 2), p. 45 (1928); de Funiak, Community Property, c. II (1943).
There are, of course, support aspects to the community property principle, and in some cases they may be of considerable importance. Likewise alimony may not be limited to the amount essential to support the divorced spouse. But we do not think the Congress would have intended decision to turn on factual variations in the spouse’s need. If there is a distinction to be drawn, we think it must be based upon a generalization as to the dominating characteristics of a particular class of cases — alimony cases, support cases, community property cases. The alimony cases have uniformly been decided on that basis. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states. | What is the issue area of the decision? | [
"Criminal Procedure",
"Civil Rights",
"First Amendment",
"Due Process",
"Privacy",
"Attorneys",
"Unions",
"Economic Activity",
"Judicial Power",
"Federalism",
"Interstate Relations",
"Federal Taxation",
"Miscellaneous",
"Private Action"
] | [
9
] | sc_issuearea |
SHAARE TEFILA CONGREGATION et al. v. COBB et al.
No. 85-2156.
Argued February 25, 1987
Decided May 18, 1987
White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Patricia A. Brannan argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were David S. Tatel, Joseph M. Hassett, Steven P. Hollman, Irvin N. Shapell, and Kevin J. Lipson.
Deborah T. Garren argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent Remer. With her on the brief was Robert B. Bamhouse
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Maryland by Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, Dennis M. Sweeney, Deputy Attorney General, and Ralph S. Tyler III and C. J. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorneys General; for the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith et al. by Gregg H. Levy, Mitchell F. Dolin, Meyer Eisenberg, David Brody, Edward N. heavy, Steven M. Freeman, Jill L. Kahn, Robert S. Rifkind, Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, Eileen Kaufman, Harold R. Tyler, James Robertson, Norman Redlich, William L. Robinson, Judith A. Winston, Joseph A. Morris, and Grover G. Hankins; and for the Ameriean-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee by James G. Abourezk.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On November 2, 1982, the outside walls of the synagogue of the Shaare Tefila Congregation in Silver Spring, Maryland, were sprayed with red and black paint and with large anti-Semitic slogans, phrases, and symbols. A few months later, the Congregation and some individual members brought this suit in the Federal District Court, alleging that defendants’ desecration of the synagogue had violated 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1982, 1985(3) and the Maryland common law of trespass, nuisance, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On defendants’ motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), the District Court dismissed all the claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects. 785 F. 2d 523 (CA4 1986). Petitioners petitioned for writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, 479 U. S. 812 (1986), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Section 1982 guarantees all citizens of the United States, “the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The section forbids both official and private racially discriminatory interference with property rights, Jones v. Alfred, H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968). Petitioners’ allegation was that they were deprived of the right to hold property in violation of § 1982 because the defendants were motivated by racial prejudice. They unsuccessfully argued in the District Court and Court of Appeals that Jews are not a racially distinct group, but that defendants’ conduct is actionable because they viewed Jews as racially distinct and were motivated by racial prejudice. The Court of Appeals held that § 1982 was not “intended to apply to situations in which a plaintiff is not a member of a racially distinct group but is merely perceived to be so by defendants.” 785 F. 2d, at 526 (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals believed that “[bjecause discrimination against Jews is not racial discrimination,” id., at 527, the District Court was correct in dismissing the § 1982 claim.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a charge of racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1982 cannot be made out by alleging only that the defendants were motivated by racial animus; it is necessary as well to allege that defendants’ animus was directed towards the kind of group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute. To hold otherwise would unacceptably extend the reach of the statute.
We agree with petitioners, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Jews cannot state a § 1982 claim against other white defendants. That view rested on the notion that because Jews today are not thought to be members of a separate race, they cannot make out a claim of racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1982. That construction of the section we have today rejected in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, ante, p. 604. Our opinion in that case observed that definitions of race when § 1982 was passed were not the same as they are today, ante, at 609-613, and concluded that the section was “intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.” Ante, at 613. As Saint Francis makes clear, the question before us is not whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today’s standards, but whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people that Congress intended to protect. It is evident from the legislative history of the section reviewed in Saint Francis College, a review that we need not repeat here, that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then considered to be distinct races and hence within the protection of the statute. Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against other members of what today is considered to be part of the Caucasian race.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
NEW HAMPSHIRE v. MAINE
No. 130, Orig.
Argued April 16,2001
Decided May 29, 2001
Paul R Stern, Deputy Attorney General of Maine, argued the cause for defendant. With Mm on the briefs were An drew Ketterer, Attorney General, and Christopher C. Taub and William R. Stokes, Assistant Attorneys General.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were former So He-itor General Waccman, Assistant. Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and Patricia Weiss.
Leslie J. Ludtke, Associate Attorney General of New Hampshire, argued the cause for plaintiff With her on the briefs were Phillip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General, and John R. Harrington.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Piscataqua River lies at the southeastern end of New Hampshire’s boundary with Maine. The river begins at the headwaters of Salmon Falls and runs seaward into Portsmouth Harbor (also known as' Piscataqua Harbor). On March 6, 2000, New Hampshire brought this original action against Maine, claiming that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore and that the entire river and all of Portsmouth Harbor belong to New Hampshire. Maine has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that two prior proceedings — a 1740 boundary determination by King George II and a 1977 consent judgment entered by this Court — definitively fixed the Piscataqua River boundary at the middle of the river’s main channel of navigation.
The 1740 decree located the Piscataqua River boundary at the “Middle of the River.” Because New Hampshire, in the 1977 proceeding, agreed without reservation that the words “Middle of the River” mean the middle of the Pis-cataqua River’s main channel of navigation, we conclude that New Hampshire is estopped from asserting now that the boundary runs along the Maine shore. Accordingly, we grant Maine’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
I
New Hampshire and Maine share a border that runs from northwest to southeast. At the southeastern end of the border, the easternmost point of New Hampshire meets the southernmost point of Maine. The boundary in this region follows the Piscataqua River eastward into Portsmouth Harbor and, from there, extends in a southeasterly direction into the sea. Twenty-five years ago, in a dispute between the two States over lobster fishing rights, this Court entered a consent judgment fixing the precise location of the “lateral marine boundary,” i. e., the boundary in the marine waters off the coast of New Hampshire and Maine, from the closing line of Portsmouth Harbor five miles seaward to Gosport Harbor in the Isles of Shoals. New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U. S. 363 (1976); New Hampshire v. Maine, 434 U.S. 1, 2 (1977). This ease concerns the location of the Maine-New Hampshire boundary along the inland stretch of the Pis-cataqua River, from the mouth of Portsmouth Harbor westward to the river’s headwaters at Salmon Falls. (A map of the region appears as an appendix to this opinion.)
In the 1970’s contest over the lateral marine boundary, we summarized the history of the interstate boundary in the Piscataqua River region. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S., at 366-367. The boundary, we said, “was in fact fixed in 1740 by decree of Ring George II of England” as follows:
“‘That the Dividing Line shall pass up thro the Mouth of Piscataqua Harbour and up the Middle of the River .... And that the Dividing Line shall part the Isles of Shoals and run thro the Middle of the Har-bour between the Islands to the Sea on the Southerly Side....’ ” Id., at 366 (quoting the 1740 decree).
In 1976, New Hampshire and Maine “expressly agree[d] . . . that the decree of 1740 fixed the boundary in the Pis-cataqua Harbor area.” Id., at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Their quarrel was over the location ... of the ‘Mouth of Piscataqua River,’ ‘Middle of the River,’ and ‘Middle of the Harbour’ within the contemplation of the decree.” Ibid. The meaning of those terms was essential to delineating the lateral marine boundary. See Report of Special Master, O. T. 1975, No. 64 Orig., pp. 32-49 (hereinafter Report). In particular, the northern end of the lateral marine boundary required a determination of the point where the line marking the “Middle of the [Piseataqua] River” crosses the closing line of Piseataqua Harbor. Id., at 43.
In the course of litigation, New Hampshire and Maine proposed a consent decree in which they agreed, inter alia, that the words “Middle of the River” in the 1740 decree refer to the middle of the Piseataqua River’s main channel of navigation. Motion for Entry of Judgment By Consent of Plaintiff and Defendant in New Hampshire v. Maine, O. T. 1973, No. 64 Orig., p. 2 (hereinafter Motion for Consent Judgment). The Special Master, upon reviewing pertinent history, rejected the States’ interpretation and concluded that “the geographic middle of the river and not its main or navigable channel was intended by the 1740 decree.” Report 41. This Court determined, however, that the States’ interpretation “reasonably invested] imprecise terms” with a definition not “wholly contrary to relevant evidence.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S., at 369. On that basis, the Court declined to adopt the Special Master’s construction of “Middle of the River” and directed entry of the consent decree. Id., at 369-370. The final decree, entered in 1977, defined “Middle of the River” as “the middle of the main channel of navigation of the Piseataqua River.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 434 U.S., at 2.
The 1977 consent judgment fixed only the lateral marine boundary and not the inland Piseataqua River boundary. See Report 42-43 (“For the purposes of the present dispute, ... it is unnecessary to lay out fully the course of the boundary as it proceeds upriver ....”). In the instant action, New Hampshire contends that the inland river boundary “run[s] along the low water mark on the Maine shore,” Complaint 49, and asserts sovereignty over the entire river and all of Portsmouth Harbor, including the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on Seavey Island located within the harbor just south of Kittery, Maine, id., at 34. Relying on various historical records, New Hampshire urges that “Middle of the River,” as those words were used in 1740, denotes the main branch of the river, not a midchannel boundary, Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 12-16, and that New Hampshire, not Maine, exercised sole jurisdiction over shipping and military activities in Portsmouth Harbor during the decades before and after the 1740 decree, id., at 17-19, and nn. 35-38.
While disagreeing with New Hampshire’s understanding of history, see Motion to Dismiss 9-14,18-19 (compiling evidence that Maine continually exercised jurisdiction over the harbor and shipyard from the 1700’s to the present day), Maine primarily contends that the 1740 decree and the 1977 consent judgment divided the Piseataqua River at the middle of the main channel of navigation — a division that places Seavey Island within Maine’s jurisdiction. Those earlier proceedings, according to Maine, bar New Hampshire’s complaint under principles of claim and issue preclusion as well as judicial estoppel.
We pretermit the States’ competing historical claims along with their arguments on the application vel non of the res judicata doctrines commonly called claim and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit. Issue preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17, 27, pp. 148, 250 (1980); D. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: Preclusion in Civil Actions 32, 46 (2001). In the unusual circumstances this case presents, we conclude that a discrete doctrine, judicial estoppel, best fits the controversy. Under that doctrine, we hold, New Hampshire is equitably barred from asserting — contrary to its position in the 1970’s litigation — that the inland Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore.
II
“[W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895). This rule, known as judicial estoppel, “generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227, n. 8 (2000); see 18 Moore’s Federal Practice §134.30, p. 134-62 (3d ed. 2000) (“The doetrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding”); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4477, p.782 (1981) (hereinafter Wright) (“absent any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory”).
Although we have not had occasion to discuss the doctrine elaborately, other courts have uniformly recognized that its purpose is “to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F. 2d 595, 598 (CA6 1982), by “prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,” United States v. McCaskey, 9 F. 3d 368, 378 (CA5 1993). See In re Cassidy, 892 F. 2d 637, 641 (CA7 1990) (“Judicial estoppel is a doctrine intended to prevent the perversion of the judicial process.”); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F. 2d 1162, 1166 (CA4 1982) (judicial estoppel “proteet[s] the essential integrity of the judicial process”); Scarano v. Central R. Co., 203 F. 2d 510, 513 (CA3 1953) (judicial estoppel prevents parties from “playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’ ” (quoting Stretch v. Watson, 6 N. J. Super. 456, 469, 69 A. 2d 596, 603 (1949))). Because the rule is intended to prevent “improper use of judicial machinery,” Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F. 2d 933, 938 (CADC 1980), judicial estoppel “is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion,” Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F. 2d 1033, 1037 (CA9 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts have observed that “[t]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,” Allen, 667 F. 2d, at 1166; accord, Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F. 3d 219, 223 (CA4 1996); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F. 2d 208, 212 (CAl 1987). Nevertheless, several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position. United States v. Hook, 195 F. 3d 299, 306 (CA7 1999); In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F. 3d 197, 206 (CA5 1999); Hossaini v. Western Mo. Medical Center, 140 F. 3d 1140, 1143 (CA8 1998); Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128 F. 3d 94, 98 (CA2 1997). Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would ereate “the perception that either the first or the second court was misled,” Edwards, 690 F. 2d, at 599. Absent sue-cess in a prior proceeding, a party’s later inconsistent position introduces no “risk of inconsistent court determinations,” United States v. C. I. T. Constr. Inc., 944 F. 2d 253, 259 (CA5 1991), and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity. See Hook, 195 F. 3d, at 306; Maharaj, 128 F. 3d, at 98; Konstantinidis, 626 F. 2d, at 939. A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. See Davis, 156 U.S., at 689; Philadelphia, W., & B. R. Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 307, 335-337 (1852); Scarano, 203 F. 2d, at 513 (judicial estoppel forbids use of “intentional self-contradiction ... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage”); see also 18 Wright §4477, p.782.
In enumerating these factors, we do not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel. Additional considerations may inform the doctrine’s application in specific factual contexts. In this case, we simply observe that the factors above firmly tip the balance of equities in favor of barring New Hampshire’s present complaint.
New Hampshire’s claim that the Piseataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore is clearly inconsistent with its interpretation of the words “Middle of the River” during the 1970’s litigation. As mentioned above, supra, at 747, interpretation of those words was “necessary” to fixing the northern endpoint of the lateral marine boundary, Report 43. New Hampshire offered two interpretations in the earlier proceeding — first agreeing with Maine in the proposed consent decree that “Middle of the River” means the middle of the main channel of navigation, and later agreeing with the Special Master that the words mean the geographic middle of the river. Both constructions located the “Middle of the River” somewhere other than the Maine shore of the Pis-eataqua River.
Moreover, the record of the 1970’s dispute makes clear that this Court accepted New Hampshire’s agreement with Maine that “Middle of the River” means middle of the main navigable channel, and that New Hampshire benefited from that interpretation. New Hampshire, it is true, preferred the interpretation of “Middle of the River” in the Special Master’s report. See Exceptions and Brief for Plaintiff in New Hampshire v. Maine, O. T. 1975, No. 64 Grig., p. 3 (hereinafter Plaintiff’s Exceptions) (“the boundary now proposed by the Special Master is more favorable to [New Hampshire] than that recommended in the proposed consent decree”). But the consent decree was sufficiently favorable to New Hampshire to garner its approval. Although New Hampshire now suggests that it “compromised in Maine’s favor” on the definition of “Middle of the River” in the 1970’s litigation, Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 24, that “compromise” enabled New Hampshire to settle the case, see id., at 24-25, on terms beneficial to both States. Notably, in their joint motion for entry of the consent decree, New Hampshire and Maine represented to this Court that the proposed judgment was “in the best interest of each State.” Motion for Consent Judgment 1. Relying on that representation, the Court accepted the boundary proposed by the two States. New Hampshire v. Maine, 434 U.S. 1 (1977).
At oral argument, New Hampshire urged that the consent decree simply fixed the “Middle of the River” at “an arbitrary location based on the administrative convenience of the parties.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. To the extent New Hampshire implies that the parties settled the lateral marine boundary dispute without judicial endorsement of their interpretation of “Middle of the River,” that view is foreclosed by the Court’s determination that “[t]he consent decree . . . proposes a wholly permissible final resolution of the controversy both as to facts and law,” New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S., at 368-369. Three dissenting Justices agreed with New Hampshire that the consent decree interpreted the middle-of-the-river language “by agreements of convenience” and not “in accordance with legal principles.” Id., at 371 (White, J., joined by Blaekmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). But the Court concluded otherwise, noting that its acceptance of the consent decree involved “[n]othing remotely resembling ‘arbitral’ rather than ‘judicial’ functions,” id., at 369. The consent decree “reasonably invested] imprecise terms with definitions that give effect to [the 1740] decree,” ibid., and “[did] not fall into the category of agreements that we reject because acceptance would not be consistent with our Art. Ill function and duty,” ibid.
New Hampshire also contends that the 1977 consent decree was entered without “a searching historical inquiry into what that language [‘Middle of the River’] meant.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. According to New Hampshire, had it known then what it knows now about the relevant history, it would not have entered into the decree. Ibid. We do not question that it may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel “when a party’s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.” John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden, P. C., 65 F. 3d 26, 29 (GA4 1995); see In re Corey, 892 F. 2d 829, 836 (GA9 1989); Konstantinidis, 626 F. 2d, at 939. We are unpersuaded, however, that New Hampshire’s position in 1977 fairly may be regarded as a product of inadvertence or mistake.
The pleadings in the lateral marine boundary case show that New Hampshire did engage in “a searching historical inquiry” into the meaning of “Middle of the River.” See Reply Brief for Plaintiff in New Hampshire v. Maine, O. T. 1975, No. 64 Orig., pp. 3-9 (examining history of river boundaries under international law, proceedings leading up to the 1740 order of the King in Council, and relevant precedents of this Court). None of the historical evidence cited by New Hampshire remotely suggested that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore. In fact, in attempting to place the boundary at the geographic middle of the river, New Hampshire acknowledged that its agents in 1740 understood the King’s order to “adjudg[e] half of the river to” the portion of Massachusetts that is now Maine. Id., at 6 (emphasis in original) (quoting N. H. State Papers, XIX, pp. 591, 596-597); see Reply Brief in No. 64 Orig., supra, at 4 (“The intention of those participating in the proceedings leading to the [174.0 decree] was to use ‘geographic middle’ as the Piscataqua boundary.” (emphasis in original)). In addition, this Court independently determined that “there is nothing to suggest that the location of the 1740 boundary agreed upon by the States is wholly contrary to relevant evidence.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S., at 369.
Nor can it be said that New Hampshire lacked the opportunity or incentive to locate the river boundary at Maine’s shore. In its present complaint, New Hampshire relies on historical materials — primarily official documents and events from the eolonial and posteolonial periods, see Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 12-19 — that were no less available 25 years ago than they are today. And New Hampshire had every reason to consult those materials: A river boundary running along Maine’s shore would have placed the northern terminus of the lateral marine boundary much closer to Maine, “resulting] in hundreds if not thousands of additional acres of territory being in New Hampshire rather than Maine,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48 (rebuttal argument of Maine). Tellingly, New Hampshire at the time understood the importance of placing the northern terminus as close to Maine as possible. While agreeing with the Special Master that “Middle of the River” means geographic middle, New Hampshire insisted that the geographic middle should be determined by using the banks of the river, not low tide elevations (as the Special Master had proposed), as the key reference points — a . methodology that would have placed the northern terminus 350 yards closer to the Maine shore. Plaintiff’s Exceptions 3.
In short, considerations of equity persuade us that application of judicial estoppel is appropriate in this case. Having convinced this Court to accept one interpretation of “Middle of the River,” and having benefited from that interpretation, New Hampshire now urges an inconsistent interpretation to gain an additional advantage at Maine’s expense. Were we to accept New Hampshire’s latest view, the “risk of inconsistent court determinations,” C. I. T. Constr. Inc., 944 F. 2d, at 259, would become a reality. We cannot interpret “Middle of the River” in the 1740 decree to mean two different things along the same boundary line without undermining the integrity of the judicial process.
Finally, notwithstanding the balance of equities, New Hampshire points to this Court’s recognition that “ordinarily the doctrine of estoppel or that part of it which precludes inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings is not applied to states,” Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 369 (1946). Of course, “broad interests of public policy may make it important to allow a change of positions that might seem inappropriate as a matter of merely private interests.” 18 Wright §4477, p.784. But this is not a case where estoppel would compromise a governmental interest in enforcing the law. Cf. Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) (“When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.”). Nor is this a case where the shift in the government’s position is “the result of a change in public policy,” United States v. Owens, 54 F. 3d 271, 275 (CA6 1995); cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) (collateral estoppel does not apply to Commissioner where pertinent statutory provisions or Treasury regulations have changed between the first and second proceeding), or the result of a change in facts essential to the prior judgment, cf. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159 (1979) (“changes in facts essential to a judgment will render collateral estoppel inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same issues”). Instead, it is a case between two States, in which each owes the other a full measure of respect.
What has changed between 1976 and today is New Hampshire’s interpretation of the historical evidence concerning the King’s 1740 decree. New Hampshire advances its new interpretation not to enforce its own laws within its borders, but to adjust the border itself. Given Maine’s countervailing interest in the location of the boundary, we are unable to discern any “broad interest] of public policy,” 18 Wright § 4477, p. 784, that gives New Hampshire the prerogative to construe “Middle of the River” differently today than it did 25 years ago.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we conclude that judicial estoppel bars New Hampshire from asserting that the Piscataqua River boundary runs along the Maine shore. Accordingly, we grant Maine’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
It is so ordered.
Justice Squter took no part in the consideration or decision of this ease.
[Appendix containing Portsmouth Harbor to Isles of Shoals map follows this page.]
Adapted from Map 13283, Portsmouth Harbor to Isles of Shoals, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (18th ed. Nov. 2000).
According to New Hampshire, the Federal Government in recent years has taken steps to dose portions of the shipyard and to lease its land and fadlities to private developers. Complaint 34. New Hampshire and Maine assert competing daims of sovereignty over private development on shipyard lands. Ibid. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
PUBLIC CITIZEN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 88-429.
Argued April 17, 1989
Decided June 21, 1989
Eric R. Glitzenstein argued the cause for appellant in No. 88-429. With him on the briefs were Patti A. Goldman and Alan B. Morrison. Paul D. Kamenar argued the cause for appellant in No. 88-494. With him on the briefs was Daniel J. Popeo.
Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro argued the cause for ap-pellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Assistant Attorney General Bolton, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., and Douglas Letter. Rex E. Lee, Ronald S. Flagg, Carter G. Phillips, Mark D. Hopson, H. Blair White, David T. Pritikin, and Darryl L. DePriest filed a brief for appellee American Bar Association.
Together with No. 88-494, Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Department of Justice et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Robert M. Weinberg, Walter A. Kamiat, and Laitrence Gold; and for the People for the American Way Action Fund et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Thomas F. Connell, and William L. Taylor.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Department of Justice regularly seeks advice from the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary regarding potential nominees for federal judge-ships. The question before us is whether the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 86 Stat. 770, as amended, 5 U. S. C. App. § 1 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V), applies to these consultations and, if it does, whether its application interferes unconstitutionally with the President’s prerogative under Article II to nominate and appoint officers of the United States; violates the doctrine of separation of powers; or unduly infringes the First Amendment right of members of the American Bar Association to freedom of association and expression. We hold that FACA does not apply to this special advisory relationship. We therefore do not reach the constitutional questions presented.
1 — H
¡>
The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint” Supreme Court Justices and, as established by Congress, other federal judges. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Since 1952 the President, through the Department of Justice, has requested advice from the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary (ABA Committee) in making such nominations.
The American Bar Association is a private voluntary professional association of approximately 343,000 attorneys. It has several working committees, among them the advisory body whose work is at issue here. The ABA Committee consists of 14 persons belonging to, and chosen by, the American Bar Association. Each of the 12 federal judicial Circuits (not including the Federal Circuit) has one representative on the ABA Committee, except for the Ninth Circuit, which has two; in addition, one member is chosen at large. The ABA Committee receives no federal funds. It does not recommend persons for appointment to the federal bench of its own initiative.
Prior to announcing the names of nominees for judgeships on the courts of appeals, the district courts, or the Court of International Trade, the President, acting through the Department of Justice, routinely requests a potential nominee to complete a questionnaire drawn up by the ABA Committee and to submit it to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy, to the chair of the ABA Committee, and to the committee member (usually the representative of the relevant judicial Circuit) charged with investigating the nominee. See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, What It Is and How It Works (1983), reprinted in App. 43-49; Brief for Federal Ap-pellee 2. The potential nominee’s answers and the referral of his or her name to the ABA Committee are kept confidential. The committee member conducting the investigation then reviews the legal writings of the potential nominee, interviews judges, legal scholars, and other attorneys regarding the potential nominee’s qualifications, and discusses the matter confidentially with representatives of various professional organizations and other groups. The committee member also interviews the potential nominee, sometimes with other committee members in attendance.
Following the initial investigation, the committee representative prepares for the chair an informal written report describing the potential nominee’s background, summarizing all interviews, assessing the candidate’s qualifications, and recommending one of four possible ratings: “exceptionally well qualified,” “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “not qualified.” The chair then makes a confidential informal report to the Attorney General’s Office. The chair’s report discloses the substance of the committee representative’s report to the chair, without revealing the identity of persons who were interviewed, and indicates the evaluation the potential nominee is likely to receive if the Department of Justice requests a formal report.
If the Justice Department does request a formal report, the committee representative prepares a draft and sends copies to other members of the ABA Committee, together with relevant materials. A vote is then taken and a final report approved. The ABA Committee conveys its rating— though not its final report — in confidence to the Department of Justice, accompanied by a statement whether its rating was supported by all committee members, or whether it only commanded a majority or substantial majority of the ABA Committee. After considering the rating and other information the President and his advisers have assembled, including a report by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and additional interviews conducted by the President’s judicial selection committee, the President then decides whether to nominate the candidate. If the candidate is in fact nominated, the ABA Committee’s rating, but not its report, is made public at the request of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
B
FACA was born of a desire to assess the need for the “numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Government.” § 2(a), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. § 2(a). Its purpose was to ensure that new advisory committees be established only when essential and that their number be minimized; that they be terminated when they have outlived their usefulness; that their creation, operation, and duration be subject to uniform standards and procedures; that Congress and the public remain apprised of their existence, activities, and cost; and that their work be exclusively advisory in nature. § 2(b).
To attain these objectives, FACA directs the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and agency heads to establish various administrative guidelines and management controls for advisory committees. It also imposes a number of requirements on advisory groups. For example, FAGA requires that each advisory committee file a charter, § 9(c), and keep detailed minutes of its meetings. § 10(c). Those meetings must be chaired or attended by an officer or employee of the Federal Government who is authorized to adjourn any meeting when he or she deems its adjournment in the public interest. § 10(e). FACA also requires advisory committees to provide advance notice of their meetings and to open them to the public, § 10(a), unless the President or the agency head to which an advisory committee reports determines that it may be closed to the public in accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. §552b(c). § 10(d). In addition, FACA stipulates that advisory committee minutes, records, and reports be made available to the public, provided they do not fall within one of the Freedom of Information Act’s exemptions, see 5 U. S. C. § 552, and the Government does not choose to withhold them. § 10(b). Advisory committees established by legislation or created by the President or other federal officials must also be “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions” they perform. §§ 5(b)(2), (c). Their existence is limited to two years, unless specifically exempted by the entity establishing them. § 14(a)(1).
C
In October 1986, appellant Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) brought suit against the Department of Justice after the ABA Committee refused WLF’s request for the names of potential judicial nominees it was considering and for the ABA Committee’s reports and minutes of its meetings. WLF asked the District Court for the District of Columbia to declare the ABA. Committee an “advisory committee” as FACA defines that term. WLF further sought an injunction ordering the Justice Department to cease utilizing the ABA Committee as an advisory committee until it complied with FACA. In particular, WLF contended that the ABA Committee must file a charter, afford notice of its meetings, open those meetings to the public, and make its minutes, records, and reports available for public inspection and copying. See WLF Complaint, App. 5-11. The Justice Department moved to dismiss, arguing that the ABA Committee did not fall within FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” and that, if it did, FACA would violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Appellant Public Citizen then moved successfully to intervene as a party plaintiff. Like WLF, Public Citizen requested a declaration that the Justice Department’s utilization of the ABA Committee is covered by FACA and an order enjoining the Justice Department to comply with FACA’s requirements.
The District Court dismissed the action following oral argument. 691 F. Supp. 483 (1988). The court held that the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee is subject to FACA’s strictures, but that “FACA cannot constitutionally be applied to the ABA Committee because to do so would violate the express separation of nomination and consent powers set forth in Article II of the Constitution and because no overriding congressional interest in applying FACA to the ABA Committee has been demonstrated.” Id., at 486. Congress’ role in choosing judges “is limited to the Senate’s advice and consent function,” the court concluded; “the purposes of FACA are served through the public confirmation process and any need for applying FACA to the ABA Committee is outweighed by the President’s interest in preserving confidentiality and freedom of consultation in selecting judicial nominees.” Id., at 496. We noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U. S. 979 (1988), and now affirm on statutory grounds, making consideration of the relevant constitutional issues unnecessary.
II
As a preliminary matter, appellee American Bar Association contests appellants’ standing to bring this suit. Appel-lee’s challenge is twofold. First, it contends that neither appellant has alleged injury sufficiently concrete and specific to confer standing; rather, appellee maintains, they have advanced a general grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, and thus lack standing under our precedents. Brief for Appellee ABA 12-15. Second, appellee argues that even if appellants have asserted a sufficiently discrete injury, they have not demonstrated that a decision in their favor would likely redress the alleged harm, because the meetings they seek to attend and the minutes and records they wish to review would probably be closed to them under FACA. Hence, the American Bar Association submits, Article III bars their suit. Id., at 15-17.
We reject these arguments. Appellee does not, and cannot, dispute that appellants are attempting to compel the Justice Department and the ABA Committee to comply with FACA’s charter and notice requirements, and that they seek access to the ABA Committee’s meetings and records in order to monitor its workings and participate more effectively in the judicial selection process. Appellant WLF has specifically requested, and been refused, the names of candidates under consideration by the ABA Committee, reports and minutes of the Committee’s meetings, and advance notice of future meetings. WLF Complaint, App. 8. As when an agency denies requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize the ABA Committee’s activities to the extent FACA allows constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue. Our decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those requesting information under it need show more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records. See, e. g., Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of Press, 489 U. S. 749 (1989); Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1 (1988); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792 (1984); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615 (1982); Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352 (1976). There is no reason for a different rule here. The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury, any more than the fact that numerous citizens might request the same information under the Freedom of Information Act entails that those who have been denied access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.
We likewise find untenable the American Bar Association’s claim that appellants lack standing because a ruling in their favor would not provide genuine relief as a result of FACA’s exceptions to disclosure. Appellants acknowledge that many meetings of the ABA Committee might legitimately be closed to the public under FACA and that many documents might properly be shielded from public view. But they by no means concede that FACA licenses denying them access to all meetings and papers, or that it excuses noncompliance with FACA’s other provisions. As Public Citizen contends, if FACA applies to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee without violating the Constitution, the ABA Committee will at least have to file a charter and give notice of its meetings. In addition, discussions and documents regarding the overall functioning of the ABA Committee, including its investigative, evaluative, and voting procedures, could well fall outside FACA’s exemptions. See Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, pp. 5-6, and n. 3.
Indeed, it is difficult to square appellee’s assertion that appellants cannot hope to gain noteworthy relief with its contention that “even more significant interference [than participation of Government officials in the ABA Committee’s affairs] would result from the potential application of the ‘public inspection’ provisions of Section 10 of the Act.” Brief for Appellee ABA 36. The American Bar Association explains: “Disclosure and public access are the rule under FACA; the exemptions generally are construed narrowly. In fact, the Government-in-the-Sunshine Act has no deliberative process privilege under which ABA Committee meetings could be closed.” Id., at 38-39 (citations omitted). Appellee therefore concludes: “At bottom, there can be no question that application of FACA will impair the sensitive and necessarily confidential process of gathering information to assess accurately the qualifications and character of prospective judicial nominees.” Id., at 39. Whatever the merits of these claims and whatever their relevance to appellee’s constitutional objections to FACA’s applicability, they certainly show, as appellants contend, that appellants might gain significant relief if they prevail in their suit. Appellants’ potential gains are undoubtedly sufficient to give them standing.
Ill
Section 3(2) of FACA, as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. §3(2), defines “advisory committee” as follows:
“For the purpose of this Act —
“(2) The term ‘advisory committee’ means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as ‘committee’), which is —
“(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or
“(B) established or utilized by the President, or
“(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that such term ex-eludes (i) the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, (ii) the Commission on Government Procurement, and (iii) any committee which is composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government.”
Appellants agree that the ABA Committee was not “established” by the President or the Justice Department. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, p. 16; Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, pp. 13, 15-16, 21. Equally plainly, the ABA Committee is a committee that furnishes “advice or recommendations” to the President via the Justice Department. Whether the ABA Committee constitutes an “advisory committee” for purposes of FACA therefore depends upon whether it is “utilized” by the President or the Justice Department as Congress intended that term to be understood.
A
There is no doubt that the Executive makes use of the ABA Committee, and thus “utilizes” it in one common sense of the term. As the District Court recognized, however, “reliance on the plain language of FACA alone is not entirely satisfactory.” 691 F. Supp., at 488. “Utilize” is a woolly verb, its contours left undefined by the statute itself. Read unqualifiedly, it would extend FACA’s requirements to any group of two or more persons, or at least any formal organization, from which the President or an Executive agency seeks advice. We are convinced that Congress did not intend that result. A nodding acquaintance with FACA’s purposes, as manifested by its legislative history and as recited in § 2 of the Act, reveals that it cannot have been Congress’ intention, for example, to require the filing of a charter, the presence of a controlling federal official, and detailed minutes any time the President seeks the views of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) before nominating Commissioners to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or asks the leaders of an American Legion Post he is visiting for the organization’s opinion on some aspect of military policy.
Nor can Congress have meant — as a straightforward reading of “utilize” would appear to require — that all of FACA’s restrictions apply if a President consults with his own political party before picking his Cabinet. It was unmistakably not Congress’ intention to intrude on a political party’s freedom to conduct its affairs as it chooses, cf. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 230 (1989), or its ability to advise elected officials who belong to that party, by placing a federal employee in charge of each advisory group meeting and making its minutes public property. FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful expenditure of public funds for worthless committee meetings and biased proposals; although its reach is extensive, we cannot believe that it was intended to cover every formal and informal consultation between the President or an Executive agency and a group rendering advice. As we said in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 459 (1892): “[Frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to include the particular act.”
Where the literal reading of a statutory term would “compel an odd result,” Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 509 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope. See also, e. g., Church of the Holy Trinity, supra, at 472; FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U. S. 426, 432 (1986). “The circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation,” for example, “may persuade a court that Congress did not intend words of common meaning to have their literal effect.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 266 (1981). Even though, as Judge Learned Hand said, “the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing,” nevertheless “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F. 2d 737, 739 (CA2), aff’d, 326 U. S. 404 (1945). Looking beyond the naked text for guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or where it seems inconsistent with Congress’ intention, since the plain-meaning rule is “rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.” Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.). See also United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial examination’ ”) (citations omitted).
Consideration of FACA’s purposes and origins in determining whether the term “utilized” was meant to apply to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee is particularly appropriate here, given the importance we have consistently attached to interpreting statutes to avoid deciding difficult constitutional questions where the text fairly admits of a less problematic construction. See infra, at 465-467. It is therefore imperative that we consider indicators of congressional intent in addition to the statutory language before concluding that FACA was meant to cover the ABA Committee’s provision of advice to the Justice Department in connection with judicial nominations.
B
Close attention to FACA’s history is helpful, for FACA did not flare on the legislative scene with the suddenness of a meteor. Similar attempts to regulate the Federal Government’s use of advisory committees were common during the 20 years preceding FACA’s enactment. See Note, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 Harv. J. Legis. 217, 219-221 (1973). An understanding of those efforts is essential to ascertain the intended scope of the term “utilize.”
In 1950, the Justice Department issued guidelines for the operation of federal advisory committees in order to forestall their facilitation of anticompetitive behavior by bringing industry leaders together with Government approval. See Hearings on WOC’s [Without Compensation Government employees] and Government Advisory Groups before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 586-587 (1955) (reprinting guidelines). Several years later, after the House Committee on Government Operations found that the Justice Department’s guidelines were frequently ignored, Representative Fascell sponsored a bill that would have accorded the guidelines legal status. H. R. 7390, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Although the bill would have required agencies to report to Congress on their use of advisory committees and would have subjected advisory committees to various controls, it apparently would not have imposed any requirements on private groups, not established by the Federal Government, whose advice was sought by the Executive. See H. R. Rep. No. 576, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-7 (1957); 103 Cong. Rec. 11252 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Fascell and Rep. Vorys).
Despite Congress’ failure to enact the bill, the Bureau of the Budget issued a directive in 1962 incorporating the bulk of the guidelines. See Perritt & Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the Political Process: The Federal Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 Geo. L. J. 725, 731 (1975). Later that year, President Kennedy issued Executive Order No. 11007, 3 CFR 573 (1959-1963 Comp.), which governed the functioning of advisory committees until FACA’s passage. Executive Order No. 11007 is the probable source of the term “utilize” as later employed in FACA. The Order applied to advisory committees “formed by a department or agency of the Government in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations,” or “not formed by a department or agency, but only during any period when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.” §2(a) (emphasis added). To a large extent, FACA adopted wholesale the provisions of Executive Order No. 11007. For example, like FACA, Executive Order No. 11007 stipulated that no advisory committee be formed or utilized unless authorized by law or determined as a matter of formal record by an agency head to be in the public interest, § 3; that all advisory committee meetings be held in the presence of a Government employee empowered to adjourn the meetings whenever he or she considered adjournment to be in the public interest, § 6(b); that meetings only occur at the call of, or with the advance approval of, a federal employee, § 6(a); that minutes be kept of the meetings, §§ 6(c), (d); and that committees terminate after two years unless a statute or an agency head decreed otherwise, § 8.
There is no indication, however, that Executive Order No. 11007 was intended to apply to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee. Neither President Kennedy, who issued the Order, nor President Johnson, nor President Nixon apparently deemed the ABA Committee to be “utilized” by the Department of Justice in the relevant sense of that term. Notwithstanding the ABA Committee’s highly visible role in advising the Justice Department regarding potential judicial nominees, and notwithstanding the fact that the Order’s requirements were established by the Executive itself rather than Congress, no President or Justice Department official applied them to the ABA Committee. As an entity formed privately, rather than at the Federal Government’s prompting, to .render confidential advice with respect to the President’s constitutionally specified power to nominate federal judges — an entity in receipt of no federal funds and not amenable to the strict management by agency officials envisaged by Executive Order No. 11007— the ABA Committee cannot easily be said to have been “utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.” That the Executive apparently did not consider the ABA Committee’s activity within the terms of its own Executive Order is therefore unsurprising.
Although FACA’s legislative history evinces an intent to widen the scope of Executive Order No. 11007’s definition of “advisory committee” by including “Presidential advisory committees,” which lay beyond the reach of Executive Order No. 11007, see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, pp. 9-10 (1970); H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, p. 4 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1098, pp. 3-5, 7 (1972), as well as to augment the restrictions applicable to advisory committees covered by the statute, there is scant reason to believe that Congress desired to bring the ABA Committee within FACA’s net. FACA’s principal purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees established by the Executive Branch and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them. That purpose could be accomplished, however, without expanding the coverage of Executive Order No. 11007 to include privately organized committees that received no federal funds. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Congress sought nothing more than stricter compliance with reporting and other requirements — which were made more stringent — by advisory committees already covered by the Order and similar treatment of a small class of publicly funded groups created by the President.
The House bill which in its amended form became FACA applied exclusively to advisory committees “established” by statute or by the Executive, whether by a federal agency or by the President himself. H. R. 4383, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(2) (1972). Although the House Committee Report stated that the class of advisory committees was to include “committees which may have been organized before their advice was sought by the President or any agency, but which are used by the President or any agency in the same way as an advisory committee formed by the President himself or the agency itself,” H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, supra, at 4, it is questionable whether the Report’s authors believed that the Justice Department used the ABA Committee in the same way as it used advisory committees it established. The phrase “used ... in the same way” is reminiscent of Executive Order No. 11007’s reference to advisory committees “utilized ... in the same manner” as a committee established by the Federal Government, and the practice of three administrations demonstrates that Executive Order No. 11007 did not encompass the ABA Committee.
This inference draws support from the earlier House Report which instigated the legislative efforts that culminated in FACA. That Report complained that committees “utilized” by an agency — as opposed to those established directly by an agency — rarely complied with the requirements of Executive Order No. 11007. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, supra, at 15. But it did not cite the ABA Committee or similar advisory committees as willful evaders of the Order. Rather, the Report’s paradigmatic example of a committee “utilized” by an agency for purposes of Executive Order No. 11007 was an advisory committee established by a quasi-public organization in receipt of public funds, such as the National Academy of Sciences. There is no indication in the Report that a purely private group like the ABA Committee that was not formed by the Executive, accepted no public funds, and assisted the Executive in performing a constitutionally specified task committed to the Executive was within the terms of Executive Order No. 11007 or was the type of advisory entity that legislation was urgently needed to address.
Paralleling the initial House bill, the Senate bill that grew into FACA defined “advisory committee” as one “established or organized” by statute, the President, or an Executive agency. S. 3529,92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3(1), (2) (1972). Like the House Report, the accompanying Senate Report stated that the phrase “established or organized” was to be understood in its “most liberal sense, so that when an officer brings together a group by formal or informal means, by contract or other arrangement, and whether or not Federal money is expended, to obtain advice and information, such group is covered by the provisions of this bill.” S. Rep. No. 92-1098, supra, at 8. While the Report manifested a clear intent not to restrict FACA’s coverage to advisory committees funded by the Federal Government, it did not indicate any desire to bring all private advisory committees within FACA’s terms. Indeed, the examples the Senate Report offers — “the Advisory Council on Federal Reports, the National Industrial Pollution Control Council, the National Petroleum Council, advisory councils to the National Institutes of Health, and committees of the national academies where they are utilized and officially recognized as advisory to the President, to an agency, or to a Government official,” ibid,.— are limited to groups organized by, or closely tied to, the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status. Given the prominence of the ABA Committee’s role and its familiarity to Members of Congress, its omission from the list of groups formed and maintained by private initiative to offer advice with respect to the President’s nomination of Government officials is telling. If the examples offered by the Senate Committee on Government Operations are representative, as seems fair to surmise, then there is little reason to think that there was any support, at least at the committee stage, for going beyond the terms of Executive Order No. 11007 to regulate comprehensively the workings of the ABA Committee.
It is true that the final version of FACA approved by both Houses employed the phrase “established or utilized,” and that this phrase is more capacious than the word “established” or the phrase “established or organized.” But its genesis suggests that it was not intended to go much beyond those narrower formulations. The words “or utilized” were added by the Conference Committee to the definition included in the House bill. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1403, p. 2 (1972). The Joint Explanatory Statement, however, said simply that the definition contained in the House bill was adopted “with modification.” Id., at 9. The Conference Report offered no indication that the modification was significant, let alone that it would substantially broaden FACA’s application by sweeping within its terms a vast number of private groups, such as the Republican National Committee, not formed at the behest of the Executive or by quasi-public organizations whose opinions the Federal Government sometimes solicits. Indeed, it appears that the House bill’s initial restricted focus on advisory committees established by the Federal Government, in an expanded sense of the word “established,” was retained rather than enlarged by the Conference Committee. In the section dealing with FACA’s range of application, the Conference Report stated: “The Act does not apply to persons or organizations which have contractual relationships with Federal agencies nor to advisory committees not directly established by or for such agencies.” Id., at 10 (emphasis added). The phrase “or utilized” therefore appears to have been added simply to clarify that FACA applies to advisory committees established by the Federal Government in a generous sense of that term, encompassing groups formed indirectly by quasi-public organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences “for” public agencies as well as “by” such agencies themselves.
Read in this way, the term “utilized” would meet the concerns of the authors of House Report No. 91-1731 that advisory committees covered by Executive Order No. 11007, because they were “utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee” — such as the groups organized by the National Academy of Sciences and its affiliates which the Report discussed— would be subject to FACA’s requirements. And it comports well with the initial House and Senate bills’ limited extension to advisory groups “established,” on a broad understanding of that word, by the Federal Government, whether those groups were established by the Executive Branch or by statute or whether they were the offspring of some organization created or permeated by the Federal Government. Read in this way, however, the word “utilized” does not describe the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee. Consultations between the Justice Department and the ABA Committee were not within the purview of Executive Order No. 11007, nor can the ABA Committee be said to have been formed by the Justice Department or by some semiprivate entity the Federal Government helped bring into being.
In sum, a literalistic reading of §3(2) would bring the Justice Department’s advisory relationship with the ABA Committee within FACA’s terms, particularly given FACA’s objective of opening many advisory relationships to public scrutiny except in certain narrowly defined situations. A literalistic reading, however, would catch far more groups and consulting arrangements than Congress could conceivably have intended. And the careful review which this interpretive difficulty warrants of earlier efforts to regulate federal advisory committees and the circumstances surrounding FACA’s adoption strongly suggests that FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” was not meant to encompass the ABA Committee’s relationship with the Justice Department. That relationship seems not to have been within the contemplation of Executive Order No. 11007. And FACA’s legislative history does not display an intent to widen the Order’s application to encircle it. Weighing the deliberately inclusive statutory language against other evidence of congressional intent, it seems to us a close question whether FACA should be construed to apply to the ABA Committee, although on the whole we are fairly confident it should not. There is, however, one additional consideration which, in our view, tips the balance decisively against FACA’s application.
C
“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932) (footnote collecting citations omitted). It has long been an axiom of statutory interpretation that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). See also St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U. S. 772, 780 (1981); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500-501 (1979); Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749-750 (1961). This approach, we said recently, “not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., supra, at 575. Our reluctance to decide constitutional issues is especially great where, as here, they concern the relative powers of coordinate branches of government. See American Foreign Service Assn. v. Garfinkel, 490 U. S. 153, 161 (1989) (per curiam). Hence, we are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils.
That construing FACA to apply to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee would present formidable constitutional difficulties is undeniable. The District Court declared FACA unconstitutional insofar as it applied to those consultations, because it concluded that FACA, so applied, infringed unduly on the President’s Article II power to nominate federal judges and violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Whether or not the court’s conclusion was correct, there is no gainsaying the seriousness of these constitutional challenges.
To be sure, “[w]e cannot press statutory construction ‘to the point of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional question.” United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 96 (1985), quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933). But unlike in Locke, where “nothing in the legislative history remotely suggest[ed] a congressional intent contrary to Congress’ chosen words,” 471 U. S., at 96, our review of the regulatory scheme prior to FACA’s enactment and the likely origin of the phrase “or utilized” in FACA’s definition of “advisory committee” reveals that Congress probably did not intend to subject the ABA Committee to FACA’s requirements when the ABA Committee offers confidential advice regarding Presidential appointments to the federal bench. Where the competing arguments based on FACA’s text and legislative history, though both plausible, tend to show that Congress did not desire FACA to apply to the Justice Department’s confidential solicitation of the ABA Committee’s views on prospective judicial nominees, sound sense counsels adherence to our rule of caution. Our unwillingness to resolve important constitutional questions unnecessarily thus solidifies our conviction that FACA is inapplicable.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
The Justice Department does not ordinarily furnish the names of potential Supreme Court nominees to the ABA Committee for evaluation prior to their nomination, although in some instances the President has done so. See Brief for Federal Appellee 4-5.
The ratings now used in connection with Supreme Court nominees are “well qualified,” “not opposed,” and “not qualified.” See American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, What It Is and How It Works (1983), reprinted in App. 50.
The Senate regularly requests the ABA Committee to rate Supreme Court nominees if the Justice Department has not already sought the ABA Committee’s opinion. As with nominees for other federal judgeships, the ABA Committee’s rating is made public at confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Federal advisory committees are legion. During fiscal year 1988, 58 federal departments sponsored 1,020 advisory committees. General Services Administration, Seventeenth Annual Report of the President on Federal Advisory Committees 1 (1988). Over 3,500 meetings were held, and close to 1,000 reports were issued. Ibid. Costs for fiscal year 1988 totaled over $92 million, roughly half of which was spent on federal staff support. Id., at 3.
WLF originally sued the ABA Committee, its members, and the American Bar Association, but not the Department of Justice. The District Court dismissed that complaint on the ground that the Justice Department was the proper defendant. Washington Legal Foundation v. American Bar Assn. Standing Comm. on Federal Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353 (DC 1986). WLF’s appeal on the issue whether a committee can be sued directly for noncompliance with FACA is pending before the Court of Appeals. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, p. 10, n. 9.
The American Bar Association was not a party below, but intervened for purposes of this appeal after the District Court rendered judgment.
The Justice Department concedes that appellants have standing to challenge the application of at least some of FACA’s provisions to the Justice Department’s consultations with the ABA Committee. See Brief for Federal Appellee 11-16. Because those challenges present the threshold question whether the ABA Committee constitutes an advisory committee for purposes of FACA, and because we hold that it does not, we need not address the Department’s claim that appellants lack standing to contest the application of certain other provisions.
FACA provides exceptions for advisory committees established or utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal Reserve System, § 4(b), as well as for “any local civic group whose primary function is that of rendering a public service with respect to a Federal program, or any State or local committee, council, board, commission, or similar group established to advise or make recommendations to State or local officials or agencies.” § 4(c). The presence of these exceptions does little to curtail the almost unfettered breadth of a dictionary reading of FACA’s definition of “advisory committee.”
Justice Kennedy agrees with our conclusion that an unreflective reading of the term “utilize” would include the President’s occasional consultations with groups such as the NAACP and committees of the President’s own political party. See post, at 472. Having concluded that groups such as these are covered by the statute when they render advice, however, Justice Kennedy refuses to consult FACA’s legislative history — which he later denounces, with surprising hyperbole, as “unauthori-tative materials,” post, at 473, although countless opinions of this Court, including many written by the concurring Justices, have rested on just such materials — because this result would not, in his estimation, be “absurd,” post, at 472. Although this Court has never adopted so strict a standard for reviewing committee reports, floor debates, and other non-statutory indications of congressional intent, and we explicitly reject that standard today, see also infra, at 455, even if “absurdity” were the test, one would think it was met here. The idea that Members of Congress would vote for a bill subjecting their own political parties to bureaucratic intrusion and public oversight when a President or Cabinet officer consults with party committees concerning political appointments is outlandish. Nor does it strike us as in any way “unhealthy,” post, at 470, or undemocratic, post, at 473, to use all available materials in ascertaining the intent of our elected representatives, rather than read their enactments as requiring what may seem a disturbingly unlikely result, provided only that the result is not “absurd.” Indeed, the sounder and more democratic course, the course that strives for allegiance to Congress’ desires in all cases, not just those where Congress’ statutory directive is plainly sensible or borders on the lunatic, is the traditional approach we reaffirm today.
Neither Public Citizen nor WLF contends that the ABA Committee is a Presidential advisory committee as Congress understood that term. Nor does it appear to be one. In a House Report on the effectiveness of federal advisory committees, which provided the impetus for legislative proposals that eventually produced FACA, the Committee on Government Operations noted that Presidential committees were a special concern because they often consumed large amounts of federal money and were subject to no controls. The House Committee, however, defined “Presidential committee” narrowly, “as a group with either one or all of its members appointed by the President with a function of advising or making recommendations to him.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, p. 10 (1970). None of the ABA Committee’s members are appointed by the President, nor does the ABA Committee report directly to him. The House and Senate Reports accompanying early versions of P’ACA likewise referred to advisory committees “formed” or “established” or “organized” by the President, or to committees created by an Act of Congress to advise the President — categories into which the ABA Committee cannot readily be fitted. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-1017, pp. 4-5 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1098, p. 7 (1972). Although FACA itself provides a more open-ended definition of “Presidential advisory committee,” applying it to “an advisory committee which advises the President,” §3(4), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. §3(4), that category is a species of “advisory committee,” and does not purport to cover committees advising the President that were not “established or utilized” by him. As FACA’s legislative history reveals, the Presidential advisory committees Congress intended FACA to reach do not include the ABA Committee.
The relevant paragraph of H. R. Rep. No. 91-1731, supra, at 15 (footnotes omitted), reads in full:
“The definition, further, states ‘the term also includes any committee, board, . . . that is not formed by a department or agency, when it is being utilized by a department or agency in the same manner as a Government-formed advisory committee.’ Rarely were such committees reported. A great number of the approximately 500 advisory committees of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and its affiliates possibly should be added to the above 1800 advisory committees as the NAS committees fall within the intent and literal definition of advisory committees under Executive Order 11007. The National Academy of Sciences was created by Congress as a semi-private organization for the explicit purpose of furnishing advice to the Government. This is done by the use of advisory committees. The Government meets the expense of investigations and reports prepared by the Academy committees at the request of the Government. Yet, very few of the Academy committees were reported by the agencies and departments of the Government.”
Appellants note as well that regulations of the General Services Administration (GSA), the agency responsible for administering FACA, define a “utilized” advisory committee as
“a committee or other group composed in whole or in part of other than full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government with an established existence outside the agency seeking its advice which the President or agency official(s) adopts, such as through institutional arrangements, as a preferred source from which to obtain advice or recommendations . . . in the same manner as that individual would obtain advice or recommendations from an established advisory committee.” 41 CFR §101-6.1003 (1988).
Appellants argue that the ABA Committee comes within the terms of this regulatory definition, because it exists outside the Justice Department and because it serves as a “preferred source” of advice, inasmuch as the ABA Committee’s recommendations regarding potential judicial nominees are unfailingly requested and accorded considerably more weight than those advanced by other groups. See Brief for Appellant in No. 88-429, pp. 17-18; Brief for Appellant in No. 88-494, pp. 18-20.
This argument is not without force. For several reasons, however, we do not think it conclusive, either alone or together with appellants’ arguments from FACA’s text and legislative history. The first is that the regulation, like FACA’s definition of “advisory committee,” appears too sweeping to be read without qualification unless further investigation of congressional intent confirms that reading. And our review of FACA’s legislative history and purposes demonstrates that the Justice Department, assisting the Executive’s exercise of a constitutional power specifically assigned to the Executive alone, does not use the ABA Committee in what is obviously the “same manner” as federal agencies use other advisory committees established by them or by some other creature of the Federal Government.
Second, appellants’ claim that the regulation applies to the ABA Committee is questionable. GSA publishes an annual report listing advisory committees covered by FACA. Although 17 reports have thus far been issued, not once has the ABA Committee been included in that list. The agency’s own interpretation of its regulation thus appears to contradict the expansive construction appellants ask us to give it — a fact which, though not depriving the regulation’s language of independent force, see post, at 479, nevertheless weakens the claim that the regulation applies to the Justice Department’s use of the ABA Committee.
Third, even if the ABA Committee were covered by the regulation, appellants’ case would not be appreciably bolstered. Deference to the agency’s expertise in interpreting FACA is less appropriate here than it would be were the regulatory definition a contemporaneous construction of the statute, since the current definition was first promulgated in 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 19327 (1983), and did not become final until 1987, see 52 Fed. Reg. 45930 (1987) — more than a decade after FACA’s passage. See,'e. g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Utility Dist., 467 U. S. 380, 390 (1984); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142 (1976) (discounting significance of agency interpretive guideline promulgated eight years after statute’s enactment, although fact that guideline contradicted agency’s earlier position deemed “more important]”); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396, 408 (1961); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 315 (1933).
In addition, we owe GSA’s regulation diminished deference for a reason independent of its not having been issued contemporaneously with FACA’s passage. In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, supra, we held that an agency’s interpretive regulations not promulgated pursuant to express statutory authority should be accorded less weight than “administrative regulations which Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or to regulations which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for imposition of liability.” Id., at 141 (citations omitted). GSA’s regulatory definition falls into neither category. Section 7(c), as set forth in 5 U. S. C. App. § 7(c), authorizes the Administrator to “prescribe administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to advisory committees, and, to the maximum extent feasible, provide advice, assistance, and guidance to advisory committees to improve their performance.” It does not empower the agency to issue, in addition to these guidelines, a regulatory definition of “advisory committee” carrying the force of law. Justice Kennedy’s assertion that GSA’s interpretation of FACA’s provisions is “binding,” post, at 478, 480, confuses wish with reality.
In addition, appellee American Bar Association contends that application of FACA to the ABA Committee would impermissibly interfere with the associational and expressive rights guaranteed its members by the First Amendment. See Brief for Appellee ABA 40-48; Brief for People for the American Way Action Fund and Alliance for Justice as Amicus Curiae 22-29. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_casedisposition |
B & B HARDWARE, INC., Petitioner
v.
HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC., dba Sealtite Building Fasteners, dba East Texas Fastenerset al.
No. 13-352.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Dec. 2, 2014.
Decided March 24, 2015.
William M. Jay, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Neal K. Katyal, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
John F. Bashfor the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.
Trey Yarbrough, Yarbrough Wilcox, PLLC, Tyler, TX, James C. Martin, Colin E. Wrabley, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Neal Kumar Katyal, Counsel of Record, Catherine E. Stetson, Mary Helen Wimberly, Colleen E. Roh, Eugene A. Sokoloff, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Robert D. Carroll, Christine Dieter, Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA, Ira J. Levy, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY, William M. Jay, Counsel of Record, Jacob R. Osborn, Goodwin Procter LLP, Washington, DC, Tim Cullen, Cullen & Co., PLLC, Little Rock, AR, for Petitioner.
Opinion
Justice ALITOdelivered the opinion of the Court.
Sometimes two different tribunals are asked to decide the same issue. When that happens, the decision of the first tribunal usually must be followed by the second, at least if the issue is really the same. Allowing the same issue to be decided more than once wastes litigants' resources and adjudicators' time, and it encourages parties who lose before one tribunal to shop around for another. The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is designed to prevent this from occurring.
This case concerns the application of issue preclusion in the context of trademark law. Petitioner, B & B Hardware, Inc. (B & B), and respondent Hargis Industries, Inc. (Hargis), both use similar trademarks; B & B owns SEALTIGHT while Hargis owns SEALTITE. Under the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.,an applicant can seek to register a trademark through an administrative process within the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). But if another party believes that the PTO should not register a mark because it is too similar to its own, that party can oppose registration before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). Here, Hargis tried to register the mark SEALTITE, but B & B opposed SEALTITE's registration. After a lengthy proceeding, the TTAB agreed with B & B that SEALTITE should not be registered.
In addition to permitting a party to object to the registration of a mark, the Lanham Act allows a mark owner to sue for trademark infringement. Both a registration proceeding and a suit for trademark infringement, more-over, can occur at the same time. In this case, while the TTAB was deciding whether SEALTITE should be registered, B & B and Hargis were also litigating the SEALTIGHT versus SEALTITE dispute in federal court. In both registration proceedings and infringement litigation, the tribunal asks whether a likelihood of confusion exists between the mark sought to be protected (here, SEALTIGHT) and the other mark (SEALTITE).
The question before this Court is whether the District Court in this case should have applied issue preclusion to the TTAB's decision that SEALTITE is confusingly similar to SEALTIGHT. Here, the Eighth Circuit rejected issue preclusion for reasons that would make it difficult for the doctrine ever to apply in trademark disputes. We disagree with that narrow understanding of issue preclusion. Instead, consistent with principles of law that apply in innumerable contexts, we hold that a court should give preclusive effect to TTAB decisions if the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remand for further proceedings.
I
A
Trademark law has a long history, going back at least to Roman times. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9, Comment b(1993). The principle underlying trademark protection is that distinctive marks-words, names, symbols, and the like-can help distinguish a particular artisan's goods from those of others. Ibid.One who first uses a distinct mark in commerce thus acquires rights to that mark. See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:1 (4th ed. 2014)(hereinafter McCarthy). Those rights include preventing others from using the mark. See 1 A. LaLonde, Gilson on Trademarks § 3.02[8] (2014) (hereinafter Gilson).
Though federal law does not create trademarks, see, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases,100 U.S. 82, 92, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879), Congress has long played a role in protecting them. In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act, the current federal trademark scheme. As relevant here, the Lanham Act creates at least two adjudicative mechanisms to help protect marks. First, a trademark owner can register its mark with the PTO. Second, a mark owner can bring a suit for infringement in federal court.
Registration is significant. The Lanham Act confers "important legal rights and benefits" on trademark owners who register their marks. 3 McCarthy § 19:3, at 19-21see also id.,§ 19:9, at 19-34 (listing seven of the "procedural and substantive legal advantages" of registration). Registration, for instance, serves as "constructive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership" of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1072. It also is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner's ownership of the mark, and of the owner's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate." § 1057(b). And once a mark has been registered for five years, it can become "incontestable." §§ 1065, 1115(b).
To obtain the benefits of registration, a mark owner files an application with the PTO.§ 1051. The application must include, among other things, "the date of the applicant's first use of the mark, the date of the applicant's first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark." § 1051(a)(2). The usages listed in the application-i.e., those goods on which the mark appears along with, if applicable, their channels of distribution-are critical. See, e.g., 3 McCarthy § 20:24, at 20-83("[T]he applicant's right to register must be made on the basis of the goods described in the application"); id.,§ 20:15, at 20-85 (explaining that if an "application does not delimit any specific trade channels of distribution, no limitation will be" applied). The PTO generally cannot register a mark which "so resembles" another mark "as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
If a trademark examiner believes that registration is warranted, the mark is published in the Official Gazette of the PTO. § 1062. At that point, "[a]ny person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration" may "file an opposition." § 1063(a). Opposition proceedings occur before the TTAB (or panels thereof). § 1067(a). The TTAB consists of administrative trademark judges and high-ranking PTO officials, including the Director of the PTO and the Commissioner of Trademarks. § 1067(b).
Opposition proceedings before the TTAB are in many ways "similar to a civil action in a federal district court." TTAB Manual of Procedure § 102.03 (2014) (hereinafter TTAB Manual), online at http://www.uspto.gov (as visited Mar. 20, 2015, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). These proceedings, for instance, are largely governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116(a), 2.122(a) (2014). The TTAB also allows discovery and depositions. See §§ 2.120, 2.123(a). The party opposing registration bears the burden of proof, see § 2.116(b), and if that burden cannot be met, the opposed mark must be registered, see 15 U.S.C. § 1063(b).
The primary way in which TTAB proceedings differ from ordinary civil litigation is that "proceedings before the Board are conducted in writing, and the Board's actions in a particular case are based upon the written record therein." TTAB Manual § 102.03. In other words, there is no live testimony. Even so, the TTAB allows parties to submit transcribed testimony, taken under oath and subject to cross-examination, and to request oral argument. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.123, 2.129.
When a party opposes registration because it believes the mark proposed to be registered is too similar to its own, the TTAB evaluates likelihood of confusion by applying some or all of the 13 factors set out in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co.,476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973). After the TTAB decides whether to register the mark, a party can seek review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or it can file a new action in district court. See 15 U.S.C. § 1071. In district court, the parties can conduct additional discovery and the judge resolves registration de novo. § 1071(b); see also 3 McCarthy § 21:20(explaining differences between the forums); cf. Kappos v. Hyatt,566 U.S. ----, 132 S.Ct. 1690, 182 L.Ed.2d 704 (2012)(de novoreview for analogous scheme in patent law).
The Lanham Act, of course, also creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement. The owner of a mark, whether registered or not, can bring suit in federal court if another is using a mark that too closely resembles the plaintiff's. The court must decide whether the defendant's use of a mark in commerce "is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" with regards to the plaintiff's mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)(registered marks); § 1125(a)(1)(A)(unregistered marks). In infringement litigation, the district court considers the full range of a mark's usages, not just those in the application.
B
Petitioner B & B and respondent Hargis both manufacture metal fasteners. B & B manufactures fasteners for the aerospace industry, while Hargis manufactures fasteners for use in the construction trade. Although there are obvious differences between space shuttles and A-frame buildings, both aerospace and construction engineers prefer fasteners that seal things tightly. Accordingly, both B & B and Hargis want their wares associated with tight seals. A feud of nearly two decades has sprung from this seemingly commonplace set of facts.
In 1993 B & B registered SEALTIGHT for "threaded or unthreaded metal fasteners and other related hardwar[e]; namely, self-sealing nuts, bolts, screws, rivets and washers, all having a captive o-ring, for use in the aerospace industry." App. 223a (capitalization omitted). In 1996, Hargis sought to register SEALTITE for "self-piercing and self-drilling metal screws for use in the manufacture of metal and post-frame buildings." App. 70a (capitalization omitted). B & B opposed Hargis' registration because, although the two companies sell different products, it believes that SEALTITE is confusingly similar to SEALTIGHT.
The twists and turns in the SEALTIGHT versus SEALTITE controversy are labyrinthine. The question whether either of these marks should be registered, and if so, which one, has bounced around within the PTO for about two decades; related infringement litigation has been before the Eighth Circuit three times; and two separate juries have been empaneled and returned verdicts. The full story could fill a long, unhappy book.
For purposes here, we pick up the story in 2002, when the PTO published SEALTITE in the Official Gazette. This prompted opposition proceedings before the TTAB, complete with discovery, including depositions. B & B argued that SEALTITE could not be registered because it is confusingly similar to SEALTIGHT. B & B explained, for instance, that both companies have an online presence, the largest distributor of fasteners sells both companies' products, and consumers sometimes call the wrong company to place orders. Hargis rejoined that the companies sell different products, for different uses, to different types of consumers, through different channels of trade.
Invoking a number of the DuPontfactors, the TTAB sided with B & B. The Board considered, for instance, whether SEALTIGHT is famous (it's not, said the Board), how the two products are used (differently), how much the marks resemble each other (very much), and whether customers are actually confused (perhaps sometimes). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a-71a. Concluding that "the most critical factors in [its] likelihood of confusion analysis are the similarities of the marks and the similarity of the goods," id.,at 70a, the TTAB determined that SEALTITE-when "used in connection with 'self-piercing and self-drilling metal screws for use in the manufacture of metal and post-frame buildings' "-could not be registered because it "so resembles" SEALTIGHT when "used in connection with fasteners that provide leakproof protection from liquids and gases, fasteners that have a captive o-ring, and 'threaded or unthreaded metal fastners and other related hardware ... for use in the aerospace industry' as to be likely to cause confusion," id.,at 71a. Despite a right to do so, Hargis did not seek judicial review in either the Federal Circuit or District Court.
All the while, B & B had sued Hargis for infringement. Before the District Court ruled on likelihood of confusion, however, the TTAB announced its decision. After a series of proceedings not relevant here, B & B argued to the District Court that Hargis could not contest likelihood of confusion because of the preclusive effect of the TTAB decision. The District Court disagreed, reasoning that the TTAB is not an Article III court. The jury returned a verdict for Hargis, finding no likelihood of confusion.
B & B appealed to the Eighth Circuit. Though accepting for the sake of argument that agency decisions can ground issue preclusion, the panel majority affirmed for three reasons: first, because the TTAB uses different factors than the Eighth Circuit to evaluate likelihood of confusion; second, because the TTAB placed too much emphasis on the appearance and sound of the two marks; and third, because Hargis bore the burden of persuasion before the TTAB, while B & B bore it before the District Court. 716 F.3d 1020 (2013). Judge Colloton dissented, concluding that issue preclusion should apply. After calling for the views of the Solicitor General, we granted certiorari. 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2899, 189 L.Ed.2d 854 (2014).
II
The first question that we must address is whether an agency decision can ever ground issue preclusion. The District Court rejected issue preclusion because agencies are not Article III courts. The Eighth Circuit did not adopt that view, and, given this Court's cases, it was right to take that course.
This Court has long recognized that "the determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that question in a second suit." Cromwell v. County of Sac,94 U.S. 351, 354, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877). The idea is straightforward: Once a court has decided an issue, it is "forever settled as between the parties," Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn.,283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517, 75 L.Ed. 1244 (1931), thereby "protect[ing]" against "the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[ing] judicial resources, and foster[ing] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent verdicts,"
Montana v. United States,440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). In short, "a losing litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly suffered." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino,501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991).
Although the idea of issue preclusion is straightforward, it can be challenging to implement. The Court, therefore, regularly turns to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for a statement of the ordinary elements of issue preclusion. See, e.g., Bobby v. Bies,556 U.S. 825, 834, 129 S.Ct. 2145, 173 L.Ed.2d 1173 (2009); New Hampshire v. Maine,532 U.S. 742, 748-749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001); Baker v. General Motors Corp.,522 U.S. 222, 233, n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 657, 139 L.Ed.2d 580 (1998). The Restatement explains that subject to certain well-known exceptions, the general rule is that "[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, p. 250 (1980); see also id.,§ 28, at 273(listing exceptions such as whether appellate review was available or whether there were "differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed").
Both this Court's cases and the Restatement make clear that issue preclusion is not limited to those situations in which the same issue is before two courts. Rather, where a single issue is before a court and an administrative agency, preclusion also often applies. Indeed, this Court has explained that because the principle of issue preclusion was so "well established" at common law, in those situations in which Congress has authorized agencies to resolve disputes, "courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with the expectation that the principle [of issue preclusion] will apply except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Astoria, supra,at 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166. This reflects the Court's longstanding view that " '[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.' " University of Tenn. v. Elliott,478 U.S. 788, 797-798, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986)(quoting United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.,384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966)); see also Hayfield Northern R. Co. v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co.,467 U.S. 622, 636, n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 2610, 81 L.Ed.2d 527 (1984)(noting Utah Construction); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,456 U.S. 461, 484-485, n. 26, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982)(characterizing Utah Construction's discussion of administrative preclusion as a holding); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(1), at 266(explaining that, with some limits, "a valid and final adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court").
Although apparently accepting Astoriaand Utah Construction,Hargis argues that we should not read the Lanham Act (or, presumably, many other federal statutes) as authorizing issue preclusion. Otherwise, Hargis warns, the Court would have to confront " 'grave and doubtful questions' as to the Lanham Act's consistency with the Seventh Amendment and Article III of the Constitution." Brief for Respondent 38 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,213 U.S. 366, 408, 29 S.Ct. 527, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909)). We are not persuaded.
At the outset, we note that Hargis does not argue that giving issue preclusive effect to the TTAB's decision would be unconstitutional. Instead, Hargis contends only that we should read the Lanham Act narrowly because a broad reading mightbe unconstitutional. See, e.g.,Brief for Respondent 37, 39, 40, 41-42. The likely reason that Hargis has not directly advanced a constitutional argument is that, at least as to a jury trial right, Hargis did not even list the Seventh Amendment as an authority in its appellee brief to the Eighth Circuit. Moreover, although Hargis pressed an Article III argument below, in its opposition to certiorari in this Court, Hargis seemingly conceded that TTAB decisions can sometimesground issue preclusion, though it now protests otherwise. See Supplemental Brief in Opposition 2. To the extent, if any, that there could be a meritorious constitutional objection, it is not before us. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,514 U.S. 211, 231-232, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995).
We reject Hargis' statutory argument that we should jettison administrative preclusion in whole or in part to avoid potential constitutional concerns. As to the Seventh Amendment, for instance, the Court has already held that the right to a jury trial does not negate the issue-preclusive effect of a judgment, even if that judgment was entered by a juryless tribunal. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,439 U.S. 322, 337, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). It would seem to follow naturally that although the Seventh Amendment creates a jury trial right in suits for trademark damages, see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,369 U.S. 469, 477, 479-480, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962), TTAB decisions still can have preclusive effect in such suits. Hargis disputes this reasoning even though it admits that in 1791 " 'a party was not entitled to have a jury determine issues that had been previously adjudicated by a chancellor in equity.' " Brief for Respondent 39 (quoting Parklane Hosiery, supra,at 333, 99 S.Ct. 645). Instead, Hargis contends that issue preclusion should not apply to TTAB registration decisions because there were no agencies at common law. But our precedent holds that the Seventh Amendment does not strip competent tribunals of the power to issue judgments with preclusive effect; that logic would not seem to turn on the nature of the competent tribunal. And at the same time, adopting Hargis' view would dramatically undercut agency preclusion, despite what the Court has already said to the contrary. Nothing in Hargis' avoidance argument is weighty enough to overcome these weaknesses.
The claim that we should read the Lanham Act narrowly to avoid Article III concerns is equally unavailing-and for similar reasons. Hargis argues that because it might violate Article III if an agency could make a decision with preclusive effect in a later proceeding before a federal court, we should conclude, as a statutory matter, that issue preclusion is unavailable. Such a holding would not fit with our precedent. For instance, in Elliott,the Court, relying on Utah Construction, explained that absent a contrary indication, Congress presumptively intends that an agency's determination (there, a state agency) has preclusive effect. 478 U.S., at 796-799, 106 S.Ct. 3220; see also Astoria,501 U.S., at 110, 111 S.Ct. 2166(recognizing the "presumption"). To be sure, the Court has never addressed whether such preclusion offends Article III. But because this Court's cases are so clear, there is no ambiguity for this Court to sidestep through constitutional avoidance.
III
The next question is whether there is an "evident" reason why Congress would not want TTAB decisions to receive preclusive effect, even in those cases in which the ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met. Astoria, supra,at 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166. We conclude that nothing in the Lanham Act bars the application of issue preclusion in such cases.
The Lanham Act's text certainly does not forbid issue preclusion. Nor does the Act's structure. Granted, one can seek judicial review of a TTAB registration decision in a de novodistrict court action, and some courts have concluded from this that Congress does not want unreviewed TTAB decisions to ground issue preclusion. See, e.g.,American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.,494 F.2d 3, 9-10 (C.A.5 1974). But that conclusion does not follow. Ordinary preclusion law teaches that if a party to a court proceeding does not challenge an adverse decision, that decision can have preclusive effect in other cases, even if it would have been reviewed de novo. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, Comment aand Illustration 1 (explaining that the failure to pursue an appeal does not undermine issue preclusion and including an example of an apparently unappealed district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim); cf. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981)(noting "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits").
This case is also unlike Astoria,where a plaintiff claiming discrimination first went to an agency and then sued in court about the same alleged conduct. See 501 U.S., at 111, 111 S.Ct. 2166. The Court concluded, quite sensibly, that the structure of that scheme indicated that the agency decision could not ground issue preclusion. When exhausting an administrative process is a prerequisite to suit in court, giving preclusive effect to the agency's determination in that very administrative process could render the judicial suit "strictly pro forma." Ibid.; see also Elliott, supra,at 795-796, 106 S.Ct. 3220(similar analysis). Here, if a party urged a district court reviewing a TTAB registration decision to give preclusive effect to the very TTAB decision under review, Astoriawould apply. But that is not this case.
What matters here is that registration is not a prerequisite to an infringement action. Rather, it is a separate proceeding to decide separate rights. Neither is issue preclusion a one-way street. When a district court, as part of its judgment, decides an issue that overlaps with part of the TTAB's analysis, the TTAB gives preclusive effect to the court's judgment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a-55a (giving preclusive effect to the District Court's earlier decision regarding SEALTIGHT's distinctiveness because the issue "was actually litigated and necessarily determined").
Hargis also argues that allowing TTAB decisions to have issue-preclusive effect will adversely affect the registration process. Because of the TTAB's " 'limited jurisdiction' " and " 'the narrowness of the issues' " before it, Hargis contends, the Court should infer that TTAB proceedings are supposed to be more streamlined than infringement litigation. See Brief for Respondent 30 (quoting TTAB Manual § 402.01). But, the argument goes, if TTAB decisions can have issue-preclusive effect in infringement litigation, parties may spend more time and energy before the TTAB, thus bogging down the registration process. This concern does not change our conclusion. Issue preclusion is available unless it is "evident," Astoria, supra,at 108, 111 S.Ct. 2166that Congress does not want it. Here, if a streamlined process in all registration matters was particularly dear to Congress, it would not have authorized de novochallenges for those "dissatisfied" with TTAB decisions. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b). Plenary review serves many functions, but ensuring a streamlined process is not one of them. Moreover, as explained below, for a great many registration decisions issue preclusion obviously will not apply because the ordinary elements will not be met. For those registrations, nothing we say today is relevant.
IV
At last we turn to whether there is a categorical reason why registration decisions can never meet the ordinary elements of issue preclusion, e.g., those elements set out in § 27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Although many registrations will not satisfy those ordinary elements, that does not mean that none will. We agree with Professor McCarthy that issue preclusion applies where "the issues in the two cases are indeed identical and the other rules of collateral estoppel are carefully observed." 6 McCarthy § 32:99, at 32-244; see also 3 Gilson § 11.08[4][i][iii][B], p. 11-319 ("Ultimately, Board decisions on likelihood of confusion ... should be given preclusive effect on a case-by-case basis").
A
The Eighth Circuit's primary objection to issue preclusion was that the TTAB considers different factors than it does. Whereas the TTAB employs some or all of the DuPontfactors to assess likelihood of confusion, the Eighth Circuit looks to similar, but not identical, factors identified in SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co.,628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (C.A.8 1980). The court's instinct was sound: "[I]ssues are not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal standard, even though the factual setting of both suits may be the same." 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4417, p. 449 (2d ed. 2002)(hereinafter Wright & Miller). Here, however, the same likelihood-of-confusion standard applies to both registration and infringement.
To begin with, it does not matter that registration and infringement are governed by different statutory provisions. Often a single standard is placed in different statutes; that does not foreclose issue preclusion. See, e.g.,Smith v. Bayer Corp.,564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 2376, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011). Neither does it matter that the TTAB and the Eighth Circuit use different factors to assess likelihood of confusion. For one thing, the factors are not fundamentally different, and "[m]inor variations in the application of what is in essence the same legal standard do not defeat preclusion." Id.,at ----, n. 9, 131 S.Ct., at 2378, n. 9. More important, if federal law provides a single standard, parties cannot escape preclusion simply by litigating anew in tribunals that apply that one standard differently. A contrary rule would encourage the very evils that issue preclusion helps to prevent.
The real question, therefore, is whether likelihood of confusion for purposes of registration is the same standard as likelihood of confusion for purposes of infringement. We conclude it is, for at least three reasons. First, the operative language is essentially the same; the fact that the registration provision separates "likely" from "to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" does not change that reality.See 2 Gilson § 5.01[2][a], at 5-17 (explaining that "the same statutory test" applies). Second, the likelihood-of-confusion language that Congress used in these Lanham Act provisions has been central to trademark registration since at least 1881. See Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 3, 21 Stat. 503 (using a "likely to cause confusion" standard for registration). That could hardly have been by accident. And third, district courts can cancel registrations during infringement litigation, just as they can adjudicate infringement in suits seeking judicial review of registration decisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119; 3 McCarthy § 21:20. There is no reason to think that the same district judge in the same case should apply two separate standards of likelihood of confusion.
Hargis responds that the text is not actually the same because the registration provision asks whether the marks "resemble" each other, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), while the infringement provision is directed towards the "use in commerce" of the marks, § 1114(1). Indeed, according to Hargis, the distinction between "resembl[ance]" and "use" has been key to trademark law for over a century. There is some force to this argument. It is true that "a party opposing an application to register a mark before the Board often relies only on its federal registration, not on any common-law rights in usages not encompassed by its registration," and "the Board typically analyzes the marks, goods, and channels of trade only as set forth in the application and in the opposer's registration, regardless of whether the actual usage of the marks by either party differs." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae23; see also id.,at 5 (explaining that "the Board typically reviews only the usages encompassed by the registration") (citing 3 Gilson § 9.03[2][a][ii] ); 3 McCarthy § 20:15, at 20-45(explaining that for registration "it is the mark as shown in the application and as used on the goods described in the application which must be considered, not the mark as actually used"). This means that unlike in infringement litigation, "[t]he Board's determination that a likelihood of confusion does or does not exist will not resolve the confusion issue with respect to non-disclosed usages." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae23.
Hargis' argument falls short, however, because it mistakes a reason not to apply issue preclusion in some or even many cases as a reason never to apply issue preclusion. Just because the TTAB does not always consider the same usagesas a district court does, it does not follow that the Board applies a different standardto the usages it does consider.If a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially the same as the usages included in its registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a district court in infringement litigation. By contrast, if a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially unlike the usages in its application, then the TTAB is not deciding the same issue. Thus, if the TTAB does not consider the marketplace usage of the parties' marks, the TTAB's decision should "have no later preclusive effect in a suit where actual usage in the marketplace is the paramount issue." 6 McCarthy § 32:101, at 32-246.
Materiality, of course, is essential-trivial variations between the usages set out in an application and the use of a mark in the marketplace do not create different "issues," just as trivial variations do not create different "marks." See generally 4 id., § 23:50, at 23-265 (explaining that "adding descriptive or non-distinctive" elements to another's mark generally will not negate confusion). Otherwise, a party could escape the preclusive effect of an adverse judgment simply by adding an immaterial feature to its mark. That is not the law. See, e.g.,Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, Comment c,at 252-253 (explaining that "issue" must be understood broadly enough "to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute"); United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co.,464 U.S. 165, 172, 104 S.Ct. 575, 78 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984)(applying issue preclusion where a party sought to "litigate twice ... an issue arising ... from virtually identical facts" because the "factual differences" were "of no legal significance").
A fortiori,if the TTAB considers a different mark altogether, issue preclusion would not apply. Needless to say, moreover, if the TTAB has not decided the same issue as that before the district court, there is no reason why any deference would be warranted.
For a similar reason, the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that issue preclusion could not apply here because the TTAB relied too heavily on "appearance and sound." App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. Undoubtedly there are cases in which the TTAB places more weight on certain factors than it should. When that happens, an aggrieved party should seek judicial review. The fact that the TTAB may have erred, however, does not prevent preclusion. As Judge Colloton observed in dissent, " 'issue preclusion prevent[s] relitigation of wrong decisions just as much as right ones.' " 716 F.3d, at 1029(quoting Clark v. Clark,984 F.2d 272, 273 (C.A.8 1993)); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, Comment j,at 284 (explaining that "refusal to give the first judgment preclusive effect should not ... be based simply on a conclusion that [it] was patently erroneous").
B
Hargis also argues that registration is categorically incompatible with issue preclusion because the TTAB uses procedures that differ from those used by district courts. Granted, "[r]edetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation." Montana,440 U.S., at 164, n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 970; see also Parklane Hosiery,439 U.S., at 331, and n. 15, 99 S.Ct. 645(similar). But again, this only suggests that sometimes issue preclusion might be inappropriate, not that it always is.
No one disputes that the TTAB and district courts use different procedures. Most notably, district courts feature live witnesses. Procedural differences, by themselves, however, do not defeat issue preclusion. Equity courts used different procedures than did law courts, but that did not bar issue preclusion. See id., at 333, 99 S.Ct. 645. Nor is there reason to think that the state agency in Elliottused procedures identical to those in federal court; nonetheless, the Court held that preclusion could apply. See 478 U.S., at 796-799, 106 S.Ct. 3220. Rather than focusing on whether procedural differences exist-they often will-the correct inquiry is whether the procedures used in the first proceeding were fundamentally poor, cursory, or unfair. See Montana,440 U.S., at 164, n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 970.
Here, there is no categorical "reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness," ibid.,of the agency's procedures. In large part they are exactly the same as in federal court. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116(a), 2.122(a). For instance, although "[t]he scope of discovery in Board proceedings.... is generally narrower than in court proceedings"-reflecting the fact that there are often fewer usages at issue-the TTAB has adopted almost the whole of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. TTAB Manual § 402.01; see also id.,§ 401. It is conceivable, of course, that the TTAB's procedures may prove ill-suited for a particular issue in a particular case, e.g., a party may have tried to introduce material evidence but was prevented by the TTAB from doing so, or the TTAB's bar on live testimony may materially prejudice a party's ability to present its case. The ordinary law of issue preclusion, however, already accounts for those "rare" cases where a "compelling showing of unfairness" can be made. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, Comments gand j,at 283-284.
The Eighth Circuit likewise erred by concluding that Hargis bore the burden of persuasion before the TTAB. B & B, the party opposing registration, bore the burden, see 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(b); TTAB Manual § 702.04(a), just as it did in the infringement action. Hargis does not defend the decision below on this ground.
C
Hargis also contends that the stakes for registration are so much lower than for infringement that issue preclusion should never apply to TTAB decisions. Issue preclusion may be inapt if "the amount in controversy in the first action [was] so small in relation to the amount in controversy in the second that preclusion would be plainly unfair." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28, Comment j,at 283-284. After all, "[f]ew ... litigants would spend $50,000 to defend a $5,000 claim." Wright & Miller § 4423, at 612. Hargis is wrong, however, that this exception to issue preclusion applies to every registration. To the contrary: When registration is opposed, there is good reason to think that both sides will take the matter seriously.
The benefits of registration are substantial. Registration is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark," 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), and is a precondition for a mark to become "incontestable," § 1065. Incontestability is a powerful protection. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,469 U.S. 189, 194, 105 S.Ct. 658, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985)(holding that an incontestable mark cannot be challenged as merely descriptive); see also id.,at 193, 105 S.Ct. 658(explaining that "Congress determined that ... 'trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given them' " and that "[a]mong the new protections created by the Lanham Act were the statutory provisions that allow a federally registered mark to become incontestable" (quoting S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1946))).
The importance of registration is undoubtedly why Congress provided for de novoreview of TTAB decisions in district court. It is incredible to think that a district court's adjudication of particular usages would not have preclusive effect in another district court. Why would unchallenged TTAB decisions be different? Congress' creation of this elaborate registration scheme, with so many important rights attached and backed up by plenary review, confirms that registration decisions can be weighty enough to ground issue preclusion.
V
For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit erred in this case. On remand, the court should apply the following rule: So long as the other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met, when the usages adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same as those before the district court, issue preclusion should apply.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See Brief for Respondent 28 (acknowledging that administrative "[p]reclusion's status as part of the common-law backdrop means that courts may presume its application" absent contrary indication from Congress) (citing Astoria,501 U.S., at 110, 111 S.Ct. 2166); Brief for Respondent 34 (explaining that Utah Constructiondetermined that "an administrative board's factfinding ... could ... have preclusive effect in an Article III suit raising damages claims over which the board had no jurisdiction").
Our dissenting colleagues argue that Utah Construction's conclusion that courts "have not hesitated" to apply administrative preclusion, 384 U.S., at 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545was mistaken and certainly should not be applied to statutes-such as the Lanham Act-enacted prior to 1966. We do not decide who reads the history better. The Court has repeatedly endorsed Utah Constructionand, importantly, neither party challenges its historical accuracy. For the same reason, we do not decide whether such preclusion is unconstitutional because the issue is not before us.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)("Any person who shall ... use in commerce any ... mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided" (emphasis added)) with § 1052(d)("No trademark ... shall be refused registration ... unless it ... [c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office ... as to be likely,when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive..." (emphasis added)).
The parties dispute whether and how often the TTAB considers usages beyond those listed in the application and registration. We do not resolve that dispute here. Suffice it to say that when the TTAB adjudicates a usage within its authority,that adjudication can ground issue preclusion. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1980). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)",
"mergers",
"bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)",
"sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death",
"election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things",
"liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.",
"liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages",
"liability, punitive damages",
"Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)",
"state or local government tax",
"state and territorial land claims",
"state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)",
"federal or state regulation of securities",
"natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)",
"corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending",
"zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property",
"arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)",
"federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts",
"patents and copyrights: patent",
"patents and copyrights: copyright",
"patents and copyrights: trademark",
"patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes",
"federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad",
"federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)",
"federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company",
"miscellaneous economic regulation"
] | [
20
] | sc_issue_8 |
UNITED STATES v. JAMES et al.
No. 85-434.
Argued April 21, 1986
Decided July 2, 1986
Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 612.
Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, and Deputy Solicitor General Geller.
T. John Ward argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents James et al. were Peter E. Scheer and Joseph N. Onek. Sam J. DAmico and J. Michael McDonald filed a brief for respondent Clardy.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Flood Control Act’s immunity provision in 33 U. S. C. § 702c, which states that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place,” bars recovery where the Federal Government would otherwise be liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2671 et seq., for personal injury caused by the Federal Government’s negligent failure to warn of the dangers from the release of floodwaters from federal flood control projects.
H — 1
The present case arose from serious accidents at flood control projects in Arkansas and Louisiana. In both accidents, recreational users of the reservoirs were swept through retaining structures when those structures were opened to release waters in order to control flooding.
A
The project in Arkansas, Millwood Dam, was dedicated in 1966 and is located in the southwestern corner of the State. The Millwood Reservoir behind the structure is used for fishing, swimming, boating, and waterskiing. This reservoir has marinas and launching areas for small boats. The United States Government Printing Office has printed brochures that promote the recreational features of the project and encourage the public to water-ski at the Millwood Reservoir.
Enormous underwater portals set within the Millwood Dam, called “tainter gates,” allow the discharge of water from the Reservoir into a spilling basin below. On June 8, 1979, the level of the Reservoir was such that the United States Corps of Engineers designated it at “flood stage.” As part of the flood control function of the Millwood facility, the Corps of Engineers began to release water through the tainter gates. This release created a swift, strong current toward the underwater discharge.
Respondents Charlotte James and Kathy Butler, who were water-skiing in that area because the water appeared to be calm, fell and began drifting toward the tainter gates. Respondents’ husbands, who were operating the ski boat, circled back to give them the towlines, apparently intending to pull them away from danger. Tr. 20-21, 166-167. Because of the swift currents, respondents were unable to hold on to the lines. Ibid. The husbands’ attempts to pull respondents aboard by hand also failed because each time the current pulled the skiers out of reach. Id., at 21. Eddy Butler then dove into the water in an attempt to save his wife, but all three were pulled through the tainter gates. He drowned, and respondents James and Butler were injured. The boat, still occupied by Mr. James and his daughter Sonja, became lodged in the tainter gates, and the occupants were rescued without injury.
Respondents James and Butler filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. After a bench trial, the court in an unreported opinion found that a cable strung with orange buoys delineating the area of danger near the tainter gates had broken and drifted away; that white anchor buoys marking a restricted area near the dam were also out of place and consequently offered no warning to a reasonably prudent user; that the United States “knew that the dangerous condition created would result in injury to those situated as [were respondents James and Butler] if an adequate warning was not given”; and that respondents James and Butler were not negligent. The court assessed damages at $1 million for respondent Butler, and $40,000 for respondent James, stating that the case went “beyond gross negligence” and “constitute[d] a classic classroom example of a death and injuries resulting from conscious governmental indifference to the safety of the public.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. At the same time, however, the court concluded that although Federal Government agents had willfully and even maliciously failed to warn of a known danger, the Federal Government was immune from damages under 33 U. S. C. §702c, a statute left unre-pealed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 60 Stat. 842, , 846-847 (listing statutes specifically revoked by FTCA). The court accordingly denied relief.
B
The relevant flood control project in Louisiana, the Cour-tableau Drainage Structure, is located near the West Atcha-falaya Basin. On May 17, 1980, the waters in the reservoir of Bayou Courtableau Basin were at flood stage, and consequently the Corps of Engineers opened the gates in the project. This created a strong current. Kenneth Clardy and his father, Joseph Clardy, were fishing in the Basin. Only two faded signs at the entrance of the drainage structure warned of the dangerous current. The boaters could not see the signs until they already had been swept past them. The boat became disabled and was drawn through the open gates of the spillway. Kenneth Clardy was thrown into the approach basin and drowned while being pulled through a 220-foot-long barrel of the drainage structure. His father survived without injury.
Respondent Susan Clardy, Kenneth Clardy’s wife, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Corps of Engineers failed to post adequate warnings of the danger from the current caused by the open gates. The Federal Government conceded that it negligently failed to warn the decedent. The District Court found, however, that under Graci v. United States, 456 F. 2d 20 (CA5 1971), and Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 1184 (CA5 1975), the United States was immune under §702c from damages for personal injury caused by floods or floodwaters in the negligent operation of flood control projects. The court found further that the Federal Government’s action was within the scope of § 702c because “the gates were opened to prevent flooding and inundation landside of the drainage structure.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. The court accordingly granted summary judgment for the United States.
C
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases on appeal, and a panel affirmed. 740 F. 2d 365 (1984). Although the panel believed that the legislative history of §702c showed that Congress intended the provision to disclaim only “liability for ‘takings’ and not liability for consequential damages,” id., at 373, the panel affirmed both judgments from the District Courts because of the Circuit’s earlier interpretation of the section in Graci, supra, and Florida East Coast R. Co., supra. See n. 2, supra.
The Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc and reversed the District Courts’ judgments. 760 F. 2d 590 (1985). The court determined that § 702c contained “latent ambiguities” that could be resolved only by reference to the legislative history. Id., at 594. Analyzing that history, the court stated that in enacting § 702c as part of the Flood Control Act of 1928, “Congress was concerned with allocating the costs of a major public works program between the federal government and the state and local interests, both public and private, in the wake of a financial, administrative, and engineering debacle [from the great Mississippi River flood of 1927].” Id., at 596. Departing from the panel’s reading of § 702c’s legislative history, the en banc court concluded that Congress intended §702c to immunize the Federal Government from liability for damage resulting directly from construction of flood control projects and from liability for flooding caused by factors beyond the Government’s control, but that Congress had not intended “to shield the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees — either in the construction or in the continued operation” of flood control projects, including the failure “to warn the public of the existence of hazards to their accepted use of government-impounded water, or nearby land.” Id., at 599, 603.
Judge Gee, joined by four other judges in dissent, argued that the holding was contrary to “the statute’s plain words,” id., at 604, and that “[b]oth the language of §702c and the legislative history [are] entirely consistent with a purpose in the Congress, poised over a half-century ago on the brink of entry into a massive public works program — one of then unprecedented scope and laden with foreseeable and unforeseeable prospects of liability — to state clearly that the federal treasury was to be placed at risk by it no further than was required by the Constitution,” id., at 605-606. He noted that this construction was the unanimous view of previous Courts of Appeals that had construed § 702c, and that it “has stood for three decades without any sign of Congressional dissatisfaction.” Id., at 606.
We granted certiorari to resolve the resultant split among the Circuits. 474 U. S. 978 (1985). We now reverse.
HH HH
The starting point in statutory interpretation is the language [of the statute] itself.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drag Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). “[W]e assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. ” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982). The immunity provision in § 702c, enacted as part of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 534, 33 U. S. C. §701 et seq., outlines immunity in sweeping terms: “No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.” (Emphasis added.) It is difficult to imagine broader language.
On its face, this language covers the accidents here. Respondents’ injuries occurred as a result of the release of waters from reservoirs that had reached flood stage. Given the nature of the accidents at issue, and given the plain terms of the statute, “it requires some ingenuity to create ambiguity.” Rothschild v. United States, 179 U. S. 463, 465 (1900). Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 173, n. 18 (1978) (assertions of ambiguity do not transform a clear statute into an ambiguous provision).
Although the Court of Appeals found, for example, that the word “damage” was ambiguous because it might refer only to damage to property and exclude damage to persons, 760 F. 2d, at 594, and n. 7, the ordinary meaning of the word carries no such limitation. Damages “have historically been awarded both for injury to property and injury to the person — a fact too well-known to have been overlooked by the Congress . . . .” American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U. S. 446, 450 (1947). Moreover, Congress’ choice of the language “any damage” and “liability of any kind” further undercuts a narrow construction. (Emphasis added.)
Nor do the terms “flood” and “flood waters” create any uncertainty in the context of accidents such as the ones at issue in these cases. The Act concerns flood control projects designed to carry floodwaters. It is thus clear from § 702c’s plain language that the terms “flood” and “flood waters” apply to all waters contained in or carried through a federal flood control project for purposes of or related to flood control, as well as to waters that such projects cannot control. As both District Courts found, the waters here clearly fall within the ambit of the statute.
HH HH HH
We have repeatedly recognized that “[w]hen . . . the terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except ‘in “rare and exceptional circumstances.”’” Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981) (citations omitted). In the absence of a “clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,” the language of the statute itself “must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). Despite respondents’ contentions and the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, we do not find that the legislative history of the statute justifies departure from the plain words of the statute. Indeed, on balance we think the legislative history of the Flood Control Act of 1928 reinforces the plain language of the immunity provision in § 702c.
The Flood Control Act enacted “a comprehensive ten-year program for the entire [Mississippi River] valley, embodying a general bank protection scheme, channel stabilization and river regulation, all involving vast expenditures of public funds.” United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U. S. 256, 262 (1939). The Act was the Nation’s response to the disastrous flood in the Mississippi River Valley in 1927. That flood resulted in the loss of nearly 200 lives and more than $200 million in property damage; almost 700,000 people were left homeless. S. Rep. No. 619, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1928). The flood control system in the Mississippi River Valley in response to this catastrophe was the largest public works project undertaken up to that time in the United States.
It is not surprising, in the light of the devastation wrought by the 1927 flood and the magnitude of Congress’ undertaking, that the legislative history of § 702c shows a consistent concern for limiting the Federal Government’s financial liability to expenditures directly necessary for the construction and operation of the various projects. Numerous statements concerning the immunity provision confirm that it was intended to reaffirm sovereign immunity in such a dangerous and extensive project. The Chairman of the House Rules Committee, in opening the discussion on the rule governing debate on the 1928 Act, stated:
“I want this bill so drafted that it will contain all the safeguards necessary for the Federal Government. If we go down there and furnish protection to these people — and I assume it is a national responsibility — I do not want to have anything left out of the bill that would protect us now and for all time to come. I for one do not want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government in the next 10, 20, or 50 years.” 69 Cong. Rec. 6641 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Snell).
A number of other Congressmen unequivocally stated that the United States should not be hable for any expense other than the direct cost of constructing the project. See id., at 7028 (remarks of Rep. Spearing); id., at 6999-7000 (remarks of Rep. Frear).
These statements show that the sweeping language of § 702c was no drafting inadvertence. See National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263, 270 (CA8), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 967 (1954). Congress clearly sought to ensure beyond doubt that sovereign immunity would protect the Government from “any” liability associated with flood control. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explained three decades ago in National Mfg., § 702c’s language “safeguarded the United States against liability of any kind for damage from or by floods or flood waters in the broadest and most emphatic language.” 210 F. 2d, at 270. The equally broad and emphatic language found in the legislative history shows that Congress understood what it was saying. We therefore conclude that the legislative history fully supports attributing to the unambiguous words of the statute their ordinary meaning.
IV
A
Respondents nevertheless advance several alternative readings of § 702c’s seemingly clear language.
Respondents Butler and James argue that the immunity provision of § 702c was enacted as a potential bar to claims against the Government for damages to property that do not rise to the level of a constitutional taking. The provision, according to this argument, thereby assured the Federal Government control over paying for property rights that it acquired under the proviso of §702c (authorizing purchase of interests in certain properties bordering the Mississippi River) or under §702d (authorizing purchase of “flowage rights”). Such a reading, it is contended, would still allow recovery for damages to persons or property not connected with these acquisitions.
We do not agree. Both § 702d and the proviso of § 702c provide for compensation by the Federal Government for the acquisition of certain kinds of property rights. We cannot see why Congress would first determine that these property rights deserved compensation, and then in the same statute give the Federal Government absolute discretion to decide whether to pay that compensation. Moreover, there is little in the legislative history to support the proposition that the immunity provision in § 702c was intended to bar only liability for the compensation described in the proviso and §702d. Section 702c’s immunity provision and proviso were introduced by different sponsors. 69 Cong. Rec. 7023 (1928). Congress unanimously accepted the immunity provision, but enacted the proviso only after debate and by a vote of 111-79. Ibid. The debates on the proviso, which addressed the narrow issue of whether compensation should be provided to property owners affected by the construction of levees on the opposite bank of the river, see id., at 6642, contain no reference to the immunity provision, see id., at 6642, 7022-7023. Similarly, the debate on § 702d does not reveal any relationship between that section and the immunity provision in §702c. Id., at 7104-7111. Finally, and most importantly, the proffered interpretation of §702c ignores the broad language of the statute. If Congress had wished to bar actions for compensation for purchases under § 702c’s proviso and § 702d, presumably it would have done so more specifically.
Respondents Butler and James also argue, in the alternative, that even if § 702c is intended to grant immunity in connection with flood control projects, the Federal Government is not entitled to immunity here because their injuries arose from Government employees’ alleged mismanagement of recreational activities wholly unrelated to flood control. In support of this argument they point to a “fundamental principle of immunity” that the “sphere or protected activity must be narrowly limited by the purpose for which the immunity was granted.” We think, however, that the manner in which to convey warnings, including the negligent failure to do so, is part of the “management” of a flood control project. And as noted in n. 7, supra, the Court of Appeals found that the release of the waters at the Millwood Reservoir and at the Courtableau Basin was clearly related to flood control. Moreover, contrary to respondents’ argument of “narrowly limited” immunity, the broad principle applicable here is that a “clear relinquishment of sovereign immunity [is required] to give justification for tort actions.” Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953).
B
Respondent Clardy adopts the en banc Court of Appeals’ reading of § 702c: Congress enacted the section to immunize the Federal Government from liability only for property damage resulting directly from construction of flood control projects.
To support this argument, both respondent Clardy and the Court of Appeals rely on the portion of the legislative history of § 702c that concerns the Government’s acquisition of property rights. According to the argument, the House of Representatives, where the provision originated, enacted § 702c solely in response to the Senate version of the Flood Control Act, which would have created broad remedies for property owners, offering “|j]ust compensation” for “all property used, taken, damaged, or destroyed in carrying out the flood control plan.” S. 3740, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1928), 69 Cong. Rec. 5483 (1928). This language would have provided compensation well beyond the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. It accordingly met with substantial hostility in the House, where Members feared it might “make the railroads” and other large property owners “a present of many millions of dollars.” Id., at 6712 (remarks of Rep. Kopp).
According to respondent Clardy, § 702c was added simply to counteract this generosity, and to prevent any excess costs for the acquisition of flowage rights or easements after the completion of the flood control project. Since none of the respondents’ claims stem from property damage due to construction of a dam or reservoir, the argument goes, § 702c’s immunity does not apply, and the Government may be held liable for its failure to warn the public of “the existence of hazards to their accepted use of government-impounded water or nearby land.” 760 F. 2d, at 603.
We find no merit to this argument. It is true that during the debates on the Act, several Congressmen used the terms “liability” and “damage” to refer only to property damage caused by the construction of the flood control projects. But, as we have noted above, there are numerous passages in the legislative history that emphasize the intention of Congress to protect the Federal Government from any damages liability that might arise out of flood control. Supra, at 607-608. We think that the “fragments of legislative history” on which respondent Clardy and the Court of Appeals relied do not constitute “a clearly expressed legislative intent contrary to the plain language of the statute.” American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S., at 75.
V
As the facts in this case demonstrate, one can well understand why the Court of Appeals sought to find a principled way to hold the Government responsible for its concededly negligent conduct. But our role is to effectuate Congress’ intent, and Congress rarely speaks more plainly than it has in the provision we apply here. If that provision is to be changed, it should be by Congress and not by this Court. We therefore follow the plain language of § 702c, a section of the 1928 Act that received careful consideration by Congress and that has remained unchanged for nearly 60 years, and hold that the Federal Government is immune from suit in this type of case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is accordingly reversed.
It is so ordered.
The District Court incorrectly identified Joseph Clardy as the decedent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a.
In Graci v. United States property owners in Louisiana brought suit for flooding allegedly caused by negligent design in the Mississippi River Gulf Channel Outlet, a navigation project that provides a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico to New Orleans. The Federal Government contended that § 702c granted immunity from damages caused by any floodwaters, even those unconnected with flood control projects. The court rejected this argument, and held that the provision conferred immunity only for floods or floodwaters connected with a flood control project.
In Florida East Coast R. Co. v. United States the court denied recovery to a railroad after its tracks near a central Florida flood control project were washed out by heavy rains. The court rejected arguments that the immunity provision did not cover losses caused or aggravated by the Federal Government’s own negligence, and that “washouts” caused by the rapid runoff of surface water were not “flood” damage.
Judge Higginbotham filed a separate dissenting opinion stating that “[wjithout clear evidence of what Congress meant to do in 1928, I would defer to the longstanding and unanimous construction placed on § 702e by this and other courts . . . .” 760 F. 2d, at 606-607.
All other Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 702c — and, prior to this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see n. 2, supra — have held that § 702c grants immunity to the Federal Government from damages caused by floodwaters from a flood control project. See, e. g., Portis v. Folk Construction Co., 694 F. 2d 520, 522 (CA8 1982) (purpose of § 702c is “to assure the government of absolute immunity for [damages caused by flooding related to] flood control projects”); Morici Corp. v. United States, 681 F. 2d 645, 647-648 (CA9 1982) (“[I]f [the plaintiff’s] injury resulted from the operation of [a] federal project for flood control purposes, government immunity is complete”); Callaway v. United States, 568 F. 2d 684, 686-687 (CA10 1978) (rejecting arguments that § 702c does not apply to flood damages resulting from the operation of a flood control project in view of “broad and emphatic language of § 702c”); Parks v. United States, 370 F. 2d 92, 93 (CA2 1966) (same).
As the principal dissent noted, any effort to devise a provision that more plainly rules out liability “serves small purpose beyond making the enactment read like an insurance company’s form [of] general release rather than a statute.” 760 F. 2d, at 604. Respondents conceded as much at oral argument: “I don’t believe that [§ 702c] could have been more expansive [‘in its absolute terms’].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 30.
Damages means “loss due to . . . injury or harm to person, property, or reputation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 571 (1961); Black’s Law Dictionary 351 (5th ed. 1979). Damages carried the same meaning at the time § 702e was enacted. See 4 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages §§ 1241-1252 (4th ed. 1916); 2 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages §§ 573-574a (9th ed. 1912).
See Morici Corp. v. United States, supra, at 647-648 (no immunity for flooding if inundation “ ‘wholly unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control, or any act undertaken pursuant to any such authorization’ ”), quoting Peterson v. United States, 367 F. 2d 271 (CA9 1966); Hayes v. United States, 585 F. 2d 701, 702-703 (CA4 1978) (“If the plaintiff could prove damage to his farm as a result of the dam’s operation as a recreational facility without relation to the opera tion of the dam as a flood control project, he would avoid the absolute bar of § 702e” (emphasis added)).
We have noted that here the District Court in each case found that the waters were being released from federal flood control facilities to prevent flooding. App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a, 68a. The Court of Appeals upheld these findings, 760 F. 2d, at 603, and assumed that “the waters in this [consolidated] case were floodwaters.” Id., at 594, n. 6.
Representative Snell, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, stated in reporting the rules on debate for the Flood Control Act of 1928:
“[T]he legislation made in order under this rule is the most important matter that has been brought before this House since the declaration of war about 11 years ago. This legislation provides for the most gigantic undertaking in construction and engineering that any government in the civilized world has ever undertaken. . . . [I]t is much larger and will cost four times as much as the Panama Canal.” 69 Cong. Rec. 6640 (1928).
The statute authorized $325 million for the program, Act of May 15, 1928, ch. 569, § 1,45 Stat. 534-535, but estimates of the cost of the entire project ranged past $500 million. H. R. Rep. No. 1100, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1928).
Respondents have argued that Congress would not have enacted § 702c if it were merely a codification of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity. The legislative history refutes this contention. One of the principal Congressmen in the debates concerning the immunity provision in § 702c remarked: “While it is wise to insert that provision in the bill, it is not necessary, because the Supreme Court of the United States has decided . . . that the Government is not liable for any of these damages.” 69 Cong. Rec. 7028 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Spearing).
The cases on which respondents Butler and James rely relate to personal immunity, not to the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity. See Brief for Respondent James et al. 38, citing, inter alia, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978).
Respondents Butler and James have also argued that the immunity provision of §702c applies only to projects authorized under the 1928 Act, and therefore does not extend to the Millwood Project. Section 702c is not by its terms restricted to projects constructed under the 1928 Act. Nor would it make sense for the Federal Government to have immunity only for some, but not all, of its flood control projects. We find no merit to this argument.
Section 702c, which consists of both the immunity provision at issue and a proviso, reads:
“No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place: Provided, however, That if in carrying out the purposes of. . . this title it shall be found that upon any stretch of the banks of the Mississippi River it is impracticable to construct levees, either because such construction is not economically justified or because such construction would unreasonably restrict the flood channel, and lands in such stretch of the river are subjected to overflow and damage which are not now overflowed or damaged by reason of the construction of levees on the opposite banks of the river it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Engineers to institute proceedings on behalf of the United States Government to acquire either the absolute ownership of the lands so subjected to overflow and damage or floodage rights over such lands.” (Emphasis in original.) | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
0
] | sc_adminaction_is |
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al. v. KLAMATH WATER USERS PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
No. 99-1871.
Argued January 10, 2001
Decided March 5, 2001
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, Matthew M. Collette, John Leshy, and Scott Bergstrom.
Andrew M. Eitchings argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul S. Simmons and Donald B. Ayer
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Campo Band of Mission Indians et al. by Susan M. Williams and Gwenellen P. Janov; and for the Klamath Tribes et al. by Tracy A Labin, Carl Ullman, Curtis Berkey, Thomas P. Schlosser, Reid Peyton Chambers, Jill E. Grant, Dan Rey-Bear, Alice E. Walker, John B. Carter, Peter G. Chestnut, Rodney B. Lewis, Stephen V. Quesenberry, and Gregory M. Quinlan.
Lucy A Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Bruce W Sandford filed a brief for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amid curiae were filed for the City of Tacoma, Washington, by J Richard Creatura; and for United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., by William W. Taylor III, Michael R. Smith, and Eleanor H. Smith.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Documents in issue here, passing between Indian Tribes and the Department of the Interior, addressed tribal interests subject to state and federal proceedings to determine water allocations. The question is whether the documents are exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, as “intra-agency memorandums or letters” that would normally be privileged in civil discovery. 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). We hold they are not.
Í — 4
Two separate proceedings give rise to this case, the first a planning effort within the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation, and the second a state water rights adjudication in the Oregon courts. Within the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) administers the Klamath Irrigation Project (Klamath Project or Project), which uses water from the Klamath River Basin to irrigate territory in Klamath County, Oregon, and two northern California counties. In 1995, the Department began work to develop a long-term operations plan for the Project, to be known as the Klamath Project Operation Plan (Plan), which would provide for allocation of water among competing uses and competing water users. The Department asked the Klamath as well as the Hoopa Valley, Karuk, and Yurok Tribes (Basin Tribes) to consult with Reclamation on the matter, and a memorandum of understanding between the Department and the Tribes recognized that “[t]he United States Government has a unique legal relationship with Native American tribal governments,” and called for “[assessment, in consultation with the Tribes, of the impacts of the [Plan] on Tribal trust resources.” App. 59, 61.
During roughly the same period, the Department’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (Bureau) filed claims on behalf of the Klamath Tribe alone in an Oregon state-court adjudication intended to allocate water rights. Since the Bureau is responsible for administering land and water held in trust for Indian tribes, 25 U. S. C. § la; 25 CPR subeh. H, pts. 150-181 (2000), it consulted with the Klamath Tribe, and the two exchanged written memorandums on the appropriate scope of the claims ultimately submitted by the United States for the benefit of the Klamath Tribe. The Bureau does not, however, act as counsel for the Tribe, which has its own lawyers and has independently submitted claims on its own behalf.
Respondent, the Klamath Water Users Protective Association (Association), is a nonprofit association of water users in the Klamath River Basin, most of whom receive water from the Klamath Project, and whose interests are adverse to the tribal interests owing to scarcity of water. The Association filed a series of requests with the Bureau under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. 0. § 552, seeking access to communications between the Bureau and the Basin Tribes during the relevant time period. The Bureau turned over several documents but withheld others as exempt under the attorney work-product and deliberative process privileges. These privileges are said to be incorporated in FOIA Exemption 5, which exempts from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” § 552(b)(5). The Association then sued the Bureau under FOIA to compel release of the documents.
By the time of the District Court ruling, seven documents remained in dispute, three of them addressing the Plan, three concerned with the Oregon adjudication, and the seventh relevant to both proceedings. See 189 F. 3d 1034,1036 (CA9 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-49a. Six of the documents were prepared by the Klamath Tribe or its representative and were submitted at the Government’s behest to the Bureau or to the Department’s Regional Solicitor; a Bureau official prepared the seventh document and gave it to lawyers for the Klamath and Yurok Tribes. See ibid.
The District Court granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment. It held that each document qualified as an inter-agency or intra-agency communication for purposes of Exemption 5, and that each was covered by the deliberative process privilege or the attorney work-product privilege, as having played a role in the Bureau’s deliberations about the Plan or the Oregon adjudication. See 189 P. 3d, at 1036, App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-32a, 56a-65a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 189 P. 3d 1034 (1999). It recognized that some Circuits had adopted a “functional” approach to Exemption 5, under which a document generated outside the Government might still qualify as an “intra-agency” communication. See id., at 1037-1038. The court saw no reason to go into that, however, for it ruled out any application of Exemption 5 on the ground that “the Tribes with whom the Department has a consulting relationship have a direct interest in the subject matter of the consultations.” Id., at 1038. The court said that “[t]o hold otherwise would extend Exemption 5 to shield what amount to ex parte communications in contested proceedings between the Tribes and the Department.” Ibid. Judge Hawkins dissented, for he saw the documents as springing “from a relationship that remains consultative rather than adversarial, a relationship in which the Bureau and Department were seeking the expertise of the Tribes, rather than opposing them.” Id., at 1045. He saw the proper enquiry as going not to a document’s source, but to the role it plays in agency decisionmaking. See id., at 1039. We granted certiorari in view of the decision’s significant impact on the relationship between Indian tribes and the Government, 530 U. S. 1304 (2000), and now affirm.
II
Upon request, POIA mandates disclosure of records held by a federal agency, see 5 U. S. C. § 552, unless the documents fall within enumerated exemptions, see § 552(b). “[T]hese limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not seereey, is the dominant objective of the Act,” Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 361 (1976); “[consistent with the Act's goal of broad disclosure, these exemptions have been consistently given a narrow compass,” Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U. S. 136, 151 (1989); see also FBI v. Abramson, 456 U. S. 615, 630 (1982) (“FQLA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”).
A
Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). To qualify, a document must thus satisfy two conditions: its source must be a Government agency, and it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.
Our prior cases on Exemption 5 have addressed the second condition, incorporating civil discovery privileges. See, e. g., United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792, 799-800 (1984); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S. 132, 148 (1975) (“Exemption 5 withholds from a member of the public documents which a private party could not discover in litigation with the agency”). So far as they might matter here, those privileges include the privilege for attorney work-product and what is sometimes called the “deliberative process” privilege. Work product protects “mental processes of the attorney,” United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, 238 (1975), while deliberative process covers “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated,” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U. S., at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted). The deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, and its object is to enhance “the quality of agency decisions,” id., at 151, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government, see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-87 (1973); see also Weber Aircraft Corp., supra, at 802.
The point is not to protect Government secrecy pure and simple, however, and the first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second; the communication must be “inter-agency or intra-agency.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(5). Statutory definitions underscore the apparent plainness of this text. With exceptions not relevant here, “agency” means “each authority of the Government of the United States,” §551(1), and “includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government..., or any independent regulatory agency,” § 552(f).
Although neither the terms of the exemption nor the statutory definitions say anything about communications with outsiders, some Courts of Appeals have held that in some circumstances a document prepared outside the Government may nevertheless qualify as an “intra-agency” memorandum under Exemption 5. See,- e. g., Hoover v. Dept. of Interior, 611F. 2d 1132, 1137-1138 (CA5 1980); Lead Industries Assn. v. OSHA, 610 F. 2d 70, 83 (CA2 1979); Soucie v. David, 448 F. 2d 1067 (CADC 1971). In Department of Justice v. Julian, 486 U. S. 1 (1988), Justice Scaua, joined by Justices O’Connor and White, explained that “the most natural meaning of the phrase ‘intra-agency memorandum’ is a memorandum that is addressed both to and from employees of a single agency,” id., at 18, n. 1 (dissenting opinion). But his opinion also acknowledged the more expansive reading by some Courts of Appeals:
“It is textually possible and ... in accord with the purpose of the provision, to regard as an intra-agency memorandum one that has been received by an agency, to assist it in the performance of its own functions, from a person acting in a governmentally conferred capacity other than on behalf of another agency — e. g., in a capacity as employee or consultant to the agency, or as employee or officer of another governmental unit (not an agency) that is authorized or required to provide adviee to the agency.” Ibid.
Typically, courts taking the latter view have held that the exemption extends to communications between Government agencies and outside consultants hired by them. See, e. g., Hoover, supra, at 1138 (“In determining value, the government may deem it necessary to seek the objective opinion of outside experts rather than rely solely on the opinions of government appraisers”); Lead Industries Assn., supra, at 83 (applying Exemption 5 to , cover draft reports “prepared by outside consultants who had testified on behalf of the agency rather than agency staff”); see also Government Land Bank v. GSA, 671 P. 2d 663, 665 (CA5 1982) (“Both parties agree that a property appraisal, performed under contract by an independent professional, is an ‘intra-agency’ document for purposes of the exemption”). In such cases, the records submitted by outside consultants played essentially the same part in an agency’s process of deliberation as documents prepared by agency personnel might have done. To be sure, the consultants in these cases were independent contractors and were not assumed to be subject to the degree of control that agency employment could have entailed; nor do we read the cases as necessarily assuming that an outside consultant must be devoid of a definite point of view when the agency contracts for its services. But the fact about the consultant that is constant in the typical cases is that the consultant does not represent an interest of its own, or the interest of any other client, when it advises the agency that hires it. Its only obligations are to truth and its sense of what good judgment calls for, and in those respects the consultant functions just as an employee would be expected to do.
B
The Department purports to rely on this consultant corollary to Exemption 5 in arguing for its application to the Tribe’s communications to the Bureau in its capacity of fiduciary for the benefit of the Indian Tribes. The existence of a trust obligation is not, of course, in question, see United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U. S. 700, 707 (1987); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). The fiduciary relationship has been described as “one of the primary cornerstones of Indian law,” F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221 (1982), and has been compared to one existing under a common law trust, with the United States as trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as beneficiaries, and the property and natural resources managed by the United States as the trust corpus. See, e. g., Mitchell, supra, at 225. Nor is there any doubt about the plausibility of the Government’s assertion that the candor of tribal communications with the Bureau would be eroded without the protections of the deliberative process privilege recognized under Exemption 5. The Department is surely right in saying that confidentiality in communications with tribes is conducive to a proper discharge of its trust obligation.
From the recognition of this interest in frank communication, which the deliberative process privilege might protect, the Department would have us infer a sufficient justification for applying Exemption 5 to communications with the Tribes, in the same fashion that Courts of Appeals have found sufficient reason to favor a consultant’s advice that way. But the Department’s argument skips a necessary step, for it ignores the first condition of Exemption 5, that the communication be “intra-agency or inter-agency.” The Department seems to be saying that “intra-agency” is a purely conclusory term, just a label to be placed on any document the Government would find it valuable to keep confidential.
There is, however, no textual justification for draining the first condition of independent vitality, and once the intra-agency condition is applied, it rules out any application of Exemption 5 to tribal communications on analogy to consultants’ reports (assuming, which we do not decide, that these reports may qualify as intra-agency under Exemption 5). As mentioned already, consultants whose communications have typically been held exempt have not been communicating with the Government in their own interest or on behalf of any person or group whose intereste might be affected by the Government action addressed by the consultant. In that regard, consultants may be enough like the agency’s own personnel to justify calling their communications “intra-agency.” The Tribes, on the contrary, necessarily communicate with the Bureau with their own, albeit entirely legitimate, interests in mind. While this fact alone distinguishes tribal communications from the consultants’ examples recognized by several Courts of-Appeals, the distinction is even sharper, in that the Tribes are self-advocates at the expense of others seeking benefits inadequate to satisfy everyone.
As to those documents bearing on the Plan, the Tribes are obviously in competition with nontribal claimants, including those irrigators represented by the respondent. App. 66-71. The record shows that documents submitted by the Tribes included, among others, “a position paper that discusses water law legal theories” and “addresses issues related to water rights of the tribes,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a-43a, a memorandum “contain[ing] views on policy the BIA could provide to other governmental agencies,” “views concerning trust resources,” id., at 44a, and a letter “conveying the views of the Klamath Tribes concerning issues involved in the water rights adjudication,” id., at 47a. While these documents may not take the formally argumentative form of a brief, their function is quite apparently to support the tribal claims. The Tribes are thus urging a position necessarily adverse to the other claimants, the water being inadequate to satisfy the combined demand. As the Court of Appeals said, “[t]he Tribes’ demands, if satisfied, would lead to reduced water allocations to members of the Association and have been protested by Association members who fear water shortages and economic injury in dry years.” 189 F. 3d, at 1035.
The Department insists that the Klamath Tribe’s consultant-like character is clearer in the circumstances of the Oregon adjudication, since the Department merely represents the interests of the Tribe before a state court that will make any decision about the respective rights of the contenders. Brief for Petitioners 42-45; Reply Brief for Petitioners 4-6. But it is not that simple. Even if there were no rival interests at stake in the Oregon litigation, the Klamath Tribe would be pressing its own view of its own interest in its communications with the Bureau. Nor could that interest be ignored as being merged somehow in the fiduciary interest of the Government trustee; the Bureau in its fiduciary capacity would be obliged to adopt the stance it believed to be in the beneficiary’s best interest, not necessarily the position espoused by the beneficiary itself. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 176, Comment a (1957) (“[I]t is the duty of the trustee to exercise such care and skill to preserve the trust property as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property ...”).
But, again, the dispositive point is that the apparent object of the Tribe’s communications is a decision by an agency of the Government to support a claim by the Tribe that is necessarily adverse to the interests of competitors. Since there is not enough water to satisfy everyone, the Government’s position on behalf of the Tribe is potentially adverse to other users, and it might ask for more or less on behalf of the Tribe depending on how it evaluated the tribal claim compared with the claims of its rivals. The ultimately adversarial character of tribal submissions to the Bureau therefore seems the only fair inference, as confirmed by the Department’s acknowledgment that its “obligation to represent the Klamath Tribe necessarily coexists with the duty to protect other federal interests, including in particular its interests with respect to the Klamath Project.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 8; cf. Nevada v. United States, 463 U. S. 110, 142 (1983) (“[W]here Congress has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for reclamation projects, and has even authorized the inclusion of reservation lands within a project, the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary cannot be controlling for purposes of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent different interests”). 'Hie position of the Tribe as beneficiary is thus a far cry from the position of the paid consultant.
Quite apart from its attempt to draw a direct analogy between tribes and conventional consultants, the Department argues that compelled release of the documents would itself impair the Department’s performance of a specific fiduciary obligation to protect the confidentiality of communications with tribes. Because, the Department argues, traditional fiduciary standards forbid a trustee to disclose information acquired as a trustee when it should know that disclosure would be against the beneficiary’s interests, excluding the Tribes’ submissions to the Department from Exemption 5 would handicap the Department in doing what the law requires. Brief for Petitioners 36-37. And in much the same vein, the Department presses the argument that “FOIA is intended to cast light on existing government practices; it should not be interpreted and applied so as to compel federal agencies to perform their assigned substantive functions in other than the normal manner.” Id., at 29.
All of this boils down to requesting that we read an “Indian trust” exemption into the statute, a reading that is out of the question for reasons already explored. There is simply no support for the exemption in the statutory text, which we have elsewhere insisted be read strictly in order to serve FOIA’s mandate of broad disclosure, which was obviously expected and intended to affect Government operations. In FOIA, after all, a new conception of Government conduct was enacted into law, “‘a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.’ ” Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U. S., at 142 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Gong., 1st Sess., 3 (1965)). “Congress believed that this philosophy, put into practice, would help ‘ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.’” 492 U. S., at 142 (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 242 (1978)). Congress had to realize that not every secret under the old law would be seeret under the new.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The Government is “not technically acting as [the Tribes’] attorney. That is, the Tribes have their own attorneys, but the United States acts as trustee.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. “The United States has also filed claims on behalf of the Project and on behalf of other Federal interests” in the Oregon adjudication. Id., at 6. The Hoopa Valley, Karuk, and Yurok Tribes are not parties to the adjudication. Brief for Respondent 7.
The majority in Julian did not address the question whether the documents at issue were “inter-agency or intra-agency” records within the meaning of Exemption 5, because it concluded that the documents would be routinely discoverable in civil litigation and therefore would not be covered by Exemption 5 in any event. 486 U. S., at 11-14.
Because we conclude that the documents do not meet this threshold condition, we need not reach step two of the Exemption 5 analysis and enquire whether the communications would normally be discoverable in civil litigation. See United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792, 799 (1984).
Courts of Appeals have recognized at least two instances of intra-agency consultants that arguably extend beyond what we have character-. ized as the typical examples. In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 111 F. 3d 168 (CADC 1997), former Presidents were so treated in their Communications with the National Archives and Kecords Administration, even though the Presidents had their own, independent interests, id., at 171. And in Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F. 2d 781 (CADC 1980), Senators’ responses to the Attorney General’s questionnaires about the judicial nomination process were held exempt, even though we would expect a Senator to have strong personal views on the matter. We need not decide whether either instance should be recognized as intra-agency, even if communications with paid consultants are ultimately so treated. As explained above, the intra-ageney condition excludes, at the least, communications to or from an interested party seeking a Government benefit at the expense of other applicants.
The Department points out that the Plan-related documents submitted by the Tribes were furnished to the Bureau rather than to Reclamation, a fact which the Department claims reinforces the conclusion that the documents were provided to the Department in its capacity as trustee. Brief for Petitioners 47. This fact does not alter our analysis, however, because we think that even communications made in support of the trust relationship fail to fit comfortably within the statutory text.
We note that the Department cites the Restatement for the proposition that a “ ‘trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary not to disclose to a third person information which he has acquired as trustee where he should know that the effect of such disclosure would be detrimental to the interest of the beneficiary.’” Brief for Petitioners 36 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, Comment s (1957)). It is unnecessary for us to decide if the Department’s duties with respect to its communications with Indian tribes fit this pattern.
The Department does not attempt to argue that Congress specifically envisioned that Exemption 5 would cover communications pursuant to the Indian trust responsibility, or any other trust responsibility. Although as a general rule we are hesitant to construe statutes in light of legislative inaction, see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600 (1983), we note that Congress has twice considered specific proposals to protect Indian trust information, see Indian Amendment to Freedom of Information Act: Hearings on S. 2652 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Indian Trust Information Protection Act of 1978, S. 2773,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). We do so because these proposals confirm the commonsense reading that we give Exemption 5 today, as well as to emphasize that nobody in the Federal Government should be surprised by this reading. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion. | What type of decision did the court make? | [
"opinion of the court (orally argued)",
"per curiam (no oral argument)",
"decrees",
"equally divided vote",
"per curiam (orally argued)",
"judgment of the Court (orally argued)",
"seriatim"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiontype |
UNITED STATES v. PATRICK et al.
No. 22.
Argued March 28, 1962.
Restored to the calendar for reargument April 2, 1962.
Reargued December 6, 1962.
Decided February 18, 1963.
Wayne G. Barnett reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Richard J. Medalie, Melva M. Graney, Harold C. Wilkenfeld'and Arthur I. Gould.
Robert M. Ward reargued the cause and filed briefs for respondents.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question, similar to that decided today in No. 21, United States v. Gilmore, ante, p. 39, as to the deductibility of certain legal fees paid by the respondent to his attorneys and attorneys representing his wife in connection with divorce proceedings instituted by the wife. In a suit for refund contesting the Commissioner’s disallowance of such a deduction claimed in the taxpayer’s 1956 federal income tax return, the United States District Court for the Western District of South Carolina held these expenses to be deductible under § 212 (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 186 F. Supp. 48, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 288 F. 2d 292, and we granted certiorari on the Government’s petition, 368 U. S. 817.
In 1955 respondent’s wife sued for divorce, alleging adultery on the part of her husband. Extended negotiations by the attorneys for both parties resulted in a property settlement agreement, and thereafter respondent filed his answer to the complaint neither admitting nor denying the allegations of adultery. Respondent did not testify at the trial. The South Carolina divorce court granted the wife an absolute divorce, approved the property settlement agreement, and in accordance therewith ordered respondent to pay the attorneys’ fee.s for both parties.
At the time of these proceedings, respondent was president of the Herald Publishing Company in Rock Hill, South Carolina, and editor of the newspaper published by it. He owned 28% of the corporation’s outstanding stock, his wife owned 28%, their oldest son, Hugh Patrick, owned 9%, and the remaining 35% was held in trusts for Hugh and the parties’ two minor children. The real property on which the Herald Company was situated was owned by respondent and his wife, the former having an 80% undivided interest and the latter a 20% undivided interest. The couple also owned two houses. In addition, each independently owned diversified securities and other assets of substantial value.
The property settlement agreement recited that “by virtue of this agreement a final and lump settlement has been made of any and all rights whatsoever . . . concerning the matter of support, separate maintenance, alimony or any financial obligation of whatsoever sort due to [the wife] ... on account of and growing out of the marital relationship of the parties ....” Besides provisions for the custody and support of the minor children and a provision giving one of the two houses to each of the parties, certain arrangements were made concerning the respective interests in the newspaper properties. Respondent delivered to his wife high-quality securities worth $112,000, the agreed value of her 28% of the publishing company stock, which she transferred to him subject to the condition that such stock should go to their three children in the event of his death or a sale of the entire business. A new long-term lease of the real property housing the newspaper was entered into with the corporation, and both parties then transferred their interests in this property to a trust, the income therefrom being payable to the wife for life and the remainder to pass in equal shares to the children. Finally, respondent agreed to pay all of his wife’s attorneys’ fees for services rendered in connection with the divorce and property settlement arrangements.
These fees, paid by respondent in 1956, amounted to $24,000 — $12,000 to his attorneys and $12,000 to his wife’s attorneys. The $24,000 total was allocated by agreement of counsel and the parties as follows: $4,000 for handling the divorce itself; $16,000 for rearranging the stock interests in the publishing company; and $4,000 for leasing the real property and transferring it to a trust. Respondent claimed a deduction for the $16,000 item and for 80% of the $4,000 ($3,200) item relating to the business real estate.
Both courts below held that the entire $19,200 was deductible under § 212 (2) of the 1954 Code as an “ordinary and necessary [expense] paid or incurred ... for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income.” The Government’s contention that this was a personal expense, nondeductible under § 262 of the Code, was rejected. Relying on Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F. 2d 646, and cases following it (see No. 21, ante, pp. 49-51), the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the fees were incurred not to resist a liability, but to arrange how it could be met without depriving the taxpayer of income-producing property, the loss of which would have destroyed his capacity to earn income. The property settlement provisions, so the lower courts held, were designed to satisfy respondent’s marital obligations to his wife and protect the interests of the children, yet at the same time preserve respondent’s control over the publishing company, to which he had devoted many years of effort.
The situation, in short, is comparable to that in United States v. Gilmore, supra. The principles held governing in that case are equally applicable here. It is evident that the claims asserted by the wife in the divorce action arose from respondent’s marital relationship with her and were thus the product of respondent’s personal or family life, not profit-seeking activity. As we have held in Gilmore, payments made for the purpose of discharging such claims are not deductible as “business” expenses.
We find no significant distinction in the fact that the legal fees for which deduction is claimed were paid for arranging a transfer of stock interests, leasing real property, and creating a trust rather than for conducting litigation. These matters were incidental to litigation brought by respondent’s wife, whose claims arising from respondent’s personal and family life were the origin of the property arrangements. The property settlement agreement itself recited that it settled rights “growing out of the marital relationship,” supra, p. 55, and both courts below found that, although nominally an agreement for the purchase of the wife’s property, it served ultimately to protect respondent’s income-producing property from an assertion of his wife’s latent marital rights. It would be unsound to make deductibility turn on the nature of the measures taken to forestall a claim rather than the source of the claim itself.
As in the Gilmore case, we need not pass on the Government’s alternative contention that part of the legal fees sought to be deducted here are not expenses at all, but rather are capital outlays. Since we hold that the payments were not deductible as “business” expenses, it makes no difference for present purposes whether they are personal expenses or capital expenditures; in either case they would not be deductible.
We conclude that none of the legal fees paid by respondent is deductible, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissent.
Section 212 provides, in pertinent part: “In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year— . . . (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income . . . .”
This case was argued at the 1961 Term, and was restored to the calendar for reargument at this Term. 369 U. S. 835.
Mr. Patrick will be referred to as the sole respondent. The administrator of the estate of his second wife is a party only because a joint return was filed. Respondent’s former wife will be referred to as the “wife” notwithstanding the divorce.
Section 262 provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.”
In view of our conclusion that the legal fees were not “business” expenses, we do not reach the Government’s second alternative contention that at least the fees paid by respondent to his wife’s attorneys were not deductible under prior decisions of this Court. See, e. g., Magruder v. Supplee, 316 U. S. 394; Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U. S. 590. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
22
] | sc_casesource |
COLE v. YOUNG et al.
No. 442.
Argued March 6, 1956.
Decided June 11, 1956.
David I. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James H. Heller and Osmond K. Fraenkel.
Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Burger, Samuel D. Slade and Benjamin Forman.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Harlan,
announced by Mr. Justice Burton.
This case presents the question of the meaning of the term “national security” as used in the Act of August 26, 1950, giving to the heads of certain departments and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when deemed necessary “in the interest of the national security of the United States.”
Petitioner, a preference-eligible veteran under § 2 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 851, held a position in the classified civil service as a food and drug inspector for the New York District of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In November 1953, he was suspended without pay from his position, pending investigation to determine whether his employment should be terminated. He was given a written statement of charges alleging that he had “a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists” and that he had maintained a “sympathetic association” with, had contributed funds and services to, and had attended social gatherings of an allegedly subversive organization.
Although afforded an opportunity to do so, petitioner declined to answer the charges or to request a hearing, as he had the right to do. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, after “a study of all the documents in [petitioner’s] case,” determined that petitioner’s continued employment was not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security” and ordered the termination of his employment. Petitioner appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which declined to accept the appeal on the ground that the Veterans’ Preference Act, under which petitioner claimed the right of appeal, was inapplicable to such discharges.
Petitioner thereafter brought an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission had improperly refused to entertain his appeal, and an order requiring his reinstatement in his former position. The District Court granted the respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint. 125 F. Supp. 284. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337. Because of the importance of the questions involved in the field of Government employment, we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 900.
Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863, provides that preference eligibles may be discharged only “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service” and, among other procedural rights, “shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,” whose decision is made binding on the employing agency. Respondents concede that petitioner’s discharge was invalid if that Act is controlling. They contend, however, as was held by the courts below, that petitioner’s discharge was authorized by the Act of August 26, 1950, supra, which eliminates the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Thus the sole question for decision is whether petitioner’s discharge was authorized by the 1950 Act.
The 1950 Act provides in material part that, notwithstanding any other personnel laws, the head of any agency to which the Act applies
“may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee of [his agency] .... The agency head concerned may, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the United States, and such determination by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final: . . . .”
The Act was expressly made applicable only to the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Section 3 of the Act provides, however, that the Act may be extended “to such other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security,” and the President has extended the Act under this authority “to all other departments and agencies of the Government.” While the validity of this extension of the Act depends upon questions which are in many respects common to those determining the validity of the Secretary’s exercise of the authority thereby extended to her, we will restrict our consideration to the latter issue and assume, for purposes of this decision, that the Act has validly been extended to apply to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
The Act authorizes dismissals only upon a determination by the Secretary that the dismissal is “necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security.” That determination requires an evaluation of the risk of injury to the “national security” that the employee’s retention would create, which in turn would seem necessarily to be a function, not only of the character of the employee and the likelihood of his misconducting himself, but also of the nature of the position he occupies and its relationship to the “national security.” That is, it must be determined whether the position is one in which the employee’s misconduct would affect the “national security.” That, of course, would not be necessary if “national security” were used in the Act in a sense so broad as to be involved in all activities of the Government, for then the relationship to the “national security” would follow from the very fact of employment. For the reasons set forth below, however, we conclude (1) that the term “national security” is used in the Act in a definite and limited sense and relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the Nation’s safety, as distinguished from the general welfare; and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner’s position was affected with the “national security,” as that term is used in the Act. It follows that his dismissal was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence violated the Veterans’ Preference Act.
I.
In interpreting the 1950 Act, it is important to note that that Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source of authority to dismiss Government employees. The general personnel laws — the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans’ Preference Acts — authorize dismissals for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” and the ground which we conclude was the basis for petitioner’s discharge here — a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty — was recognized as a “cause” for dismissal under those procedures as early as 1942. Indeed, the President’s so-called Loyalty Program, Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, which prescribed an absolute standard of loyalty to be met by all employees regardless of position, had been established pursuant to that general authority three years prior to the 1950 Act and remained in effect for nearly three years after its passage. Thus there was no want of substantive authority to dismiss employees on loyalty grounds, and the question for decision here is not whether an employee can be dismissed on such grounds but only the extent to which the summary procedures authorized by the 1950 Act are available in such a case.
, As noted above, the issue turns on the meaning of “national security,” as used in the Act. While that term is not defined in the Act, we think it clear from the statute as a whole that that term was intended to comprehend only those activities of the Government that are directly concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those which contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the general welfare.
Virtually conclusive of this narrow meaning of “national security” is the fact that, had Congress intended the term in a sense broad enough to include all activities of the Government, it would have granted the power to terminate employment “in the interest of the national security” to all agencies of the Government. Instead, Congress specified 11 named agencies to which the Act should apply, the character of which reveals, without doubt, a purpose to single out those agencies which are directly concerned with the national defense and which have custody over information the compromise of which might endanger the country’s security, the so-called “sensitive” agencies. Thus, of the 11 named agencies, 8 are concerned with military operations or weapons development, and the other 3, with international relations, internal security, and the stock-piling of strategic materials. Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the grant of authority to the President, in § 3 of the Act, to extend the Act to such other agencies as he “may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security.” Rather, the character of the named agencies indicates the character of the determination required to be made to effect such an extension. Aware of the difficulties of attempting an exclusive enumeration and of the undesirability of a rigid classification in the face of changing circumstances, Congress simply enumerated those agencies which it determined to be affected with the “national security” and authorized the President, by making a similar determination, to add any other agencies which were, or became, “sensitive.” That it was contemplated that this power would be exercised “from time to time” confirms the purpose to allow for changing circumstances and to require a selective judgment, necessarily implying that the standard to be applied is a less than all-inclusive one.
The limitation of the Act to the enumerated agencies is particularly significant in the light of the fact that Exec. Order No. 9835, establishing the Loyalty Program, was in full effect at the time of the consideration and passage of the Act. In that Order, the President had expressed his view that it was of “vital importance” that all employees of the Government be of “complete and unswerving loyalty” and had prescribed a minimum loyalty standard to be applied to all employees under the normal civil service procedures. Had Congress considered the objective of insuring the “unswerving loyalty” of all employees, regardless of position, as a matter of “national security” to be effectuated by the summary procedures authorized by the Act, rather than simply a desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the normal civil service procedures, it surely would not have limited the Act to selected agencies. Presumably, therefore, Congress meant something more by the “interest of the national security” than the general interest the Nation has in the loyalty of even “nonsensitive” employees.
We can find no justification for rejecting this implication of the limited purpose of the Act or for inferring the unlimited power contended for by the Government. Where applicable, the Act authorizes the agency head summarily to suspend an employee pending investigation and, after charges and a hearing, finally to terminate his employment, such termination not being subject to appeal. There is an obvious justification for the summary suspension power where the employee occupies a “sensitive” position in which he could cause serious damage to the national security during the delay incident to an investigation and the preparation of charges. Likewise, there is a reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty grounds of employees who are not in “sensitive” positions and who are thus not situated where they could bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation’s security. In the absence of an immediate threat of harm to the “national security,” the normal dismissal procedures seem fully adequate and the justification for summary powers disappears. Indeed, in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on loyalty grounds, the need for procedural safeguards seems even greater than in other cases, and we will not lightly assume that Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of employees handling defense secrets.
The 1950 Act itself reflects Congress’ concern for the procedural rights of employees and its desire to limit the unreviewable dismissal power to the minimum scope necessary to the purpose of protecting activities affected with the “national security.” A proviso to § 1 of the Act provides that a dismissal by one agency under the power granted by the Act “shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government,” if the Civil Service Commission determines that the employee is eligible for such other employment. That is, the unreviewable dismissal power was to be used only for the limited purpose of removing the employee from the position in which his presence had been determined to endanger the “national security”; it could affect his right to employment in other agencies only if the Civil Service Commission, after review, refused to clear him for such employment. This effort to preserve the employee’s procedural rights to the maximum extent possible hardly seems consistent with an intent to define the scope of the dismissal power in terms of the indefinite and virtually unlimited meaning for which the respondents contend.
Moreover, if Congress intended the term to have such a broad meaning that all positions in the Government could be said to be affected with the “national security,” the result would be that the 1950 Act, though in form but an exception to the general personnel laws, could be utilized effectively to supersede those laws. For why could it not be said that national security in that sense requires not merely loyal and trustworthy employees but also those that are industrious and efficient? The relationship of the job to the national security being the same, its demonstrated inadequate performance because of inefficiency or incompetence would seem to present a surer threat to national security, in the sense of the general welfare, than a mere doubt as to the employee’s loyalty.
Finally, the conclusion we draw from the face of the Act that "national security” was used in a limited and definite sense is amply supported by the legislative history of the Act.
In the first place, it was constantly emphasized that the bill, first introduced as S. 1561 in the 80th Congress and passed as H. R. 7439 in the 81st Congress, was intended to apply, or to be extended, only to “sensitive” agencies, a term used to imply a close and immediate concern with the defense of the Nation. Thus the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in reporting out S. 1561,stated:
“This bill provides authority to terminate employment of indiscreet or disloyal employees who are employed in areas of the Government which are sensitive from the standpoint of national security.
“[Section 3 will permit] the President to determine additional sensitive areas and include such areas in the scope of the authorities contained in this bill.
“Insofar as the [addition of § 3] is concerned, it was recognized by all witnesses that there were other sensitive areas within the various departments of the Government which are now, or might in the future become, deeply involved in national security. . . . In view ... of the fact that there are now and will be in the future other sensitive areas of equal importance to the national security, it is believed that the President should have authority to make a finding concerning such areas and by Executive action place those areas under the authorities contained in this act.”
The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service reported that “The provisions of the bill extend only to departments and agencies which are concerned with vital matters affecting the national security of our Nation.” The committee reports on H. R. 7439 in the next Congress similarly referred to the bill as granting the dismissal power only to the heads of the “sensitive” agencies. While these references relate primarily to the agencies to be covered by the Act, rather than to the exercise of the power within an agency, the standard for both is the same — in the “interests of the national security” — and the statements thus clearly indicate the restricted sense in which “national security” was used. In short, “national security” is affected only by “sensitive” activities.
Secondly, the history makes clear that the Act was intended to authorize the suspension and dismissal only of persons in sensitive positions. Throughout the hearings, committee reports, and debates, the bill was described as being designed to provide for the dismissal of “security risks.” In turn, the examples given of what might be a “security risk” always entailed employees having access to classified materials; they were security risks because of the risk they posed of intentional or inadvertent disclosure of confidential information. Mr. Larkin, a representative of the Department of Defense, which Department had requested and drafted the bill, made this consideration more explicit:
“They are security risks because of their access to confidential and classified material. . . . But if they do not have classified material, why, there is no notion that they are security risks to the United States. They are security risks to the extent of having access to classified material.”
“A person is accused of being disloyal, but is cleared by the loyalty board, because there is not enough evidence against him. If that person is not in a sensitive job, it is not of any further concern to us. We are willing to take the view, that while we might have misgivings about his loyalty, he cannot prejudice our security because he does not have access to any of the classified or top secret material.”
It is clear, therefore, both from the face of the Act and the legislative history, that “national security” was not used in the Act in an all-inclusive sense, but was intended to refer only to the protection of “sensitive” activities. It follows that an employee can be dismissed “in the interest of the national security” under the Act only if he occupies a “sensitive” position, and thus that a condition precedent to the exercise of the dismissal authority is a determination by the agency head that the position occupied is one affected with the “national security.” We now turn to an examination of the Secretary’s action to show that no such determination was made as to the position occupied by petitioner.
II.
The Secretary’s action in dismissing the petitioner was expressly taken pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, promulgated in April 1953 to provide uniform standards and procedures for the exercise by agency heads of the suspension and dismissal powers under the 1950 Act. That Order prescribes as the standard for dismissal, and the dismissal notice given to petitioner contained, a determination by the Secretary that the employee’s retention in employment “is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” Despite this verbal formula, however, it is our view that the Executive Order does not in fact require the agency head to make any determination whatever on the relationship of the employee’s retention to the “national security” if the charges against him are within the categories of the charges against petitioner — that is, charges which reflect on the employee’s loyalty. Rather, as we read the Order, it enjoins upon the agency heads the duty of discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty, irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the “national security.” That is, the Executive Order deems an adverse determination as to loyalty to satisfy the requirements of the statute without more.
The opening preamble to the Order recites, among other things, that “the interests of the national security require” that “all” Government employees be persons “of complete and unswerving loyalty.” It would seem to follow that an employee’s retention cannot be “clearly consistent” with the “interests of the national security” as thus defined unless he is “clearly” loyal — that is, unless there is no doubt as to his loyalty. And § 8 (a) indicates that that is in fact what was intended by the Order. That section provides that the investigation of an employee pursuant to the Order shall be designed to develop information “as to whether . . . [his employment] is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security,” and prescribes certain categories of facts to which “such” information shall relate. The first category, §8 (a)(1), includes nonloyalty-oriented facts which, in general, might reflect upon the employee’s reliability, trustworthiness, or susceptibility to coercion, such as dishonesty, drunkenness, sexual perversion, mental defects, or other reasons to believe that he is subject to influence or coercion. Section 8 (a)(1) expressly provides, however, that such facts are relevant only “depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security.” The remaining categories include facts which, in general, reflect upon the employee’s “loyalty,” such as acts of espionage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government, sympathetic association with persons who so advocate, or sympathetic association with subversive organizations. § 8 (a) (2)-(8). Significantly, there is wholly absent from these categories — under which the charges against petitioner were expressly framed — any qualification making their relevance dependent upon the relationship of the employee’s position to the national security. The inference we draw is that in such cases the relationship to the national security is irrelevant, and that an adverse “loyalty” determination is sufficient ex proprio vigore to require discharge.
Arguably, this inference can be avoided on the ground that § 8 (a) relates only to the scope of information to be developed in the investigation and not to the evaluation of it by the agency head. That is, while loyalty information is to be developed in all cases regardless of the nature of the employment, that does not mean that the agency head should not consider the nature of the employment in determining whether the derogatory information is sufficient to make the employee’s continued employment not “clearly consistent” with the “national security.” No doubt that is true to the extent that the greater the sensitivity of the position the smaller may be the doubts that would justify termination; the Order undoubtedly leaves it open to an agency head to apply a stricter standard in some cases than in others, depending on the nature of the employment. On the other hand, by making loyalty information relevant in all cases, regardless of the nature of the job, § 8 (a) seems strongly to imply that there is a minimum standard of loyalty that must be met by all employees. It would follow that the agency head may terminate employment in cases where that minimum standard is not met without making any independent determination of the potential impact of the person’s employment on the national security.
Other provisions of the Order confirm the inferences that may be drawn from § 8 (a). Thus § 3 (b) directs each agency head to designate as “sensitive” those positions in his agency “the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security.” By definition, therefore, some employees are admittedly not in a position to bring about such an effect. Nevertheless, the Order makes this distinction relevant only for purposes of determining the scope of the investigation to be conducted, not for purposes of limiting the dismissal power to such “sensitive” positions. Section 3 (a) is more explicit. That provides that the appointment of all employees shall be made subject to an investigation the scope of which shall depend upon the degree of adverse effect on the national security the occupant of the position could bring about, but which “in no event” is to be less than a prescribed minimum. But the sole purpose of such an investigation is to provide a basis for a “clearly consistent” determination. Thus the requirement of a minimum investigation of all persons appointed implies that an adverse “clearly consistent” determination may be made as to any such employee, regardless of the potential adverse effect he could cause to the national security. Finally, the second “Whereas” clause of the preamble recites as a justification for the Order that “all persons . . . privileged to be employed ... [by the Government should] be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards,” thus implying that the Order prescribes minimum standards that all employees must meet irrespective of the character of the positions held, one of which is the “complete and unswerving loyalty” standard recited in the first “Whereas” clause of the preamble.
Confirmation of this reading of the Order is found in its history. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690, had established the Loyalty Program under which all employees, regardless of their positions, were made subject to discharge if there was a “reasonable doubt” as to their loyalty. That Order was expressly revoked by § 12 of the present Executive Order. There is no indication, however, that it was intended thereby to limit the scope of the persons subject to a loyalty standard. And any such implication is negatived by the remarkable similarity in the preambles to the two Orders and in the kinds of information considered to be relevant to the ultimate determinations. In short, all employees were still to be subject to at least a minimum loyalty standard, though under new procedures which do not afford a right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
We therefore interpret the Executive Order as meaning that, when “loyalty” charges are involved, an employee may be dismissed regardless of the character of his position in the Government service, and that the agency head need make no evaluation as to the effect which continuance of his employment might have upon the “national security.” We recognize that this interpretation of the Order rests upon a chain of inferences drawn from less than explicit provisions. But the Order was promulgated to guide the agency heads in the exercise of the dismissal power, and its failure to state explicitly what determinations are required leaves no choice to the agency heads but to follow the most reasonable inferences to be drawn. Moreover, whatever the practical reasons that may have dictated the awkward form of the Order, its failure to state explicitly what was meant is the fault of the Government. Any ambiguities should therefore be resolved against the Government, and we will not burden the employee with the assumption that an agency head, in stating no more than the formal conclusion that retention of the employee is not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security,” has made any subsidiary determinations not clearly required by the Executive Order.
From the Secretary’s determination that petitioner’s employment was not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security,” therefore, it may be assumed only that the Secretary found the charges to be true and that they created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s loyalty. No other subsidiary finding may be inferred, however, for, under the Executive Order as we have interpreted it, no other finding was required to support the Secretary’s action.
From our holdings (1) that not all positions in the Government are affected with the “national security” as that term is used in the 1950 Act, and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner’s position was one in which he could adversely affect the “national security,” it necessarily follows that petitioner’s discharge was not authorized by the 1950 Act. In reaching this conclusion, we are not confronted with the problem of reviewing the Secretary’s exercise of discretion, since the basis for our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the Executive Order and applied by the Secretary is not in conformity with the Act. Since petitioner’s discharge was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence violated the Veterans’ Preference Act, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 565.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450.
(18 Fed. Reg. 2489, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10491, Oct. 13, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583.)
WHEREAS the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States ; and
WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government requires that all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and agencies governing the employment and retention in employment of persons in the Federal service:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j) ; and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C. 22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said act of August 26, 1950, and Executive Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the Government.
Sec. 2. The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
Sec. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less investigation as may meet the requirements of the national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United States. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field investigation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
(b) The head of any department or agency shall designate, or 'cause to be designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position. Any position so designated shall be filled or occupied only by a person with respect to whom a full field investigation has been conducted: Provided, that a person occupying a sensitive position at the time it is designated as such may continue to occupy such position pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject to the other provisions of this order: And provided further, that in case of emergency a sensitive position may be filled for a limited period by a person with respect to whom a full field preappointment investigation has not been completed if the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency.
Sec. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, and, after such further investigation as may be appropriate, shall re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under this order.
Sec. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26,1950, the case of such officer or employee.
Sec. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of the person involved if he deems such suspension necessary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, the head of the department or agency concerned shall terminate the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.
Sec. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in the same department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or agency, unless the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency: Provided, that no person whose employment has been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other department or agency except after a determination by the Civil Service Commission that such person is eligible for such employment.
Sec. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited, to the following:
(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for serious mental or neurological disorder without satisfactory evidence of cure.
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.
(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.
(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(8) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct.
Sec. 10. Nothing in this order shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security which may be required by law.
Sec. 11. On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board established by Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. . . .
Sec. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked. For the purposes described in section 11 hereof the Loyalty Review Board and the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission shall continue to exist and function for a period of one hundred and twenty days from the effective date of this order, and the Department of Justice shall continue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3 of Part III of the said Executive Order No. 9835, but directly to the head of each department and agency.
Sec. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
The White House,
April 27, 1953.
§ 1. “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), as amended (5 U. S. C. 652), or the provisions of any other law, the Secretary of State; Secretary of Commerce; Attorney General; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Secretary of the Treasury; Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, National Security Resources Board; or the Director, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee of the Department of State (including the Foreign Service of the United States), Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Coast Guard, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Resources Board, or National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, respectively, or of their several field services: Provided, That to the extent that such agency head determines that the interests of the national security permit, the employee concerned shall be notified of the reasons for his suspension and within thirty days after such notification any such person shall have an opportunity to submit any statements or affidavits to the official designated by the head of the agency concerned to show why he should be reinstated or restored to duty. The agency head concerned may, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the United States, and such determination by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final: Provided further, That any employee having a permanent or indefinite appointment, and having completed his probationary or trial period, who is a citizen of the United States whose employment is suspended under the authority of this Act, shall be given after his suspension and before his employment is terminated under the authority of this Act, (1) a written statement within thirty days after his suspension of the charges against him, which shall be subject to amendment within thirty days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit; (2) an opportunity within thirty days thereafter (plus an additional thirty days if the charges are amended) to answer such charges and to submit affidavits; (3) a hearing, at the employee’s request, by a duly constituted agency authority for this purpose; (4) a review of his case by the agency head, or some official designated by him, before a decision adverse to the employee is made final; and (5) a written statement of the decision of the agency head: Provided further, That any person whose employment is so suspended or terminated under the authority of this Act may, in the discretion of the agency head concerned, be reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored shall be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such suspension or termination in an amount not to exceed the difference between the amount such person would normally have earned during the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate, and the interim net earnings of such person: Provided further, That the termination of employment herein provided shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government: Provided further, That the head of any department or agency considering the appointment of any person whose employment has been terminated under the provisions of this Act may make such appointment only after consultation with the Civil Service Commission, which agency shall have the authority at the written request of either the head of such agency or such employee to determine whether any such person is eligible for employment by any other agency or department of the Government.
“Sec-. 3. The provisions of this Act shall apply to such other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security. If any departments or agencies are included by the President, he shall so report to the Committees on the Armed Services of the Congress." 64 Stat. 476, 5 IT. S. C. §§ 22-1, 22-3.
§ 1, Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, set forth in the Appendix, post, p. 558.
Secretary Folsom, the present Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has been substituted as respondent for the former Secretary Hobby.
§ 6, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 652.
§ 14, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863.
Civil Service War Regulations, § 18.2 (c) (7), September 26, 1942, 5 CFR, Cum. Supp., § 18.2 (c) (7).
Employees dismissed under the Loyalty Program were entitled to review by the Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, thus satisfying the requirements of § 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act. See Kutcher v. Gray, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 266, 199 F. 2d 783 (C.A.D.C.Cir.).
Congress’ reluctance to extend such powers to all agencies of the Government is also indicated by the prior legislation. At various times since 1942, similar summary dismissal statutes, of limited duration, had been enacted, but these had been limited to the obviously “sensitive” military departments, 56 Stat. 1053, 63 Stat. 1023, and the State Department, 60 Stat. 458. The 1950 Act, introduced at the request of the Department of Defense, was designed to make the authority permanent, include several other “sensitive” agencies, and afford greater flexibility by permitting the President to extend the Act to other agencies which became “sensitive.” H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4.
H. R. Rep. No. 2264, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
E. g., S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2: “The purpose of the bill is to increase the authority of the heads of Government departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend employees considered to be bad security risks . . . .”
For example, Mr. Murray, the Chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, which had reported the bill, gave the following illustration of the purpose of the bill in opening the debate in the House: “For instance, an employee who is working in some highly sensitive agency doing very confidential, secret defense work and who goes out and gets too much liquor may unintentionally or unwittingly, because of his condition, confide to someone who may be a subversive, secret military information about the character of work he is doing in that department. He is, by his conduct, a bad security risk and should be discharged.” 96 Cong. Rec. 10017.
Hearings, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on H. R. 7439, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 67.
Id., at p. 72.
The relevant portions of the Executive Order, as it stood at the time of petitioner’s suspension and discharge, are printed in the Appendix, post, p. 558.
Section 6 of the Order, which formally prescribes the standards for “termination,” in terms adopts the very language of the statute, “necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security.” Section 7, however, provides that a suspended employee “shall not be reinstated” unless the agency head determines that reinstatement is “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” Since nonreinstatement of a suspended employee is equivalent to the termination of his employment, it is apparent that the “clearly consistent” standard of § 7 is the controlling one. See also §§ 2, 8, and 3 (a). In the view we take of the case, we need not determine whether the “clearly consistent” standard is, as petitioner contends, a more onerous one than the “necessary or advisable” standard.
Executive Order No. 9835 recited that it was “of vital importance” that all employees be of “complete and unswerving loyalty”; Exec. Order No. 10450 recites that “the interests of the national security require” that all employees be of “complete and unswerving loyalty.” Executive Order No. 9835 listed six factors to be considered “in connection with the determination of disloyalty” (Pt. V, § 2); these are repeated in substantially identical form in §§ 8 (a) (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Exec. Order No. 10450 as “information as to whether . . . [the employee’s retention] is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.”
That the Secretary. similarly interpreted the Executive Order and did not in fact determine that petitioner’s job was a “sensitive” one is confirmed by the respondents’ concession that petitioner “did not have access to Government secrets or classified material and was not in a position to influence policy against the interests of the Government.” Respondents’ Brief, pp. 3-4; Record, p. 40.
No contention is made that the Executive Order might be sustained under the President’s executive power even though in violation of the Veterans’ Preference Act. There is no basis for such an argument in any event, for it is clear from the face of the Executive Order that the President did not intend to override statutory limitations on the dismissal of employees, and promulgated the Order solely as an implementation of the 1950 Act. Thus § 6 of the Order purports to authorize dismissals only “in accordance with the said Act of August 26, 1950,” and similar references are made in §§ 4, 5, and 7. This explicit limitation in the substantive provisions of the Order is of course not weakened by the inclusion of the “Constitution,” as well as the 1950 and other Acts, in the omnibus list of authorities recited in the Preamble to the Order; it is from the Constitution that the President derives any authority to implement the 1950 Act at all. When the President expressly confines his action to the limits of statutory authority, the validity of the action must be determined solely by the congressional limitations which the President sought to respect, whatever might be the result were the President ever to assert his independent power against that of Congress.
After the date of petitioner’s discharge, this paragraph was amended, by Exec. Order No. 10548, Aug. 2, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 4871, to read:
“(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
ILLINOIS BRICK CO. et al. v. ILLINOIS et al.
No. 76-404.
Argued March 23, 1977
Decided June 9, 1977
Edward H. Hatton argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Lynne E. McNown, Alan L. Metz, Samuel J. Betar, Earl E. Pollack, James P. Morgan, Thomas W. Johnston, and George B. Collins.
Lee A. Freeman, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was William J. Scott, Attorney General.
Assistant Attorney General Baker argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman and Carl D. Lawson.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Sanford N. Gruskin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Warren J. Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael I. Spiegel and Richard N. Light, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: Bruce E. Babbitt, Attorney General, John A. Baade, Assistant Attorney General, and Kenneth R. Reed, of Arizona; William J. Baxley, Attorney General, and William T. Stephens, Assistant Attorney General, of Alabama; Avrum M. Gross, Attorney General, and Joseph K. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, of Alaska; Bill Clinton, Attorney General, and Frank B. Newell, Deputy Attorney General, of Arkansas; J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, and Robert F. Hill, First Assistant Attorney General, of Colorado; Carl R. Afelio, Attorney General, and Gerard J. Dowling and Larry H. Evans, Assistant Attorneys General, of Connecticut; Richard R. Wier, Jr., Attorney General, and Regina M. Small, Deputy Attorney General, of Delaware; Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and Charles R. Ranson, Assistant Attorney General, of Florida; Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, and R. Douglas Lackey, Assistant Attorney General, of Georgia; Ronald Y. Amemiya, Attorney General, and Nelson S. W. Chang, Deputy Attorney General, of Hawaii; Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General, and Rudolf D. Barchas, Deputy Attorney General, of Idaho; Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, and Donald P. Bogard, of Indiana; Richard C. Turner, Attorney General, and Gary H. Swanson, Assistant Attorney General, of Iowa; Curt T. Schneider, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Brill, Assistant Attorney General, of Kansas; Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General, and W. Patrick Stallard, Assistant Attorney General, of Kentucky; William J. Guste, Jr., Attorney General, and John R. Flowers, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of Louisiana; Joseph E. Brennan, Attorney General, and Cheryl Harrington, Assistant Attorney General, of Maine; Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Thomas M. Wilson III, Assistant Attorney General, of Maryland; Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, and Paula W. Gold, Assistant Attorney General, of Massachusetts; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Edwin M. Bladen, Assistant Attorney General, of Michigan; Warren R. Spannaus, Attorney General, and Alan H. Maclin, Special Assistant Attorney General, of Minnesota; A. F. Summer, Attorney General, and Donald Clark, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, of Mississippi; John Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri; Michael T. Greely, Attorney General, and Mike McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, of Montana; Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Robert F. Bartle, Assistant Attorney General, of Nebraska; Robert List, Attorney General, and Donald Klasic, Deputy Attorney General, of Nevada; David H. Souter, Attorney General, and Wilfred John Funk, Assistant Attorney General, of New Hampshire; William F. Hyland, Attorney General, and Elias Abelson, of New Jersey; Toney Anaya, Attorney General, and Robert N. Hilgendorf, Assistant Attorney General, of New Mexico; Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and John M. Desiderio, Assistant Attorney General, of New York; Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, and G. Joña Poe, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, of North Carolina; Allen I. Olson, Attorney General, and Lynn E. Erickson, Assistant Attorney General, of North Dakota; Larry Derryberry, Attorney General, and Paul C. Duncan, Assistant Attorney General, of Oklahoma; James A. Redden, Attorney General of Oregon; Robert P. Kane, Attorney General, and Vincent X. Yakowicz, Solicitor General, of Pennsylvania; Julius C. Michaelson, Attorney General of Rhode Island; Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General, and Victor S. Evans, Deputy Attorney General, of South Carolina; William J. Janklow, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Welk, Assistant Attorney General, of South Dakota; Brooks McLemore, Attorney General of Tennessee; John L. Hill, Attorney General, and Lee C. Clyburn, of Texas; Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, and William T. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, of Utah; M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General, and Jay I. Ashman, Assistant Attorney General, of Vermont; Anthony F. Troy, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and John J. Miles, Assistant Attorney General, of Virginia; Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Thomas L. Boeder, Assistant Attorney General, of Washington; Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Attorney General, and Gene Hal Williams, Deputy Attorney General, of West Virginia; Bfonson C. LaFollette, Attorney General, and Michael L. Zaleski, Assistant Attorney General, of Wisconsin; V. Frank Mendicino, Attorney General, Charles J. Carroll, Deputy Attorney General, and Jim Gusea, Assistant Attorney General, of Wyoming.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion, of the Court.
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481 (1968), involved an antitrust treble-damages action brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act against a manufacturer of shoe machinery by one of its customers, a manufacturer of shoes. In defense, the shoe machinery manufacturer sought to show that the plaintiff had not been injured in its business as required by § 4 because it had passed on the claimed illegal overcharge to those who bought shoes from it. Under the defendant’s theory, the illegal overcharge was absorbed by the plaintiff’s customers — indirect purchasers of the defendant’s shoe machinery — who were the persons actually injured by the antitrust violation.
In Hanover Shoe this Court rejected as a matter of law this defense that indirect rather than direct purchasers were the parties injured by the antitrust violation. The Court held that, except in certain limited circumstances, a direct purchaser suing for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act is injured within the meaning of § 4 by the full amount of the overcharge paid by it and that the antitrust defendant is not permitted to introduce evidence that indirect purchasers were in fact injured by the illegal overcharge. 392 U. S., at 494. The first reason for the Court’s rejection of this offer of proof was an unwillingness to complicate treble-damages actions with attempts to trace the effects of the overcharge on the purchaser’s prices, sales, costs, and profits, and of showing that these variables would have behaved differently without the overcharge. Id., at 492-493. A second reason for barring the pass-on defense was the Court’s concern that unless direct purchasers were allowed to sue for the portion of the overcharge arguably passed on to indirect purchasers, antitrust violators “would retain the fruits of their illegality” because indirect purchasers “would have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit” and hence little incentive to sue. Id., at 494.
In this case we once again confront the question whether the overcharged direct purchaser should be deemed for purposes of § 4 to have suffered the full injury from the overcharge; but the issue is presented in the context of a suit in which the plaintiff, an indirect purchaser, seeks to show its injury by establishing pass-on by the direct purchaser and in which the antitrust defendants rely on Hanover Shoe’s rejection of the pass-on theory. Having decided that in general a pass-on theory may not be used defensively by an antitrust violator against a direct purchaser plaintiff, we must now decide whether that theory may be used offensively by an indirect purchaser plaintiff against an alleged violator.
I
Petitioners manufacture and distribute concrete block in the Greater Chicago area. They sell the block primarily to masonry contractors, who submit bids to general contractors for the masonry portions of construction projects. The general contractors in turn submit bids for these projects to customers such as the respondents in this case, the State of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities in the Greater Chicago area, including counties, municipalities, housing authorities, and school districts. See 67 F. R. D. 461, 463 (ND Ill. 1975); App. 16-48. Respondents are thus indirect purchasers of concrete block, which passes through two separate levels in the chain of distribution before reaching respondents. The block is purchased directly from petitioners by masonry contractors and used by them to build masonry structures; those structures are incorporated into entire buildings by general contractors and sold to respondents.
Respondent State of Illinois, on behalf of itself and respondent local governmental entities, brought this antitrust treble-damages action under § 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging that petitioners had engaged in a combination and conspiracy to fix the prices of concrete block in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleged that the amounts paid by respondents for concrete block were more than $3 million higher by reason of this price-fixing conspiracy. The only way in which the antitrust violation alleged could have injured respondents is if all or part of the overcharge was passed on by the masonry and general contractors to respondents, rather than being absorbed at the first two levels of distribution. See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F. 2d 1163, 1164 (CA7 1976).
Petitioner manufacturers moved for partiál summary judgment against all plaintiffs that were indirect purchasers of concrete block from petitioners, contending that as a matter of law only direct purchasers could sue for the alleged overcharge. The District Court granted petitioners’ motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that indirect purchasers such as respondents in this case can recover treble damages for an illegal overcharge if they can prove that the overcharge was passed on to them through intervening links in the distribution chain.
We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. 938 (1976), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether the offensive use of pass-on authorized by the decision below is consistent with Hanover Shoe’s restrictions on the defensive use of pass-on. We hold that it is not, and we reverse. We reach this result in two steps. First, we conclude that whatever rule is to be adopted regarding pass-on in antitrust damages actions, it must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants. Because Hanover Shoe would bar petitioners from using respondents’ pass-on theory as a defense to a treble-damages suit by the direct purchasers (the masonry contractors), we are faced with the choice of overruling (or narrowly limiting) Handover Shoe or of applying it to bar respondents’ attempt to use this pass-on theory offensively. Second, we decline to abandon the construction given § 4 in Hanover Shoe — that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party “injured in his busir ness or property” within the meaning of the section — in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Court was wrong in Hanover Shoe to think that the effectiveness of the antitrust treble-damages action would be substantially reduced by adopting a rule that any party in the chain may sue to recover the fraction of the overcharge allegedly absorbed by it.
II
The parties in this case agree that however § 4 is construed with respect to the pass-on issue, the rule should apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants — that an indirect purchaser should not be allowed to use a pass-on theory to recover damages from a defendant unless the defendant would be allowed to use a pass-on defense in a suit by a direct purchaser. Respondents, in arguing that they should be allowed to recover by showing pass-on in this case, have conceded that petitioners should be allowed to assert a pass-on defense against direct purchasers of concrete block, Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 48; they ask this Court to limit Hanover Shoe’s bar on pass-on defenses to its “particular factual context” of overcharges for capital goods used to manufacture new products. Id., at 41; see id., at 36, 47-48.
Before turning to this request to limit Hanover Shoe, we consider the substantially contrary position, adopted by our dissenting Brethren, by the United States as amicus curiae, and by lower courts that have allowed offensive use of pass-on, that the unavailability of a pass-on theory to a defendant should not necessarily preclude its use by plaintiffs seeking treble damages against that defendant. Under this view, Hanover Shoe’s rejection of pass-on would continue to apply to defendants unless direct and indirect purchasers were both suing the defendant in the same action; but it would not bar indirect purchasers from attempting to show that the overcharge had been passed on to them. We reject this position for two reasons.
First, allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants. Even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part of an overcharge passed on to it, the direct purchaser would still recover automatically the full amount of the overcharge that the indirect purchaser had shown to be passed on; similarly, following an automatic recovery of the full overcharge by the direct purchaser, the indirect purchaser could sue to recover the same amount. The risk of duplicative recoveries created by unequal application of the Hanover Shoe rule is much more substantial than in the more usual situation where the defendant is sued in two different lawsuits by plaintiffs asserting conflicting claims to the same fund. A one-sided application of Hanover Shoe substantially increases the possibility of inconsistent adjudications — and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability for the defendant — by presuming that one plaintiff (the direct purchaser) is entitled to full recovery while preventing the defendant from using that presumption against the other plaintiff; overlapping recoveries are certain to result from the two lawsuits unless the indirect purchaser is unable to establish any pass-on whatsoever. As in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U. S. 251, 264 (1972), we are unwilling to “open the door to duplicative recoveries” under § 4.
Second, the reasoning of Hanover Shoe cannot justify unequal treatment of plaintiffs and defendants with respect to the permissibility of pass-on arguments. The principal basis for the decision in Hanover Shoe was the Court’s perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing price and output decisions “in the real economic world rather than an economist’s hypothetical model,” 392 U. S., at 493, and of the costs to the judicial system and the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct those decisions in the courtroom. This perception that the attempt to trace the complex economic adjustments to a change in the cost of a particular factor of production would greatly complicate and reduce the effectiveness of already protracted treble-damages proceedings applies with no less force to the assertion of pass-on theories by plaintiffs than it does to the assertion by defendants. However “long and complicated” the proceedings would be when defendants sought to prove pass-on, ibid., they would be equally so when the same evidence was introduced by plaintiffs. Indeed, the evidentiary complexities and uncertainties involved in the defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser are multiplied in the offensive use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant in the chain of distribution. The demonstration of how much of the overcharge was passed on by the first purchaser must be repeated at each point at which the price-fixed goods changed hands before they reached the plaintiff.
It is argued, however, that Hanover Shoe rests on a policy of ensuring that a treble-damages plaintiff is available to deprive antitrust violators of “the fruits of their illegality,” id., at 494, a policy that would be furthered by allowing plaintiffs but not defendants to use pass-on theories. See, e. g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F. 2d 191, 197 (CA9 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 919 (1974); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4-6, 12-13, 17-19. We do not read the Court’s concern in Hanover Shoe for the effectiveness of the treble-damages remedy as countenancing unequal application of the Court’s pass-on rule. Rather, we understand Hanover Shoe as resting on the judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it.
We thus decline to construe § 4 to permit offensive use of a pass-on theory against an alleged violator that could not use the same theory as a defense in an action by direct purchasers. In this case, respondents seek to demonstrate that masonry contractors, who incorporated petitioners’ block into walls and other masonry structures, passed on the alleged overcharge on the block to general contractors, who incorporated the masonry structures into entire buildings, and that the general contractors in turn passed on the overcharge to respondents in the bids submitted for those buildings. We think it clear that under a fair reading of Hanover Shoe petitioners would be barred from asserting this theory in a suit by the masonry contractors.
In Hanover Shoe this Court did not endorse the broad exception that had been recognized in that case by the courts below — permitting -the pass-on defense against middlemen who did not alter the goods they purchased before reselling them. The masonry contractors here could not be included under this exception in any évent, because they transform the concrete block purchased from defendants into the masonry portions of buildings. But this Court in Hanover Shoe indicated the narrow scope it intended for any exception to its rule barring pass-on defenses by citing, as the only example of a situation where the defense might be permitted, a preexisting cost-plus contract. In such a situation, the purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its sales as a result of attempting to pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed to buying a fixed quantity regardless of .price. The effect of the overcharge is essentially determined in advance, without reference to the interaction of supply and demand that complicates the determination in the general case. The competitive bidding process by which the concrete block involved in this case was incorporated into masonry structures and then into entire buildings can hardly be said to circumvent complex market interactions as would a cost-plus contract.
We are left, then, with two. alternatives: either we must overrule Hanover Shoe (or at least narrowly confine it to its facts), or we must preclude respondents from seeking to recover on their pass-on theory. We choose the latter course.
Ill
In considering whether to cut back or abandon the Hanover Shoe rule, we must bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This presumption of adherence to our prior decisions construing legislative enactments would support our reaffirmance of the Hanover Shoe construction of § 4, joined by eight Justices without dissent only a few years ago even if the Court were persuaded that the use of pass-on theories by plaintiffs and defendants in treble-damages actions is more consistent with the policies underlying the treble-damages action than is the Hanover Shoe rule. But we are not So persuaded.
Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge — from direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate- consumers. However appealing this attempt to allocate the overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine their effectiveness.
As we have indicated, potential plaintiffs at each level in the distribution chain are in a position to assert conflicting claims to a common fund — the amount of the alleged overcharge — by contending that the entire overcharge was absorbed at that particular level in the chain. A treble-damages action brought by one of these potential plaintiffs (or one class of potential plaintiffs) to recover the overcharge implicates all three of the interests that have traditionally been thought to support compulsory joinder of absent and potentially adverse claimants: the interest of the defendant in avoiding multiple liability for the fund; the interest of the absent potential plaintiffs in protecting their right to recover for the portion of the fund allocable to them; and the social interest in the efficient administration of justice and the avoidance of multiple litigation. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 327, 330 (1957). See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102, 110-111 (1968); 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1602 (1972).
Opponents of the Hanover Shoe rule have recognized this need for compulsory joinder in suggesting that the defendant could interplead potential claimants under 28 U. S. C. § 1335. But if the defendant, for any of a variety of reasons, does not choose to interplead the absent potential claimants, there would be a strong argument for joining them as “persons needed for just adjudication” under Fed. Rule Civ. Proe. 19 (a). See Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 976, 998 (1975). These absent potential claimants would seem to fit the classic definition of “necessary parties,” for purposes of compulsory joinder, given in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 139 (1855):
“Persons having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which requires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire controversy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights involved in it.”
See Notes of.Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendment to Rule 19, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 7760; 7 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, §§ 1604, 1618 ; 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 19.08 (1974). The plaintiff bringing the treble-damages action would be required, under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (c), to “state the names, if known,” of these absent potential claimants; they should also be notified by some means that the action was pending. Where, as would often be tlm case, the potential claimants at a particular level of distribution are so numerous that joinder of all is impracticable, a representative presumably would have to be found to bring them into the action as a class. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (d); 3A J. Moore, supra, ¶ 19.21.
It is unlikely, of course, that all potential plaintiffs could or would be joined. Some may not wish to assert claims to the overcharge; others may be unmanageable as a class; and still others may be beyond the personal jurisdiction of the court. We can assume that ordinarily the action would still proceed, the absent parties not being deemed “indispensable” under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19 (b). See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, supra. But allowing indirect purchasers to recover using pass-on theories, even under the optimistic assumption that joinder of potential plaintiffs will deal satisfactorily with problems of multiple litigation and liability, would transform treble-damages actions into massive multiparty litigations involving many levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate consumers remote from the defendant. In treble-damages actions by ultimate consumers, the overcharge would have to be apportioned among the relevant wholesalers, retailers, and other middlemen, whose representatives presumably should be joined. And in suits by direct purchasers or middlemen, the interests of ultimate consumers are similarly implicated.
There is thus a strong possibility that indirect purchasers remote from the defendant would be parties to virtually every treble-damages action (apart from those brought against defendants at the retail level). The Court’s concern in Hanover Shoe to avoid weighing down treble-damages actions with the “massive evidence and complicated theories,” 392 U. S., at 493, involved in attempting to establish a pass-on defense against a direct purchaser applies a fortiori to the attempt to trace the effect of the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain from the direct purchaser to the ultimate consumer. We are no more inclined than we were in Hanover Shoe to ignore the burdens that such an attempt would impose on the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Under an array of simplifying assumptions, economic theory provides a precise formula for calculating how the overcharge is distributed between the overcharged party (passer) and its customers (passees). If the market for the passer’s product is perfectly competitive; if the overcharge is imposed equally on all of the passer’s competitors; and if the passer maximizes its profits, then the ratio of the shares of the overcharge borne by passee and passer will equal the ratio of the elasticities of supply and demand in the market for the passer’s product. Even if these assumptions are accepted, there remains a serious problem of measuring the relevant elasticities — the percentage change in the quantities of the passer’s product demanded and supplied in response to a one percent change in price. In view of the difficulties that have been encountered, even in informal adversary proceedings, with the statistical techniques used to estimate these concepts, see Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1442, 1444 (1973), it is unrealistic to think that elasticity studies introduced by expert witnesses will resolve the pass-on issue. We need look no further than our own difficulties with sophisticated statistical methodology that were evident last Term in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), and its companion cases. See id., at 184-185 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); 233-236 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325, 354-355 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
More important, as the Hanover Shoe Court observed, 392 U. S., at 493, “in the real economic world rather than an economist’s hypothetical model,” the latter’s drastic simplifications generally must be abandoned. Overcharged direct purchasers often sell in imperfectly competitive markets. They often compete with other sellers that have not been subject to the overcharge; and their pricing policies often cannot be explained solely by the convenient assumption of profit maximization. As we concluded in Hanover Shoe, 392 U. S., at 492, attention to “sound laws of economics” can only heighten the awareness of the difficulties and uncertainties involved in determining how the relevant market variables would have behaved had there been no overcharge.
It is quite true that these difficulties and uncertainties will be less substantial in some contexts than in others. There have been many proposals to allow pass-on theories in some of these contexts while preserving the Hanover Shoe rule in others. Respondents here argue, not without support from some lower courts, that pass-on theories should be permitted for middlemen that resell goods without altering them and for contractors that add a fixed percentage markup to the cost of their materials in submitting bids. Brief for Respondents 9-30; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36-48. Exceptions to the Hanover Shoe rule have also been urged for other situations in which most of the overcharge is purportedly passed on — for example, where a price-fixed good is a small but vital input into a much larger product, making the demand for the price-fixed good highly inelastic. Compare Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F. R. D. 13 (ED Pa. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F. 2d 1187 (CA3 1971), with In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,680 (Conn.). See Schaefer, supra n. 25, at 918-925.
We reject these attempts to carve out exceptions to the Hanover Shoe rule for particular types of markets. An exception allowing evidence of pass-on by middlemen that resell the goods they purchase of course would be of no avail to respondents, because the contractors that allegedly passed on the overcharge on the block incorporated it into buildings. See supra, at 735. An exception for the contractors here on the ground that they purport to charge a fixed percentage above their costs would substantially erode the Hanover Shoe rule without justification. Firms in many sectors of the economy rely to an extent on cost-based rules of thumb in setting prices. See F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 173-179 (1970). These rules are not adhered to rigidly, however; the extent of the markup (or the allocation of costs) is varied to reflect demand conditions. Id., at 176-177. The intricacies of tracing the effect of an overcharge on the purchaser’s prices, costs, sales, and profits thus are not spared the litigants.
More generally, the process of classifying various market situations according to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and its susceptibility of proof in a judicial forum would entail the very problems that the Hanover Shoe rule was meant to avoid. The litigation over where the line should be drawn in a particular class of cases would inject the same “massive evidence and complicated theories” into treble-damages proceedings, albeit at a somewhat higher level of generality. As we have noted, supra, at 735-736, Hanover Shoe itself implicitly discouraged the creation of exceptions to its rule barring pass-on defenses, and we adhere to the narrow scope of exemption indicated by our decision there.
The concern in Hanover Shoe for the complexity that would be introduced into treble-damages suits if pass-on theories were permitted was closely related to the Court’s concern for the reduction in the effectiveness of those suits if brought by indirect purchasers with a smaller stake in the outcome than that of direct purchasers suing for the full amount of the overcharge. The apportionment of the recovery throughout the distribution chain would increase the overall costs of recovery by injecting extremely complex issues into the case; at the same time such an apportionment would reduce the benefits to each plaintiff by dividing the potential recovery among a much larger group. Added to the uncertainty of how much of an overcharge could be established at trial would be the uncertainty of how that overcharge would be apportioned among the various plaintiffs. This additional uncertainty would further reduce the incentive to sue. The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits of bringing a treble-damages action could seriously impair this important weapon of antitrust enforcement.
We think the longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws, see, e. g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 139 (1968), supports our adherence to the Hanover Shoe rule, under which direct purchasers are not only spared the burden of litigating the intricacies of pass-on but also are permitted to recover the full amount of the overcharge. We recognize that direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers. But on balance, and until there are clear directions from Congress to the contrary, we conclude that the legislative purpose in creating a group of “ 'private attorneys general’ ” to enforce the antitrust laws under § 4, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U. S., at 262, is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may have absorbed a part of it.
It is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a preferred position as private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have been actually injured by antitrust violations. Of course, as Mr. Justice Brennan points out in dissent, “from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as some one redresses the violation.” Post, at 760. But § 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators and depriving them of “the fruits of their illegality,” Hanover Shoe, 392 U. S., at 494; it is also designed to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries. E. g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U. S. 477, 485-486 (1977). Hanover Shoe does further the goal of compensation to the extent that the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the overcharge. In view of the considerations supporting the Hanover Shoe rule, we are unwilling to carry the compensation principle to its logical extreme by attempting to allocate damages among all “those within the defendant’s chain of distribution,” post, at 761, especially because we question the extent to which such an attempt would make individual victims whole for actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall recovery in litigation over pass-on issues. Many of the indirect purchasers barred from asserting pass-on claims under the Hanover Shoe rule have such a small stake in the lawsuit that even if they were to recover as part of a class, only a small fraction would be likely to come forward to collect their damages. And given the difficulty of ascertaining the amount absorbed by any particular indirect purchaser, there is little basis for believing that the amount of the recovery would reflect the actual injury suffered.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. § 15, provides:
“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
The Court cited, as an example of when a pass-on defense might be permitted, the situation where “an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing ‘cost-plus’ contract, thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged . . . .” 392 U. S., at 494. See infra, at 735-736.
The Court explained the economic uncertainties and complexities involved in proving pass-on as follows:
“A wide range of factors influence a company’s pricing policies. Normally the impact of a single change in the relevant conditions cannot be measured after the fact; indeed a businessman may be unable to state whether, had one fact been different (a single supply less expensive, general economic conditions more buoyant, or the labor market tighter, for example), he would have chosen a different price. Equally difficult to determine, in the real economic world rather than an economist’s hypothetical model, is what effect a change in a company’s price will have on its total sales. Finally, costs per unit for a different volume of total sales are hard to estimate. Even if it could be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter declined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued. Since establishing the applicability of the passing-on defense would require a convincing showing of each of these virtually unaseertainable figures, the task would normally prove insurmountable. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that if the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will frequently seek to establish its applicability. Treble-damage actions would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories.” 392 U. S., at 492-493. (Footnote omitted.)
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, provides in relevant part:
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal . . . .”
Private treble-damages actions brought by masonry contractors, general contractors, and private builders were settled, without prejudice to this suit. 536 F. 2d, at 1164.
The responses to petitioners’ interrogatories indicated that only four of the plaintiffs represented by the State purchased concrete block directly from one of the petitioners. 67 F. R. D. 461, 463 (ND Ill. 1975). Only 7% of the 700 public entities named as plaintiffs were apparently able to state the cost of the concrete block used in their building projects. Brief for Petitioners 5 n. **. In the only example cited to us by the parties, the cost of the concrete block was reported as less than one-half of one percent of the total cost of the project. Id., at 21 n. *.
The District Court based its grant of summary judgment against the indirect purchaser plaintiffs not on the ground that this Court’s construction of § 4 in Hanover Shoe barred their attempt to show that the masonry and general contractors passed on the overcharge to them, but rather on the ground that these indirect purchasers lacked standing to sue for an overcharge on one product — concrete block — that was incorporated by the masonry and general contractors into an entirely new and different product — a building. 67 F. R. D., at 467-468. Although the Court of Appeals held that these indirect purchasers did have standing to sue for damages under § 4, it agreed with the District Court’s reading of Hanover Shoe. 536 F. 2d, at 1164-1167. Because we find Hanover Shoe dispositive here, we do not address the standing issue, except to note, as did the Court of Appeals below, 536 F. 2d, at 1166, that the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal overcharge for purposes of § 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under § 4. See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 Yale L. J. 626, 644-645 (1976).
Compare Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F. 2d 1187 (CA3 1971), aff’g Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F. R. D. 13 (ED Pa. 1970), with In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F. 2d 191 (CA9 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 919 (1974); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F. 2d 1079 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U. S. 871 (1971), and the decision below, Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F. 2d 1163.
See infra, at 734-735.
Post, at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting); post, at 765-766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4-6, 15-21; Tr. of Oral Arg. 50-54, 57-60; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F. 2d, at 1086-1088; Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F. R. D. 589, 592-598 (ND Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1973-2 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,680, p. 94,978 (Conn.); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 290-291 (SDNY 1975). See also Brief for State of California as Amicus Curiae 6-12.
In recognition of the need to avoid duplicative recoveries, courts adopting the view that pass-on theories should not be equally available to plaintiffs and defendants have agreed that defendants should be allowed to assert a pass-on defense against a direct purchaser if an indirect purchaser is also attempting to recover on a pass-on theory in the same lawsuit. E. g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F. 2d, at 200-201; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F. 2d, at 1088. See also Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 976, 995-998 (1975); Comment, Mangano and Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 394, 410 (1972); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25. Various procedural devices, such as the Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1407, and statutory interpleader, 28 U. S. C. § 1335, are relied upon to bring indirect and direct purchasers together in one action in order to apportion damages among them and thereby reduce the risk of duplicative recovery. These procedural devices cannot protect against multiple liability where the direct purchasers have already recovered by obtaining a judgment or by settling, as is more likely (and as occurred here, see n. 5, supra); acknowledging that the risk of multiple recoveries is inevitably increased by allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on, e. g., Comment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev., supra, at 994, proponents of this approach ultimately fall back on the argument that it is better for the defendant to pay sixfold or more damages than for an injured party to go uncompensated. E. g., Comment, 72 Colum. L. Rev., supra, at 411; Tr. of Oral Arg. 58 (“a little slopover on the shoulders of the wrongdoers ... is acceptable”). We do not find this risk acceptable.
Moreover, even if ways could be found to bring all potential plaintiffs together in one huge action, the complexity thereby introduced into treble-damages proceedings argues strongly for retaining the Hanover Shoe rule. See Part III, infra.
That this rationale was more important in the decision to bar the pass-on defense than the second reason — the concern that if pass-on defenses were permitted indirect purchasers would lack the incentive to sue and antitrust violators would retain their ill-gotten gains, see supra, at 725-726, is shown by the fact that the Court recognized an exception for pre-existing cost-plus contracts, which “mak[e] it easy to prove that [the direct purchaser] has not been damaged.” 392 U. S., at 494. (Emphasis added.) The amount of the stake that the customers of the direct purchaser have in a lawsuit against the overcharger is not likely to depend on whether they buy under a cost-plus contract or in a competitive market, but the Court allowed a pass-on defense in the former situation because the pre-existing cost-plus contract makes easy the normally complicated task of demonstrating that the overcharge has not been absorbed by the direct purchaser. See Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-on Doctrine, 46 So. Cal. L. Rev. 98, 108 (1972).
Offensive use of pass-on by the last purchaser in the distribution chain is simpler in one respect than defensive use of pass-on against a direct purchaser that sells a product to other customers. In the latter case, even if the defendant shows that as a result of the overcharge the direct purchaser increased its price by the full amount of the overcharge, the direct purchaser may still claim injury from a reduction in the volume of its sales caused by its higher prices. This additional element of injury from reduced volume is not present in the suit by the final purchaser of the overcharged goods, where the issue regarding injury will be whether the defendant’s overcharge caused the plaintiff to pay a higher price for whatever it purchased. But the final purchaser still will have to trace the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain. In our view, the difficulty of reconstructing the pricing decisions of intermediate purchasers at each step in the chain beyond the direct purchaser generally will outweigh any gain in simplicity from not having to litigate the effects of the passed-on overcharge on the direct purchaser’s volume.
We are urged to defer to evidence in the legislative history of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1394r-1396, 15 U. S. C. § 15c et seq. (1976 ed.), that Congress understood Hanover Shoe as applying only to defendants. Post, at 756-758 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brief for 47 States as Amici Curiae L4-15, n. 6; Brief for United States as Amicus Cunae 14-15, and n. 12. The House Report (apparently viewing the issue as one of standing, cf. n. 7, supra) endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s view of “the pro-enforcement thrust of Hanover Shoe” in In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, supra, and criticized lower court decisions barring pass-on arguments by plaintiffs. H. R. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 6 n. 4 (1975). In addition, one of the sponsors of this legislation, Representative Rodino, clearly assumed that the issue of offensive use of pass-on under § 4 would be resolved favorably to plaintiffs by this Court. See 122 Cong. Rec. H10295 (daily ed., Sept. 16, 1976).
Congress made clear, however, that this legislation did not alter the definition of which overcharged persons were injured within the meaning of § 4. It simply created a new procedural device — parens patriae actions by States on behalf of their citizens — to enforce existing rights of recovery under § 4. The House Report quoted above stated that the parens patriae provision “creates no new substantive liability”; the relevant language of the newly enacted § 4C (a) of the Clayton Act tracks that of existing § 4, showing that it was intended only as “an alternative means ... for the vindication of existing substantive claims.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-499, supra, at 9. “The establishment of an alternative remedy does not increase any defendant's liability.” Ibid. Representative Rodino himself acknowledged in the remarks cited above that this legislation did not create a right of recovery for consumers where one did not already exist.
We thus cannot agree with the dissenters that the legislative history of the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act is dispositive as to the interpretation of § 4 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, or the predecessor section of the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890. Post, at 756-758. The eases cited by Mr. Justice Brennan, post, at 765 n. 24, to support his reliance on this legislation all involved specific statutory language that was thought to clarify the meaning of an earlier statute. E. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 380-381 (1969) (language in 1959 amendment to § 315 of the Communications Act approved fairness doctrine adopted by FCC under the “public interest” standard of the original Act). Here, by contrast, Congress borrowed the language of §4 in adding the parens patriae section. The views expressed by particular legislators as to the meaning of that language in §4 “cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress . . . ‘since the statements were [made] after passage of the [Clayton] Act.’ ” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 132 (1974), quoting National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 639 n. 34 (1967).
While we do not lightly disagree with the reading of Hanover Shoe urged by these legislators, we think the construction of § 4 adopted in that decision cannot be applied for the exclusive benefit of plaintiffs. Should Congress disagree with this result, it may, of course, amend the section to change it. But it has not done so in the recent parens patriae legislation.
In a separate trial pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(b), the District Court held that the defendant shoe machinery manufacturer was not permitted to assert a pass-on defense against its customer. 185 F. Supp. 826 (MD Pa.), aff’d, 281 F. 2d 481 (CA3), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 901 (1960). The District Court indicated that pass-on defenses were barred against “consumers” who use the defendant’s product to make their own but not against “middlemen” who simply resell the defendant’s product. 185 F. Supp., at 830-831. Both on interlocutory appeal and after trial on the merits, the Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court’s reasoning. See 392 U. S., at 488 n. 6.
Another situation in which market forces have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer. Cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U. S. 642, 648 (1969); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F. 2d, at 197, 199.
The sole dissenting Justice in Hanover Shoe did not reach th*e pass-on question. 392 U. S., at 513.
In this Part, we assume that use of pass-on will be permitted symmetrically, if at all. This assumption, of course, reduces the substantial risk of multiple liability for defendants that is posed by allowing indirect purchasers to recover for the overcharge passed on to them while at the same time allowing direct purchasers automatically to collect the entire overcharge. See supra, at 730-731. But the possibility of inconsistent judgments obtained by conflicting claimants remains nonetheless. Even this residual possibility justifies bringing potential and actual claimants together in one action if possible.
See n. 11, supra. Interpleader under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 22(1) often would be unavailable because service of process for rule interpleader, as contrasted with statutory interpleader, does not run nationwide. See 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 22.04[2] (1974).
For example, a condition precedent for invoking statutory interpleader is the posting of a bond for the amount in dispute, 28 U. S. C. § 1335 (a) (2), see 3A J. Moore, supra, ¶ 22.10, and a defendant may be unwilling to put up a bond for the huge amounts normally claimed in multiple-party treble-damages suits. For a discussion of other circumstances in which statutory interpleader may be “impractical,” see McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 177, 197-198 (1971).
Rule 19 (a) provides in part:
“A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.”
See the comment of the Advisory Committee on the 1966 Amendment to Rule 19: “In some situations it may be desirable to advise a person who has not been joined of the fact that the action is pending, and in particular cases the court in its discretion may itself convey this information by directing a letter or other informal notice to the absentee.” 28 U. S. C. App., p. 7760.
E. g., Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F. R. D. 13 (ED Pa. 1970), aff’d sub nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F. 2d 1187 (CA3 1971) (suit against manufacturers of plumbing fixtures on behalf of all homeowners in the United States). There often will be more levels of distribution or manufacture between the defendant and the ultimate consumers than the two levels (masonry and general contractors) in this case. For example, in Philadelphia Housing Auth., supra, the plaintiffs included homeowners who had bought used rather than new homes and who therefore had to show that each time their houses changed hands the sellers passed on part of the plumbing manufacturers’ original overcharge. 50 F. R. D., at 19-20, 25-26. Treble-damages suits by ultimate consumers against any of the manufacturers of industrial raw materials or equipment that have been charged in recent Government price-fixing suits would involve not only several levels within a distribution chain, but also several separate chains of distribution; for example, chromite sand is used to make ingots, ingots are used to make steel, and steel is used to make consumer products. Handler & Blechman, supra n. 7, at 640 n. 77, and see id., at 636-637 (citing Justice Department price-fixing suits against defendants far removed from consumers).
E. g., Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F. R. D. 481 (SDNY 1973) (motion to intervene by a putative class of 20 million consumers of bread in treble-damages action against bread manufacturers). Cf. Handler & Blechman, supra, n. 7, at 653 (arguing that the effect of legislation authorizing States to bring treble-damages actions on behalf of their citizens, see n. 14, supra, will be to interject claims on behalf of large classes of consumers into treble-damages suits brought by middlemen). Thus in this ease the plaintiff housing authorities, App. 20, presumably have passed on part of the alleged overcharge to their tenants and subtenants, who would have to be brought into the suit before damages could be fairly apportioned.
An overcharge imposed by an antitrust violator or group of violators on their customers is analytically equivalent to an excise tax imposed on the violator’s product in the amount of the overcharge. The effect of such an overcharge can be calculated using the economic theorems for the incidence of an excise tax. See Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 883, 887, 893 (1975), and sources cited in id., at 887 n. 21.
Thus, in the instant case respondents have offered to prove that general and masonry contractors calculate their bids by adding a percentage markup to the cost of their materials, Brief for Respondents 20-23, rather than by attempting to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue as required by an explicit profit-maximizing strategy.
Mr. Justice Brennan in dissent argues that estimating a passee’s damages requires nothing more than estimating what the passer’s price would have been absent the violation, and suggests that apportioning the overcharge throughout the distribution chain is “no different from and no more complicated” than the initial task of estimating the amount of the overcharge itself. Post, at 758-759, and n. 14. But as the dissent recognizes, post, at 749 n. 3, unless the indirect purchaser is at the end of the distribution chain it can claim damages not only from the portion of the overcharge it absorbs but also from the portion it passes on, which causes a reduction in sales volume under less than perfectly inelastic demand conditions. See n. 13, supra. The difficulties of the task urged upon us by the dissenters cannot be so easily brushed aside.
In any event, as we understand the dissenters’ argument, it reduces to the proposition that because antitrust cases are already complicated there is little harm in making them more so. We disagree.
See, e. g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 745-746 (SDNY 1970), aff’d, 440 F. 2d 1079 (CA2 1971); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F. R. D., at 597.
We note that supporters of the offensive use of pass-on, other than litigants in particular cases, generally have not contended for a halfway rejection of Hanover Shoe that would permit offensive use of pass-on in some types of market situations but not in others. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 57 (United States as amicus curiae); Note, The Defense of “Passing On” in Treble Damage Suits Under the Antitrust Laws, 70 Yale L. J. 469, 476, 478 (1961); commentators cited in n. 11, supra.
See, e. g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F. 2d, at 198; Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1319, 1325 (1973).
Commentators have noted that recoveries in treble-damages actions aggregating large numbers of small claims often have failed to compensate the individuals on behalf of whom the suits have been brought. E. g., Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits — the Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1971); Wheeler, supra, n. 30, at 1339; Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation — Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F. R. D. 199, 206-207 (1976).
The dissenting opinion of Mr Justice Brennan appears to suggest that the 1976 parens patriae legislation, see n. 14, supra, provides an answer to this problem of compensating indirect purchasers for small injuries. Post, at 764 n. 23. Quite to the contrary, the Act “recognizes that rarely, if ever, will all potential claimants actually come forward to secure their share of the recovery,” and that “the undistributed portion of the fund . . . will often be substantial.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-499, p. 16 (1975). The portion of the fund recovered in a parens patriae action that is not used to compensate the actual injuries of antitrust victims is to be used as “a civil penalty . . . deposited with the State as general revenues,” Clayton Act §4E(2), 15 U. S. C. § 15e (2) (1976 ed.), enacted by the 1976 Act, or “for some public purposes benefiting, as closely as possible, the class of injured persons,” such as reducing the price of the overcharged goods in future sales. H. R. Rep. No. 94-499, supra, at 16. That Congress chose to provide such innovative methods of distributing damages awarded in a parens patriae action under newly enacted § 4C of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15c (1976 ed.), does not eliminate the obstacles to compensating indirect purchasers bringing traditional suits under § 4.
The block was sold to various general and special contractors who had successfully bid to construct public buildings. The State was thus an indirect purchaser of the block. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
METROMEDIA, INC., et al. v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.
No. 80-195.
Argued February 25, 1981
Decided July 2, 1981
White, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined. Bren-NAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 521. Stevens, J., while concurring in Parts I-IV of the plurality opinion, filed an opinion dissenting from Parts V-VII of the plurality opinion and from the judgment, post, p. 540. Burger, C. J., post, p. 555, and Rehnquist, J., post, p. 569, filed dissenting opinions.
Floyd Abrams argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Theodore B. Olson, Dean Ring el, and Wayne W. Smith.
C. Alan Sumption argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was John W. Witt
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Nadine Strossen and Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Arthur B. Hanson, Frank M. Northam, and Mitchell W. Dale for the American Newspaper Publishers Association; by Eric M. Rubin for the Outdoor Advertising Association of America; by Ronald A. Zumbrun, Thomas E. Hookano, and Raymond M. Momboisse for the Pacific Legal Foundation; and by Kip Pope for Robert P. Pope et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Moorman, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Edwin S. Kneedler, F. Raid Benfield, and Edward J. Shawaker; for the State of Hawaii et al. by Wayne Minami, Attorney General of Hawaii, and Laurence Lau, Deputy Attorney General, Richard S. Cohen, Attorney General of Maine, and Cabanne Howard, Assistant Attorney General, and M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General of Vermont, and Benson D. Scotch, Assistant Attorney General; for the City of Alameda et al. by Carter J. Stroud, David E. Schricker, and John Powers; for the City and County of San Francisco by George Agnost, Burk E. Delventhal, Diane L. Hermann, and Alice Suet Yee Barkley; and for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by Aaron A. Wilson, J. LaMar Shelley, Benjamin L. Brown, John Dekker, James B. Brennan, Henry W. Underhill, Jr., William R. Quinlan, George F. Knox, Jr., Max P. Zall, Allen G. Schwartz, Lee E. Holt, Burt Pines, Walter M. Powell, Roger F. Cutler, Conrad B. Mattox, Jr., Charles S. Rhyne, and William S. Rhyne.
Justice White
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall, and Justice Powell joined.
This case involves the validity of an ordinance of the city of San Diego, Cal., imposing substantial prohibitions on the erection of outdoor advertising displays within the city.
I
Stating that its purpose was “to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by distracting sign displays” and “to preserve and improve the appearance of the City,” San Diego enacted an ordinance to prohibit “outdoor advertising display signs.” The California Supreme Court subsequently defined the term “advertising display sign” as “a rigidly assembled sign, display, or device permanently affixed to the ground or permanently attached to a building or other inherently permanent structure constituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the public.” 26 Cal. 3d 848, 856, n. 2, 610 P. 2d 407, 410, n. 2 (1980). “Advertising displays signs” include any sign that “directs attention to a product, service or activity, event, person, institution or business.”
The ordinance provides two kinds of exceptions to the general prohibition: onsite signs and signs falling within 12 specified categories. Onsite signs are defined as those
“designating the name of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed.”
The specific categories exempted from the prohibition include: government signs; signs located at public bus stops; signs manufactured, transported, or stored within the city, if not used for advertising purposes; commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs within shopping malls; for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles; signs depicting time, temperature, and news; approved temporary, off-premises, subdivision directional signs; and “[t]emporary political campaign signs.” Under this scheme, onsite commercial advertising is permitted, but other commercial advertising and noncommercial communications using fixed-structure signs are everywhere forbidden unless permitted by one of the specified exceptions.
Appellants are companies that were engaged in the outdoor advertising business in San Diego at the time the ordinance was passed. Each owns a substantial number of outdoor advertising displays (approximately 500 to 800) within the city. These signs are all located in areas zoned for commercial and industrial purposes, most of them on property leased by the owners to appellants for the purpose of maintaining billboards. Each sign has a remaining useful income-producing life of over 25 years, and each sign has a fair market value of between $2,500 and $25,000. Space on the signs was made available to “all comers” and the copy on each sign changed regularly, usually monthly. The nature of the outdoor advertising business was described by the parties as follows:
“Outdoor advertising is customarily purchased on the basis of a presentation or campaign requiring multiple exposure. Usually a large number of signs in a variety of locations are utilized to communicate a particular advertiser’s message. An advertiser will generally purchase a ‘showing’ which would involve the utilization of a specific number of signs advertising the same message in a variety of locations throughout a metropolitan area.”
Although the purchasers of advertising space on appellants’ signs usually seek to convey a commercial message, their billboards have also been used to convey a broad range of noncommercial political and social messages.
Appellants brought suit in state court to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. After extensive discovery, the parties filed a stipulation of facts, including:
“2. If enforced as written, Ordinance No. 10795 will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in the City of San Diego.
“28. Outdoor advertising increases the sales of products and produces numerous direct and indirect benefits to the public. Valuable commercial, political and social information is communicated to the public through the use of outdoor advertising. Many businesses and politicians and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive.” Joint Stipulation of Facts Nos. 2, 28, App. 42a, 48a.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police power and an abridgment of appellants’ First Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the first ground alone and did not reach the First Amendment argument. Without questioning any of the stipulated facts, including the fact that enforcement of the ordinance would “eliminate the outdoor advertising business in the City of San Diego,” the California Supreme Court reversed. It held that the two purposes of the ordinance were within the city’s legitimate interests and that the ordinance was “a proper application of municipal authority over zoning and land use for the purpose of promoting the public safety and welfare.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 858, 610 P. 2d, at 411 (footnote omitted). The court rejected appellants’ argument that the ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amendment. It relied on certain summary actions of this Court, dismissing for want of a substantial federal question appeals from several state-court decisions sustaining governmental restrictions on outdoor sign displays. Appellants sought review in this Court, arguing that the ordinance was facially invalid on First Amendment grounds and that the city’s threatened destruction of the outdoor advertising business was prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 449 U. S. 897.
II
Early cases in this Court sustaining regulation of and prohibitions aimed at billboards did not involve First Amendment considerations. See Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105 (1932); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526 (1917). Since those decisions, we have not given plenary consideration to cases involving First Amendment challenges to statutes or ordinances limiting the use of billboards, preferring on several occasions summarily to affirm decisions sustaining state or local legislation directed at billboards.
Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U. S. 808 (1978), involved a municipal ordinance that distinguished between offsite and onsite billboard advertising prohibiting the former and permitting the latter. We summarily dismissed as not presenting a substantial federal question an appeal from a judgment sustaining the ordinance, thereby rejecting the submission, repeated in this case, that prohibiting offsite commercial advertising violates the First Amendment. The definition of “billboard,” however, was considerably narrower in Suffolk than it is here: “A sign which directs attention to a business, commodity, service, entertainment, or attraction sold, offered or existing elsewhere than upon the same lot where such sign is displayed.” This definition did not sweep within its scope the broad range of noncommercial speech admittedly prohibited by the San Diego ordinance. Furthermore, the Southampton, N. Y., ordinance, unlike that in San Diego, contained a provision permitting the establishment of public information centers in which approved directional signs for businesses could be located. This Court has repeatedly stated that although summary dispositions are decisions on the merits, the decisions extend only to “the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977); see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 345, n. 14 (1975); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974). Insofar as the San Diego ordinance is challenged on the ground that it prohibits noncommercial speech, the Suffolk case does not directly support the decision below.
The Court has summarily disposed of appeals from state-court decisions upholding state restrictions on billboards on several other occasions. Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U. S. 316 (1969), and Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U. S. 901 (1979), both involved the facial validity of state billboard prohibitions that extended only to certain designated roadways or to areas zoned for certain uses. The statutes in both instances distinguished between onsite commercial billboards and offsite billboards within the protected areas. Our most recent summary action was Lotze v. Washington, 444 U. S. 921 (1979), which involved an “as applied” challenge to a Washington prohibition on offsite signs. In that case, appellants erected, on their own property, billboards expressing their political and social views. Although billboards conveying information relating to the commercial use of the property would have been permitted, appellants’ billboards were prohibited, and the state courts ordered their removal. We dismissed as not raising a substantial federal question an appeal from a judgment rejecting the First Amendment challenge to the statute.
Insofar as our holdings were pertinent, the California Supreme Court was quite right in relying on our summary decisions as authority for sustaining the San Diego ordinance against First Amendment attack. Hicks v. Miranda, supra. As we have pointed out, however, summary actions do not have the same authority in this Court as do decisions rendered after plenary consideration, Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 180-181 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 671; see also Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U. S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring). They do not present the same justification for declining to reconsider a prior decision as do decisions rendered after argument and with full opinion. “It is not at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to give full consideration to a question that has been the subject of previous summary action.” Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 477, n. 20 (1979); see also Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. 68, 74-75 (1976); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 14 (1976). Probable jurisdiction having been noted to consider the constitutionality of the San Diego ordinance, we proceed to do so.
Ill
This Court has often faced the problem of applying the broad principles of the First Amendment to unique forums of expression. See, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530 (1980) (billing envelope inserts); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980) (picketing in residential areas); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980) (door-to-door and on-street solicitation); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) (Army bases); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205 (1975) (outdoor movie theaters); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (advertising space within city-owned transit system). Even a cursory reading of these opinions reveals that at times First Amendment values must yield to other societal interests. These cases support the cogency of Justice Jackson’s remark in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 97 (1949): Each method of communicating ideas is “a law unto itself” and that law must reflect the “differing natures, values, abuses and dangers” of each method. We deal here with the law of billboards.
Billboards are a well-established medium of communication, used to convey a broad range of different kinds of messages. As Justice Clark noted in his dissent below:
“The outdoor sign or symbol is a venerable medium for expressing political, social and commercial ideas. From the poster or ‘broadside’ to the billboard, outdoor signs have played a prominent role throughout American history, rallying support for political and social causes.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 888, 610 P. 2d, at 430-431.
The record in this case indicates that besides the typical commercial uses, San Diego billboards have been used
“to publicize the 'City in motion’ campaign of the City of San Diego, to communicate messages from candidates for municipal, state and national offices, including candidates for judicial office, to propose marriage, to seek employment, to encourage the use of seat belts, to denounce the United Nations, to seek support for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, to promote the United Crusade and a variety of other charitable and socially-related endeavors and to provide directions to the traveling public.”
But whatever its communicative function, the billboard remains a “large, immobile, and permanent structure which like other structures is subject to . . . regulation.” Id., at 870, 610 P. 2d, at 419. Moreover, because it is designed to stand out and apart from its surroundings, the billboard creates a unique set of problems for land-use planning and development.
Billboards, then, like other media of communication, combine communicative and noncommunicative aspects. As with other media, the government has legitimate interests in controlling the noncommunicative aspects of the medium, Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, but the First and Fourteenth Amendments foreclose a similar interest in controlling the communicative aspects. Because regulation of the noncom-municative aspects of a medium often impinges to some degree on the communicative aspects, it has been necessary for the courts to reconcile the government’s regulatory interests with the individual’s right to expression. “'[A] court may not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation.’ ” Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 91 (1977), quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 826 (1975). Performance of this task requires a particularized inquiry into the nature of the conflicting interests at stake here, beginning with a precise appraisal of the character of the ordinance as it affects communication.
As construed by the California Supreme Court, the ordinance restricts the use of certain kinds of outdoor signs. That restriction is defined in two ways: first, by reference to the structural characteristics of the sign; second, by reference to the content, or message, of the sign. Thus, the regulation only applies to a “permanent structure constituting, or used for the display of, a commercial or other advertisement to the public.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 856, n. 2, 610 P. 2d, at 410, n. 2. Within that class, the only permitted signs are those (1) identifying the premises on which the sign is located, or its owner or occupant, or advertising the goods produced or services rendered on such property and (2) those within one of the specified exemptions to the general prohibition, such as temporary political campaign signs. To determine if any billboard is prohibited by the ordinance, one must determine how it is constructed, where it is located, and what message it carries.
Thus, under the ordinance (1) a sign advertising goods or services available on the property where the sign is located is allowed; (2) a sign on a building or other property advertising goods or services produced or offered elsewhere is barred; (3) noncommercial advertising, unless within one of the specific exceptions, is everywhere prohibited. The occupant of property may advertise his own goods or services; he may not advertise the goods or services of others, nor may he display most noncommercial messages.
IV
Appellants’ principal submission is that enforcement of the ordinance will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in San Diego and that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the elimination of this medium of communication. Appellants contend that the city may bar neither all offsite commercial signs nor all noncommercial advertisements and that even if it may bar the former, it may not bar the latter. Appellants may raise both arguments in their own right because, although the bulk of their business consists of offsite signs carrying commercial advertisements, their billboards also convey a substantial amount of noncommercial advertising. Because our cases have consistently distinguished between the constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech, in evaluating appellants’ contention we consider separately the effect of the ordinance on commercial and noncommercial speech.
The extension of First Amendment protections to purely commercial speech is a relatively recent development in First Amendment jurisprudence. Prior to 1975, purely commercial advertisements of services or goods for sale were considered to be outside the protection of the First Amendment. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). That construction of the First Amendment was severely cut back in Bigelow v. Virginia, supra. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we plainly held that speech proposing no more than a commercial transaction enjoys a substantial degree of First Amendment protection: A State may not completely suppress the dissemination of truthful information about an entirely lawful activity merely because it is fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. That decision, however, did not equate commercial and noncommercial speech for First Amendment purposes; indeed, it expressly indicated the contrary. See id., at 770-773, and n. 24. See also id., at 779-781 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Although the protection extended to commercial speech has continued to develop, commercial and noncommercial communications, in the context of the First Amendment, have been treated differently. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), held that advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression and that the specific advertisement at issue there was constitutionally protected. However, we continued to observe the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, indicating that the former could be forbidden and regulated in situations where the latter could not be. Id., at 379-381, 383-384. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978), the Court refused to invalidate on First Amendment grounds a lawyer’s suspension from practice for face-to-face solicitation of business for pecuniary gain. In the course of doing so, we again recognized the common-sense and legal distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction and other varieties of speech:
“To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” Id., at 456.
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 69, n. 32 (1976), Justice Stevens stated that the difference between commercial price and product advertising and ideological communication permits regulation of the former “that the First Amendment would not tolerate with respect to the latter.” See also Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S., at 91-92, and Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 8-10 (1979).
Finally, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 567 (1980), we held: “The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available for a particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.” Id., at 562-563 (citation omitted). We then adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of government restrictions on commercial speech as distinguished from more fully protected speech. (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. Id., at 563-566.
Appellants agree that the proper approach to be taken in determining the validity of the restrictions on commercial speech is that which was articulated in Central Hudson, but assert that the San Diego ordinance fails that test. We do not agree.
There can be little controversy over the application of the first, second, and fourth criteria. There is no suggestion that the commercial advertising at issue here involves unlawful activity or is misleading. Nor can there be substantial doubt that the twin goals that the ordinance seeks to further — traffic safety and the appearance of the city — are substantial governmental goals. It is far too late to contend otherwise with respect to either traffic safety, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949). or esthetics, see Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954). Similarly, we reject appellants’ claim that the ordinance is broader than necessary and, therefore, fails the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. If the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them. The city has gone no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends. Indeed, it has stopped short of fully accomplishing its ends: It has not prohibited all billboards, but allows onsite advertising and some other specifically exempted signs.
The more serious question, then, concerns the third of the Central Hudson criteria: Does the ordinance “directly advance” governmental interests in traffic safety and in the appearance of the city? It is asserted that the record is inadequate to show any connection between billboards and traffic safety. The California Supreme Court noted the meager record on this point but held “as a matter of law that an ordinance which eliminates billboards designed to be viewed from streets and highways reasonably relates to traffic safety.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 859, 610 P. 2d, at 412. Noting that “[b]illboards are intended to, and undoubtedly do, divert a driver’s attention from the roadway,” ibid., and that whether the “distracting effect contributes to traffic accidents invokes an issue of continuing controversy,” ibid., the California Supreme Court agreed with many other courts that a legislative judgment that billboards are traffic hazards is not manifestly unreasonable and should not be set aside. We likewise hesitate to disagree with the accumulated, commonsense judgments of local lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and substantial hazards to traffic safety. There is nothing here to suggest that these judgments are unreasonable. As we said in a different context, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, supra, at 109:
“We would be trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all municipal problems if we held that this regulation had no relation to the traffic problem of New York City. It is the judgment of the local authorities that it does have such a relation. And nothing has been advanced which shows that to be palpably false.”
We reach a similar result with respect to the second asserted justification for the ordinance — advancement of the city’s esthetic interests. It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an “esthetic harm.” San Diego, like many States and other municipalities, has chosen to minimize the presence of such structures. Such esthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, defying objective evaluation, and for that reason must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are only a public rationalization of an impermissible purpose. But there is no claim in this case that San Diego has as an ulterior motive the suppression of speech, and the judgment involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself.
It is nevertheless argued that the city denigrates its interest in traffic safety and beauty and defeats its own case by permitting onsite advertising and other specified signs. Appellants question whether the distinction between onsite and offsite advertising on the same property is justifiable in terms of either esthetics or traffic safety. The ordinance permits the occupant of property to use billboards located on that property to advertise goods and services offered at that location; identical billboards, equally distracting and unattractive, that advertise goods or services available elsewhere are prohibited even if permitting the latter would not multiply the number of billboards. Despite the apparent incongruity, this argument has been rejected, at least implicitly, in all of the cases sustaining the distinction between offsite and onsite commercial advertising. We agree with those cases and with our own decisions in Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U. S. 808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U. S. 316 (1969); and Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U. S. 901 (1979).
In the first place, whether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is under-inclusive because it permits onsite advertising. Second, the city may believe that offsite advertising, with its periodically changing content, presents a more acute problem than does onsite advertising. See Railway Express, 336 U. S., at 110. Third, San Diego has obviously chosen to value one kind of commercial speech' — onsite advertising — more than another kind of commercial speech — offsite advertising. The ordinance reflects a decision by the city that the former interest, but not the latter, is stronger than the city’s interests in traffic safety and esthetics. The city has decided that in a limited instance — onsite commercial advertising — its interests should yield. We do not reject that judgment. As we see it, the city could reasonably conclude that a commercial enterprise — as well as the interested public — has a stronger interest in identifying its place of business and advertising the products or services available there than it has in using or leasing its available space for the purpose of advertising commercial enterprises located elsewhere. See Railway Express, supra, at 116 (Jackson, J., concurring); Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 289 U. S. 92, 97 (1933). It does not follow from the fact that the city has concluded that some commercial interests outweigh its municipal interests in this context that it must give similar weight to all other commercial advertising. Thus, offsite commercial billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are permitted.
The constitutional problem in this area requires resolution of the conflict between the city’s land-use interests and the commercial interests of those seeking to purvey goods and services within the city. In light of the above analysis, we cannot conclude that the city has drawn an ordinance broader than is necessary to meet its interests, or that it fails directly to advance substantial government interests. In sum, insofar as it regulates commercial speech the San Diego ordinance meets the constitutional requirements of Central Hudson, supra.
V
It does not follow, however, that San Diego’s general ban on signs carrying noncommercial advertising is also valid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The fact that the city may value commercial messages relating to onsite goods and services more than it values commercial communications relating to offsite goods and services does not justify prohibiting an occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of others.
As indicated above, our recent commercial speech cases have consistently accorded noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than commercial speech. San Diego effectively inverts this judgment, by affording a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech. There is a broad exception for onsite commercial advertisements, but there is no similar exception for noncommercial speech. The use of onsite billboards to carry commercial messages related to the commercial use of the premises is freely permitted, but the use of otherwise identical billboards to carry noncommercial messages is generally prohibited. The city does not explain how or why noncommercial billboards located in places where commercial billboards are permitted would be more threatening to safe driving or would detract more from the beauty of the city. Insofar as the city tolerates billboards at all, it'cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages; the city may not conclude that the communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of greater value than the communication of noncommercial messages.
Furthermore, the ordinance contains exceptions that permit various kinds of noncommercial signs, whether on property where goods and services are offered or not, that would otherwise be within the general ban. A fixed sign may be used to identify any piece of property and its owner. Any piece of property may carry or display religious symbols, commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations, signs carrying news items or telling the time or temperature, signs erected in discharge of any governmental function, or temporary political campaign signs. No other noncommercial or ideological signs meeting the structural definition are permitted, regardless of their effect on traffic safety or esthetics.
Although the city may distinguish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S., at 462; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). With respect to noncommercial speech, the city may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse: “To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth.” Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U. S., at 538. Because some noncommercial messages may be conveyed on billboards throughout the commercial and industrial zones, San Diego must similarly allow billboards conveying other noncommercial messages throughout those zones.
Finally, we reject appellees’ suggestion that the ordinance may be appropriately characterized as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” restriction. The ordinance does not generally ban billboard advertising as an unacceptable “manner” of communicating information or ideas; rather, it permits various kinds of signs. Signs that are banned are banned everywhere and at all times. We have observed that time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if “they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . serve a significant governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S., at 771. Here, it cannot be assumed that “alternative channels” are available, for the parties stipulated to just the opposite: “Many businesses and politicians and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive.” A similar argument was made with respect to a prohibition on real estate “For Sale” signs in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 (1977), and what we said there is equally applicable here:
“Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a number of different alternatives, in practice [certain products are] not marketed through leaflets, sound trucks, demonstrations, or the like. The options to which sellers realistically are relegated . . . involve more cost and less autonomy then . . . signs [,] . . . are less likely to reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information [,] . . . and may be less effective media for communicating the message that is conveyed by a . . . sign .... The alternatives, then, are far from satisfactory.” Id., at 93.
It is apparent as well that the ordinance distinguishes in several ways between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to their content. Whether or not these distinctions are themselves constitutional, they take the regulation out of the domain of time, place, and manner restrictions. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra.
VI
Despite the rhetorical hyperbole of The Chief Justice’s dissent, there is a considerable amount of common ground between the approach taken in this opinion and that suggested by his dissent. Both recognize that each medium of communication creates a unique set of First Amendment problems, both recognize that the city has a legitimate interest in regulating the noncommunicative aspects of a medium of expression, and both recognize that the proper judicial role is to conduct “ 'a careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression.’ ” Post, at 556. Our principal difference with his dissent is that it gives so little weight to the latter half of this inquiry.
The Chief Justice writes that
“[ajlthough we must ensure that any regulation of speech ‘further [s] a sufficiently substantial government interest’ . . . given a reasonable approach to a perceived problem, this Court’s duty ... is to determine whether the legislative approach is essentially neutral to the messages conveyed and leaves open other adequate means of conveying those messages.” Post, at 561.
Despite his belief that this is “the essence of . . . democracy,” this has never been the approach of this Court when a legislative judgment is challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights.
By “essentially neutral,” The Chiee Justice may mean either or both of two things. He may mean that government restrictions on protected speech are permissible so long as the government does not favor one side over another on a subject of public controversy. This concept of neutrality was specifically rejected by the Court last Term in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S., at 537. There, the Court dismissed the Commission’s contention that a prohibition of all discussion, regardless of the viewpoint expressed, on controversial issues of public policy does not unconstitutionally suppress freedom of speech. “The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.” Ibid. On the other hand, The Chief Justice may mean by neutrality that government restrictions on speech cannot favor certain communicative contents over others. As a general rule, this, of course, is correct, see, e. g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980). The general rule, in fact, is applicable to the facts of this case: San Diego has chosen to favor certain kinds of messages — such as onsite commercial advertising, and temporary political campaign advertisements — over others. Except to imply that the favored categories are for some reason de minimis in a constitutional sense, his dissent fails to explain why San Diego should not be held to have violated this concept of First Amendment neutrality.
Taken literally The Chief Justice’s approach would require reversal of the many cases striking down antisolicitation statutes on First Amendment grounds: In each of them the city would argue that preventing distribution of leaflets rationally furthered the city’s interest in limiting litter, applied to all kinds of leaflets and hence did not violate the principle of government neutrality, and left open alternative means of communication. See, e. g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939). Despite the dissent’s assertion to the contrary, however, it has been this Court’s consistent position that democracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgments in this area:
“Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.” Id., at 161.
Because The Chief Justice misconceives the nature of the judicial function in this situation, he misunderstands the significance of the city’s extensive exceptions to its billboard prohibition. He characterizes these exceptions as “essentially negligible,” post, at 562, and then opines that it borders on the frivolous to suggest that in “allowing such signs but forbidding noncommercial billboards, the city has infringed freedom of speech.” Post, at 565. That, of course, is not the nature of this argument.
There can be no question that a prohibition on the erection of billboards infringes freedom of speech: The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition does. But the exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in assessing the strength of the city’s interest in prohibiting billboards. We conclude that by allowing commercial establishments to use billboards to advertise the products and services they offer, the city necessarily has conceded that some communicative interests, e. g., onsite commercial advertising, are stronger than its competing interests in esthetics and traffic safety. It has nevertheless banned all noncommercial signs except those specifically excepted.
The Chief Justice agrees that in allowing the exceptions to the rule the city has balanced the competing interests, but he argues that we transgress the judicial role by independently reviewing the relative values the city has assigned to various communicative interests. He seems to argue that although the Constitution affords a greater degree of protection to noncommercial than to commercial speech, a legislature need not make the same choices. Post, at 567. This position makes little sense even abstractly, and it surely is not consistent with our cases or with The Chief Justice’s own argument that statutes challenged on First Amendment grounds must be evaluated in light of the unique facts and circumstances of the case. Governmental interests are only revealed and given concrete force by the steps taken to meet those interests. If the city has concluded that its official interests are not as strong as private interests in commercial communications, may it nevertheless claim that those same official interests outweigh private interests in noncommercial communications? Our answer, which is consistent with our cases, is in the negative.
VII
Because the San Diego ordinance reaches too far into the realm of protected speech, we conclude that it is unconstitutional on its face. The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court.
It is so ordered.
San Diego Ordinance No. 10795 (New Series), enacted March 14, 1972. The general prohibition of the ordinance reads as follows:
“B. OFF-PREMISE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING DISPLAY SIGNS PROHIBITED
“Only those outdoor advertising display signs, hereinafter referred to as signs in this Division, which are either signs designating the name of the owner or occupant of the premises upon which such signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs are placed shall be permitted. The following signs shall be prohibited:
“1. Any sign identifying a use, facility or service which is not located on the premises.
“2. Any sign identifying a product which is not produced, sold or manufactured on the premises.
“3. Any sign which advertises or otherwise directs attention to a product, service or activity, event, person, institution or business which may or may not be identified by a brand name and which occurs or is generally conducted, sold, manufactured, produced or offered elsewhere than on the premises where such sign is located.”
The California Supreme Court noted that the ordinance as written might be interpreted “to apply to signs of a character very different from commercial billboards — for example, to a picket sign announcing a labor dispute or a small sign placed in one’s front yard proclaiming a political or religious message.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 856, n. 2, 610 P. 2d, at 410, n. 2. For this reason the court adopted the narrowing definition (quoted in the text). That definition, however, focused on the structure not the content of the billboard: It excluded “picket signs” but not billboards used to convey a noncommercial message. Cf. State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Pile, 603 P. 2d 337 (1979) (Oklahoma Supreme Court construed a state statute prohibiting outdoor advertising signs as not covering noncommercial speech in order to avoid constitutional problems). The court explicitly recognized this continuing burden on noncommercial speech: “The relatively few non-commercial advertisers who would be restricted by the San Diego ordinance . . . possess a great variety of alternative means of communication.” 26 Cal. 3d, at 869, 610 P. 2d, at 418-419. Furthermore, the city continues to contend that the ordinance prohibits the use of billboards to convey a noncommercial message, unless that message falls within one of the specified exemptions contained in the ordinance. Brief for Appellees 6.
Section 101.0700 (F) provides as follows:
“The following types of signs shall be exempt from the provisions of these regulations:
“1. Any sign erected and maintained pursuant to and in discharge of any governmental function or required by any law, ordinance or governmental regulation.
“2. Bench signs located at designated public transit bus stops; provided, however, that such signs shall have any necessary permits required by Sections 62.0501 and 62.0502 of this Code.
“3. Signs being manufactured, transported and/or stored within the City limits of the City of San Diego shall be exempt; provided, however, that such signs are not used, in any manner or form, for purposes of advertising at the place or places of manufacture or storage.
“4. Commemorative plaques of recognized historical societies and organizations.
“5. Religious symbols^ legal holiday decorations and identification emblems of religious orders or historical societies.
“6. Signs located within malls, courts, arcades, porches, patios and similar areas where such signs are not visible from any point on the boundary of the premises.
“7. Signs designating the premises for sale, rent or lease; provided, however, that any such sign shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which it is located.
“8. Public service signs limited to the depiction of time, temperature or news; provided, however, that any such sign shall conform to all regulations of the particular zone in which it is located.
“9. Signs on vehicles regulated by the City that provide public transportation including, but not limited to, buses and taxicabs.
“10. Signs on licensed commercial vehicles, including trailers; provided, however, that such vehicles shall not be utilized as parked or stationary outdoor display signs.
“11. Temporary off-premise subdivision directional signs if permitted by a conditional use permit granted by the Zoning Administrator.
“12. Temporary political campaign signs, including their supporting structures, which are erected or maintained for no longer than 90 days and which are removed within 10 days after election to which they pertain.”
This account of appellants’ businesses is taken from the joint stipulation of facts entered into by the parties and filed with their cross-motions for summary judgment in the California Superior Court. See Joint Stipulation of Facts Nos. 12-20, App. 44a-45a.
Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 24, App. 47a.
Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U. S. 808 (1978); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 440 U. S. 901 (1979); Lotze v. Washington, 444 U. S. 921 (1979).
These cases primarily involved due process and equal protection challenges to municipal regulations directed at billboards. The plaintiffs claimed that their method of advertising was improperly distinguished from other methods that were not similarly regulated and that the ordinances resulted in takings of property without due process. The Court rejected these claims, holding that the regulation of billboards fell within the legitimate police powers of local government.
The uniqueness of each medium of expression has been a frequent refrain: See, e. g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 557 (1975) (“Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems”); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 748 (1978) (“We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952) (“Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems”).
For a description of the history of the use of outdoor advertising in this country and the use of billboards within that history, see F. Presbrey, The History and Development of Advertising 497-511 (1929); Toeker, Standardized Outdoor Advertising: History, Economics and Self-Regulation, in Outdoor Advertising: History and Regulation 11, 29 (J. Houck ed. 1969).
Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 23, App. 46a-47a.
The California Supreme Court suggested that appellants, owners of billboard businesses, did not have standing to raise the argument that billboards may, for some individuals or groups, be the only affordable method of communicating to a large audience. 26 Cal. 3d, at 869, n. 14, 610 P. 2d, at 419, n. 14. In so holding, the California court seems to have confused the category of “commercial speech” with the category of individuals who have a “commercial interest” in protected speech. We have held that the overbreadth doctrine, under which a party whose own activities are unprotected may challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of parties not before the court, wiE not be applied in cases involving “commercial speech.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 381 (1977). However, we have never held that one with a “commercial interest” in speech also cannot chaEenge the facial validity of a statute on the grounds of its substantial infringement of the First Amendment interests of others. Were it otherwise, newspapers, radio stations, movie theaters and producers — often those with the highest interest and the largest stake in a First Amendment controversy— would not be able to challenge government limitations on speech as substantially overbroad. As the opinion in Bates observed, id., at 363:
“[O]ur cases long have protected speech even though it is in the form of a paid advertisement, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); in a form that is sold for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); or in the form of a solicitation to pay or contribute money, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). If commercial speech is to be distinguished, it 'must be distinguished by its content.’ 425 U. S., at 761.”
See also Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 761 (1976).
Justice Stewart's comments in Virginia Pharmacy Board are worth quoting here:
“The Court’s determination that commercial advertising of the kind at issue here is not ‘wholly outside the protection of’ the First Amendment indicates by its very phrasing that there are important differences between commercial price and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on the other. Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of thought— thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man. Although such expression may convey factual information relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected by the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual representations and even if it includes inaccurate assertions of fact. . . .
“Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological expression because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services. The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of the 'information of potential interest and value conveyed, rather than because of any direct contribution to the interchange of ideas.” Id., at 779-780 (references and footnotes omitted).
The California Supreme Court had held in Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909), that a municipal ordinance prohibiting all advertising billboards purely for esthetic reasons was an unconstitutional exercise of municipal police power. The court specifically overruled Varney in upholding the San Diego ordinance at issue here. California’s current position is in accord with that of most other jurisdictions. See n. 15, infra.
See E. B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F. 2d 1141, 1152 (CA5 1970); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 420-421, 439 P. 2d 248, 258 (1968); New York State Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 10 N. Y. 2d 151, 155-156, 176 N. E. 2d 566, 568 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 438, 200 N. E. 2d 328, 337 (1964); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N. W. 2d 741, 757 (N. D. 1978); Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S. W. 2d 935, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 59, 593 P. 2d 811, 814 (1979); Inhabitants, Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A. 2d 419, 422 (Me. 1975); Stuckey’s Stores, Inc. v. O’Cheskey, 93 N. M. 312, 321, 600 P. 2d 258, 267 (1979); In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 N. H. 268, 270, 169 A. 2d 762, 764 (1961); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 180-181, 193 N. E. 799, 813-814 (1935). But see John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F. 2d 6, 11 (CA1 1980); State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Pile, 603 P. 2d, at 343; Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Des Plaines, 26 Ill. App. 3d 942, 946, 326 N. E. 2d 59, 62 (1975).
See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, supra, at 11-12; E. B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, supra, at 1152; Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, supra, at 757; Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, supra, at 422-423, 439 P. 2d, at 259; Stuckey’s Stores, Inc. v. O’Cheskey, supra, at 321, 600 P. 2d, at 267; Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 43 N. Y. 2d 483, 489, 373 N. E. 2d 263, 265 (1977); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 219, 339 N. E. 2d 709, 717 (1975); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N. Y. 2d 263, 269, 225 N. E. 2d 749, 753 (1967); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Haw. 33, 35-36, 429 P. 2d 825, 827 (1967); United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N. J. 1, 6, 198 A. 2d 447, 449 (1964); In re Opinion of the Justices, supra, at 270-271, 169 A. 2d, at 764. But see State ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Pile, supra, at 342; Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 614-615 (Fla. 1960).
The federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028, as amended, 23 U. S. C. § 131 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), requires that States eliminate billboards from areas adjacent to certain highways constructed with federal funds. The Federal Government also prohibits billboards on federal lands. 43 CFR §2921.0-6 (a) (1980). Three States have enacted statewide bans on billboards. Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 1901 et seq. (1980); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 264-71 et seq., § 445-111 et seq. (1976); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 10, § 488 et seq. (1973).
See Howard v. State Department of Highways of Colorado, 478 F. 2d 581 (CA10 1973); John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, supra; John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., supra; Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 668, 370 A. 2d 1127, 1132 (1977); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Berle, 43 N. Y. 2d 468, 373 N. E. 2d 255 (1977); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, supra; Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, supra; Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, supra; United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N. J. 144, 93 A. 2d 362 (1952) (Brennan, J.); United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, supra; Stuckey’s Stores, Inc. v. O’Cheskey, supra.
In John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F. 2d 6 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered a statewide limitation on billboards, which similarly afforded a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial messages. That court took a position very similar to the one that we take today: it sustained the regulation insofar as it restricted commercial advertising, but held unconstitutional its more intrusive restrictions on noncommercial speech. The court stated: “The law thus impacts more heavily on ideological than on commercial speech — a peculiar inversion of First Amendment values. The statute . . . provides greater restrictions — and fewer alternatives, the other side of the coin— for ideological than for commercial speech .... In short, the statute’s impositions are both legally and practically the most burdensome on ideological speech, where they should be the least.” 639 F. 2d, at 15-16. Other courts, however, have failed to give adequate weight to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech and to the higher level of protection to be afforded the latter. See Donnelly Advertising Corp. v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 A. 2d 1127 (1977); State v. Lotze, 92 Wash. 2d 52, 593 P. 2d 811 (1979). To the extent that this decision is not consistent with the conclusion reached in Lotze, we overrule our prior summary approval of that decision in 444 U. S. 921 (1979).
In this sense, this case presents the opposite situation from that in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), and Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). In both of those cases a government agency had chosen to prohibit from a certain forum speech relating to political campaigns, while other kinds of speech were permitted. In both cases this Court upheld the prohibition, but both cases turned on unique fact situations involving government-created forums and have no application here.
Because a total prohibition of outdoor advertising is not before us, we do not indicate whether such a ban would be consistent with the First Amendment. But see Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61 (1981), on the constitutional problems created by a total prohibition of a particular expressive forum, live entertainment in that case. Despite Justice SteveNs’ insistence to the contrary, post, at 540, 541, and 548, n. 16, we do not imply that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it “does not abridge enough speech.”
Similarly, we need not reach any decision in this case as to the constitutionality of the federal Highway Beautification Act of 1965. That Act, like the San Diego ordinance, permits onsite commercial billboards in areas in which it does not permit billboards with noncommercial messages. 23 U. S. C. §131 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. III). However, unlike the San Diego ordinance, which prohibits billboards conveying noncommercial messages throughout the city, the federal law does not contain a total prohibition of such billboards in areas adjacent to the interstate and primary highway systems. As far as the Federal Government is concerned, such billboards are permitted adjacent to the highways in areas zoned industrial or commercial under state law or in unzoned commercial or industrial areas. 23 U. S. C. § 131 (d). Regulation of billboards in those areas is left primarily to the States. For this reason, the decision today does not determine the constitutionality of the federal statute. Whether, in fact, the distinction is constitutionally significant can only be determined on the basis of a record establishing the actual effect of the Act on billboards conveying noncommercial messages.
See Joint Stipulation of Facts No. 28, App. 48a.
Justice Stevens’ suggested standard seems to go even further than The Chief Justice in ignoring the private interests protected by the First Amendment. He suggests that regulation of speech is permissible so long as it is not biased in favor of a particular position and leaves open “ample” means of communication. Post, at 552. Nowhere does he suggest that the strength or weakness of the government’s interests is a factor in the analysis.
The Chief Justice correctly notes that traditional labels should not be substituted for analysis and, therefore, he correctly rejects any simple classification of the San Diego ordinance as either a “prohibition” or a "time, place, and manner restriction.” These “labels” or “categories,” however, have played an important role in this Court’s analysis of First Amendment problems in the past. The standard The Chief Justice himself adopts appears to be based almost exclusively on prior discussions of time, place, and manner restrictions. See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 535 (1980); California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 117, n. 4 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949). But this Court has never held that the less strict standard of review applied to time, place, and manner restrictions is appropriately used in every First Amendment case, or that it is the most that the First Amendment requires of government legislation which infringes on protected speech. If this were the case, there would be no need for the detailed inquiry this Court consistently pursues in order to answer the question of whether a challenged restriction is in fact a time, place, and manner restriction — the same standard of review would apply regardless of the outcome of that inquiry. As we demonstrated above, the San Diego ordinance is not such a restriction and there is, therefore, no excuse for applying a lower standard of First Amendment review to that ordinance.
Nor has this Court ever accepted the view that it must defer to a legislative judgment that a particular medium of communication is “offensive” and “intrusive,” merely because “other means [of communication] are available.” Post, at 561.
Appellants contend that the ordinance will effectively eliminate their businesses and that this violates the Due Process Clause. We do not know, however, what kind of ordinance, if any, San Diego will seek to enforce in place of that which we invalidate today. In any case, any question of unconstitutional “takings” aside, the Due Process Clause does not afford a greater degree of protection to appellants’ business than does the First Amendment. Since we hold that the First Amendment interests in commercial speech are not sufficient to prevent the city from prohibiting offsite commercial advertisements, no different result should be reached under the Due Process Clause.
Although the ordinance contains a severability clause, determining the meaning and application of that clause is properly the responsibility of the state courts. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 497 (1965) (“The record suffices ... to permit this Court to hold that, without the benefit of limiting construction, the statutory provisions on which the indictments are founded are void on their face; until an acceptable limiting construction is obtained, the provisions cannot be applied”); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 541 (1933) (“The operation of this [severability clause] consequent on our decision is a matter of state law. While we have jurisdiction of the issue, we deem it appropriate that we should leave the determination of the question to the state court”) ; Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 291 (“In cases coming from the state courts, this Court, in the absence of a controlling state decision may, in passing upon the claim under the federal law, decide, also, the question of severability. But it is not obliged to do so. The situation may be such as to make it appropriate to leave the determination of the question to the state court”). This rule is reflected in the different approaches this Court has taken to statutory construction of federal and state statutes infringing on protected speech. Compare United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 (1971), with Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 60 (1965). Since our judgment is based essentially on the inclusion of noncommercial speech within the prohibitions of the ordinance, the California courts may sustain the ordinance by limiting its reach to commercial speech, assuming the ordinance is susceptible to this treatment. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
2
] | sc_respondent |
BARTONE v. UNITED STATES.
No. 337.
Decided October 28, 1963.
O. B. Cline, Jr. and Nicholas J. Capuano for petitioner.
Solicitor General Cox for the United States.
Per Curiam.
Although there were other questions before the Court of Appeals, the sole question presented by this petition is stated as follows:
“May a United States District Judge orally revoke the probation of a Defendant in open court and in the presence of the Defendant and his counsel and impose a sentence of confinement for a specific period of time and thereafter enter a formal written judgment and commitment in which a larger and longer sentence of confinement is imposed and set forth?”
It appears that on September 14, 1962, petitioner and his counsel appeared in the District Court, at which time a sentence of confinement of one year was imposed. Subsequently, and in petitioner’s absence, the court enlarged the penalty by one day.
The propriety of this enlargement of the sentence, along with other questions, was presented on the appeal to the Court of Appeals, which made no mention of it in its opinion. 317 F. 2d 608. The Court of Appeals did, however, deny a motion of the United States to remand the cause for the purpose of correcting the sentence — relief to which the United States concedes petitioner is entitled. See Rakes v. United States, 309 F. 2d 686. The only question is whether the error will be corrected here and now or whether petitioner will be remitted to his remedy under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ; and whether petitioner will be advantaged by one procedure or another is not our concern.
This error, in enlarging the sentence in the absence of petitioner, was so plain in light of the requirements of Rule 43 that it should have been dealt with by the Court of Appeals, even though it had not been alleged as error.
As seen from our Miscellaneous Docket for 1962, the use of collateral proceedings for relief from federal judgments of conviction is considerable:
October Term, 1962. — Miscellaneous Docket.
totals.
Federal prisoners:
Direct attack. 109
28 U. S. C. § 2255. 93
Habeas corpus through federal courts. 38
Original habeas corpus (in this Court). 40
Rule 35, Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 4
284
Where state procedural snarls or obstacles preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts have no other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391. But the situation is different in federal proceedings, over which both the Courts of Appeals and this Court (McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332) have broad powers of supervision. It is more appropriate, whenever possible, to correct errors reachable by the appeal rather than remit the parties to a new collateral proceeding.
We grant certiorari and reverse the judgment denying correction of the sentence.
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules. In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant’s voluntary absence after the trial has been commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the verdict. A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes. In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in the defendant’s absence. The defendant’s presence is not required at a reduction of sentence under Rule 35.”
Supra, note 1. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the opinion effectively says that the decision in this case "overruled" one or more of the Court's own precedents. Alteration also extends to language in the majority opinion that states that a precedent of the Supreme Court has been "disapproved," or is "no longer good law". Note, however, that alteration does not apply to cases in which the Court "distinguishes" a precedent. | Did the the decision of the court overrule one or more of the Court's own precedents? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_precedentalteration |
ALEXANDER et al. v. HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al.
No. 632.
Argued October 23, 1969
Decided October 29, 1969
Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were James M. Nabrit III, Norman C. Amaker, Melvyn Zarr, and Charles L. Black, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General Leonard argued the cause for the United States. With him on the memorandum was Solicitor General Griswold. A. F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi, and John C. Satterfield argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents other than the United States.
Louis F. Oberdorfer argued the cause for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were John W. Douglas, Bethuel M. Webster, Cyrus R. Vance, Asa Sokolow, John Schafer, John Door, Richard C. Dinkel-spiel, Arthur II. Dean, Lloyd N. Cutler, Bruce Bromley, Berl I. Bernhard, Timothy B. Dyk, and Michael R. Klein.
Richard B. Sobol and David Rubin filed a brief for the National Education Association as amicus curiae urging reversal. The Tennessee Federation for Constitutional Government filed a brief as amicus curiae.
Per Curiam.
This case comes to the Court on a petition for cer-tiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petition was granted on October 9, 1969, and the case set down for early argument. The question presented is one of paramount importance, involving as it does the denial of fundamental rights to many thousands of school children, who are presently attending Mississippi schools under segregated conditions contrary to the applicable decisions of this Court. Against this background the Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for additional time because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of allowing “all deliberate speed” for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools. Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218, 234 (1964); Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 438-439, 442 (1968). Accordingly,
It is hereby adjudged, ordered, and decreed:
1. The Court of Appeals’ order of August 28, 1969, is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court to issue its decree and order, effective immediately, declaring that each of the school districts here involved may no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color, and directing that they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or color.
2. The Court of Appeals may in its discretion direct the schools here involved to accept all or any part of the August 11, 1969, recommendations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, with any modifications which that court deems proper insofar as those recommendations insure a totally unitary school system for all eligible pupils without regard to race or color.
The Court of Appeals may make its determination and enter its order without further arguments or submissions.
3. While each of these school systems is being operated as a unitary system under the order of the Court of Appeals, the District Court may hear and consider objections thereto or proposed amendments thereof, provided, however, that the Court of Appeals’ order shall be complied with in all respects while the District Court considers such objections or amendments, if any are made. No amendment shall become effective before being passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
4. The Court of Appeals shall retain jurisdiction to insure prompt and faithful compliance with its order, and may modify or amend the same as may be deemed necessary or desirable for the operation of a unitary school system.
5. The order of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 1969, having been vacated and the case remanded for proceedings in conformity with this order, the judgment shall issue forthwith and the Court of Appeals is requested to give priority to the execution of this judgment as far as possible and necessary. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
8
] | sc_lcdisposition |
Keanu D.W. ORTIZ, Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 16-1423.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Jan. 16, 2018.
Decided June 22, 2018.
Brian L. Mizer, Johnathan D. Legg, Lauren-Ann L. Shure, Appellate Defense Counsel, Air Force Legal Ops. Agency, MD, Eugene R. Fidell, New Haven, CT, Stephen I. Vladeck, Austin, TX, Mary J. Bradley, Christopher D. Carrier, Defense Appellate Division, Army Legal Services Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, for Petitioners.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, Dana J. Boente, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joseph F. Palmer, Danielle S. Tarin, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is about the legality of a military officer serving as a judge on both an Air Force appeals court and the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR). The petitioner, an airman convicted of crimes in the military justice system, contends that the judge's holding of dual offices violated a statute regulating military service, as well as the Constitution's Appointments Clause. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) rejected those claims, and we granted a petition for certiorari. We hold first that this Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of the CAAF, even though it is not an Article III court. We then affirm the CAAF's determination that the judge's simultaneous service was lawful.
I
In the exercise of its authority over the armed forces, Congress has long provided for specialized military courts to adjudicate charges against service members. Today, trial-level courts-martial hear cases involving a wide range of offenses, including crimes unconnected with military service; as a result, the jurisdiction of those tribunals overlaps substantially with that of state and federal courts. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) ; United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496, 186 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). And courts-martial are now subject to several tiers of appellate review, thus forming part of an integrated "court-martial system" that closely resembles civilian structures of justice.
United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 920, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009) ; see Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174, 114 S.Ct. 752, 127 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994).
That system begins with the court-martial itself, an officer-led tribunal convened to determine guilt or innocence and levy appropriate punishment, up to lifetime imprisonment or execution. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 818, 856a. The next phase of military justice occurs at one of four appellate courts: the Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. Those courts, using three-judge panels of either officers or civilians, review all decisions in which the sentence imposed involves a punitive discharge, incarceration for more than one year, or death. See §§ 866(a)-(c). Atop the court-martial system is the CAAF, a "court of record" made up of five civilian judges appointed to serve 15-year terms. § 941 ; see §§ 942(a)-(b). The CAAF must review certain weighty cases (including those in which capital punishment was imposed), and may grant petitions for review in any others. See § 867. Finally, this Court possesses statutory authority to step in afterward: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1259, we have jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions by writ of certiorari.
Petitioner Keanu Ortiz's case has run the gamut of this legal system. Ortiz, an Airman First Class in the Air Force, was charged with knowingly possessing and distributing child pornography, in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. A court-martial found Ortiz guilty as charged and imposed a sentence of two years' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. On appeal, an Air Force CCA panel, including Colonel Martin Mitchell, summarily affirmed the court-martial's decision. The CAAF then granted Ortiz's petition for review to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA, thus entitling Ortiz to an appellate do-over.
That issue arose from Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CMCR. Congress created the CMCR as an appellate tribunal to review the decisions of military commissions, particularly those operating in Guantanamo Bay. The Secretary of Defense put Judge Mitchell on that court shortly after he became a member of the CCA, under a statutory provision authorizing the Secretary to "assign [officers] who are appellate military judges" to serve on the CMCR as well. 10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(2). Around the same time, a military-commission defendant argued to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that the Appointments Clause requires the President and Senate (rather than the Secretary) to place judges on the CMCR. The D.C. Circuit avoided resolving that issue, but suggested that the President and Senate could "put [it] to rest" by appointing the very CMCR judges whom the Secretary had previously assigned. In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 86 (2015). The President decided to take that advice, and nominated each of those judges-Mitchell, among them-under an adjacent statutory provision authorizing him to "appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," CMCR judges. § 950f(b)(3). The Senate then confirmed those nominations. About a month later, Judge Mitchell-now wearing his CCA robe-participated in the panel decision rejecting Ortiz's appeal.
In Ortiz's view, Judge Mitchell's appointment to the CMCR barred his continued service on the CCA under both a statute and the Constitution. First, Ortiz invoked 10 U.S.C. § 973(b). That statute, designed to ensure civilian preeminence in government, provides that unless "otherwise authorized by law," an active-duty military officer like Judge Mitchell "may not hold, or exercise the functions of," certain "civil office[s]" in the Federal Government. § 973(b)(2)(A). According to Ortiz, a CMCR judgeship is a covered civil office, and no other law allowed the President to put Mitchell in that position: Thus, his appointment to the CMCR violated § 973(b). See Brief in Support of Petition Granted in No. 16-0671 (CAAF), pp. 17-22. And the proper remedy, Ortiz argued, was to terminate Judge Mitchell's military service effective the date of his CMCR appointment and void all his later actions as a CCA judge-including his decision on Ortiz's appeal. See ibid. Second and independently, Ortiz relied on the Appointments Clause to challenge Judge Mitchell's dual service. See id., at 27-40. The premise of his argument was that CMCR judges are "principal officers" under that Clause, whereas CCA judges (as this Court has held) are "inferior officers." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 666, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997). Ortiz claimed that the Appointments Clause prohibits someone serving as a principal officer on one court (the CMCR) from sitting alongside inferior officers on another court (the CCA). Because Judge Mitchell had done just that, Ortiz concluded, the CCA's ruling on his appeal could not stand.
The CAAF rejected both grounds for ordering another appeal. See 76 M.J. 189 (2017). In considering the statutory question, the court chose not to decide whether § 973(b) precluded Judge Mitchell from serving on the CMCR while an active-duty officer. Even if so, the CAAF held, the remedy for the violation would not involve terminating the judge's military service or voiding actions he took on the CCA. See id., at 192. Turning next to the constitutional issue, the CAAF "s[aw] no Appointments Clause problem." Id., at 193. Even assuming Judge Mitchell was a principal officer when sitting on the CMCR, the court held, that status in no way affected his service on the CCA: "When Colonel Mitchell sits as a CCA judge, he is no different from any other CCA judge." Ibid. The CAAF thus upheld the CCA's affirmance of Ortiz's convictions.
This Court granted Ortiz's petition for certiorari to consider whether either § 973(b) or the Appointments Clause prevents a military officer from serving, as Judge Mitchell did, on both a CCA and the CMCR. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 54, 198 L.Ed.2d 780 (2017). We now affirm the decision below.
II
We begin with a question of our own jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. Congress has explicitly authorized us to undertake such review in 28 U.S.C. § 1259. See ibid. ("Decisions of the [CAAF] may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari"). Both the Federal Government and Ortiz view that grant of jurisdiction as constitutionally proper. But an amicus curiae, Professor Aditya Bamzai, argues that it goes beyond what Article III allows. That position is a new one to this Court: We have previously reviewed nine CAAF decisions without anyone objecting that we lacked the power to do so. Still, we think the argument is serious, and deserving of sustained consideration. That analysis leads us to conclude that the judicial character and constitutional pedigree of the court-martial system enable this Court, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, to review the decisions of the court sitting at its apex.
Bamzai starts with a proposition no one can contest-that our review of CAAF decisions cannot rest on our original jurisdiction. Brief for Aditya Bamzai as Amicus Curiae 11. Article III of the Constitution grants this Court original jurisdiction in a limited category of cases: those "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party." § 2, cl. 2. That list, of course, does not embrace Ortiz's case, or any other that the CAAF considers. And ever since Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), this Court has recognized that our original jurisdiction cannot extend any further than the cases enumerated: If Congress attempts to confer more on us, we must (as Chief Justice Marshall famously did, in the pioneer act of judicial review) strike down the law. Id., at 174-180. As a result, Bamzai is right to insist that § 1259 could not authorize this Court, as part of its original jurisdiction, to hear military cases like Ortiz's.
The real issue is whether our appellate jurisdiction can cover such cases. Article III's sole reference to appellate jurisdiction provides no apparent barrier, but also no substantial guidance: Following its specification of this Court's original jurisdiction, Article III says only that in all "other Cases" that the Constitution comprehends (including cases, like this one, involving federal questions), "the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact." § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution's failure to say anything more about appellate jurisdiction leads Bamzai to focus on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury . See Brief for Bamzai 2-4, 12-14. In that case (as you surely recall), William Marbury petitioned this Court-without first asking any other-to issue a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison directing him to deliver a commission. After holding (as just related) that the Court's original jurisdiction did not extend so far, Chief Justice Marshall also rejected the idea that the Court could provide the writ in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. "[T]he essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction," the Chief Justice explained, is "that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause." 1 Cranch, at 175. Marbury's petition, Chief Justice Marshall held, commenced the cause-or, to use the more modern word, the case; hence, it was not a matter for appellate jurisdiction.
Bamzai contends that the same is true of Ortiz's petition.
On any ordinary understanding of the great Chief Justice's words, that is a surprising claim. Ortiz's petition asks us to "revise and correct" the latest decision in a "cause" that began in and progressed through military justice "proceedings." Ibid. Or, as the Government puts the point, this case fits within Chief Justice Marshall's standard because "it comes to th[is] Court on review of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces' decision, which reviewed a criminal proceeding that originated in [a] court[ ]-martial." Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48. So this Court would hardly be the first to render a decision in the case. Unless Chief Justice Marshall's test implicitly exempts cases instituted in a military court-as contrasted, for example, with an ordinary federal court-the case is now appellate.
The military justice system's essential character-in a word, judicial-provides no reason to make that distinction. Accord post, at 2186 - 2188 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Each level of military court decides criminal "cases" as that term is generally understood, and does so in strict accordance with a body of federal law (of course including the Constitution). The procedural protections afforded to a service member are "virtually the same" as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding, whether state or federal. 1 D. Schlueter, Military Criminal Justice: Practice and Procedure § 1-7, p. 50 (9th ed. 2015) (Schlueter). And the judgments a military tribunal renders, as this Court long ago observed, "rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations[, as] give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals." Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L.Ed. 538 (1879). Accordingly, we have held that the "valid, final judgments of military courts, like those of any court of competent jurisdiction [,] have res judicata effect and preclude further litigation of the merits." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975). In particular, those judgments have identical effect under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 345, 27 S.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084 (1907).
The jurisdiction and structure of the court-martial system likewise resemble those of other courts whose decisions we review. Although their jurisdiction has waxed and waned over time, courts-martial today can try service members for a vast swath of offenses, including garden-variety crimes unrelated to military service. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877 - 934 ; Solorio, 483 U.S., at 438-441, 107 S.Ct. 2924 ; supra, at 2170 - 2171. As a result, the jurisdiction of those tribunals overlaps significantly with the criminal jurisdiction of federal and state courts. See Kebodeaux, 570 U.S., at 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). The sentences meted out are also similar: Courts-martial can impose, on top of peculiarly military discipline, terms of imprisonment and capital punishment. See § 818(a) ; post, at 2186 - 2187 (THOMAS, J., concurring) ("[T]hese courts decide questions of the most momentous description, affecting even life itself" (quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). And the decisions of those tribunals are subject to an appellate process-what we have called an "integrated system of military courts and review procedures"-that replicates the judicial apparatus found in most States. Councilman, 420 U.S., at 758, 95 S.Ct. 1300. By the time a case like Ortiz's arrives on our doorstep under 28 U.S.C. § 1259, it has passed through not one or two but three military courts (including two that can have civilian judges).
And just as important, the constitutional foundation of courts-martial-as judicial bodies responsible for "the trial and punishment" of service members-is not in the least insecure. Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79, 15 L.Ed. 838 (1858). The court-martial is in fact "older than the Constitution," 1 Schlueter § 1-6(B), at 39; the Federalist Papers discuss "trials by courts-martial" under the Articles of Confederation, see No. 40, p. 250 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). When it came time to draft a new charter, the Framers "recogni[zed] and sanction[ed] existing military jurisdiction," W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 48 (2d ed. 1920) (emphasis deleted), by exempting from the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause all "cases arising in the land or naval forces." And by granting legislative power "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," the Framers also authorized Congress to carry forward courts-martial. Art. I, § 8, cl. 14. Congress did not need to be told twice. The very first Congress continued the court-martial system as it then operated. See Winthrop, supra, at 47. And from that day to this one, Congress has maintained courts-martial in all their essentials to resolve criminal charges against service members. See 1 Schlueter § 1 -6, at 35-48.
Throughout that history, and reflecting the attributes described above, courts-martial have operated as instruments of military justice, not (as the dissent would have it) mere "military command," post, at 2199 (opinion of ALITO, J.). As one scholar has noted, courts-martial "have long been understood to exercise 'judicial' power," of the same kind wielded by civilian courts. Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 576 (2007) ; see W. De Hart, Observations on Military Law 14 (1859) (Military courts are "imbued or endowed with the like essence of judicial power" as "ordinary courts of civil judicature"); accord post, at 2186 - 2188 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Attorney General Bates, even in the middle of the Civil War, characterized a court-martial "proceeding, from its inception, [a]s judicial," because the "trial, finding, and sentence are the solemn acts of a court organized and conducted under the authority of and according to the prescribed forms of law." Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558, 22 Ct.Cl. 487, 7 S.Ct. 1141, 30 L.Ed. 1167 (1887) (quoting 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 19, 21 (1864)). Colonel Winthrop-whom we have called the "Blackstone of Military Law," Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19, n. 38, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957) (plurality opinion)-agreed with Bates. He regarded a court-martial as "in the strictest sense" a "court of law and justice"-"bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law" and the duty to adjudicate cases "without partiality, favor, or affection." Winthrop, supra, at 54.
Despite all this, Bamzai claims that "Marbury bars th[is] Court from deciding" any cases coming to us from the court-martial system. Brief for Bamzai 3. He begins, much as we did above, by explaining that under Marbury the Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction only when it is "supervising an earlier decision by a lower court." Brief for Bamzai 13. The next step is where the argument gets interesting. The CAAF, Bamzai contends, simply does not qualify as such a body (nor does any other military tribunal). True enough, "the CAAF is called a 'court' "; and true enough, it decides cases, just as other courts do. Id., at 3 ; see id., at 28. But the CAAF, Bamzai notes, is "not an Article III court," id., at 3 (emphasis added): As all agree, its members lack the tenure and salary protections that are the hallmarks of the Article III judiciary, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 942(b), (c). Congress established the CAAF under its Article I, rather than its Article III, powers, and Congress located the CAAF (as we have previously observed) within the Executive Branch, rather than the judicial one. See § 941 ; Edmond, 520 U.S., at 664, and n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1573. Those facts, in Bamzai's view, prevent this Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the CAAF. "For constitutional purposes," Bamzai concludes, the members of the CAAF "stand on equal footing with James Madison in Marbury ." Brief for Bamzai 4. (With variations here and there, the dissent makes the same basic argument.)
But this Court's appellate jurisdiction, as Justice Story made clear ages ago, covers more than the decisions of Article III courts. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816), we considered whether our appellate jurisdiction extends to the proceedings of state courts, in addition to those of the Article III federal judiciary. We said yes, as long as the case involves subject matter suitable for our review. Id., at 338-352. For our "appellate power," Story wrote, "is not limited by the terms of [Article III] to any particular courts." Id., at 338. Or again: "[I]t will be in vain to search in the letter of the [C]onstitution for any qualification as to the tribunal" from which a given case comes. Ibid. The decisions we review might come from Article III courts, but they need not.
The same lesson emerges from two contexts yet more closely resembling this one-each involving a non-Article III judicial system created by Congress. First, in United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 15 S.Ct. 16, 39 L.Ed. 76 (1894), this Court upheld the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over decisions of federal territorial courts, despite their lack of Article III status. We observed there that the Constitution grants Congress broad authority over the territories: to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting" those areas. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ; see Coe, 155 U.S., at 85, 15 S.Ct. 16. And we recognized that Congress, with this Court's permission, had long used that power to create territorial courts that did not comply with Article III. See ibid. Chief Justice Marshall had held such a court constitutional in 1828 even though its authority was "not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article." American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 546, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) ; see Coe, 155 U.S., at 85, 15 S.Ct. 16 (describing that opinion as having "settled" that Article III "does not exhaust the power of Congress to establish courts"). The exception to Article III for territorial courts was thus an established and prominent part of the legal landscape by the time Coe addressed this Court's role in reviewing their decisions. And so the Court found the issue simple. "There has never been any question," we declared, "that the judicial action of [territorial courts] may, in accordance with the Constitution, be subjected to [our] appellate jurisdiction." Id., at 86, 15 S.Ct. 16.
Second, we have routinely, and uncontroversially, exercised appellate jurisdiction over cases adjudicated in the non-Article III District of Columbia courts. Here too, the Constitution grants Congress an unqualified power: to legislate for the District "in all Cases whatsoever." Art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Under that provision, we long ago determined, "Congress has the entire control over the [D]istrict for every purpose of government," including that of "organizing a judicial department." Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 619, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838). So when Congress invoked that authority to create a set of local courts, this Court upheld the legislation-even though the judges on those courts lacked Article III protections. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407-410, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). We relied on the Constitution's "plenary grant [ ] of power to Congress to legislate with respect to" the national capital. Id., at 408, 93 S.Ct. 1670. And several years later, we referred as well to the "historical consensus" supporting congressional latitude over the District's judiciary. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (plurality opinion); see id., at 65, n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 2858. To be sure, we have never explicitly held, as we did in the territorial context, that those same considerations support our appellate jurisdiction over cases resolved in the D.C. courts. But some things go unsaid because they are self-evident. And indeed, even Bamzai readily acknowledges that this Court can review decisions of the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Brief for Bamzai 23, 25.
The non-Article III court-martial system stands on much the same footing as territorial and D.C. courts, as we have often noted. The former, just like the latter, rests on an expansive constitutional delegation: As this Court early held, Article I gives Congress the power-"entirely independent" of Article III-"to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations." Dynes, 20 How., at 79 ; see supra, at 2174 - 2175. The former has, if anything, deeper historical roots, stretching from before this nation's beginnings up to the present. See supra, at 2174 - 2175. And the former, no less than the others, performs an inherently judicial role, as to substantially similar cases. See supra, at 2174 - 2176. So it is not surprising that we have lumped the three together. In Palmore, the Court viewed the military, territories, and District as a triad of "specialized areas having particularized needs" in which Article III "give[s] way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress." 411 U.S., at 408, 93 S.Ct. 1670. And in Northern Pipeline, the plurality said of all three that "a constitutional grant of power [as] historically understood" has bestowed "exceptional powers" on Congress to create courts outside Article III. 458 U.S., at 66, 70, 102 S.Ct. 2858. Given those well-understood connections, we would need a powerful reason to divorce military courts from territorial and D.C. courts when it comes to defining our appellate jurisdiction.
And Bamzai fails to deliver one. His initial attempt relies on a simple fact about territorial and D.C. courts: They exercise power over "discrete geographic areas." Brief for Bamzai 23. Military courts do not; they instead exercise power over discrete individuals-i.e., members of the armed forces. So Bamzai gives us a distinction: places vs. people. What he does not offer is a good reason why that distinction should matter in our jurisdictional inquiry-why it is one of substance, rather than convenience. He mentions that the territorial and D.C. courts are "functional equivalents of state courts." Id., at 24; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 35. But for starters, that could be said of courts-martial too. As we have described, they try all the "ordinary criminal offenses" (murder, assault, robbery, drug crimes, etc., etc., etc.) that state courts do.
Kebodeaux, 570 U.S., at 404, 133 S.Ct. 2496 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); see supra, at 2170 - 2171, 2174 - 2175. And more fundamentally, we do not see why geographical state -likeness, rather than historical court -likeness, should dispose of the issue. As we have shown, the petition here asks us to "revise[ ] and correct[ ] the proceedings in a cause already instituted" in a judicial system recognized since the founding as competent to render the most serious decisions. Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 175 ; see supra, at 2174 - 2176. That should make the case an appeal, whether or not the domain that system covers is precisely analogous to, say, Alabama.
So Bamzai tries another route to cleave off military courts, this time focusing on their location in the Executive Branch. See Brief for Bamzai 26-30. Bamzai actually never says in what branch (if any) he thinks territorial and D.C. courts reside. But he knows-because this Court has said-that the CAAF is an "Executive Branch entity." Edmond, 520 U.S., at 664, and n. 2, 117 S.Ct. 1573 ; see supra, at 2176 - 2177. And in Bamzai's view, two of our precedents show that we may never accept appellate jurisdiction from any person or body within that branch. See Brief for Bamzai 2-4. The first case he cites is Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243, 17 L.Ed. 589 (1864), in which the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over decisions of a temporary Civil War-era military commission. See id ., at 251-252. The second is Marbury itself, in which the Court held (as if this needed repeating) that it lacked jurisdiction to review James Madison's refusal to deliver a commission appointing William Marbury a justice of the peace. See 1 Cranch, at 175-176 ; supra, at 2173 - 2174.
As to the first, Vallandigham goes to show only that not every military tribunal is alike. The commission the Court considered there was established by General Ambrose Burnside (he of the notorious facial hair) for a time-limited, specialized purpose-to try persons within the military Department of Ohio (Burnside's then-command) for aiding the Confederacy. See 1 Wall., at 243-244. And the General kept firm control of the commission (made up entirely of his own field officers): After personally ordering Vallandigham's arrest, he (and he alone) also reviewed the commission's findings and sentence. See id., at 247-248 ; J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 596-597 (1988). This Court therefore found that the commission lacked "judicial character." 1 Wall., at 253. It was more an adjunct to a general than a real court-and so we did not have appellate jurisdiction over its decisions.
But the very thing that Burnside's commission lacked, the court-martial system-and, in particular, the CAAF (whose decision Ortiz asks us to review)-possesses in spades. Once again, the CAAF is a permanent "court of record" created by Congress; it stands at the acme of a firmly entrenched judicial system that exercises broad jurisdiction in accordance with established rules and procedures; and its own decisions are final (except if we review and reverse them). See supra, at 2170 - 2171, 2174 - 2176. That is "judicial character" more than sufficient to separate the CAAF from Burnside's commission, and align it instead with territorial and D.C. (and also state and federal) courts of appeals.
And the differences between the CAAF's decisions and James Madison's delivery refusal should have already leaped off the page. To state the obvious: James Madison was not a court, either in name or in function. He was the Secretary of State-the head of a cabinet department (and, by the way, the right arm of the President). Likewise, Madison's failure to transmit Marbury's commission was not a judicial decision; it was an enforcement action (though in the form of non-action), pertaining only to the execution of law. As Chief Justice Marshall saw, Secretary Madison merely triggered the case of Marbury v. Madison ; he did not hear and resolve it, as a judicial body would have done. See 1 Cranch, at 175. The Chief Justice's opinion thus cleanly divides that case from this one, even if both (as Bamzai notes) formally involve executive officers. Here, three constitutionally rooted courts, ending with the CAAF, rendered inherently judicial decisions-just as such tribunals have done since our nation's founding. In reviewing, "revis[ing,] and correct[ing]" those proceedings, as Ortiz asks, we do nothing more or different than in generally exercising our appellate jurisdiction. Ibid.
But finally, in holding that much, we say nothing about whether we could exercise appellate jurisdiction over cases from other adjudicative bodies in the Executive Branch, including those in administrative agencies. Our resolution of the jurisdictional issue here has rested on the judicial character, as well as the constitutional foundations and history, of the court-martial system. We have relied, too, on the connections that our cases have long drawn between that judicial system and those of the territories and the District. If Congress were to grant us appellate jurisdiction over decisions of newer entities advancing an administrative (rather than judicial) mission, the question would be different-and the answer not found in this opinion.
III
We may now turn to the issues we took this case to decide. Recall that Ortiz seeks a new appeal proceeding before the Air Force CCA, based on Judge Mitchell's participation in his last one. See supra, at 2170 - 2172. Ortiz's challenge turns on Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on another court, the CMCR. Originally, the Secretary of Defense had assigned Judge Mitchell to sit on that court. Then, to moot a possible constitutional problem with Judge Mitchell's CMCR service, the President (with the Senate's advice and consent) appointed Judge Mitchell as well. A short time later, Judge Mitchell ruled on Ortiz's CCA appeal. Ortiz contends that doing so violated both a federal statute and the Appointments Clause. We disagree on both counts.
A
The statutory issue respecting Judge Mitchell's dual service turns on two interlocking provisions. The first is § 973(b)(2)(A) -the statute Ortiz claims was violated here. As noted earlier, that law-in the interest of ensuring civilian preeminence in government-prohibits active-duty military officers like Judge Mitchell from "hold[ing], or exercis[ing] the functions of," certain "civil office[s]" in the Federal Government, "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law." See supra, at 2172. The second is § 950f(b) -a statute the Government claims "otherwise authorize[s]" Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR, even if a seat on that court is a covered "civil office." As also noted above, § 950f(b) provides two ways to become a CMCR judge. See supra, at 2171. Under § 950f(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense "may assign" qualified officers serving on a CCA to "be judges on the [CMCR]" as well. And under § 950f(b)(3), the President (with the Senate's advice and consent) "may appoint" persons-whether officers or civilians is unspecified-to CMCR judgeships.
Against that statutory backdrop, Ortiz claims that Judge Mitchell became disqualified from serving on the CCA the moment his presidential appointment to the CMCR became final. See Brief for Petitioners 39-42. Notably, Ortiz has no statutory objection to Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on those courts before that date-when he sat on the CMCR solely by virtue of the Secretary of Defense's assignment. See id., at 40. Nor could he reasonably lodge such a complaint, for § 950f(b)(2), in no uncertain terms, "otherwise authorize[s]" the Secretary to place a military judge on the CMCR-thus exempting such an officer from § 973(b)(2)(A)'s prohibition. But in Ortiz's view, the provision in § 950f(b)(3) for presidential appointments contains no similar authorization, because it makes no "express[ ] or unambiguous[ ]" reference to military officers. Id ., at 20. And so, Ortiz concludes, § 973(b)(2)(A)'s general rule must govern.
In the circumstances here, however, the authorization in § 950f(b)(2) was the only thing necessary to exempt Judge Mitchell from the civil office-holding ban-not just before but also after his presidential appointment. That provision, as just noted, unambiguously permitted the Secretary of Defense to place Judge Mitchell on the CMCR, even if such a judgeship is a "civil office." See supra, at 2181. And once that happened, the President's later appointment of Judge Mitchell made not a whit of difference. Nothing in § 950f (or any other law) suggests that the President's appointment erased or otherwise negated the Secretary's earlier action. To the contrary, that appointment (made for purposes of protecting against a constitutional challenge, see supra, at 2171) merely ratified what the Secretary had already done. The nomination papers that the President submitted to the Senate reflect that fact. They sought confirmation of Judge Mitchell's appointment as a CMCR judge "[i]n accordance with [his] continued status as [a CMCR] judge pursuant to [his] assignment by the Secretary of Defense[,] under 10 U.S.C. Section 950f(b)(2)." 162 Cong. Rec. S1474 (Mar. 14, 2016). So after the Senate approved the nomination, Judge Mitchell served on the CMCR by virtue of both the Secretary's assignment and the President's appointment. And because § 950f(b)(2) expressly authorized the Secretary's assignment, Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR could not run afoul of § 973(b)(2)(A)'s general rule.
Ortiz argues in response that the President's appointment demanded its own clear authorization because only that appointment put Judge Mitchell into a "new office." Reply Brief 7. According to Ortiz, an officer who receives a secretarial assignment to the CMCR "exercise[s] additional duties"-but he does not hold a second position. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. A presidential appointment alone, he says, effects that more dramatic change. And Ortiz contends that § 973(b)(2)(A)'s rule cares about that difference. That law, Ortiz says, requires a legislative authorization when, and only when, a service member receives a whole new office-which is to say here when, and only when, the President appoints a judge to the CMCR. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5 (stating that § 973(b)(2)(A)"prohibit[s] military officers from holding [civil offices] absent express congressional authorization, while generally allowing military officers to be assigned to exercise the duties of such positions").
But that argument is contrary to § 973(b)(2)(A)'s text, as well as to the purposes it reflects. The statute draws no distinction between secretarial assignees and presidential appointees, nor between those who exercise the duties of an office and those who formally hold it. True enough, we have sometimes referred to § 973(b)(2)(A) as a rule about dual "office-holding," see supra, at 2181 - 2182, 2182, n. 10-but that is mere shorthand. In fact, § 973(b)(2)(A)'s prohibition applies broadly, and uniformly, to any military officer who "hold[s], or exercise[s] the functions of," a covered civil office. And the "except as otherwise authorized" caveat applies in the same way-to "hold[ing]" and "exercis[ing]" alike. So the very distinction that Ortiz relies on, the statute rejects: Indeed, the law could not be clearer in its indifference. That is because Congress determined that military officers threaten civilian preeminence in government by either "hold [ing]" or "exercis[ing] the functions of" important civil offices. Except ... if Congress decides otherwise and says as much.
And once again, here Congress did exactly that. Judge Mitchell became a CMCR judge, while remaining in the military, because of a secretarial assignment that Congress explicitly authorized. See supra, at 2181 - 2182. After his presidential appointment, he continued on the same court, doing the same work, in keeping with the same congressional approval. Even supposing he obtained a "new office" in the way Ortiz says, that acquisition is of no moment. With or without that formal office, Judge Mitchell "h[e]ld, or exercise[d] the functions of," a CMCR judgeship, and so was subject to § 973(b)(2)(A)'s ban. But likewise, with or without that formal office, Judge Mitchell could receive permission from Congress to do the job-that is, to sit as a judge on the CMCR. And § 950f(b)(2) gave Judge Mitchell that legislative green light, from the date of his assignment through his ruling on Ortiz's case and beyond.
B
Finally, Ortiz raises an Appointments Clause challenge to Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR. That Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint" the "Officers of the United States," but that "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Litigants usually invoke the Appointments Clause when they object to how a government official is placed in his office. A litigant may assert, for example, that because someone is a principal rather than an inferior officer, he must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (Recall that just such an argument about CMCR judges led to Judge Mitchell's presidential appointment. See supra, at 2171.) But Ortiz's argument is not of that genre. He does not claim that the process used to make Judge Mitchell either a CCA judge or a CMCR judge violated the Appointments Clause. Instead, he claims to find in that Clause a principle relating to dual service. A CCA judge, Ortiz notes, is an inferior officer. See Edmond, 520 U.S., at 666, 117 S.Ct. 1573. But a CMCR judge, he says (though the Government has argued otherwise), is a principal officer. And in Ortiz's view, a single judge cannot, consistent with the Appointments Clause, serve as an inferior officer on one court and a principal officer on another. He calls such dual office-holding "incongru[ous]" and "functionally incompatible." Brief for Petitioners 50. The problem, he suggests, is that the other (inferior officer) judges on the CCA will be "unduly influenced by" Judge Mitchell's principal-officer status on the CMCR. Id., at 51.
But that argument stretches too far. This Court has never read the Appointments Clause to impose rules about dual service, separate and distinct from methods of appointment. Nor has it ever recognized principles of "incongruity" or "incompatibility" to test the permissibility of holding two offices. As Ortiz himself acknowledges, he can "cite no authority holding that the Appointments Clause prohibits this sort of simultaneous service." Id., at 52.
And if we were ever to apply the Clause to dual office-holding, we would not start here. Ortiz tells no plausible story about how Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR would result in "undue influence" on his CCA colleagues. The CMCR does not review the CCA's decisions (or vice versa); indeed, the two courts do not have any overlapping jurisdiction. They are parts of separate judicial systems, adjudicating different kinds of charges against different kinds of defendants. See supra, at 2170 - 2171, and n. 1. We cannot imagine that anyone on the CCA acceded to Judge Mitchell's views because he also sat on the CMCR-any more than we can imagine a judge on an Article III Court of Appeals yielding to a colleague because she did double duty on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (another specialized court). The CAAF put the point well: "When Colonel Mitchell sits as a CCA judge, he is no different from any other CCA judge." 76 M.J., at 193 ; see supra, at 2172. So there is no violation of the Appointments Clause.
IV
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the CAAF's decisions. In exercising that jurisdiction, we hold that Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR violated neither § 973(b)(2)(A)'s office-holding ban nor the Constitution's Appointments Clause. We therefore affirm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
In contrast to courts-martial, military commissions have historically been used to substitute for civilian courts in times of martial law or temporary military government, as well as to try members of enemy forces for violations of the laws of war. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 595-597, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) (plurality opinion).
At the same time we issued a writ of certiorari in this case, we granted and consolidated petitions in two related cases-Dalmazzi v. United States, No. 16-961, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2273, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 3073953 (2018) and Cox v. United States, No. 16-1017, ---U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 2273, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 3074030 (2018). Those cases raise issues of statutory jurisdiction that our disposition today makes it unnecessary to resolve. We accordingly dismiss Dalmazzi, ---U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at ----, 2018 WL 3073953, post, p. ----, and Cox, --- U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at ----, 2018 WL 3074030, post, p. ----, as improvidently granted in opinions accompanying this decision.
See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 129 S.Ct. 2213, 173 L.Ed.2d 1235 (2009) ; Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 119 S.Ct. 1538, 143 L.Ed.2d 720 (1999) ; United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) ; Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 117 S.Ct. 1573, 137 L.Ed.2d 917 (1997) ; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) ; Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 115 S.Ct. 2031, 132 L.Ed.2d 136 (1995) ; Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) ; Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 114 S.Ct. 752, 127 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) ; Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987).
The dissent asserts that, in setting out that test, we have "basically proceed[ed] as though Marbury were our last word on the subject" and overlooked "two centuries of precedent." Post, at 2193 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But the cases the dissent faults us for failing to cite stand for the same principle that we-and more important, Marbury -already set out. They too say that our appellate jurisdiction permits us to review only prior judicial decisions, rendered by courts. See, e.g., Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 97, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869) (Our "appellate jurisdiction" may "be exercised only in the revision of judicial decisions"); The Alicia, 7 Wall. 571, 573, 19 L.Ed. 84 (1869) ("[A]n appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies some judicial determination ... of an inferior tribunal, from which an appeal has been taken"); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 396, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (In exercising appellate jurisdiction, we act as a "supervising Court, whose peculiar province it is to correct the errors of an inferior Court"); Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807) (We exercise "appellate jurisdiction" in "revisi[ng] a decision of an inferior court"); post, at 2190 - 2192, 2194, 2195. Marbury, then, remains the key precedent.
The independent adjudicative nature of courts-martial is not inconsistent with their disciplinary function, as the dissent claims, see post, at 2198 - 2203. By adjudicating criminal charges against service members, courts-martial of course help to keep troops in line. But the way they do so-in comparison to, say, a commander in the field-is fundamentally judicial. Accord post, at 2188 - 2189 (THOMAS, J., concurring) ("While the CAAF is in the Executive Branch and its purpose is to help the President maintain troop discipline, those facts do not change the nature of the power that it exercises"). Colonel Winthrop stated as much: Even while courts-martial "enforc[e] discipline" in the armed forces, they remain "as fully a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal." W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 49, 54 (2d ed. 1920). And he was right. When a military judge convicts a service member and imposes punishment-up to execution-he is not meting out extra-judicial discipline. He is acting as a judge, in strict compliance with legal rules and principles-rather than as an "arm of military command." Post, at 2199. It is in fact one of the glories of this country that the military justice system is so deeply rooted in the rule of law. In asserting the opposite-that military courts are not "judicial" in "character"-the dissent cannot help but do what it says it would like to avoid: "denigrat [e the court-martial] system." Post, at 2203; see post, at 2202.
See, e.g., Artis v. District of Columbia, 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 594, 199 L.Ed.2d 473 (2018) ; Turner v. United States, 582 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1885, 198 L.Ed.2d 443 (2017) ; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) ; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) ; Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 1412, 75 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983) ; Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) ; United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) ; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974) ; Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 93 S.Ct. 1670, 36 L.Ed.2d 342 (1973). In none of these or similar cases has anyone ever challenged our appellate jurisdiction.
In addition, several Justices in separate opinions have made the same linkage. See, e.g., Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1951, 191 L.Ed.2d 911 (2015) (ROBERTS, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "narrow exceptions permit Congress to establish non-Article III courts to exercise general jurisdiction in the territories and the District of Columbia [and] to serve as military tribunals"); id., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1964 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (referring to territorial courts and courts-martial as "unique historical exceptions" to Article III); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504-505, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the "firmly established historical practice" of exempting territorial courts and courts-martial from Article III's demands).
The dissent must dismiss all this authority, from Justices both functionalist and formalist, to aver that "it is only when Congress legislates for the Territories and the District that it may lawfully vest judicial power in tribunals that do not conform to Article III." Post, at 2197; see post, at 2196 - 2197. Not so, we have made clear, because (once again) of an exceptional grant of power to Congress, an entrenched historical practice, and (for some more functionalist judges) particularized needs. The result is "that Congress has the power [apart from Article III] to provide for the adjudication of disputes among the Armed Forces," just as in the territories and the District. Wellness, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1964 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
The dissent offers a different-and doubly misleading-explanation for Vallandigham . First, it says that we found jurisdiction lacking because the commission was "was not one of the 'courts of the United States' established under Article III." Post, at 2194 - 2195 (quoting Vallandigham, 1 Wall., at 251 ). But the dissent is reading from the wrong part of the opinion. Vallandigham contained two holdings-first (and relevant here), that Article III precluded the Court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over the commission's decisions, and second (and irrelevant here), that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had not authorized such jurisdiction. The language the dissent quotes relates only to the irrelevant statutory holding: The Judiciary Act, the Court explained, confined our jurisdiction to decisions of Article III courts, and the commission did not fit under that rubric. By contrast, the language we quote in the text formed the basis of the Court's constitutional holding-which is all that matters here. Second, the dissent contends that Vallandigham "recognized that the military tribunal had 'judicial character,' " even as it found jurisdiction lacking. Post, at 2195. Not so. Vallandigham expressly rejected the argument that the commission had "judicial character." 1 Wall., at 253. Though the Court understood that the commission pronounced guilt and imposed sentences, it did not think the commission was acting as a court in rendering its decisions. See ibid. (citing United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 46-47, 14 L.Ed. 40 (1852), in which the Court held that a claims tribunal was without judicial "character" and labeled its decisions the "award[s] of a commissioner," "not the judgment[s] of a court of justice").
The dissent contends that the CAAF's decisions are not always final because the President, relevant branch secretary, or one of his subordinates must approve a sentence of death or dismissal from the armed forces before it goes into effect. See post, at 2203 - 2205. But as the Government has explained, the President's (or other executive official's) authority at that stage extends only to punishment: It is "akin to relief by commutation in the federal or state system." Tr. of Oral Arg. 57; see Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 247 (C.A.A.F.2005) (likening the approval authority to "executive clemency powers"). The President, even when "mitigat[ing a] sentence[,]" cannot "upset[ ] the conviction" or "the judgment of the CAAF." Tr. of Oral Arg. 55-56. Rather, as we said above, the CAAF's judgment is final when issued (except if we reverse it). See 10 U.S.C. § 871(c)(1) (stating that even when a sentence is subject to an executive official's approval, the "judgment" is "final" when judicial review is concluded).
We state no opinion on a broader argument the Government makes-that § 950f(b)(2) would exempt Judge Mitchell from § 973(b)(2)(A)'s office-holding ban even if the Secretary had not assigned him to the CMCR before the President's appointment. See Brief for United States 27-29. And because we hold that the Secretary's assignment authorized Judge Mitchell to serve on the CMCR while an active-duty military officer, we need not decide whether a CMCR judgeship is a covered "civil office" subject to § 973(b)(2)(A). Neither need we address the remedial issue on which the CAAF ruled, see supra, at 2172-i.e., whether a violation of § 973(b)(2)(A) would have immediately terminated Judge Mitchell's military service and voided later decisions he made (including in Ortiz's case) as a military judge. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
Curtis Giovanni FLOWERS, Petitioner
v.
MISSISSIPPI
No. 17-9572
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued March 20, 2019
Decided June 21, 2019
Sheri Lynn Johnson for the petitioner.
Special Assistant Attorney General Jason Davis for the respondent.
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Counsel of Record, Keir M. Weyble, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY, Alison Steiner, Office of the State Public, Defender Capital Defense, Counsel Division, Jackson, MS, for petitioner.
Jim Hood, Attorney General, State of Mississippi, Jason Davis, Counsel of Record, Special Assistant Attorney General, Brad Smith, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Jackson, MI, for respondent.
Justice KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), this Court ruled that a State may not discriminate on the basis of race when exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors in a criminal trial.
In 1996, Curtis Flowers allegedly murdered four people in Winona, Mississippi. Flowers is black. He has been tried six separate times before a jury for murder. The same lead prosecutor represented the State in all six trials.
In the initial three trials, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction. In the first trial, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to "numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct." Flowers v. State , 773 So.2d 309, 327 (2000). In the second trial, the trial court found that the prosecutor discriminated on the basis of race in the peremptory challenge of a black juror. The trial court seated the black juror. Flowers was then convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed the conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct at trial. In the third trial, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court yet again reversed the conviction, this time because the court concluded that the prosecutor had again discriminated against black prospective jurors in the jury selection process. The court's lead opinion stated: "The instant case presents us with as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context of a Batson challenge." Flowers v. State , 947 So.2d 910, 935 (2007). The opinion further stated that the "State engaged in racially discriminatory practices during the jury selection process" and that the "case evinces an effort by the State to exclude African-Americans from jury service." Id., at 937, 939.
The fourth and fifth trials of Flowers ended in mistrials due to hung juries.
In his sixth trial, which is the one at issue here, Flowers was convicted. The State struck five of the six black prospective jurors. On appeal, Flowers argued that the State again violated Batson in exercising peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. In a divided 5-to-4 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. We granted certiorari on the Batson question and now reverse. See 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 451, 202 L.Ed.2d 346 (2018).
Four critical facts, taken together, require reversal. First , in the six trials combined, the State employed its peremptory challenges to strike 41 of the 42 black prospective jurors that it could have struck-a statistic that the State acknowledged at oral argument in this Court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32. Second , in the most recent trial, the sixth trial, the State exercised peremptory strikes against five of the six black prospective jurors. Third , at the sixth trial, in an apparent effort to find pretextual reasons to strike black prospective jurors, the State engaged in dramatically disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors. Fourth , the State then struck at least one black prospective juror, Carolyn Wright, who was similarly situated to white prospective jurors who were not struck by the State.
We need not and do not decide that any one of those four facts alone would require reversal. All that we need to decide, and all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court committed clear error in concluding that the State's peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not "motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent." Foster v. Chatman , 578 U. S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1754, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching that conclusion, we break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and we remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
I
The underlying events that gave rise to this case took place in Winona, Mississippi.
Winona is a small town in northern Mississippi, just off I-55 almost halfway between Jackson and Memphis. The total population of Winona is about 5,000. The town is about 53 percent black and about 46 percent white.
In 1996, Bertha Tardy, Robert Golden, Derrick Stewart, and Carmen Rigby were murdered at the Tardy Furniture store in Winona. All four victims worked at the Tardy Furniture store. Three of the four victims were white; one was black. In 1997, the State charged Curtis Flowers with murder. Flowers is black. Since then, Flowers has been tried six separate times for the murders. In each of the first two trials, Flowers was tried for one individual murder. In each subsequent trial, Flowers was tried for all four of the murders together. The same state prosecutor tried Flowers each time. The prosecutor is white.
At Flowers' first trial, 36 prospective jurors-5 black and 31 white-were presented to potentially serve on the jury. The State exercised a total of 12 peremptory strikes, and it used 5 of them to strike the five qualified black prospective jurors. Flowers objected, arguing under Batson that the State had exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The trial court rejected the Batson challenge. Because the trial court allowed the State's peremptory strikes, Flowers was tried in front of an all-white jury. The jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the State had committed prosecutorial misconduct in front of the jury by, among other things, expressing baseless grounds for doubting the credibility of witnesses and mentioning facts that had not been allowed into evidence by the trial judge. Flowers , 773 So.2d at 317, 334. In its opinion, the Mississippi Supreme Court described "numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct" at the trial. Id., at 327. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed based on prosecutorial misconduct at trial, the court did not reach Flowers' Batson argument. See Flowers , 773 So.2d at 327.
At the second trial, 30 prospective jurors-5 black and 25 white-were presented to potentially serve on the jury. As in Flowers' first trial, the State again used its strikes against all five black prospective jurors. But this time, the trial court determined that the State's asserted reason for one of the strikes was a pretext for discrimination. Specifically, the trial court determined that one of the State's proffered reasons-that the juror had been inattentive and was nodding off during jury selection-for striking that juror was false, and the trial court therefore sustained Flowers' Batson challenge. The trial court disallowed the strike and sat that black juror on the jury. The jury at Flowers' second trial consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror. The jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court again reversed. The court ruled that the prosecutor had again engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in front of the jury by, among other things, impermissibly referencing evidence and attempting to undermine witness credibility without a factual basis. See Flowers v. State , 842 So.2d 531, 538, 553 (2003).
At Flowers' third trial, 45 prospective jurors-17 black and 28 white-were presented to potentially serve on the jury. One of the black prospective jurors was struck for cause, leaving 16. The State exercised a total of 15 peremptory strikes, and it used all 15 against black prospective jurors. Flowers again argued that the State had used its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The trial court found that the State had not discriminated on the basis of race. See Flowers , 947 So.2d at 916. The jury in Flowers' third trial consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror. The lone black juror who served on the jury was seated after the State ran out of peremptory strikes. The jury convicted Flowers and sentenced him to death.
On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court yet again reversed, concluding that the State had again violated Batson by discriminating on the basis of race in exercising all 15 of its peremptory strikes against 15 black prospective jurors. See Flowers , 947 So.2d at 939. The court's lead opinion stated: "The instant case presents us with as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context of a Batson challenge." Id., at 935. The opinion explained that although "each individual strike may have justifiably appeared to the trial court to be sufficiently race neutral, the trial court also has a duty to look at the State's use of peremptory challenges in toto ." Id., at 937. The opinion emphasized that "trial judges should not blindly accept any and every reason put forth by the State, especially" when "the State continues to exercise challenge after challenge only upon members of a particular race." Ibid . The opinion added that the "State engaged in racially discriminatory practices" and that the "case evinces an effort by the State to exclude African-Americans from jury service." Id., at 937, 939.
At Flowers' fourth trial, 36 prospective jurors-16 black and 20 white-were presented to potentially serve on the jury. The State exercised a total of 11 peremptory strikes, and it used all 11 against black prospective jurors. But because of the relatively large number of prospective jurors who were black, the State did not have enough peremptory challenges to eliminate all of the black prospective jurors. The seated jury consisted of seven white jurors and five black jurors. That jury could not reach a verdict, and the proceeding ended in a mistrial.
As to the fifth trial, there is no available racial information about the prospective jurors, as distinct from the jurors who ultimately sat on the jury. The jury was composed of nine white jurors and three black jurors. The jury could not reach a verdict, and the trial again ended in a mistrial.
At the sixth trial, which we consider here, 26 prospective jurors-6 black and 20 white-were presented to potentially serve on the jury. The State exercised a total of six peremptory strikes, and it used five of the six against black prospective jurors, leaving one black juror to sit on the jury. Flowers again argued that the State had exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. The trial court concluded that the State had offered race-neutral reasons for each of the five peremptory strikes against the five black prospective jurors. The jury at Flowers' sixth trial consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror. That jury convicted Flowers of murder and sentenced him to death.
In a divided decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the trial court on the Batson issue and stated that the State's "race-neutral reasons were valid and not merely pretextual." Flowers v. State , 158 So.3d 1009, 1058 (2014). Flowers then sought review in this Court. This Court granted Flowers' petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court, and remanded for further consideration in light of the decision in Foster , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1. Flowers v. Mississippi , 579 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2157, 195 L.Ed.2d 817 (2016). In Foster , this Court held that the defendant Foster had established a Batson violation. 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1755.
On remand, the Mississippi Supreme Court by a 5-to-4 vote again upheld Flowers' conviction. See 240 So.3d 1082 (2017). Justice King wrote a dissent for three justices. He stated: "I cannot conclude that Flowers received a fair trial, nor can I conclude that prospective jurors were not subjected to impermissible discrimination." Id ., at 1172. According to Justice King, both the trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court "completely disregard[ed] the constitutional right of prospective jurors to be free from a racially discriminatory selection process." Id., at 1171. We granted certiorari. See 586 U. S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 451, 202 L.Ed.2d 346.
II
A
Other than voting, serving on a jury is the most substantial opportunity that most citizens have to participate in the democratic process. See Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 407, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).
Jury selection in criminal cases varies significantly based on state and local rules and practices, but ordinarily consists of three phases, which we describe here in general terms. First , a group of citizens in the community is randomly summoned to the courthouse on a particular day for potential jury service. Second , a subgroup of those prospective jurors is called into a particular courtroom for a specific case. The prospective jurors are often questioned by the judge, as well as by the prosecutor and defense attorney. During that second phase, the judge may excuse certain prospective jurors based on their answers. Third , the prosecutor and defense attorney may challenge certain prospective jurors. The attorneys may challenge prospective jurors for cause, which usually stems from a potential juror's conflicts of interest or inability to be impartial. In addition to challenges for cause, each side is typically afforded a set number of peremptory challenges or strikes. Peremptory strikes have very old credentials and can be traced back to the common law. Those peremptory strikes traditionally may be used to remove any potential juror for any reason-no questions asked.
That blanket discretion to peremptorily strike prospective jurors for any reason can clash with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This case arises at the intersection of the peremptory challenge and the Equal Protection Clause. And to understand how equal protection law applies to peremptory challenges, it helps to begin at the beginning.
Ratified in 1868 in the wake of the Civil War, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." A primary objective of the Equal Protection Clause, this Court stated just five years after ratification, was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases , 16 Wall. 36, 71, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873).
In 1875, to help enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed and President Ulysses S. Grant signed the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. Among other things, that law made it a criminal offense for state officials to exclude individuals from jury service on account of their race. 18 U. S. C. § 243. The Act provides: "No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
In 1880, just 12 years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court decided Strauder v. West Virginia , 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664. That case concerned a West Virginia statute that allowed whites only to serve as jurors. The Court held the law unconstitutional.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment required "that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color." Id., at 307. In the words of the Strauder Court: "The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." Id ., at 308. For those reasons, the Court ruled that the West Virginia statute excluding blacks from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the Court later explained in Brown v. Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), the Court's decisions in the Slaughter-House Cases and Strauder interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment "as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race," including in jury service. Brown , 347 U.S. at 490, 74 S.Ct. 686.
In the decades after Strauder , the Court reiterated that States may not discriminate on the basis of race in jury selection. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware , 103 U.S. 370, 397, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1881) ; Carter v. Texas , 177 U.S. 442, 447, 20 S.Ct. 687, 44 L.Ed. 839 (1900) ; Norris v. Alabama , 294 U.S. 587, 597-599, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935) ; Hale v. Kentucky , 303 U.S. 613, 616, 58 S.Ct. 753, 82 L.Ed. 1050 (1938) (per curiam ); Pierre v. Louisiana , 306 U.S. 354, 362, 59 S.Ct. 536, 83 L.Ed. 757 (1939) ; Smith v. Texas , 311 U.S. 128, 130-131, 61 S.Ct. 164, 85 L.Ed. 84 (1940) ; Avery v. Georgia , 345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953) ; Hernandez v. Texas , 347 U.S. 475, 477-478, 482, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954) ; Coleman v. Alabama , 377 U.S. 129, 133, 84 S.Ct. 1152, 12 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964).
But critical problems persisted. Even though laws barring blacks from serving on juries were unconstitutional after Strauder , many jurisdictions employed various discriminatory tools to prevent black persons from being called for jury service. And when those tactics failed, or were invalidated, prosecutors could still exercise peremptory strikes in individual cases to remove most or all black prospective jurors.
In the century after Strauder , the freedom to exercise peremptory strikes for any reason meant that "the problem of racial exclusion from jury service" remained "widespread" and "deeply entrenched." 5 U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Report 90 (1961). Simple math shows how that happened. Given that blacks were a minority of the population, in many jurisdictions the number of peremptory strikes available to the prosecutor exceeded the number of black prospective jurors. So prosecutors could routinely exercise peremptories to strike all the black prospective jurors and thereby ensure all-white juries. The exclusion of black prospective jurors was almost total in certain jurisdictions, especially in cases involving black defendants. Similarly, defense counsel could use-and routinely did use-peremptory challenges to strike all the black prospective jurors in cases involving white defendants and black victims.
In the aftermath of Strauder , the exclusion of black jurors became more covert and less overt-often accomplished through peremptory challenges in individual courtrooms rather than by blanket operation of law. But as this Court later noted, the results were the same for black jurors and black defendants, as well as for the black community's confidence in the fairness of the American criminal justice system. See Batson , 476 U.S. at 98-99, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Eighty-five years after Strauder , the Court decided Swain v. Alabama , 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). The defendant Swain was black. Swain was convicted of a capital offense in Talladega County, Alabama, and sentenced to death. Swain presented evidence that no black juror had served on a jury in Talladega County in more than a decade. See id ., at 226, 85 S.Ct. 824. And in Swain's case, the prosecutor struck all six qualified black prospective jurors, ensuring that Swain was tried before an all-white jury. Swain invoked Strauder to argue that the prosecutor in his case had impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race by using peremptory challenges to strike the six black prospective jurors. See 380 U.S. at 203, 210, 85 S.Ct. 824.
This Court ruled that Swain had not established unconstitutional discrimination. Most importantly, the Court held that a defendant could not object to the State's use of peremptory strikes in an individual case. In the Court's words: "[W]e cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws." Id., at 221, 85 S.Ct. 824. The Swain Court reasoned that prosecutors do not always judge prospective jurors individually when exercising peremptory strikes. Instead, prosecutors choose which prospective jurors to strike "in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group affiliations, in the context of the case to be tried." Ibid . In the Court's view, the prosecutor could strike prospective jurors on the basis of their group affiliations, including race. In other words, a prosecutor could permissibly strike a prospective juror for any reason, including the assumption or belief that a black prospective juror, because of race, would be favorable to a black defendant or unfavorable to the State. See id., at 220-221, 85 S.Ct. 824.
To be sure, the Swain Court held that a defendant could make out a case of racial discrimination by showing that the State "in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be," had been responsible for the removal of qualified black prospective jurors so that no black jurors "ever serve on petit juries." Id., at 223, 85 S.Ct. 824. But Swain 's high bar for establishing a constitutional violation was almost impossible for any defendant to surmount, as the aftermath of Swain amply demonstrated.
Twenty-one years later, in its 1986 decision in Batson , the Court revisited several critical aspects of Swain and in essence overruled them. In so doing, the Batson Court emphasized that "the central concern"
of the Fourteenth Amendment "was to put an end to governmental discrimination on account of race." 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Batson Court noted that Swain had left prosecutors' peremptory challenges "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 476 U.S. at 92-93, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In his concurrence in Batson , Justice Byron White (the author of Swain ) agreed that Swain should be overruled. He stated: "[T]he practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread, so much so" that "I agree with the Court that the time has come to rule as it has." 476 U.S. at 101-102, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Under Batson , once a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown by a defendant, the State must provide race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were the actual reasons or instead were a pretext for discrimination. Id., at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Four parts of Batson warrant particular emphasis here.
First , the Batson Court rejected Swain 's insistence that a defendant demonstrate a history of racially discriminatory strikes in order to make out a claim of race discrimination. See 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. 1712. According to the Batson Court, defendants had run into "practical difficulties" in trying to prove that a State had systematically "exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury on account of race." Id ., at 92, n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Batson Court explained that, in some jurisdictions, requiring a defendant to "investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury, and the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges" posed an "insurmountable" burden. Ibid .
In addition to that practical point, the Court stressed a basic equal protection point: In the eyes of the Constitution, one racially discriminatory peremptory strike is one too many.
For those reasons, the Batson Court held that a criminal defendant could show "purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial ." Id ., at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added).
Second , the Batson Court rejected Swain 's statement that a prosecutor could strike a black juror based on an assumption or belief that the black juror would favor a black defendant. In some of the most critical sentences in the Batson opinion, the Court emphasized that a prosecutor may not rebut a claim of discrimination "by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race." 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court elaborated: The Equal Protection Clause "forbids the States to strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case simply because the defendant is black. The core guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' race." Id., at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In his concurrence, Justice Thurgood Marshall drove the point home: "Exclusion of blacks from a jury, solely because of race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks are less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically the State's case against a black defendant than it can be justified by the notion that blacks lack the intelligence, experience, or moral integrity to be entrusted with that role." Id., at 104-105, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Third , the Batson Court did not accept the argument that race-based peremptories should be permissible because black, white, Asian, and Hispanic defendants and jurors were all "equally" subject to race-based discrimination. The Court stated that each removal of an individual juror because of his or her race is a constitutional violation. Discrimination against one defendant or juror on account of race is not remedied or cured by discrimination against other defendants or jurors on account of race. As the Court later explained: Some say that there is no equal protection violation if individuals "of all races are subject to like treatment, which is to say that white jurors are subject to the same risk of peremptory challenges based on race as are all other jurors. The suggestion that racial classifications may survive when visited upon all persons is no more authoritative today than the case which advanced the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson , 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). This idea has no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree." Powers , 499 U.S. at 410, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citing Loving v. Virginia , 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) ).
Fourth , the Batson Court did not accept the argument that race-based peremptories are permissible because both the prosecution and defense could employ them in any individual case and in essence balance things out. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stressed, even a single instance of race discrimination against a prospective juror is impermissible. Moreover, in criminal cases involving black defendants, the both-sides-can-do-it argument overlooks the percentage of the United States population that is black (about 12 percent) and the cold reality of jury selection in most jurisdictions. Because blacks are a minority in most jurisdictions, prosecutors often have more peremptory strikes than there are black prospective jurors on a particular panel. In the pre- Batson era, therefore, allowing each side in a case involving a black defendant to strike prospective jurors on the basis of race meant that a prosecutor could eliminate all of the black jurors, but a black defendant could not eliminate all of the white jurors. So in the real world of criminal trials against black defendants, both history and math tell us that a system of race-based peremptories does not treat black defendants and black prospective jurors equally with prosecutors and white prospective jurors. Cf. Batson , 476 U.S. at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
B
Equal justice under law requires a criminal trial free of racial discrimination in the jury selection process. Enforcing that constitutional principle, Batson ended the widespread practice in which prosecutors could (and often would) routinely strike all black prospective jurors in cases involving black defendants. By taking steps to eradicate racial discrimination from the jury selection process, Batson sought to protect the rights of defendants and jurors, and to enhance public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Batson immediately revolutionized the jury selection process that takes place every day in federal and state criminal courtrooms throughout the United States.
In the decades since Batson , this Court's cases have vigorously enforced and reinforced the decision, and guarded against any backsliding. See Foster , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Snyder v. Louisiana , 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ; Miller-El v. Dretke , 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) ( Miller-El II ). Moreover, the Court has extended Batson in certain ways. A defendant of any race may raise a Batson claim, and a defendant may raise a Batson claim even if the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races. See Hernandez , 347 U.S. at 477-478, 74 S.Ct. 667 ; Powers , 499 U.S. at 406, 111 S.Ct. 1364. Moreover, Batson now applies to gender discrimination, to a criminal defendant's peremptory strikes, and to civil cases. See J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. , 511 U.S. 127, 129, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) ; Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. , 500 U.S. 614, 616, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991).
Of particular relevance here, Batson 's holding raised several important evidentiary and procedural issues, three of which we underscore.
First , what factors does the trial judge consider in evaluating whether racial discrimination occurred? Our precedents allow criminal defendants raising Batson challenges to present a variety of evidence to support a claim that a prosecutor's peremptory strikes were made on the basis of race. For example, defendants may present:
• statistical evidence about the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors as compared to white prospective jurors in the case;
• evidence of a prosecutor's disparate questioning and investigation of black and white prospective jurors in the case;
• side-by-side comparisons of black prospective jurors who were struck and white prospective jurors who were not struck in the case;
• a prosecutor's misrepresentations of the record when defending the strikes during the Batson hearing;
• relevant history of the State's peremptory strikes in past cases; or
• other relevant circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial discrimination.
See Foster , 578 U. S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 195 L.Ed.2d 1 ; Snyder , 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 ; Miller-El II , 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 ; Batson , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.
Second , who enforces Batson ? As the Batson Court itself recognized, the job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges. See id ., at 97, 99, n. 22, 106 S.Ct. 1712. America's trial judges operate at the front lines of American justice. In criminal trials, trial judges possess the primary responsibility to enforce Batson and prevent racial discrimination from seeping into the jury selection process.
As the Batson Court explained and as the Court later reiterated, once a prima facie case of racial discrimination has been established, the prosecutor must provide race-neutral reasons for the strikes. The trial court must consider the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations in light of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and in light of the arguments of the parties. The trial judge's assessment of the prosecutor's credibility is often important. The Court has explained that "the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge." Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203 (quotation altered). "We have recognized that these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie peculiarly within a trial judge's province." Ibid . (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial judge must determine whether the prosecutor's proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. The ultimate inquiry is whether the State was "motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent." Foster , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third , what is the role of appellate review? An appeals court looks at the same factors as the trial judge, but is necessarily doing so on a paper record. "Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." Batson , 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court has described the appellate standard of review of the trial court's factual determinations in a Batson hearing as "highly deferential." Snyder , 552 U.S. at 479, 128 S.Ct. 1203. "On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous." Id., at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203.
III
In accord with the principles set forth in Batson , we now address Flowers' case.
The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose. See Foster , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1747. The question for this Court is whether the Mississippi trial court clearly erred in concluding that the State was not "motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent" when exercising peremptory strikes at Flowers' sixth trial. Id ., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1754 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Snyder , 552 U.S. at 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203. Because this case arises on direct review, we owe no deference to the Mississippi Supreme Court, as distinct from deference to the Mississippi trial court.
Four categories of evidence loom large in assessing the Batson issue in Flowers' case: (1) the history from Flowers' six trials, (2) the prosecutor's striking of five of six black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, (3) the prosecutor's dramatically disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial, and (4) the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking one black juror (Carolyn Wright) while allowing other similarly situated white jurors to serve on the jury at the sixth trial. We address each in turn.
A
First, we consider the relevant history of the case. Recall that in Swain , the Court held that a defendant may prove racial discrimination by establishing a historical pattern of racial exclusion of jurors in the jurisdiction in question. Indeed, under Swain , that was the only way that a defendant could make out a claim that the State discriminated on the basis of race in the use of peremptory challenges.
In Batson , the Court ruled that Swain had imposed too heavy a burden on defendants seeking to prove that a prosecutor had used peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson lowered the evidentiary burden for defendants to contest prosecutors' use of peremptory strikes and made clear that demonstrating a history of discriminatory strikes in past cases was not necessary.
In doing so, however, Batson did not preclude defendants from still using the same kinds of historical evidence that Swain had allowed defendants to use to support a claim of racial discrimination. Most importantly for present purposes, after Batson, the trial judge may still consider historical evidence of the State's discriminatory peremptory strikes from past trials in the jurisdiction, just as Swain had allowed. After Batson , the defendant may still cast Swain 's "wide net" to gather " 'relevant' " evidence. Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 239-240, 125 S.Ct. 2317. A defendant may rely on "all relevant circumstances." Batson , 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Here, our review of the history of the prosecutor's peremptory strikes in Flowers' first four trials strongly supports the conclusion that his use of peremptory strikes in Flowers' sixth trial was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. (Recall that there is no record evidence from the fifth trial regarding the race of the prospective jurors.)
The numbers speak loudly. Over the course of the first four trials, there were 36 black prospective jurors against whom the State could have exercised a peremptory strike. The State tried to strike all 36. The State used its avail-able peremptory strikes to attempt to strike every single black prospective juror that it could have struck. (At oral argument in this Court, the State acknowledged that statistic. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32.) Not only did the State's use of peremptory strikes in Flowers' first four trials reveal a blatant pattern of striking black prospective jurors, the Mississippi courts themselves concluded on two separate occasions that the State violated Batson . In Flowers' second trial, the trial court concluded that the State discriminated against a black juror. Specifically, the trial court determined that one of the State's proffered reasons-that the juror had been inattentive and was nodding off during jury selection-for striking that juror was false, and the trial court therefore sustained Flowers' Batson challenge. In Flowers' next trial-his third trial-the prosecutor used all 15 of its peremptories to strike 15 black prospective jurors. The lead opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: "The instant case presents us with as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination as we have ever seen in the context of a Batson challenge." Flowers , 947 So.2d at 935. The opinion further stated that "the State engaged in racially discriminatory practices during the jury selection process" and that the "case evinces an effort by the State to exclude African-Americans from jury service." Id., at 937, 939.
To summarize the most relevant history: In Flowers' first trial, the prosecutor successfully used peremptory strikes against all of the black prospective jurors. Flowers faced an all-white jury. In Flowers' second trial, the prosecutor tried again to strike all of the black prospective jurors, but the trial court decided that the State could not strike one of those jurors. The jury consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror. In Flowers' third trial, there were 17 black prospective jurors. The prosecutor used 15 out of 15 peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. After one black juror was struck for cause and the prosecutor ran out of strikes, one black juror remained. The jury again consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror. In Flowers' fourth trial, the prosecutor again used 11 out of 11 peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. Because of the large number of black prospective jurors at the trial, the prosecutor ran out of peremptory strikes before it could strike all of the black prospective jurors. The jury for that trial consisted of seven white jurors and five black jurors, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict. To reiterate, there is no available information about the race of prospective jurors in the fifth trial. The jury for that trial consisted of nine white jurors and three black jurors, and the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
Stretching across Flowers' first four trials, the State employed its peremptory strikes to remove as many black prospective jurors as possible. The State appeared to proceed as if Batson had never been decided. The State's relentless, determined effort to rid the jury of black individuals strongly suggests that the State wanted to try Flowers before a jury with as few black jurors as possible, and ideally before an all-white jury. The trial judge was aware of the history. But the judge did not sufficiently account for the history when considering Flowers' Batson claim.
The State's actions in the first four trials necessarily inform our assessment of the State's intent going into Flowers' sixth trial. We cannot ignore that history. We cannot take that history out of the case.
B
We turn now to the State's strikes of five of the six black prospective jurors at Flowers' sixth trial, the trial at issue here. As Batson noted, a " 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination." 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
Flowers' sixth trial occurred in June 2010. At trial, 26 prospective jurors were presented to potentially serve on the jury. Six of the prospective jurors were black. The State accepted one black prospective juror-Alexander Robinson. The State struck the other five black prospective jurors-Carolyn Wright, Tashia Cunningham, Edith Burnside, Flancie Jones, and Dianne Copper. The resulting jury consisted of 11 white jurors and 1 black juror.
The State's use of peremptory strikes in Flowers' sixth trial followed the same pattern as the first four trials, with one modest exception: It is true that the State accepted one black juror for Flowers' sixth trial. But especially given the history of the case, that fact alone cannot insulate the State from a Batson challenge. In Miller-El II , this Court skeptically viewed the State's decision to accept one black juror, explaining that a prosecutor might do so in an attempt "to obscure the otherwise consistent pattern of opposition to" seating black jurors. 545 U.S. at 250, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The overall record of this case suggests that the same tactic may have been employed here. In light of all of the circumstances here, the State's decision to strike five of the six black prospective jurors is further evidence suggesting that the State was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.
C
We next consider the State's dramatically disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors in the jury selection process for Flowers' sixth trial. As Batson explained, "the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose." 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
The questioning process occurred through an initial group voir dire and then more in-depth follow-up questioning by the prosecutor and defense counsel of individual prospective jurors. The State asked the five black prospective jurors who were struck a total of 145 questions. By contrast, the State asked the 11 seated white jurors a total of 12 questions. On average, therefore, the State asked 29 questions to each struck black prospective juror. The State asked an average of one question to each seated white juror.
One can slice and dice the statistics and come up with all sorts of ways to compare the State's questioning of excluded black jurors with the State's questioning of the accepted white jurors. But any meaningful comparison yields the same basic assessment: The State spent far more time questioning the black prospective jurors than the accepted white jurors.
The State acknowledges, as it must under our precedents, that disparate questioning can be probative of discriminatory intent. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 331-332, 344-345, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) ( Miller-El I ). As Miller-El I stated, "if the use of disparate questioning is determined by race at the outset, it is likely [that] a justification for a strike based on the resulting divergent views would be pretextual. In this context the differences in the questions posed by the prosecutors are some evidence of purposeful discrimination." Id., at 344, 123 S.Ct. 1029.
But the State here argues that it questioned black and white prospective jurors differently only because of differences in the jurors' characteristics. The record refutes that explanation.
For example, Dianne Copper was a black prospective juror who was struck. The State asked her 18 follow-up questions about her relationships with Flowers' family and with witnesses in the case. App. 188-190. Pamela Chesteen was a white juror whom the State accepted for the jury. Although the State asked questions of Chesteen during group voir dire , the State asked her no individual follow-up questions about her relationships with Flowers' family, even though the State was aware that Chesteen knew several members of Flowers' family. Compare id ., at 83, with id ., at 111. Similarly, the State asked no individual follow-up questions to four other white prospective jurors who, like Dianne Copper, had relationships with defense witnesses, even though the State was aware of those relationships. Those white prospective jurors were Larry Blaylock, Harold Waller, Marcus Fielder, and Bobby Lester.
Likewise, the State conducted disparate investigations of certain prospective jurors. Tashia Cunningham, who is black, stated that she worked with Flowers' sister, but that the two did not work closely together. To try to disprove that statement, the State summoned a witness to challenge Cunningham's testimony. Id ., at 148-150. The State apparently did not conduct similar investigations of white prospective jurors.
It is certainly reasonable for the State to ask follow-up questions or to investigate the relationships of jurors to the victims, potential witnesses, and the like. But white prospective jurors who were acquainted with the Flowers' family or defense witnesses were not questioned extensively by the State or investigated. White prospective jurors who admitted that they or a relative had been convicted of a crime were accepted without apparent further inquiry by the State. The difference in the State's approaches to black and white prospective jurors was stark.
Why did the State ask so many more questions-and conduct more vigorous inquiry-of black prospective jurors than it did of white prospective jurors? No one can know for certain. But this Court's cases explain that disparate questioning and investigation of prospective jurors on the basis of race can arm a prosecutor with seemingly race-neutral reasons to strike the prospective jurors of a particular race. See Miller-El I , 537 U.S. at 331-332, 344-345, 123 S.Ct. 1029. In other words, by asking a lot of questions of the black prospective jurors or conducting additional inquiry into their backgrounds, a prosecutor can try to find some pretextual reason-any reason-that the prosecutor can later articulate to justify what is in reality a racially motivated strike. And by not doing the same for white prospective jurors, by not asking white prospective jurors those same questions, the prosecutor can try to distort the record so as to thereby avoid being accused of treating black and white jurors differently. Disparity in questioning and investigation can produce a record that says little about white prospective jurors and is therefore resistant to characteristic-by-characteristic comparisons of struck black prospective jurors and seated white jurors. Prosecutors can decline to seek what they do not want to find about white prospective jurors.
A court confronting that kind of pattern cannot ignore it. The lopsidedness of the prosecutor's questioning and inquiry can itself be evidence of the prosecutor's objective as much as it is of the actual qualifications of the black and white prospective jurors who are struck or seated. The prosecutor's dramatically disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors-at least if it rises to a certain level of disparity-can supply a clue that the prosecutor may have been seeking to paper the record and disguise a discriminatory intent. See ibid .
To be clear, disparate questioning or investigation alone does not constitute a Batson violation. The disparate questioning or investigation of black and white prospective jurors may reflect ordinary race-neutral considerations. But the disparate questioning or investigation can also, along with other evidence, inform the trial court's evaluation of whether discrimination occurred.
Here, along with the historical evidence we described above from the earlier trials, as well as the State's striking of five of six black prospective jurors at the sixth trial, the dramatically disparate questioning and investigation of black prospective jurors and white prospective jurors at the sixth trial strongly suggests that the State was motivated in substantial part by a discriminatory intent. We agree with the observation of the dissenting justices of the Mississippi Supreme Court: The "numbers described above are too disparate to be explained away or categorized as mere happenstance." 240 So.3d at 1161 (opinion of King, J.).
D
Finally, in combination with the other facts and circumstances in this case, the record of jury selection at the sixth trial shows that the peremptory strike of at least one of the black prospective jurors (Carolyn Wright) was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. As this Court has stated, the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose. See Foster, 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1747.
Comparing prospective jurors who were struck and not struck can be an important step in determining whether a Batson violation occurred. See Snyder , 552 U.S. at 483-484, 128 S.Ct. 1203 ; Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The comparison can suggest that the prosecutor's proffered explanations for striking black prospective jurors were a pretext for discrimination. When a prosecutor's "proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack panelist who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination." Foster , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1754 (quotation altered). Although a defendant ordinarily will try to identify a similar white prospective juror whom the State did not strike, a defendant is not required to identify an identical white juror for the side-by-side comparison to be suggestive of discriminatory intent. Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 247, n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
In this case, Carolyn Wright was a black prospective juror who said she was strongly in favor of the death penalty as a general matter. And she had a family member who was a prison security guard. Yet the State exercised a peremptory strike against Wright. The State said it struck Wright in part because she knew several defense witnesses and had worked at Wal-Mart where Flowers' father also worked.
Winona is a small town. Wright had some sort of connection to 34 people involved in Flowers' case, both on the prosecution witness side and the defense witness side. See, 240 So.3d at 1126. But three white prospective jurors-Pamela Chesteen, Harold Waller, and Bobby Lester-also knew many individuals involved in the case. Chesteen knew 31 people, Waller knew 18 people, and Lester knew 27 people. See ibid. Yet as we explained above, the State did not ask Chesteen, Waller, and Lester individual follow-up questions about their connections to witnesses. That is a telling statistic. If the State were concerned about prospective jurors' connections to witnesses in the case, the State presumably would have used individual questioning to ask those potential white jurors whether they could remain impartial despite their relationships. A "State's failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination." Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 246, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Both Carolyn Wright and Archie Flowers, who is the defendant's father, had worked at the local Wal-Mart. But there was no evidence that they worked together or were close in any way. Importantly, the State did not ask individual follow-up questions to determine the nature of their relationship. And during group questioning, Wright said she did not know whether Flowers' father still worked at Wal-Mart, which "supports an inference that Wright and Flowers did not have a close working relationship." 240 So.3d at 1163 (King, J., dissenting). And white prospective jurors also had relationships with members of Flowers' family. Indeed, white prospective juror Pamela Chesteen stated that she had provided service to Flowers' family members at the bank and that she knew several members of the Flowers family. App. 83. Likewise, white prospective juror Bobby Lester worked at the same bank and also encountered Flowers' family members. Id ., at 86. Although Chesteen and Lester were questioned during group voir dire , the State did not ask Chesteen or Lester individual follow-up questions in order to explore the depth of their relationships with Flowers' family. And instead of striking those jurors, the State accepted them for the jury. To be sure, both Chesteen and Lester were later struck by the defense. But the State's acceptance of Chesteen and Lester necessarily informs our assessment of the State's intent in striking similarly situated black prospective jurors such as Wright.
The State also noted that Wright had once been sued by Tardy Furniture for collection of a debt 13 years earlier. Id ., at 209. Wright said that the debt was paid off and that it would not affect her evaluation of the case. Id ., at 71, 90-91. The victims in this case worked at Tardy Furniture. But the State did not explain how Wright's 13-year-old, paid-off debt to Tardy Furniture could affect her ability to serve impartially as a juror in this quadruple murder case. The "State's unsupported characterization of the lawsuit is problematic." 240 So.3d at 1163 (King, J., dissenting). In any event, the State did not purport to rely on that reason alone as the basis for the Wright strike, and the State in this Court does not rely on that reason alone in defending the Wright strike.
The State also explained that it exercised a peremptory strike against Wright because she had worked with one of Flowers' sisters. App. 209. That was incorrect. The trial judge immediately stated as much. Id ., at 218-219. But incorrect statements of that sort may show the State's intent: When a prosecutor misstates the record in explaining a strike, that misstatement can be another clue showing discriminatory intent.
That incorrect statement was not the only one made by the prosecutor. The State made apparently incorrect statements to justify the strikes of black prospective jurors Tashia Cunningham, Edith Burnside, and Flancie Jones. The State contradicted Cunningham's earlier statement that she had only a working relationship with Flowers' sister by inaccurately asserting that Cunningham and Flowers' sister were close friends. See id ., at 84, 220. The State asserted that Burnside had tried to cover up a Tardy Furniture suit. See id ., at 226. She had not. See id ., 70-71. And the State explained that it struck Jones in part because Jones was Flowers' aunt. See id., at 229. That, too, was not true. See id ., at 86-88. The State's pattern of factually inaccurate statements about black prospective jurors suggests that the State intended to keep black prospective jurors off the jury. See Foster , 578 U. S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 1754 ; Miller-El II , 545 U.S. at 240, 245, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
To be sure, the back and forth of a Batson hearing can be hurried, and prosecutors can make mistakes when providing explanations. That is entirely understandable, and mistaken explanations should not be confused with racial discrimination. But when considered with other evidence of discrimination, a series of factually inaccurate explanations for striking black prospective jurors can be telling. So it is here.
The side-by-side comparison of Wright to white prospective jurors whom the State accepted for the jury cannot be considered in isolation in this case. In a different context, the Wright strike might be deemed permissible. But we must examine the whole picture. Our disagreement with the Mississippi courts (and our agreement with Justice King's dissent in the Mississippi Supreme Court) largely comes down to whether we look at the Wright strike in isolation or instead look at the Wright strike in the context of all the facts and circumstances. Our precedents require that we do the latter. As Justice King explained in his dissent in the Mississippi Supreme Court, the Mississippi courts appeared to do the former. 240 So.3d at 1163-1164. As we see it, the overall context here requires skepticism of the State's strike of Carolyn Wright. We must examine the Wright strike in light of the history of the State's use of peremptory strikes in the prior trials, the State's decision to strike five out of six black prospective jurors at Flowers' sixth trial, and the State's vastly disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors during jury selection at the sixth trial. We cannot just look away. Nor can we focus on the Wright strike in isolation. In light of all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in ruling that the State's peremptory strike of Wright was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.
* * *
In sum, the State's pattern of striking black prospective jurors persisted from Flowers' first trial through Flowers' sixth trial. In the six trials combined, the State struck 41 of the 42 black prospective jurors it could have struck. At the sixth trial, the State struck five of six. At the sixth trial, moreover, the State engaged in dramatically disparate questioning of black and white prospective jurors. And it engaged in disparate treatment of black and white prospective jurors, in particular by striking black prospective juror Carolyn Wright.
To reiterate, we need not and do not decide that any one of those four facts alone would require reversal. All that we need to decide, and all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court at Flowers' sixth trial committed clear error in concluding that the State's peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent. In reaching that conclusion, we break no new legal ground. We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case.
We reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and we remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
RUBIN v. UNITED STATES
No. 79-1013.
Argued November 12, 1980
Decided January 21, 1981
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BreNNAN, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, RehNquist, and SteveNs, JJ., joined. BlaciímuN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 431.
Louis Bender argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Sandor Frcmkel.
Stephen M. Shapiro argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Sara Criscitelli, Ralph C. Ferrara, Jacob H. Stillman, and Elisse B. Walter.
Darrel E. Reed, Jr., and Richard K. Willard filed a brief for Bossier Bank & Trust Co. as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a pledge of stock to a bank as collateral for a loan is an “offer or sale” of a security under § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a).
I
Late in 1972, petitioner became vice president of Tri-State Energy, Inc., a corporation holding itself out as involved in energy exploration and production. At the time, Tri-State was experiencing serious financial problems. Petitioner approached Bankers Trust Co., a bank with which he had frequently dealt while he had been affiliated with an accounting firm. Bankers Trust initially refused a $5 million loan to Tri-State for operating a mine. Nevertheless, it lent TriState $50,000 on October 20, 1972, for 30 days with the understanding that if Tri-State could produce adequate financial information and sufficient collateral, additional financing might be available.
Petitioner assisted other officers of Tri-State in preparing a financial statement for submission to the bank. The balance sheet, which listed a net worth of $7.1 million, was false and misleading in several respects. Tri-State also submitted inflated projections of future earnings based in large measure on sham contracts and forged documentation. Subsequently, petitioner personally paid the loan officer $4,000 and another official $1,000 as inducements for further loans. Tri-State borrowed an additional $425,000 over a brief period. Ultimately, the loans were consolidated into a single demand note for $475,000, dated February 26, 1973.
Bankers Trust required collateral for each new loan; between October 20, 1972, and January 19, 1973, Tri-State pledged stock in six companies. The stocks were represented as being good, marketable, and unrestricted and valued at a total of approximately $1.7 million; in fact, they were practically worthless. Many shares were issued by “shell” companies. Most were simply “rented” — i. e., borrowed from the owner for a fee — to show to the bank or were otherwise restricted. In one instance, petitioner arranged for fictitious quotations to appear in a service reporting over-the-counter transactions and used by the bank in evaluating pledged securities; in another, Tri-State planted, through others, a fictitious advertisement in an overseas newspaper and showed it to the bank, representing it to be a quotation. Trading of one issue was suspended shortly after the pledge when the issuing company could not account for 900,000 shares of its stock; Tri-State replaced this collateral before Bankers Trust learned of the difficulty. Petitioner acted as Tri-State’s agent for most of these transactions.
A Justice Department request for information about TriState received February 28, two days after the consolidated note was signed, prompted Bankers Trust on March 5 to demand payment in full within three days. No payment of this demand was made, and in May another officer of TriState met with bank officials and tried to forestall foreclosure. After rejecting Tri-State’s request for a further loan, the bank sued on the note.
Bankers Trust also proceeded against petitioner personally as a guarantor of the loans. Petitioner signed a confession of judgment against himself in the amount of the unpaid loans, plus accrued interest, but thereafter filed a petition for bankruptcy. The bank recovered only about $2,500, plus interest and expenses, on its $475,000 loan.
Petitioner was indicted on three counts of violating and conspiring to violate various federal antifraud statutes, including § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a). Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, petitioner was convicted on the conspiracy count. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, petitioner raised several grounds, including whether a pledge of stock as collateral for a bank loan is an “offer or sale” under § 17 (a). The Court of Appeals affirmed. 609 F. 2d 51 (1979). We granted certiorari limited to the question whether such a pledge is an “offer or sale.” 445 U. S. 960 (1980).
II
Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
“(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
“(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
“(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a) (emphasis added).
Petitioner does not deny that he engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud through false representations to Bankers Trust concerning the stocks pledged; he does not deny that the shares were “securities” under the Act. Rather, he contends narrowly that these pledges did not constitute “offers” or “sales” under § 17 (a) of the Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. To sustain this contention, petitioner argues that Tri-State deposited the stocks with the bank only as collateral security for a loan, not as a transfer or sale. From this he argues that the implied, power to dispose of the stocks could ripen into title and thereby constitute a “sale” only by effecting foreclosure of the various pledges, an event that could not occur without a default on the loans.
We begin by looking to the language of the Act. E. g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). The terms “offer” and “sale” in § 17 (a) are defined in § 2 (3) of the Act:
“The term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term . . . 'offer’ shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.” 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3) (emphasis added).
Obtaining a loan secured by a pledge of shares of stock unmistakably involves a “disposition of [an] interest in a security, for value.” Although pledges transfer less than absolute title, the interest thus transferred nonetheless is an “interest in a security.” The pledges contemplated a self-executing procedure under a power that could, at the option of the pledgee (the bank) in the event of a default, vest absolute title and ownership. Bankers Trust parted with substantial consideration — specifically, a total of $475,000— and obtained the inchoate but valuable interest under the pledges and concomitant powers. It is not essential under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction to be an “offer” or a “sale.” See, e. g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F. 2d 461, 466 (CA2), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976).
Ill
When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except “in ‘rare and exceptional circumstances.' ” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 187, n. 33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 60 (1930)). Accord, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 214, n. 33. No such circumstances are present here, for our reading of the statute is wholly consistent with the history and the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. The Uniform Sale of Securities Act, a model “blue sky” statute adopted in many states, defined “sale” in language almost identical to that now appearing in § 2 (3). In Cecil B. De Mille Productions, Inc. v. Woolery, 61 F. 2d 45 (1932), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed this provision of the model statute as adopted by California and held that the definition of “sale” embraced a pledge. Congress subsequently enacted the definition from the Uniform Act almost verbatim. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). See generally id., at 13; Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 71 (1933). Petitioner has cited nothing to suggest that Congress did not intend the broad scope that cases arising under the Uniform Act, such as Woolery, supra, had given the definition of “sale.” See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 581 (1978).
Treating pledges as included among “offers” and “sales” comports with the purpose of the Act and, specifically, with that of § 17 (a). We frequently have observed that these provisions were enacted to protect against fraud and promote the free flow of information in the public dissemination of securities. E. g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, at 195. The economic considerations and realities present when a lender parts with value and accepts securities as collateral security for a loan are similar in important respect to the risk an investor undertakes when purchasing shares. Both are relying on the value of the securities themselves, and both must be able to depend on the representations made by the trans-feror of the securities, regardless of whether the transferor passes full title or only a conditional and defeasible interest to secure repayment of a loan.
Petitioner would have us interpret “offer” and “sale” in a way that not only is cramped but conflicts with the plain meaning of the statute and its purpose as well. We therefore hold that the pledges here were “offers” or “sales” under § 17 (a); accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The balance sheet listed an account receivable of $7.5 million and included a copy of a contract that purportedly formed the basis of this account. No such item existed, and the signature on the contract had been forged. Evidence also indicated that Tri-State had listed a fictitious tax liability to offset the fictitious asset. The statement also referred to over $264,000 cash on hand and coal worth $180,000. Both figures were exaggerated.
Subsequent loans were made on November 22 ($50,000), November 30 ($100,000), and December 6 ($275,000).
The pledges were 400,000 shares of American Leisure Corp. (October 20 — shell company; shares restricted); 2,000 shares of All States Life Insurance Co. (November 10 — nonmarketable; “rented” to show the bank but not owned by Tri-State); 20,000 shares of Marlin Investment Co. (November 22 — “rented” from a person who was told they would not be used as collateral); 100,000 shares of Management Dynamics, Inc. (December 6 — trading suspended; withdrawn as collateral); 175,000 shares of General Investment Corp. (December 19 — restricted); 50,000 shares of Satellite Systems Corp. (January 19 — restricted and “rented”; fictitious overseas advertisement planted).
Count 1 of the indictment charged petitioner and his codefendants with conspiring to violate 18 U. S. C. § 1014 (fraud in a bank loan application), 18 U. S. C. §1341 (mail fraud), and 18 U. S. C. § 1343 (wire fraud), as well as § 17 (a) (securities fraud). Counts 2 and 3 alleged substantive violations of § 17 (a) and 18 U. S. C. § 1014, respectively, against petitioner and some of the codefendants listed in the conspiracy count. Proceedings against petitioner were severed before trial. The Government agreed to dismiss the substantive charge of fraud in a bank loan application before the jury reached a verdict, and the jury acquitted petitioner of the substantive count of securities fraud.
The Court of Appeals divided over an evidentiary issue. It rejected petitioner’s argument regarding the scope of § 17 (a) without comment. See 609 F. 2d, at 66.
The misrepresentations at issue in this case related to the stocks themselves; petitioner does not allege that his conviction, insofar as it involved securities fraud under § 17 (a), was based on misrepresentations made about the financial condition of Tri-State itself. Thus, we need not decide whether misrepresentations or omissions involved in a securities transaction but not pertaining to thé securities themselves can form the basis of a violation of § 17 (a).
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Handbook and Proceedings 174 (1929) (Fourth and Final Draft) ("sale” defined to “include every disposition, or attempt to dispose of a security or interest in a security for value”).
To the extent that petitioner argues there was no need to protect pledgees, the very fact that Congress saw fit to afford such protection under the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, ends our inquiry, absent a contention, not present here, that the Constitution otherwise prohibits the means selected. “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
UNITED STATES v. CALIFORNIA.
No. 5,
Original.
Decided June 23, 1947, and May 17, 1965. — Order and Decree Entered October 27, 1947.
Supplemental Decree Entered January 31, 1966.
Solicitor General Marshall, Louis F. Claiborne and George S. Swarth for the United States.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General of California, Jay L. Shavelson, Assistant Attorney General, Richard H. Keatinge, Special Assistant Attorney General, and Warren J. Abbott and N. Gregory Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for the State of California.
Per Curiam.
In accordance with the Court’s opinion in United States v. California, 381 U. S. 139, proposed decrees have been submitted by the parties. The Court has examined such proposed decrees and the briefs and papers submitted in support thereof, and enters the following decree:
Supplemental Decree.
The United States having moved for entry of a supplemental decree herein, and the matter having been referred to the late William H. Davis as Special Master to hold hearings and recommend answers to certain questions with respect thereto, and the Special Master having held such hearings and having submitted his report, and the issues having been modified by the supplemental complaint of the United States and the answer of the State of California thereto, and the parties having filed amended exceptions to the report of the Special Master, and the Court having received briefs and heard argument with respect thereto and having by its opinion of May 17, 1965, approved the recommendations of the Special Master, with modifications, it is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the decree heretofore entered in this cause on October 27, 1947, 332 U. S. 804, be, and the same is hereby, modified to read as follows:
1. As against the State of California and all persons claiming under it, the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf, more than three geographical miles seaward from the nearest point or points on the coast line, at all times pertinent hereto have appertained and now appertain to the United States and have been and now are subject to its exclusive jurisdiction, control and power of disposition. The State of California has no title thereto or property interest therein.
2. As used herein, “coast line” means—
(a) The line of mean lower low water on the mainland, on islands, and on low-tide elevations lying wholly or partly within three geographical miles from the line of mean lower low water on the mainland or on an island; and
(b) The line marking the seaward limit of inland waters.
The coast line is to be taken as heretofore or hereafter modified by natural or artificial means, and includes the outermost permanent harbor works that form an integral part of the harbor system within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, T. I. A. S. No. 5639.
3. As used herein—
(a) “Island” means a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above the level of mean high water;
(b) “Low-tide elevation” means a naturally-formed area of land surrounded by water at mean lower low water, which is above the level of mean lower low water but not above the level of mean high water;
(c) “Mean lower low water” means the average elevation of all the daily lower low tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years;
(d) “Mean high water” means the average elevation of all the high tides occurring over a period of 18.6 years;
(e) “Geographical mile” means a distance of 1852 meters (6076.10333 . . . U. S. Survey Feet or approximately 6076.11549 International Feet).
4. As used herein, “inland waters” means waters landward of the baseline of the territorial sea, which are now recognized as internal waters of the United States under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The inland waters referred to in paragraph 2 (b) hereof include—
(a) Any river or stream flowing directly into the sea, landward of a straight line across its mouth;
(b) Any port, landward of its outermost permanent harbor works and a straight line across its entrance;
(c) Any “historic bay,” as that term is used in paragraph 6 of Article 7 of the Convention, defined essentially as a bay over which the United States has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations;
(d) Any other bay (defined as a well-marked coastal indentation having such penetration, in proportion to the width of its entrance, as to contain landlocked waters, and having an area, including islands within the bay, at least as great as the area of a semicircle whose diameter equals the length of the closing line across the entrance of the bay, or the sum of such closing lines if the bay has more than one entrance), landward of a straight line across its entrance or, if the entrance is more than 24 geographical miles wide, landward of a straight line not over 24 geographical miles long, drawn within the bay so as to enclose the greatest possible amount of water. An estuary of a river is treated in the same way as a bay.
5. In drawing a closing line across the entrance of any body of inland water having pronounced headlands, the line shall be drawn between the points where the plane of mean lower low water meets the outermost extension of the headlands. Where there is no pronounced headland, the line shall be drawn to the point where the line of mean lower low water on the shore is intersected by the bisector of the angle formed where a line projecting the general trend of the line of mean lower low water along the open coast meets a line projecting the general trend of the line of mean lower low water along the tributary waterway.
6. Roadsteads, waters between islands, and waters between islands and the mainland are not per se inland waters.
7. The inland waters of the Port of San Pedro are those enclosed by the breakwater and by straight lines across openings in the breakwater; but the limits of the port, east of the eastern end of the breakwater, are not determined by this decree.
8. The inland waters of Crescent City Harbor are those enclosed within the breakwaters and a straight line from the outer end of the west breakwater to the southern extremity of Whaler Island.
9. The inland' waters of Monterey Bay are those enclosed by a straight line between Point Pinos and Point Santa Cruz.
10. The description of the inland waters of the Port of San Pedro, Crescent City Harbor, and Monterey Bay, as set forth in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 hereof, does not imply that the three-mile limit is to be measured from the seaward limits of those inland waters in places where the three-mile limit is placed farther seaward by the application of any other provision of this decree.
11. The following are not historic inland waters, and do not comprise inland waters except to the extent that they rpay be enclosed by lines as hereinabove described for the enclosure- of inland waters other than historic bays:
(a) Waters between the Santa Barbara or Channel Islands, or between those islands and the mainland;
(b) Waters adjacent to the coast between Point Conception and Point Hueneme;
(c) Waters adjacent to the coast between Point Fer-min and Point Lasuen (identified as the bluffs at the end of the Las Bolsas Ridge at Huntington Beach) ;
(d) Waters adjacent to the coast between Point Lasuen and the western headland of Newport Bay;
(e) Santa Monica Bay;
(f) Crescent City Bay;
(g) San Luis Obispo Bay.
12. With the exceptions provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 32, 43 U. S. C. § 1313 (1964 ed.), and subject to the powers reserved to the United States by § 3 (d) and § 6 of said Act, 67 Stat. 31, 32, 43 U. S. C. §§ 1311 (d) and 1314 (1964 ed.), the State of California is entitled, as against the United States, to the title to and ownership of the tidelands along its coast (defined as the shore of the mainland and of islands, between the line of mean high water and the line of mean lower low water) and the submerged lands, minerals, other natural resources and improvements underlying the inland waters and the waters of the Pacific Ocean within three geographical miles seaward from the coast line and bounded on the north and south by the northern and southern boundaries of the State of California, including the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law. The United States is not entitled, as against the State of California, to any right, title or interest in or to said lands, improvements and natural resources except as provided by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act.
13. The parties shall submit to the Court for its approval any stipulation or stipulations that they may enter into, identifying with greater particularity all or any part of the boundary line, as defined by this decree, between the submerged lands of the United States and the submerged lands of the State of California, or identifying any of the areas reserved to the United States by § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act. As to any portion of such boundary line or of any areas claimed to have been reserved under § 5 of the Submerged Lands Act as to which the parties may be unable to agree, either party may apply to the Court at any time for entry of a further supplemental decree.
14. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, énter such orders, and issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties in the premises.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Clark, and Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the formulation of this decree. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
2
] | sc_authoritydecision |
MERRION et al., dba MERRION & BAYLESS, et al. v. JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE et al.
No. 80-11.
Argued March 30, 1981
Reargued November 4, 1981
Decided January 25, 1982
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 159.
Jason W. Kellahin reargued the cause for the petitioners in No. 80-11. With him on the briefs were Bruce D. Black, Thomas H. Burton, and John Wimbish. John R. Cooney reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 80-15. With him on the briefs were Mark B. Thompson Ill, John H. Pickering, Samuel A. Stem, R. H. Landt, and Richard L. Marlar.
Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne reargued the cause for respondent Secretary of the Interior in both cases. With him on the brief on reargument were Acting Solicitor General Wallace and Assistant Attorney General Dinkins. With him on the brief on the original argument were Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Liotta, Edwin S. Kneedler, Jacques B. Gelin, and Martin W. Matzen. Robert J. Nordhaus reargued the cause for respondents Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al. in both cases. With him on the briefs were B. Reid Haltom and Terry D. Farmer
Together with No. 80-15, Amoco Production Co. et al. v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Helena S. Maclay, Deirdre Boggs, and Bruce McEvoy, Special Assistant Attorneys General, for the State of Montana; by Bruce L. Herr, John B. Draper, Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota, Albert R. Hausauer, Special Assistant Attorney General, Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General of Utah, Richard L. Dewsnup and Michael Quealy, Assistant Attorneys General, John D. Troughton, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Ron Arnold, Assistant Attorney General, for the States of New Mexico et al.; by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and Timothy Malone, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington; by James G. Watt and William■ H. Mellor III for the Mountain States Legal Foundation; by Frederick J. Martone for the Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District et al.; by EdwardL. Barrett, Jr., Richard C. Cahoon, Dennis McCarthy, and Arthur H. Nielsen, for Shell Oil Co. et al.; and by George J. Miller for Westmoreland Resources. Inc.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Harry R. Sachse, Reid Peyton Chambers, Charles A. Hobbs, Robert A. Warden, Lawrence White, and Steven S. Anderson for the Council of Energy Resource Tribes et al.; and by George P. Vlassis for the Navajo Tribe of Indians.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to long-term leases with the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, petitioners, 21 lessees, extract and produce oil and gas from the Tribe’s reservation lands. In these two consolidated cases, petitioners challenge an ordinance enacted by the Tribe imposing a severance tax on “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands.” See Oil and Gas Severance Tax No. 77-0-02, App. 38. We granted certiorari to determine whether the Tribe has the authority to impose this tax, and, if so, whether the tax imposed by the Tribe violates the Commerce Clause.
I
The Jicarilla Apache Tribe resides on a reservation in northwestern New Mexico. Established by Executive Order in 1887, the reservation contains 742,315 acres, all of which are held as tribal trust property. The 1887 Executive Order set aside public lands in the Territory of New Mexico for the use and occupation of the Jicarilla Apache Indians, and contained no special restrictions except for a provision protecting pre-existing rights of bona fide settlers. Approximately 2,100 individuals live on the reservation, with the majority residing in the town of Dulce, N. M., near the Colorado border.
The Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. §461 et seq., which authorizes any tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and bylaws, subject to the approval of the' Secretary of the Interior (Secretary). The Tribe’s first Constitution, approved by the Secretary on August 4, 1937, preserved all powers conferred by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In 1968, the Tribe revised its Constitution to specify:
“The inherent powers of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, including those conferred by Section 16 of the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984), as amended, shall vest in the tribal council and shall be exercised thereby subject only to limitations imposed by the Constitution of the United States, applicable Federal statutes and regulations of the Department of the Interior, and the restrictions established by this revised constitution.” Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Art. XI, § 1.
The Revised Constitution provides that “[t]he tribal council may enact ordinances to govern the development of tribal lands and other resources,” Art. XI, § 1(a)(3). It further provides that “[t]he tribal council may levy and collect taxes and fees on tribal members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on the reservation,” Art. XI, § 1(e). The Revised Constitution was approved by the Secretary on February 13, 1969.
To develop tribal lands, the Tribe has executed mineral leases encompassing some 69% of the reservation land. Beginning in 1953, the petitioners entered into leases with the Tribe. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, on behalf of the Secretary, approved these leases, as required by the Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, 25 U. S. C. §§396a-396g (1938 Act). In exchange for a cash bonus, royalties, and rents, the typical lease grants the lessee “the exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract, remove, and dispose of all the oil and natural gas deposits in or under” the leased land for as long as the minerals are produced in paying quantities. App. 22. Petitioners may use oil and gas in developing the lease without incurring the royalty. Id., at 24. In addition, the Tribe reserves the rights to use gas without charge for any of its buildings on the leased land, and to take its royalties in kind. Id., at 27-28. Petitioners’ activities on the leased land have been subject to taxes imposed by the State of New Mexico on oil and gas severance and on oil and gas production equipment. Id., at 129. See Act of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 299, §3, 44 Stat. 1347, 25 U. S. C. §398c (permitting state taxation of mineral production on Indian reservations)-(1927 Act).
Pursuant to its Revised Constitution, the Tribal Council adopted an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production on tribal land. See App. 38. The ordinance was approved by the Secretary, through the Acting Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, on December 23, 1976. The tax applies to “any oil and natural gas severed, saved and removed from Tribal lands . . . .” Ibid. The tax is assessed at the wellhead at $0.05 per million Btu’s of gas produced and $0.29 per barrel of crude oil or condensate produced on the reservation, and it is due at the time of severance. Id., at 38-39. Oil and gas consumed by the lessees to develop their leases or received by the Tribe as in-kind royalty payments are exempted from the tax. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe 59, n. 42.
In two separate actions, petitioners sought to enjoin enforcement of the tax by either the tribal authorities or the Secretary. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico consolidated the cases, granted other lessees leave to intervene, and permanently enjoined enforcement of the tax. The District Court ruled that the Tribe lacked the authority to impose the tax, that only state and local authorities had the power to tax oil and gas production on Indian reservations, and that the tax violated the Commerce Clause.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. 617 F. 2d 537 (1980). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the taxing power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty that has not been divested by any treaty or Act of Congress, including the 1927 Act, 25 U. S. C. §398c. The court also found no Commerce Clause violation. We granted certioriari, 449 U. S. 820 (1980), and we now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
II
Petitioners argue, and the dissent agrees, that an Indian tribe’s authority to tax non-Indians who do business on the reservation stems exclusively from its power to exclude such persons from tribal lands. Because the Tribe did not initially condition the leases upon the payment of a severance tax, petitioners assert that the Tribe is without authority to impose such a tax at a later time. We disagree with the premise that the power to tax derives only from the power to exclude. Even if that premise is accepted, however, we disagree with the conclusion that the Tribe lacks the power to impose the severance tax.
A
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (Colville), we addressed the Indian tribes’ authority to impose taxes on non-Indians doing business on the reservation. We held that “[t]he power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status.” Id., at 152. The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal government to raise revenues for its essential services. The power does not derive solely from the Indian tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Instead, it derives from the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction. See, e. g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824).
The petitioners avail themselves of the “substantial privilege of carrying on business” on the reservation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U. S. 425, 437 (1980); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444-445 (1940). They benefit from the provision of police protection and other governmental services, as well as from “‘the advantages of a civilized society’ ” that are assured by the existence of tribal government. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434, 445 (1979)). Numerous other governmental entities levy a general revenue tax similar to that imposed by the Jicarilla Tribe when they provide comparable services. Under these circumstances, there is nothing exceptional in requiring petitioners to contribute through taxes to the general cost of tribal government. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 624-629 (1981); id., at 647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra, at 436-437.
As we observed in Colville, supra, the tribe’s interest in levying taxes on nonmembers to raise “revenues for essential governmental programs ... is strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.” 447 U. S., at 156-157. This surely is the case here. The mere fact that the government imposing the tax also enjoys rents and royalties as the lessor of the mineral lands does not undermine the government’s authority to impose the tax.. See infra, at 145-148. The royalty payments from the mineral leases are paid to the Tribe in its role as partner in petitioners’ commercial venture. The severance tax, in contrast, is petitioners’ contribution “to the general cost of providing governmental services.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra, at 623. State governments commonly receive both royalty payments and severance taxes from lessees of mineral lands within their borders.
Viewing the taxing power of Indian tribes as an essential instrument of self-government and territorial management has been a shared assumption of all three branches of the Federal Government. Cf. Colville, supra, at 153. In Col-ville, the Court relied in part on a 1934 opinion of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. In this opinion, the Solicitor recognized that, in the absence of congressional action to the contrary, the tribes’ sovereign power to tax “ ‘may be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions.’” 447 U. S., at 153 (quoting Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 46 (1934)). Colville further noted that official executive pronouncements have repeatedly recognized that “Indian tribes possess a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have a significant interest. . . , including jurisdiction to tax.” 447 U. S., at 152-153 (citing 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 214 (1900); 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855)).
Similarly, Congress has acknowledged that the tribal power to tax is one of the tools necessary to self-government and territorial control. As early as 1879, the Senate Judiciary Committee acknowledged the validity of a tax imposed by the Chickasaw Nation on non-Indians legitimately within its territory:
“We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy, except so far as that jurisdiction has been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress. Subject to the supervisory control of the Federal Government, they may enact the requisite legislation to maintain peace and good order, improve their condition, establish school systems, and aid their people in their efforts to acquire the arts of civilized life; and they undoubtedly possess the inherent right to resort to taxation to raise the necessa'ry revenue for the accomplishment of these vitally important objects — a right not in any sense derived from the Government of the United States.” S. Rep. No. 698, 45th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2 (1879) (emphasis added).
Thus, the views of the three federal branches of government, as well as general principles of taxation, confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental services through taxation of non-Indians who benefit from those services. Indeed, the conception of Indian sovereignty that this Court has consistently reaffirmed permits no other conclusion. As we observed in United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975), “Indian tribes within ‘Indian country’ are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations.’” They “are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.” Ibid. See, e. g., Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89, 92, 99 (CA8 1956); Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426, 428-429 (CA8 1893); Cohen, ‘The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States,’ in The Legal Conscience 230, 234 (L. Cohen ed. 1960). Adhering to this understanding, we conclude that the Tribe’s authority to tax non-Indians who conduct business on the reservation does not simply derive from the Tribe’s power to exclude such persons, but is an inherent power necessary to tribal self-government and territorial management.
Of course, the Tribe’s authority to tax nonmembers is subject to constraints not imposed on other governmental entities: the Federal Government can take away this power, and the Tribe must obtain the approval of the Secretary before any tax on nonmembers can take effect. These additional constraints minimize potential concern that Indian tribes will exercise the power to tax in an unfair or unprincipled manner, and ensure that any exercise of the tribal power to tax will be consistent with national policies.
We are not persuaded by the dissent’s attempt to limit an Indian tribe’s authority to tax non-Indians by asserting that its only source is the tribe’s power to exclude such persons from tribal lands. Limiting the tribes’ authority to tax in this manner contradicts the conception that Indian tribes are domestic, dependent nations, as well as the common understanding that the sovereign taxing power is a tool for raising revenue necessary to cover the costs of government.
Nor are we persuaded by the dissent that three early decisions upholding tribal power to tax nonmembers support this limitation. Post, at 175-183, discussing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (CA8 1905), appeal dism’d, 203 U. S. 599 (1906); Maxey v. Wright, 3 Ind. T. 243, 247-250, 54 S. W. 807, 809 (Ct. App. Ind. T.), aff’d, 105 F. 1003 (CA8 1900). In discussing these cases, the dissent correctly notes that a hallmark of Indian sovereignty is the power to exclude non-Indians from Indian lands, and that this power provides a basis for tribal authority to tax. None of these cases, however, establishes that the authority to tax derives solely from the power to exclude. Instead, these cases demonstrate that a tribe has the power to tax nonmembers only to the extent the nonmember enjoys the privilege of trade or other activity on the reservation to which the tribe can attach a tax. This limitation on tribal taxing authority exists not because the tribe has the power to exclude nonmembers, but because the limited authority that a tribe may exercise over nonmembers does not arise until the nonmember enters the tribal jurisdiction. We do not question that there is a significant territorial component to tribal power: a tribe has no authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with the tribe. However, we do not believe that this territorial component to Indian taxing power, which is discussed in these early cases, means that the tribal authority to tax derives solely from the tribe’s power to exclude nonmembers from tribal lands.
Morris v. Hitchcock, for example, suggests that the taxing power is a legitimate instrument for raising revenue, and that a tribe may exercise this power over non-Indians who receive privileges from the tribe, such as the right to trade on Indian land. In Morris, the Court approved a tax on cattle grazing and relied in part on a Report to the Senate by the Committee on the Judiciary, which found no legal defect in previous tribal tax legislation having “a twofold object — to prevent the intrusion of unauthorized persons into the territory of the Chickasaw Nation, and to raise revenue.” 194 U. S., at 389 (emphasis added). In Maxey v. Wright, the question of Indian sovereignty was not even raised: the decision turned on the construction of a treaty denying the Tribe any governing or jurisdictional authority over nonmembers. 3 Ind. T., at 247-248, 54 S. W., at 809.
Finally, the decision in Buster v. Wright actually undermines the theory that the tribes’ taxing authority derives solely from the power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. Under this theory, a non-Indian who establishes lawful presence in Indian territory could avoid paying a tribal tax by claiming that no residual portion of the power to exclude supports the tax. This result was explicitly rejected in Buster v. Wright. In Buster, deeds to individual lots in Indian territory had been granted to non-Indian residents, and cities and towns had been incorporated. As a result, Congress had expressly prohibited the Tribe from removing these non-Indian residents. Even though the ownership of land and the creation of local governments by non-Indians established their legitimate presence on Indian land, the court held that the Tribe retained its power to tax. The court concluded that “[njeither the United States, nor a state, nor any other sovereignty loses the power to govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of the land within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or foreigners.” 135 F., at 952 (emphasis added). This result confirms that the Tribe’s authority to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of government.
We choose not to embrace a new restriction on the extent of the tribal authority to tax, which is based on a questionable interpretation of three early cases. Instead, based on the views of each of the federal branches, general principles of taxation, and the conception of Indian tribes as domestic, dependent nations, we conclude that the Tribe has the authority to impose a severance tax on the mining activities of petitioners as part of its power to govern and to pay for the costs of self-government.
B
Alternatively, if we accept the argument, advanced by petitioners and the dissent, that the Tribe’s authority to tax derives solely from its power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation, we conclude that the Tribe has the authority to impose the severance tax challenged here. Nonmembers who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. This power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct, such as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation. When a tribe grants a non-Indian the right to be on Indian land, the tribe agrees not to exercise its ultimate power to oust the non-Indian as long as the non-Indian complies with the initial conditions of entry. However, it does not follow that the lawful property right to be on Indian land also immunizes the non-Indian from the tribe’s exercise of its lesser-included power to tax or to place other conditions on the non-Indian’s conduct or continued presence on the reservation. A nonmember who enters the jurisdiction of the tribe remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its sovereign power. The fact that the tribe chooses not to exercise its power to tax when it initially grants a non-Indian entry onto the reservation does not permanently divest the tribe of its authority to impose such a tax.
Petitioners argue that their leaseholds entitle them to enter the reservation and exempt them from further exercises of the Tribe’s sovereign authority. Similarly, the dissent asserts that the Tribe has lost the power to tax petitioners’ mining activities because it has leased to them the use of the mineral lands and such rights of access to the reservation as might be necessary to enjoy the leases. Post, at 186-190. However, this conclusion is not compelled by linking the taxing power to the power to exclude. Instead, it is based on additional assumptions and confusions about the consequences of the commercial arrangement between petitioners and the Tribe.
Most important, petitioners and the dissent confuse the Tribe’s role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign. This confusion relegates the powers of sovereignty to the bargaining process undertaken in each of the sovereign’s commercial agreements. It is one thing to find that the Tribe has agreed to sell the right to use the land and take from it valuable minerals; it is quite another to find that the Tribe has abandoned its sovereign powers simply because it has not expressly reserved them through a contract.
Confusing these two results denigrates Indian sovereignty. Indeed, the dissent apparently views the tribal power to exclude, as well as the derivative authority to tax, as merely the power possessed by any individual landowner or any social group to attach conditions, including a “tax” or fee, to the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the social group, and not as a sovereign power. The dissent does pay lipservice to the established views that Indian tribes retain those fundamental attributes of sovereignty, including the power to tax transactions that occur on tribal lands, which have not been divested by Congress or by necessary implication of the tribe’s dependent status, see Col-ville, 447 U. S., at 152, and that tribes “are a good deal more than ‘private, voluntary organizations.’” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S., at 557. However, in arguing that the Tribe somehow “lost” its power to tax petitioners by not in-eluding a taxing provision in the original leases or otherwise notifying petitioners that the Tribe retained and might later exercise its sovereign right to tax them, the dissent attaches little significance to the sovereign nature of the tribal authority to tax, and it obviously views tribal authority as little more than a landowner’s contractual right. This overly restrictive view of tribal sovereignty is further reflected in the dissent’s refusal to apply established principles for determining whether other governmental bodies have waived a sovereign power through contract. See post, at 189, n. 50. See also infra, at 148.
Moreover, the dissent implies that the power to tax depends on the consent of the taxed as well as on the Tribe’s power to exclude non-Indians. Whatever place consent may have in contractual matters and in the creation of democratic governments, it has little if any role in measuring the validity of an exercise of legitimate sovereign authority. Requiring the consent of the entrant deposits in the hands of the excludable non-Indian the source of the tribe’s power, when the power instead derives from sovereignty itself. Only the Federal Government may limit a tribe’s exercise of its sovereign authority. E. g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 322 (1978). Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember; to the contrary, the nonmember’s presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose.
Viewed in this light, the absence of a reference to the tax in the leases themselves hardly impairs the Tribe’s authority to impose the tax. Contractual arrangements remain subject to subsequent legislation by the presiding sovereign. See, e. g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Assn. of Newark, 310 U. S. 32 (1940); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). Even where the contract at issue requires payment of a royalty for a license or franchise issued by the governmental entity, the government’s power to tax remains unless it “has been specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable interpretation.” St. Louis v. United R. Co., 210 U. S. 266, 280 (1908).
To state that Indian sovereignty is different than that of Federal, State or local Governments, see post, at 189, n. 50, does not justify ignoring the principles announced by this Court for determining whether a sovereign has waived its taxing authority in cases involving city, state, and federal taxes imposed under similar circumstances. Each of these governments has different attributes of sovereignty, which also may derive from different sources. These differences, however, do not alter the principles for determining whether any of these governments has waived a sovereign power through contract, and we perceive no principled reason for holding that the different attributes of Indian sovereignty require different treatment in this regard. Without regard to its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign’s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms.
No claim is asserted in this litigation, nor could one-be, that petitioners’ leases contain the clear and unmistakable surrender of taxing power required for its extinction. We could find a waiver of the Tribe’s taxing power only if we inferred it from silence in the leases. To presume that a sovereign forever waives the right to exercise one of its sovereign powers unless it expressly reserves the right to exercise that power in a commercial agreement turns the concept of sovereignty on its head, and we do not adopt this analysis.
c
The Tribe has the inherent power to impose the severance tax on petitioners, whether this power derives from the Tribe’s power of self-government or from its power to exclude. Because Congress may limit tribal sovereignty, we now review petitioners’ argument that Congress, when it enacted two federal Acts governing Indians and various pieces of federal energy legislation, deprived the Tribe of its authority to impose the severance tax.
In Colville, we concluded that the “widely held understanding within the Federal Government has always been that federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power” 447 U. S., at 152 (emphasis added). Moreover, we noted that “[n]o federal statute cited to us shows any congressional departure from this view.” Id., at 153. Likewise, petitioners can cite to no statute that specifically divests the Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax on their mining activities. Instead, petitioners argue that Congress implicitly took away this power when it enacted the Acts and various pieces of legislation on which petitioners rely. Before reviewing this argument, we reiterate here our admonition in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 60 (1978): “a proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”
Petitioners argue that Congress pre-empted the Tribe’s power to impose a severance tax when it enacted the 1938 Act, 25 U. S. C. §§396a-396g. In essence, petitioners argue that the tax constitutes an additional burden on lessees that is inconsistent with the Act’s regulatory scheme for leasing and developing oil and gas reserves on Indian land. This Act, and the regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior for its enforcement, establish the procedures to be followed for leasing oil and gas interests on tribal lands. However, the proviso to 25 U. S. C. §396b states that “the foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of tribes ... to lease lands for mining purposes ... in accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter adopted by any Indian tribe pursuant to sections 4.61, 462, 463, [464-475, 476-478], and 479 of this title” (emphasis added). Therefore, this Act does not prohibit the Tribe from imposing a severance tax on petitioners’ mining activities pursuant to its Revised Constitution, when both the Revised Constitution and the ordinance authorizing the tax are approved by the Secretary.
Petitioners also assert that the 1927 Act, 25 U. S. C. §§398a-398e, divested the Tribe’s taxing power. We disagree. The 1927 Act permits state taxation of mineral lessees on Executive Order reservations, but it indicates no change in the taxing power of the affected tribes. See 25 U. S. C. § 398c. Without mentioning the tribal authority to tax, the Act authorizes state taxation of royalties from mineral production on all Indian lands. Petitioners argue that the Act transferred the Indian power to tax mineral production to the States in exchange for the royalties assured the tribes. This claim not only lacks any supporting evidence in the legislative history, it also deviates from settled principles of taxation: different sovereigns can enjoy powers to tax the same transactions. Thus, the mere existence of state authority to tax does not deprive the Indian tribe of its power to tax. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 F. 2d 1253 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 983 (1977). Cf. Colville, 447 U. S., at 158 (“There is no direct conflict between the state and tribal schemes, since each government is free to impose its taxes without ousting the other”).
Finally, petitioners contend that tribal taxation of oil and gas conflicts with national energy policies, and therefore the tribal tax is pre-empted by federal law. Again, petitioners cite no specific federal statute restricting Indian sovereignty. Nor do they explain why state taxation of the same type of activity escapes the asserted conflict with federal policy. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981). Indeed, rather than forbidding tribal severance taxes, Congress has included taxes imposed by an Indian tribe in its definition of costs that may be recovered under federal energy pricing regulations. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, §§ 110(a), (c)(1), 92 Stat. 3368, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3320(a), (c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Although this inclusion may not reflect Congress’ view with respect to the source of a tribe’s power to impose a severance tax, it surely indicates that imposing such a tax would not contravene federal energy policy and that the tribal authority to do so is not implicitly divested by that Act.
We find no “clear indications” that Congress has implicitly deprived the Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax. In any event, if there were ambiguity on this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, for “[ajmbiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with. . . traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.” White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 143-144 (1980). Accordingly, we find that the Federal Government has not divested the Tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activities on its land, whether this authority derives from the Tribe’s power of self-government or from its power to exclude.
Ill
Finding no defect in the Tribe’s exercise of its taxing power, we now address petitioners’ contention that the severance tax violates the “negative implications” of the Commerce Clause because it taxes an activity that is an integral part of the flow of commerce, discriminates against interstate commerce, and imposes a multiple burden on interstate commerce. At the outset, we note that reviewing tribal action under the Interstate Commerce Clause is not without conceptual difficulties. E. g., nn. 21 and 24, infra. Apparently recognizing these difficulties, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary, argues that the language, the structure, and the purposes of the Commerce Clause support the conclusion that the Commerce Clause does not, of its own force, limit Indian tribes in their dealings with non-Indians. Brief for Secretary of Interior 35-40. The Solicitor General reasons that the Framers did not intend “the courts, through the Commerce Clause, to impose their own views of the proper relationship between Indians and non-Indians and to strike down measures adopted by a tribe with which the political departments of government had not seen fit to disagree.” Id., at 39. Instead, where tribal legislation is inimical to the national welfare, the Solicitor asserts that the Framers contemplated that the remedies would be the negotiation or renegotiation of treaties, the enactment of legislation governing trade and other relations, or the exertion of superior force by the United States Government. Id., at 38-39. Using similar reasoning, the Solicitor suggests that if the Commerce Clause does impose restrictions on tribal activity, those restrictions must arise from the Indian Commerce Clause, and not its interstate counterpart. Id., at 40-43.
To date, however, this Court has relied on the Indian Commerce Clause as a shield to protect Indian tribes from state and local interference, and has not relied on the Clause to authorize tribal regulation of commerce without any constitutional restraints. We see no need to break new ground in this area today: even if we assume that tribal action is subject to the limitations of the Interstate Commerce Clause, this tax does not violate the “negative implications” of that Clause.
A
A state tax may violate the “negative implications” of the Interstate Commerce Clause by unduly burdening or discriminating against interstate commerce. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609 (1981); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977). Judicial review of state taxes under the Interstate Commerce Clause is intended to ensure that States do not disrupt or burden interstate commerce when Congress’ power remains unexercised: it protects the free flow of commerce, and thereby safeguards Congress’ latent power from encroachment by the several States.
However, we only engage in this review when Congress has not acted or purported to act. See, e. g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 421-427 (1946). Once Congress acts, courts are not free to review state taxes or other regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause. When Congress has struck the balance it deems appropriate, the courts are no longer needed to prevent States from burdening commerce, and it matters not that the courts would invalidate the state tax or regulation under the Commerce Clause in the absence of congressional action. See Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, supra, at 431. Courts are final arbiters under the Commerce Clause only when Congress has not acted. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S., at 454.
Here, Congress has affirmatively acted by providing a series of federal checkpoints that must be cleared before a tribal tax can take effect. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. §§476, 477, a tribe must obtain approval from the Secretary before it adopts or revises its constitution to announce its intention to tax nonmembers. Further, before the ordinance imposing the severance tax challenged here could take effect, the Tribe was required again to obtain approval from the Secretary. See Revised Constitution of the Jicarilla Tribe, Art. XI, §§ 1(e), 2. Cf. 25 U. S. C. §§476, 477; 25 CFR § 171.29 (1980) (implementing the proviso to 25 U. S. C. § 396b, quoted in n. 15, supra).
As we noted earlier, the severance tax challenged by petitioners was enacted in accordance with this congressional scheme. Both the Tribe’s Revised Constitution and the challenged tax ordinance received the requisite approval from the Secretary. This course of events fulfilled the administrative process established by Congress to monitor such exercises of tribal authority. As a result, this tribal tax comes to us in a posture significantly different from a challenged state tax, which does not need specific federal approval to take effect, and which therefore requires, in the absence of congressional ratification, judicial review to ensure that it does not unduly burden or discriminate against interstate commerce. Judicial review of the Indian tax measure, in contrast, would duplicate the administrative review called for by the congressional scheme.
Finally, Congress is well aware that Indian tribes impose mineral severance taxes such as the one challenged by petitioners. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3320(a), (c)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). Congress, of course, retains plenary power to limit tribal taxing authority or to alter the current scheme under which the tribes may impose taxes. However, it is not our function nor our prerogative to strike down a tax that has traveled through the precise channels established by Congress, and has obtained the specific approval of the Secretary.
B
The tax challenged here would survive judicial scrutiny under the Interstate Commerce Clause, even if such scrutiny were necessary.. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra, at 279, we held that a state tax on activities connected to interstate commerce is sustainable if it “is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” Petitioners do not question that the tax on the severance of minerals from the mines meets the first and the second tests: the mining activities taxed pursuant to the ordinance occur entirely on reservation land. Furthermore, petitioners do not challenge the tax on the ground that the amount of the tax is not fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioners in No. 80-15, pp. 11, 17-20.
Instead, petitioners focus their attack on the third factor, and argue that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. In essence, petitioners argue that the language “sold or transported off the reservation” exempts from taxation minerals sold on the reservation, kept on the reservation for use by individual members of the Tribe, and minerals taken by the Tribe on the reservation as in-kind royalty. Although petitioners admit that no sales have occurred on the reservation to date, they argue that the Tribe might induce private industry to locate on the reservation to take advantage of this allegedly discriminatory taxing policy. We do not accept petitioners’ arguments; instead, we agree with the Tribe, the Solicitor General, and the Court of Appeals that the tax is imposed on minerals sold on the reservation or transported off the reservation before sale. See 617 F. 2d, at 546. Cf. n. 22, supra. * Under this interpretation, the tax does not treat minerals transported away from the reservation differently than it treats minerals that might be sold on the reservation. Nor does the Tribe’s tax ordinance exempt minerals ultimately received by individual members of the Tribe. The ordinance does exempt minerals received by the Tribe as in-kind payments on the leases and used for tribal purposes, but this exemption merely avoids the administrative make-work that would ensue if the Tribe, as local government, taxed the amount of minerals that the Tribe, as commercial partner, received in royalty payments. Therefore, this exemption cannot be deemed a discriminatory preference for local commerce.
IV
In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet., at 559, Chief Justice Marshall observed that Indian tribes had “always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights.” Although the tribes are subject to the authority of the Federal Government, the “weaker power does not surrender its independence — its right to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.” Id., at 561. Adhering to this understanding, we conclude that the Tribe did not surrender its authority to tax the mining activities of petitioners, whether this authority is deemed to arise from the Tribe’s inherent power of self-government or from its inherent power to exclude nonmembers. Therefore, the Tribe may enforce its severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power, an action that Congress has not taken to date. Finally, the severance tax imposed by the Tribe cannot be invalidated on the ground that it violates the “negative implications” of the Commerce Clause.
Affirmed.
See 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 875 (1904) (Order of President Cleveland). Two earlier Orders setting aside land for the Tribe had been canceled. See id., at 874-875 (Orders of Presidents Hayes and Grant). The boundaries of the reservation were redefined or clarified by Executive Orders issued by President Theodore Roosevelt on November 11, 1907, and January 28, 1908, and by President Taft on February 17, 1912. See 3 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 681, 682, 684, . 685 (1913).
The fact that the Jicarilla Apache Reservation was established by Executive Order rather than by treaty or statute does not affect our analysis; the Tribe’s sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which its reservation was created. E. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980).
The proviso reads as follows: “this order shall not be so construed as to deprive any bona fide settler of any valid rights he may have acquired under the law of the United States providing for the disposition of the public domain.” 1 Kappler, supra, at 875.
The Tribe is also chartered under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C. § 477, which permits the Secretary to issue to an Indian tribe a charter of incorporation that may give the tribe the power to purchase, manage, operate, and dispose of its property.
Two judges dissented. Both argued that tribal sovereignty does not encompass the power to tax non-Indian lessees, 617 F. 2d, at 551-556 (Seth, C. J., dissenting); id., at 556-565 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (also arguing the tax violates the Commerce Clause).
Through various Acts governing Indian tribes, Congress has expressed the purpose of “fostering tribal self-government.” Colville, 447 U. S., at 155. We agree with Judge McKay’s observation that “[i]t simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise at least minimal taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold taxes or severance taxes.” 617 F. 2d, at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
Moreover, in its revision of the classic treatise on Indian Law, the Department of the Interior advances the view that the Indian tribes’ power to tax is not limited by the power to exclude. See U. S. Solicitor for Dept, of Interior, Federal Indian Law 438 (1958) (“The power to tax does not depend upon the power to remove and has been upheld where there was no power in the tribe to remove the taxpayer from the tribal jurisdiction”) (footnote omitted). See also F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142 (1942) (“One of the powers essential to the maintenance of any government is the power to levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress is a proposition which has never been successfully disputed”) (footnote omitted).
The governing treaty in Maxey v. Wright restricted the tribal right of self-government and jurisdiction to members of the Creek or Seminole Tribes. The court relied, at least in part, on opinions of the Attorney General interpreting this treaty. For example, one such opinion stated that, whatever the meaning of the clause limiting to tribal members the Tribes' unrestricted rights of self-government and jurisdiction, it did
“ ‘not limit the right of these tribes to pass upon the question, who. . . shall share their occupancy, and upon what terms. That is a question which all private persons are allowed to decide for themselves; and even wild animals, not men, have a certain respect paid to the instinct which in this respect they share with man. The serious words “jurisdiction” and “self-government” are scarcely appropriate to the right of a hotel keeper to prescribe rules and charges for persons who become his fellow occupants.’ ” 3 Ind. T., at 250, 54 S. W., at 809 (quoting 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 4, 36, 37 (1884)).
The court, as well as the opinion of the Attorney General, found that the Tribes’ “natural instinct” to set terms on occupancy was unaltered by the treaty. Neither the court nor the Attorney General adressed the scope of Indian sovereignty when unlimited by treaty; instead, they identified a tribe’s right, as a social group, to exclude intruders and place conditions on their occupancy. The court’s dependence on this reasoning hardly bears on the more general question posed here: what is the source of the Indian tribes’ sovereign power to tax absent a restriction by treaty or other federal law?
Both the classic treatise on Indian law and its subsequent revision by the Department of the Interior, see n. 6, supra, agree with this reading of Buster v. Wright. Federal Indian Law, supra n. 6, at 438; Cohen, supra n. 6, at 142 (both citing Buster v. Wright for the proposition that the power to tax is an inherent sovereign power not dependent on the power to exclude).
See also Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F. 2d 553 (CA8 1958) (lessees of tribal lands subject to Indian tax on use of land).
Here, the leases extend for as long as minerals are produced in paying quantities, in other words, until the resources are depleted. Thus, under the dissent’s approach, the Tribe would never have the power to tax petitioners regardless of the financial burden to the Tribe of providing and maintaining governmental services for the benefit of petitioners.
But see Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 958:
“The ultimate conclusion of the whole matter is that purchasers of lots in town sites in towns or cities within the original limits of the Creek Nation, who are in lawful possession of their lots, are still subject to the laws of that nation prescribing permit taxes for the exercise by noncitizens of the privilege of conducting business in those towns . . . .”
In contrast, the 1958 treatise on Indian law written by the United States Solicitor for the Department of the Interior recognized and distinguished the scope of these two roles when it embraced as the “present state of the law” the following summary:
“ ‘Over-tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty. But over all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to reside therein, and to do business, provided only such determination is consistent with applicable Federal laws and does not infringe any vested rights of persons now occupying reservation lands under lawful authority.’ ” Federal Indian Law, swpra n. 6, at 439 (quoting Solicitor’s Opinion of Oct. 25, 1934) (emphasis added).
See Cohen, supra n. 6, at 143.
See also P. Maxfield, M. Dieterich, & F. Trelease, Natural Resources Law on American Indian Lands 4-6 (1977). Federal limitations on tribal sovereignty can also occur when the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with overriding national interests. See Col ville, 447 U. S., at 153. This concern is not presented here. See ibid.
Petitioners and the dissent also argue that we should infer a waiver of the taxing power from silence in the Tribe’s original Constitution. Although it is true that the Constitution in force when petitioners signed their leases did not include a provision specifically authorizing a severance tax, neither the Tribe’s Constitution nor the Federal Constitution is the font of any sovereign power of the Indian tribes. E. g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 231 F. 2d 89, 94 (CA8 1956); Buster v. Wright, 135 F., at 950. Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from silence on this point is that the sovereign power to tax remains intact. The Tribe’s Constitution was amended to authorize the tax before the tax was imposed, and this is the critical event necessary to effectuate the tax. See Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F. 2d, at 554, 556; Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, supra, at 99.
The Secretary has implemented the substance of this proviso by the following regulation:
“The regulations in this part may be superseded by the provisions of any tribal constitution, bylaw or charter issued pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984; 25 U. S. C. 461-479),... or by ordinance, resolution or other action authorized under such constitution, bylaw or charter. The regulations in this part, in so far as they are not so superseded, shall apply to leases made by organized tribes if the validity of the lease depends upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.” 25 CFR § 171.29 (1980).
In arguing that the 1938 Act was intended to pre-empt the severance tax, petitioners attach great significance to the Secretary’s approval of the leases. Curiously, they attach virtually no significance to the fact that the Secretary also approved the tax ordinance that they challenge here.
The Tribe argues that the 1927 Act granting the States the power to tax mineral production on Indian land is inapplicable because the leases at issue here were signed pursuant to the 1938 Act. The 1938 Act, which makes uniform the laws applicable to leasing mineral rights on tribal lands, does not contain a grant of power to the States comparable to that found in the 1927 Act. As a result, the Tribe asserts that the State of New Mexico has no power to tax the production under petitioners’ leases with the Tribe. Because the State of New Mexico is not a party to this suit, the Court of Appeals did not reach this issue. See 617 F. 2d, at 547-548, n. 5. For this reason, and because we conclude that the 1927 Act did not affect the Tribe’s authority to tax, we likewise do not reach this issue.
The statute provides that Indian severance taxes may be recovered through federal energy pricing. However, the legislative history indicates that Congress took no position on the source of the Indian tribes’ power to impose the tax in the first place:
“While severance taxes which may be imposed by an Indian tribe are to be treated in the same manner as State imposed severance taxes, the conferees do not intend to prejudge the outcome of the cases on appeal before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals respecting the right of Indian tribes to impose taxes on persons or organizations other than Indians who are engaged in business activities on Indian reservations. The outcome of the cases on appeal will determine the legality of imposing such taxes.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1126, p. 91 (1978); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1762, p. 91 (1978).
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, this Court refused to invalidate a South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurance companies despite appellant’s contention that the tax impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. The Court refused to entertain appellant’s argument because Congress, in passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, had provided that “silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of [the business of insurance] by the several States.” 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011.
Although Congress has not expressly announced that Indian taxes do not threaten its latent power to regulate interstate commerce, it is unclear how Congress could articulate that intention any more convincingly than it has done here. In contrast to when Congress acts with respect to the States, when Congress acts with respect to the Indian tribes, it generally does so pursuant to its authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, or by virtue of its superior position over the tribes, not pursuant to its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is but one of the difficulties inherent in reviewing under the Interstate Commerce Clause both tribal action and congressional action regulating the tribes. Therefore, in determining whether Congress has “acted” to preclude judicial review, we do not find it significant that the congressional action here was not taken pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Petitioners initially contend that the ordinance taxes the transportation of the minerals from the reservation, not their severance from the mines. As a result, they argue that the ordinance impermissibly burdens interstate commerce by taxing the movement in commerce itself, which is not a local event. The tax, by its terms, applies to resources that are “produced on the Jicarilla Apache Tribe Reservation and sold or transported off the Reservation.” App. 39. The Tribe explains that this language was used because no sale occurs prior to the transportation off the reservation. The Tribe’s tax is due at the time of severance. Id,., at 38. Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the taxable event defined by the ordinance is the removal of minerals from the soil, not their transportation from the reservation. See 617 F. 2d, at 546.
The Court of Appeals noted that, because the lessees chose not to build a factual foundation to challenge the tax on this ground, there was no basis on which to find that the tax was not fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. See id., at 545, n. 4. Indeed, when the Tribe attempted to introduce at trial evidence of the services it had provided to establish this relationship, the District Court rejected this evidence upon petitioners’ objection that such evidence was irrelevant to their challenge. Brief for Respondent Jicarilla Apache Tribe 7-8; 6 Record 278-290, 294, 300-308.
The ordinance does not distinguish between minerals remaining within New Mexico and those transported beyond the state boundary. As a result, petitioners’ argument that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce by favoring local sales focuses on the boundary between the reservation and the State of New Mexico and not on any interstate boundaries. We will assume for purposes of this argument only that this alleged reservation-state discrimination could give rise to a Commerce Clause violation.
Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifies that “[rjoyalty gas, oil or condensate taken by the Tribe in kind, and used by the Tribe shall be exempt from taxation.” App. 39.
Petitioners contend that because New Mexico may tax the same mining activity at full value, the Indian tax imposes a multiple tax burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The multiple taxation issue arises where two or more taxing jurisdictions point to some contact with an enterprise to support a tax on the entire value of its multistate activities, which is more than the contact would justify. E. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U. S. 382, 384-385 (1952). This Court has required an apportionment of the tax based on the portion of the activity properly viewed as occurring within each relevant State. See, e. g., Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 447 U. S. 207, 219 (1980); Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 746, and n. 16 (1978).
This rule has no bearing here, however, for there can be no claim that the Tribe seeks to tax any more of petitioners’ mining activity than the portion occurring within tribal jurisdiction. Indeed, petitioners do not even argue that the Tribe is seeking to seize more tax revenues than would be fairly related to the services provided by the Tribe. See supra, at 157, and n. 23. In the absence of such an assertion, and when the activity taxed by the Tribe occurs entirely on tribal lands, the multiple taxation issue would arise only if a State attempted to levy a tax on the same activfy, which is more than the State’s contact with the activity would justify. In such a circumstance, any challenge asserting that tribal and state taxes create a multiple burden on interstate commerce should be directed at the state tax, which, in the absence of congressional ratification, might be invalidated under the Commerce Clause. These cases, of course, do not involve a challenge to state taxation, and we intimate no opinion on the possibility of such a challenge. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
11
] | sc_certreason |
INTERNATIONAL UNION, U. A. W. A., A. F. of L., LOCAL 232, et al. v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al.
Nos. 14 and 15.
Argued November 17-18, 1948.
Decided February 28, 1949.
David Previant argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Beatrice Lampert, Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin, argued the cause for the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, respondent. With her on the brief were Grover L. Broadfoot, Attorney General, and Stewart G. Honeck, Deputy Attorney General.
Jackson M. Bruce argued the cause for the Briggs & Stratton Corp., respondent. With him on the brief were Edgar L. Wood and Bernard V. Brady.
Max Raskin filed a brief for the Wisconsin State Industrial Union Council, as amicus curiae, in support of petitioners.
Briefs urging affirmance were filed as amici curiae by the following: A joint brief by Guy E. Williams, Attorney General, for the State of Arkansas, J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, for the State of Florida, Robert L. Larson, Attorney General, for the State of Iowa, Eugene F. Black, Attorney General, and Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, for the State of Michigan, Walter R. Johnson, Attorney General, for the State of Nebraska, P. O. Sathre, Attorney General, for the State of North Dakota, Roy H. Beeler, Attorney General, for the State of Tennessee, and Grover A. Giles, Attorney General, for the State of Utah; by T. McKeen Chidsey, Attorney General, M. Louise Rutherford, Deputy Attorney General, and George L. Reed, Solicitor, State Labor Relations Board, for the State of Pennsylvania; by Leon B. Lamfrom for the Employers Association of Milwaukee; and by Howard Johnson for the Wisconsin Manufacturers’ Association et al.
Mr. Justice Jackson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Certain labor legislation of the State of Wisconsin, as applied by its Supreme Court, is challenged because it is said to transgress constitutional limitations imposed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and by the Commerce Clause as implemented by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that its Act authorizes the State Employment Relations Board to order a labor union to cease and desist from instigating certain intermittent and unannounced work stoppages which it had caused under the following circumstances: Briggs & Stratton Corporation operates two manufacturing plants in the State of Wisconsin engaging approximately 2,000 employees. These are represented by the International Union, Automobile Workers of America, A. F. of L., Local No. 232, as collective bargaining agent, it having been duly certified as such by the National Labor Relations Board in proceedings under the National Labor Relations Act. Under such certification, the Union had negotiated collective bargaining agreements, the last of which expired on July 1, 1944. Negotiation of a new one reached a deadlock and bargaining sessions continued for some time without success.
On November 3, 1945, its leaders submitted to the Union membership a plan for a new method of putting pressure upon the employer. The stratagem consisted of calling repeated special meetings of the Union during working hours at any time the Union saw fit, which the employees would leave work to attend. It was an essential part of the plan that this should be without warning to the employer or notice as to when or whether the employees would return. The device was adopted and the first surprise cessation of work was called on November 6, 1945; thereafter, and until March 22, 1946, such action was repeated on twenty-six occasions. The employer was not informed during this period of any specific demands which these tactics were designed to enforce nor what concessions it could make to avoid them.
This procedure was publicly described by the Union leaders as a new technique for bringing pressure upon the employer. It was, and is, candidly admitted that these tactics were intended to and did interfere with production and put strong economic pressure on the employer, who was disabled thereby from making any dependable production plans or delivery commitments. And it was said that “this can’t be said for the strike. After the initial surprise of the walkout, the company knows what it has to do and plans accordingly.” It was commended as a procedure which would avoid hardships that a strike imposes on employees and was considered “a better weapon than a strike.”
The employer did not resort to any private disciplinary measures such as discharge of the employees; instead, it sought a much less drastic remedy by plea to the appropriate public authority under Wisconsin law to investigate and adjudge the Union’s conduct under the law of the State. After the prescribed procedures, the Board ordered the Union to cease and desist from “(a) engaging in any concerted efforts to interfere with production by arbitrarily calling union meetings and inducing work stoppages during regularly scheduled working hours; or engaging in any other concerted effort to interfere with production of the complainant except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.”
Two court proceedings resulted from the Board’s order: one by the Board to obtain enforcement and the other by the Union to obtain review. They are here considered, as they were below, together.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained the Board’s order but significantly limited the effect of its otherwise general prohibitions. It held that what the order does, and all that it does, is to forbid individual defendants and members of the Union from engaging in concerted effort to interfere with production by doing the acts instantly involved. As we have heretofore pointed out, the construction placed upon such an order by the State Supreme Court is conclusive on us. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740. Our only question is, therefore, whether it is beyond the power of the State to prohibit the particular course of conduct described.
The Union contends that the statute as thus applied violates the Thirteenth Amendment in that it imposes a form of compulsory service or involuntary servitude. However, nothing in the statute or the order makes it a crime to abandon work individually (compare Pollock v. Williams, 322 U. S. 4) or collectively. Nor does either undertake to prohibit or restrict any employee from leaving the service of the employer, either for reason or without reason, either with or without notice. The facts afford no foundation for the contention that any action of the State has the purpose or effect of imposing any form of involuntary servitude.
It is further contended that the statute as applied invades rights of free speech and public assemblage guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We recently considered a similar contention in connection with other state action concerning labor relations. Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., and Whitaker v. North Carolina, 335 U. S. 525, and American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U. S. 538. For reasons there stated, these contentions are without merit.
No serious question is presented by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution standing alone. It never has been thought to prevent the state legislatures from limiting “individual and group rights of aggression and defense” or from substituting “processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.” Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488; see also Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 311, cited with approval, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103; and see Hotel & Restaurant Employees’ Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437.
The substantial issue is whether Congress has protected the union conduct which the State has forbidden, and hence the state legislation must yield. When the order of the State Board and the decision of the State Supreme Court were made, the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166, was in effect and questions of conflict between state and federal law were raised and decided with reference to it. However, the order imposes a continuing restraint which it is contended now conflicts with the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. §§ 141-197, which amended the earlier statute. We therefore consider the state action in relation to both Federal Acts.
Congress has not seen fit in either of these Acts to declare either a general policy or to state specific rules as to their effects on state regulation of various phases of labor relations over which the several states traditionally have exercised control. Cf. Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85, 15 U. S. C. § 77r; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28, 48 Stat. 881, 903, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb; United States Warehouse Act, before and after 1931 Amendment, 39 Stat. 486, 490, 46 Stat. 1465, 7 U. S. C. § 269. However, as to coercive tactics in labor controversies, we have said of the National Labor Relations Act what is equally true of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, that “Congress designedly left open an area for state control” and that the “intention of Congress to exclude States from exercising their police power must be clearly manifested.” Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 750, 749. We therefore turn to its legislation for evidence that Congress has clearly manifested an exclusion of the state power sought to be exercised in this case.
Congress made in the National Labor Relations Act no express delegation of power to the Board to permit or forbid this particular union conduct, from which an exclusion of state power could be implied. The Labor Management Relations Act declared it to be an unfair labor practice for a union to induce or engage in a strike or concerted refusal to work where an object thereof is any of certain enumerated ones. § 8 (b) (4), 61 Stat. 140, 141; 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4). Nevertheless the conduct here described is not forbidden by this Act and no proceeding is authorized by which the Federal Board may deal with it in any manner. While the Federal Board is empowered to forbid a strike, when and because its purpose is one that the Federal Act made illegal, it has been given no power to forbid one because its method is illegal — even if the illegality were to consist of actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property. Policing of such conduct is left wholly to the states. In this case there was also evidence of considerable injury to property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions the State’s power to police coercion by those methods.
It seems to us clear that this case falls within the rule announced in Allen-Bradley that the state may police these strike activities as it could police the strike activities there, because “Congress has not made such employee and union conduct as is involved in this case subject to regulation by the federal Board.” There is no existing or possible conflict or overlapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, because the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate, approve or forbid the union conduct in question. This conduct is governable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.
This case is not analogous to Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, on which petitioners rely. There .the State Board undertook to determine the bargaining unit in an industry, an identical question which the Federal Board was authorized to determine, and the two had deliberately laid down contrary policies to govern decisions of this same matter. In that case, of course, the federal policy was necessarily given effect as the supreme law of the land. See also La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, ante, p. 18.
But it is claimed that the congressional labor legislation confers upon or recognizes and declares in unions and employees certain rights, privileges or immunities in connection with strikes and concerted activities, and that these are denied by the State’s prohibition as laid down in this case. It is elementary that what Congress constitutionally has given, the state may not constitutionally take away. Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538.
The argument is that two provisions, found in § § 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, not relevantly changed by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, grant to the Union and its members the right to put pressure upon the employer by the recurrent and unannounced stoppage of work. Both Acts provide that “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Because the acts forbidden by the Wisconsin judgment are concerted activities and had a purpose to assist labor organizations in collective bargaining, it is said to follow that they are federally authorized and thereby immunized from state control.
It is urged here that we are bound to hold these activities protected by § 7 because that has become the settled interpretation of the Act by the Board charged with its administration. This contention is based on decisions by the Board in American Mfg. Concern, 7 N. L. R. B. 753; Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N. L. R. B., 676; The Good Coal Co., 12 N. L. R. B. 136; Armour & Co., 25 N. L. R. B. 989; Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N. L. R. B. 837; and Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 46 N. L. R. B. 714. We do not think it can fairly be said that even the cumulative effect of those cases amounts to a fixed Board interpretation that all work stoppages are federally protected concerted activities. In those cases, but in a context of antiunion animus on the employer’s part, the Board condemned as unfair labor practices summary discharges attempted in retaliation for isolated work stoppages re-fleeting temporary rebellion over rules or conditions of work. The drastic remedy of discharge, so outweighing any possible damage in those cases to the employer and so tainted by antiunion motives, led to the Board’s conclusion of unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act. The Board, however, made it clear in the Harnischfeger and Armour cases that such a conclusion does not necessarily follow a finding that the employees’ activities were concerted :
. . Section 7 of the Act expressly guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. We do not interpret this to mean that it is unlawful for an employer to discharge an employee for any activity sanctioned by a union or otherwise in the nature of collective activity. The question before us is, we think, whether this particular activity was so indefensible, under the circumstances, as to warrant the respondent, under the Act, in discharging the stewards for this type of union activity. We do not think it was.”
In view of that statement, the facts of the present case do not bring it within the protection of the Act as administered by the Board. Here the employer has resorted to no retaliatory measures and its motive in asking help from the State is not even alleged to be anti-union but merely a desire to keep its plant in operation. The remedy sought against repeated disruption of production is not summary dismissal but invocation of a statutory procedure made available by the State for the adjudication and resolution of such difficulties. Consequently, we do not find any fixed Board policy to apply the Act to such facts as we have here. The quoted statement from the Board’s two opinions indicates lack of belief that it was creating any such rule.
However, in no event could the Board adopt such a binding practice as to the scope of § 7 in the light of the construction, with which we agree, given to § 7 by the Courts of Appeals, authorized to review Board orders. In similar cases they have denied comparable work stoppages the protection of that section. C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. Labor Board, 108 F. 2d 390; Labor Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F. 2d 67; Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board, 159 F. 2d 280; and see Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199; Labor Board v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F. 2d 987. To hold that the alleged fixed Board interpretation has irrevocably labeled all concerted activities “protected” would be in the teeth of the Board’s own language and would deny any effect to the Courts of Appeals’ decisions. The latter decisions and our own, Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240; Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31; Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740; and see Hotel & Restaurant Employees’ Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437, clearly interdict any rule by the Board that every type of concerted activity is beyond the reach of the states’ adjudicatory machinery. The bare language of' § 7 cannot be construed to immunize the conduct forbidden by the judgment below and therefore the injunction as construed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court does not conflict with § 7 of the Federal Act.
In the light of labor movement history, the purpose of the quoted provision of the statute becomes clear. The most effective legal weapon against the struggling labor union was the doctrine that concerted activities were conspiracies, and for that reason illegal. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act took this conspiracy weapon away from the employer in employment relations which affect interstate commerce. No longer can any state, as to relations within reach of the Act, treat otherwise lawful activities to aid unionization as an illegal conspiracy merely because they are undertaken by many persons acting in concert. But because legal conduct may not be made illegal by concert, it does not mean that otherwise illegal action is made legal by concert.
Reliance also is placed upon § 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, which provided, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” 49 Stat. 449, 457. The 1947 Amendment carries the same provision but that Act includes a definition. Section 501 (2) says that when used in the Act “The term ‘strike’ includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.” 61 Stat. 161.
This provision, as carried over into the Labor Management Relations Act, does not purport to create, establish or define the right to strike. On its face it is narrower in scope than § 7 — the latter would be of little significance if “strike” is a broader term than “concerted activity.” Unless we read into § 13 words which Congress omitted and a sense which Congress showed no intention of including, all that this provision does is to declare a rule of interpretation for the Act itself which would prevent any use of what originally was a novel piece of legislation to qualify or impede whatever right to strike exists under other laws. It did not purport to modify the body of law as to the legality of strikes as it then existed. This Court less than a decade earlier had stated that law to be that the state constitutionally could prohibit strikes and make a violation criminal. It had unanimously adopted the language of Mr. Justice Brandeis that “Neither the common law, nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike.” Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306, 311. Dissenting views most favorable to labor in other cases had conceded the right of the state legislature to mark the limits of tolerable industrial conflict in the public interest. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 488. This Court has adhered to that view. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103. The right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining which this Court has characterized as a “fundamental right” and which, as the Court has pointed out, was recognized as such in its decisions long before it was given protection by the National Labor Relations Act. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 33.
As to the right to strike, however, this Court, quoting the language of § 13, has said, 306 U. S. 240, 256, “But this recognition of 'the right to strike’ plainly contemplates a lawful strike, — the exercise of the unquestioned right to quit work,” and it did not operate to legalize the sit-down strike, which state law made illegal and state authorities punished. Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240. Nor, for example, did it make legal a strike that ran afoul of federal law, Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31; nor one in violation of a contract made pursuant thereto, Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332; nor one creating a national emergency, United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258.
That Congress has concurred in the view that neither § 7 nor § 13 confers absolute right to engage in every kind of strike or other concerted activity does not rest upon mere inference; indeed the record indicates that, had the courts not made these interpretations, the Congress would have gone as far or farther in the direction of limiting the right to engage in concerted activities including the right to strike. The House Committee of Conference handling the bill which became the Labor Management Relations Act, on June 3, 1947 advised the House to recede from its disagreement with the Senate and to accept the present text upon grounds there stated under the rubric “Rights of Employees.” H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 38. The Committee pointed out that “the courts have firmly established the rule that under the existing provisions of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, employees are not given any right to engage in unlawful or other improper conduct. In its most recent decisions the Board has been consistently applying the principles established by the courts. . . .” And “it was believed that the specific provisions in the House bill excepting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and violation of collective bargaining agreements from the protection of section 7 were unnecessary. Moreover, there was real concern that the inclusion of such a provision might have a limiting effect and make improper conduct not specifically mentioned subject to the protection of the act.” The full text of this section of the report is printed in the margin.
Thus, the obvious purpose of the Labor Management Amendments was not to grant a dispensation for the strike but to outlaw strikes when undertaken to enforce what the Act calls unfair labor practices, an end which would be defeated if we sustain the Union's claim in this respect. By § 8 (b) (4), strikes to attain named objectives are made unfair labor practices; and by § 10 (a), the Board is authorized to prevent them. The definition plainly enough was designed to enable the Board to order a union to cease and desist from a strike so made illegal, whether it consisted of a strike in the usual or conventional meaning or consisted of some of the other practices mentioned in the definition. However, if we add the definition to § 13, it does not change the effect of the Act on state powers. It still gives the Federal Board no authority to prohibit or to supervise the activity which the State Board has here stopped nor to entertain any proceeding concerning it, because it is the objectives only and not the tactics of a strike which bring it within the power of the Federal Board. And § 13 plus the definition only provides that “Nothing in this Act . . . shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede” the right to engage in these activities. What other Acts or other state laws might do is not attempted to be regulated by this section. Since reading the definition into § 13 confers neither federal power to control the activities in question nor any immunity from the exercise of state power in reference to them, it can have no effect on the right of the State to resort to its own reserved power over coercive conduct as it has done in this instance.
If we were to read § 13 as we are urged to do, to make the strike an absolute right and the definition to extend the right to all other variations of the strike, the effect would be to legalize beyond the power of any state or federal authorities to control not only the intermittent stoppages such as we have here but also the slowdown and perhaps the sit-down strike as well. Cf. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 751. And this is not all; the management also would be disabled from any kind of self-help to cope with these coercive tactics of the union except to submit to its undeclared demands. To dismiss or discipline employees for exercising a right given them under the Act or to interfere with them or the union in pursuing it is made an unfair labor practice and if the rights here asserted are rights conferred by the Labor Management Relations Act, it is hard to see how the management can take any steps to resist or combat them without incurring the sanctions of the Act. It is certain that such a result would be inconsistent with the whole purpose disclosed by the Labor Management Relations Act amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. Nor do we think such is the result of any fair interpretation of the text of the Act.
We think that this recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work to win unstated ends was neither forbidden by federal statute nor was it legalized and approved thereby. Such being the case, the state police power was not superseded by congressional Act over a subject normally within its exclusive power and reachable by federal regulation only because of its effects on that interstate commerce which Congress may regulate. Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Board, 330 U. S. 767.
We find no basis for denying to Wisconsin the power, in governing her internal affairs, to regulate a course of conduct neither made a right under federal law nor a violation of it and which has the coercive effect obvious in this device.
The judgments are
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge concur, dissenting.
This strike was legal under the Wagner Act in 1945 and 1946 and its legality was not affected by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. I think, therefore, that the effort of Wisconsin to make it unlawful must fail because it conflicts with the national policy.
Section 13 of the Wagner Act is written in language too plain to admit of doubt or ambiguity: “Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike.” The Court held in Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 256, that by this provision Congress “recognized the right to strike, — that the employees could lawfully cease work at their own volition because of the failure of the employer to meet their demands.” The congressional policy of protection of strikes as economic sanctions is now converted into a congressional policy of hands-off.
If the States can outlaw this strike, I see no reason why they cannot adopt regulations which determine the manner in which strikes may be called in these interstate industries. Can they in practical effect outlaw strikes by requiring a unanimous vote of the workers in order to call one? The federal Board is not authorized, it is said, to forbid or control strikes because of the method by which they are called or the way in which they are utilized. If that is the criterion, as the Court declares, then the manner of calling of strikes is left wholly to the States. The right to strike, which Congress has sanctioned, can in that way be undermined by state action. The federal policy thus becomes a formula of empty words.
That conclusion is made all the more surprising when § 13 of the Act is read in conjunction with § 7 which provides, “Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” (Italics added.) Section 7 read in conjunction with § 13 must mean that one of the “concerted activities” in which employees may engage is to strike in these interstate industries. In all of labor's history no “concerted activity” has been more conspicuous and important than the strike; and none was thought to be more essential to recognition of the right to collective bargaining. Moreover, the strike historically and in the present cases was used to make effective the collective bargaining power which § 7 of the Wagner Act guarantees. The right to strike, recognized by § 13, is thus an integral part of the federal labor-management policy.
Section 7 was invoked in Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 750, to challenge as unconstitutional Wisconsin’s regulation of picketing, threats, and violence in connection with labor disputes. We disallowed the defense, holding that those matters were problems within the reach of the traditional police power of the States and remained there after passage of the federal Act because it had not undertaken to regulate them.
The Wagner Act, to be sure, did not undertake to give the federal agency control over the manner of calling strikes or the purpose for which they may be called. To that extent these cases have common ground with the Allen-Bradley decision. But there the similarity ends. In Allen-Bradley the Congress had not expressed a policy on picketing, threats or violence in connection with labor disputes. In this case, as § 13 read in conjunction with § 7 makes plain, it has adopted a policy on strikes.
It is the presence of a conflicting federal policy that determines whether state action must give way under the Supremacy Clause, even though there may be no actual or potential collision between federal and state administrative agencies. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218. In Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538, a state regulation of the licensing of business agents of unions subject to the federal Act was held to be in conflict with the Wagner Act not because the federal Board had any licensing jurisdiction but because the state law interfered with the freedom of collective bargaining guaranteed by § 7 of the Act. The present cases follow a fortiori, if the strike is included in the “concerted activities” guaranteed by § 7.
The concerted activities in these cases were as old as labor’s struggle for existence and were aimed at (as well as a part of) the purposes which § 7 of the federal Act was designed to protect. Therefore the legality of the methods used is exclusively a question of federal law.
Mr. Justice Murphy, with whom Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs, dissenting.
To interfere with production and to enforce their bargaining demands, employees of Briggs and Stratton called twenty-seven union meetings during working hours without advance notice to the employer. Employees left their work and returned later in the day, or the following day. Wisconsin has made this concerted activity unlawful. The question is whether the State’s action violates the federal guarantee contained in § 7 of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts: “Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”
We have recognized that the phrase “concerted activities” does not make every union activity a federal right. We have held that violence by strikers is not protected, Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 316 U. S. 740; that a sit-down strike, Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240, a mutiny, Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31, and a strike in violation of a contract, Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U. S. 332, must be withdrawn from the literal language of § 7.
But the Court, by its reasoning and its quotation from a Congressional report, now makes intermittent work stoppages the equivalent of mutiny, contract-breaking, and the sit-down strike. It stretches the “objectives and means” test to include a form of pressure which is peaceful and direct. In effect, it adopts the employer’s plea that it cannot plan production schedules, cannot notify its customers and suppliers, cannot determine its output with any degree of certainty and that these inconveniences withdraw this activity from § 7 of the national statutes. The majority and the Wisconsin court call the weapon objectionable, then, only because it is effective. To impute this rationale to the Congress which enacted the Wagner Act is, in my opinion, judicial legislation of an extreme form.
The Court chooses to ignore the consistent policy of the agency charged with primary responsibility in interpreting and administering § 7. The National Board has repeatedly held that work stoppages of this nature are “partial strikes” and “concerted activities” within the meaning of § 7. Cudahy Packing Company, 29 N. L. R. B. 837, 863; Armour & Company, 25 N. L. R. B. 989; The Good Coal Company, 12 N. L. R. B. 136, 146; American Mfg. Concern, 7 N. L. R. B. 753, 758; Harnischfeger Corporation, 9 N. L. R. B. 676, 685; Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 46 N. L. R. B. 714, 716. In each of these six cases, the Board’s interpretation of § 7 is directly contrary to that reached by the Court in the case before us. In each case the Board concluded that work stoppages or “partial strikes” cannot be withdrawn from the language of § 7. To ignore the Board’s consistent rulings in this case is a new and unique departure from the rule of deference to settled administrative interpretation. The fact that the stoppages in the Board cases were fewer in number than those at Briggs and Stratton is not, of course, a controlling difference — unless we are to say that the stoppages are not protected by § 7 because they are effective from the union’s point of view.
Wisconsin’s action clearly conflicts with § 7, and accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.
The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act provides in part as follows:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employe individually or in concert with others: (a) To coerce or intimidate an employe in the enjoyment of his legal rights, including those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to intimidate his family, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such employe or his family. ... (e) To co-operate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing (not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed free speech), boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employes of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a strike. . . . (h) To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer or to engage in any concerted effort to interfere with production except by leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on strike.” Wis. Stat. (1947) c. Ill, § 111.06 (2).
U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3, giving the Congress power “To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”
49 Stat. 449; 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-166.
61 Stat. 136; 29 U. S. C. §§ 141-197.
250 Wis. 550, 27 N. W. 2d 875. The State Supreme Court concluded that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practices as defined in §§ 111.06 (2) (a), (e) and (h) of the Wisconsin statutes. Those provisions are set out in note 1.
Petitioners suggest that the stoppages were initiated to force the employer to comply with a War Labor Board directive. However, the stoppages began several weeks before that directive reached either the Union or the employer. By the latter date, the National Board had been abolished. Consequently the issuance of the directive would not seem to throw any light on the Union’s motives or to have any effect on the State Board’s jurisdiction.
The Employment Relations Board was created by the 1939 Act. See Wis. Stat. (1947) c. 111, § 111.03. The Board’s jurisdiction over unfair labor practices is delineated in § 111.07.
The Board also ordered petitioners to cease and desist from “(b) Coercing or intimidating employes by threats of violence or other punishment to engage in any activities for the purpose of interfering with production or that will interfere with the legal rights of the employes.” This provision of the order, based on evidence of some violence and threats, is not challenged here.
In the consolidated case before the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, that court denied enforcement of paragraph (a) of the Board’s order forbidding the work stoppages, but upheld paragraph (b) enjoining violence and threats. See note 8. The Supreme Court approved the order in its entirety. Review of that court’s action in upholding paragraph (a) is sought in these petitions by the Union and nine of its officers, seven of whom are employees of respondent corporation, and all of whom are members of the Union’s Bargaining Committee.
See notes 8 and 9.
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, 749.
§ 7 of National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 452. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 added a proviso that employees also have the right to refrain from any or all activities mentioned in this section, except to the extent that the right to refrain might conflict with an agreement requiring membership in a union as a condition of employment as authorized by the Act. 61 Stat. 140.
9 N. L. R. B. 676, 686; 25 N. L. R. B. 989, 996.
With respect to activities subject to state control, §111.04 of the Wisconsin statutes provides that employees shall have the right of self-organization, the right to form, join and assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in lawful, concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Section 111.06 (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain or coerce his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 111.04, and lists other unfair labor practices which the Board is also empowered to prevent.
“Both the House bill and the Senate amendment in amending the National Labor Relations Act preserved the right under section 7 of that act of employees to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any labor organization, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The House bill, however, made two changes in that section of the act. First, it was stated specifically that the rights set forth were not to be considered as including the right to commit or participate in unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, or violations of collective bargaining contracts. Second, it was specifically set forth that employees were also to have the right to refrain from self-organization, etc., if they chose to do so.
“The first change in section 7 of the act made by the House bill was inserted by reason of early decisions of the Board to the effect that the language of section 7 protected concerted activities regardless of their nature or objectives. An outstanding decision of this sort was the one involving a 'sit down’ strike wherein the Board ordered the reinstatement of employees who engaged in this unlawful activity. Later the Board ordered the reinstatement of certain employees whose concerted activities constituted mutiny. In both of the above instances, however, the decision of the Board was reversed by the Supreme Court. More recently, a decision of the Board ordering the reinstatement of individuals who had engaged in mass picketing was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (Indiana Desk Co. v. N. L. R. B., 149 Fed. (2d) 987) (1944).
“Thus the courts have firmly established the rule that under the existing provisions of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, employees are not given any right to engage in unlawful or other improper conduct. In its most recent decisions the Board has been consistently applying the principles established by the courts. For example, in the American News Company case (55 N. L. R. B. 1302) (1944) the Board held that employees had no right which was protected under the act to strike to compel an employer to violate the wage stabilization laws. Again, in the Scullin Steel case (65 N. L. R. B. 1294) and in the Dyson case (decided February 7, 1947), the Board held that strikes in violation of collective bargaining contracts were not concerted activities protected by the act, and refused to reinstate employees discharged for engaging in such activities. In the second Thompson Products case (decided February 21, 1947) the Board held that strikes to compel the employer to violate the act and rulings of the Board thereunder were not concerted activities protected by the provisions of section 7. The reasoning of these recent decisions appears to have had the effect of overruling such decisions of the Board as that in Matter of Berkshire Knitting Mills (46 N. L. R. B. 955 (1943)), wherein the Board attempted to distinguish between what it considered as major crimes and minor crimes for the purpose of determining what employees were entitled to reinstatement.
“By reason of the foregoing, it was believed that the specific provisions in the House bill excepting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and violation of collective bargaining agreements from the protection of section 7 were unnecessary. Moreover, there was real concern that the inclusion of such a provision might have a limiting effect and make improper conduct not specifically mentioned subject to the protection of the act.
“In addition, other provisions of the conference agreement deal with this particular problem in general terms. For example, in the declaration of policy to the amended National Labor Relations Act adopted by the conference committee, it is stated in the new paragraph dealing with improper practices of labor organizations, their officers, and members, that the ‘elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.’ This in and of itself demonstrates a clear intention that these undesirable concerted activities are not to have any protection under the act, and to the extent that the Board in the past has accorded protection to such activities, the conference agreement makes such protection no longer possible. Furthermore, in section 10 (c) of the amended act, as proposed in the conference agreement, it is specifically provided that no order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual or the payment to him of any back pay if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause, and this, of course, applies with equal force whether or not the acts constituting the cause for discharge were committed in connection with a concerted activity. Again, inasmuch as section 10 (b) of the act, as proposed to be amended by the conference agreement, requires that the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts shall, so far as practicable, be followed and applied by the Board, proof of acts of unlawful conduct cannot hereafter be limited to proof of confession or conviction thereof.
“The second change made by the House bill in section 7 of the act (which is carried into the conference agreement) also has an important bearing on the kinds of concerted activities which are protected by section 7. That provision, as heretofore stated, provides that employees are also to have the right to refrain from joining in concerted activities with their fellow employees if they choose to do so. Taken in conjunction with the provisions of section 8 (b) (1) of the conference agreement (which will be hereafter discussed), wherein it is made an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7, it is apparent that many forms and varieties of concerted activities which the Board, particularly in its early days, regarded as protected by the act will no longer be treated as having that protection, since obviously persons who engage in or support unfair labor practices will not enjoy immunity under the act.”
61 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (a).
To call these stoppages a strike we would have to ignore petitioners’ own conception of this activity. As we have shown, they adopted this technique precisely because it was believed to be “better than a strike.” See text, pp. 249-250.
It was held in Labor Board v. Peter C. K. Swiss Choc. Co., 130 F. 2d 503, 505, 506, that the right to engage in a sympathetic strike or a secondary boycott was a concerted activity protected by § 7 prior to the 1947 amendments. It was also held in Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 871, that a strike because of an employer’s refusal to negotiate was protected by § 13, and employees so engaged could recover their positions even at the expense of workers hired to replace them during the strike.
Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
Although this litigation is controlled by the Wagner Act, there is nothing in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 that suggests that Congress wished to withdraw its protection from the right to strike except to the extent specially provided by the amendments to the Act. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947). It makes some strikes unfair labor practices. 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b). But the strikes so condemned concededly do not include the kind we have in the present cases. The amendments to §§7 and 13, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 163, do not restrict the right as it previously existed. Moreover, the 1947 legislation comprehensively defines a strike, 29 U. S. C. § 142, as “any concerted slow-down or other concerted interruption of operations by employees,” which is broad enough to include the activity which Wisconsin has condemned here.
The Court heretofore has held that the measure of the right to strike in these interstate industries is a question of federal law. Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. at 255-257. Thus § 2 (3) of the Wagner Act defined employee to “include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute . . . .” 49 Stat. 450, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3). In accordance with this section the Court has held that participation in a strike did not remove workers from the protection of the Act and that they retained the status of employees. See Labor Board v. Mackay Co., 304 U. S. 333, 345-347. The question of what is a “labor dispute” within the meaning of § 2 (3) necessarily involves a consideration of whether the strike was or was not justified. See Labor Board v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F. 2d 167, 176.
Determination of the legality of strikes in interstate industries by federal law is necessary if the administration of the federal system of labor-management relations is to be uniform and harmonious. The status of workers as employees will determine what relief they may be entitled to under the federal Act. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177. Reinstatement rights may indeed depend on whether a worker has lost his status as an employee through activities not comprehended in the federal protection of the right to strike. Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
3
] | sc_authoritydecision |
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS
No. 70-5014.
Argued October 19, 1971
Decided April 3, 1972
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BrenNan, Stewart, and Marshall, JJ., joined, and in Parts I and II of which Douglas, J., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 659. Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of-the case.
Patrick T. Murphy argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Morton E. Friedman, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Joel M. Flaum, First Assistant Attorney General.
Jonathan Weiss and E. Judson Jennings filed a brief for the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Calvin Sawyier and Richard L. Mandel filed a brief for the Child Care Association of Illinois, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children. Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother. Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley’s death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and placed with court-appointed guardians. Stanley appealed, claiming that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent and that since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley’s own unfitness had not been established but rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married. Stanley’s actual fitness as a father was irrelevant. In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N. E. 2d 814 (1970).
Stanley presses his equal protection claim here. The State continues to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their children. We granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1020 (1971), to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers — whether divorced, widowed, or separated — and mothers — even if unwed — the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children.
I
At the outset we reject any suggestion that we need not consider the propriety of the dependency proceeding that separated the Stanleys because Stanley might be able to regain custody of his children as a guardian or through adoption proceedings. The suggestion is that if Stanley has been treated differently from other parents, the difference is immaterial and not legally cognizable for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969). Surely, in the case before us, if there is delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner suffers from the deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from uncertainty and dislocation.
It is clear, moreover, that Stanley does not have the means at hand promptly to erase the adverse consequences of the proceeding in the course of which his children were declared wards of the State. It is first urged that Stanley could act to adopt his children. But under Illinois law, Stanley is treated not as a parent but as a stranger to his children, and the dependency proceeding has gone forward on the presumption that he is unfit to exercise parental rights. Insofar as we are informed, Illinois law affords him no priority in adoption proceedings. It would be his burden to establish not only that he would be a suitable parent but also that he would be the most suitable of all who might want custody of the children. Neither can we ignore that in the proceedings from which this action developed, the “probation officer,” see App. 17, the assistant state’s attorney, see id., at 29-30, and the judge charged with the case, see id., at 16-18, 23, made it apparent that Stanley, unmarried and impecunious as he is, could not now expect to profit from adoption proceedings. The Illinois Supreme Court apparently recognized some or all of these considerations, because it did not suggest that Stanley’s case was undercut by his failure to petition for adoption.
Before us, the State focuses on Stanley’s failure to petition for “custody and control” — the second route by which, it is urged, he might regain authority for his children. Passing the obvious issue whether it would be futile or burdensome for an unmarried father — without funds and already once presumed unfit — to petition for custody, this suggestion overlooks the fact that legal custody is not parenthood or adoption. A person appointed guardian in an action for custody and control is subject to removal at any time without such cause as must be shown in a neglect proceeding against a parent. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 705-8. He may not take the children out of the jurisdiction without the court’s approval. He may be required to report to the court as to his disposition of the children’s affairs. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 705-8. Obviously then, even if Stanley were a mere step away from “custody and control,” to give an unwed father only “custody and control” would still be to leave him seriously prejudiced by reason of his status.
We must therefore examine the question that Illinois would have us avoid: Is a presumption that distinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers constitutionally repugnant? We conclude that, as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
Illinois has two principal methods of removing non-delinquent children from the homes of their parents. In a dependency proceeding it may demonstrate that the children are wards of the State because they have no surviving parent or guardian. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, §§ 702-1, 702-5. In a neglect proceeding it may show that children should be wards of the State because the present parent(s) or guardian does not provide suitable care. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, §§ 702-1, 702-4.
The State’s right — indeed, duty — to protect minor children through a judicial determination of their interests in a neglect proceeding is not challenged here. Rather, we are faced with a dependency statute that empowers state officials to circumvent neglect proceedings on the theory that an unwed father is not a “parent” whose existing relationship with his children must be considered. “Parents,” says the State, “means the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent,” Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 701-14, but the term does not include unwed fathers.
Under Illinois law, therefore, while the children of all parents can be taken from them in neglect proceedings, that is only after notice, hearing, and proof of such unfitness as a parent as amounts to neglect, an unwed father is uniquely subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding. By use of this proceeding, the State, on showing that the father was not married to the mother, need not prove unfitness in fact, because it is presumed at law. Thus, the unwed father’s claim of parental qualification is avoided as “irrelevant.”
In considering this procedure under the Due Process Clause, we recognize, as we have in other cases, that due process of law does not require a hearing “in every conceivable case of government impairment of private interest.” Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894 (1961). That case explained that “[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation” and firmly established that “what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.” Id., at 895; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 263 (1970).
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children “come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed “essential,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923), “basic civil rights of man,” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942), and “[rjights far more precious ... than property rights,” May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 533 (1953). “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony. The Court has declared unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing that such children cannot be denied the right of other children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized family unit. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68, 71-72 (1968). “To say that the test of equal protection should be the ‘legal’ rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such ‘legal’ lines as it chooses.” Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U. S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
These authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stanley’s interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and substantial.
For its part, the State has made its interest quite plain: Illinois has declared that the aim of the Juvenile Court Act is to protect “the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community” - and to “strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or safety or the protection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without removal . . . .” Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 701-2. These are legitimate interests, well within the power of the State to implement. We do not question the assertion that neglectful parents may be separated from their children.
But we are here not asked to evaluate the legitimacy of the state ends, rather, to determine whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible. What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit in a particular disputed case? We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family.
In Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), we found a scheme repugnant to the Due Process Clause because it deprived a driver of his license without reference to the very factor (there fault in driving, here fitness as a parent) that the State itself deemed fundamental to its statutory scheme. Illinois would avoid the self-contradiction that rendered the Georgia license suspension system invalid by arguing that Stanley and all other unmarried fathers can reasonably be presumed to be unqualified to raise their children.
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is such a parent and that his children should be placed in other hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children. This much the State readily concedes, and nothing in this record indicates that Stanley is or has been a neglectful father who has not cared for his children. Given the opportunity to make his case, Stanley may have been seen to be deserving of custody of his offspring. Had this been so, the State’s statutory policy would have been furthered by leaving custody in him.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 (1965), dealt with a similar situation. There we recognized that Texas had a powerful interest in restricting its electorate to bona fide residents. It was not disputed that most servicemen stationed in Texas had no intention of remaining in the State; most therefore could be deprived of a vote in state affairs. But we refused to tolerate a blanket exclusion depriving all servicemen of the vote, when some servicemen clearly were bona fide residents and when “more precise tests,” id., at 95, were available to distinguish members of this latter group. “By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence,” id., at 96, the State, we said, unjustifiably effected a substantial deprivation. It viewed people one-dimensionally (as servicemen) when a finer perception could readily have been achieved by assessing a serviceman’s claim to residency on an individualized basis.
“We recognize that special problems may be involved in determining whether servicemen have actually acquired a new domicile in a State for franchise purposes. We emphasize that Texas is free to take reasonable and adequate steps, as have other States, to see that all applicants for the vote actually fulfill the requirements of bona fide residence. But [the challenged] provision goes beyond such rules. ‘[T]he presumption here created is . . . definitely conclusive — incapable of being overcome by proof of the most positive character.’ ” Id., at 96.
“All servicemen not residents of Texas before induction,” we concluded, “come within the provision’s sweep. Not one of them can ever vote in Texas, no matter” what their individual qualifications. Ibid. We found such a situation repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite Bell and Carrington, it may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including Stanley’s. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
Bell v. Burson held that the State could not, while purporting to be concerned with fault in suspending a driver’s license, deprive a citizen of his license without a hearing that would assess fault. Absent fault, the State’s declared interest was so attenuated that administrative convenience was insufficient to excuse a hearing where evidence of fault could be considered. That drivers involved in accidents, as a statistical matter, might be very likely to have been wholly or partially at fault did not foreclose hearing and proof in specific cases before licenses were suspended.
We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here. The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family.
Ill
The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children of . married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect. The children of unmarried fathers, however, are declared dependent children without a hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect. Stanley’s claim in the state courts and here is that failure to afford him a hearing on his parental qualifications while extending it to other parents denied him equal protection of the laws. We have concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Douglas joins in Parts I and II of this opinion.
TJncontradicted testimony of Peter Stanley, App. 22.
Only two children are involved in this litigation.
The Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion is not at all contrary to this conclusion. That court said: “[T]he trial court's comments clearly indicate the court’s willingness to consider a future request by the father for custody and guardianship.” 45 Ill. 2d 132, 135, 256 N. E. 2d 814, 816. (Italics added.) See also the comment of Stanley’s counsel on oral argument: “If Peter Stanley could have adopted his children, we would not be here today.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
Even while refusing to label him a “legal parent,” the State does not deny that Stanley has a special interest in the outcome of these proceedings. It is undisputed that he is the father of these children, that he lived with the two children whose custody is challenged all their lives, and that he has supported them.
Illinois says in its brief, at 21-23.
“[T]he only relevant consideration in determining the propriety of governmental intervention in the raising of children is whether the best interests of the child are served by such intervention.
“In effect, Illinois has imposed a statutory presumption that the best interests of a particular group of children necessitates some governmental supervision in certain clearly defined situations. The group of children who are illegitimate are distinguishable from legitimate children not so much by their status at birth as by the factual differences in their upbringing. While a legitimate child usually is raised by both parents with the attendant familial relationships and a firm concept of home and identity, the illegitimate child normally knows only one parent — the mother. . . .
“. . . The petitioner has premised his argument upon particular factual circumstances — a lengthy relationship with the mother . . . a familial relationship with the two children, and a general assumption that this relationship approximates that in which the natural parents are married to each other.
“. . . Even if this characterization were accurate (the record is insufficient to support it) it would not affect the validity of the statutory definition of parent. . . . The petitioner does not deny that the children are illegitimate. The record reflects their natural mother’s death. Given these two factors, grounds exist for the State’s intervention to ensure adequate care and protection for these children. This is true whether or not this particular petitioner assimilates all or none of the normal characteristics common to the classification of fathers who are not married to the mothers of their children.”
See also Illinois’ Brief 23 (“The comparison of married and putative fathers involves exclusively factual differences. The most significant of these are the presence or absence of the father from the home on a day-to-day basis and the responsibility imposed upon the relationship”), id.., at 24 (to the same effect), id., at 31 (quoted below in n. 6), id., at 2A-26 (physiological and other studies are cited in support of the proposition that men are not naturally inclined to childrearing), and Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“We submit that both based on history or [sic] culture the very real differences . . . between the married father and the unmarried father, in terms of their interests in children and their legal responsibility for their children, that the statute here fulfills the compelling governmental objective of protecting children . . .”).
The State speaks of “the general disinterest of putative fathers in their illegitimate children” (Brief 8) and opines that “[i]n most instances, the natural father is a stranger to his children.” Brief 31.
See In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App. 122, 154 N. W. 2d 27 (1967). There a panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals in unanimously affirming a circuit court’s determination that the father of an illegitimate son was best suited to raise the boy, said:
“The appellants’ presentation in this case proceeds on the assumption that placing Mark for adoption is inherently preferable to rearing by his father, that uprooting him from the family which he knew from birth until he was a year and a half old, secretly institutionalizing him and later transferring him to strangers is so incontrovertibly better that no court has the power even to consider the matter. Hardly anyone would even suggest such a proposition if we were talking about a child born in wedlock.
“We are not aware of any sociological data justifying the assumption that an illegitimate child reared by his natural father is less likely to receive a proper upbringing than one reared by his natural father who was at one time married to his mother, or that the stigma of illegitimacy is so pervasive it requires adoption by strangers and permanent termination of a subsisting relationship with the child’s father.” Id., at 146, 154 N. W. 2d, at 39.
Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971). “Clearly the objective of reducing" the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legitimacy. . . . [But to] give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 96 (1965), teaches the same lesson. “. . . States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the State. Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633. By forbidding a soldier ever to controvert the presumption of non-residence, the Texas Constitution imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal. If unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children, they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do_care, under the scheme here held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at..somelatértnfié"have'tb aff6fd"fhem a properly_ focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding!
Extending opportunity for hearing Yb'unwed fathers who desire and claim competence to care for their children creates no constitutional or procedural obstacle to foreclosing those unwed fathers who are not so inclined. The Illinois law governing procedure in juvenile cases, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37, § 704r-l et seq., provides for personal service, notice by certified mail, or for notice by publication when personal or certified mail service cannot be had or when notice is directed to unknown respondents under the style of “All whom it may Concern.” Unwed fathers who do not promptly respond cannot complain if their children are declared wards of the State. Those who do respond retain the burden of proving their fatherhood.
Predicating a finding of constitutional invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the observation that a State has accorded bedrock procedural rights to some, but not to all similarly situated, is not contradictory to our holding in Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971). In that case a due process, rather than an equal protection, claim was raised in the state courts. The federal courts were, in our opinion, barred from reversing the state conviction on grounds of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause when that clause had not been referred to for consideration by the state authorities. Here, in contrast, we dispose of the case on the constitutional premise raised below, reaching the result by a method of analysis readily available to the state court.
For the same reason the strictures of Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U. S. 437 (1969), and Hill v. California, 401 U. S. 797 (1971), have been fully observed. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the court in which the case originated. Consider the District of Columbia as a state. | What is the state of the court in which the case originated? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
16
] | sc_caseoriginstate |
SUSSER et al. v. CARVEL CORP. et al.
No. 355.
Argued April 29, 1965.
Decided May 3, 1965.
Arnold Fleischmann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Sidney W. Rothstein and Robert G. Levy.
Herman L. Weisman and John A. Wilson argued the cause for respondents. With Mr. Weisman on the briefs for Carvel Corp. et al. were Herbert F. Roth and Lester G. Renard. With Mr. Wilson on the brief for H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., was Willard M. L. Robinson. Albert L. Wigor filed a brief for Eagle Cone Corp. William G. Mulligan and Doris Carroll filed a brief for Rakestraw’s Dairy Products, Inc.
J err old G. Van Cise filed a brief for the International Franchise Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the decision of this case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
89
] | sc_petitioner |
CHAPPELL et al. v. WALLACE et al.
No. 82-167.
Argued April 26, 1983
Decided June 13, 1983
Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Assistant Attorney General McGrath argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, David A. Strauss, Robert E. Kopp, and John F. Cordes.
John Murcko, by appointment of the Court, 459 U. S. 1068, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Mitchell L. Lathrop and Terrence L. Bingman for the Naval Reserve Association; and by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Nicholas E. Calió for the Washington Legal Foundation.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Nanette Dembitz and Burt Neubome for the American Civil Liberties Union; by Leonard B. Boudin for the Bill of Rights Foundation, Inc.; by Barry Sullivan for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabritt III, Steven L. Winter, and Steven J. Phillips for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to determine whether enlisted military personnel may maintain suits to recover damages from superior officers for injuries sustained as a result of violations of constitutional rights in the course of military service.
Respondents are five enlisted men who serve m the United States Navy on board a eombat naval vessel. Petitioners are the commanding officer of the vessel, four lieutenants, and three noncommissioned officers.
Respondents brought action against these officers seeking damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Respondents alleged that because of their minority race petitioners failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity. App. 5-16. Respondents claimed, inter alia, that the actions complained of “deprived [them] of [their] rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including the right not to be discriminated against because of [their] race, color or previous condition of servitude . . . .” Id., at 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. Respondents also alleged a conspiracy among petitioners to deprive them of rights in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the actions respondents complained of were nonreviewable military decisions, that petitioners were entitled to immunity, and that respondents had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 661 F. 2d 729 (1981). The Court of Appeals assumed that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), authorized the award of damages for the constitutional violations alleged in their complaint, unless either the actions complained of were not reviewable or petitioners were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals set out certain tests for determining whether the actions at issue are reviewable by a civilian court and, if so, whether petitioners are nonetheless immune from suit. The case was remanded to the District Court for application of these tests.
We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 966 (1982), and we reverse.
II
This Court’s holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, authorized a suit for damages against federal officials whose actions violated an individual’s constitutional rights, even though Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. The Court, in Bivens and its progeny, has expressly cautioned, however, that such a remedy will not be available when “special factors counselling hesitation” are present. Id., at 396. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 18 (1980). Before a Bivens remedy may be fashioned, therefore, a court must take into account any “special factors counselling hesitation.” See Bush v. Lucas, post, at 378.
The “special factors” that bear on the propriety of respondents’ Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court’s decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). There the Court addressed the question “whether the [Federal] Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‘incident to [military] service’ what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.” Id., at 138. The Court held that, even assuming the Act might be read literally to allow tort actions against the United States for injuries suffered by a soldier in service, Congress did not intend to subject the Government to such claims by a member of the Armed Forces. The Court acknowledged “that if we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases,” id., at 142, the Government would have waived its sovereign immunity under the Act and would be subject to liability. But the Feres Court was acutely aware that it was resolving the question of whether soldiers could maintain tort suits against the Government for injuries arising out of their military service. The Court focused on the unique relationship between the Government and military personnel — noting that no such liability existed before the Federal Tort Claims Act — and held that Congress did not intend to create such liability. The Court also took note of the various “enactments by Congress which provide systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in the armed services.” Id., at 144. As the Court has since recognized, “[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the ‘peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline ....’” United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954). See also Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743-744 (1974); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 673 (1977). Although this case concerns the limitations on the type of nonstatutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress’ intent in enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Court’s analysis in Feres guides our analysis in this case.
The need for special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice, is too obvious to require extensive discussion; no military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting. See Parker v. Levy, supra, at 743-744; Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). In the civilian life of a democracy many command few; in the military, however, this is reversed, for military necessity makes demands on its personnel “without counterpart in civilian life.” Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 757 (1975). The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection. The Court has often noted “the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,” United States v. Brown, supra, at 112; see In re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, 153 (1890), and has acknowledged that “the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty . . . .” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). This becomes imperative in combat, but conduct in combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat; for that reason, centuries of experience have developed a hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command, unique in its application to the military establishment and wholly different from civilian patterns. Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.
Many of the Framers of the Constitution had recently experienced the rigors of military life and were well aware of the differences between it and civilian life. In drafting the Constitution they anticipated the kinds of issues raised in this case. Their response was an explicit grant of plenary authority to Congress “To raise and support Armies”; “To provide and maintain a Navy”; and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Art. I, § 8, els. 12-14. It is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity with that view.
Congress’ authority in this area, and the distance between military and civilian life, was summed up by the Court in Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, at 93-94:
“[J]udges are not given the task of running the Army. The responsibility for setting up channels through which . . . grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and upon the President of the United States and his subordinates. The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.”
Only recently we restated this principle in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64-65 (1981):
“The case arises in the context of Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.”
In Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 4 (1973), we addressed the question of whether Congress’ analogous power over the militia, granted by Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, would be impermissibly compromised by a suit seeking to have a Federal District Court examine the “pattern of training, weaponry and orders” of a State’s National Guard. In denying relief we stated:
“It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly responsible — as the Judicial Branch is not — to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability.” Id., at 10 (emphasis in original).
Congress has exercised its plenary constitutional authority over the military, has enacted statutes regulating military life, and has established a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special patterns that define the military structure. The resulting system provides for the review and remedy of complaints and grievances such as those presented by respondents. Military personnel, for example, may avail themselves of the procedures and remedies created by Congress in Art. 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. §938, which provides:
“Any member of the armed forces who believes himself wronged by his commanding officer, and who, upon due application to that commanding officer, is refused redress, may complain to any superior commissioned officer, who shall forward the complaint to the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the officer against whom it is made. The officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction shall examine into the complaint and take proper measures for redressing the wrong complained of; and he shall, as soon as possible, send to the Secretary concerned a true statement of that complaint, with the proceedings had thereon.”
The Board for Correction of Naval Records, composed of civilians appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, provides another means with which an aggrieved member of the military “may correct any military record . . . when [the Secretary of the Navy acting through the Board] considers it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice.” 10 U. S. C. § 1552(a). Respondents’ allegations concerning performance evaluations and promotions, for example, could readily have been made within the framework of this intra-military administrative procedure. Under the Board’s procedures, one aggrieved as respondents claim may request a hearing; if the claims are denied without a hearing, the Board is required to provide a statement of its reasons. 32 CFR §§ 723.3(e)(2), (4), (5), 723.4, 723.5 (1982). The Board is empowered to order retroactive backpay and retroactive promotion. 10 U. S. C. § 1552(c). Board decisions are subject to judicial review and can be set aside if they are arbitrary, capricious, or not based on substantial evidence. See Grieg v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 258, 640 F. 2d 1261 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 907 (1982); Sanders v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 285, 594 F. 2d 804 (1979).
The special status of the military has required, the Constitution has contemplated, Congress has created, and this Court has long recognized two systems of justice, to some extent parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U. S., at 140. The special nature of military life — the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel — would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command. Here, as in Feres, we must be “concerned] with the disruption of ‘[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors’ that might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court,” Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S., at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U. S., at 112.
Also, Congress, the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the military system of justice, has not provided a damages remedy for claims by military personnel that constitutional rights have been violated by superior officers. Any action to provide a judicial response by way of such a remedy would be plainly inconsistent with Congress’ authority in this field.
Taken together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in the field constitute “special factors” which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide enlisted military personnel a Bivenstype remedy against their superior officers. See Bush v. Lucas, post, p. 367.
Ill
Chief Justice Warren had occasion to note that “our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.” Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1962). This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service. See, e. g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973). But the special relationships that define military life have “supported the military establishment’s broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have.” Warren, supra, at 187.
We hold that enlisted military personnel may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged constitutional violations. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
The record shows that one of the respondents availed himself of his remedy before the Board for Correction of Naval Records by filing an application for correction of naval records. The request for relief was denied by the Board based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies and to present sufficient relevant evidence. App. 67. The applicant was informed of his right to pursue an appeal from this decision, ibid., and the record does not reflect whether any further action was taken.
Respondents and the Court of Appeals rely on Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How. 89 (1849), after remand, Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390 (1852). Wilkes, however, is inapposite because it involved a well-recognized common-law cause of action by a marine against his commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of punishment and did not ask the Court to imply a new kind of cause of action. Also, since the time of Wilkes, significant changes have been made establishing a comprehensive system of military justice.
We leave it for the Court of Appeals to decide on remand whether the portion of respondents’ suit seeking damages flowing from an alleged conspiracy among petitioners in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985(3) can be maintained. This issue was not adequately addressed either by the Court of Appeals or in the briefs and oral argument before this Court. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the bases on which the Supreme Court rested its decision with regard to the legal provision that the Court considered in the case. Consider "judicial review (national level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of the federal government, including an interstate compact. Consider "judicial review (state level)" if the majority determined the constitutionality of some action taken by some unit or official of a state or local government. Consider "statutory construction" for cases where the majority interpret a federal statute, treaty, or court rule; if the Court interprets a federal statute governing the powers or jurisdiction of a federal court; if the Court construes a state law as incompatible with a federal law; or if an administrative official interprets a federal statute. Do not consider "statutory construction" where an administrative agency or official acts "pursuant to" a statute, unless the Court interprets the statute to determine if administrative action is proper. Consider "interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order" if the majority treats federal administrative action in arriving at its decision.Consider "diversity jurisdiction" if the majority said in approximately so many words that under its diversity jurisdiction it is interpreting state law. Consider "federal common law" if the majority indicate that it used a judge-made "doctrine" or "rule; if the Court without more merely specifies the disposition the Court has made of the case and cites one or more of its own previously decided cases unless the citation is qualified by the word "see."; if the case concerns admiralty or maritime law, or some other aspect of the law of nations other than a treaty; if the case concerns the retroactive application of a constitutional provision or a previous decision of the Court; if the case concerns an exclusionary rule, the harmless error rule (though not the statute), the abstention doctrine, comity, res judicata, or collateral estoppel; or if the case concerns a "rule" or "doctrine" that is not specified as related to or connected with a constitutional or statutory provision. Consider "Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction" otherwise (i.e., the residual code); for issues pertaining to non-statutorily based Judicial Power topics; for cases arising under the Court's original jurisdiction; in cases in which the Court denied or dismissed the petition for review or where the decision of a lower court is affirmed by a tie vote; or in workers' compensation litigation involving statutory interpretation and, in addition, a discussion of jury determination and/or the sufficiency of the evidence. | What is the basis of the Supreme Court's decision? | [
"judicial review (national level)",
"judicial review (state level)",
"Supreme Court supervision of lower federal or state courts or original jurisdiction",
"statutory construction",
"interpretation of administrative regulation or rule, or executive order",
"diversity jurisdiction",
"federal common law"
] | [
6
] | sc_authoritydecision |
GRAY, CHAIRMAN OF THE GEORGIA STATE DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, et al. v. SANDERS.
No. 112.
Argued January 17, 1963.
Decided March 18, 1963.
B. D. Mur-phy and E. Freeman Leverett, Deputy-Assistant Attorneys General of Georgia, argued the cause for appellants. With them on the brief were Eugene Cook, Attorney General, and Lamar W. Sizemore.
Morris B. Abram argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Herman Heyman and Robert E. Hicks.
Attorney General Kennedy, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Marshall, Bruce J. Terris, Harold H. Greene, David Rubin and Howard A. Glickstein.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
I.
This suit was instituted by appellee, who is qualified to vote in primary and general elections in Fulton County, Georgia, to restrain appellants from using Georgia’s county unit system as a basis for counting votes in a Democratic primary for the nomination of a United States Senator and statewide officers, and for declaratory relief. Appellants are the Chairman and Secretary of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee, and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Appellee alleges that the use of the county unit system in counting, tabulating, consolidating, and certifying votes cast in primary elections for statewide offices violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As the constitutionality of a state statute was involved and the question was a substantial one, a three-judge court was properly convened. See 28 U. S. C. § 2281; United States v. Georgia Public Service Comm’n, 371 U. S. 285.
Appellants moved to dismiss; and they also filed an answer denying that the county unit system was uncon-constitutional and alleging that it was designed “to achieve a reasonable balance as between urban and rural electoral power.”
Under Georgia law each county is given a specified number of representatives in the lower House of the General Assembly. This county unit system at the time this suit was filed was employed as follows in statewide primaries: (1) Candidates for nominations who received the highest number of popular votes in a county were considered to have carried the county and to be entitled to two votes for each representative to which the county is entitled in the lower House of the General Assembly; (2) the majority of the county unit vote nominated a United States Senator and Governor; the plurality of the county unit vote nominated the others.
Appellee asserted that the total population of Georgia in 1960 was 3,943,116; that the population of Fulton County, where he resides, was 556,326; that the residents of Fulton County comprised 14.11% of Georgia’s total population; but that, under the county unit system, the six unit votes of Fulton County constituted 1.46% of the total of 410 unit votes, or one-tenth of Fulton County’s percentage of statewide population. The complaint further alleged that Echols County, the least populous county in Georgia, had a population in 1960 of 1,876, or .05% of the State’s population, but the unit vote of Echols County was .48% of the total unit vote of all counties in Georgia, or 10 times Echols County’s statewide percentage of population. One unit vote in Echols County represented 938 residents, whereas one unit vote in Fulton County represented 92,721 residents. Thus, one resident in Echols County had an influence in the nomination of candidates equivalent to 99 residents of Fulton County.
On the same day as the hearing in the District Court, Georgia amended the statutes challenged in the complaint. This amendment modified the county unit system by allocating units to counties in accordance with a “bracket system” instead of doubling the number of representatives of each county in the lower House of the Georgia Assembly. Counties with from 0 to 15,000 people were allotted two units; an additional one unit was allotted for the next 5,000 persons; an additional unit for the next 10,000 persons; another unit for each of the next two brackets of 15,000 persons; and, thereafter, two more units for each increase of 30,000 persons. Under the amended Act, all candidates for statewide office (not merely for Senator and Governor as under the earlier Act) are required to receive a majority of the county unit votes to be entitled to nomination in the first primary. In addition, in order to be nominated in the first primary, a candidate has to receive a majority of the popular votes unless there are only two candidates for the nomination and each receives an equal number of unit votes, in which event the candidate with the popular majority wins. If no candidate receives both a majority of the unit votes and a majority of the popular votes, a second run-off primary is required between the candidate receiving the highest number of unit votes and the candidate receiving the highest number of popular votes. In the second primary, the candidate receiving the highest number of unit votes is to prevail. But again, if there is a tie in unit votes, the candidate with the popular majority wins.
Appellee was allowed to amend his complaint so as to challenge the amended Act. The District Court held that the amended Act had some of the vices of the prior Act. It stated that under the amended Act “the vote of each citizen counts for less and less as the population of the county of his residence increases.” 203 F. Supp. 158, 170, n. 10. It went on to say:
“There are 97 two-unit counties, totalling 194 unit votes, and 22 counties totalling 66 unit votes, altogether 260 unit votes, within 14 of a majority; but no county in the above has as much as 20,000 population. The remaining 40 counties range in population from 20,481 to 556,326, but they control altogether only 287 county unit votes. Combination of the units from the counties having the smallest population gives counties having population of one-third of the total in the state a clear majority of county units.” Ibid.
The District Court held that as a result of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, it had jurisdiction, that a justiciable case was stated, that appellee had standing, and that the Democratic primary in Georgia is “state” action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. It held that the county unit system as applied violates the Equal Protection Clause, and it issued an injunction, not against conducting any party primary election under the county unit system, but against conducting such an election under a county unit system that does not meet the requirements specified by the court. 203 F. Supp. 158. In other words, the District Court did not proceed on the basis that in a statewide election every qualified person was entitled to one vote and that all weighted voting was outlawed. Rather, it allowed a county unit system to be used in weighting the votes if the system showed no greater disparity against a county than exists against any State in the conduct of national elections. Thereafter the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary election for the statewide offices mentioned on a popular vote basis. We noted probable jurisdiction. 370 U. S. 921.
II.
We agree with the District Court that the action of this party in the conduct of its primary constitutes state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Sibley, writing for the court in Chapman v. King, 154 F. 2d 460, showed with meticulous detail the manner in which Georgia regulates the conduct of party primaries (id., pp. 463-464) and he concluded:
“We think these provisions show that the State, through the managers it requires, collaborates in the conduct of the primary, and puts its power behind the rules of the party. It adopts the primary as a part of the public election machinery. The exclusions of voters made by the party by the primary rules become exclusions enforced by the State.” Id., p. 464.
We agree with that result and conclude that state regulation of this preliminary phase of the election process makes it state action. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649.
We also agree that appellee, like any person whose right to vote is impaired (Smith v. Allwright, supra; Baker v. Carr, supra, pp. 204-208), has standing to sue.
Moreover, we think the case is not moot by reason of the fact that the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis. But for the injunction issued below, the 1962 Act remains in force; and if the complaint were dismissed it would govern future elections. In addition, the voluntary abandonment of a practice does not relieve a court of adjudicating its legality, particularly where the practice is deeply rooted and long standing. For if the case were dismissed as moot appellants would be “free to return to . . . [their] old ways.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632.
III.
On the merits we take a different view of the nature of the problem than did the District Court.
This case, unlike Baker v. Carr, supra, does not involve a question of the degree to which the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the authority of a State Legislature in designing the geographical districts from which representatives are chosen either for the State Legislature or for the Federal House of Representatives. Nor does it include the related problems of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, where “gerrymandering” was used to exclude a minority group from participation in municipal affairs. Nor does it present the question, inherent in the bicameral form of our Federal Government, whether a State may have one house chosen without regard to population. The District Court, however, analogized Georgia’s use of the county unit system in determining the results of a statewide election to phases of our federal system. It pointed out that under the electoral college, required by Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment in the election of the President, voting strength “is not in exact proportion to population .... Recognizing that the electoral college was set up as a compromise to enable the formation of the Union among the several sovereign states, it still could hardly be said that such a system used in a state among its counties, assuming rationality and absence of arbitrariness in end result, could be termed invidious.” 203 F. Supp., at 169.
Accordingly the District Court as already noted held that use of the county unit system in counting the votes in a statewide election was permissible “if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation.” 203 F. Supp., at 170. Moreover the District Court held that use of the county unit system in counting the votes in a statewide election was permissible “if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity that exists . . . under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several states in the Congress.” Ibid. The assumption implicit in these conclusions is that since equality is not inherent in the electoral college and since precise equality among blocs of votes in one State or in the several States when it comes to the election of members of the House of Representatives is never possible, precise equality is not necessary in statewide elections.
We think the analogies to the electoral college, to dis-tricting and redistricting, and to other phases of the problems of representation in state or federal legislatures or conventions are inapposite. The inclusion of the electoral college in the Constitution, as the result of specific historical concerns, validated the collegiate principle despite its inherent numerical inequality, but implied nothing about the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide election. No such specific accommodation of the latter was ever undertaken, and therefore no validation of its numerical inequality ensued. Nor does the question here have anything to do with the composition of the state or federal legislature. And we intimate no opinion on the constitutional phases of that problem beyond what we said in Baker v. Carr, supra. The present case is only a voting case. Cf. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73; Smith v. Allwright, supra. Georgia gives every qualified voter one vote in a statewide election; but in counting those votes she employs the county unit system which in end result weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weights some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties.
States can within limits specify the qualifications of voters in both state and federal elections; the Constitution indeed makes voters’ qualifications rest on state law even in federal elections. Art. I, § 2. As we held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U. S. 45, a State may if it chooses require voters to pass literacy tests, provided of course that literacy is not used as a cloak to discriminate against one class or group. But we need not determine all the limitations that are placed on this power of a State to determine the qualifications of voters, for appellee is a qualified voter.
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or abridging a Negro’s right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment does the same for women. If a State in a statewide election weighted the male vote more héavily than the female vote or the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote; none could successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461. How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have an equal vote — whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concept of “we the people” under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. The idea that every voter is equal to every other voter in his State, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing candidates, underlies many of our decisions.
The Court has consistently recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right “to cast their ballots and have them counted at Congressional elections.” United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315; see Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S. 487. Every voter’s vote is entitled to be counted once. It must be correctly counted and reported. As stated in United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383, 386, “the right to have one’s vote counted” has the same dignity as “the right to put a ballot in a box.” It can be protected from the diluting effect of illegal ballots. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371; United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385. And these rights must be recognized in any preliminary election that in fact determines the true weight a vote will have. See United States v. Classic, supra; Smith v. Allwright, supra. The concept of political equality in the voting booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends to all phases of state elections, see Terry v. Adams, supra; and, as previously noted, there is no indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State.
The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns matters of representation, such as the allocation of Senators irrespective of population and the use of the electoral college in the choice of a President. Yet when Senators are chosen, the Seventeenth Amendment states the choice must be made “by the people.” Minors, felons, and other classes may be excluded. See Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, supra, p. 51. But once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. As we stated in Oomillion v. Lightfoot, supra, p. 347:
“When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.”
The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing — one person, one vote.
While we agree with the District Court on most phases of the case and think it was right in enjoining the use of the county unit system in tabulating the votes, we vacate its judgment and remand the case so that a decree in conformity with our opinion may be entered.
It is so ordered.
Ga. Const., 1945, Art. III, § III, ¶ I:
“The House of Representatives shall consist of representatives apportioned among the several counties of the State as follows: To the eight counties having the largest population, three representatives each; to the thirty counties having the next largest population, two representatives each; and to the remaining counties, one representative each.”
Ga. Code Ann., §§ 34-3212, 34-3213 (1936).
Ga. Laws 1962, Ex. Sess., No. 1, p. 1217; Ga. Code Ann., §§34-3212, 34-3213 (1962).
The order, dated April 28, 1962,/was not restricted to the party primary of September 12, 1962; nor was the relief asked so restricted.
The District Court in its order defined the type of county unit system which violated the Equal Protection Clause as follows:
“A county unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory if any unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionate to population, or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial primary, or to the vote for electors of the party in the most recent presidential election; provided, no discrimination is deemed to be invidious under such system if the disparity against any county is not in excess of the disparity that exists as against any state in the most recent electoral college allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several states in the Congress of the United States, and, provided provision is made for allocations to be adjusted to accord with changes in the basis at least once each ten years.”
See note 5, supra.
Chief Justice Holt stated over 250 years ago:
“A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to represent him in parliament, there to concur to the making of laws, which are to bind his liberty and property, is a most transcendent thing, and of an high nature .... [I]t is a great injury to deprive . . . [him] of it. . . .
“. . . It would look very strange, when the commons of England are so fond of their right of sending representatives to parliament, that it should be in the power of a sheriff, or other officer, to deprive them of that right, and yet that they should have no remedy .... This right of voting is a right in the plaintiff by the common law, and consequently he shall maintain an action for the obstruction of it. . . .
“But in the principal case my brother says, we cannot judge of this matter, because it is a parliamentary thing. 0! by all means be very tender of that. Besides it is intricate, and there may be contrariety of opinions. ... To allow this action will make publick officers more careful to observe the constitution of cities and boroughs, and not to be so partial as they commonly are in all elections, which is indeed a great and growing mischief, and tends to the prejudice of the peace of the nation. But they say, that this is a matter out of our jurisdiction, and we ought not to inlarge it. I agree we ought not to incroach or inlarge our jurisdiction; . . . but sure we may determine on a charter granted by the king, or on a matter of custom or prescription, when it comes before us without incroaching on the parliament. And if it be a matter within our jurisdiction, we are bound by our oaths to judge of it. This is a matter of property determinable before us. Was ever such a petition heard of in parliament, as that a man was hindered of giving his vote, and praying them to give him remedy? The parliament undoubtedly would say, take your remedy at law. It is not like the case of determining the right of election between the candidates'.” Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953, 954, 956 (1702).
The electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to the people. See S. Doc. No. 97, Survey of the Electoral College in the Political System of the United States, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. “George Washington was elected to the office of Chief Magistrate of the Nation, by 69 votes — the total number east by the electors. At that time, three States did not vote. New York had not yet passed an electoral law, and North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet ratified the Constitution. Therefore, of an estimated population of 4,000,000 people, a President was chosen by 69 voters, who had not been selected by the people, but appointed by State legislatures, save in the instances of Maryland and Virginia.” Id., p. 4.
Hamilton expressed the philosophy behind the electoral college in The Federalist No. 68. “This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of president, will seldom fall to the lot of any man, who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single state; but it will require other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of president of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the constitution, by those, who are able to estimate the share, which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration.”
Passage of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments shows that this conception of political equality belongs to a bygone day, and should not be considered in determining what the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires in statewide elections.
See note 5, supra.
We do not reach here the questions that would be presented were the convention system used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary system.
See note 8, supra.
The county unit system, even in its amended form (see note 3, supra) would allow the candidate winning the popular vote in the county to have the entire unit vote of that county. Hence the weighting of votes would continue, even if unit votes were allocated strictly in proportion to population. Thus if a candidate won 6,000 of 10,000 votes in a particular county, he would get the entire unit vote, the 4,000 other votes for a different candidate being worth nothing and being counted only for the purpose of being discarded. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
4
] | sc_casedisposition |
PATTERSON v. NEW YORK
No. 75-1861.
Argued March 1, 1977
Decided June 17, 1977
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BurgeR, C. J., and Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 216. Rbhnquist, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Victor J. Rubino argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Betty D. Friedlander.
John M. Finnerty argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Alan D. Marms.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of burdening the defendant in a New York State murder trial with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law.
I
After a brief and unstable marriage, the appellant, Gordon Patterson, Jr., became estranged from his wife, Roberta. Roberta resumed an association with John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged prior to her marriage to appellant. On December 27, 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There, he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in the presence of John Northrup. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head.
Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. In New York there are two elements of this crime: (1) “intent to cause the death of another person”; and (2) “caus[ing] the death of such person or of a third person.” N. Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) , Malice aforethought is not an element of the crime. In addition, the State permits a person accused of murder to raise an affirmative defense that he “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.”
New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally kills another person “under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” Appellant confessed before trial to killing Northrup, but at trial he raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
The jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime of murder. Focusing on the element of intent, the trial court charged:
“Before you, considering all of the evidence, can convict this defendant or anyone of murder, you must believe and decide that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended, in firing the gun, to kill either the victim himself or some other human being. . . .
“Always remember that you must not expect or require the defendant to prove to your satisfaction that his acts were done without the intent to kill. Whatever proof he may have attempted, however far he may have gone in an effort to convince you of his innocence or guiltlessness, he is not obliged, he is not obligated to prove anything. It is always the People's burden to prove bis guilt, and to prove that he intended to kill in this instance beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. A70-A71.
The jury was further instructed, consistently with New York law, that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was told that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had intentionally killed Northrup but that appellant had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find appellant guilty of manslaughter instead of murder.
The jury found appellant guilty of murder. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed. While appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, this Court decided Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), in which the Court declared Maine’s murder statute unconstitutional. Under the Maine statute, a person accused of murder could rebut the statutory presumption that he committed the offense with “malice aforethought” by proving that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Court held that this scheme improperly shifted the burden of persuasion from the prosecutor to the defendant and was therefore a violation of due process. In the Court of Appeals appellant urged that New York’s murder statute is functionally equivalent to the one struck down in Mullaney and that therefore his conviction should be reversed.
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s argument, holding that the New York murder statute is consistent with due process. 39 N. Y. 2d 288, 347 N. E. 2d 898 (1976). The Court distinguished Mullaney on the ground that the New York statute involved no shifting of the burden to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged since the New York affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance bears no direct relationship to any element of murder. This appeal ensued, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 429 U.S. 813 (1976). We affirm.
II
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality opinion), and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is normally “within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion,” and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 798 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
In determining whether New York’s allocation to the defendant of proving the mitigating circumstances of severe emotional disturbance is consistent with due process, it is therefore relevant to note that this defense is a considerably expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of passion on sudden provocation and that at common law the burden of proving the latter, as well as other affirmative defenses — indeed, “all... circumstances of justification, excuse or alleviation” — rested on the defendant. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *201; M. Foster, Crown Law 255 (1762); Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at 693-694. This was the rule when the Fifth Amendment was adopted, and it was the American rule when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 93 (1845).
In 1895 the common-law view was abandoned with respect to the insanity defense in federal prosecutions. Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895). This ruling had wide impact on the practice in the federal courts with respect to the burden of proving various affirmative defenses, and the prosecution in a majority of jurisdictions in this country sooner or later came to shoulder the burden of proving the sanity of the accused and of disproving the facts constituting other affirmative defenses, including provocation. Davis was not a constitutional ruling, however, as Leland v. Oregon, supra, made clear.
At issue in Leland v. Oregon was the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Oregon rule that the defense of insanity must be proved by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Noting that Davis “obviously establish [ed] no constitutional doctrine,” 343 U. S., at 797, the Court refused to strike down the Oregon scheme, saying that the burden of proving all elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt, including the elements of premeditation and deliberation, was placed on the State under Oregon procedures and remained there throughout the trial. To convict, the jury was required to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence, including the evidence going to the issue of insanity. Only then was the jury “to consider separately the issue of legal sanity per se . . . .” Id., at 795. This practice did not offend the Due Process Clause even though among the 20 States then placing the burden of proving his insanity on the defendant, Oregon was alone in requiring him to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
In 1970, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970). Five years later, in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), the Court further announced that under the Maine law of homicide, the burden could not constitutionally be placed on the defendant of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the killing had occurred in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The Chief Justice and Me. Justice Rehnquist, concurring, expressed their understanding that the Mullaney decision did not call into question the ruling in Leland v. Oregon, supra, with respect to the proof of insanity.
Subsequéntly, the Court confirmed that it remained constitutional to burden the defendant with proving his insanity defense when it dismissed, as not raising a substantial federal question, a case in which the appellant specifically challenged the continuing validity of Leland v. Oregon. This occurred in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U. S. 877 (1976), an appeal from a Delaware conviction which, in reliance on Leland, had been affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court over the claim that the Delaware statute was unconstitutional because it burdened the defendant with proving his affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial federal question. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 (1975).
Ill
We cannot conclude that Patterson’s conviction under the New York law deprived him of due process of law. The crime of murder is defined by the statute, which represents a recent revision of the state criminal code, as causing the death of another person with intent to do so. The death, the intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder. No further facts are either presumed or inferred in order to constitute the crime. The statute does provide an affirmative defense — that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation — which, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would reduce the crime to manslaughter, an offense defined in a separate section of the statute. It is plain enough that if the intentional killing is shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates the mitigating circumstances.
Here, the jury was instructed in accordance with the statute, and the guilty verdict confirms that the State successfully carried its burden of proving the facts of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the evidence, including any evidence that might have been offered with respect to Patterson’s mental state at the time of the crime, raised a reasonable doubt about his guilt as a murderer; and clearly the evidence failed to convince the jury that Patterson’s affirmative defense had been made out. It seems to us that the State satisfied the mandate of Winship that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt “every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [Patterson was] charged.” 397 U. S., at 364.
In convicting Patterson under its murder statute, New York did no more than Leland and Rivera permitted it to do without violating the Due Process Clause. Under those cases, once the facts constituting a crime are established beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all the evidence including the evidence of the defendant’s mental state, the State may refuse to sustain the affirmative defense of insanity unless demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.
The New York law on extreme emotional disturbance follows this pattern. This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting “the defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not arising to the level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them,” 39 N. Y. 2d, at 302, 347 N. E. 2d, at 907, does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion; and unless we are to overturn Leland and Rivera, New York has not violated the Due Process Clause, and Patterson’s conviction must be sustained.
We are unwilling to reconsider Leland and Rivera. But even if we were to hold that a State must prove sanity to convict once that fact is put in issue, it would not necessarily follow that a State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact, the existence or nonexistence of which it is willing to recognize as an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance affecting the degree of culpability or the severity of the punishment. Here, in revising its criminal code, New York provided the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a substantially expanded version of the older heat-of-passion concept; but it was willing to do so only if the facts making out the defense were established by the defendant with sufficient certainty. The State was itself unwilling to undertake to establish the absence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt, perhaps fearing that proof would be too difficult and that too many persons deserving treatment as murderers would escape that punishment if the evidence need merely raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s emotional state. It has been said that the new criminal code of New York contains some 25 affirmative defenses which exculpate or mitigate but which must be established by the defendant to be operative. The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by substantial punishment.
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is “bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.” Winship, 397 U. S., at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). The social cost of placing the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is thus an increased risk that the guilty will go free. While it is clear that our society has willingly chosen to bear a substantial burden in order to protect the innocent, it is equally clear that the risk it must bear is not without limits; and Mr. Justice Harlan’s aphorism provides little guidance for determining what those limits are. Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person. Punishment of those found guilty by a jury, for example, is not forbidden merely because there is a remote possibility in some instances that an innocent person might go to jail.
It is said that the common-law rule permits a State to punish one as a murderer when it is as likely as not that he acted in the heat of passion or under severe emotional distress and when, if he did, he is guilty only of manslaughter. But this has always been the case in those jurisdictions adhering to the traditional rule. It is also very likely true that fewer convictions of murder would occur if New York were required to negative the affirmative defense at issue here. But in each instance of a murder conviction under the present law, New York will have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has intentionally killed another person, an act which it is not disputed the State may constitutionally criminalize and punish. If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.
We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused. Traditionally, due process has required that only the most basic procedural safeguards be observed; more subtle balancing of society’s interests against those of the accused have been left to the legislative branch. We therefore will not disturb the balance struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here.
This view may seem to permit state legislatures to reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements of the crimes now defined in their statutes. But there are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard. “[I]t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.” McFarland v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86 (1916). The legislature cannot “validly command that the finding of an indictment, or mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt.” Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463, 469 (1943). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S., at 523-525. Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934), also makes the point with sufficient clarity.
Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitutionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required. This was not the problem to which Winship was addressed. Nor does the fact that a majority of the States have now assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses — for whatever reasons — mean that those States that strike a different balance are in violation of the Constitution.
IY
It is urged that Mullaney v. Wilbur necessarily invalidates Patterson’s conviction.. In Mullaney the charge was murder, which the Maine statute defined as the unlawful killing of a human being “with malice aforethought, either express or implied.” The trial court instructed the jury that the words “malice aforethought” were most important because “malice aforethought is an essential and indispensable element of the crime of murder.” Malice, as the statute indicated and as the court instructed, could be implied and was to be implied from “any deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another suddenly ... or without a considerable provocation,” in which event an intentional killing was murder unless by a preponderance of the evidence it was shown that the act was committed “in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation.” The instructions emphasized that “ 'malice aforethought and heat of passion on sudden provocation are two inconsistent things’; thus, by proving the latter the defendant would negate the former.” 421 U. S., at 686-687 (citation omitted).
Wilbur’s conviction, which followed, was affirmed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that murder and manslaughter were varying degrees of the crime of felonious homicide and that the presumption of malice arising from the unlawful killing was a mere policy presumption operating to cast on the defendant the burden of proving provocation if he was to be found guilty of manslaughter rather than murder — a burden which the Maine law had allocated to him at least since the mid-1800’s.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then ordered that a writ of habeas corpus issue, holding that the presumption unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden of proof with respect to an essential element of the crime. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court disputed this interpretation of Maine law in State v. Lafferty, 309 A. 2d 647 (1973), declaring that malice aforethought, in the sense of premeditation, was not an element of the crime of murder and that the federal court had erroneously equated the presumption of malice with a presumption of premeditation.
“Maine law does not rely on a presumption of 'premeditation’ (as Wilbur v. Mullaney assumed) to prove an essential element of unlawful homicide punishable as murder. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 'malice aforethought’ (in the sense of 'premeditation’) is not essential to conviction. . . . [T]he failure of the State to prove 'premeditation’ in this context is not fatal to such a prosecution because, by legal definition under Maine law, a killing becomes unlawful and punishable as 'murder’ on proof of 'any deliberate, cruel act, committed by one person against another, suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation.’ State v. Neal, 37 Me. 468, 470 (1854). Neal has been frequently cited with approval by our Court.” Id., at 664-665. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.)
When the judgment of the First Circuit was vacated for reconsideration in the light of Lafferty, that court reaffirmed its view that Wilbur’s conviction was unconstitutional. This Court, accepting the Maine court’s interpretation of the Maine law, unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeals that Wilbur’s due process rights had been invaded by the presumption casting upon him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted in the heat ,of passion upon sudden provocation.
Mullaney’s holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the blameworthiness of an act or the severity of punishment authorized for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view, the Mullaney holding should not be so broadly read. The concurrence of two Justices in Mullaney was necessarily contrary to such a reading; and a majority of the Court refused to so understand and apply Mullaney when Rivera was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense. This is true even though the State’s practice, as in Maine, had been traditionally to the contrary. Such shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed is impermissible under the Due Process Clause.
It was unnecessary to go further in Mullaney. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court made it clear that malice aforethought, which was mentioned in the statutory definition of the crime, was not equivalent to premeditation and that the presumption of malice traditionally arising in intentional homicide cases carried no factual meaning insofar as premeditation was concerned. Even so, a killing became murder in Maine when it resulted from a deliberate, cruel act committed by one person against another, “suddenly without any, or without a considerable provocation.” State v. Lafferty, supra, at 665. Premeditation was not within the definition of murder; but malice, in the sense of the absence of provocation, was part of the definition of that crime. Yet malice, i. e., lack of provocation, was presumed and could be rebutted by the defendant only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden provocation. In Mullaney we held that however traditional this mode of proceeding might have been, it is contrary to the Due Process Clause as construed in Winship.
As we have explained, nothing was presumed or implied against Patterson; and his conviction is not invalid under any of our prior cases. The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
References herein to the charge of “murder” under New York law are to this section. Cf. N. Y. Penal Law § 125.27 (McKinney 1975) (murder in the first degree).
Section 125.25 provides in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
“1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
“(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.”
Section 125.20 (2), N. Y. Penal Law § 125.20 (2) (McKinney 1975), provides:
“A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
“2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.”
Appellant also contended at trial that the shooting was accidental and that therefore he had no intent to kill Northrup. It is here undisputed, however, that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was intentional.
The trial court’s instructions to the jury focused emphatically and repeatedly on the prosecution’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
“The burden of proving the guilt of a defendant beyond a reasonable doubt rests at all times upon the prosecution. A defendant is never obliged to prove his innocence.
“Before you can find a defendant guilty, you must be convinced that each and every element of the crime charged and his guilt has been established to your satisfaction by reliable and credible evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” App. A48-A49.
In Hankerson v. North Carolina, post, p. 233, we hold, as did the New York Court of Appeals in the present case, that Mullaney is to be applied retroactively. The fact that Patterson was tried prior to our decision in Mullaney does not insulate this case from the principles of Mullaney.
See also F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Criminal Issues 240-269 (9th ed. 1884); H. Kelley, Criminal Law and Practice 124^128, 131 (1876); Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L. J. 880, 882-884 (1968); Note, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 171, 190 (1976).
York, which relied on American authorities dating back to the early 1800’s, confirmed that the common-law and prevailing American view was that the burden was on the defendant to prove provocation. York is said to have governed a half century of American burden-of-proof decisions in provocation and self-defense cases. Fletcher, supra, n. 7, at 903-904.
Meanwhile, the Court had explained that although the State could go too far in shifting the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal case, the Due Process Clause did not invalidate every instance of burdening the defendant with proving an exculpatory fact. In Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82 (1934), a state law made it illegal for an alien ineligible for citizenship to own or possess land. Initially, in a summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question, Morrison v. California, 288 U. S. 591 (1933), the Court held that it did not violate the Due Process Clause for the State to place on the defendant “the burden of proving citizenship as a defense,” 291 U. S., at 88, once the State’s evidence had shown that the defendant possessed the land and was a member of a race barred from citizenship. In the later Morrison case the Court reiterated and approved its previous summary holding, even though it struck down more drastic burden shifting permitted under another section of the statute. The Court said that its earlier per curiam ruling “was not novel”:
“The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression. Cf. Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, §§ 2486, 2512 and cases cited. Special reasons are at hand to make the change permissible when citizenship vel non is the issue to be determined. Citizenship is a privilege not due of common right. One who lays claim to it as his, and does this in justification or excuse of an act otherwise illegal, may fairly be called upon to prove his title good.” Id., at 88-89.
In ruling that in the other section of the statute then at issue the State had gone too far, the Court said:
“For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance (Yee Hem v. United States, [268 U. S. 178 (1925)]; Casey v. United States [276 U. S. 413 (1928)]), or if this at times be lacking, there must be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance, where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to bring himself within the range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence, Vol. 1, § 79.” Id., at 90-91.
The Court added that, of course, the possible situations were too variable and that too much depended on distinctions of degree to crowd them all into a simple formula. A sharper definition was to await specific cases. Of course, if the Morrison cases are understood as approving shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving a fact necessary to constitute the crime, the result in the first Morrison case could not coexist with In re Winship, 397 U. S.(358 (1970), and Mullaney.
The State of New York is not alone in this result:
“Since the Model Penal Code was completed in 1962, some 22 states have codified and reformed their criminal laws. At least 12 of these jurisdictions have used the concept of an ‘affirmative defense’ and have defined that phrase to require that the defendant prove the existence of an ‘affirmative defense’ by a preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, at least six proposed state codes and each of the four successive versions of a revised federal code use the same procedural device. Finally, many jurisdictions that do not generally employ this concept of 'affirmative defense’ nevertheless shift the burden of proof to the defendant on particular issues.” Low & Jeffries, DICTA: Constitutionalizing the Criminal Law?, 29 Ya. Law Weekly, No. 18, p. 1 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
Even so, the trend over the years appears to have been to require the prosecution to disprove affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 8, p. 50 (1972); C. McCormick, Evidence § 341, pp. 800-802 (2d ed. 1972). The split among the various jurisdictions varies for any given defense. Thus, 22 jurisdictions place the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity on the defendant, while 28 jurisdictions place the burden of disproving insanity on the prosecution. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B. U. L. Rev. 499, 503-505 (1976).
The drafters of the Model Penal Code would, as a matter of policy, place the burden of proving the nonexistence of most affirmative defenses, including the defense involved in this case, on the prosecution once the defendant has come forward with some evidence that the defense is present. The drafters recognize the need for flexibility, however, and would, in “some exceptional situations,” place the burden of persuasion on the accused.
“Characteristically these are situations where the defense does not obtain at all under existing law and the Code seeks to introduce a mitigation. Resistance to the mitigation, based upon the prosecution’s difficulty in obtaining evidence, ought to be lowered if the burden of persuasion is imposed on the defendant. Where that difficulty appears genuine and there is something to be said against allowing the defense at all, we consider it defensible to shift the burden in this way.” ALI, Model Penal Code § 1.13, Comment, p. 113 (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955).
Other writers have recognized the need for flexibility in allocating the burden of proof in order to enhance the potential for liberal legislative reforms. See, e. g., Low & Jeffries, supra, n. 10; Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 Duke L. J. 919, 933-938. See also Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law — An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Texas L. Rev. 269 (1977).
Whenever due process guarantees are dependent upon the law as defined by the legislative branches, some consideration must be given to the possibility that legislative discretion may be abused to the detriment of the individual. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S., at 698-699. The applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard, however, has always been dependent on how a State defines the offense that is charged in any given case; yet there has been no great rush by the States to shift the burden of disproving traditional elements of the criminal offenses to the accused.
As Chief Judge Breitel cogently stated in concurring in the judgment and opinion below:
"A preliminary caveat is indicated. It would be an abuse of affirmative defenses, as it would be of presumptions in the criminal law, if the purpose or effect were to unhinge the procedural presumption of innocence which historically and constitutionally shields one charged with crime. Indeed, a by-product of such abuse might well be also to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination by in effect forcing a defendant in a criminal action to testify in his own behalf.
“Nevertheless, although one should guard against such abuses, it may be misguided, out of excess caution, to forestall or discourage the use of affirmative defenses, where defendant may have the burden of proof but no greater than by a preponderance of the evidence. In the absence of affirmative defenses the impulse to legislators, especially in periods of concern about the rise of crime, would be to define particular crimes in unqualifiedly general terms, and leave only to sentence the adjustment between offenses of lesser and greater degree. In times when there is also a retrogressive impulse in legislation to restrain courts by mandatory sentences, the evil would be compounded.
“The affirmative defense, intelligently used, permits the gradation of offenses at the earlier stages of prosecution and certainly at the trial, and thus offers the opportunity to a defendant to allege or prove, if he can, the distinction between the offense charged and the mitigating .circumstances which should ameliorate the degree or kind of offense. The instant homicide case is a good example. Absent the affirmative defense, the crime of murder or manslaughter could legislatively be defined simply to require an intent to kill, unaffected by the spontaneity with which that intent is formed or the provocative or mitigating circumstances which should legally or morally lower the grade of crime. The placing of the burden of proof on the defense, with a lower threshold, however, is fair because of defendant’s knowledge or access to the evidence other than his own on the issue. To require the prosecution to negative the ‘element’ of mitigating circumstances is generally unfair, especially since the conclusion that the negative of the circumstances is necessarily a product of definitional and therefore circular reasoning, and is easily avoided by the likely legislative practice mentioned earlier.
“In sum, the appropriate use of affirmative defenses enlarges the ameliorative aspects of a statutory scheme for the punishment of crime, rather than the other way around — a shift from primitive mechanical classifications based on the bare antisocial act and its consequences, rather than on the nature of the offender and the conditions which produce some degree of excuse for his conduct, the mark of an advanced criminology.” 39 N. Y. 2d 288, 305-307, 347 N. E. 2d 898, 909-910 (1976).
The defendant in Mullaney was convicted under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2651 (1964), which provided:
“Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.”
There is some language in Mullaney that has been understood as perhaps construing the Due Process Clause to require the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any fact affecting “the degree of criminal culpability.” See, e. g., Note, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York’s Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 Brooklyn L. Rev. 171 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 Ohio St. L. J. 828 (1975); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 390 (1976). It is said that such a rule would deprive legislatures of any discretion whatsoever in allocating the burden of proof, the practical effect of which might be to undermine legislative reform of our criminal justice system. See Part II, supra; Low & Jeffries, supra, n. 10. Carried to its logical extreme, such a reading of Mullaney might also, for example, discourage Congress from enacting pending legislation to change the felony-murder rule by permitting the accused to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense that the homicide committed was neither a necessary nor a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the underlying felony. See Senate bill S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 118 (1975). The Court did not intend Mullaney to have such far-reaching effect. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
0
] | sc_adminaction_is |
HICKS v. OKLAHOMA
No. 78-6885.
Argued March 26, 1980
Decided June 16, 1980
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and BreNnaN, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 347.
David M. Ebel, by appointment of the Court, 444 U. S. 988, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard A. Sonntag.
Janet L. Cox, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause pro hac vice for respondent. With her on the brief was Jan Eric Cartwright, Attorney General.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was brought to trial in an Oklahoma court on a charge of unlawfully distributing heroin. Since he had been convicted of felony offenses twice within the preceding 10 years, the members of the jury were instructed, in accordance with the habitual offender statute then in effect in Oklahoma, that, if they found the petitioner guilty, they “shall assess [the] punishment at forty (40) years imprisonment.” The jury returned a verdict of guilt and imposed the mandatory 40-year prison term.
Subsequent to the petitioner’s conviction, the provision of the habitual offender statute under which the mandatory 40-year prison term had been imposed was in another case declared unconstitutional by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Thigpen v. State, 571 P. 2d 467, 471 (1977). On his appeal, the petitioner sought to have his 40-year sentence set aside in view of the unconstitutionality of this statutory provision. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the provision was unconstitutional, but nonetheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction and sentence, reasoning that the petitioner was not prejudiced by the impact of the invalid statute, since his sentence was within the range of punishment that could have been imposed in any event. We granted certiorari to consider the petitioner’s contention that the State deprived him of due process of law guaranteed to him by the .Fourteenth Amendment. 444 U. S. 963.
By statute in Oklahoma, a convicted defendant is entitled to have his punishment fixed by the jury. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 926 (1971). Had the members of the jury been correctly instructed in this case, they could have imposed any sentence of “not less than ten . . . years.” Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 51 (A)(1) (1971). The possibility that the jury would have returned a sentence of less than 40 years is thus substantial. It is, therefore, wholly incorrect to say that the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the instruction requiring the jury to impose a 40-year prison sentence.
It is argued that all that is involved in this case is the denial of a procedural right of exclusively state concern. Where, however, a State has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the discretion of the trial jury, it is not correct to say that the defendant’s interest in the exercise of that discretion is merely a matter of state procedural law. The defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion, cf. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the State. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 488-489, citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539; Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, supra; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471. In this case Oklahoma denied the petitioner the jury sentence to which he was entitled under state law, simply on the frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender provision. Such an arbitrary disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty is a denial of due process of law.
The State argues, however, that, in view of the revisory authority of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, the petitioner had no absolute right to a sentence imposed by a jury. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 1066 (1971) (“The Appellate Court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment appealed from. . .”). The argument is unpersuasive. The State concedes that the petitioner had a statutory right to have a jury fix his punishment in the first instance, and this is the right that was denied. Moreover, it is a right that substantially affects the punishment imposed. No case has been cited to us in which the Court of Criminal Appeals has increased a sentence on appeal, and the State’s Assistant Attorney General indicated at oral argument that it was doubtful whether the appellate court had power to do so. In consequence, it appears that the right to have a jury fix the sentence in the first instance is determinative, at least as a practical matter, of the maximum sentence that a defendant will receive. Nor did the appellate court purport to cure the deprivation by itself reconsidering the appropriateness of the petitioner’s 40-year sentence. Rather, it simply affirmed the sentence imposed by the jury under the invalid mandatory statute. In doing so, the State deprived the petitioner of his liberty without due process of law.
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
See 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 94, § 1, codified at Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §61 (B) (Supp. 1977). The text of §51 provided:
“(A) Every person who, having been convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, commits any crime after such conviction is punishable therefor as follows:
“1. If the offense of which such person is subsequently convicted is such that upon a first conviction an offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term exceeding five (5) years, such person is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than ten (10) years.
“2. If such subsequent offense is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for five (5) years, or any less term, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding ten (10) years.
“3. If such subsequent conviction is for petit larceny, or for any attempt to commit an offense which, if committed, would be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five (5) years.
“(B) Every person who, having been twice convicted of felony offenses, commits a third, or thereafter, felony offenses within ten (10) years of the date following the completion of the execution of the sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of twenty (20) years plus the longest imprisonment for which the said third or subsequent conviction was punishable, had it been a first offense; provided, that felony offenses relied upon shall not have arisen out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of events closely related in time or location; provided, further, that nothing in this section shall abrogate or affect the punishment by death in all crimes now or hereafter made punishable by death.”
The Oklahoma Legislature has since amended §51 (B). See 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 281, § 1, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §51 (B) (Supp. 1979).
“Defendant asserts in his fourth assignment of error that [Okla. Stat., Tit. 21,] § 51 (B), under which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional. We agree. This question was laid to rest by this Court in Thigpen v. State, Okla. Cr., 571 P. 2d 467 (1977). We must find however, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the use of this statute in that the sentence imposed is within the range of punishment authorized by the provisions of [Okla. Stat., Tit. 21,] § 51 (A).” Hicks v. State, No. F-77-751 (Mar. 8, 1979).
The decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals is unreported. A petition for rehearing was denied April 6,1979.
Only if the jury fails to do so may the trial court impose sentence. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, § 927 (1971).
Because of our disposition of the case, we do not reach the petitioner’s several other contentions.
Because the appellate court did not purport to resentenee the petitioner, we have no occasion to consider his contention that due process of law requires that the State provide him with notice and a hearing, including the opportunity to present mitigating evidence, before appellate sentencing. See McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 218-220; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, 606. See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion. | What type of decision did the court make? | [
"opinion of the court (orally argued)",
"per curiam (no oral argument)",
"decrees",
"equally divided vote",
"per curiam (orally argued)",
"judgment of the Court (orally argued)",
"seriatim"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiontype |
UNITED STATES v. CLARK et al.
No. 80-1121.
Argued November 3, 1981
Decided January 12, 1982
O’ConnoR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. On the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, former Solicitor General McCree, Acting Assistant Attorney General Martin, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Mark I. Levy, Mark H. Gallant, and Harvey J. Wilcox.
John I. Heise, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Samuel Resnicoff
Edward J. Hickey, Jr., and Thomas A. Woodley filed a brief for the Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether 5 U. S. C. § 5334(b), which requires a two-step pay increase for federal employees “promoted ... to a position in a higher grade,” applies to prevailing wage rate employees promoted to General Schedule positions. We hold that it does not apply, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims.
I
This case involves the relationship between the two principal pay systems for federal employees and the pay treatment to which an employee moving from one system to another is entitled. Both systems are governed by Title 5, United States Code.
One of the pay systems, the General Schedule (GS), 5 U. S. C. §5331 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), applies to federal “white-collar” employees. See R. Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law § 6.2(a), p. 6-4 (1976) (hereinafter Vaughn). The GS is divided into 18 numbered grades; as the number of the grade increases, so do pay and responsibilities. §§5104 and 5332 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The grades are subdivided into rates of pay or “steps.” § 5332. The salary for each step of each grade in the GS is uniform nationwide.
The second principal pay system is the prevailing rate wage system (WS), 5 U. S. C. §5341 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), which primarily applies to those federal “blue-collar” employees specifically excluded from the GS. See §§ 5102(b), (c)(7), 5331, and 5342(a)(2)(A); Vaughn §6.2(b), p. 6-17. The WS also is divided into grades and subdivided into “steps.” The rate of pay for each step within each grade is based upon wage surveys of prevailing rates for comparable work in local wage areas. § 5343 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); Office of Personnel Management, Federal Personnel Manual, Supp. 532-1, 56 (Apr. 14, 1980) (hereinafter FPM). Pay rates for positions within the WS thus vary from one locale to another.
Salary treatment for GS employees who change their employment status and employees shifted or hired into the GS system is governed by 5 U. S. C. § 5334 (1976 ed. and Supp. V) and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. Under the statute, an employee’s salary after promotion is determined by reference either to the “highest previous rate” rule or to the “two-step increase” rule.
Prior to July 1973, all six respondents worked as federal civilian employees for the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Department of the Navy. In those positions, they were paid pursuant to the WS. Between July 1973 and October 1974, all were promoted to positions covered by the GS. After his promotion, Libretto learned that the other respondents received a salary increase equivalent to a two-step pay increase on their appointment to the GS positions. Since Libretto’s increase was based upon the “highest previous rate” rule and was much smaller, he filed a claim with the Department of the Navy. As a result, the Navy reexamined the salary treatment afforded respondents. Concluding the salaries of all should have been determined by applying the “highest previous rate” rule, the Navy denied Libretto’s claim and notified the other respondents their salaries would be reduced accordingly.
Respondents unsuccessfully pursued their administrative remedies and then filed this action in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and the Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U. S. C. § 5596. Respondents contended they were entitled to a two-step increase in pay pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 5334(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The Government opposed the claims on the ground that § 5334(b) applies only to promotions within the GS and not to shifts or promotions between the WS and the GS, which are governed by § 5334(a).
The Court of Claims, reasoning that respondents had been “promoted” within the meaning of 5 CFR § 531.202(h)(2) (1969), determined they were entitled to a two-step increase under § 5334(b). Accordingly, the court invalidated, as inconsistent with the statute, 5 CFR § 531.204(a) (1969), which construed § 5334(b) as limited to transfers or promotions within the GS. 220 Ct. Cl. 278, 599 F. 2d 411 (1979).
After remand, the parties stipulated to the amount of respondents’ recovery, and the court entered final judgment on August 8, 1980. We granted the Government’s petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Claims. 450 U. S. 993 (1981). We have jurisdiction based upon 28 U. S. C. § 1255.
II
We look first to the language and organization of the statutes governing General Schedule pay rates and the prevailing rate wage system. If the statutory language is clear, it is ordinarily conclusive. See Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102 (1980).
Section 5334 is part of subchapter III, chapter 53 of Title 5, entitled “General Schedule Pay Rates.” Subsection 5334(a) describes the general conditions, including promotions, under which a GS employee is entitled to a change in basic pay. It directs simply that the rate is “governed by regulations prescribed by the [Civil Service Commission]. . . .” Following that direction, the Civil Service Commission promulgated the “highest previous rate” rule.
In subsection 5334(b), on the other hand, Congress restricted the Commission’s discretion in one limited situation:
“An employee who is promoted or transferred to a position in a higher grade is entitled to basic pay at the lowest rate of the higher grade which exceeds his existing rate of basic pay by not less than two step-increases of the grade from which he is promoted or transferred.”
For purposes of subchapter III, 5 U. S. C. §5331 assigns the word “grade” the meaning given the term by 5 U. S. C. § 5102(a)(5). That section, in turn, defines a grade as those positions sufficiently similar to warrant their inclusion within one range of rates of basic pay “in the General Schedule.” Giving § 5334(b) its plain meaning, then, when an employee is promoted to a position in a higher grade “in the General Schedule,” he is entitled to pay which exceeds by two step-increases his pay in the grade “in the General Schedule” from which he was promoted.
The Wage System, on the other hand, is governed by subchapter IV of chapter 53, Title 5. No express statutory provision in subchapter IV defines how an employee’s salary should be set when a WS employee is promoted to a GS position. Thus, the only applicable statutory provisions are those found in subchapter III and its accompanying regulations, which specifically limit the two-step increase to promotions within the GS. Nothing in the statutory language indicates Congress intended to include employees promoted from WS to GS within the two-step requirement of § 5334(b). Absent such language, the statute and the accompanying regulations reveal a congressional intent to apply the two-step increase provision of § 5334(b) only to promotions or transfers of employees already within the GS system.
III
Although the language of the statute is clear, any lingering doubt as to its proper construction may be resolved by examining the legislative history of the statute and by according due deference to the longstanding interpretation given the statute by the agencies charged with its interpretation. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974). The legislative history of § 5334(b) reinforces the apparent intent of the statutory language. The predecessor to § 5334(b) was § 802(b) of the Classification Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 954, 5 U. S. C. § 1071 et seq. (1946 ed. and Supp. IV) (1949 Act). Through the 1949 Act, Congress completely revised the Classification Act of 1923, Pub. L. 516, 42 Stat. 1488, 5 U. S. C. § 661 et seq. (1925-1926 ed.). Under the latter statute, an employee who was at the top step of his grade could receive little or no salary increase upon promotion to a higher grade. That inequity resulted because the salary for the higher steps in one grade could equal or exceed the salary for the lower steps in the next higher grade. Congress’ 1949 revision plainly undertook to correct this problem: the 1949 Act numbered among its stated purposes the need “to permit the solution of certain troublesome problems or to avoid unintentional pay inequities in the conduct of various personnel transactions.” S. Rep. No. 847, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1949). Congress, moreover, understood the precise nature of the salary overlap problem. The Committee Reports which accompanied the proposed revisions explained:
“At present, a promoted employee receives no immediate increase if he is already receiving a rate in the lower grade that also occurs in the higher grade. If he is receiving a rate in the lower grade that falls between two rates of the higher grade, he is promoted at the higher of these two rates.
“In too many cases, accordingly, an employee who is promoted to greater responsibilities or more difficult duties receives no immediate increase in pay. This is not in accord with the commonly accepted principle that a promotion in pay should [concurrently] accompany a promotion in duties and responsibilities.
“Subsection (b) of section 802 corrects this situation.” Id., at 38; H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13 (1949).
Examination of the history of the prevailing wage system dispels any notion that Congress intended the corrective measure of § 802(b) to apply to movement between the prevailing wage and Classification Act systems. In 1949, each federal agency had its own pay system for blue-collar workers. As a result, employees holding the same federal position in the same locale often received different wages if they worked for different agencies. In addition, each agency had its own job grading system for prevailing wage employees, which resulted in widely varying numbers of grades and wage steps. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress was even aware of — much less was attempting to adjust — the varied results that might occur if a prevailing wage worker moved into a Classification Act position. The 1949 legislative history suggests only that Congress was concerned with inequities that might occur through application of the Classification Act system to movement within that system.
Moreover, in 1972, approximately one year before respondents’ promotions, Congress undertook a comprehensive examination of the prevailing wage statutes and amended existing laws to declare congressional policy for the payment of prevailing wage employees. See S. Rep. No. 92-791, p. 1 (1972). Congress’ stated purpose was to codify existing law. Ibid. As part of the 1972 amendments, Congress for the first time directed that a grading system be established and maintained for prevailing wage employees. 5 U. S. C. § 5346 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Even then, Congress made no effort to correlate the WS grades with those used in the GS. By that time, the agency practice of specifically limiting § 5334(b) and its predecessor to transfers between Classification Act, or GS, positions had been followed for nearly 25 years. Congress’ failure to correct that practice, if it did not correspond with congressional intent, at the very time Congress was revamping the laws applicable to pay for prevailing wage positions provides further evidence of its intent that § 802(b) and, later, § 5334(b) apply only to GS employees. See United States v. Bergh, 352 U. S. 40 (1956).
The absence of any indication that Congress intended § 5334(b) to apply to promotions into the GS from the WS is hardly surprising, since the two systems have no necessary or obvious relationship. First, because the WS involves an entirely separate pay structure based on prevailing rates in local wage areas, no necessary overlap occurs between WS and GS salaries. In fact, since WS rates vary by locale, an employee changing from a WS position to a GS position could receive a greater salary, a lesser salary, or the same salary as another employee making the identical change in another part of the country. Moreover, although by definition a change to a higher grade within the GS system involves a change to a position with greater responsibility (see 5 U. S. C. § 5102(a)(5) (1976 ed., Supp. V)), no similar relationship necessarily exists between a WS grade and a GS grade.
Although the legislative history does not expressly indicate that Congress intended to limit § 5334(b) and its predecessor to GS employees, the history provides ample indication that such was Congress’ intent. Moreover, the reasons for enactment of the provision are consistent with such a limitation.
► — I <1
Although not determinative, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed consistently over a long period of time. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1 (1977). In this instance, the agency responsible for proposing and administering § 5334(b) has consistently construed it to apply only to promotions within the GS.
Section 802(b) of the 1949 Act was drafted and submitted to the Congress by the Civil Service Commission. Soon after its enactment, the Civil Service Commission promulgated regulations interpreting the section. The first regulations guaranteed a pay increase to one promoted “to a higher grade between Classification Act [GS] positions . . . .” 15 Fed. Reg. 7868 (1950), 5 CFR §25.104(a) (Supp. 1951). In contrast, an employee promoted or transferred from another pay system into the Classification Act system was subject to the “highest previous rate” rule. 15 Fed. Reg. 1235 (1950), 5 CFR § 25.103(b) (Supp. 1951). Subsequent versions of the regulations continued to apply the automatic salary increase of § 802(b) and, later, of § 5334(b), only to promotions or transfers within the Classification Act, or GS, system. In fact, the regulation in effect when respondents were promoted expressly provided that the two-step pay increase provision of § 5334(b) applied “only (i) to a transfer from one General Schedule position to a higher General Schedule position, and (ii) to a promotion from one General Schedule grade to a higher General Schedule grade.” 33 Fed. Reg. 12450 (1968), 5 CFR § 531.204(a)(1) (1969).
V
The language of the statute, the entire statutory scheme, the legislative history, and consistent administrative interpretation all demonstrate the soundness of the Government’s position that § 5334(b) is inapplicable to promotions from the Wage System to the General Schedule.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, 5 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), defines the principles applied to determine GS salaries.
The “highest previous rate” rule derives from 5 U. S. C. § 5334(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which provides in part:
“The rate of basic pay to which an employee is entitled is governed by regulations prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management [formerly the Civil Service Commission] in conformity with this subchapter and chapter 51 of this title when—
(1) he is transferred from a position in the legislative, judicial, or executive branch to which this subchapter does not apply;
(6) his employment status is otherwise changed; or
(7) his position is changed from one grade to another grade.”
At the time of respondents’ promotions, 33 Fed. Reg. 12450 (1968), 5 CFR § 531.203(c) (1969), one of the regulations prescribed by authority of § 5334(a), provided in part:
“Subject to §531.204 . . . , when an employee is reemployed, transferred, reassigned, promoted, or demoted, the agency may pay him at any rate of his grade which does not exceed his highest previous rate; however, if his highest previous rate falls between two rates of his grade, the agency may pay him at the higher rate.”
The “two-step increase” rule is codified in 5 U. S. C. § 5334(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which provides in pertinent part:
“An employee who is promoted or transferred to a position in a higher grade is entitled to basic pay at the lowest rate of the higher grade which exceeds his existing rate of basic pay by not less than two step-increases of the grade from which he is promoted or transferred.”
At the time of respondents’ promotions, 33 Fed. Reg. 12450 (1968), 5 CFR § 531.204(a)(1) (1969), the regulation interpreting § 5334(b), provided:
“The requirements of section 5334(b) of title 5, United States Code, apply only (i) to a transfer from one General Schedule position to a higher General Schedule position, and (ii) to a promotion from one General Schedule grade to a higher General Schedule grade.”
Respondents’ changes of position were as follows: Clark, from WS ship surveyor (shipfitter) to GS quality assurance specialist; D’Aversa, from WS ship surveyor (pipefitter) to GS production controller; Libretto, from WS ship surveyor (machinist) to GS engineering technician; Proto, from WS ship surveyor (electrician) to GS production controller, and later to GS contract negotiator; Scialpi, from WS ship surveyor (shipfitter) to GS contract negotiator; and Wolfus, from WS ship surveyor (machinist) to GS contract negotiator.
The parties agree that Libretto’s salary after promotion was determined by reference to the “highest previous rate” rule. Because his WS salary fell between two steps of his new GS grade, he was given the higher salary level of the new GS grade. The parties disagree as to the method used to determine the postpromotion salaries of the remaining respondents. Respondents allege they were simply given a two-step increase, pursuant to § 5334(b). The Government explains their GS salaries were originally determined by first applying the provision of subchapter S8-3d of the FPM, Supp. 532-1, Inst. 8 (Jan. 16, 1973), which stated that an employee promoted to a WS position is entitled to be paid at the lowest scheduled rate that exceeds his existing rate of pay by no less than a one-step increment of the category from which he was promoted. Once this adjustment had been made, the new GS salaries of these respondents were computed by applying the “highest previous rate” rule of 5 CFR § 531.203(c) (1969) to the adjusted rates of pay. Thus, each of these respondents was awarded two salary increases for a single change of position. If this method was utilized, the salary determinations were obviously erroneous because subchapter S8-3d and the “highest previous rate” rule of 5 CFR § 531.203(c) (1969) are not applicable to the same personnel action. Regardless of the method used, the effect was to give all respondents except Libretto the equivalent of a two-step increase.
At the time of respondents’ promotions, 33 Fed. Reg. 12449 (1968), 5 CFR § 531.202(h) (1969), provided:
“‘Promotion’ means a change of an employee, while continuously employed, from:
(1) One General Schedule grade to a higher General Schedule grade; or
(2) A lower rate paid under authority other than subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, to a higher rate within a General Schedule grade.”
See 5 CFR § 531.203(c) (1969). The Civil Service Commission promulgated the initial regulation. In 1978, Congress substituted the Office of Personnel Management for the Civil Service Commission. 5 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. V). The terms of the regulation have remained consistent since 1950. See n. 15, infra.
In 1962, the Act was amended to provide a two-step rather than a one-step salary increase. 5 U. S. C. § 1132(b) (1958 ed., Supp. V).
See Staff Report, President’s Panel on Federal Compensation 107 (Jan. 1976).
In 1965, President Johnson directed all executive agencies to coordinate their wage policies and practices under the leadership of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. See FPM, Supp. 532-1, App. A-AL, B-B-l (Nov. 16, 1965). As a result, the Coordinated Federal Wage System was developed. In 1972, Congress amended the prevailing wage statutes. The purpose of the 1972 amendments was to codify existing law and enact a system for all agencies to use for determining the prevailing wage rates. S. Rep. No. 92-791, p. 1 (1972). As part of the 1972 amendments, Congress added 5 U. S. C. § 5346, which directed the Civil Service Commission to establish and maintain a job grading system for positions covered by subchapter IV. That was the first time Congress directed the maintenance of a uniform system for WS employees.
See Part IV, infra.
The two systems are simply independent. Unlike the 10 steps or rates of pay in most GS grades (see 5 U. S. C. § 5332 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)), the WS currently uses only 5 rates for each position (see 5 U. S. C. § 5343(c)(2) (1976 ed. and Supp. V)) and before 1972 used only 3 rates. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-339, p. 6 (1971); S. Rep. No. 92-791, p. 2 (1972). In addition, the range of pay in a GS grade is approximately 30 percent of the base rate, but the range in the WS is only approximately 16 percent. See 5 U. S. C. §§5332 (chart), 5343(e)(l)(A)-(E) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Moreover, the periodic step increases in the WS occur considerably more quickly than in the GS. Compare 5 U. S. C. §§ 5335(a)(1) — (3) with 5 U. S. C. §§ 5343(e)(2)(A)-(C) (1976 ed. and Supp. V). As a result, the maximum rate of pay for a position is more often reached, and in a far shorter time, by a WS employee than by a GS employee.
See S. Rep. No. 847, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1949).
Congress specifically excluded prevailing rate positions from the Classification Act of 1949. 5 U. S. C. §1082(7) (1946 ed., Supp. IV). Those positions remain specifically excluded from the General Schedule. 5 U. S. C. §§ 5102(c)(7), 5331 (1976 ed. and Supp. V).
See, e. g., 15 Fed. Reg. 7868 (1950), 5 CFR §25.104(a) (Supp. 1951) (refers to “[a]n employee promoted, repromoted or transferred to a higher grade between Classification Act positions or grades”); 25 Fed. Reg. 7147 (1960), 5 CFR §25.104(a) (1961) (“[t]he requirements of section 802(b) of the [Classification] Act apply in repromotion actions and in transfers involving promotions between Classification Act grades”); 28 Fed. Reg. 10948 (1963), 5 CFR § 531.204(a)(1) (1964) (“[t]he requirements of section 802(b) of the [A]ct, apply in a transfer involving a promotion between Classification Act grades”); 33 Fed. Reg. 12450 (1968), 5 CFR § 531.204(a) (1969) (“[t]he requirements of section 5334(b) of title 5, United States Code, apply only (i) to a transfer from one General Schedule position to a higher General Schedule position, and (ii) to a promotion from one General Schedule grade to a higher General Schedule grade”).
The General Accounting Office, authorized to settle and adjust “[a]U claims and demands whatever . . . against [the Government],” 31 U. S. C. §§71, 72, has consistently determined that the “highest previous rate” rule, rather than the automatic step-increase provision, governs transfers or promotions from a WS position to a GS position. See, e. g., In re Nail, 59 Comp. Gen. 209 (1980); Letter Decision, 52 Comp. Gen. 695 (1973); Letter Decision, 52 Comp. Gen. 671 (1973); Letter Decision, 44 Comp. Gen. 518 (1965). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
1
] | sc_adminaction_is |
ANDERSON, WARDEN v. HARLESS
No. 81-2066.
Decided November 1, 1982
Per Curiam.
Respondent was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed respondent’s conviction, Peo ple v. Harless, 78 Mich. App. 745, 261 N. W. 2d 41 (1977), and the Michigan Supreme Court, on review of the record, denied respondent’s request for relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a.
Respondent then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. He alleged, inter alia, that the trial court’s instruction on “malice”— a crucial element in distinguishing between second-degree murder and manslaughter under Michigan law — was unconstitutional. In particular, respondent focused on the following language from the trial court’s lengthy charge:
“Malice is implied from the nature of the act which caused the death. Malice can be implied from using the weapon on another person. You are not obligated to reach the conclusion, but you must imply malice if you find death was implied [sic] by the use of a gun against another.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.
Relying primarily on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510 (1979), the District Court held that this instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to respondent and was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. 504 F. Supp. 1135 (1981). The court also held that respondent had exhausted available state-court remedies, as required by 28 U. S. C. §§2254 (b) and (c), since his conviction had been reviewed by both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. The District Court ordered that the application for writ of habeas corpus be granted unless respondent was retried within 90 days.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 664 F. 2d 610 (1982). The court held that respondent’s claim had been properly exhausted in the state courts, because respondent had presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals the facts on which he based his federal claim and had argued that the malice instruction was “reversible error.” See People v. Harless, supra, at 748, 261 N. W. 2d, at 43. The court also emphasized that respondent, in his brief to the Michigan Court of Appeals, had cited People v. Martin, 392 Mich. 553, 221 N. W. 2d 336 (1974) — a decision predicated solely on state law in which no federal issues were decided, but in which the defendant had argued broadly that failure to properly instruct a jury violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the view of the United States Court of Appeals, respondent’s assertion before the Michigan Court of Appeals that the trial court’s malice instruction was erroneous, coupled with his citation of People v. Martin, supra, provided the Michigan courts with sufficient opportunity to consider the issue encompassed by respondent’s subsequent federal habeas petition.
We reverse. In Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), we made clear that 28 U. S. C. § 2254 requires a federal ha-beas petitioner to provide the state courts with a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. Id., at 276-277. It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, id., at 277, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made. See, e. g., Gayle v. LeFevre, 613 F. 2d 21 (CA2 1980); Paullet v. Howard, 634 F. 2d 117, 119-120 (CA3 1980); Wilks v. Israel, 627 F. 2d 32, 37-38 (CA7), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1086 (1980); Conner v. Auger, 595 F. 2d 407, 413 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 851 (1979). In addition, the habeas petitioner must have “fairly presented” to the state courts the “substance” of his federal habeas corpus claim. Picard, supra, at 275, 277-278. Cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 518 (1982).
In this case respondent argued on appeal that the trial court’s instruction on the element of malice was “erroneous.” He offered no support for this conclusion other than a citation to, and three excerpts from, People v. Martin, supra — a case which held that, under Michigan law, malice should not be implied from the fact that a weapon is used. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-49a, 51a-53a. Not surprisingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted respondent’s claim as being predicated on the state-law rule of Martin, and analyzed it accordingly. 78 Mich. App., at 748-750, 261 N. W. 2d, at 43.
The United States Court of Appeals concluded that “the due process ramifications” of respondent’s argument to the Michigan court “were self-evident,” and that respondent’s “reliance on Martin was sufficient to present the state courts with the substance of his due process challenge to the malice instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes.” 664 F. 2d, at 612. We disagree. The District Court based its grant of habeas relief in this case on the doctrine that certain sorts of “mandatory presumptions” may undermine the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and thus deprive a criminal defendant of due process. See Sandstrom, supra; In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the same rationale. However, it is plain from the record that this constitutional argument was never presented to, or considered by, the Michigan courts. Nor is this claim even the same as the constitutional claim advanced in Martin — the defendant there asserted a broad federal due process right to jury instructions that “properly explain” state law, 392 Mich., at 558, 221 N. W. 2d, at 339, and did not rely on the more particular analysis developed in cases such as Sandstrom, supra. Since it appears that respondent is still free to present his Sandstrom claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals, see People v. Berry, 10 Mich. App. 469, 474-475, 157 N. W. 2d 310, 312-313 (1968), we conclude that he has not exhausted his available state-court remedies as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2254. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and respondent’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Respondent was convicted oí first-degree murder, which requires proof not only of “malice” but also of premeditation. For this reason, petitioner argues that any error in the trial court’s definition of malice was harmless. In light of our disposition, we do not reach the issue.
Respondent was represented by counsel on appeal.
We doubt that a defendant’s citation to a state-court decision predicated solely on state law ordinarily will be sufficient to fairly apprise a reviewing court of a potential federal claim merely because the defendant in the cited case advanced a federal claim. However, it is clear that such a citation is insufficient when, as here, the federal claim asserted in the cited case is not even the same as the federal claim on which federal habeas relief is sought. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 276 (1971). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ. | What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction? | [
"cert",
"appeal",
"bail",
"certification",
"docketing fee",
"rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument",
"injunction",
"mandamus",
"original",
"prohibition",
"stay",
"writ of error",
"writ of habeas corpus",
"unspecified, other"
] | [
0
] | sc_jurisdiction |
INTEL CORP. v. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC.
No. 02-572.
Argued April 20, 2004 —
Decided June 21, 2004
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Joseph Kattan, and James A. Murray. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae for the Commission of the European Communities in support of petitioner under this Court’s Rule 12.6. With him on the brief were Virginia A. Seitz, Richard Weiner, Gene C. Schaerr, and Marinn F. Carlson.
Patrick Lynch argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jonathan D. Hacker.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Michael Jay Singer, and Sushma Soni
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Roy T. Englert, Jr., Max Huffman, and Robin S. Conrad; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Kenneth S. Getter and Miriam R. Nemetz.
“[A] letter rogatory is the request by a domestic court to a foreign court to take evidence from a certain witness.” Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 Yale L. J. 515, 519 (1953). See Smit, International Litigation under the United States Code, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1015, 1027 (1965) (hereinafter Smit, International Litigation) (noting foreign courts’ use of letters rogatory to request evidence-gathering aid from United States courts).
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of federal district courts to assist in the production of evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal. In the matter before us, respondent Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD), filed an antitrust complaint against petitioner Intel Corporation (Intel) with the Directorate-General for Competition (DG-Competition) of the Commission of the European Communities (European Commission or Commission). In pursuit of that complaint, AMD applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, invoking 28 U. S. C. § 1782(a), for an order requiring Intel to produce potentially relevant documents. Section 1782(a) provides that a federal district court “may order” a person “residing]” or “found” in the district to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal... upon the application of any interested person.”
Concluding that § 1782(a) did not authorize the requested discovery, the District Court denied AMD’s application.. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that determination and remanded the case, instructing the District Court to rule on the merits of AMD’s application. In accord with the Court of Appeals, we hold that the District Court had authority finder § 1782(a) to entertain AMD’s discovery request. The statute, we rule, does not categorically bar the assistance AMD seeks: (1) A complainant before the European Commission, such as AMD, qualifies as an “interested person” within §1782(a)’s compass; (2) the Commission is a § 1782(a) “tribunal” when it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker; (3) the “proceeding” for which discovery is sought under § 1782(a) must be in reasonable contemplation, but need not be “pending” or “imminent”; and (4) § 1782(a) contains no threshold requirement that evidence sought from a federal district court would be discoverable under the law governing the foreign proceeding. We caution, however, that § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals or to “interested person[s]” in proceedings abroad. Whether such assistance is appropriate in this case is a question yet unresolved. To guide the District Court on remand, we suggest considerations relevant to the disposition of that question.
I
A
Section 1782 is the product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly 150 years, to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals. Congress first provided for federal-court aid to foreign tribunals in 1855; requests for aid took the form of letters rogatory forwarded through diplomatic channels. See Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (circuit court may appoint “a United States commissioner designated ... to make the examination of witnesses” on receipt of a letter rogatory from a foreign court); Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769 (authorizing district courts to respond to letters rogatory by compelling witnesses here to provide testimony for use abroad in “suitfs] for the recovery of money or property”). In 1948, Congress substantially broadened the scope of assistance federal courts could provide for foreign proceedings. That legislation, codified as § 1782, eliminated the prior requirement that the government of a foreign country be a party or have an interest in the proceeding. The measure allowed district courts to designate persons to preside at depositions “to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with which the United States is at peace.” Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (emphasis added). The next year, Congress deleted “civil action” from § 1782’s text and inserted “judicial proceeding.” Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §93, 63 Stat. 103. See generally Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 Yale L. J. 515 (1953).
In 1958, prompted by the growth of international commerce, Congress created a Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure (Rules Commission) to “investigate and study existing practices of judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements.” Act of Sept. 2, Pub. L. 85-906, §2, 72 Stat. 1743; S. Rep. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1958); Smit, International Litigation 1015-1016. Six years later, in 1964, Congress unanimously adopted legislation recommended by the Rules Commission; the legislation included a complete revision of § 1782. See Act of Oct. 3, Pub: L. 88-619, § 9, 78 Stat. 997; Smit, International Litigation 1026-1035.
As recast in 1964, § 1782 provided for assistance in obtaining documentary and other tangible evidence as well as testimony. Notably, Congress deleted the words “in any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign country,” and replaced them with the phrase “in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” Brief for United States as Ami-cus Curiae 6, 4a-5a (emphasis added). While the accompanying Senate Report does not account discretely for the deletion of the word “pending,” it explains that Congress introduced the word “tribunal” to ensure that “assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts,” but extends also to “administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings.” S. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1964); see H. R. Rep. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1963) (same). Congress further amended § 1782(a) in 1996 to add, after the reference to “foreign or international tribunal,” the words “including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. 104-106, § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 486. Section 1782(a)’s current text reads:
“The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person____ The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing ... [or may be] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
“A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in 'violation of any legally applicable privilege.” .
B
AMD and Intel are “worldwide competitors in the microprocessor industry.” 292 F. 3d 664, 665 (CA9 2002). In October 2000, AMD filed an antitrust complaint with the DG-Competition of the European Commission. Ibid,.; App. 41. “The European Commission is the executive and administrative organ of the European Communities.” Brief for Commission of European Communities as Amicus Curiae 1 (hereinafter European Commission Amicus Curiae). The Commission exercises responsibility over the wide range of subject areas covered by the European Union treaty; those areas include the treaty provisions, and regulations thereunder, governing competition. See ibid.; Consolidated Versions of Treaty on European Union and Treaty Establishing European Community, Arts. 81 and 82, 2002 O. J. (C 325) 33, 64-65, 67 (hereinafter EC Treaty). The DG-Competition, operating under the Commission’s aegis, is the European Union’s primary antitrust law enforcer. European Commission Amicus Curiae 2. Within the DG-Competition’s domain are anticompetitive agreements (Art. 81) and abuse of dominant market position (Art. 82). Ibid.; EC Treaty 64-65.
AMD’s complaint alleged that Intel, in violation of European competition law, had abused its dominant position in the European market through loyalty rebates, exclusive purchasing agreements with manufacturers and retailers, price discrimination’ and standard-setting cartels. App. 40-43; Brief for Petitioner 13. AMD recommended that the DG-Competition seek discovery of documents Intel had produced in a private antitrust suit, titled Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., brought in a Federal District Court in Alabama. 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (ND Ala. 1998), vacated, 195 F. 3d 1346 (CA Fed. 1999), remanded, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (ND Ala. 2000), aff’d, 253 F. 3d 695 (CA Fed. 2001); App. 111; App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. After the DG-Competition declined to seek judicial assistance in the United States, AMD, pursuant to § 1782(a), petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of California for an order directing Intel to produce documents discovered in the Intergraph litigation and on file in the federal court in Alabama. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a-14a. AMD asserted that it sought the materials in connection with the complaint it had filed with the European Commission. Ibid.
The District Court denied the application as “[unsupported by applicable authority.” Id., at 15a. Reversing that determination, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for disposition on the merits. 292 F. 3d, at 669. The Court of Appeals noted two points significant to its decision: § 1782(a) includes matters before “ ‘bodies of a quasi-judicial or administrative nature,’ ” id., at 667 (quoting In re Letters Rogatory from Tokyo Dist., 539 F. 2d 1216, 1218-1219 (CA9 1976)); and, since 1964, the statute’s text has contained “[no] requirement that the proceeding be ‘pending,’ ” 292 F. 3d, at 667 (quoting United States v. Sealed 1, Letter of Request for Legal Assistance from the Deputy Prosecutor Gen. of Russian Federation, 235 F. 3d 1200, 1204 (CA9 2000)); see supra, at 248-249. A proceeding judicial in character, the Ninth Circuit further observed, was a likely sequel to the European Commission’s investigation: “[The European Commission is] a body authorized to enforce the EC Treaty with written, binding decisions, enforceable through fines and penalties. [The Commission’s] decisions are appealable to the Court of First Instance and then to the [European] Court of Justice. Thus, the proceeding for which discovery is sought is, at minimum, one leading to quasi-judicial proceedings.” 292 F. 3d, at 667; see infra, at 254-255 (presenting synopsis of Commission proceedings and judicial review of Commission decisions).
The Court of Appeals rejected Intel’s argument that § 1782(a) called for a threshold showing that the documents AMD sought in the California federal court would have been discoverable by AMD in the European Commission investigation had those documents been located within the Union. 292 F. 3d, at 668. Acknowledging that other Courts of Appeals had construed § 1782(a) to include a “foreign-discoverability” rule, the Ninth Circuit found “nothing in the plain language or legislative history of Section 1782, including its 1964 and 1996 amendments, to require a threshold showing [by] the party seeking discovery that what is sought be discoverable in the foreign proceeding,” id., at 669. A foreign-discoverability threshold, the Court of Appeals added, would disserve § 1782(a)’s twin aims of “providing efficient assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.” Ibid.
On remand, a Magistrate Judge found AMD’s application “overbroad,” and recommended an order directing AMD to submit a more specific discovery request confined to documents directly relevant to the European Commission investigation. App. to Brief in Opposition la-6a; Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 9. The District Court has stayed further proceedings pending disposition of the questions presented by Intel’s petition for certiorari. Ibid,.; see Order Vacating Hearing Date, No. C 01-7033 MISC JW (ND Cal., Dec. 1, 2003) (stating “Intel may renotice its motion for de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s decision after the Supreme Court issues its ruling”).
We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1003 (2003), in view of the division among the Circuits on the question whether § 1782(a) contains a foreign-discoverability requirement. We now hold that § 1782(a) does not impose such a requirement. We also granted review on two other questions. First, does § 1782(a) make discovery available to complainants, such as AMD, who do not have the status of private “litigants” and are not sovereign agents? See Pet. for Cert. (i). Second, must a “proceeding” before a foreign “tribunal” be “pending” or at least “imminent” for an applicant to invoke § 1782(a) successfully? Compare In re Letter of Request from Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom, 870 F. 2d 686, 691 (CADC 1989) (proceeding must be “within reasonable contemplation”), with In re Ishihari Chemical Co., 251 F. 3d 120, 125 (CA2 2001) (proceeding must be “imminent — very likely to occur and very soon to occur”); In re International Judicial Assistance (Letter Rogatory) for Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F. 2d 702, 706 (CA2 1991) (same). Answering “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second, we affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
II
To place this case in context, we sketch briefly how the European Commission, acting through the DG-Competition, enforces European competition laws and regulations. The DG-Competition’s “overriding responsibility” is to conduct investigations into alleged violations of the European Union’s competition prescriptions. See European Commission Amicus Curiae 6. On receipt of a complaint or sua sponte, the DG-Competition conducts a preliminary investigation. Ibid. In that investigation, the DG-Competition “may take into account information provided by a complainant, and it may seek information directly from the target of the complaint.” Ibid. “Ultimately, DG Competition’s preliminary investigation results in a formal written decision whether to pursue the complaint. If [the DG-Competition] declines to proceed, that decision is subject to judicial review” by the Court of First Instance and, ultimately, by the court of last resort for European Union matters, the Court of Justice for the European Communities (European Court of Justice). Id., at 7; App. 50; see, e. g., Case T-241/97, Stork Amsterdam BV v. Commission, 2000 E. C. R. 11-309, [2000] 5 C. M. L. R. 31 (Ct. 1st Instance 2000) (annulling Commission’s rejection of a complaint).
If the DG-Competition decides to pursue the complaint, it typically serves the target of the investigation with a formal “statement of objections” and advises the target of its intention to recommend a decision finding that the target has violated European competition law. European Commission Amicus Curiae 7. The target is entitled to a hearing before an independent officer, who provides a report to the DG-Competition. Ibid.; App. 18-27. Once the DG-Competition has made its recommendation, the European Commission may “dismis[s] the complaint, or issu[e] a decision finding infringement and imposing penalties.” European Commission Amicus Curiae 7. The Commission’s final action dismissing the complaint or holding the target liable is subject to review in the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. Ibid.; App. 52-53, 89-90.
Although lacking formal “party” or “litigant” status in Commission proceedings, the complainant has significant procedural rights. Most prominently, the complainant may submit to the DG-Competition information in support of its allegations, and may seek judicial review of the Commission’s disposition of a complaint. See European Commission Ami-cus Curiae 7-8, and n. 5; Stork Amsterdam, 2000 E. C. R. II, at 328-329, ¶¶ 51-53.
Ill
As “in all statutory construction cases, we begin [our examination of §1782] with the language of the statute.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002). The language of § 1782(a), confirmed by its context, our examination satisfies us, warrants this conclusion: The statute authorizes, but does not require, a federal district court to provide assistance to a complainant in a European Commission proceeding that leads to a dispositive ruling, i. e., a final administrative action both responsive to the complaint and reviewable in court. Accordingly, we reject the categorical limitations Intel would place on the statute’s reach.
A
We turn first to Intel’s contention that the catalog of “interested person[s]” authorized to apply for judicial assistance under § 1782(a) includes only “litigants, foreign sovereigns, and the designated agents of those sovereigns,” and excludes AMD, a mere complainant before the Commission, accorded only “limited rights.” Brief for Petitioner 10-11, 24, 26-27. Highlighting § 1782’s caption, “[assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals,” Intel urges that the statutory phrase “any interested person” should be read, correspondingly, to reach only “litigants.” Id., at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
The caption of a statute, this Court has cautioned, “cannot undo or limit that which the [statute’s] text makes plain.” Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 529 (1947). The text of § 1782(a), “upon the application of any interested person,” plainly reaches beyond the universe of persons designated “litigant.” No doubt litigants are included among, and may be the most common example of, the “interested person[s]” who may invoke § 1782; we read § 1782’s caption to convey no more. See, e. g., Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 482-483 (2001) (rejecting narrow reading of 42 U. S. C. § 7511(a) based on caption in light of “specifically” broader coverage of provision’s text).
The complainant who triggers a European Commission investigation has a significant role in the process. As earlier observed, see supra, at 255, in addition to prompting an investigation, the complainant has the right to submit information for the DG-Competition’s consideration, and may proceed to court if the Commission discontinues the investigation or dismisses the complaint. App. 52-53. Given these participation rights, a complainant “possesses] a reasonable interest in obtaining [judicial] assistance,” and therefore qualifies' as an “interested person” within any fair construction of that term. See Smit, International Litigation 1027 (“any interested person” is “intended to include not only litigants before foreign or international tribunals, but also foreign and international officials as well as any other person whether he be designated by foreign law or international convention or merely possess a reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance”).
B
We next consider whether the assistance in obtaining documents here sought by an “interested person” meets the specification “for use in a foreign or international tribunal.” Beyond question the reviewing authorities, both the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice, qualify as tribunals. But those courts are not proof-taking instances. Their review is limited to the record before the Commission. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. Hence, AMD could “use” evidence in the reviewing courts only by submitting it to the Commission in the current, investigative stage.
Moreover, when Congress established the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure in 1958, see supra, at 248, it instructed the Rules Commission to recommend procedural revisions “for the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies.” §2, 72 Stat. 1743 (emphasis added). Section 1782 had previously referred to “any judicial proceeding.” The Rules Commission’s draft, which Congress adopted, replaced that term with “a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.” See supra, at 248-249. Congress understood that change to “provid[e] the possibility of U. S. judicial assistance in connection with [administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings abroad].” S. Rep. No. 1580, at 7-8; see Smit, International Litigation 1026-1027, and nn. 71, 73 (“[t]he term ‘tribunal’.. . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts”; in addition to affording assistance in cases before the European Court of Justice, § 1782, as revised in 1964, “permits the rendition of proper aid in proceedings before the [European] Commission in which the Commission exercises quasi-judicial powers”). See also European Commission Amicus Curiae 9 (“[W]hen the Commission acts on DG Competition’s final recommendation ... the investigative function blur[s] into deci-sionmaking.”). We have no warrant to exclude the European Commission, to the extent that it acts as a first-instance decisionmaker, from § 1782(a)’s ambit. See 292 F. 3d, at 667; supra, at 255, n. 9.
C
Intel also urges that AMD’s complaint has not progressed beyond the investigative stage; therefore, no adjudicative action is currently or. even imminently on the Commission’s agenda. Brief for Petitioner 27-29.
Section 1782(a) does not limit the provision of judicial assistance to “pending” adjudicative proceedings. In 1964, when Congress eliminated the requirement that a proceeding be “judicial,” Congress also deleted the requirement that a proceeding be “pending.” See supra, at 248-249. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 397 (1995). The legislative history of the 1964 revision is in sync; it reflects Congress’ recognition that judicial assistance would be available “whether the foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a criminal, civil, administrative, or other nature.” S. Rep. No. 1580, at 9 (emphasis added).
In 1996, Congress amended § 1782(a) to clarify that the statute covers “criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.” See § 1342(b), 110 Stat. 486; supra, at 249. Nothing suggests that this amendment was an endeavor to rein in, rather than to confirm, by way of example, the broad range of discovery authorized in 1964. See S. Rep. No. 1580, at 7 (“[Tjhe [district] court[s] have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigating magistrates in foreign countries.”).
In short, we reject the view, expressed in In re Ishihara Chemical Co., that § 1782 comes into play only when adjudicative proceedings are “pending” or “imminent.” See 251 F. 3d, at 125 (proceeding must be “imminent — very likely to occur and very soon to occur” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we hold that § 1782(a) requires only that a dispositive ruling by the Commission, reviewable by the European courts, be within reasonable contemplation. See Crown Prosecution Serv. of United Kingdom, 870 F. 2d, at 691; In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F. 2d 1151, 1155, and n. 9 (CA11 1988); Smit, International Litigation 1026 (“It is not • necessary . , . for the [adjudicative] proceeding to be pending at the time the evidence is sought, but only that the evidence is eventually to be used in such a proceeding.”).
D
We take up next the foreign-discoverability rule on which lower courts have divided: Does § 1782(a) categorically bar a district court from ordering production of documents when the foreign tribunal or the “interested person” would not be able to obtain the documents if they were located in the foreign jurisdiction? See supra, at 253-254, and n. 7.
We note at the outset, and count it significant, that § 1782(a) expressly shields privileged material: “A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.” See S. Rep. No. 1580, at 9 (“[N]o person shall be required under the provisions of [§ 1782] to produce any evidence in violation of an applicable privilege.”). Beyond shielding material safeguarded by an applicable privilege, however, nothing in the text of § 1782 limits a district court’s production-order authority to materials that could be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there. “If Congress had intended to impose such a sweeping restriction on the district court’s discretion, at a time when it was enacting liberalizing amendments to the statute, it would have included statutory language to that effect.” In re Application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F. 3d 54, 59 (CA2 1993); accord Four Pillars Enterprises Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F. 3d 1075, 1080 (CA9 2002); 292 F. 3d, at 669 (case below); In re Bayer AG, 146 F. 3d 188, 193-194 (CA3 1998).
Nor does § 1782(a)’s legislative history suggest that Congress intended to impose a blanket foreign-discoverability rule on the provision of assistance under § 1782(a). The Senate Report observes in this regard that § 1782(a) “leaves the issuance of an appropriate order to the discretion of the court which, in proper cases, may refuse to issue an order or may impose conditions it deems desirable.” S. Rep. No. 1580, at 7.
Intel raises two policy concerns in support of a foreigndiscoverability limitation on § 1782(a) aid — avoiding offense to foreign governments, and maintaining parity between litigants. Brief for Petitioner 23-24; Reply Brief 5, 13-14; see In re Application of Asta Medica, S. A., 981 F. 2d 1, 6 (CA1 1992) (“Congress did not seek to place itself on a collision course with foreign tribunals and legislatures, which have carefully chosen the procedures and laws best suited to their concepts of litigation.”). While comity and parity concerns may be important as touchstones for a district court’s exercise of discretion in particular cases, they do not permit our insertion of a generally applicable foreign-discoverability rule into the text of § 1782(a).
We question whether foreign governments would in fact be offended by a domestic prescription permitting, but not requiring, judicial assistance. A foreign nation may limit discovery within its domain for reason's peculiar to its own legal practices, culture, or traditions — reasons that do not necessarily signal objection to aid from United States federal courts. See Bayer, 146 F. 3d, at 194 (“[TJhere is no reason to assume that because a country has not adopted a particular discovery procedure, it would take offense at its use.”); Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 215, 235-236 (1994) (hereinafter Smit, Recent Developments) (same). A foreign tribunal’s reluctance to order production of materials present in the United States similarly may signal no resistance to the receipt of evidence gathered pursuant to § 1782(a). See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij “De Zeven Provincien” N. V., [1987] 1 App. Cas. 24 (House of Lords ruled that nondiscoverability under English law did not stand in the way of a litigant in English proceedings seeking assistance in the United States under §1782). When the foreign tribunal would readily accept relevant information discovered in the United States, application of a foreign-discoverability rule would be senseless. The rule in that situation would serve only to thwart § 1782(a)’s objective to assist foreign tribunals in obtaining relevant information that the tribunals may find useful but, for reasons having no bearing on international comity, they cannot obtain under their own laws.
Concerns about maintaining parity among adversaries in litigation likewise do not provide a sound basis for a eross-the-board foreign-discoverability rule. When information is sought by an “interested person,” a district court could condition relief upon thát person’s reciprocal exchange of .information. See Euromepa, S. A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F. 3d 1095, 1102 (CA2 1995); Smit, Recent Developments 237. Moreover, the foreign tribunal can place conditions on its acceptance of the information to maintain whatever measure of parity it concludes is appropriate. See Euromepa, 51 F. 3d, at 1101.
We also reject Intel’s suggestion that a § 1782(a) applicant must show that United States law would allow discovery in domestic litigation analogous to the foreign proceeding. Brief for Petitioner 19-20 (“[I]f AMD were pursuing this matter in the United States, U. S. law would preclude it from obtaining discovery of Intel’s documents.”). Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught with danger. For example, we have in the United States no close analogue to the European Commission regime under which AMD is not free to mount its own case in the Court of First Instance or the European Court of Justice, but can participate only as complainant, an “interested person,” in Commission-steered proceedings. See L. Ritter, W. Braun, & F. Rawlinson, European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide 824-826 (2d ed. 2000) (describing a complaint as a potentially “more certain (and cheaper) alternative to private enforcement through the [European Union’s member states’] courts”).
IV
As earlier emphasized, see supra, at 260-261, a district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so. See United Kingdom v. United States, 288 F. 3d 1312, 1319 (CA11 2001) (“a district court’s compliance with a § 1782 request is not mandatory”). We note below factors that bear consideration in ruling on a § 1782(a) request.
First, when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding (as Intel is here), the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad. A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over those appearing before it, and can itself order them to produce evidence. App. to Reply Brief 4a (“When th[e] person [who is to produce the evidence] is a party to the foreign proceedings, the foreign or international tribunal can exercise its own jurisdiction to order production of the evidence.” (quoting declaration of H. Smit in In re: Application of Ishihara Chemical Co., Ltd., For order to take discovery of Shipley Company, L. L. C., Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782, Misc. 99-232 (FB) (EDNY, May 18, 2000))). In contrast, nonparticipants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal’s jurisdictional reach; hence, their evidence, available in the United States, may be unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid. See App. to Reply Brief 4a.
Second, as the 1964 Senate Report suggests, a court presented with a § 1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U. S. federal-court judicial assistance. See S. Rep. No. 1580, at 7. Further, the grounds Intel urged for categorical limitations on § 1782(a)’s scope may be relevant in determining whether a discovery order should be granted in a particular case. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. Specifically, a district court could consider whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States. See id,., at 27. Also, unduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed. See Bayer, 146 F. 3d, at 196 (remanding for district-court consideration of “appropriate measures, if needed, to protect the confidentiality of materials”); In re Application of Esses, 101 F. 3d 873, 876 (CA2 1996) (affirming limited discovery that is neither “burdensome [n]or duplicative”).
Intel maintains that, if we do not accept the categorical limitations it proposes, then, at least, we should exercise our supervisory authority to adopt rules barring § 1782(a) discovery here. Brief for Petitioner 34-36; cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U. S. 140, 146-147 (1985) (this Court can establish rules of “sound judicial practice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We decline, at this juncture, to adopt supervisory rules. Any such endeavor at least should await further experience with § 1782(a) applications in the lower courts. The European Commission has stated in amicus curiae briefs to this Court that it does not need or want the District Court’s assistance. See European Commission Amicus Curiae 11-16; Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pet. for Cert. 4-8. It is not altogether clear, however, whether the Commission, which may itself invoke § 1782(a) aid, means to say “never” or “hardly ever” to judicial assistance from United States courts. Nor do we know whether the European Commission’s views on § 1782(a)’s utility are widely shared in the international community by entities with similarly blended adjudicative and prosecutorial functions.
Several facets of this case remain largely unexplored. Intel and its amici have expressed concerns that AMD’s application, if granted in any part, may yield disclosure of confidential information, encourage “fishing expeditions,” and undermine the European Commission’s Leniency Program. See Brief for Petitioner 37; European Commission Amicus Curiae 11-16. Yet no one has suggested that AMD’s complaint to the Commission is pretextual. Nor has it been shown that § 1782(a)’s preservation of legally applicable privileges, see supra, at 260, and the controls on discovery avail-. able to the District Court, see, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(b)(2) and (c), would be ineffective to prevent discovery of Intel’s business secrets and other confidential information.
On the merits, this case bears closer scrutiny than it has received to date. Having held that § 1782(a) authorizes, but does not require, discovery assistance, we leave it to the courts below to ensure an airing adequate to determine what, if any, assistance is appropriate.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
Affirmed.
Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Rules Commission also drafted amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and a Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, recommended for adoption by individual States. See Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, H. R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1963).
See Smit, International Litigation 1026-1027, n. 72 (commenting that Congress eliminated the word “pending” in order “to facilitate the gathering of evidence prior to the institution of litigation abroad”).
The Alabama federal court granted summary judgment in Intel’s favor in the Intergraph litigation, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. See 253 F. 3d, at 699. A protective order, imposed by the Alabama federal court, governs the confidentiality of all discovery in that case. App. 72-73.
Both Intel and AMD are headquartered in the Northern District of California. Id., at 113.
AMD’s complaint to the Commission alleges, inter alia, “that Intel has monopolized the worldwide market for Windows-capable i. e. x86, microprocessors.” Id., at 55-56. The documents from the Intergraph litigation relate to: “(a) the market within which Intel x86 microprocessors compete; (b) the power that Intel enjoys within that market; (c) actions taken by Intel to preserve and enhance its position in the market; and (d) the impact of the actions taken by Intel to preserve and enhance its market position.” App. 55.
The First and Eleventh Circuits have construed § 1782(a) to contain a foreign-discoverability requirement. See In re Application of Asta Medica, S. A., 981 F. 2d 1, 7 (CA1 1992); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F. 2d 1151, 1156 (CA11 1988). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that no such requirement exists if the § 1782(a) applicant is a foreign sovereign. See In re Letter of Request from Amtsgericht Ingolstadt, F. R. G., 82 F. 3d 590, 592 (CA4 1996); In re Letter Rogatory from First Court of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F. 3d 308, 310-311 (CA5 1995). In alignment with the Ninth Circuit, the Second and Third Circuits have rejected a foreign-discoverability requirement. See In re Application of Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F. 3d 54, 59-60 (CA2 1993); In re Bayer AG, 146 F. 3d 188, 193-194 (CA3 1998).
The Court of First Instance, which is “attached to the [European] Court of Justice,” was established “to improve the judicial protection of individual interests, particularly in cases requiring the examination of complex facts, whilst at the same time reducing the workload of the [European] Court of Justice.” C. Kerse, E. C. Antitrust Procedure 37 (3d ed. 1994).
The dissent suggests that the Commission “more closely resembles a prosecuting authority, say, the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, than an administrative agency that adjudicates cases, say, the Federal Trade Commission.” Post, at 270. That is a questionable suggestion in view of the European Commission’s authority to determine liability and impose penalties, dispositions that will remain final unless overturned by the European courts. See supra this page.
The term “interested person,” Intel notes, also appears in 28 U. S. C. § 1696(a), a provision enacted concurrently with the 1964 revision of § 1782. Brief for Petitioner 27. Section 1696(a) authorizes federal district courts to “order service ... of any document issued in connection with a [foreign] proceeding” pursuant to a request made by the foreign tribunal “or upon application of any interested person.” Intel reasons that “[t]he class of private parties qualifying as ‘interested persons’ for [service] purposes must of course be limited to litigants, because private parties ... cannot serve ‘process’ unless they have filed suit.” Brief for Petitioner 27 (emphasis in original). Section 1696(a), however, is not limited to service of process; it allows service of “any document” issued in connection with a foreign proceeding. As the Government points out by way of example: “[I]f the European Commission’s procedures were revised to require a complainant to serve its complaint on a target company, but the complainant’s role in the Commission’s proceedings otherwise remained unchanged, [§ ]1696 would authorize the district court to provide that ‘interested [person]’ with assistance in serving that document.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 11.
Section 1782(a) instructs that a district court’s discovery order “may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing ... [or may be] the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” This mode-of-proof-taking instruction imposes no substantive limitation on the discovery to be had.
Most civil-law systems lack procedures analogous to the pretrial discovery regime operative under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See ALI, ALI/Unidroit Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, Proposed Final Draft, Rule 22, Comment R-22E, p. 118 (2004) (“Disclosure and exchange of evidence under the civil-law systems are generally more restricted, or nonexistent.”); Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1017, 1018-1019 (1998) (same). See also Smit, Recent Developments 235, n. 93 (“The drafters [of §1782] were quite aware of the circumstance that civil law systems generally do not have American type pretrial discovery, and do not compel the production of documentary evidence.”),
See Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U. S. C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Comm. 1, 13, and n. 63 (1998) (hereinafter Smit, American Assistance) (noting that “[a] similar decision was rendered by the President of the Amsterdam District Court”).
A civil-law court, furthermore, might attend to litigant-parity concerns in its merits determination: “In civil law countries, documentary evidence is generally submitted as an attachment to the pleadings of as part of a report by an expert. ... A civil law court generally rules upon the question of whether particular documentary evidence may be relied upon only in its decision on the merits.” Smit, Recent Developments 235-236, n. 94.
Among its proposed rules, the dissent would'exclude from §1782(a)’s reach discovery not available “under foreign law” and “under domestic law in analogous circumstances.” Post, at 270. Because comparison of systems is slippery business, the dissent’s rule is infinitely easier to state than to apply. As the dissent’s examples tellingly reveal, see post, at 267-268, a foreign proceeding may have no direct analogue in our legal system. In light of the variety of foreign proceedings resistant to ready classification in domestic terms, Congress left unbounded by categorical rules the determination whether a matter is proceeding “in a foreign or international tribunal.” While we reject the rules the dissent would inject into the statute, see post, at 269-273, we do suggest guides for the exercise of district-court discretion, see infra, at 264-266.
At oral argument, counsel for AMD observed: “In the United States, we could have brought a private action in the district court for these very same violations. In Europe, our only Europe-wide remedy was to go to the [European Commission].” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
The dissent sees a need for “categorical limits” to ward off “expensive, time-consuming battles about discovery.” Post, at 268. That concern seems more imaginary than real. There is no evidence whatsoever, in the 40 years since § 1782(a)’s adoption, see supra, at 248, of the costs, delays, and forced settlements the dissent hypothesizes. See Smit, American Assistance 1, 19-20 (“The revised section 1782... has been applied in scores of cases.... All in all, Section 1782 has largely served the purposes for which it was enacted. . . . [TJhere appears to be no reason for seriously considering, at this time, any statutory amendments.”).
The Commission, we note, is not obliged to respond to a discovery request of the kind AMD has made. The party targeted in the complaint and in the § 1782(a) application would no doubt wield the laboring oar in opposing discovery, as Intel did here. Not only was there no “need for the Commission to respond,” post, at 271, the Commission in fact made no submission at all in the instant matter before it reached this Court.
The European Commission's “Leniency Program” allows “cartel participants [to] confess their own wrongdoing” in return for prosecutorial leniency. European Commission Amicus Curiae 14-15; Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pet. for Cert. 6.
The District Court might also consider the significance of the protective order entered by the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. See App. 73; supra, at 251, n. 4; cf. Four Pillars Enterprises Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F. 3d 1075, 1080 (CA9 2002) (affirming district-court denial of discovery that “would frustrate the protective order of [another] federal [district] court”). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states. | What is the issue area of the decision? | [
"Criminal Procedure",
"Civil Rights",
"First Amendment",
"Due Process",
"Privacy",
"Attorneys",
"Unions",
"Economic Activity",
"Judicial Power",
"Federalism",
"Interstate Relations",
"Federal Taxation",
"Miscellaneous",
"Private Action"
] | [
4
] | sc_issuearea |
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE ET AL.
No. 83-1032.
Argued November 28, 1984
Decided March 18, 1985
Rehnquist,- J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which Brennan and Stevens, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 501. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Part I of which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 502. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 518.
Charles N. Steele argued the cause for appellant in No. 83-1032. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Bader, Miriam Aguiar, and Jonathan A. Bernstein. Steven B. Feirson argued the cause for appellants in No. 83-1122. With him on the briefs were John M. Coleman and Anthony S. Harrington.
Robert R. Sparks, Jr., argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief was J. Curtis Herge.
Together with No. 83-1122, Democratic Party of the United States et al. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee et al., also on appeal from the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Philip A. Lacovara, Ronald A. Stern, Charles S. Sims, and Arthur B. Spitzer; for the Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation et al. by Wilkes C. Robinson; and for the National Congressional Club by Brice M. Clagett and John R. Bolton.
Roger M. Witten, William T. Lake, and Archibald Cox filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act), 26 U. S. C. §9001 et seq., offers the Presidential candidates of major political parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election campaigns. If a Presidential candidate elects public financing, § 9012(f) makes it a criminal offense for independent “political committees,” such as appellees National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund For A Conservative Majority (FCM), to expend more than $1,000 to further that candidate’s election. A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in companion lawsuits brought respectively by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and by the Democratic Party of the United States and the Democratic National Committee (DNC), held § 9012(f) unconstitutional on its face because it violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. These plaintiffs challenge that determination on this appeal, and the FEC also appeals from that part of the judgment holding that the Democratic Party and the DNC have standing under 26 U. S. C. § 9011(b)(1) to seek a declaratory judgment against appellees upholding the constitutionality of § 9012(f). We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory appeal provision of § 9011(b)(2), which provides for a direct appeal to this Court from three-judge district courts convened in proceedings under § 9011(b)(1). 466 U. S. 935 (1984). We reverse the judgment of the District Court on the issue of the standing of the Democratic Party and the DNC, but affirm its judgment as to the constitutional validity of § 9012(f).
The present litigation began in May 1983 when the Democratic Party, the DNC, and Edward Mezvinsky, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee, in his individual capacity as a citizen eligible to vote for President of the United States (collectively, the Democrats), filed suit against NCPAC and FCM (the PACs), who had announced their intention to spend large sums of money to help bring about the reelection of President Ronald Reagan in 1984. Their amended complaint sought a declaration that § 9012(f), which they believed would prohibit the PACs’ intended expenditures, was constitutional. The FEC intervened for the sole purpose of moving, along with the PACs, to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing.
In June 1983, the FEC brought a separate action against the same defendants seeking identical declaratory relief. It was referred to the same three-judge District Court, which consolidated the two cases for all purposes. The parties submitted 201 stipulations and three books of exhibits as the factual record. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the court issued a comprehensive opinion, holding that the Democrats had standing under § 9011(b)(1) and Art. Ill of the Constitution to seek the requested declaratory relief, but that the Democrats and the FEC were not entitled to a declaration that § 9012(f) is constitutional. 578 F. Supp. 797 (1983). The court held that § 9012(f) abridges First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, that it is substantially overbroad, and that it cannot permissibly be given a narrowing construction to cure the overbreadth. The court did not, however, declare § 9012(f) unconstitutional because the PACs had not filed a counterclaim requesting such a declaration.
I
In their respective suits, the Democrats and the FEC relied upon 26 U. S. C. § 9011(b) to confer standing on them and subject-matter jurisdiction on the three-judge District Court. Section 9011(b)(1) provides:
“The [FEC], the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President are authorized to institute such actions, including actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, as may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true any provisions of [the Fund Act].”
Section 9011(b)(2) confers subject-matter jurisdiction on the district courts of the United States, sitting in panels of three judges in accordance with 28 U. S. C. §2284, to hear proceedings instituted under § 9011(b)(1).
We do not doubt, nor do any of the parties in these cases challenge, the standing of the FEC, which is specifically identified in § 9011(b)(1), to bring a declaratory action to test the constitutionality of a provision of the Fund Act. We think such an action is “appropriate” within the meaning of that section because a favorable declaration would materially advance the FEC’s ability to expedite its enforcement of the Fund Act against political committees such as NCPAC and FCM. This is especially important because the relatively short duration of the then upcoming general election campaigns for President allowed little time in which to prosecute an enforcement action before it would become moot in whole or in part. We are fortified in our conclusion by § 306(b)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as added, 88 Stat. 1281, and amended, 2 U. S. C. §437c(b)(l), which provides that the FEC “shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement” of the Fund Act. Article III standing exists by virtue of the facts that the FEC and the PACs have adverse interests, the PACs threatened, and now have made, substantial expenditures in apparent contravention of 26 U. S. C. § 9012(f), and the declaratory relief the FEC requests would aid its enforcement efforts against the PACs and others similarly situated.
Despite the identity of the relief requested by the FEC and the Democrats, the FEC asks this Court to reverse the District Court’s holding that the Democrats also have standing under § 9011(b)(1). The Democrats maintain that there is no need to resolve this question because there is no doubt about the standing of the FEC and the legal issues and relief requested are the same in the two cases. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U. S. 10, 16 (1963). The PACs have declined to renew or brief their jurisdictional challenge in this Court because in the present procedural posture they see the standing question as a “turf fight” in which they do not wish to participate.
Though McCulloch, supra, is authority on its somewhat different facts for finessing a decision as to questions of “jurisdiction” in one of two companion cases raising the same substantive issues, we decline to follow that course here. The statutory standing issue is squarely presented by the Democrats’ appeal, and if the FEC is correct in its assertion as to lack of standing, the decision of the District Court could seriously interfere with the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction to determine how and when to enforce the Act. In the present cases, for example, there is no indication that the FEC would have filed a complaint against the PACs for a declaratory judgment if the Democrats had not done so first. The FEC might have chosen to focus its resources elsewhere or to pursue an enforcement action at a later date. The Democrats forced its hand; the subject of the litigation was so central to the FEC’s function that it had no choice but to intervene once the action had been commenced.
The plain language of the Fund Act and the FEC A suggests quite emphatically that the Democrats do not have standing to bring a private action against another private party. In addition to the FEC, § 9011(b)(1) applies only to “the national committee of any political party” and to “individuals eligible to vote for President.” Clearly the Democratic Party is not included; hence the District Court erred in permitting it to remain in the proceedings. The DNC is a national committee of a political party, and Edward Mezvin-sky is an individual eligible to vote for President; therefore, they are authorized to bring actions under § 9011(b)(1). But such actions must be “appropriate to implement or construe” the provision of the Fund Act at issue. The District Court’s conclusion that the language of the statute “plainly” authorizes a private suit to seek construction of § 9012(f) seems to us to ignore the word “appropriate.” That word would be superfluous unless it restricts standing to suits which are “appropriate” in light of the statutory scheme for interpreting and enforcing the Act.
This scheme seems simple enough. Title 2 U. S. C. §437c(b)(l) provides that the FEC “shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to” the Fund Act and confers on the FEC “exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of” the Act. Title 26 U. S. C. § 9010(a) authorizes the FEC “to appear in and defend against any action filed under section 9011.” Reading these two provisions together with §9011, “appropriate” actions by private parties are actions that do not interfere with the FEC’s responsibilities for administering and enforcing the Act. Common sense indicates that only one body can intelligently formulate the policy necessary to administer an Act of this kind. The decision to sue third parties to construe or enforce the Act falls within these functions. Accordingly, private suits of this kind are inappropriate interference with the FEC’s responsibilities.
Consistent with this statutory scheme an “appropriate” role for private parties under § 9011(b)(1) would be to bring suits against the FEC to challenge its interpretations of various provisions of the Act. For example, the defendant PACs might have instituted an action challenging the FEC’s interpretation of § 9012(f) to cover the type of independent expenditures they planned to make. The specific authorization in the adjacent § 9010(a) for the FEC to appear in and defend actions under §9011 implies that Congress contemplated that private suits pursuant to the latter section would be directed at the FEC. Lest one ask why the FEC is also given standing under § 9011(b)(1), the obvious answer would be to give it the benefit of a three-judge district court and direct appeal to this Court under § 9011(b)(2), which procedures are not available in ordinary §437c(b)(l) enforcement actions. See 2 U. S. C. §§437g(a)(6), (10).
This interpretation makes a good deal of sense. Suits to construe the Fund Act and to bring about implementation of the Act — presumably implementation by the FEC, which has exclusive authority to administer and enforce the Act— raise issues that are likely to be of great importance and in Congress’ judgment justify a three-judge court, expedited review, and direct appeal to this Court. Ordinary enforcement actions to obtain compliance with the terms of the Act after they have been construed and implemented would not justify such extraordinary procedures. Moreover, it seems highly dubious that Congress intended every one of the millions of eligible voters in this country to have the power to invoke expedited review by a three-judge district court with direct appeal to this Court in actions brought by them against other private parties. The DNC is obviously not just another private litigant, and it would undoubtedly be a worthy representative of collective interests which would justify expedited review had Congress so provided; but Congress simply did not draft the statute in a way that distinguishes the DNC from any individual voter.
Consistent with FEC’s supervisory role, Congress provided an administrative complaint procedure in 2 U. S. C. §437g, through which the Democrats could have pursued their dispute with the PACs. The Democrats could have filed a complaint expressing their belief that “a violation [of the Fund Act] ha[d] occurred” based on the PACs’ independent expenditures in the 1980 Presidential election. § 437g(a)(l). If the FEC, “upon receiving a complaint... or on the basis of information ascertained in the normal course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities, determines . . . that it has reason to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation [of the Fund Act],” §437g(a)(2), it is obligated to investigate and, if it finds “probable cause to believe that any person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation,” to pursue various corrective and enforcement steps, which can ultimately involve civil and criminal proceedings in district court.
If the FEC dismissed the complaint or failed to act on it in 120 days, the Democrats could petition the District Court for the District of Columbia under §437g(a)(8) for a declaration that the FEC had acted contrary to law and for an order directing the FEC to pursue the complaint. If, and only if, the FEC failed to obey such an order, could the Democrats bring a civil action directly against the PACs to remedy the violation charged in their complaint.
Alternatively, the DNC or an individual voter could sue the FEC under 26 U. S. C. § 9011(b) to implement or construe the Act. This avenue, of course, is available to the Democrats without first pursuing or exhausting the §437g administrative complaint procedure, see § 9011(b)(2), but it would be worth pursuing only if the disagreement between the litigant and the FEC were over a matter of implementation or construction, and not routine enforcement. However, that is a judgment Congress made in establishing the statutory scheme.
We do not necessarily reject the District Court’s conclusion that the legislative history of the successive amendments to §437c(b)(l) indicates an intention by the word “exclusive” to centralize in one agency the civil enforcement responsibilities previously fragmented among various governmental agencies. But nowhere is there any indication that Congress previously expressed any intention that anyone other than Government agencies have enforcement responsibilities. Section 9011(b) certainly is not a source.of general private “enforcement” authority, as that word is conspicuously absent from § 9011(b), which speaks only of suits to “implement or construe.” We also do not believe that an intention to create a so-called “maximum enforcement regime,” calling for both Government and private enforcement, can be inferred from the fact that other congressional Acts, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. § 1270, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U. S. C. §6305, and the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §7604, expressly adopt such an enforcement scheme. Nor may it be inferred from the fact that the related FEC A has a different enforcement scheme than the Fund Act. Compare 2 U. S. C. §437d(e) and 26 U. S. C. § 9011(b). Such speculative inferences do not carry the day in the face of the contrary language of the Fund Act.
In view of our conclusion that the Democrats lack standing under the statute, there is no need to reach the Art. Ill issue decided by the District Court. Therefore, we turn to the merits of the FEC’s appeal of its unsuccessful declaratory judgment action against the PACs.
i — i l-H
NCPAC is a nonprofit, nonmembership corporation formed under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act in August 1975 and registered with the FEC as a political committee. Its primary purpose is to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election or defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and by making its own expenditures. It is governed by a three-member board of directors which is elected annually by the existing board. The board’s chairman and the other two members make all decisions concerning which candidates to support or oppose, the strategy and methods to employ, and the amounts of money to spend. Its contributors have no role in these decisions. It raises money by general and specific direct mail solicitations. It does not maintain separate accounts for the receipts from its general and specific solicitations, nor is it required by law to do so.
FCM is incorporated under the laws of Virginia and is registered with the FEC as a multicandidate political committee. In all material respects it is identical to NCPAC.
Both NCPAC and FCM are self-described ideological organizations with a conservative political philosophy. They solicited funds in support of President Reagan’s 1980 campaign, and they spent money on such means as radio and television advertisements to encourage voters to elect him President. On the record before us, these expenditures were “independent” in that they were not made at the request of or in coordination with the official Reagan election campaign committee or any of its agents. Indeed, there are indications that the efforts of these organizations were at times viewed with disfavor by the official campaign as counterproductive to its chosen strategy. NCPAC and FCM expressed their intention to conduct similar activities in support of President Reagan’s reelection in 1984, and we may assume that they did so.
As noted above, both the Fund Act and FECA play a part in regulating Presidential campaigns. The Fund Act comes into play only if a candidate chooses to accept public funding of his general election campaign, and it covers only the period between the nominating convention and 30 days after the general election. In contrast, FECA applies to all Presidential campaigns, as well as other federal elections, regardless of whether publicly or privately funded. Important provisions of these Acts have already been reviewed by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976). Generally, in that case we upheld as constitutional the limitations on contributions to candidates and struck down as unconstitutional limitations on independent expenditures.
In these cases we consider provisions of the Fund Act that make it a criminal offense for political committees such as NCPAC and FCM to make independent expenditures in support of a candidate who has elected to accept public financing. Specifically, § 9012(f) provides:
“(1) ... it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.”
The term “political committee” is defined to mean “any committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office.” . 26 U. S. C. § 9002(9). The term “qualified campaign expense” simply means an otherwise lawful expense by a candidate or his authorized committee “to further his election” incurred during the period between the candidate’s nomination and 30 days after election day. §§9002(11), 9002(12). The term “eligible candidates” means those Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who are qualified under the Act to receive public funding and have chosen to do so. §§ 9002(4), 9003. Two of the more important qualifications are that a candidate and his authorized committees not incur campaign expenses in excess of his public funding and not accept contributions to defray campaign expenses. §§ 9003(b), 9012(b).
There is no question that NCPAC and FCM are political committees and that President Reagan was a qualified candidate, and it seems plain enough that the PACs’ expenditures fall within the term “qualified campaign expense.” The PACs have argued in this Court, though apparently not below; that § 9012(f) was not intended to cover truly independent expenditures such as theirs, but only coordinated expenditures. But “expenditures in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents,” are considered “contributions” under the FECA, 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and as such are already subject to FECA’s $1,000 and $5,000 limitations in §§441a(a)(l), (2). Also, as noted above, one of the requirements for public funding is the candidate’s agreement not to accept such contributions. Under the PACs’ construction, § 9012(f) would be wholly superfluous, and we find no support for that construction in the legislative history. We conclude that the PACs’ independent expenditures at issue in this case are squarely prohibited by § 9012(f), and we proceed to consider whether that prohibition violates the First Amendment.
There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue in this case produce speech at the core of the First Amendment. We said in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 14:
“The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’ Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957). . . . This no more than reflects our ‘profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964).”
The PACs in this case, of course, are not lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in the Tom Paine mold; they spend substantial amounts of money in order to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated media advertisements. And of course the criminal sanction in question is applied to the expenditure of money to propagate political views, rather than to the propagation of those views unaccompanied by the expenditure of money. But for purposes of presenting political views in connection with a nationwide Presidential election, allowing the presentation of views while forbidding the expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system. The Court said in Buckley v. Valeo, supra:
“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.” 424 U. S., at 19.
We also reject the notion that the PACs’ form of organization or method of solicitation diminishes their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment freedom of association is squarely implicated in these cases. NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by which large numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations which serve to “amplif[y] the voice of their adherents.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 22; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460 (1958); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 29Ó, 295-296 (1981). It is significant that in 1979-1980 approximately 101,000 people contributed an average of $75 each to NCPAC and in 1980 approximately 100,000 people contributed an average of $25 each to FCM.
The FEC urges that these contributions do not constitute individual speech, but merely “speech by proxy,” see California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 196 (1981) (Marshall, J.) (plurality opinion), because the contributors do not control or decide upon the use of the funds by the PACs or the specific content of the PACs’ advertisements and other speech. The plurality emphasized in that case, however, that nothing in the statutory provision in question “limits the amount [an unincorporated association] or any of its members may independently expend in order to advocate political views,” but only the amount it may contribute to a multicandidate political committee. Id., at 195. Unlike California Medical Assn., the present cases involve limitations on expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive; and in any event these contributions are predominantly small and thus do not raise the same concerns as the sizable contributions involved in California Medical Assn.
Another reason the “proxy speech” approach is not useful in this case is that the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their money. To say that their collective action in pooling their resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to full First Amendment protection would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own resources.
Our decision in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U. S. 197 (1982) (NRWC), is not to the contrary. That case turned on the special treatment historically accorded corporations. In return for the special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form, individuals acting jointly through corporations forgo some of the rights they have as individuals. Id., at 209-210. We held in NRWC that a rather intricate provision of the FEC A dealing with the prohibition of corporate campaign contributions to political candidates did not violate the First Amendment. The prohibition excepted corporate solicitation of contributions to a segregated fund established for the purpose of contributing to candidates, but in turn limited such solicitations to stockholders or members of a corporation without capital stock. We upheld this limitation on solicitation of contributions as applied to the National Right to Work Committee, a corporation without capital stock, in view of the well-established constitutional validity of legislative regulation of corporate contributions to candidates for public office. NRWC is consistent with this Court’s earlier holding that a corporation’s expenditures to propagate its views on issues of general public interest are of a different constitutional stature than corporate contributions to candidates. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 789-790 (1978). In Bellotti, of course, we did not reach, nor do we need to reach in these cases, the question whether a corporation can constitutionally be restricted in making independent expenditures to influence elections for public office. Id., at 788, n. 26.
Like the National Right to Work Committee, NCPAC and FCM are also formally incorporated; however, these are not “corporations” cases because § 9012(f) applies not just to corporations but to any “committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated)” that accepts contributions or makes expenditures in connection with electoral campaigns. The terms of §9012(f)’s prohibition apply equally to an informal neighborhood group that solicits contributions and spends money on a Presidential election as to the wealthy and professionally managed PACs involved in these cases. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, supra, at 300 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Having concluded that the PACs’ expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection, we now look to see if there is a sufficiently strong governmental interest served by § 9012(f )’s restriction on them and whether the section is narrowly tailored to the evil that may legitimately be regulated. The restriction involved here is not merely an effort by the Government to regulate the use of its own property, such as was involved in United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114 (1981), or the dismissal of a speaker from Government employment, such as was involved in Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983). It is a flat, across-the-board criminal sanction applicable to any “committee, association, or organization” which spends more than $1,000 on this particular type of political speech.
We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. In Buckley we struck down the FECA’s limitation on individuals’ independent expenditures because we found no tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign, to corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption. For similar reasons, we also find § 9012(f )’s limitation on independent expenditures by political committees to be constitutionally infirm.
Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. But here the conduct proscribed is not contributions to the candidate, but independent expenditures in support of the candidate. The amounts given to the PACs are overwhelmingly small contributions, well under the $1,000 limit on contributions upheld in Buckley; and the contributions are by definition not coordinated with the campaign of the candidate. The Court concluded in Buckley that there was a fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one’s views independently of the candidate’s campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign. We said there:
“Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” 424 U. S., at 47.
We think the same conclusion must follow here. It is contended that, because the PACs may by the breadth of their organizations spend larger amounts than the individuals in Buckley, the potential for corruption is greater. But precisely what the “corruption” may consist of we are never told with assurance. The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of varying points of view. It is of course hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages. But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more.
Even were we to determine that the large pooling of financial resources by NCPAC and FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption, § 9012(f) is a fatally overbroad response to that evil. It is not limited to multimillion dollar war chests; its terms apply equally to informal discussion groups that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views about a particular Presidential candidate.
Several reasons suggest that we are not free to adopt a limiting construction that might isolate wealthy PACs, even if such a construction might save the statute. First, Congress plainly intended to prohibit just what § 9012(f) prohibits— independent expenditures over $1,000 by all political committees, large and small.- Even if it did not intend to cover small neighborhood groups, there is also no evidence in the statute or the legislative history that it would have looked favorably upon a construction of the statute limiting § 9012(f) only to very successful PACs. Secondly, we cannot distinguish in principle between a PAC that has solicited 1,000 $25 contributions and one that has solicited 100,000 $25 contributions. Finally, it has been suggested that § 9012(f) could be narrowed by limiting its prohibition to political committees in which the contributors have no voice in the use to which the contributions are put. Again, there is no indication in the statute or the legislative history that Congress would be content with such a construction. More importantly, as observed by the District Court, such a construction is intolerably vague. At what point, for example, does a neighborhood group that solicits some outside contributions fall within § 9012(f)? How active do the group members have to be in setting policy to satisfy the control test? Moreover, it is doubtful that the members of a large association in which each have a vote on policy have substantially more control in practice than the contributors to NCPAC and FCM: the latter will surely cease contributing when the message those organizations deliver ceases to please them.
In the District Court, the FEC attempted to show actual corruption or the appearance of corruption by offering evidence of high-level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs and newspaper articles and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption. The District Court excluded most of the proffered evidence as irrelevant to the critical elements to be proved: corruption of candidates or public perception of corruption of candidates. A tendency to demonstrate distrust of PACs is not sufficient. We think the District Court’s finding that “the evidence supporting an adjudicative finding of corruption or its appearance is evanescent,” 587 F. Supp., at 830, was clearly within its discretion, and we will not disturb it here. If the matter offered by the FEC in the District Court be treated as addressed to what the District Court referred to as “legislative facts,” we nonetheless agree with the District Court that the evidence falls far short of being adequate for this purpose.
Finally, the FEC urges us to uphold § 9012(f) as a prophylactic measure deemed necessary by Congress, which has far more expertise than the Judiciary in campaign finance and corrupting influences. In NRWC, 459 U. S., at 210, we stated:
“While [2 U. S. C.] §441b restricts the solicitation of corporations and labor unions without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress’ judgment that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation. Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.”
Here, however, the groups and associations in question, designed expressly to participate in political debate, are quite different from the traditional corporations organized for economic gain. In NRWC we rightly concluded that Congress might include, along with labor unions and corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, membership corporations, though contributions by the latter might not exhibit all of the evil that contributions by traditional economically organized corporations exhibit. But this proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule where the evil of potential corruption had long been recognized does not suffice to establish the validity of § 9012(f), which indiscriminately lumps with corporations any “committee, association or organization.” Indeed, the FEC in its briefs to this Court does not even make an effort to defend the statute under a construction limited in reach to corporations.
While in NRWC we held that the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption supported the restriction of the influence of political war chests tunneled through the corporate form, in the present cases we do not believe that a similar finding is supportable: when the First Amendment is involved, our standard of review is “rigorous,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 29, and the effort to link either corruption or the appearance of corruption to independent expenditures by PACs, whether large or small, simply does not pass this standard of review. Even assuming that Congress could fairly conclude that large-scale PACs have a sufficient tendency to corrupt, the overbreadth of § 9012(f) in these cases is so great that the section may not be upheld. We are not quibbling over fine-tuning of prophylactic limitations, but are concerned about wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973).
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as to the constitutionality of § 9012(f), but is reversed on the issue of the Democrats’ standing, with instructions to dismiss their complaint for lack of standing.
It is so ordered.
Justice Brennan joins only Part II of this opinion.
Mezvinsky did not pursue an appeal in this Court, though his name was inadvertently included in the notice of appeal filed by the Democratic Party and the DNC.
The Democrats implicitly conceded as much by amending their complaint to delete their initial request for injunctive relief.
In Buckley, The Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun would have struck down the limitations on contributions along with the limitations on independent expenditures. Justice White would have upheld both limitations. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
LALLI v. LALLI, ADMINISTRATRIX, et al.
No. 77-1115.
Argued October 4, 1978
Decided December 11, 1978
Powell, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, J., joined. Stewart, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 276. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 276. Rehnquist, J., filed a statement concurring in the judgment, post, p. 276. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 277-.
Leonard M. Henkin argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Morris R. Henkin.
Irwin M. Strum, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee Lefkowitz. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, pro se, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Neil S. Solon and Suzanne McOrattan, Assistant Attorneys General.
John E. Kirklin, Kalman Finkel, and Jane Greengold Stevens filed a brief for the Legal Aid Society of New York City et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Mr. Justice Powell
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart join.
This case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of § 4 — 1.2 of New York’s Estates, Powers, and Trusts Law, which requires illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers by intestate succession to provide a particular form of proof of paternity. Legitimate children are not subject to the same requirement.
I
Appellant Robert Lalli claims to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli who died intestate on January 7, 1973, in the State of New York. Appellant’s mother, who died in 1968, never was married to Mario. After Mario’s widow, Rosa-mond Lalli, was appointed administratrix of her husband’s estate, appellant petitioned the Surrogate’s Court for West-chester County for a compulsory accounting, claiming that he and his sister Maureen Lalli were entitled to inherit from Mario as his children. Rosamond Lalli opposed the petition. She argued that even if Robert and Maureen were Mario’s children, they were not lawful distributees of the estate because they had failed to comply with § 4-1.2, which provides in part:
“An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.”
Appellant conceded that he had not obtained an order of filiation during his putative father’s lifetime. He contended, however, that § 4M.2, by imposing this requirement, discriminated against him on the basis of his illegitimate birth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant tendered certain evidence of his relationship with Mario Lalli, including a notarized document in which Lalli, in consenting to appellant’s marriage, referred to him as "my son,” and several affidavits by persons who stated that Lalli had acknowledged openly and often that Robert and Maureen were his children.
The Surrogate’s Court noted that § 4-1.2 had previously, and unsuccessfully, been attacked under the Equal Protection Clause. After reviewing recent decisions of this Court concerning discrimination against illegitimate children, particularly Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532 (1971), and three New York decisions affirming the constitutionality of the statute, In re Belton, 70 Misc. 2d 814, 335 N. Y. S. 2d 177 (Surr. Ct. 1972); In re Hendrix, 68 Misc. 2d 439, 444, 326 N. Y. S. 2d 646, 652 (Surr. Ct. 1971); In re Crawford, 64 Misc. 2d 758, 762-763, 315 N. Y. S. 2d 890, 895 (Surr. Ct. 1970), the court ruled that appellant was properly excluded as a distributee of Lalli’s estate and therefore lacked status to petition for a compulsory accounting.
On direct appeal the New York Court of Appeals affirmed. In re Lalli, 38 N. Y. 2d 77, 340 N. E. 2d 721 (1975). It understood Labine to require the State to show no more than that “there is a rational basis for the means chosen by the Legislature for the accomplishment of a permissible State objective.” 38 N. Y. 2d, at 81, 340 N. E. 2d, at 723. After discussing the problems of proof peculiar to establishing paternity, as opposed to maternity, the court concluded that the State was constitutionally entitled to require a judicial decree during the father’s lifetime as the exclusive form of proof of paternity.
Appellant appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision to this Court. While that case'- was pending here, we decided Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 (1977). Because the issues in these two cases were similar in some respects, we vacated and remanded to permit further consideration in light of Trimble. Lalli v. Lalli, 431 U. S. 911 (1977).
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals, with two judges dissenting, adhered to its former disposition. In re Lalli, 43 N. Y. 2d 65, 371 N. E. 2d 481 (1977). It acknowledged that Trimble contemplated a standard of judicial review demanding more than “a mere finding of some remote rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate State purpose,” 43 N. Y. 2d, at 67, 371 N. E. 2d, at 482, though less than strictest scrutiny. Finding § 4^1.2 to be “significantly and determinatively different” from the statute overturned in Trimble, the court ruled that the New York law was sufficiently related to the State’s interest in “ 'the orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws,’ ” 43 N. Y. 2d, at 67, 69-70, 371 N. E. 2d, at 482-483, quoting Trimble, supra, at 771, to meet the requirements of equal protection.
Appellant again sought review here, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 435 TJ. S. 921 (1978). We now affirm.
II
We begin our analysis with Trimble. At issue in that case was the constitutionality of an Illinois statute providing that a child born out of wedlock could inherit from his intestate father only if the father had “acknowledged” the child and the child had been legitimated by the intermarriage of the parents. The appellant in Trimble was a child born out of wedlock whose father had neither acknowledged her nor married her mother. He had, however, been found to be her father in a judicial decree ordering him to contribute to her support. When the father died intestate, the child was excluded as a distributee because the statutory requirements for inheritance had not been met.
We concluded that the Illinois statute discriminated against illegitimate children in a manner prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Although, as decided in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 506 (1976), and reaffirmed in Trimble, supra, at 767, classifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to “strict scrutiny,” they nevertheless are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permissible state interests. Upon examination, we found that the Illinois law failed that test.
Two state interests were proposed which the statute was said to foster: the encouragement of legitimate family relationships and the maintenance of an accurate and efficient method of disposing of an intestate decedent’s property. Granting that the State was appropriately concerned with the integrity of the family unit, we viewed the statute as bearing “only the most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal.” Trimble, supra, at 768. We again rejected the argument that “persons will shun illicit relations because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits” that would accrue to them were they legitimate. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 173 (1972). The statute therefore was not defensible as an incentive to enter legitimate family relationships.
Illinois’ interest in safeguarding the orderly disposition of property at death was more relevant to the statutory classification. We recognized that devising “an appropriate legal framework” in the furtherance of that interest “is a matter particularly within the competence of the individual States.” Trimble, supra, at 771. An important aspect of that framework is a response to the often difficult problem of proving the paternity of illegitimate children and the related danger of spurious claims against intestate estates. See infra, at 270-271. These difficulties, we said, “might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers’ estates or for legitimate children generally.” Trimble, supra, at 770.
The Illinois statute, however, was constitutionally flawed because, by insisting upon not only an acknowledgment by the father, but also the marriage of the parents, it excluded “at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men [whose] inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.” Id., at 771. We concluded that the Equal Protection Clause required that a statute placing exceptional burdens on illegitimate children in the furtherance of proper state objectives must be more “ 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations/ ” id., at 772, quoting Mathews v. Lucas, mpra, at 513, than was true of the broad disqualification in the Illinois law.
Ill
The New York statute, enacted in 1965, was intended to soften the rigors of previous law which permitted illegitimate children to inherit only from their mothers. See infra, at 269. By lifting the absolute bar to paternal inheritance, § 4-1.2 tended to achieve its desired effect. As in Trimble, however, the question before us is whether the remaining statutory obstacles to inheritance by illegitimate children can be squared with the Equal Protection Clause.
A
At the outset we observe that § 4-1.2 is different in important respects from the statutory provision overturned in Trimble. The Illinois statute required, in addition to the father’s acknowledgment of paternity, the legitimation of the child through the intermarriage of the parents as an absolute precondition to inheritance. This combination of requirements eliminated “the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.” Trimble, 430 U. S., at 770-771. As illustrated by the facts in Trimble, even a judicial declaration of paternity was insufficient to permit inheritance.
Under § 4 — 1.2, by contrast, the marital status of the parents is irrelevant. The single requirement at issue here is an evi-dentiary one — that the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death. The child need not have been legitimated in order to inherit from his father. Had the appellant in Trimble been governed by § 4-1.2, she would have been a distributee of her father’s estate. See In re Lalli, 43 N. Y. 2d, at 68 n. 2, 371 N. E. 2d, at 482 n. 2.
A related difference between the two provisions pertains to the state interests said to be served by them. The Illinois law was defended, in part, as a means of encouraging legitimate family relationships. No such justification has been offered in support of § 4-1.2. The Court of Appeals disclaimed that the purpose of the statute, “even in small part, was to discourage illegitimacy, to mold human conduct or to set societal norms.” In re Lalli, supra, at 70, 371 N. E. 2d, at 483. The absence in § 4-1.2 of any requirement that the parents intermarry or otherwise legitimate a child born out of wedlock and our review of the legislative history of the statute, infra, at 269-271, confirm this view.
Our inquiry, therefore, is focused narrowly. We are asked to decide whether the discrete procedural demands that § 4-1.2 places on illegitimate children bear an evident and substantial relation to the particular state interests this statute is designed to serve.
B
The primary state goal underlying the challenged aspects of § 4 — 1.2 is to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death. We long have recognized that this is an area with which the States have an interest of considerable magnitude. Trimble, supra, at 771; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S., at 170; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S., at 538; see also Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188, 193 (1938); Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490, 493 (1850).
This interest is directly implicated in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children because of the peculiar problems of proof that are involved. Establishing maternity is seldom difficult. As one New York Surrogate’s Court has observed: “[T]he birth of the child is a recorded or registered event usually taking place in the presence of others. In most cases the child remains with the mother and for a time is necessarily reared by her. That the child is the child of a particular woman is rarely difficult to prove.” In re Ortiz, 60 Mise. 2d 756, 761, 303 N. Y. S. 2d 806, 812 (1969). Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father is not part of a formal family unit. “The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed the mother may not know who is responsible for her pregnancy.” Ibid, (emphasis in original); accord, In re Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855, 861, 381 N. Y. S. 2d 573, 576-577 (Surr. Ct. 1975); In re Hendrix, 68 Misc. 2d, at 443, 326 N. Y. S. 2d, at 650; cf. Trimble, supra, at 770, 772.
Thus, a number of problems arise that counsel against treating illegitimate children identically to all other heirs of an intestate father. These were the subject of a comprehensive study by the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates. This group, known as the Bennett Commission, consisted of individuals experienced in the practical problems of estate administration. In re Flemm, supra, at 858, 381 N. Y. S. 2d, at 575. The Commission issued its report and recommendations to the legislature in 1965. See Fourth Report of the Temporary State Commission on the Modernization, Revision and Simplification of the Law of Estates, Legis. Doc. No. 19 (1965) (hereinafter Commission Report). The statute now codified as § 4^1.2 was included.
Although the overarching purpose of the proposed statute was “to alleviate the plight of the illegitimate child,” Commission Report 37, the Bennett Commission considered it necessary to impose the strictures of § 4-1.2 in order to mitigate serious difficulties in the administration of the estates of both testate and intestate decedents. The Commission's perception of some of these difficulties was described by Surrogate Sobel, a member of “the busiest [surrogate’s] court in the State measured by the number of intestate estates which traffic daily through this court,” In re Flemm, supra, at 857, 381 N. Y. S. 2d, at 574, and a participant in some of the Commission’s deliberations:
“An illegitimate, if made an unconditional distributee in intestacy, must be served with process in the estate of his parent or if he is a distributee in the estate of the kindred of a parent. . . . And, in probating the will of his parent (though not named a beneficiary) or in probating the will of any person who makes a class disposition to ‘issue’ of such parent, the illegitimate must be served with process. . . . How does one cite and serve an illegitimate of whose existence neither family nor personal representative may be aware? And of greatest concern, how achieve finality of decree in any estate when there always exists the possibility however remote of a secret illegitimate lurking in the buried past of a parent or an ancestor of a class of beneficiaries? Finality in decree is essential in the Surrogates’ Courts since title to real property passes under such decree. Our procedural statutes and the Due Process Clause mandate notice and opportunity to be heard to all necessary parties. Given the right to intestate succession, all illegitimates must be served with process. This would be no real problem with respect to those few estates where there are ‘known’ illegitimates. But it presents an almost insuperable burden as regards ‘unknown’ illegitimates. The point made in the [Bennett] commission discussions was that instead of affecting only a few estates, procedural problems would be created for many — some members suggested a majority — of estates.” 85 Misc. 2d, at 859, 381 N. Y. S. 2d, at 575-576.
Cf. In re Leventritt, 92 Misc. 2d 598, 601-602, 400 N. Y. S. 2d 298, 300-301 (Surr. Ct. 1977).
Even where an individual claiming to be the illegitimate child of a deceased man makes himself known, the difficulties facing an estate are likely to persist. Because of the particular problems of proof, spurious claims may be difficult to expose. The Bennett Commission therefore sought to protect “innocent adults and those rightfully interested in their estates from fraudulent claims of heirship and harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to establish themselves as illegitimate heirs.” Commission Report 265.
C
As the State’s interests are substantial, we now consider the means adopted by New York to further these interests. In order to avoid the problems described above, the Commission recommended a requirement designed to ensure the accurate resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the potential for disruption of estate administration. Accuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father. As the New York Court of Appeals observed in its first opinion in this case, the “availability [of the putative father] should be a substantial factor contributing to the reliability of the fact-finding process.” In re Lalli, 38 N. Y. 2d, at 82, 340 N. E. 2d, at 724. In addition, requiring that the order be issued during the father’s lifetime permits a man to defend his reputation against “unjust accusations in paternity claims,” which was a secondary purpose of § 4 1,2. Commission Report 266.
The administration of an estate will be facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainty minimized, where the entitlement of an illegitimate child to notice and participation is a matter of judicial record before the administration commences. Fraudulent assertions of paternity will be much less likely to succeed, or even to arise, where the proof is put before a court of law at a time when the putative father is available to respond, rather than first brought to light when the distribution of the assets of an estate is in the offing.
Appellant contends that § 4-1.2, like the statute at issue in Trimble, excludes "significant categories of illegitimate children” who could be allowed to inherit “without jeopardizing the orderly settlement” of their intestate fathers’ estates. Trimble, 430 U. S., at 771. He urges that those in his position — -“known” illegitimate children who, despite the absence of an order of filiation obtained during their fathers’ lifetimes, can present convincing proof of paternity — cannot rationally be denied inheritance as they pose none of the risks § 4-1.2 was intended to minimize.
We do not question that there will be some illegitimate children who would be able to establish their relationship to their deceased fathers without serious disruption of the administration of estates and that, as applied to such individuals, § 4-1.2 appears to operate unfairly. But few statutory classifications are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable results. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract “fairness” of a state law, but on whether the statute’s relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Illinois statute in Trimble was constitutionally unacceptable because it effected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was far in excess of its justifiable purposes. Section 4-1.2 does not share this defect. Inheritance is barred only where there has been a failure to secure evidence of paternity during the father’s lifetime in the manner prescribed by the State. This is not a requirement that inevitably disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of children bom out of wedlock.
The New York courts have interpreted § 4-1.2 liberally and in such a way as to enhance its utility to both father and child without sacrificing its strength as a procedural prophylactic. For example, a father of illegitimate children who is willing to acknowledge paternity can waive his defenses in a paternity proceeding, e. g., In re Thomas, 87 Misc. 2d 1033, 387 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (Surr. Ct. 1976), or even institute such a proceeding himself. N. Y. Family Court Act § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1978); In re Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d, at 863, 381 N. Y. S. 2d, at 578. In addition, the courts have excused “technical” failures by illegitimate children to comply with the statute in order to prevent unnecessary injustice. E. g., In re Niles, 53 App. Div. 2d 983, 385 N. Y. S. 2d 876 (1976), appeal denied, 40 N. Y. 2d 809, 392 N. Y. S. 2d 1027 (1977) (filiation order may be signed nunc pro tunc to relate back to period prior to father’s death when court’s factual finding of paternity had been made); In re Kennedy, 89 Misc. 2d 551, 554, 392 N. Y. S. 2d 365, 367 (Surr. Ct. 1977) (judicial support order treated as “tantamount to an order of filiation,” even though paternity was not specifically declared therein).
As the history of § 4r-1.2 clearly illustrates, the New York Legislature desired to “grant to illegitimates in so far as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by legitimate children,” Commission Report 265 (emphasis added), while protecting the important state interests we have described. Section 4-1.2 represents a carefully considered legislative judgment as to how this balance best could be achieved.
Even if, as Mr. Justice Brennan believes, § 4-1.2 could have been written somewhat more equitably, it is not the function of a court “to hypothesize independently on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative [s] ” to the statutory scheme formulated by New York. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S., at 515. “These matters of practical judgment and empirical calculation are for [the State]. ... In the end, the precise accuracy of [the State’s] calculations is not a matter of specialized judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality.” Id., at 515-516.
We conclude that the requirement imposed by § 4-1.2 on illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers is substantially related to the important state interests the statute is intended to promote. We therefore find no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
For the reasons stated in his dissent in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 777 (1977), Mr. Justice Rehnquist concurs in the judgment of affirmance.
1965 N. Y. Laws, ch. 958, § 1. The statute was initially codified as N. Y. Decedent Est. Law § 83-a. In 1966 it was recodified without material change as N. Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 4^1.2 (McKinney 1967). 1966 N. Y. Laws, ch. 952. Further nonsubstantive amendments were made the next year. 1967 N. Y. Laws, ch. 686, §§ 28, 29.
Section 4-1.2 in its entirety provides:
“(a) For the purposes of this article:
“(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
“(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
“(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the absence of an order of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
“(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only by the father, and such motion must be made within one year from the entry of such order.
“(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administration as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or obtain such letters only if an order of filiation has been made in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (2).” N. Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 4AL.2 (McKinney 1967).
Appellant also claimed that § 4-1.2 was invalid under N. Y. Const., Art. 1, § 11. The New York Court of Appeals did not rule on this issue, nor do we. We also do not consider whether §4-1.2 unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex or whether the administratrix of Mario’s estate is required to account for her alleged failure to bring a wrongful-death action on behalf of appellant. The latter question was not considered by the Court of Appeals, and the former was raised for the first time by a brief amici curiae in this Court.
On remand from this Court, the New York Attorney General was permitted to intervene as a defendant-appellee. He has filed a brief on the merits and argued the case in this Court. Appellee Rosamond Lalli did not present oral argument and has not filed a brief on the merits.
Section 4r-l.2 requires not only that the order of filiation be made during the lifetime of the father, but that the proceeding in which it is sought be commenced “during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.” The New York Court of Appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of the two-year limitation in both of its opinions in this case because appellant concededly had never commenced a paternity proceeding at all. Thus, if the rule that paternity be judicially declared during his father’s lifetime were upheld, appellant would lose for failure to comply with that requirement alone. If, on the other hand, appellant prevailed in his argument that his inheritance could not be conditioned on the existence of an order of filiation, the two-year limitation would become irrelevant since the paternity proceeding itself would be unnecessary. See In re Lalli, 43 N. Y. 2d 65, 68 n. 1, 371 N. E. 2d 481, 482 n. 1 (1977); In re Lalli, 38 N. Y. 2d 77, 80 n., 340 N. E. 2d 721, 723 n. (1975). As the New York Court of Appeals has not passed upon the constitutionality of the two-year limitation, that question is not before us. Our decision today therefore sustains §4-1.2 under the Equal Protection Clause only with respect to its requirement that a judicial order of filiation be issued during the lifetime of the father of an illegitimate child.
The presence in this case of the State’s interest in the orderly disposition of a decedent’s property at death distinguishes it from others in which that justification for an illegitimacy-based classification was absent. E. g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 170 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 (1968).
The Bennett Commission was created by the New York Legislature in 1961. It was instructed to recommend needed changes in certain areas of state law, including that pertaining to “the descent and distribution of property, and the practice and procedure relating thereto.” 1961 N. Y. Laws, ch. 731, § 1.
In affirming the judgment below, we do not, of course, restrict a State’s freedom to require proof of paternity by means other than a judicial decree. Thus, a State may prescribe any formal method of proof, whether it be similar to that provided by § 4r-1.2 or some other regularized procedure that would assure the authenticity of the acknowledgment. As we noted in Trimble, 430 U. S., at 772 n. 14, such a procedure would be sufficient to satisfy the State’s interests. See also n. 11, infra.
Appellant claims that in addition to discriminating between illegitimate and legitimate children, §4^1.2, in conjunction with N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law §24 (McKinney 1977), impermissibly discriminates between classes of illegitimate children. Section 24 provides that a child conceived out of wedlock is nevertheless legitimate if, before or after his birth, his parents marry, even if the marriage is void, illegal, or judicially annulled. Appellant argues that by classifying as “legitimate” children born out of wedlock whose parents later marry, New York has, with respect to these children, substituted marriage for § 4r-1.2’s requirement of proof of paternity. Thus, these “illegitimate” children escape the rigors of the rule unlike their unfortunate counterparts whose parents never marry.
Under § 24, one claiming to be the legitimate child of a deceased man would have to prove not only his paternity but also his maternity and the fact of the marriage of his parents. These additional evidentiary requirements make it reasonable to accept less exacting proof of paternity and to treat such children as legitimate for inheritance purposes.
In addition to making intestate succession possible, of course, a father is always free to provide for his illegitimate child by will. See In re Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855, 864, 381 N. Y. S. 2d 573, 579 (Surr. Ct. 1975).
The dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan would reduce the opinion in Trimble v. Gordon, supra, to a simplistic holding that the Constitution requires a State, in a case of this kind, to recognize as sufficient any “formal acknowledgment of paternity.” This reading of Trimble is based on a single phrase lifted from a footnote. 430 U. S., at 772 n. 14. It ignores both the broad rationale of the Court’s opinion and the context in whiehthe note and the phrase relied upon appear. The principle that the footnote elaborates is that the States are free to recognize the problems arising from different forms of proof and to select those forms “carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity.” Ibid. The New York Legislature, with the benefit of the Bennett Commission's study, exercised this judgment when it considered and rejected the possibility of accepting evidence of paternity less formal than a judicial order. Commission Report 266-267.
The “formal acknowledgment” contemplated by Trimble is such as would minimize post-death litigation, i. e., a regularly prescribed, legally recognized method of acknowledging paternity. See n. 8, swpra. It is thus plain that footnote in Trimble does not sustain the dissenting opinion. Indeed, the document relied upon by the dissent is not an acknowledgment of paternity at all. It is a simple “Certificate of Consent” that apparently was required at the time by New York for the marriage of a minor. It consists of one sentence:
“THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, who have hereto subscribed my name, do hereby consent that Robert Lalli who is my son and who is under the age of 21 years, shall be united in marriage to Janice Bivins by any minister of the gospel or other person authorized by law to solemnize marriages.” App. A-14.
Mario Lalli’s signature to this document was acknowledged by a notary public, but the certificate contains no oath or affirmation as to the truth of its contents. The notary did no more than confirm the identity of Lalli. Because the certificate was executed for the purpose of giving consent to marry, not of proving biological paternity, the meaning of the words “my son” is ambiguous. One can readily imagine that had Robert Lalli’s half-brother, who was not Mario’s son but who took the surname Lalli and lived as a member of his household, sought permission to marry, Mario might also have referred to him as “my son” on a consent certificate.
The important state interests of safeguarding the accurate and orderly disposition of property at death, emphasized in Tumble and reiterated in our opinion today, could be frustrated easily if there were a constitutional rule that any notarized but unsworn statement identifying an individual as a “child” must be accepted as adequate proof of paternity regardless of the context in which the statement was made. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_casedisposition |
MILLIKEN, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al. v. BRADLEY et al.
No. 73-434.
Argued February 27, 1974
Decided July 25, 1974
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 73-434. With him on the brief were Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Eugene Krasicky, Gerald F. Young, George L. McCargar, and Thomas F. Schimpf, Assistant Attorneys General. William M. Saxton argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 73-435 and 73-436. With him on the brief in No. 73-435 were John B. Weaver, Robert M. Vercruysse, and Xhafer Orhan. Douglas H. West filed a brief for petitioner in No. 73-436.
/. Harold Flannery and Nathaniel R. Jones argued the cause for respondents in all cases. With them on the brief for respondents Bradley et al. were Jack Greenberg, Norman Chachkin, and Louis R. Lucas. George T. Rou-mell, Jr., and C. Nicholas Revelos filed a brief for respondents Board of Education for the School District of the city of Detroit et al. John Bruff and William Ross filed a brief for respondent Professional Personnel of Van Dyke. Robert J. Lord filed a brief for respondents Green et al.
Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief was Assistant Attorney General Pottinger
Together with No. 73-435, Allen Park Public Schools et al. v. Bradley et al., and No. 73-436, Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Donald P. Bogard, Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Harvey for the State of Indiana; by Lewis C. Bose and William M. Evans for the Metropolitan School District of Lawrence Township, Indiana, et al.; by Richard D. Wagner and Richard L. Brown for the town of Speedway, Indiana, et al.; and by Harold H. Fuhrman for the National Suburban League, Ltd.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Leonard P. Strickman for the city of Boston, Massachusetts; by Alexander A. Goldfarb for the city of Hartford, Connecticut; by Sanford Jay Rosen for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund; and by Inter-Faith Centers for Racial Justice, Inc.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Charles F. Clippert, Charles E. Keller, Thomas H. Schwarze, John F. Shantz, Raymond McPeters, Walter J. Cuth, Jr., Raymond G. Glime, Tony Ferris, and Perry Christy for Bloomfield Hills School District et al.; by Stephen J. Poliak, Richard M. Sharp, and David Rubin for the National Education Assn.; and by David I. Caplan for the Jewish Rights Council.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in these consolidated cases to determine whether a federal court may impose a multi-district, areawide remedy to a single-district de jure segregation problem absent any finding that the other included school districts have failed to operate unitary school systems within their districts, absent any claim or finding that the boundary lines of any affected school district were established with the purpose of fostering racial segregation in public schools, absent any finding that the included districts committed acts which effected segregation within the other districts, and absent a meaningful opportunity for the included neighboring school districts to present evidence or be heard on the propriety of a multidistrict remedy or on the question of constitutional violations by those neighboring districts.
I
The action was commenced in August 1970 by the respondents, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and individual parents and students, on behalf of a class later defined by order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, dated February 16, 1971, to include “all school children in the City of Detroit, Michigan, and all Detroit resident parents who have children of school age.” The named defendants in the District Court included the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Board of Education, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Board of Education of the city of Detroit, its members, and the city’s former superintendent of schools. The State of Michigan as such is not a party to this litigation and references to the State must be read- as references to the public officials, state and local, through whom the State is alleged to have acted. In their complaint respondents attacked the constitutionality of a statute of the State of Michigan known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature on the ground that it put the State of Michigan in the position of unconstitutionally interfering with the execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation, known as the April 7, 1970, Plan, which had been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning with the fall 1970 semester. The complaint also alleged that the Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of the defendants and their predecessors in office, and called for the implementation of a plan that would eliminate “the racial identity of every school in the [Detroit] system and . . . maintain now and hereafter a unitary, nonracial school system.”
Initially the matter was tried on respondents’ motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan to be implemented. On that issue, the District Court ruled that respondents were not entitled to a preliminary injunction since at that stage there was no proof that Detroit had a dual segregated school system. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the “implementation of the April 7 plan was [unconstitutionally] thwarted by State action in the form of the Act of the Legislature of Michigan,” 433 F. 2d 897, 902 (CA6 1970), and that such action could not be interposed to delay, obstruct, or nullify steps lawfully taken for the purpose of protecting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was remanded to the District Court for an expedited trial on the merits.
On remand, the respondents moved for immediate implementation of the April 7 Plan in order to remedy the deprivation of the claimed constitutional rights. In response, the School Board suggested two other plans, along with the April 7 Plan, and urged that top priority be assigned to the so-called “Magnet Plan” which was “designed to attract children to a school because of its superior curriculum.” The District Court approved the Board’s Magnet Plan, and respondents again appealed to the Court of Appeals, moving for summary reversal. The Court of Appeals refused to pass on the merits of the Magnet Plan and ruled that the District Court had not abused its discretion in refusing to adopt the April 7 Plan without an evidentiary hearing. The case was again remanded with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial on the merits of respondents’ substantive allegations concerning the Detroit school system. 438 F. 2d 945 (CA6 1971).
The trial of the issue of segregation in the Detroit school system began on April 6, 1971, and continued through July 22, 1971, consuming some 41 trial days. On September 27, 1971, the District Court issued its findings and conclusions on the issue of segregation, finding that “Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have combined, with those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area.” 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (ED Mich. 1971). While still addressing a Detroit-only violation, the District Court reasoned:
“While it would be unfair to charge the present defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies have done, it can be said that the actions or the failure to act by the responsible school authorities, both city and state, were linked to that of these other governmental units. When we speak of governmental action we should not view the different agencies as a collection of unrelated units. Perhaps the most that can be said is that all of them, including the school authorities, are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists. And we note that just as there is an interaction between residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the racial composition of the schools.” Ibid.
The District Court found that the Detroit Board of Education created and maintained optional attendance zones within Detroit neighborhoods undergoing racial transition and between high school attendance areas of opposite predominant racial compositions. These zones, the court found, had the “natural, probable, foreseeable and actual effect” of allowing white pupils to escape identifiably Negro schools. Ibid. Similarly, the District Court found that Detroit school attendance zones had been drawn along north-south boundary lines despite the Detroit Board’s awareness that drawing boundary lines in an east-west direction would result in significantly greater desegregation. Again, the District Court concluded, the natural and actual effect of these acts was the creation and perpetuation of school segregation within Detroit.
The District Court found that in the operation of its school transportation program, which was designed to relieve overcrowding, the Detroit Board had admittedly bused Negro Detroit pupils to predominantly Negro schools which were beyond or away from closer white schools with available space. This practice was found to have continued in recent years despite the Detroit Board’s avowed policy, adopted in 1967, of utilizing transportation to increase desegregation:
“With one exception (necessitated by the burning of a white school), defendant Board has never bused
white children to predominantly black schools. The Board has not bused white pupils to black schools despite the enormous amount of space available in inner-city schools. There were 22,961 vacant seats in schools 90 %■ or more black.” Id., at 588.
With respect to the Detroit Board of Education’s practices in school construction, the District Court found that Detroit school construction generally tended to have a seg-regative effect with the great majority of schools being built in either overwhelmingly all-Negro or all-white neighborhoods so that the new schools opened as predominantly one-race schools. Thus, of the 14 schools which opened for use in 1970-1971, 11 opened over 90% Negro and one opened less than 10% Negro.
The District Court also found that the State of Michigan had committed several constitutional violations with respect to the exercise of its general responsibility for, and supervision of, public education. The State, for example, was found to have failed, until the 1971 Session of the Michigan Legislature, to provide authorization or funds for the transportation of pupils within Detroit regardless of their poverty or distance from the school to which they were assigned; during this same period the State provided many neighboring, mostly white, suburban districts the full range of state-supported transportation.
■ The District Court found that the State, through Act 48, acted to “impede, delay and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools.” The first sentence of § 12 of Act 48 was designed to delay the April 7, 1970, desegregation plan originally adopted by the Detroit Board. The remainder of § 12 sought to prescribe for each school in the eight districts criteria of “free choice” and “neighborhood schools,” which, the District Court found, “had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of segregation.” 338 F. Supp., at 589.
The District Court also held that the acts of the Detroit Board of Education, as a subordinate entity of the State, were attributable to the State of Michigan, thus creating a vicarious liability oh the part of the State. Under Michigan law, Mich. Comp. Laws §388.851 (1970), for example, school building construction plans had to be approved by the State Board of Education, and, prior to 1962, the State Board had specific statutory authority to supervise schoolsite selection. The proofs concerning the effect of Detroit’s school construction program were, therefore, found to be largely applicable to show state responsibility for the segregative results.
Turning to the question of an appropriate remedy for these several constitutional violations, the District Court deferred a pending motion by intervening parent defendants to join as additional parties defendant the 86 outlying school districts in the three-county Detroit metropolitan area on the ground that effective relief could not be achieved without their presence. The District Court concluded that this motion to join was “premature,” since it “has to do with relief” and no reasonably specific desegregation plan was before the court. 338 F. Supp., at 596. Accordingly, the District Court proceeded to order the Detroit Board of Education to submit desegregation plans limited to the segregation problems found to be existing within the city of Detroit. At the same time, however, the state defendants were directed to submit desegregation plans encompassing the three-county metropolitan area despite the fact that the 85 outlying school districts of these three counties were not parties to the action and despite the fact that there had been no claim that these outlying districts had committed constitutional violations. An effort to appeal these orders to the Court of Appeals was dismissed on the ground that the orders were not appealable. 468 F. 2d 902 (CA6), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 844 (1972). The sequence of the ensuing actions and orders of the District Court are significant factors and will therefore be catalogued in some detail.
Following the District Court’s abrupt announcement that it planned to consider the implementation of a multidistrict, metropolitan area remedy to the segregation problems identified within the city of Detroit, the District Court was again requested to grant the outlying school districts intervention as of right on the ground that the District Court’s new request for multidistrict plans “may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [the intervenors’] ability to protect” the welfare of their students. The District Court took the motions to intervene under advisement pending submission of the requested desegregation plans by Detroit and the state officials. On March 7, 1972, the District Court notified all parties and the petitioner school districts seeking intervention, that March 14, 1972, was the deadline for submission of recommendations for conditions of intervention and the date of the commencement of hearings on Detroit-only desegregation plans. On the second day of the scheduled hearings, March 15, 1972, the District Court granted the motions of the intervenor school districts subject, inter alia, to the following conditions:
“1. No intervenor will be permitted to assert any claim or defense previously adjudicated by the court.
“2. No intervenor shall reopen any question or issue which has previously been decided by the court.
“7. New intervenors are granted intervention for two principal purposes: (a) To advise the court, by brief, of the legal propriety or impropriety of considering a metropolitan plan; (b) To review any plan or plans for the desegregation of the so-called larger Detroit Metropolitan area, and submitting objections, modifications or alternatives to it or them, and in accordance with the requirements of the United States Constitution and the prior orders of this court.” 1 Joint Appendix 206 (hereinafter App.).
Upon granting the motion to intervene, on March 15, 1972, the District Court advised the petitioning inter-venors that the court had previously set March 22, 1972, as the date for the filing of briefs on the legal propriety of a “metropolitan” plan of desegregation and, accordingly, that the intervening school districts would have one week to muster their legal arguments on the issue. Thereafter, and following the completion of hearings on the Detroit-only desegregation plans, the District Court issued the four rulings that were the principal issues in the Court of Appeals.
(a) On March 24, 1972, two days after the inter-venors’ briefs were due, the District Court issued its ruling on the question of whether it could “consider relief in the form of a metropolitan plan, encompassing not only the City of Detroit, but the larger Detroit metropolitan area.” It rejected the state defendants’ arguments that no state action caused the segregation of the Detroit schools, and the intervening suburban districts’ contention that interdistrict relief was inappropriate unless the suburban districts themselves had committed violations. The court concluded:
“[I]t is proper for the court to consider metropolitan plans directed toward the desegregation of the Detroit public schools as an alternative to the present intra-city desegregation plans before it and, in the event that the court finds such intra-city plans inadequate to desegregate such schools, the court is of the opinion that it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for desegregation.” Pet. App. 51a.
(b) On March 28, 1972, the District Court issued its findings and conclusions on the three Detroit-only plans submitted by the city Board and the respondents. It found that the best of the three plans “would make the Detroit school system more identifiably Black . . . thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system.” Id., at 55a. From this the court concluded that the plan “would not accomplish desegregation . . . within the corporate geographical limits of the city.” Id., at 56a. Accordingly, the District Court held that it “must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem,” and that “[s]chool district lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights.” Id., at 57a.
(c) During the period from March 28 to April 14, 1972, the District Court conducted hearings on a metropolitan plan. Counsel for the petitioning intervenors was allowed to participate in these hearings, but he was ordered to confine his argument to “the size and expanse of the metropolitan plan” without addressing the inter-venors’ opposition to such a remedy or the claim that a finding of a constitutional violation by the intervenor districts was an essential predicate to any remedy involving them. Thereafter, on June 14, 1972, the District Court issued its ruling on the “desegregation area” and related findings and conclusions. The court acknowledged at the outset that it had “taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in the counties [in the Detroit area], nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts of de jure segregation.” Nevertheless, the court designated 53 of the 85 suburban school districts plus Detroit as the “desegregation area” and appointed a panel to prepare and submit “an effective desegregation plan” for the Detroit schools that would encompass the entire desegregation area. The plan was to be based on 15 clusters, each containing part of the Detroit system and two or more suburban districts, and was to “achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition.” 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED Mich. 1972).
(d) On July 11, 1972, and in accordance with a recommendation by the court-appointed desegregation panel, the District Court ordered the Detroit Board of Education to purchase or lease “at least” 295 school buses for the purpose of providing transportation under an interim plan to be developed for the 1972-1973 school year. The costs of this acquisition were to be borne by the state defendants. Pet. App. 106a-107a.
On June 12, 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 484 F. 2d 215 (CA6). The Court of Appeals held, first, that the record supported the District Court’s findings and conclusions on the constitutional violations committed by the Detroit Board, id., at 221-238, and by the state defendants, id., at 239-241. It stated that the acts of racial discrimination shown in the record are “causally related to the substantial amount of segregation found in the Detroit school system,” id,., at 241, and that “the District Court was therefore authorized and required to take effective measures to desegregate the Detroit Public School System.” Id., at 242.
The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that ‘‘any less comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority population in the total metropolitan area.” Id., at 245. The court went on to state that it could “not see how such segregation can be any less harmful to the minority students than if the same result were accomplished within one school district.” Ibid.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the only feasible desegregation plan involves the crossing of the boundary lines between the Detroit School District and adjacent or nearby school districts for the limited purpose of providing an effective desegregation plan.” Id., at 249. It reasoned that such a plan would be appropriate because of the State’s violations, and could be implemented because of the State’s authority to control local school districts. Without further elaboration, and without any discussion of the claims that no constitutional violation by the outlying districts had been shown and that no evidence on that point had been allowed, the Court of Appeals held:
“[T]he State has committed de jure acts of segregation and . . . the State controls the instrumentalities whose action is necessary to remedy the harmful effects of the State acts.” Ibid.
An interdistrict remedy was thus held to be “within the equity powers of the District Court.” Id., at 250.
The Court of Appeals expressed no views on the propriety of the District Court's composition of the metropolitan “desegregation area.” It held that all suburban school districts that might be affected by any metropol-itanwide remedy should, under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 19, be made parties to the case on remand and be given an opportunity to be heard with respect to the scope and implementation of such a remedy. 484 F. 2d, at 251-252. Under the terms of the remand, however, the District Court was not “required” to receive further evidence on the issue of segregation in the Detroit schools or on the propriety of a Detroit-only remedy, or on the question of whether the affected districts had committed any violation of the constitutional rights of Detroit pupils or others. Id., at 252. Finally, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's order directing the acquisition of school buses, subject to the right of the District Court to consider reimposing the order “at the appropriate time.” Ibid.
II
Ever since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), judicial consideration of school desegregation cases has begun with the standard:
“[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id., at 495.
This has been reaffirmed time and again as the meaning of the Constitution and the controlling rule of law.
The target of the Brown holding was clear and forthright: the elimination of state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils. This duality and racial segregation were held to violate the Constitution in the cases subsequent to 1954, including particularly Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Comm’rs, 391 U. S. 450 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971); Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484 (1972).
The Swann case, of course, dealt
“with the problem of defining in more precise terms than heretofore the scope of the duty of school authorities and district courts in implementing Brown I and the mandate to eliminate dual systems and establish unitary systems at once.” 402 U. S., at 6.
In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955) (Brown II), the Court’s first encounter with the problem of remedies in school desegregation cases, the Court noted:
“In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” Id., at 300 (footnotes omitted).
In further refining the remedial process, Swann held, the task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests, “the condition that offends the Constitution.” A federal remedial power may be exercised “only on the basis of a constitutional violation” and, “[a]s with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.” 402 IT. S., at 16.
Proceeding from these basic principles, we first note that in the District Court the complainants sought a remedy aimed at the condition alleged to offend the Constitution — the segregation within the Detroit City School District. The court acted on this theory of the case and in its initial ruling on the “Desegregation Area” stated:
“The task before this court, therefore, is now, and . . . has always been, how to desegregate the Detroit public schools.” 345 F. Supp., at 921.
Thereafter, however, the District Court abruptly rejected the proposed Detroit-only plans on the ground that “while [they] would provide a racial mix more in keeping with the Black-White proportions of the student population [they] would accentuate the racial identifiability of the [Detroit] district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation.” Pet. App. 56a. “[T]he racial composition of the student body is such,” said the court, “that the plan's implementation would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable” (id., at 54a), “leav[ing] many of its schools 75 to 90 per cent Black.” Id., at 55a. Consequently, the court reasoned, it was imperative to “look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem of segregation in the Detroit public schools . . .” since “[s]chool district lines are simply matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional rights.” Id., at 57a. Accordingly, the District Court proceeded to redefine the relevant area to include areas of predominantly white pupil population in order to ensure that “upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition” of the entire metropolitan area.
While specifically acknowledging that the District Court’s findings of a condition of segregation were limited to Detroit, the Court of Appeals approved the use of a metropolitan remedy largely on the grounds that it is
“impossible to declare 'clearly erroneous’ the District Judge’s conclusion that any Detroit only segregation plan will lead directly to a single segregated Detroit school district overwhelmingly black in all of its schools, surrounded by a ring of suburbs and suburban school districts overwhelmingly white in composition in a State in which the racial composition is 87 per cent white and 13 per cent black.” 484 F. 2d, at 249.
Viewing the record as a whole, it seems clear that the District Court and the Court of Appeals shifted the primary focus from a Detroit remedy to the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion that total desegregation of Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable. Both courts proceeded on an assumption that the Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated — in their view of what constituted desegregation — unless the racial composition of the student body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the population of the metropolitan area as a whole. The metropolitan area was then defined as Detroit plus 53 of the outlying school districts. That this was the approach the District Court expressly and frankly employed is shown by the order which expressed the court’s view of the constitutional standard:
“Within the limitations of reasonable travel time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be effected within the clusters described in Exhibit P. M. 12 so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom [will be] substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition.” 345 F. Supp., at 918 (emphasis added).
In Swann, which arose in the context of a single independent school district, the Court held:
“If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse.” 402 U. S., at 24.
The clear import of this language from Swann is that desegregation, in the sense of dismantling a dual school system, does not require any particular racial balance in each “school, grade or classroom.” See Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U. S. 1027 (1972).
Here the District Court’s approach to what constituted “actual desegregation” raises the fundamental question, not presented in Swann, as to the circumstances in which a federal court may order desegregation relief that embraces more than a single school district. The court’s analytical starting point was its conclusion that school district lines are no more than arbitrary lines on a map drawn “for political convenience.” Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S., at 469. Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 50 (1973), we observed that local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages “experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.”
The Michigan educational structure involved in this case, in common with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, and a review of the scope and character of these local powers indicates the extent to which the interdistrict remedy approved by the two courts could disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan. The metropolitan remedy would require, in effect, consolidation of 54 independent school districts historically administered as separate units into a vast new super school district. See n. 10, supra. Entirely apart from the logistical and other serious problems attending large-scale transportation of students, the consolidation would give rise to an array of other problems in financing and operating this new school system. Some of the more obvious questions would be: What would be the status and authority of the present popularly elected school boards? Would the children of Detroit be within the jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected by the parents and residents of other districts? What board or boards would levy taxes for school operations in these 54 districts constituting the consolidated metropolitan area? What provisions could be made for assuring substantial equality in tax levies among the 54 districts, if this were deemed requisite? What provisions would be made for financing? Would the validity of long-term bonds be jeopardized unless approved by all of the component districts as well as the State? What body would determine that portion of the curricula now left to the discretion of local school boards? Who would establish attendance zones, purchase school equipment, locate and construct new schools, and indeed attend to all the myriad day-to-day decisions that are necessary to school operations affecting potentially more than three-quarters of a million pupils? See n. 10, supra.
It may be suggested that all of these vital operational problems are yet to be resolved by the District Court, and that this is the purpose of the Court of Appeals’ proposed remand. But it is obvious from the scope of the interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District Court will become first, a de facto “legislative authority” to resolve these complex questions, and then the “school superintendent” for the entire area. This is a task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one which would deprive the people of control of schools through their elected representatives.
Of course, no state law is above the Constitution. School district lines and the present laws with respect to local control, are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate remedies. See, e. g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972) ; United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484 (1972) (state or local officials prevented from carving out a new school district from an existing district that was in process of dismantling a dual school system); cf. Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 429 F. 2d 364 (CA8 1970) (State contributed to separation of races by drawing of school district lines); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (ED Tex. 1970), aff’d, 447 F. 2d 441 (CA5 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. United States, 404 U. S. 1016 (1972) (one or more school districts created and maintained for one race). But our prior holdings have been confined to violations and remedies within a single school district. We therefore turn to address, for the first time, the validity of a remedy mandating cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in only one district.
The controlling principle consistently expounded in our holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann, 402 U. S., at 16. Before the boundaries of separate and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant seg-regative effect in another district. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation. Thus an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be appropriate to eliminate the interdis-trict segregation directly caused by the constitutional violation. Conversely, without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.
The record before us, voluminous as it is, contains evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the Detroit schools; indeed, that was the theory on which the litigation was initially based and on which the District Court took evidence. See supra, at 725-726. With no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect, the court went beyond the original theory of the case as framed by the pleadings and mandated a metropolitan area remedy. To approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose on the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and II or any holding of this Court.
In dissent, Mb. Justice White and Mb. Justice Mae-shall undertake to demonstrate that agencies having statewide authority participated in maintaining the dual school system found to exist in Detroit. They are apparently of the view that once such participation is shown, the District Court should have a relatively free hand to reconstruct school districts outside of Detroit in fashioning relief. Our assumption, arguendo, see infra, at 748, that state agencies did participate in the maintenance of the Detroit system, should make it clear that it is not on this point that we part company. The difference between us arises instead from established doctrine laid down by our cases. Brown, supra; Oreen, supra; Swann, supra; Scotland Neck, supra; and Emporia, supra, each addressed the issue of constitutional wrong in terms of an established geographic and administrative school system populated by both Negro and white children. In such a context, terms such as “unitary” and “dual” systems, and “racially identifiable schools,” have meaning, and the necessary federal authority to remedy the constitutional wrong is firmly established. But the remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. Disparate treatment of white and Negro students occurred within the Detroit school system, and not elsewhere, and on this record the remedy must be limited to that system. Swann, supra, at 16.
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in that district. Unless petitioners drew the district lines in a discriminatory fashion, or arranged for white students residing in the Detroit District to attend schools in Oakland and Macomb Counties, they were under no constitutional duty to make provisions for Negro students to do so. The view of the dissenters, that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can be made the basis for a decree requiring cross-district transportation of pupils, cannot be supported on the grounds that it represents merely the devising of a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights already established by our prior decisions. It can be supported only by drastic expansion of the constitutional right itself, an expansion without any support in either constitutional principle or precedent.
Ill
We recognize that the six-volume record presently under consideration contains language and some specific incidental findings thought by the District Court to afford a basis for interdistrict relief. However, these comparatively isolated findings and brief comments concern only one possible interdistrict violation and are found in the context of a proceeding that, as the District Court conceded, included no proof of segregation practiced by any of the 85 suburban school districts surrounding Detroit. The Court of Appeals, for example, relied on five factors which, it held, amounted to unconstitutional state action with respect to the violations found in the Detroit system:
(1) It held the State derivatively responsible for the Detroit Board’s violations on the theory that actions of Detroit as a political subdivision of the State were attributable to the State. Accepting, arguendo, the correctness of this finding of state responsibility for the segregated conditions within the city of Detroit, it does not follow that an interdistrict remedy is constitutionally justified or required. With a single exception, discussed later, there has been no showing that either the State or any of the 85 outlying districts engaged in activity that had a cross-district effect. The boundaries of the Detroit School District, which are coterminous with the boundaries of the city of Detroit, were established over a century ago by neutral legislation when the city was incorporated; there is no evidence in the record, nor is there any suggestion by the respondents, that either the original boundaries of the Detroit School District, or any other school district in Michigan, were established for the purpose of creating, maintaining, or perpetuating segregation of races. There is no claim and there is no evidence hinting that petitioner outlying school districts and their predecessors, or the 30-odd other school districts in the tricounty area — but outside the District Court's “desegregation area” — have ever maintained or operated anything but unitary school systems. Unitary school systems have been required for more than a century by the Michigan Constitution as implemented by state law. Where the schools of only one district have been affected, there is no constitutional power in the courts to decree relief balancing the racial composition of that district's schools with those of the surrounding districts.
(2) There was evidence introduced at trial that, during the late 1950’s, Carver School District, a predominantly Negro suburban district, contracted to have Negro high school students sent to a predominantly Negro school in Detroit. At the time, Carver was an independent school district that had no high school because, according to the trial evidence, “Carver District . . . did not have a place for adequate high school facilities.” 484 F. 2d, at 231. Accordingly, arrangements were made with Northern High School in the abutting Detroit School District so that the Carver high school students could obtain a secondary school education. In 1960 the Oak Park School District, a predominantly white suburban district, annexed the predominantly Negro Carver School District, through the initiative of local officials. Ibid. There is, of course, no claim that the 1960 annexation had a segregative purpose or result or that Oak Park now maintains a dual system.
According to the Court of Appeals, the arrangement during the late 1950’s which allowed Carver students to be educated within the Detroit District was dependent upon the “tacit or express” approval of the State Board of Education and was the result of the refusal of the white suburban districts to accept the Carver students. Although there is nothing in the record supporting the Court of Appeals’ supposition that suburban white schools refused to accept the Carver students, it appears that this situation, whether with or without the State’s consent, may have had a segregative effect on the school populations of the two districts involved. However, since “the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,” Swann, 402 U. S., at 16, this isolated instance affecting two of the school districts would not justify the broad metropolitan wide remedy contemplated by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals, particularly since it embraced potentially 52 districts having no responsibility for the arrangement and involved 503,000 pupils in addition to Detroit’s 276,000 students.
(3) The Court of Appeals cited the enactment of state legislation (Act 48) which had the effect of rescinding Detroit’s voluntary desegregation plan (the April 7 Plan). That plan, however, affected only 12 of 21 Detroit high schools and had no causal connection with the distribution of pupils by race between Detroit and the other school districts within the tri-county area.
(4) The court relied on the State’s authority to supervise schoolsite selection and to approve building construction as a basis for holding the State responsible for the segregative results of the school construction program in Detroit. Specifically, the Court of Appeals asserted that during the period between 1949 and 1962 the State Board of Education exercised general authority as overseer of site acquisitions by local boards for new school construction, and suggested that this state-approved school construction "fostered segregation throughout the Detroit Metropolitan area.” 484 F. 2d, at 241. This brief comment, however, is not supported by the 'evidence taken at trial since that evidence was specifically limited to proof that schoolsite acquisition and school construction within the city of Detroit produced de jure segregation within the city itself. Id., at 235-238. Thus, there was no evidence suggesting that the State's activities with respect to either school construction or site acquisition within Detroit affected the racial composition of the school population outside Detroit or, conversely, that the State’s school construction and site acquisition activities within the outlying districts affected the racial composition of the schools within Detroit.
(5) The Court of Appeals also relied upon the District Court’s finding:
“This and other financial limitations, such as those on bonding and the working of the state aid formula whereby suburban districts were able to make far larger per pupil expenditures despite less tax effort, have created and perpetuated systematic educational inequalities.” Id., at 239.
However, neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court offered any indication in the record or in their opinions as to how, if at all, the availability of state-financed aid for some Michigan students outside Detroit, but not for those within Detroit, might have affected the racial character of any of the State’s school districts. Furthermore, as the respondents recognize, the application of our recent ruling in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973), to this state education financing system is questionable, and this issue was not addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the District Court. This, again, underscores the crucial fact that the theory upon which the case proceeded related solely to the establishment of Detroit city violations as a basis for desegregating Detroit schools and that, at the time of trial, neither the parties nor the trial judge was concerned with a foundation for interdistrict relief.
IV
Petitioners have urged that they were denied due process by the manner in which the District Court limited their participation after intervention was allowed, thus precluding adequate opportunity to present evidence that they had committed no acts having a segregative effect in Detroit. In light of our holding that, absent an interdis-trict violation, there is no basis for an interdistrict remedy, we need not reach these claims. It is clear, however, that the District Court, with the approval of the Court of Appeals, has provided an interdistrict remedy in the face of a record which shows no constitutional violations that would call for equitable relief except within the city of Detroit. In these circumstances there was no occasion for the parties to address, or for the District Court to consider whether there were racially discriminatory acts for which any of the 53 outlying districts were responsible and which had direct and significant segregative effect on schools of more than one district.
We conclude that the relief ordered by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was based upon an erroneous standard and was unsupported by record evidence that acts of the outlying districts effected the discrimination found to exist in the schools of Detroit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools, a remedy which has been delayed since 1970.
Reversed and remanded.
484 F. 2d 215 (CA6), cert. granted, 414 U. S. 1038 (1973).
The standing of the NAACP as a proper party plaintiff was not contested in the trial court and is not an issue in this case.
Optional zones, sometimes referred to as dual zones or dual overlapping zones, provide pupils living within certain areas a choice of attendance at one of two high schools.
The Court of Appeals found record evidence that in at least one instance during the period 1957-1958, Detroit served a suburban school district by contracting with it to educate its Negro high school students by transporting them away from nearby suburban white high schools, and past Detroit high schools which were predominantly white, to all-Negro or predominantly Negro Detroit schools. 484 E. 2d, at 231.
School districts in the State of Michigan are instrumentalities of the State and subordinate to its State Board of Education and legislature. The Constitution of the State of Michigan, Art. 8, § 2, provides in relevant part:
“The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law.”
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated: "The school district is a State agency. Moreover, it is of legislative creation. . . .” Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 644, 92 N. W. 289, 290 (1902); “ 'Education in Michigan belongs to the State. It is no part of the local self-government inherent in the township or municipality, except so far as the legislature may choose to make it such. The Constitution has turned the whole subject over to the legislature. . . .’” Attorney General ex rel. Zacharias v. Detroit Board of Education, 154 Mich. 584, 590, 118 N. W. 606, 609 (1908).
“Sec. 12. The implementation of any attendance provisions for the 1970-71 school year determined by any first' class school district board shall be delayed pending the date of commencement of functions by the first class school district boards established under the provisions of this amendatory act but such provision shall not impair the right of any such board to determine and implement prior to such date such changes in attendance provisions as are mandated by practical necessity. . . Act No. 48, § 12, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1970; Mich. Comp. Laws §388.182 (1970) (emphasis added).
The District Court briefly alluded to the possibility that the State, along with private persons, had caused, in part, the housing patterns of the Detroit metropolitan area which, in turn, produced the predominantly white and predominantly Negro neighborhoods that characterize Detroit:
“It is no answer to say that restricted practices grew gradually (as the black population in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), or that since 1948 racial restrictions on the ownership of real property have been removed. The policies pursued by both government and private persons and agencies have a continuing and present effect upon the complexion of the community — as we know, the choice of a residence is a relatively infrequent affair. For many years FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the maintenance of 'harmonious’ neighborhoods, i. e., racially and economically harmonious. The conditions created continue.” 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (ED Mich. 1971).
Thus, the District Court concluded:
“The affirmative obligation of the defendant Board has been and is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the effects of residential racial segregation.” Id., at 593.
The Court of Appeals, however, expressly noted that:
“In affirming the District Judge’s findings of constitutional violations by the Detroit Board of Education and by the State defendants resulting in segregated schools in Detroit, we have not relied at all upon testimony pertaining to segregated housing except as school construction programs helped cause or maintain such segregation.” 484 F. 2d, at 242.
Accordingly, in its present posture, the case does not present any question concerning possible state housing violations.
On March 22, 1971, a group of Detroit residents, who were parents of children enrolled in the Detroit public schools, were permitted to intervene as parties defendant. On June 24, 1971, the District Judge alluded to the “possibility” of a metropolitan school system stating: “[A]s I have said to several witnesses in this case: ‘How do you desegregate a black city, or a black school system.’ ” Petitioners’ Appendix 243a (hereinafter Pet. App.). Subsequently, on July 16, 1971, various parents filed a motion to require joinder of all of the 85 outlying independent school districts within the tricounty area.
The respondents, as plaintiffs below, opposed the motion to join the additional school districts, arguing that the presence of the state defendants was sufficient and all that was required, even if, in shaping a remedy, the affairs of these other districts was to be affected. 338 F. Supp., at 595.
At the time of the 1970 census, the population of Michigan was 8,875,083, almost half of which, 4,199,931, resided in the tri-county area of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb. Oakland and Macomb Counties abut Wayne County to the north, and Oakland County abuts Macomb County to the west. These counties cover 1,952 square miles, Michigan Statistical Abstract (9th ed. 1972), and the area is approximately the size of the State of Delaware (2,057 square miles), more than half again the size of the State of Rhode Island (1,214 square miles) and almost 30 times the size of the District of Columbia (67 square miles). Statistical Abstract of the United States (93d ed. 1972). The populátions of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb Counties were 2,666,751; 907,871; and 625,309, respectively, in 1970. Detroit, the State’s largest city, is located in Wayne County.
In the 1970-1971 school year, there were 2,157,449 children enrolled in school districts in Michigan. There are 86 independent, legally distinct school districts within the tri-county area, having a total enrollment of approximately 1,000,000 children. In 1970, the Detroit Board of Education operated 319 schools with approximately 276,000 students.
In its formal opinion, subsequently announced, the District Court candidly recognized:
“It should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts of de jure segregation.” 345 F. Supp. 914, 920 (ED Mich. 1972).
According to the District Court, intervention was permitted under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24 (a), “Intervention of Right/’ and also under Rule 24(b), “Permissive Intervention.”
This rather abbreviated briefing schedule was maintained despite the fact that the District Court had deferred consideration of a motion made eight months earlier, to bring the suburban districts into the case. See text accompanying n. 8, supra.
As of 1970, the 53 school districts outside the city of Detroit that were included in the court's “desegregation area” had a combined student population of approximately 503,000 students compared to Detroit’s approximately 276,000 students. Nevertheless, the District Court directed that the intervening districts should be represented by only one member on the desegregation panel while the Detroit Board of Education was granted three panel members. 345 F. Supp., at 917.
The District Court had certified most of the foregoing rulings for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) (1 App. 265-266) and the case was initially decided on the merits by a panel of three judges. However, the panel’s opinion and judgment were vacated when it was determined to rehear the case en banc, 484 F. 2d, at 218.
With respect to the State’s violations, the Court of Appeals held: (1) that, since the city Board is an instrumentality of the State and subordinate to the State Board, the segregative actions of the Detroit Board “are the actions of an agency of the State,” id., at 238; (2) that the state legislation rescinding Detroit’s voluntary desegregation plan contributed to increasing segregation in the Detroit schools, ibid.; (3) that under state law prior to 1962 the State Board had authority over school construction plans and therefore had to be held responsible “for the segregative results,” ibid.; (4) that the “State statutory scheme of support of transportation for school children directly discriminated against Detroit/’ id., at 240, by not providing transportation funds to Detroit on the same basis as funds were provided to suburban districts, id., at 238; and (5) that the transportation of Negro students from one suburban district to a Negro school in Detroit must have had the “approval, tacit or express, of the State Board of Education,” ibid.
The court sought to distinguish Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 462 F. 2d 1058 (CA4 1972), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 412 U. S. 92 (1973), on the grounds that the District Court in that case had ordered an actual consolidation of three school districts and that Virginia’s Constitution and statutes, unlike Michigan’s, gave the local boards exclusive power to operate the public schools. 484 F. 2d, at 251.
Although the list of issues presented for review in petitioners’ briefs and petitions for writs of certiorari do not include arguments on the findings of segregative violations on the part of the Detroit defendants, two of the petitioners argue in brief that these findings constitute error. This Court’s Rules 23 (1) (c) and 40(1) (d)(2), at a minimum, limit our review of the Detroit violation findings to “plain error,” and, under our decision last Term in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U. S. 189 (1973), the findings appear to be correct.
Disparity in the racial composition of pupils within a single district may well constitute a “signal” to a district court at the outset, leading to inquiry into the causes accounting for a pronounced racial identifiability of schools within one school system. In Swann, for example, we were dealing with a large but single independent school system, and a unanimous Court noted: “Where the ... proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all or predominantly of one race [the school authority has] the burden of showing that such school assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory.” 402 U. S., at 26. See also Keyes, supra, at 208. However, the use of significant racial imbalance in schools within an autonomous school district as a signal which operates simply to shift the burden of proof, is a very different matter from equating racial imbalance with a constitutional violation calling for a remedy. Keyes, supra, also involved a remedial order within a single autonomous school district.
Under the Michigan School Code of 1955, the local school district is an autonomous political body corporate, operating through a Board of Education popularly elected. Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 340.27, 340.55, 340.107, 340.148, 340.149, 340.188. As such, the day-today affairs of the school district are determined at the local level in accordance with the plenary power to acquire real and personal property, §§340.26, 340.77, 340.113, 340.165, 340.192, 340.352; to hire and contract with personnel, §§ 340.569, 340.574; to levy taxes for operations, § 340.563; to borrow against receipts, § 340.567; to determine the length of school terms, § 340.575; to control the admission of nonresident students, §340.582; to determine courses of study, §340.583; to provide a kindergarten program, § 340.584; to establish and operate vocational schools, § 340.585; to offer adult education programs, §340.586; to establish attendance areas, §340-589; to arrange for transportation of nonresident students, § 340-591; to acquire transportation equipment, § 340.594; to receive gifts and bequests for educational purposes, §340.605; to employ an attorney, § 340.609; to suspend or expel students, § 340.613; to make rules and regulations for the operation of schools, § 340.614; to cause to be levied authorized millage, § 340.643a; to acquire property by eminent domain, §340.711 et seq.; and to approve and select textbooks, § 340.882.
Since the Court has held that a resident of a school district has a fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution to vote in a district election, it would seem incongruous to disparage the importance of the school district in a different context. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621, 626 (1969). While the district there involved was located in New York, none of the facts in our possession suggest that the relation of school districts to the State is significantly different in New York from that in Michigan.
The suggestion in the dissent of Mr Justice Marshall that schools which have a majority of Negro students are not “desegregated,” whatever the racial makeup of the school district’s population and however neutrally the district lines have been drawn and administered, finds no support in our prior cases. In Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430 (1968), for example, this Court approved a desegregation plan which would have resulted in each of the schools within the district having a racial composition of 57% Negro and 43% white. In Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 (1972), the optimal desegregation plan would have resulted in the schools’ being 66% Negro and 34% white, substantially the same percentages as could be obtained under one of the plans involved in this case. And in United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U. S. 484, 491 n. 5 (1972), a desegregation plan was implicitly approved for a school district which had a racial composition of 77% Negro and 22% white. In none of these cases was it even intimated that “actual desegregation” could not be accomplished as long as the number of Negro students was greater than the number of white students.
The dissents also seem to attach importance to the metropolitan character of Detroit and neighboring school districts. But the constitutional principles applicable in school desegregation cases cannot vary in accordance with the size or population dispersal of the particular city, county, or school district as compared with neighboring areas.
People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Education of Detroit, 18 Mich. 400 (1869); Act 34, §28, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1867. The Michigan Constitution and laws provide that “[e]very school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin,” Mich. Const. 1963, Art. 8, §2; that “[n]o separate school or department shall be kept for any person or persons on account of race or color,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 340.365; and that “[a]ll persons, residents of a school district . . . shall have an equal right to attend school therein,” id., § 340.356. See also Act 319, Part II, c. 2, § 9, Mich. Pub. Acts of 1927.
Apparently, when the District Court, sua sponte, abruptly altered the theory of the case to include the possibility of multidistrict relief, neither the plaintiffs nor the trial judge considered amending the complaint to embrace the new theory. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
71
] | sc_caseorigin |
ALEXANDER et al. v. VIRGINIA
No. 71-1315.
Argued October 19, 1972 —
Decided June 25, 1973
Stanley M. Dietz argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
James E. Kulp, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General.
Ralph J. Schwarz, Jr., Mel S. Friedman, and Joel Hirschhorn filed a brief for the First Amendment Lawyers’ Association as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Per Curiam.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with Miller v. California, ante, at 23-25, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 58 n. 7, and Heller v. New York, ante, p. 483. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante, at 129-130 and n. 7. A trial by jury is not constitutionally required in this state civil proceeding pursuant to § 18.1-236.3 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended. See Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1027, 1035-1045, 1048 (ED La.), aff'd sub nom. Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U. S. 943 (1972), and Hill v. Mc- Keithen, 409 U. S. 943 (1972). Cf. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 443-444 (1957).
Vacated and remanded.
Mr. Justice Douglas would reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Miller v. California, ante, p. 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
EBAY INC. et al. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C.
No. 05-130.
Argued March 29, 2006
Decided May 15, 2006
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard D. Bernstein, Virginia A. Seitz, and Allan M. Soobert.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Barnett, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, David Seidman, Mark R. Freeman, John M. Whealan, Cynthia C. Lynch, and Heather F. Auyang.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul R. Q. Wolf son, Scott L. Robertson, Gregory N. Stillman, Jennifer A. Albert, David M. Young, and Brian M. Buroker.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Innovators’ Alliance by Theodore B. Olson and Matthew D. McGill; for the. Association of the Bar of the City of New York by James W. Dabney and Peter A. Sullivan; for the Business Software Alliance et al. by Kenneth S. Getter and Andrew J. Pincus; for the Computer & Communications Industry Association by Jonathan Band; for the Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. by Jason Schultz; for Nokia Corp. by Michael P. Kenny; for Research in Motion, Ltd., by Martin R. Glick, Sarah M. King, Herbert L. Fenster, Lawrence S. Ebner, Henry C. Bunsow, David W. Long, and Mark L. Whitaker; for the Securities Industry Association et al. by W. Hardy Callcott and Richard Whiting; for Time Warner Inc. et al. by Kathleen M. Sullivan, Daniel H. Bromberg, and Margret M. Caruso; for Yahoo! Inc. by Christopher J. Wright, Timothy J. Simeone, and Lisa G. McFall; and for Malla Pollack et al. by Ms. Pollack, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Bar Association by Michael S. Greco, Robert F. Altherr, Jr., Nina L. Med-lock, and Joseph M. Potenza; for the Biotechnology Industry Organization by Nancy J. Linck and Brian P. Barrett; for the General Electric Co. et al. by John C. Englander, J. Anthony Downs, Kevin P. Martin, and William F. Sheehan; for Law Professors by Thomas G. Field, Jr., Craig S. Jepson, and Karl F. Jorda, all pro se; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by Harry J. Roper, Aaron A Barlow, Paul M. Smith, and Katherine A. Fallow; for Qualcomm Irie. et al. by Kenneth C. Bass III, Robert G. Sterne, Edward J. Kessler, and Linda E. Horner; for Rembrandt IP Management, LLC, by Lawrence S. Robbins and Roy T. Englert, Jr.; for Technology, Patents & Licensing, Inc., et al. by Keara A Bergin; for the United Inventors Association et al. by Robert M. Asher and Erik Paul Belt; for Various Law & Economics Professors by F. Scott Kieff and Richard A. Epstein, both pro se; for the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. by Gary M. Hoffman and Woody N. Peterson; for Martin Cooper et al. by Justin A. Nelson, Parker C. Folse III, Stephen D. Susman, Mark L. D. Wawro, and Max L. Tribble, Jr.; and for Steven M. Hoffberg by Robert J. Rando and Mr. Hoffberg, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association et al. by Joseph S. Cianfrani, Melvin C. Garner, and Martha B. Schneider; for the Association of American Universities et al. by Morgan Chu and Laura W. Brill; for International Business Machines Corp. by Christopher A. Hughes and Mark J. Abate; for the Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia by Blair E. Taylor and Susan M. Dadio; for Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., by James Galbraith and Elizabeth J. Holland; and for 52 Intellectual Property Professors by Mark A. Lemley, pro se.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Ordinarily, a federal court considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff applies the four-factor test historically employed by courts of equity. Petitioners eBay Inc. and Half.com, Inc., argue that this traditional test applies to disputes arising under the Patent Act. We agree and, accordingly, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Petitioner eBay operates a popular Internet Web site that allows private sellers to list goods they wish to sell, either through an auction or at a fixed price. Petitioner Half.com, now a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay, operates a similar Web site. Respondent MercExchange, L. L. C., holds a number of patents, including a business method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing a central authority to promote trust among participants. See U. S. Patent No. 5,845,265. MercExchange sought to license its patent to eBay and Half.com, as it had previously done with other companies, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. MercExchange subsequently filed a patent infringement suit against eBay and Half.com in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. A jury found that MercExchange’s patent was valid, that eBay and Half.com had infringed that patent, and that an award of damages was appropriate.
Following the jury verdict, the District Court denied MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunctive relief. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, applying its “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.” 401 F. 3d 1323, 1339 (2005). We granted certiorari to determine the appropriateness of this general rule. 546 U. S. 1029 (2005).
II
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. See, e. g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311-313 (1982); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 542 (1987). The decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. See, e. g., Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 320.
These familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act. As this Court has long recognized, “a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.” Ibid.; see also Amoco, supra, at 542. Nothing in the Patent Act indicates that Congress intended such a departure. To the contrary, the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity.” 35 U. S. C. § 283.
To be sure, the Patent Act also declares that “patents shall have the attributes of personal property,” §261, including “the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,” § 154(a)(1). According to the Court of Appeals, this statutory right to exclude alone justifies its general rule in favor of permanent injunctive relief. 401 F. 3d, at 1338. But the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right. Indeed, the Patent Act itself indicates that patents shall have the attributes of personal property “[sjubject to the provisions of this title,” 35 U. S. C. §261, including, presumably, the provision that injunctive relief “may” issue only “in accordance with the principles of equity,” § 283.
This approach is consistent with our treatment of injunctions under the Copyright Act. Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses “the right to exclude others from using his property.” Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932); see also id., at 127-128 (“A copyright, like a patent, is at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U. S. C. § 502(a). And as in our decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U. S. 483, 505 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Assn., 209 U. S. 20, 23-24 (1908).
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals below fairly applied these traditional equitable principles in deciding respondent’s motion for a permanent injunction. Although the District Court recited the traditional four-factor test, 275 F. Supp. 2d, at 711, it appeared to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases. Most notably, it concluded that a “plaintiff’s willingness to license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents” would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue. Id., at 712. But traditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications. For example, some patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do so. To the extent that the District Court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by Congress. The court’s categorical rule is also in tension with Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 422-430 (1908), which rejected the contention that a eourt of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.
In reversing the District Court, the Court of Appeals departed in the opposite direction from the four-factor test. The court articulated a “general rule,” unique to patent disputes, “that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.” 401 F. 3d, at 1338. The court further indicated that injunctions should be denied only in the “unusual” case, under “exceptional circumstances” and “‘in rare instances ... to protect the public interest.’” Id., at 1338-1339. Just as the District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such relief. Cf. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F. 2d 858, 865 (CA Fed. 1984) (recognizing the “considerable discretion” district courts have “in determining whether the facts of a situation require it to issue an injunction”).
Because we conclude that neither court below correctly applied the traditional four-factor framework that governs the award of injunctive relief, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, so that the District Court may apply that framework in the first instance. In doing so, we take no position on whether permanent injunctive relief should or should not issue in this particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes arising under the Patent Act. We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
EBay and Half.eom continue to challenge the validity of Mere-Exchange’s patent in proceedings pending before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
Section 283 provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
10
] | sc_certreason |
MASTRO PLASTICS CORP. et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
No. 19.
Argued October 17, 1955.
Decided February 27, 1956.
Bernard H. Fitzpatrick argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Theophil C. Kammholz and David P. Findling.
Mr. Justice Bukton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents two principal questions: (1) whether, in the collective-bargaining contract before us, the union’s undertaking “to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement” waives not only the employees’ right to strike for economic benefits but also their right to strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers, and (2) whether § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, deprives individuals of their status as employees if, within the waiting period prescribed by § 8 (d) (4), they engage in a strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers. For the reasons hereafter stated, we answer each in the negative.
Mastro Plastics Corp. and French-American Reeds Manufacturing Co., Inc., petitioners herein, are New York corporations which, in 1949 and 1950, were engaged in interstate commerce, manufacturing, selling and distributing plastic articles, including reeds and other accessories for musical instruments. They operated in the City of New York within the same plant, under the same management and with the same employees. For collective bargaining, their employees were represented by Local 22045, American Federation of Labor, or by Local 3127, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL. These locals occupied the same office and used the services of the same representatives. During the period in question, the right of representation of petitioners’ employees was transferred back and forth between them for reasons not material here. Accordingly, they are referred to in this opinion as the “Carpenters.”
In August 1950, Local 65 of the Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union began a campaign among petitioners’ employees in an effort to become their collective-bargaining representative. Petitioners bitterly opposed the movement, believing Local 65 to be Communist-controlled. Feeling that the Carpenters were too weak to cope successfully with Local 65, petitioners asked the Carpenters to transfer their bargaining rights to Local 318, International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, AFL. When the Carpenters declined to do so, petitioners selected a committee of employees to visit 318, obtain membership cards and seek members for that union. The cards were distributed during working hours and petitioners paid their employees for time spent in the campaign, including attendance at a meeting of 318. Petitioners’ officers and supervisors instructed employees to sign these cards and indicated that those refusing to do so would be “out.”
September 28, Local 65 filed with the National Labor Relations Board its petition for certification as bargaining representative. October 24, Local 318 intervened in the representation proceedings and asked that it be certified. However, many employees revoked their applications for membership in 318 and reaffirmed their adherence to the Carpenters. This was followed on October 31 by the Carpenters’ refusal to consent to an election on the ground that petitioners had unlawfully assisted 318 in the campaign.
November 10, 1950, a crisis developed when the president of petitioners summarily discharged Frank Ciccone, an employee of over four years’ standing, because of the latter’s activity in support of the Carpenters and his opposition to 318. We accept the finding of the National Labor Relations Board that petitioners “discriminatorily discharged, and thereafter refused to reinstate, Frank Ciccone because of his organizational activities in support of the . . . [Carpenters].” This discharge at once precipitated the strike which is before us and which the Board found “was clearly caused and prolonged by the cumulative effects of the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices culminating in the discriminatory discharge of Ciccone.” There was no disorder but the plant was virtually shut down until December 11 and it was March 9, 1951, before the Carpenters, on behalf of petitioners’ employees, made an unconditional request to return to work. Petitioners ignored that request and neither Ciccone nor any of the other 76 striking employees has been reinstated.
While the strike against petitioners’ unfair labor practices continued, the collective-bargaining contract between petitioners and the Carpenters approached its expiration date of November 30, 1950, and, apart from the above-described organizational controversy, the Carpenters had taken timely steps to secure modification of their agreement. October 10, they had delivered to petitioners a notice (dated September 29, 1950) “requesting modification” of the contract. They thus had started the statutory negotiating period running as prescribed by the above-mentioned § 8 (d). The Carpenters met several times with petitioners and pressed their demands for changes in the contract but the expiration date passed without any agreement being reached.
In January 1951, the Carpenters initiated the present proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board by charging petitioners with unfair labor practices. Acting on those charges, the Board’s general counsel filed a complaint alleging petitioners’ support of Local 318 and discharge of numerous employees, including Ciccone, as violations of § 8 (a)(1), (2) and (3) of the Act.
Petitioners admitted that they had discharged the employees in question and had not rehired them. They denied, however, that in so doing they had committed any unfair labor practices. Their first affirmative defense was that the waiver of the right to strike, expressed by their employees in their collective-bargaining contract, applied to strikes not only for economic benefits but to any and all strikes by such employees, including strikes directed solely against unfair labor practices of the employer.
Petitioners’ other principal defense was that the existing strike began during the statutory waiting period initiated by the employees’ request for modification of the contract and that, by virtue of § 8 (d) of the Act, the strikers had lost their status as employees. That defense turned upon petitioners’ interpretation of § 8 (d), applying it not only to strikes for economic benefits but to any and all strikes occurring during the waiting period, including strikes solely against unfair labor practices of the employer.
The trial examiner made findings of fact sustaining the complaint and recommended that petitioners be ordered to cease and desist from the interference complained of and be required to offer to Ciccone and the 76 other discharged employees full reinstatement, together with back pay for Ciccone from November 10, 1950, and for the other employees from March 9,1951. See 103 N. L. R. B. 511, 526-563. With minor modifications, the Board adopted the examiner’s findings and conclusions and issued the recommended order. 103 N. L. R. B. 511. The chairman and one member dissented in part.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting in part, accepted the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and enforced the Board’s order. 214 F. 2d 462. Since then, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. Labor Board v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F. 2d 126. Because of the importance of the issues in industrial relations and in the interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we granted certiorari. 348 U. S. 910.
Apart from the issues raised by petitioners’ affirmative defenses, the proceedings reflect a flagrant example of interference by the employers with the expressly protected right of their employees to select their own bargaining representative. The findings disclose vigorous efforts by the employers to influence and even to coerce their employees to abandon the Carpenters as their bargaining representatives and to substitute Local 318. Accordingly, unless petitioners sustain at least one of their affirmative defenses, they must suffer the consequences of their unfair labor practices violating §8 (a) (1), (2) or (3) of the Act, as amended.
In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, petitioners’ unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly strike that occurred here. Under those circumstances, the striking employees do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made. Failure of the Board to enjoin petitioners’ illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to strike against that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act. See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 673. While we assume that the employees, by explicit contractual provision, could have waived their right to strike against such unfair labor practices and that Congress, by explicit statutory provision, could have deprived strikers, under the circumstances of this case, of their status as employees, the questions before us are whether or not such a waiver was made by the Carpenters in their 1949-1950 contract and whether or not such a deprivation of status was enacted by Congress in § 8 (d) of the Act, as amended in 1947.
I. Does the collective-bargaining contract waive the employees’ right to strike against the unfair labor practices committed by their employers? The answer turns upon the proper interpretation of the particular contract before us. Like other contracts, it must be read as a whole and in the light of the law relating to it when made.
“. . . we have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.” Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. S, 325 U. S. 797, 806.
This contract was made in the light of that declared policy. A similar dual purpose is emphasized as follows in § 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended:
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.” 61 Stat. 137, 29 U. S. C. § 151. See also, the declaration of policy in § 1 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 17. S. C. § 141 (b).
The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon assurance of “full freedom of association.” Only after that is assured can the parties turn to effective negotiation as a means of maintaining “the normal flow of commerce and . . . the full production of articles and commodities . . . .” 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. § 141 (b).
On the premise of fair representation, collective-bargaining contracts frequently have included certain waivers of the employees' right to strike and of the employers’ right to lockout to enforce their respective economic demands during the term of those contracts. Provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce and to the maintenance of regular production schedules. Individuals violating such clauses appropriately lose their status as employees.
The waiver in the contract before us, upon which petitioners rely, is as follows:
“5. The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be no interference of any kind with the operations of the Employers, or any interruptions or slackening of production of work by any of its members. The Union further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement.”
That clause expresses concern for the continued operation of the plant and has a natural application to strikes and work stoppages involving the subject matter of the contract.
Conceding that the words “in any strike or work stoppage during the [one-year] term of this agreement,” if read in complete isolation, may include all strikes and work stoppages of every nature, yet the trial examiner, the Board and the Court of Appeals agree that those words do not have that scope when read in their context and in the light of the law under which the contract was made. This unanimity of interpretation is entitled to much weight.
Petitioners argue that the words “any strike” leave no room for interpretation and necessarily include all strikes, even those against unlawful practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining must rest. We disagree. We believe that the contract, taken as a whole, deals solely with the economic relationship between the employers and their employees. It is a typical collective-bargaining contract dealing with terms of employment and the normal operations of the plant. It is for one year and assumes the existence of a lawfully designated bargaining representative. Its strike and lockout clauses are natural adjuncts of an operating policy aimed at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts to change existing economic relationships. The main function of arbitration under the contract is to provide a mechanism for avoiding similar stoppages due to disputes over the meaning and application of the various contractual provisions.
To adopt petitioners’ all-inclusive interpretation of the clause is quite a different matter. That interpretation would eliminate, for the whole year, the employees’ right to strike, even if petitioners, by coercion, ousted the em--ployees’ lawful bargaining representative and, by threats of discharge, caused the employees to sign membership cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the legality of such a waiver when explicitly stated, there is no adequate basis for implying its existence without a more compelling expression of it than appears in § 5 of this contract.
There has been no court decision called to our attention which has held that the employees’ right to strike against unfair labor practices has been waived by language such as that which is before us. On the other hand, prior to such contract, such language had been held by the Board to apply appropriately to economic strikes with consequent loss of employee status.
It is suggested that § 13 of the Act, as amended, precludes reliance by the Board upon the Act for support of its interpretation of the strike-waiver clause. That section provides that “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. § 163. On the basis of the above language, petitioners claim that because the contract-waiver clause prohibits all strikes of every nature, nothing in the Act may be construed to affect the “limitations or qualifications” which the contract thus places on that right. Such a claim assumes the point at issue. The Board relies upon the context of the contract and upon the language of the clause itself, rather than upon the statute, to define the kind of strike that is waived.
As a matter of fact, the initial provision in § 13 that nothing in the Act “shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike” adds emphasis to the Board's insistence upon preserving the employees' right to strike to protect their freedom of concerted action. Inasmuch as strikes against unfair labor practices are not anywhere specifically excepted from lawful strikes, § 13 adds emphasis to the congressional recognition of their propriety.
For the reasons stated above and those given by the Board and the court below, we conclude that the contract did not waive the employees’ right to strike solely against the unfair labor practices of their employers.
II. Does § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, deprive individuals of their status as employees if, within the waiting period prescribed by § 8 (d)(4), they engage in a strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers ? Here again the background is the dual purpose of the Act (1) to protect the right of employees to be free to take concerted action as provided in §§ 7 and 8 (a), and (2) to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours of work and employment conditions. Section 8 (d) seeks to bring about the termination and modification of collective-bargaining agreements without interrupting the flow of commerce or the production of goods, while §§ 7 and 8 (a) seek to insure freedom of concerted action by employees at all times.
The language in § 8 (d) especially relied upon by petitioners is as follows: “Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended . . . 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
Petitioners contend that the above words must be so read that employees who engage in any strike, regardless of its purpose, within the 60-day waiting period, thereby lose their status as employees. That interpretation would deprive Ciccone and his fellow strikers of their rights to reinstatement and would require the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, “In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.” United States v. Boisdoré’s Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622-623; Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U. S. 216, and United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 542-543.
Reading the clause in conjunction with the rest of § 8, the Board points out that “the sixty-day period” referred to is the period mentioned in paragraph (4) of § 8 (d). That paragraph requires the party giving notice of a desire to “terminate or modify” such a contract, as part of its obligation to bargain under § 8 (a) (5) or § 8 (b) (3), to continue “in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.” Section 8 (d) thus seeks, during this natural renegotiation period, to relieve the parties from the economic pressure of a strike or lockout in relation to the subjects of negotiation. The final clause of § 8 (d) also warns employees that, if they join a proscribed strike, they shall thereby lose their status as employees and, consequently, their right to reinstatement.
The Board reasons that the words which provide the key to a proper interpretation of § 8 (d) with respect to this problem are “termination or modification.” Since the Board expressly found that the instant strike was not to terminate or modify the contract, but was designed instead to protest the unfair labor practices of petitioners, the loss-of-status provision of § 8 (d) is not applicable. We sustain that interpretation. Petitioners’ construction would produce incongruous results. It concedes that prior to the 60-day negotiating period, employees have a right to strike against unfair labor practices designed to oust the employees’ bargaining representative, yet petitioners’ interpretation of § 8 (d) means that if the employees give the 60-day notice of their desire to modify the contract, they are penalized for exercising that right to strike. This would deprive them of their most effective weapon at a time when their need for it is obvious. Although the employees’ request to modify the contract would demonstrate their need for the services of their freely chosen representative, petitioners’ interpretation would have the incongruous effect of cutting off the employees’ freedom to strike against unfair labor practices aimed at that representative. This would relegate the employees to filing charges under a procedure too slow to be effective. The result would unduly favor the employers and handicap the employees during negotiation periods contrary to the purpose of the Act. There also is inherent inequity in any interpretation that penalizes one party to a contract for conduct induced solely by the unlawful conduct of the other, thus giving advantage to the wrongdoer.
Petitioners contend that, unless the loss-of-status clause is applicable to unfair labor practice strikes, as well as to economic strikes, it adds nothing to the existing law relating to loss of status. Assuming that to be so, the clause is justifiable as a clarification of the law and as a warning to employees against engaging in economic strikes during the statutory waiting period. Moreover, in the face of the affirmative emphasis that is placed by the Act upon freedom of concerted action and freedom of choice of representatives, any limitation on the employees’ right to strike against violations of §§ 7 and 8 (a), protecting those freedoms, must be more explicit and clear than it is here in order to restrict them at the very time they may be most needed.
There is sufficient ambiguity here to permit consideration of relevant legislative history. While such history provides no conclusive answer, it is consistent with the view taken by the Board and by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits.
Senator Ball, who was a manager for the 1947 amendments in the Senate and one of the conferees on the bill, stated that § 8 (d) made mandatory what was already good practice and was aimed at preventing such interruptions of production as the “quickie strikes” occasionally used to gain economic advantages.
“The provision in the National Labor Relations Act defining collective bargaining, and providing that where a contract between a union and an employer is in existence, fulfilling the obligation on both sides to protect [bargain] collectively means giving at least 60 days’ notice of the termination of the contract, or of the desire for any change in it, is another provision aimed primarily at protecting the public, as well as the employee, who have been the victims of 'quickie’ strikes. I do not think that is taking away any rights of labor ... it is simply saying that they should all follow the sound, fair, and sane procedure which a majority of the good ones now follow.” 93 Cong. Rec. 5014.
One minority report suggested a fear that § 8 (d) would be applicable to unfair practice strikes. The suggestion, however, was not even made the subject of comment by the majority reports or in the debates. An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority and thus, indirectly, amend a bill.
The record shows that the supporters of the bill were aware of the established practice which distinguished between the effect on employees of engaging in economic strikes and that of engaging in unfair practice strikes. If Congress had wanted to modify that practice, it could readily have done so by specific provision. Congress cannot fairly be held to have made such an intrusion on employees’ rights, as petitioners claim, without some more explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here.
Finally, petitioners seek support for their interpretation of § 8 (d) from the fact that its last clause makes a cross-reference to §§ 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. Such reference does not expand the scope of § 8 (d). It merely makes it clear that if % 8 (d) is violated by the employees to whom it applies, then they lose their status as employees for the purposes of §§ 8, 9 and 10.
As neither the collective-bargaining contract nor § 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, stands in the way, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
61 Stat. 140, 142-143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
In December, Locals 318 and 65 withdrew their representation proceedings from before the Board and the Carpenters (through Local 3127) filed its own representation proceeding. January 29, 1951, the Board issued a direction of election in the latter proceeding but, after the Carpenters filed charges of unfair practices, the Board postponed the holding of any election until the regional director might deem it proper.
103 N. L. R. B. 511, 512, and see 214 F. 2d 462, 464.
103 N. L. R. B., at 513. See also, the following findings of the trial examiner:
"... the purpose of the strike was to protest and seek to remedy the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices. The record does not support a finding that the strike also had as an additional objective the termination or modification of the existing contract. It is true that demands for contract changes had previously been presented to the [petitioners], and there had been some discussion at meetings of Local 22045 or Local 3127 of a possible strike if such demands were not met. But no strike vote on that issue had ever been taken, nor was any strike action otherwise determined upon. On the record as a whole, I am fully satisfied, and I find, that the strike which immediately followed Ciccone’s discharge was unplanned and began as a spontaneous demonstration by employees of their protest of the [petitioners’] unfair labor practices. Nor does the record reflect that its character changed after it began to one where the strikers were seeking to compel changes or modifications in economic terms or conditions of employment. There is no evidence that any negotiations were conducted or overtures made along such lines at any time after the commencement of the strike. The [petitioners] at the hearing made no such claim, and offered no evidence to establish that the strike had any purpose other than, or in addition to, that claimed by the General Counsel.” 103 N. L. R. B., at 560. These were adopted by the Board, id., at 511-512, and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, 214 F. 2d, at 465.
103 N. L. R. B., at 560 and 512, n. 2.
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested b^ either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided,, That where,there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification—
“(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
“(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
“(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
“(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
“The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9 (a), and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer.” (Emphasis supplied except for the word “Provided") 61 Stat. 140, 142-143, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d).
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).
“Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ;
“ (2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: . . .
“(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 158 (a) (1), (2) and (3).
See note 6, supra.
Before the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, see Labor Board v. Poultrymen’s Service Corp., 138 F. 2d 204, 210; Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 130 F. 2d 919, 927-928; Labor Board v. Moore-Lowry Flour Mills Co., 122 F. 2d 419, 426; Ritzwoller Co. v. Labor Board, 114 F. 2d 432, 437; Labor Board v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F. 2d 780, 792; Labor Board v. Boss Manufacturing Co., 107 F. 2d 574, 579; Labor Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. 2d 533, 535; Labor Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 871. Since the 1947 amendments, see Labor Board v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F. 2d 902, 907-908; Labor Board v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8, 16-17.
See Dyson & Sons, 72 N. L. R. B. 445, 457; ScvUin Steel Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 1294, enforced as modified, 161 F. 2d 143. While these cases were decided under the Act before its 1947 amendments, there is nothing in the amendments to suggest their subsequent inapplicability. Both are referred to with approval in the House Conference Report on the 1947 amendments. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 39. See also, 93 Cong. Rec. 6442. But see National Electric Products Corp., 80 N. L. R. B. 995, distinguished by the Board in the instant case, 103 N. L. R. B., at 514.
While two members of the Board and one of the Court of Appeals disagreed with their respective majorities as to petitioners’ defense based upon § 8 (d), no member of either body has expressed a dissent from the Board’s interpretation of the contract.
The preamble states that “the parties hereto desire to enter into an agreement relating to the rates of pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment which will provide methods of harmonious co-operation between the Employers and their employees and to that end accomplish fair and peaceful adjustments which may arise without interruption of the Employers’ businesses
The balance of the contract relates to: (1) Limitation of employment to union members in good standing; definitions of exempt employees and union shop; (2) Availability of arbitration, under § 19, in disputes as to failures to maintain union memberships; (3) Checkoff of union dues; (4) Exempt employees and new employees; (5) Strike waiver as quoted in text; (6) Lockout waiver as follows: “The Employers agree that there shall be no lockout during the term of this agreement." (7) Arbitration, under § 19, to determine whether a strike, work stoppage or lockout has actually occurred; (8) Probationary periods for new employees; (9) Employers to have control over plant production and business requirements resulting in layoffs, furloughs or intra-plant transfers; (10) Employee seniority; (11) Hours of work; (12) Work weeks and extra shifts; (13) Rest periods; (14) Overtime; (15) Holidays; (16) Rates of pay and wage incentives; (17) Contract not to be interpreted so as to reduce wages, standards or working conditions; (18) Union officers who are active employees and union stewards governed by plant rules; (19) (a) Disputes as to meaning and application of the contract are subject to arbitration; (b) Rights of employees to present grievances to their employers are assured; (20) Notice of work days; (21) Vacations; (22) Employers’ rights to manage plant and to discharge employees “for proper cause” preserved; union to cooperate with employers in interest of employee efficiency; (23) A specific wage increase is prescribed in lieu of an increase recently awarded by arbitration; (24) Effective December 1, 1949 — November 30, 1950, with 60-day notice of intention to modify or terminate, and in such event “negotiations shall be promptly started.”
See note 10, supra.
See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S., at 673.
See note 7, supra.
See note 6, supra.
Although the notice required to put the 60-day waiting period into operation in this case was not delivered until 51. days before the expiration of the contract, it was dated more than 60 days before such expiration date and it has been treated by all concerned as putting the waiting period into effect.
See note 4, supra.
See Note, 53 Col. L. Rev. 1023,1025.
With the exception of one suggestion in a minority report, which is discussed elsewhere, the relevant committee reports describe the provisions of § 8 (d) as being applicable to economic strikes and do not suggest their applicability to strikes against unfair labor practices in violation of §§ 7 and 8 (a). S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35.
S. Rep. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22; 93 Cong. Rec. 6385, 4036, 6503.
“The fears and doubts of the opposition are no authoritative guide to the construction of legislation. It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395, and see S. H. Camp & Co. v. Labor Board, 160 F. 2d 519, 521.
“. . . to hold that a worker who because of an unfair labor practice has . . . gone on strike is no longer an employee, would be to give legal sanction to an illegal act and to deny redress to the individual injured thereby.” S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7.
For example, Senator Ball proposed an amendment, to the definition of “employee” in § 2 (3) of the Act, which unintentionally might have abrogated the distinction which favored the employees’ right to engage in unfair practice strikes as against economic strikes, but at once withdrew the amendment as going “too far,” when this possible effect of it was brought to his attention. 93 Cong. Rec. 1827-1828.
See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether the petitioning party (i.e., the plaintiff or the appellant) emerged victorious. The victory the Supreme Court provided the petitioning party may not have been total and complete (e.g., by vacating and remanding the matter rather than an unequivocal reversal), but the disposition is nonetheless a favorable one. Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. | Consider that the petitioning party lost if the Supreme Court affirmed or dismissed the case, or denied the petition. Consider that the petitioning party won in part or in full if the Supreme Court reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed and reversed in part, affirmed and reversed in part and remanded, or vacated the case. Did the petitioning win the case? | [
"Yes",
"No"
] | [
1
] | sc_partywinning |
LANDON, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. PLASENCIA
No. 81-129.
Argued October 5, 1982
Decided November 15, 1982
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 37.
Elliott Schulder argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee and Deputy Solicitor General Getter.
Gary H. Manulkin argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Following an exclusion hearing, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) denied the respondent, a permanent resident alien, admission to the United States when she attempted to return from a brief visit abroad. Reviewing the respondent’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals vacated the decision, holding that the question whether the respondent was attempting to “enter” the United States could be litigated only in a deportation hearing and not in an exclusion hearing. Because we conclude that the INS has statutory authority to proceed in an exclusion hearing, we reverse the judgment below. We remand to allow the Court of Appeals to consider whether the respondent, a permanent resident alien, was accorded due process at the exclusion hearing.
I
Respondent Maria Antonieta Plasencia, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States as a permanent resident alien in March 1970. She established a home in Los Angeles with her husband, a United States citizen, and their minor children. On June 27, 1975, she and her husband traveled to Tijuana, Mexico. During their brief stay in Mexico, they met with several Mexican and Salvadoran nationals and made arrangements to assist their illegal entry into the United States. She agreed to transport the aliens to Los Angeles and furnished some of the aliens with alien registration receipt cards that belonged to her children. When she and her husband attempted to cross the international border at 9:27 on the evening of June 29, 1975, an INS officer at the port of entry found six nonresident aliens in the Plasencias’ car. The INS detained the respondent for further inquiry pursuant to § 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Act), 66 Stat. 182, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. In a notice dated June 30, 1975, the INS charged her under §212(a)(31) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(31), which provides for the exclusion of any alien seeking admission “who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law,” and gave notice that it would hold an exclusion hearing at 11 a. m. on June 30, 1975.
An Immigration Law Judge conducted the scheduled exclusion hearing. After hearing testimony from the respondent, her husband, and three of the aliens found in the Plasencias’ car, the judge found “clear, convincing and unequivocal” evidence that the respondent did “knowingly and for gain encourage, induce, assist, abet, or aid nonresident aliens” to enter or try to enter the United States in violation of law. He also found that the respondent’s trip to Mexico was a “meaningful departure” from the United States and that her return to this country was therefore an “entry” within the meaning of § 101(a)(13), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13). On the basis of these findings, he ordered her “excluded and deported.”
After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her administrative appeal and denied her motion to reopen the proceeding, the respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, seeking release from the exclusion and deportation order. The Magistrate initially proposed a finding that, on the basis of evidence adduced at the exclusion hearing, “a meaningful departure did not occur . . . and that therefore [the respondent] is entitled to a deportation hearing.” After considering the Government’s objections, the Magistrate declared that the Government could relitigate the question of “entry” at the deportation hearing. The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s final report and recommendation and vacated the decision of the BIA, instructing the INS to proceed against respondent, if at all, only in deportation proceedings.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Plasencia v. Sureck, 637 F. 2d 1286 (1980).
► — I
The immigration laws create two types of proceedings in which aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United States: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings. See generally Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 187 (1958). The deportation hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien already physically in the United States, and the exclusion hearing is the usual means of proceeding against an alien outside the United States seeking admission. The two types of proceedings differ in a number of ways. See generally Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS, 518 F. 2d 278, 280, n. 3 (CA9 1975). An exclusion proceeding is usually held at the port of entry, while a deportation hearing is usually held near the residence of the alien within the United States, see 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.6c (rev. ed. 1981). The regulations of the Attorney General, issued under the authority of § 242(b), 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b), require in most deportation proceedings that the alien be given seven days’ notice of the charges against him, 8 CFR §242.1(b) (1982), while there is no requirement of advance notice of the charges for an alien subject to exclusion proceedings. Indeed, the BIA has held that, “as long as the applicant is informed of the issues confronting him at some point in the hearing, and he is given a reasonable opportunity to meet them,” no further notice is necessary. In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (1979). Also, if the INS prevails in a deportation proceeding, the alien may appeal directly to the court of appeals, § 106(a), 75 Stat. 651, as amended, 8 U. S. C. §1105a(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. V), while the alien can challenge an exclusion order only by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, § 106(b), 75 Stat. 653, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(b). Finally, the alien who loses his right to reside in the United States in a deportation hearing has a number of substantive rights not available to the alien who is denied admission in an exclusion proceeding: he can, within certain limits, designate the country of deportation, § 243(a), 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. V); he may be able to depart voluntarily, § 244(e), 8 U. S. C. § 1254(e) (1976 ed., Supp. V), avoiding both the stigma of deportation, § 242(b), 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b) (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and the limitations on his selection of destination, § 243(a), 8 U. S. C. § 1253(a) (1976 ed. and Supp. V); or he can seek suspension of deportation, § 242(e), 8 U. S. C. § 1252(e) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The respondent contends that she was entitled to have the question of her admissibility litigated in a deportation hearing, where she would be the beneficiary of the procedural protections and the substantive rights outlined above. Our analysis of whether she is entitled to a deportation rather than an exclusion hearing begins with the language of the Act. Section 285(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225(a), permits the INS to examine “[ajll aliens” who seek “admission or readmission to” the United States and empowers immigration officers to take evidence concerning the privilege of any person suspected of being an alien “to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside” in the United States. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, “every alien” who does not appear “to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained” for further inquiry. § 285(b). If an alien is so detained, the Act directs the special inquiry officer to determine whether the arriving alien “shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.” § 236(a), 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a). The proceeding before that officer, the exclusion hearing, is by statute “the sole and exclusive procedure for determining admissibility of a person to the United States . . . .” Ibid.
The Act’s legislative history also emphasizes the singular role of exclusion hearings in determining whether an alien should be admitted. The Reports of both the House and Senate state:
“The special inquiry officer is empowered to determine whether an alien detained for further inquiry shall be excluded and deported or shall be allowed to enter after he has given the alien a hearing. The procedure established in the bill is made the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the admissibility of a person to the United States.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 56 (1952).
The language and history of the Act thus clearly reflect a congressional intent that, whether or not the alien is a permanent resident, admissibility shall be determined in an exclusion hearing. Nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history suggests that the respondent’s status as a permanent resident entitles her to a suspension of the exclusion hearing or requires the INS to proceed only through a deportation hearing. Under the terms of the Act, the INS properly proceeded in an exclusion hearing to determine whether respondent was attempting to “enter” the United States and whether she was excludable.
HH HH
To avoid the impact of the statute, the respondent contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that unless she was “entering,” she was not subject to exclusion proceedings, and that prior decisions of this Court indicate that she is entitled to have the question of “entry” decided in deportation proceedings.
The parties agree that only “entering” aliens are subject to exclusion. See Brief for Petitioner 19. That view accords with the language of the statute, which describes the exclusion hearing as one to determine whether the applicant “shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported.” § 236(a), 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). But the respondent’s contention that the question of entry can be determined only in deportation proceedings reflects a misconception of our decisions.
In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449 (1963), we faced the question whether a resident alien’s return from an afternoon trip across the border was an “entry” for immigration law purposes. The definition of that term was the same then as it is now: it means “any coming of an alien into the United States . . . except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him . . . § 101(a)(13), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13). We held in Fleuti that the “intent exception” refers to an intent to depart in a “manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence.” 374 U.S, at 462. Thus, an “innocent, casual, and brief excursion” by a resident alien outside this country’s borders would not subject him to the consequences of an “entry” on his return. Ibid. If, however, “the purpose of leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of residence thereby occurring would properly be regarded as meaningful.” Ibid. That distinction both protects resident aliens from “unsuspected risks and unintended consequences of. . . a wholly innocent action,” ibid., and gives effect to the language of § 101(a)(13).
The Government has argued in this case that Plasencia violated the immigration laws by attempting to smuggle aliens for gain. Therefore, her departure was “meaningfully interruptive” of her residence, she was attempting an “entry,” and she was subject to exclusion proceedings. And, the Government urges, under §212(a)(31), 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(31), she was excludable because she had attempted to smuggle aliens for gain. Plasencia, on the other hand, argues that it would “violat[e] both the scope and spirit,” Brief for Respondent 15, of Fleuti to permit the INS to litigate questions of “entry” in exclusion proceedings.
The Court of Appeals viewed Fleuti as a deportation case rather than an exclusion case, 637 F. 2d, at 1288, and therefore not relevant in deciding whether the question of “entry” could be determined in exclusion proceedings. For guidance on that decision, the Court of Appeals turned to Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590 (1953), which it read to hold that a resident alien returning from a brief trip “could not be excluded without the procedural due process to which he would have been entitled had he never left the country”— i. e., in this case, a deportation proceeding. 637 F. 2d, at 1288. The court concluded that Plasencia was entitled to litigate her admissibility in deportation proceedings. It would be “circular” and “unfair,” thought the court, to allow the INS to litigate the question of “entry” in exclusion proceedings when that question also went to the merits of the respondent’s admissibility. Id., at 1288-1289.
We disagree. The reasoning of Chew was only that a resident alien returning from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously present resident alien. It does not create a right to identical treatment for these two differently situated groups of aliens. As the Ninth Circuit seemed to recognize, if the respondent here was making an “entry,” she would be subject to exclusion proceedings. It is no more “circular” to allow the immigration judge in the exclusion proceeding to determine whether the alien is making an entry than it is for any court to decide that it has jurisdiction when the facts relevant to the determination of jurisdiction are also relevant to the merits. Thus, in United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161 (1904), this Court held that an immigration inspector could make a determination whether an applicant for admission was an alien or a citizen, although only aliens were subject to exclusion. Cf. Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 739 (1947) (district court has jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction by proceeding to a decision on the merits). Nor is it in any way “unfair” to decide the question of entry in exclusion proceedings as long as those proceedings themselves are fair. Finally, the use of exclusion proceedings violates neither the “scope” nor the “spirit” of Fleuti. As the Court of Appeals held, that case only defined “entry” and did not designate the forum for deciding questions of entry. The statutory scheme is clear: Congress intended that the determinations of both “entry” and the existence of grounds for exclusion could be made at an exclusion hearing.
> HH
Our determination that the respondent is not entitled to a deportation proceeding does not, however, resolve this case. In challenging her exclusion in the District Court, Plasencia argued not only that she was entitled to a deportation proceeding but also that she was denied due process in her exclusion hearing. See App. 5, ¶ 9; Record 19, 20, 23. We agree with Plasencia that under the circumstances of this case, she can invoke the Due Process Clause on returning to this country, although we do not decide the contours of the process that is due or whether the process accorded Plasencia was insufficient.
This Court has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659-660 (1892). Our recent decisions confirm that view. See, e. g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753 (1972). As we explained in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 770 (1950), however, once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly. Our cases have frequently suggested that a continuously present resident alien is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation, see, e. g., United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131, 133, 134 (1924); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 468 (1912) (hearing may be conclusive “when fairly conducted”); see also Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U. S., at 598, n. 8, and, although we have only rarely held that the procedures provided by the executive were inadequate, we developed the rule that a continuously present permanent resident alien has a right to due process in such a situation. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 106 (1927); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86,100-101 (1903); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 153-154 (1945).
The question of the procedures due a returning resident alien arose in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, supra. There, the regulations permitted the exclusion of an arriving alien without a hearing. We interpreted those regulations not to apply to Chew, a permanent resident alien who was returning from a 5-month voyage abroad as a crewman on an American merchant ship. We reasoned that, “[f ]or purposes of his constitutional right to due process, we assimilate petitioner’s status to that of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States.” 344 U. S., at 596. Then, to avoid constitutional problems, we construed the regulation as inapplicable. Although the holding was one of regulatory interpretation, the rationale was one of constitutional law. Any doubts that Chew recognized constitutional rights in the resident alien returning from a brief trip abroad were dispelled by Rosenberg v. Fleuti, where we described Chew as holding “that the returning resident alien is entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing on the charges underlying any attempt to exclude him.” 374 U. S., at 460.
If the permanent resident alien’s absence is extended, of course, he may lose his entitlement to “assimilation of his] status,” Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, supra, at 596, to that of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206 (1953), this Court rejected the argument of an alien who had left the country for some 20 months that he was entitled to due process in assessing his right to admission on his return. We did not suggest that no returning resident alien has a right to due process, for we explicitly reaffirmed Chew. We need not now decide the scope of Mezei; it does not govern this case, for Plasencia was absent from the country only a few days, and the United States has conceded that she has a right to due process, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 9, 14; Brief for Petitioner 9-10, 20-21.
The constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided in any situation, of course, varies with the circumstances. See, e. g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U. S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 12 (1979); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current procedures rather than additional or different procedures. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 334-335 (1976). Plasencia’s interest here is, without question, a weighty one. She stands to lose the right “to stay and live and work in this land of freedom,” Bridges v. Wixon, supra, at 154. Further, she may lose the right, to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual. See, e. g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 499, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972). The Government’s interest in efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border also is weighty. Further, it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature. See, e. g., Fiallo, supra, at 792-793; Knauff, supra, at 542-543; The Japanese Immigrant Case, supra, at 97. The role of the judiciary is limited to determining whether the procedures meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to imposing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of policy. Our previous discussion has shown that Congress did not intend to require the use of deportation procedures in cases such as this one. Thus, it would be improper simply to impose deportation procedures here because the reviewing court may find them preferable. Instead, the courts must evaluate the particular circumstances and determine what procedures would satisfy the minimum requirements of due process on the reentry of a permanent resident alien.
Plasencia questions three aspects of the procedures that the Government employed in depriving her of these interests. First, she contends that the Immigration Law Judge placed the burden of proof upon her. In a later proceeding in Chew, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, without mention of the Due Process Clause, that, under the law of the case, Chew was entitled to a hearing at which the INS was the moving party and bore the burden of proof. Kwong Hai Chew v. Rogers, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 228, 257 F. 2d 606 (1958). The BIA has accepted that decision, and although the Act provides that the burden of proof is on the alien in an exclusion proceeding, § 291, 8 U. S. C. § 1361 (1976 ed., Supp. Y), the BIA has followed the practice of placing the burden on the Government when the alien is a permanent resident alien. See, e. g., In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 169; In re Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. 258, 264 (BIA 1975); In re Becerra-Miranda, 12 I. & N. Dec. 358, 363-364, 366 (BIA 1967). There is no explicit statement of the placement of the burden of proof in the Attorney General’s regulations or in the Immigration Law Judge’s opinion in this case and no finding on the issue below.
Second, Plasencia. contends that the notice provided her was inadequate. She apparently had less than 11 hours’ notice of the charges and the hearing. The regulations do not require any advance notice of the charges against the alien in an exclusion hearing, and the BIA has held that it is sufficient that the alien have notice of the charges at the hearing, In re Salazar, supra, at 169. The United States has argued to us that Plasencia could have sought a continuance. It concedes, however, that there is no explicit statutory or regulatory authorization for a continuance.
Finally, Plasencia contends that she was allowed to waive her right to representation, § 292, 8 U. S. C. § 1362, without a full understanding of the right or of the consequences of waiving it. Through an interpreter, the Immigration Law Judge informed her at the outset of the hearing, as required by the regulations, of her right to be represented. He did not tell her of the availability of free legal counsel, but at the time of the hearing, there was no administrative requirement that he do so. 8 CFR § 236.2(a) (1975). The Attorney General has since revised the regulations to require that, when qualified free legal services are available, the immigration law judge must inform the alien of their existence and ask whether representation is desired. 44 Fed. Reg. 4654 (1979) (codified at 8 CFR § 236.2(a) (1982)). As the United States concedes, the hearing would not comply with the current regulations. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.
If the exclusion hearing is to ensure fairness, it must provide Plasencia an opportunity to present her case effectively, though at the same time it cannot impose an undue burden on the Government. It would not, however, be appropriate for us to decide now whether the new regulation on the right to notice of free legal services is of constitutional magnitude or whether the remaining procedures provided comport with the Due Process Clause. Before this Court, the parties have devoted their attention to the entitlement to a deportation hearing rather than to the sufficiency of the procedures in the exclusion hearing. Whether the several hours’ notice gave Plasencia a realistic opportunity to prepare her case for effective presentation in the circumstances of an exclusion hearing without counsel is a question we are not now in a position to answer. Nor has the Government explained the burdens that it might face in providing more elaborate procedures. Thus, although we recognize the gravity of Plasencia’s interest, the other factors relevant to due process analysis — the risk of erroneous deprivation, the efficacy of additional procedural safeguards, and the Government’s interest in providing no further procedures — have not been adequately presented to permit us to assess the sufficiency of the hearing. We remand to the Court of Appeals to allow the parties to explore whether Plasencia was accorded due process under all of the circumstances.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 235, as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1225, provides in part:
(a) “The inspection ... of aliens (including alien crewmen) seeking admission or readmission to . . . the United States shall be conducted by immigration officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to special inquiry officers. All aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such regulations as he may prescribe. ...”
(b) “Every alien . . . who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer.”
The hearing was authorized by § 236(a), which, as set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1226(a), provides:
“A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section, administer oaths, present and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses. He shall have authority in any case to determine whether an arriving alien who has been detained for further inquiry under section 1225 of this title shall be allowed to enter or shall be excluded and deported. The determination of such special inquiry officer shall be based only on the evidence produced at the inquiry. . . . Proceedings before a special inquiry officer under this section shall be conducted in accordance with this section, the applicable provisions of sections 1225 and 1375(b) of this title, and such regulations as the Attorney General shall prescribe, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining admissibility of a person to the United States under the provisions of this section. ... A complete record of the proceedings and of all testimony and evidence produced at such inquiry, shall be kept.”
Section 101(a)(13), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13), defines “entry” as “any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying possession, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purposes of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary: Provided, That no person whose departure from the United States was occasioned by deportation proceedings, extradition, or other legal process shall be held to be entitled to such exception.”
Voluntary departure for an alien who would otherwise be deported also means that he will not be subject to §212(a)(17), 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(17), which, at the time of Plasencia’s hearing, required aliens who had once been deported to seek prior approval of the Attorney General before reentering. There was no comparable requirement of prior approval for aliens who had been excluded and sought again to enter more than one year later. § 212(a)(16), 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(16). The requirement of prior approval for deported aliens now applies only within five years of deportation. 95 Stat. 1612, §212(a)(17), 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(17) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
Apparently the practice of the INS is to determine this question in exclusion proceedings. See In re Leal, 15 I. & N. Dec. 477, 478-479 (BIA 1975); In re Becerra-Miranda, 12 I. & N. Dec. 358, 362-363 (BIA 1967).
Section 101(a)(13), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13), which defines “entry,” was enacted in 1952 in response to the harsh results visited upon resident aliens by earlier restrictive interpretations of the term. Both the House and Senate Reports contained identical explanatory language:
“Normally an entry occurs when the alien crosses the borders of the United States and makes a physical entry, and the question of whether an entry has been made is susceptible of a precise determination. However, for the purposes of determining the effect of a subsequent entry upon the status of an alien who has previously entered the United States and resided therein, the preciseness of the term ‘entry’ has not been found to be as apparent. Earlier judicial constructions of the term in the immigration laws, as set forth in Volpe v. Smith (289 U. S. 422 (1933)), generally held that the term ‘entry’ included any coming of an alien from a foreign country to the United States whether such coming be the first or a subsequent one. More recently, the courts have departed from the rigidity of that rule and have recognized that an alien does not make an entry upon his return to the United States from a foreign country where he had no intent to leave the United States (Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F. 2d 878 (C. C. A. 2d 1947)), or did not leave the country voluntarily (Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388 (1947)). The bill defines the term ‘entry’ as precisely as practicable, giving due recognition to the judicial precedents. Thus any coming of an alien from a foreign port or place or an outlying possession into the United States is to be considered an entry, whether voluntary or otherwise, unless the Attorney General is satisfied that the departure of the alien, other than a deportee, from this country was unintentional or was not voluntary.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 32 (1952).
In Di Pasquale, the court refused to allow a deportation that depended upon an “entry” that occurred after an overnight train on which an alien was a passenger passed through Canada on its way from Buffalo to Detroit. In Delgadillo, the Court refused to define as an “entry” the return of an alien taken to Cuba to recuperate after the merchant ship on which he sailed was torpedoed in the Caribbean diming World War II.
Indeed, we expressly declined to reach the question whether Chew himself was entitled to a deportation proceeding. We stated: “From a constitutional point of view, he is entitled to due process without regard to whether or not, for immigration purposes, he is to be treated as an entrant alien, and we do not now reach the question whether he is to be so treated.” 344 U. S., at 600.
The statute provides a right to representation without expense to the Government. § 292, 8 U. S. C. § 1362. Plasencia has not suggested that she is entitled to free counsel.
Thus, the question of Plasencia’s entitlement to due process has been briefed and argued, is properly before us, and is sufficiently developed that we are prepared to decide it. Precisely what procedures are due, on the other hand, has not been adequately developed by the briefs or argument. The dissent undertakes to decide these questions, but, to do so, must rely heavily on an argument not raised by Plasencia: to wit, that she was not informed at the hearing that the alleged agreement to receive compensation and the meaningfulness of her departure were critical issues. Also, the dissent fails to discuss the interests that the Government may have in employing the procedures that it did. The omission of arguments raised by the parties is quite understandable, for neither Plasencia nor the Government has yet discussed what procedures are due. Unlike the dissent, we would allow the parties to explore their respective interests and arguments in the Court of Appeals. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code",
"due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)",
"due process: hearing, government employees",
"due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights",
"due process: impartial decision maker",
"due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)",
"due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property"
] | [
0
] | sc_issue_4 |
HOPSON et al. v. TEXACO, INC.
No. 818.
Decided February 28, 1966.
Abraham E. Freedman for petitioners.
Harry E. McCoy for respondent.
Per Curiam.
These actions were brought under the Jones Act, as amended (41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1964 ed.)), to recover damages for injuries sustained by one seaman, and for the death of another, as a result of an automobile accident on the island of Trinidad. Judgment on the jury’s verdict was entered in United States District Court in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Court of Appeals reversed. 351 F. 2d 415. We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.
The facts are not in dispute. The two seamen were members of the crew of respondent’s tanker which was docked at respondent’s refinery at Pointe-á-Pierre on the island of Trinidad. Both fell ill and it was determined that they would be unable to continue the voyage. In order to discharge an incapacitated seaman in a foreign port, federal law requires that he be taken to a United States Consul where arrangements for his return to the United States can be made. The United States Consul’s Office was located in Port of Spain, some 38 miles distant. Although respondent had a fleet of motor vehicles used for transportation in the immediate vicinity of the refinery and docking area, its practice was to utilize either of two local taxi companies for journeys to more distant points. The ship’s Master procured one of these cabs which set out for Port of Spain with the two ill seamen. En route, the taxi collided with a truck, killing the Master and one of the seamen; the other seaman was seriously injured. The jury found that the taxi driver had been negligent— a finding challenged neither in the Court of Appeals nor here. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s determination that respondent is liable to petitioners for this negligence of the taxi operator.
The Jones Act incorporates the standards of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, as amended, which renders an employer liable for the injuries negligently inflicted on its employees by its “officers, agents, or employees.” We noted in Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 U. S. 326, that the latter Act was “an avowed departure from the rules of the common law” {id., at 329), which, recognizing “[t]he cost of human injury, an inescapable expense of railroading,” undertook to “adjust that expense equitably between the worker and the carrier.” Ibid. In order to give “an accommodating scope ... to the word ‘agents’” (id., at 330-331), we concluded that “when [an] . . . employee’s injury is caused in whole or in part by the fault of others performing, under contract, operational activities of his employer, such others are ‘agents’ of the employer within the meaning of § 1 of FELA.” {Id., at 331-332).
We think those principles apply with equal force here. These seamen were in the service of the ship and the ill-fated journey to Port of Spain was a vital part of the ship’s total operations. The ship could not sail with these two men, nor could it lawfully discharge them without taking them to the United States Consul. Indeed, to have abandoned them would have breached the statutory duty to arrange for their return to the United States. Getting these two ill seamen to the United States Consul’s office was, therefore, the duty of respondent. And it was respondent — not the seamen — which selected, as it had done many times before, the taxi service. Respondent — the law says — should bear the responsibility for the negligence of the driver which it chose. This is so because, as we said in Sinkler, “justice demands that one who gives his labor to the furtherance of the enterprise should be assured that all combining their exertions with him in the common pursuit will conduct themselves in all respects with sufficient care that his safety while doing his part will not be endangered.” 356 U. S., at 330.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Harlan, believing that Sinkler v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 U. S. 326, should not be extended, dissents.
Rev. Stat. §§ 4578, 4580, 4581, as amended, 46 U. S. C. §§ 679, 682, 683 (1964 ed.).
46 U. S. C. §688 (1964 ed.).
53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1964 ed.).
45 U. S. C. §51 (1964 ed.). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
HECKLER, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES v. EDWARDS
No. 82-874.
Argued November 30, 1983
Decided March 21, 1984
Marshall, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John H. Garvey argued the cause for petitioner. On the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Edwin S. Kneedler, and Frank A. Rosenfeld.
Neal S. Dudovitz argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Eileen Sweeney.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises an issue concerning this Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of district courts, “except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Section 1252 of Title 28 provides for such a direct appeal from a United States court’s judgment, in a civil proceeding to which the Government is a party, holding that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional. The issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ appeal from a proceeding in which a federal statute was declared unconstitutional, but in which the Secretary challenged only the District Court’s remedy.
I
Respondent filed this suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in October 1980. On behalf of a nationwide class of Social Security applicants and recipients, respondent challenged the constitutionality of § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Social Security Act, 64 Stat. 502, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 411(a)(5)(A), which established a gender-based presumption concerning the allocation of income from family businesses in community property States. In pretrial proceedings, the Secretary argued that the constitutional ruling sought by the class was unnecessary because the Secretary acquiesced in judicial precedents holding the challenged provision unconstitutional. Indeed, shortly after respondent’s complaint was filed, the Attorney General formally notified Congress that the Executive would not defend the constitutionality of the section. The District Court nevertheless rejected the Secretary’s claim of mootness, and granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. According to the court, although the Secretary “essentially conceded the unconstitutionality of § 411(a)(5)(A),” a ruling on the merits was necessary because the Department was still applying the challenged statutory section.
Having held the statute unconstitutional, the District Court turned to the issue of relief. The unconstitutional provision had provided that all gross income and deductions derived from a nonpartnership trade or business in community property jurisdictions should be attributed to the husband unless the wife could establish that she exercised substantially all of the management and control of the business, in which case all income would be treated as the wife’s. Having struck down this gender-based presumption, the court found the respondent class entitled to an allocation of co-proprietor income between the spouses’ earnings accounts on the basis of the relative amount of labor contributed by each. Finding that retroactive application of its holding was appropriate under the tests of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971), the court found that class members “are entitled to a recomputation of their earnings records, extending back to the beginning of Social Security if necessary.” Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Jan. 22, 1982). The court entered judgment March 23, 1982.
The following week the Secretary filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In the Secretary’s docketing statement, filed on May 5, 1982, the Secretary fisted only matters concerning the remedy ordered by the District Court, noting that the Government conceded the unconstitutionality of the statute. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Secretary’s appeal, contending that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 “where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. ” Respondent argued that the Secretary had such a right to direct review to the Supreme Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, because the District Court had held a statute unconstitutional in a civil action to which a United States officer was a party. In a one-sentence order dated July 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, citing Donovan v. Richland County Assn. for Retarded Citizens, 454 U. S. 389 (1982) (per curiam). The Secretary timely filed a petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit seeking our review of this dismissal. Because the petition raised an important question concerning this Court’s mandatory docket, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. 1200 (1983). We conclude that a party does not have a right to direct review in the Supreme Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 unless the holding of federal statutory unconstitutionality is in issue. We therefore vacate and remand for reinstatement of the appeal.
HH I — I
In the normal course, a party dissatisfied with the judgment of a United States district court must first appeal to the court of appeals, and may then petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Recourse to the court of appeals is a matter of right, 28 U. S. C. § 1291; writs of certiorari are granted at the discretion of the Supreme Court, § 1254(1). The general rule of discretionary Supreme Court review is not without exceptions. Although this Court’s mandatory jurisdiction has been minimized through legislation such as the Judge’s Bill of 1925 and the 1976 repeal of most of the Three Judge District Court Act, Congress has identified a narrow group of cases that merit the immediate and mandatory attention of this Court. Section 1252 is such a direct appeal provision.
When a party has a right to pursue a direct appeal to this Court under § 1252, the normal route for appellate review is blocked, and a court of appeals is without jurisdiction. Donovan v. Richland County Assn, for Retarded Citizens, supra, at 389-390. Thus, the consequence of an erroneous choice of forum can be to preclude any court’s review, because by the time a party discovers its error, appeal to the correct forum may be untimely. To avoid that consequence, litigants ought to be able to apply a clear test to determine whether, as an exception to the general rule of appellate review, they must perfect an appeal directly to the Supreme Court. Such a test, of course, must be crafted “with precision and with fidelity to the terms by which Congress has expressed its wishes” in the jurisdictional statute. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968).
The Secretary and respondent offer different tests. Respondent’s position is that when the “literal requirements of § 1252 are satisfied,” only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U. S. 358, 366 (1980); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 929 (1983) (“express requisites for an appeal under § 1252 . . . have been met”). Section 1252 establishes four prerequisites for a direct appeal to the Supreme Court: the order appealed from must issue from an enumerated court; the United States or an agency or officer must be a party; the proceeding must be civil; and the order must hold an Act of Congress unconstitutional. Those prerequisites are met in the present case. Therefore, respondent argues, the Secretary’s sole avenue for appellate review of the judgment was by direct appeal to this Court. Because the Secretary did not file a notice of appeal to this Court within 30 days of the District Court’s order, 28 U. S. C. § 2101(a), respondent contends that the Secretary has lost her right to appellate review of any aspect of the District Court’s orders.
The Secretary claims that direct review under §1252 is available only when the correctness of the constitutional holding is at issue. She argues that a close examination of the statute and its enactment supports the conclusion that the constitutional holding must be raised on appeal, and not merely decided below, before a party must invoke direct review by the Supreme Court. Under this reading, the Secretary sought review in the proper forum because she challenged the scope of the District Court’s remedy and not the correctness of its constitutional ruling. Indeed, by the Secretary’s reasoning, had she filed an appeal in this Court, we would have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
To articulate a test to resolve the present dispute and to provide guidance for litigants and courts in future cases, we begin with the language and structure of the statute itself.
“Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam and the District Court of the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.
“A party who has received notice of appeal under this section shall take any subsequent appeal or cross appeal to the Supreme Court. All appeals or cross appeals taken to other courts prior to such notice shall be treated as taken directly to the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 1252.
A literal reading of § 1252 tells us that parties have a right to direct appeal from a “judgment, decree or order,” and not merely a right to direct appeal of a court’s “holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional.” Under the literal language, a party not contesting the constitutional holding would seem to be required to proceed directly to this Court for review of other aspects of the court’s judgment. That literal reading gains support from the fact that Congress has not limited our review under § 1252 to the federal constitutional issue, but has mandated that when we have properly asserted jurisdiction under § 1252, the whole case is to come before us.
Section 1252, however, presents a case in which “to give the surface literal meaning to a jurisdictional provision . . . would not be consistent with the ‘sense of the thing’ and would confer upon this Court a jurisdiction beyond what ‘naturally and properly belongs to it.’” When Congress created the exceptional right to bypass the court of appeals, it directly linked that right to a lower court’s invalidation of an Act of Congress. Although it is in the nature of cases and controversies that the court’s judgment may address not only the issue of statutory constitutionality, but other issues as well, such as attorney’s fees, remedy, or related state-law claims, the natural sense of the jurisdictional provision is that the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, not these other issues, is what Congress wished this Court to review in the first instance. Thus, the sense of the statute and the literal language are at loggerheads.
The structure of § 1252 helps resolve this tension, and leads us towards the common-sense view that the constitutional holding must be at issue for direct review in this Court to lie. The first paragraph of § 1252 grants the right of direct appeal from the judgment holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional; the second paragraph brings before us the whole case, including appeals filed before and after the constitutional appeal. The clear implication of the second paragraph is that parties may have properly lodged appeals in other courts prior to a § 1252 filing. Only after a party has filed a notice of direct appeal pursuant to § 1252 must all other appeals and cross-appeals in the case be taken here. The necessary corollary is that in the absence of such notice, other appeals in the case will follow the normal route for appellate review. The conclusion inherent in the structure of § 1252 is that not all appeals in a case in which an Act of Congress has been held unconstitutional must be taken directly to this Court. Because direct review is linked to a court’s holding a federal statute unconstitutional, the logical test of which appeals from a judgment must be brought directly to this Court and which, standing alone, must follow the normal route of appellate review, is whether the issue on appeal is the holding of statutory unconstitutionality.
The history of the enactment of § 1252’s statutory predecessor also guides us to a conclusion that Congress considered the jurisdictional predicate for mandatory direct review by the Supreme Court to be appeal from the constitutional holding. Three interrelated justifications for expediting final determinations of the constitutionality of federal statutes recur in discussions of the direct appeal provision. First, when a federal judge strikes down an act of a coequal branch of government, the decision implicates separation of powers, not only through the original exercise of judicial review, but also through this Court’s exercise of discretion to hear such a case. By mandating direct review, Congress asserted its prerogative to define a category of important cases that the Court is not free to ignore. Second, Congress justified imposing mandatory jurisdiction on the Supreme Court because of the need for certainty and uniformity in federal government when an Act may have been declared unconstitutional. It is significant that the first paragraph of § 1252 authorizes a direct appeal to this Court only in civil actions “to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, ... is a party”; no direct appeal lies if there are only nonfederal parties to the suit. That language reveals a congressional purpose to assure an expeditious means of affirming or removing the restraint on the Federal Government’s administration of the law when it would be bound by a holding that the law in question is unconstitutional.
Finally, Congress expressed its sense that declarations of unconstitutionality have ramifications beyond the interests of litigants in the particular case. For this reason, the predecessor statute created the right of intervention by the Attorney General in cases between private parties when the constitutionality of an Act of Congress was drawn into question, as well as the right to direct appeal from a holding of unconstitutionality. The Senate Report emphasized that the “decision of the constitutional question may affect the public at large, may be in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes a duty to all the citizens of securing to them their common rights.” S. Rep. No. 963, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1937).
The first two of these concerns are not implicated in cases in which the Government concedes statutory unconstitutionality by its decision not to appeal that aspect of the district court’s judgment. Such cases raise no separation-of-powers issue, nor do they implicate the need for certainty and uniformity in the administration of federal law. In the present case, for example, the Attorney General, charged with enforcing federal laws, informed the Congress that he agreed with the courts that the challenged provision in the Social Security Act was unconstitutional. Furthermore, prior to seeking review of the District Court’s judgment, the Secretary had agreed not to enforce the statute anywhere and the District Court’s remedial order was in effect nationwide. The decision not to raise the issue of statutory unconstitutionality on appeal obviously was intended to bind the Secretary in her nationwide administration of the Social Security Act. When the court and the affected agency reach the same conclusion, there is no need to resort to direct review under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 in an effort to remove the binding effect on the Executive Branch’s administration of the law.
The only justification for exerting mandatory jurisdiction in such cases might be the considerable ramifications of district court orders; here, for example, the District Court’s remedy provided retroactive relief for a nationwide class. We do not believe that serious consequences alone can support the exercise of our § 1252 jurisdiction. Congress did not enact an open-ended “impact” test for determining which cases should come to this Court for direct review. Although remedial aspects of a case are important, the touchstone of direct appeal under § 1252 is not a party’s or our own judgment of the significance of a decision. We exercise that judgment under our discretion to grant certiorari in any civil or criminal case before, as well as after, rendition of judgment. 28 U. S. C. §1254(1); this Court’s Rule 18. In § 1252, Congress mandated direct review not simply for decisions with impact, but rather for decisions whose impact was predicated upon a potentially incorrect exercise of judicial review. See nn. 15, 16, supra.
Not only are Congress’ justifications for creating an expedited method of direct review not present in cases such as this, but a construction of § 1252 that would require us to review collateral issues coming to us as independent matters, rather than as pendent to the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, would undermine the effectiveness of the direct appeal provision. If we were to adopt respondent’s construction of the language, this Court would be required to give precedence to issues outside the congressional definition of public importance. We would, for example, be obliged to crowd our docket with appeals concerned solely with attorney’s fee awards or pendent claims arising under state law— matters that would typically fail to meet our criteria for discretionary review. See this Court’s Rule 17. Appeals of this sort would almost certainly be better handled by the courts of appeals, which is where they will lie under the interpretation of § 1252 that we adopt today.
HH HH HH
We conclude, therefore, that § 1252 does not warrant a construction that would require appeals raising only issues other than statutory unconstitutionality to be taken directly to this Court. If the four prerequisites to direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252 are met, and a party seeks review of the court’s holding that an Act of Congress is unconstitutional, that party should file a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. If a party does not contest the holding of statutory unconstitutionality, and seeks review only of another portion of the court’s judgment, the party should file a notice of appeal to the appropriate court of appeals. Although the formal prerequisites to direct appeal under § 1252 were met in the present case, the Secretary did not contest the holding of statutory unconstitutionality. Therefore, the Secretary’s appeal belonged in the first instance in the Court of Appeals, which should not have dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the cause is remanded for reinstatement of the Secretary’s appeal.
It is so ordered.
The District Court certified a class of “[a]ll applicants for or recipients of Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U. S. C. § 401 et seq., on their own accounts as wage earners whose applications have been denied or for whom the monthly benefit amount has been reduced due to the omission from their earnings records of income earned while married and operating a trade or business in a community property state, as required by 42 U. S. C. § 411(a)(5)(A).” Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal, May 22, 1981). The class was further limited to members who received a final decision from the Secretary within the 60 days prior to the filing of the lawsuit or at any time thereafter. Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., Mar. 19, 1982).
In the latter half of 1980, several courts held that the statutory presumption violated the equal protection element of the Due Process Clause. Hester v. Harris, 631F. 2d 53, 55-56 (CA5 1980); Carrasco v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 628 F. 2d 624, 627-631 (CA1 1980); Becker v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 991, 994-996 (ED Cal. 1980). These courts remanded to the Secretary to formulate new standards for crediting self-employment income in community property States. 631 F. 2d, at 56-57; 628 F. 2d, at 631; 493 F. Supp., at 997.
Although the Secretary had argued that § 211(a)(5)(A) is merely an eligibility requirement, not a constitutionally suspect classification based on gender, the Solicitor General later concluded that the statutory presumption could not be defended under the standards announced by this Court in Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76 (1979) (provision that rests on stereotypical gender presumptions, without more, violates due process), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977) (classification by gender must serve and be substantially related to important governmental objectives).
Executive Communication 4772, 126 Cong. Rec. 29377 (1980) (notice that Solicitor General would not take an appeal from the District Court’s holding in Becker v. Harris, supra); Executive Communication 5587, 126 Cong. Rec. 29295 (1980) (same). Congress has required the Attorney General to notify both Houses of Congress in any case in which the Attorney General considers an enacted law, at issue in the case, to be unconstitutional. See note following 28 U. S. C. §519 (1982 ed.).
In July 1981, the agency’s concession that § 211(a)(5)(A) of the Act is unconstitutional was published as Social Security Ruling 81-17c (C. E. 1981) (acquiescing in Becker v. Harris, supra). “Once published, a ruling is binding on all components of the Social Security Administration in accordance with [20 CFR pt. 422]. Rulings do not have the force and effect of the law or regulations but are to be relied upon as precedents in determining other cases where the facts are basically the same. A ruling may be superseded, modified, or revoked by later legislation, regulations, court decisions or rulings.” Social Security Rulings iii (C. E. 1981).
Neither Congress nor the agency had modified the statute or implementing regulations at the time this case was argued.
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959 (ND Cal., May 22,1981). Petitioner did not file an appeal challenging the ruling that the statute was unconstitutional. The jurisdictional statute at issue in this case permits, but does not require, an interlocutory appeal from a holding of unconstitutionality. 28 U. S. C. § 1252; see United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 26-27, n. 2 (1980) (Government need not appeal before final judgment is entered).
Edwards v. Schweiker, No. C-80-3959, p. 2, n. 2 (ND Cal., Jan. 22, 1982) (referring to order of May 22, 1981).
The notice of appeal from the judgment of March 23, 1982, does not state the ground of appeal, nor is it its function to do so. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 3(c).
The relevant portion of the docketing statement provided:
“H. Brief Description of Nature of Action and Result Below:
“Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 42 U. S. C. 411(a)(5)(A), which requires that where both the husband and wife worked in a family business in a community property State, all of the self-employment income must be allocated to the husband. The government conceded the statute’s unconstitutionality, and the remaining issues concerned relief, in particular, the standard to apply in place of the invalid statutory standard. The district court certified a class action, and ordered that the Secretary recompute benefits on the principle that the self-employment income of the business be split between husband and wife on the basis of their relative amounts of labor.
“I. Issues to be raised on Appeal:
“The issues on appeal may include: (1) whether the district court’s standard based on relative amount of labor should be applied rather than the Secretary’s standard based on whether there was a true partnership between the spouses; (2) whether it was error to apply the new rule to earnings records dating back to the beginning of the self-employment program; (3) whether it was error to require that no individual lose benefits as a result of the recomputation required under the order; and (4) whether the notice that the court required be sent to potential class members is appropriate.”
Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. See Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 98, and n. 16 (1974).
Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119 (repealing 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2282 (1970 ed.), amending §§ 2284, 2403). For a discussion of classes of cases that have been removed from the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction since 1971, see Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court — Some Recent Developments, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347, 359 (1977).
Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2) (party may appeal a court of appeals’ invalidation of a state statute on federal grounds, but review on appeal “shall be restricted to the Federal questions presented”).
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 94 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting American Security & Trust Co. v. District of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, 495 (1912)).
For cases discussing our jurisdiction over the whole case when a direct appeal is properly filed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252, see United States v. American Friends Service Committee, 419 U. S. 7, 12, n. 7 (1974) (per curiam); United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 27, n. 7 (1960). When we consider the whole case, we are not only implementing Congress’ jurisdictional intent expressed in paragraph two of 28 U. S. C. § 1252. We are also exercising judicial discretion to administer our caseload to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. But neither paragraph two of § 1252 nor our principle of case management should come into play unless we have established first that the Court has appellate jurisdiction.
Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, §2, 50 Stat. 752, provided:
“In any suit or proceeding in any court of the United States to which the United States, or any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party, or in which the United States has intervened and become a party, and in which the decision is against the constitutionality of any Act of Congress, an appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States by the United States or any other party . . . .”
As in the current version, appeal could be taken from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order. Congress mandated that such appeals “shall be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States at the earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all other matters not of a like character.” Ibid. The whole thrust of the bill was its focus on the special importance of lower court invalidations of federal statutes.
Floor debate affirms that Congress understood that the predicate to direct appeal was that a party would seek review of the holding that a statute was unconstitutional. The bill’s sponsor, Representative Sumners, explicated the section to mean that the Government “may appeal directly to the Supreme Court in order to expedite the determination of the constitutional question.” 81 Cong. Rec. 3272 (1937); see also id., at 3260 (remarks of Rep. Sumners) (case would come up to Court just on question of constitutionality); id., at 3257 (remarks of Rep. Michener) (bill affects only constitutional questions); id., at 3256 (remarks of Rep. Brewster) (bill eliminates delays in determining constitutional question). The sponsor emphasized the “good, practical common sense” in having “just as little delay between the enactment of Congress and the determination [of its constitutionality] as can be arranged.” Id., at 3268 (remarks of Rep. Sumners).
The impetus in the mid-1930’s to establish expedited appeal of holdings of statutory unconstitutionality was courts’ response to much of the New Deal legislation, such as enjoining operation of the newly created Tennessee Valley Authority. See, e. g., Appeals from Federal Courts, Hearings on S. 2176 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong, 1st Sess., 13-16 (1935).
As then Senator Hugo L. Black, sponsor in the 74th Congress of a bill for direct appeal from injunctions preventing the effectuation of Acts of Congress explained:
“I see no reason why ... we should not say to the Supreme Court, ‘. . . [i]t is not for you to determine whether you will take the case or not. Those who are charged primarily with enforcing the law in this country are bound to be in closer contact with the necessity for a speedy decision than you are in your court room, and they have determined that this is a case of such great national moment and importance that it must be decided at once.’” Id., at 20.
One commentator suggests that the existence and current definition of § 1252 mandatory jurisdiction rests on a policy of separation of powers. Tushnet, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev., at 358-365. Congressional enactment of mandatory jurisdiction provisions incorporates what the author refers to as the “importance” standard. Thus, the impact of a ruling regarding a statute is recognized as having particularly broad impact.
See, e. g., McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31 (1975) (§1252 language permits appeal where the Government has participated in litigation “and thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality”).
The 1937 Act provided for notice to the Attorney General of private litigation “whenever the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question,” and intervention by the United States as of right “for presentation of evidence . . . and argument upon the question of the constitutionality of such Act.” Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 754, 50 Stat. 751. The current version of this portion of the original bill appears at 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a).
See also 81 Cong. Rec. 3268 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Michener) (“If,” “when,” and “[w]here the constitutionality [of Acts of Congress] is questioned, more than the rights of individual litigants in the suit are involved. The rights of all the people who might be affected by the laws are involved, and in these days time is of the essence in many of these important cases coming before the Supreme Court”); id., at 3265 (remarks of then Rep. Fred M. Vinson) (When the constitutionality of an Act of Congress has been drawn into question, that question “affects not only the litigants in the particular case, but it affects many others. It ought to be decided right in the public interest”).
See n. 4, supra. Such concurrence of views between the Executive Branch and the Judiciary does not necessarily preclude a case or controversy over the constitutionality of a federal statute. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), for example, the agency and the private party agreed that a federal provision was unconstitutional. Congress, however, had intervened as a party, and contested the holding. The constitutionality of the one-House legislative veto was therefore squarely presented on direct appeal to this Court. But that is not the situation in the present case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
9
] | sc_certreason |
OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY OF THE STATE OF OREGON et al.
No. 93-70.
Argued January 18, 1994
Decided April 4, 1994
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined, post, p. 108.
Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs for petitioners in No. 93-70 were James E. Benedict and J. Laurence Cable. John Di-Lorenzo, Jr., filed briefs for petitioner in No. 93-108.
Thomas A. Balmer, Deputy Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant Solicitor General.
Together with No. 93-108, Columbia Resource Co. v. Environmental Quality Commission of the State of Oregon, also on certiorari to the same court.
A brief of amici curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of Indiana et al. by Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, and Arend J. Abel, Matthew R. Gutwein, and Myra P. Spicker, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Chris Gorman of Kentucky, Michael E. Carpenter of Maine, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Lee Fisher of Ohio, Susan B. Loving of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming, and James E. Doyle of Wisconsin.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two Terms ago, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S. 334 (1992), we held that the negative Commerce Clause prohibited Alabama from imposing a higher fee on the disposal in Alabama landfills of hazardous waste from other States than on the disposal of identical waste from Alabama. In reaching that conclusion, however, we left open the possibility that such a differential surcharge might be valid if based on the costs of disposing of waste from other States. Id., at 346, n. 9. Today, we must decide whether Oregon’s purportedly cost-based surcharge on the in-state disposal of solid waste generated in other States violates the Commerce Clause.
I
Like other States, Oregon comprehensively regulates the disposal of solid wastes within its borders. Respondent Oregon Department of Environmental Quality oversees the State’s regulatory scheme by developing and executing plans for the management, reduction, and recycling of solid wastes. To fund these and related activities, Oregon levies a wide range of fees on landfill operators. See, e. g., Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459.235(3), 459.310 (1991). In 1989, the Oregon Legislature imposed an additional fee, called a “surcharge,” on “every person who disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site.” § 459.297(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). The amount of that surcharge was left to respondent Environmental Quality Commission (Commission) to determine through rulemaking, but the legislature did require that the resulting surcharge “be based on the costs to the State of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for” under specified statutes. § 459.298. At the conclusion of the rulemaking process, the Commission set the surcharge on out-of-state waste at $2.25 per ton. Ore. Admin. Rule 340-97-120(7) (Sept. 1993).
In conjunction with the out-of-state surcharge, the legislature imposed a fee on the in-state disposal of waste generated within Oregon. See Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459A.110(1), (5) (1991). The in-state fee, capped by statute at $0.85 per ton (originally $0.50 per ton), is considerably lower than the fee imposed on waste from other States. §§459A.110(5) and 459A.115. Subsequently, the legislature conditionally extended the $0.85 per ton fee to out-of-state waste, in addition to the $2.25 per ton surcharge, §459A. 110(6), with the proviso that if the surcharge survived judicial challenge, the $0.85 per ton fee would again be limited to in-state waste. 1991 Ore. Laws, ch. 385, §§ 91-92.
The anticipated court challenge was not long in coming. Petitioners, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. (Oregon Waste), and Columbia Resource Company (CRC), joined by Gilliam County, Oregon, sought expedited review of the out-of-state surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Oregon Waste owns and operates a solid waste landfill in Gilliam County, at which it accepts for final disposal solid waste generated in Oregon and in other States. CRC, pursuant to a 20-year contract with Clark County, in neighboring Washington State, transports solid waste via barge from Clark County to a landfill in Morrow County, Oregon. Petitioners challenged the administrative rule establishing the out-of-state surcharge and its enabling statutes under both state law and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the statutes and rule. Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental Quality, 114 Ore. App. 369, 837 P. 2d 965 (1992).
The State Supreme Court affirmed. Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 316 Ore. 99, 849 P. 2d 500 (1993). As to the Commerce Clause, the court recognized that the Oregon surcharge resembled the Alabama fee invalidated in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U. S. 334 (1992), in that both prescribed higher fees for the disposal of waste from other States. Nevertheless, the court viewed the similarity as superficial only. Despite the explicit reference in §459.297(1) to out-of-state waste’s geographic origin, the court reasoned, the Oregon surcharge is not facially discriminatory “[b]ecause of [its] express nexus to actual costs incurred [by state and local government].” 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P. 2d, at 508. That nexus distinguished Chemical Waste, supra, by rendering the surcharge a “compensatory fee,” which the court viewed as “prima facie reasonable,” that is to say, facially constitutional. 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P. 2d, at 508. The court réad our case law as invalidating compensatory fees only if they are “‘manifestly disproportionate to the services rendered.’” Ibid, (quoting Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 599 (1939)). Because Oregon law restricts the scope of judicial review in expedited proceedings to deciding the facial legality of administrative rules and the statutes underlying them, Ore. Rev. Stat. §183.400 (1991), the Oregon court deemed itself precluded from deciding the factual question whether the surcharge on out-of-state waste was disproportionate. 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P. 2d, at 508.
We granted certiorari, 509 U. S. 953 (1993), because the decision below conflicted with a recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. We now reverse.
II
The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a “negative” aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce. See, e. g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 454 (1992); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876). The Framers granted Congress plenary authority over interstate commerce in “the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.” Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325-326 (1979). See generally The Federalist No. 42 (J. Madison). “This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy,... has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units.” H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525, 537-538 (1949).
Consistent with these principles, we have held that the first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it “regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce.” Hughes, supra, at 336. See also Chemical Waste, 504 U. S., at 340-341. As we use the term here, “discrimination” simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. Id., at 344, n. 6. See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 624 (1978). By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970).
In Chemical Waste, we easily found Alabama’s surcharge on hazardous waste from other States to be facially discriminatory because it imposed a higher fee on the disposal of out-of-state waste than on the disposal of identical in-state waste. 504 U. S., at 342. We deem it equally obvious here that Oregon’s $2.25 per ton surcharge is discriminatory on its face. The surcharge subjects waste from other States to a fee almost three times greater than the $0.85 per ton charge imposed on solid in-state waste. The statutory determinant for which fee applies to any particular shipment of solid waste to an Oregon landfill is whether or not the waste was “generated out-of-state.” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.297(1) (1991). It is well established, however, that a law is discriminatory if it “ ‘tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.’ ” Chemical Waste, supra, at 342 (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638, 642 (1984)). See also American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 286 (1987).
Respondents argue, and the Oregon Supreme Court held, that the statutory nexus between the surcharge and “the [otherwise uncompensated] costs to the State of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state,” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.298 (1991), necessarily precludes a finding that the surcharge is discriminatory. We find respondents’ narrow focus on Oregon’s compensatory aim to be foreclosed by our precedents. As we reiterated in Chemical Waste, the purpose of, or justification for, a law has no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory. See 504 U. S., at 340-341. See also Philadelphia, supra, at 626. Consequently, even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the differential charge favors shippers of Oregon waste over their counterparts handling waste generated in other States. In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge patently discriminates against interstate commerce.
HI
Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se rule of invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the Pike balancing test. As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated unless respondents can “sho[w] that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). See also Chemical Waste, supra, at 342-343. Our cases require that justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce pass the “strictest scrutiny.” Hughes, 441 U. S., at 337. The State’s burden of justification is so heavy that “facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect.” Ibid. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406-407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 759-760 (1981).
At the outset, we note two justifications that respondents have not presented. No claim has been made that the disposal of waste from other States imposes higher costs on Oregon and its political subdivisions than the disposal of instate waste. Also, respondents have not offered any safety or health reason unique to nonhazardous waste from other States for discouraging the flow of such waste into Oregon. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131 (1986) (upholding ban on importation of out-of-state baitfish into Maine because such baitfish were subject to parasites completely foreign to Maine baitfish). Consequently, respondents must come forward with other legitimate reasons to subject waste from other States to a higher charge than is levied against waste from Oregon.
Respondents offer two such reasons, each of which we address below.
A
Respondents’ principal defense of the higher surcharge on out-of-state waste is that it is a “compensatory tax” necessary to make shippers of such waste pay their “fair share” of the costs imposed on Oregon by the disposal of their waste in the State. In Chemical Waste we noted the possibility that such an argument might justify a discriminatory surcharge or tax on out-of-state waste. See 504 U. S., at 346, n. 9. In making that observation, we implicitly recognized the settled principle that interstate commerce may be made to “‘pay its way.’” Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 281 (1977). See also Maryland, supra, at 754. “It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden[sj.” Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 254 (1938). See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937). Nevertheless, one of the central purposes of the Clause was to prevent States from “exacting more than a just share” from interstate commerce. Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, 748 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 462 (1959).
At least since our decision in Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (1869), these principles have found expression in the “compensatory” or “complementary” tax doctrine. Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means. See Chemical Waste, supra, at 346, n. 9 (referring to the compensatory tax doctrine as a “justification]” for a facially discriminatory tax). Under that doctrine, a facially discriminatory tax that imposes on interstate commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and “substantially similar” tax on intrastate commerce does not offend the negative Commerce Clause. Maryland, supra, at 758-759. See also Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232, 242-243 (1987); Armco, 467 U. S., at 643.
To justify a charge on interstate commerce as a compensatory tax, a State must, as a threshold matter, “identify]... the [intrastate tax] burden for which the State is attempting to compensate.” Maryland, supra, at 758. Once that burden has been identified, the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approximate — but not exceed— the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce. See, e. g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 204-205 (1961). Finally, the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed must be “substantially equivalent”; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive “prox[ies]” for each other. Armco, supra, at 643. As Justice Cardozo explained for the Court in Henneford, under a truly compensatory tax scheme “the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed.” 300 U. S., at 584.
Although it is often no mean feat to determine whether a challenged tax is a compensatory tax, we have little difficulty concluding that the Oregon surcharge is not such a tax. Oregon does not impose a specific charge of at least $2.25 per ton on shippers of waste generated in Oregon, for which the out-of-state surcharge might be considered compensatory. In fact, the only analogous charge on the disposal of Oregon waste is $0.85 per ton, approximately one-third of the amount imposed on waste from other States. See Ore. Rev. Stat. §§459A. 110(5), 459A.115 (1991). Respondents’ failure to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge is fatal to their claim. See Maryland, 451 U. S., at 758.
Respondents argue that, despite the absence of a specific $2.25 per ton charge on in-state waste, intrastate commerce does pay its share of the costs underlying the surcharge through general taxation. Whether or not that is true is difficult to determine, as “[general] tax payments are received for the general purposes of the [government], and are, upon proper receipt, lost in the general revenues.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even assuming, however, that various other means of general taxation, such as income taxes, could serve as an identifiable intrastate burden roughly equivalent to the out-of-state surcharge, respondents’ compensatory tax argument fails because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not imposed on substantially equivalent events.
The prototypical example of substantially equivalent taxable events is the sale and use of articles of trade. See Henneford, supra. In fact, use taxes on products purchased out of state are the only taxes we have upheld in recent memory under the compensatory tax doctrine. See ibid. Typifying our recent reluctance to recognize new categories of compensatory taxes is Armco, where we held that manufacturing and wholesaling are not substantially equivalent events. 467 U. S., at 643. In our view, earning income and disposing of waste at Oregon landfills are even less equivalent than manufacturing and wholesaling. Indeed, the very fact that in-state shippers of out-of-state waste, such as Oregon Waste, are charged the out-of-state surcharge even though they pay Oregon income taxes refutes respondents’ argument that the respective taxable events are substantially equivalent. See ibid. We conclude that, far from being substantially equivalent, taxes on earning income and utilizing Oregon landfills are “entirely different kind[s] of tax[es].” Washington v. United States, 460 U. S. 536, 546, n. 11 (1983). We are no more inclined here than we were in Scheiner to “plunge . . . into the morass of weighing comparative tax burdens” by comparing taxes on dissimilar events. 483 U. S., at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B
Respondents’ final argument is that Oregon has an interest in spreading the costs of the in-state disposal of Oregon waste to all Oregonians. That is, because all citizens of Oregon benefit from the proper in-state disposal of waste from Oregon, respondents claim it is only proper for Oregon to require them to bear more of the costs of disposing of such waste in the State through a higher general tax burden. At the same time, however, Oregon citizens should not be required to bear the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste, respondents claim. The necessary result of that limited cost shifting is to require shippers of out-of-state waste to bear the full costs of in-state disposal, but to permit shippers of Oregon waste to bear less than the full cost.
We fail to perceive any distinction between respondents’ contention and a claim that the State has an interest in reducing the costs of handling in-state waste. Our cases condemn as illegitimate, however, any governmental interest that is not “unrelated to economic protectionism,” Wyoming, 502 U. S., at 454, and regulating interstate commerce in such a way as to give those who handle domestic articles of commerce a cost advantage over their competitors handling similar items produced elsewhere constitutes such protectionism. See New Energy, 486 U. S., at 275. To give controlling effect to respondents’ characterization of Oregon’s tax scheme as seemingly benign cost spreading would require us to overlook the fact that the scheme necessarily incorporates a protectionist objective as well. Cf. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 273 (1984) (rejecting Hawaii’s attempt to justify a discriminatory tax exemption for local liquor producers as conferring a benefit on them, as opposed to burdening out-of-state liquor producers).
Respondents counter that if Oregon is engaged in any form of protectionism, it is “resource protectionism,” not economic protectionism. It is true that by discouraging the flow of out-of-state waste into Oregon landfills, the higher surcharge on waste from other States conserves more space in those landfills for waste generated in Oregon. Recharacterizing the surcharge as resource protectionism hardly advances respondents’ cause, however. Even assuming that landfill space is a “natural resource,” “a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders.” Philadelphia, 437 U. S., at 627. As we held more than a century ago, “if the State, under the guise of exerting its police powers, should [impose a burden] . . . applicable solely to articles [of commerce]... produced or manufactured in other States, the courts would find no difficulty in holding such legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.” Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443 (1880).
Our decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941 (1982), is not to the contrary. There we held that a State may grant a “limited preference” for its citizens in the utilization of ground water. Id., at 956. That holding was premised on several different factors tied to the simple fact of life that “water, unlike other natural resources, is essential for human survival.” Id., at 952. Sporhase therefore provides no support for respondents’ position that States may erect a financial barrier to the flow of waste from other States into Oregon landfills. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U. S., at 364-365, and n. 6. However serious the shortage in landfill space may be, post, at 108, “[n]o State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade.” Chemical Waste, 504 U. S., at 339-340, and 346, n. 9.
IV
We recognize that the States have broad discretion to configure their systems of taxation as they deem appropriate. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 622-623 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 336-337 (1977). All we intimate here is that their discretion in this regard, as in all others, is bounded by any relevant limitations of the Federal Constitution, in these cases the negative Commerce Clause. Because respondents have offered no legitimate reason to subject waste generated in other States to a discriminatory surcharge approximately three times as high as that imposed on waste generated in Oregon, the surcharge is facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Oregon defines “solid wastes” as “all putrescible and nonputrescible wastes, including but not limited to garbage, rubbish, refuse, ashes, waste paper and cardboard; sewage sludge, septic tank and cesspool pumpings or other sludge; commercial, industrial, demolition and construction wastes; discarded or abandoned vehicles or parts thereof; discarded home and industrial appliances; manure, vegetable or animal solid and semisolid wastes, dead animals, infectious waste ... and other wastes.” Ore. Rev. Stat. §459.005(27) (1991). Hazardous wastes are not considered solid wastes. § 459.005(27)(a).
As a result, shippers of out-of-state solid waste currently are being charged $3.10 per ton to dispose of such waste in Oregon landfills, as compared to the $0.85 per ton fee charged to dispose of Oregon waste in those same landfills. We refer hereinafter only to the $2.25 surcharge, because the $0.85 per ton fee, which will be refunded to shippers of out-of-state waste if the surcharge is upheld, 1991 Ore. Laws, ch. 385, §92, is not challenged here.
Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F. 2d 1267 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1053 (1993).
The dissent argues that the $2.25 per ton surcharge is so minimal in amount that it cannot be considered discriminatory, even though the surcharge expressly applies only to waste generated in other States. Post, at 115. The dissent does not attempt to reconcile that novel understanding of discrimination with our precedents, which clearly establish that the degree of a differential burden or charge on interstate commerce “measures only the extent of the discrimination” and “is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce.” Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U. S. 437, 455 (1992). See also, e. g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 760 (1981) (“We need not know how unequal [a] [t]ax is before concluding that it... discriminates”).
In fact, the Commission fixed the $2.25 per ton cost of disposing of solid waste in Oregon landfills without reference to the origin of the waste, 3 Record 665-690, and Oregon’s economic consultant recognized that the per ton costs are the same for both in-state and out-of-state waste. Id., at 731-732, 744. Of course, if out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon than in-state waste, Oregon could recover the increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state waste, for then there would be a “reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the [State] should be treated differently.” Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U. S. 353, 361 (1992). Cf. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U. S. 415, 417 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 399 (1948).
The Oregon Supreme Court, though terming the out-of-state surcharge a “compensatory fee,” relied for its legal standard on our “user fee” cases. See 316 Ore. 99, 112, 849 P. 2d 500, 508 (1993) (citing, for example, Evansville-Vanderbwgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972), and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U. S. 583 (1939)). The compensatory tax cases cited in the text, rather than the user fee cases, are controlling here, as the latter apply only to “charge[s] imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation or other facilities and services.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U. S. 609, 621 (1981). Because it is undisputed that, as in Chemical Waste, the landfills in question are owned by private entities, including Oregon Waste, the out-of-state surcharge is plainly not a user fee. Nevertheless, even if the surcharge could somehow be viewed as a user fee, it could not be sustained as such, given that it discriminates against interstate commerce. See Evansville, supra, at 717; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (1880). Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U. S. 355, 369 (1994) (A user fee is valid only to the extent it “does not discriminate against interstate commerce”).
We would note that respondents, like the dissent, post, at 112, ignore the fact that shippers of waste from other States in all likelihood pay income taxes in other States, a portion of which might well be used to pay for waste reduction activities in those States.
Furthermore, permitting discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce to compensate for charges purportedly included in general forms of intrastate taxation “would allow a state to tax interstate commerce more heavily than in-state commerce anytime the entities involved in interstate commerce happened to use facilities supported by general state tax funds.” Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F. 2d, at 1284. We decline respondents’ invitation to open such an expansive loophole in our carefully confined compensatory tax jurisprudence.
We recognize that “[t]he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce.” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869, 877, n. 6 (1985). Here, as in New Energy, we confront a patently discriminatory law that is plainly connected to the regulation of interstate commerce. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether Oregon could validly accomplish its limited cost spreading through the “market participant” doctrine, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 806-810 (1976), or other means unrelated to any regulation of interstate commerce. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state of the court in which the case originated. Consider the District of Columbia as a state. | What is the state of the court in which the case originated? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
42
] | sc_caseoriginstate |
Charles MURPHY, Petitioner
v.
Robert SMITH, et al.
No. 16-1067.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Dec. 6, 2017.
Decided Feb. 21, 2018.
Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
Brett E. Legner, Chicago, IL, for Respondents.
Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Daniel B. Levin, Mark R. Yohalem, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Fabian J. Rosati, Chicago, IL, Stuart Banner, UCLA School of Law, Supreme Court Clinic, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, Brett E. Legner, Deputy Solicitor General, Mary Ellen Margaret Welsh, Kaitlyn N. Chenevert, Sarah A. Hunger, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, IL, for Respondents.
Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a case about how much prevailing prisoners must pay their lawyers. When a prisoner wins a civil rights suit and the district court awards fees to the prisoner's attorney, a federal statute says that "a portion of the [prisoner's] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). Whatever else you might make of this, the first sentence pretty clearly tells us that the prisoner has to pay some part of the attorney's fee award before financial responsibility shifts to the defendant. But how much is enough? Does the first sentence allow the district court discretion to take any amount it wishes from the plaintiff's judgment to pay the attorney, from 25% down to a penny? Or does the first sentence instead mean that the court must pay the attorney's entire fee award from the plaintiff's judgment until it reaches the 25% cap and only then turn to the defendant?
The facts of our case illustrate the problem we face. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for Charles Murphy in the amount of $307,733.82 against two of his prison guards, Officer Robert Smith and Lieutenant Gregory Fulk. The court also awarded Mr. Murphy's attorney $108,446.54 in fees. So far, so good. But then came the question who should pay what portion of the fee award. The defendants argued that, under the statute's terms, the court had to take 25% (or about $77,000) from Mr. Murphy's judgment before taxing them for the balance of the fee award. The court, however, refused that request. Instead, it ordered that Mr. Murphy "shall pay 10% of [his] judgment" (or about $31,000) toward the fee award, with the defendants responsible for the rest. In support of this allocation, the district court explained that it commonly varied the amount prisoners pay, though the court offered no explanation for choosing 10% instead of some other number. On appeal, a unanimous panel reversed, explaining its view that the language of § 1997e(d)(2) requires a district court to exhaust 25% of the prisoner's judgment before demanding payment from the defendants. 844 F.3d 653, 660 (C.A.7 2016). So there we have both sides of the debate, and our question, in a nutshell: did the district court have latitude to apply 10% (or some other discretionary amount) of the plaintiff's judgment to his attorney's fee award instead of 25%? See 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 42, 198 L.Ed.2d 770 (2017) (granting certiorari to resolve this question).
As always, we start with the specific statutory language in dispute. That language (again) says "a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded." § 1997e(d)(2). And we think this much tells us a few things. First, the word "shall" usually creates a mandate, not a liberty, so the verb phrase "shall be applied" tells us that the district court has some nondiscretionary duty to perform. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998) ("[T]he mandatory 'shall' ... normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion"). Second, immediately following the verb we find an infinitival phrase ("to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded") that specifies the purpose or aim of the verb's non-discretionary duty. Cf. R. Huddleston & G. Pullum, Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, ch. 8, §§ 1, 12.2, pp. 669, 729-730 (2002). Third, we know that when you purposefully seek or aim "to satisfy" an obligation, especially a financial obligation, that usually means you intend to discharge the obligation in full. Together, then, these three clues suggest that the court (1) must apply judgment funds toward the fee award (2) with the purpose of (3) fully discharging the fee award. And to meet that duty, a district court must apply as much of the judgment as necessary to satisfy the fee award, without of course exceeding the 25% cap. If Congress had wished to afford the judge more discretion in this area, it could have easily substituted "may" for "shall." And if Congress had wished to prescribe a different purpose for the judge to pursue, it could have easily replaced the infinitival phrase "to satisfy ..." with "to reduce ..." or "against...." But Congress didn't choose those other words. And respect for Congress's prerogatives as policymaker means carefully attending to the words it chose rather than replacing them with others of our own.
Mr. Murphy's reply does more to hurt than help his cause. Consider, he says, college math credits that the college prospectus says shall be "applied to satisfy" a chemistry degree. No one, the argument goes, would understand that phrase to suggest a single math course will fully discharge all chemistry degree requirements. We quite agree, but that is beside the point. In Mr. Murphy's example, as in our statute, the word "satisfy" does not suggest some hidden empirical judgment about how often a math class will satisfy a chemistry degree. Instead it serves to tell the college registrar what purpose he must pursue when handed the student's transcript: the registrar must, without discretion, apply those credits toward the satisfaction or discharge of the student's credit obligations. No doubt a college student needing three credits to graduate who took a three-credit math course would be bewildered to learn the registrar thought he had discretion to count only two of those credits toward her degree. So too here. It doesn't matter how many fee awards will be fully satisfied from a judgment without breaking the 25% cap, or whether any particular fee award could be. The statute's point is to instruct the judge about the purpose he must pursue-to discharge the fee award using judgment funds to the extent possible, subject to the 25% cap.
Retreating now, Mr. Murphy contends that whatever the verb and the infinitival phrase mean, the subject of the sentence-"a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent)"-necessarily suggests wide judicial discretion. This language, he observes, anticipates a range of amounts (some "portion" up to 25%) that can be taken from his judgment. And the existence of the range, Mr. Murphy contends, necessarily means that the district court must enjoy discretion to pick any "portion" so long as it doesn't exceed the 25% cap.
But that does not logically follow. Under either side's reading of the statute the portion of fees taken from the plaintiff's judgment will vary over a range-whether because of the district court's discretionary choice (as Mr. Murphy contends), or because of the variance in the size of fee awards themselves, which sometimes will be less than 25% of the judgment (as Officer Smith and Lieutenant Fulk suggest). If the police have two suspects in a robbery committed with a red getaway car, the fact that one suspect drives a red sedan proves nothing if the other does too. The fact that the statute contemplates a range of possible "portion[s]" to be paid out of the judgment, thus, just doesn't help identify which of the two proposed interpretations we should adopt for both bear that feature.
Nor does the word "portion" necessarily denote unfettered discretion. If someone told you to follow a written recipe but double the portion of sugar, you would know precisely how much sugar to put in-twice whatever's on the page. And Congress has certainly used the word "portion" in just that way. Take 16 U.S.C. § 673b, which defines the National Elk Refuge to include the "[e]ntire portion now in Jackson Hole National Monument except that portion in section 2 lying west of the east right-of-way line of United States Highway Numbered 187," among other similar plots-descriptions sufficiently determinate that the statute itself can later give the total number of acres of covered land ("six thousand three hundred and seventy-six acres, more or less"). So the question is how has Congress used the word "portion" in this statute? And as we have explained, the text persuades us that, subject to the 25% cap, the size of the relevant "portion" here is fixed by reference to the size of the attorney's fee award, not left to a district court's unguided choice.
Even if the interpretive race in this case seems close at this point, close races still have winners. Besides, stepping back to take in the larger statutory scheme surrounding the specific language before us reveals that this case isn't quite as close as it might first appear. In 1976, Congress enacted what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) to authorize discretionary fee shifting in civil rights suits. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 90 Stat. 2641. For years that statute governed the award of attorney's fees in a large variety of civil rights actions, including prisoner civil rights lawsuits like this one. But in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Congress reentered the field and adopted § 1997e's new and specialized fee shifting rule for prisoner civil rights suits alone. See 110 Stat. 1321-71.
Comparing the terms of the old and new statutes helps to shed a good deal of light on the parties' positions. Section 1988(b) confers discretion on district courts in unambiguous terms: "[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs" against the defendant. (Emphasis added.) Meanwhile, § 1997e(d) expressly qualifies the usual operation of § 1988(b) in prisoner cases. See § 1997e(d)(1) (providing that "[i]n any action brought by a prisoner ... in which attorney's fees are authorized under section 1988... such fees shall not be awarded, except" under certain conditions). And as we've seen § 1997e(d)(2) proceeds to use very different language to describe the district court's job in awarding fees. It does not say "may," it does not say "reasonable," and it certainly does not say anything about "discretion." If Congress had wished to confer the same discretion in § 1997e(d) that it conferred in § 1988(b), we very much doubt it would have bothered to write a new law; omit all the words that afforded discretion in the old law; and then replace those old discretionary words with new mandatory ones. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (refusing to conclude that "the differing language" in two statutory provisions "has the same meaning in each").
The surrounding statutory structure of § 1997e(d) reinforces this conclusion. Like paragraph (2), the other provisions of § 1997e(d)also limit the district court's pre-existing discretion under § 1988(b). These provisions limit the fees that would otherwise be available under § 1988 to cover only certain kinds of lawyerly tasks, see §§ 1997e(d)(1)(A) and (B)(ii) ; they require proportionality between fee awards and the relief ordered, see § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) ; and they restrict the hourly rate of the prisoner's lawyer, see § 1997e(d)(3). All this suggests a statute that seeks to restrain, rather than replicate, the discretion found in § 1988(b).
Notably, too, the discretion Mr. Murphy would have us introduce into § 1997e doesn't even sit easily with our precedent under § 1988. Our cases interpreting § 1988 establish "[a] strong presumption that the lodestar figure-the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate-represents a 'reasonable' fee." Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). To be sure, before the lodestar became "the guiding light of our fee shifting jurisprudence,"
Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992), many lower courts used one of your classic 12-factor balancing tests. See Delaware Valley, 478 U.S., at 562, and n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 3088. Ultimately, though, this Court rejected undue reliance on the 12-factor test because it "gave very little actual guidance to district courts [,] ... placed unlimited discretion in trial judges[,] and produced disparate results." Id., at 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088. Yet, despite this guidance, Mr. Murphy effectively seeks to (re)introduce into § 1997e(d)(2) exactly the sort of unguided and freewheeling choice-and the disparate results that come with it-that this Court has sought to expunge from practice under § 1988. And he seeks to achieve all this on the basis of considerably less helpful statutory language. To state the suggestion is to reveal its defect.
Nor does Mr. Murphy's proposed cure solve his problem. To avoid reading § 1997e(d)(2) as affording entirely rudderless discretion, Mr. Murphy contends that district courts should apportion fees in proportion to the defendant's culpability. When a defendant has acted egregiously, he says, the court should lower the plaintiff's responsibility for the fee award and increase the defendant's-even if that means applying only a "nominal" amount of the plaintiff's judgment toward the fee. But precisely none of this appears in § 1997e(d)(2) or, for that matter, enjoys any analogue in § 1988's lodestar analysis or even the old 12-factor approach. Whatever you might have to say about Mr. Murphy's culpability formula as a matter of policy, it has no roots in the law. Nor is it clear, for what it's worth, that the culpability approach would even help him. The district court never cited the defendants' culpability (or any other reason) to justify taking only 10% rather than 25% from Mr. Murphy's judgment. And it's tough to see what the choice of 10% might have had to do with the defendant's culpability in this case. The district court actually remitted the jury's punitive damages award-suggesting that, if anything, the defendants' culpability had been already amply addressed.
At the end of the day, what may have begun as a close race turns out to have a clear winner. Now with a view of the full field of textual, contextual, and precedential evidence, we think the interpretation the court of appeals adopted prevails. In cases governed by § 1997e(d), we hold that district courts must apply as much of the judgment as necessary, up to 25%, to satisfy an award of attorney's fees.
The judgment is
Affirmed .
The Court concludes that the attorney's fee apportionment provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2), requires that a district court endeavor to fulfill the entirety of an attorney's fee award from the monetary judgment awarded to a prevailing prisoner-plaintiff, and only if 25 percent of the judgment is inadequate to cover the fee award can the court require contribution from the defendant. Ante, at 794. I cannot agree. The text of § 1997e(d)(2) -"a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant"-and its statutory context make clear that the provision permits district courts to exercise discretion in choosing the portion of a prisoner-plaintiff's monetary judgment that must be applied toward an attorney's fee award, so long as that portion is not greater than 25 percent. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
In approaching this case, it helps to understand the background of the fee award at issue. On July 25, 2011, petitioner Charles Murphy, a prisoner at the Vandalia Correctional Center in Illinois, reported that his assigned seat at mealtime had food and water on it, which resulted in Murphy being handcuffed and escorted to a segregation building. Once there, Murphy taunted respondent Correctional Officer Robert Smith, who responded by hitting Murphy in the eye and applying a choke hold, causing Murphy to lose consciousness. When Murphy woke up, Officer Smith and respondent Lieutenant Gregory Fulk were pushing him into a cell. His hands were still cuffed behind his back and he fell face-first into the cell and hit his head on a metal toilet. Officer Smith and Lieutenant Fulk then stripped Murphy of his clothes, removed his handcuffs, and left him in the cell without checking his condition. Thirty or forty minutes passed until a nurse arrived to attend to Murphy, who was sent to a hospital. Part of his eye socket had been crushed and required surgery. Despite the procedure, Murphy did not fully recover; almost five years later, his vision remained doubled and blurred.
Murphy sued respondents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law causes of action. After trial, a jury found Officer Smith liable for state-law battery and unconstitutional use of force under the Eighth Amendment, and found Lieutenant Fulk liable for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The jury awarded Murphy $409,750.00 in compensatory and punitive damages, which the District Court reduced to $307,733.82. The District Court also awarded Murphy's attorney $108,446.54 in fees for the several hundred hours he spent on the case and, pursuant to § 1997e(d)(2), ordered Murphy to contribute 10 percent of his money judgment toward the attorney's fee award and respondents to pay the rest.
Respondents appealed, arguing that § 1997e(d)(2) required Murphy to contribute 25 percent of his judgment toward payment of the attorney's fee award. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed and reversed. In so doing, it acknowledged that its interpretation of § 1997e(d)(2) was at odds with that of all the other Courts of Appeals to have considered the question. See 844 F.3d 653, 660 (2016) (citing Boesing v. Spiess, 540 F.3d 886, 892 (C.A.8 2008) ; Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198, 205 (C.A.3 2009) ).
II
A
The relevant provision in the PLRA provides:
"Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in [a civil-rights action brought by a prisoner], a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2).
The crux of the majority's reasoning is its definition of the infinitive "to satisfy." The majority contends that "when you purposefully seek or aim 'to satisfy' an obligation, especially a financial obligation, that usually means you intend to discharge the obligation in full." Ante, at 787. To meet its duty to act with the purpose of fully discharging the fee award, the majority reasons, "a district court must apply as much of the judgment as necessary to satisfy the fee award, without of course exceeding the 25% cap." Ibid .
But the phrase "to satisfy" as it is used in § 1997e(d)(2) does not bear the weight the majority places on it. Its neighboring text and the realities of prisoner-civil-rights litigation rebut the conclusion that "to satisfy" compels a district court always to maximize the amount of the prisoner-plaintiff's judgment to be contributed to the fee award, and instead indicate that the only work "to satisfy" does in the statute is to direct a district court to contribute some amount of the judgment toward payment of the fee award.
Beginning with the neighboring text, it may well be that, standing alone, "to satisfy" is often used to mean "to completely fulfill an obligation." But the statutory provision here does not simply say "to satisfy"; it says "applied to satisfy." As a matter of everyday usage, the phrase "applied to satisfy" often means "applied toward the satisfaction of," rather than "applied in complete fulfillment of." Thus, whereas an action undertaken "to satisfy" an obligation might, as the majority suggests, naturally be understood as an effort to discharge the obligation in full, ante, at 787, a contribution that is "applied to satisfy" an obligation need not be intended to discharge the obligation in full.
Take a few examples: A consumer makes a payment on her credit card, which her agreement with the card company provides shall be "applied to satisfy" her debt. A student enrolls in a particular type of math class, the credits from which her university registrar earlier announced shall be "applied to satisfy" the requirements of a physics degree. And a law firm associate contributes hours to a pro bono matter that her firm has provided may be "applied to satisfy" the firm's overall billable-hours requirement. In each case, pursuant to the relevant agreement, the payment, credits, and hours are applied toward the satisfaction of a larger obligation, but the inference is not that the consumer, student, or associate had to contribute or even necessarily did contribute the maximum possible credit card payment, classroom credits, or hours toward the fulfillment of those obligations. The consumer may have chosen to make the minimum credit card payment because she preferred to allocate her other funds elsewhere; the student may have chosen the four-credit version of the math course over the six-credit one because the former had a better instructor; and the associate may have been judicious about the hours she dedicated to the pro bono matter because she knew her firm more highly valued paid over pro bono work. So, too, here. Section 1997e(d)(2), like the credit card agreement, university registrar announcement, and law firm policy, sets out the relevant rule-"a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy" the fee award-and the district court, like the consumer, student, and law firm associate, decides how much of the judgment to apply.
As a practical matter, moreover, a district court will almost never be able to discharge fully a fee award from 25 percent of a prisoner-plaintiff's judgment. In the vast majority of prisoner-civil-rights cases, the attorney's fee award exceeds the monetary judgment awarded to the prevailing prisoner-plaintiff. In fiscal year 2012, for instance, the median damages award in a prisoner-civil-rights action litigated to victory (i.e., not settled or decided against the prisoner) was a mere $4,185. See Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 153, 168 (2015) (Table 7) (Trends in Prisoner Litigation). Therefore, in 2012, the maximum amount (25 percent) of the median judgment that could be applied toward an attorney's fee award was $1,046.25. The PLRA caps the hourly rate that may be awarded to a prisoner-plaintiff's attorney at 150 percent of the rate for court-appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, which in 2012 was $125. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) ; App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. Thus, a prisoner's attorney was entitled to up to $187.50 per hour worked. Even if a district court were to apply an hourly rate of just $100, well below the cap, unless the attorney put in fewer than 10.5 hours in the ordinary case-a virtually unimaginable scenario-25 percent of the judgment will not come close to discharging fully the attorney's fee award.
Such low judgments are not a new phenomenon in prisoner-civil-rights suits; they were the norm even before Congress enacted the PLRA. In fiscal year 1993, for example, the median damages award for prisoner-plaintiffs in cases won at trial was $1,000. See Trends in Prisoner Litigation 167; Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1602-1603, and Table II.C (2003).
Given the very small judgment awards in successfully litigated prisoner-civil-rights cases, it is hard to believe, as the majority contends, that Congress used "applied to satisfy" to command an effort by district courts to "discharge ... in full," ante, at 787, when in most cases, full discharge will never be possible. Rather, taking into account both the realities of prisoner-civil-rights litigation and the most natural reading of "applied to satisfy," the more logical inference is that § 1997e(d)(2) simply requires that a portion of the prevailing prisoner-plaintiff's judgment be applied toward the satisfaction of the attorney's fee award. It does not, however, demand that the district court always order the prisoner-plaintiff to pay the maximum possible portion of the judgment (up to 25 percent) needed to discharge fully the fee award. Under that interpretation, applying any amount of Murphy's judgment toward payment of his attorney's fee award complies with § 1997e(d)(2), whether that amount is 10 percent of the judgment as ordered by the District Court or 25 percent as ordered by the Court of Appeals.
B
The majority suggests that if Congress had wanted to permit judges to pursue something other than full discharge of the fee award from the judgment, it could have replaced "to satisfy" with "to reduce" or "against." Ante, at 792. But the majority ignores that Congress also easily could have written § 1997e(d)(2) to more clearly express the meaning it and respondents champion. The statute, for example, simply could have said: "Twenty-five percent of the plaintiff's judgment shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant."
In fact, Congress considered and rejected language prior to enacting the current attorney's fee apportionment provision that would have done just what the majority claims. An earlier version of § 1997e(d)(2) provided:
"Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is greater than 25 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant." Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 1279, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(d), p. 16 (1995) (emphasis added).
The italicized clause plainly expressed what the majority contends the current provision means, i.e., that a defendant's liability for the attorney's fee award begins only if any portion of the award remains unpaid after the prevailing prisoner-plaintiff has contributed 25 percent of the judgment. But Congress removed this clause before finalizing the bill, thus electing to keep the 25-percent ceiling for the prisoner-plaintiff's contribution to the fee award and rejecting a 25-percent floor for the defendant's contribution. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-378, p. 71 (1995).
The majority alternatively disclaims the ability to discern what motivated the deletion and pronounces that "[i]t shows that, at some stage of the bill's consideration, its proponents likely shared [the majority's] understanding" of how the first sentence works. Ante, at 794 - 795, n. 2. In the majority's view, it is more likely that Congress drafted two redundant sentences than two conflicting ones. Ibid. That supposition, however, is purely speculative. Here is what is known for certain: Congress had before it language that would have accomplished exactly the statutory function the majority today endorses and Congress chose to excise that language from the text. Our precedent instructs that "[w]here Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended." Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). See also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-443, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (" 'Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language' ").
C
The rest of the statutory text confirms that district courts have discretion to choose the amount of the judgment that must be applied toward the attorney's fee award. Specifically, that grant of discretion is evident from Congress' use of two discretion-conferring terms, "portion" and "not to exceed."
The first word, "portion," is defined as "[a] share or allotted part (as of an estate)." Black's Law Dictionary 1182 (7th ed. 1999). "Portion" thus inherently conveys an indeterminate amount. Take, for instance, the following sentence: "My dinner guest has requested a portion of apple pie for dessert." How much is a "portion" of pie? For a marathon runner, a "portion" might mean a hearty serving, perhaps an eighth of a whole pie; for someone on a diet, however, a "portion" might mean a tiny sliver. The dinner host can figure it out based on the circumstances. Similarly, in this context, referencing a "portion" of the judgment tells us that some amount of the judgment up to 25 percent of the whole is to be applied to the attorney's fee award, but not exactly what amount. That decision is left to the sound discretion of the district court, depending again on the circumstances.
The majority dismisses as insignificant Congress' use of this discretion-conferring term, arguing that under either side's reading of the statute, the "portion" of fees taken from the prisoner-plaintiff's judgment will vary. See ante, at 788. True enough, but that fact does not justify the majority's brushoff. Congress' deliberate choice to use the indeterminate, discretion-conferring term "portion" in § 1997e(d)(2) reveals much about the statute's meaning.
To illustrate the significance of Congress' use of the word "portion," imagine that § 1997e(d)(2) contained no qualifying "not to exceed" parenthetical, and instead provided only that "a portion of the judgment shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant." As applied to the typical scenario, i.e., where the attorney's fee award exceeds the prisoner-plaintiff's money judgment, the most natural reading of the statute absent the limiting parenthetical is that the amount of the judgment applied to the fee award must be more than zero and less than 100 percent. That is because, as explained above, "portion" means something less than the whole but does not have a fixed value. If the majority were correct in its reading of "to satisfy," however-that it requires the district court to endeavor to discharge fully the attorney's fee award from the prisoner-plaintiff's judgment before turning to the defendant for a contribution-then, in the typical case, absent the parenthetical, we would have to conclude that "a portion of the judgment" always means "all of the judgment" or perhaps "all of the judgment save a nominal amount." I do not think it reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to ascribe such a strained meaning to "portion." That the majority's reading of one term-"to satisfy"-forces an implausible reading of another term-"portion"-strongly suggests that its reading is incorrect.
Congress' use of the word "portion," therefore, does not merely instruct that there are a range of possible portions that can be paid out of the judgment. "Portion" makes evident that the district court is afforded the discretion to choose the amount of the judgment to be paid toward the fee award. The addition of the "not to exceed 25 percent" parenthetical only enhances this conclusion. The phrase "not to exceed," which is itself discretion conferring, sets an upper, but not a lower, limit and thus cabins, but does not eliminate, the exercise of discretion that "portion" confers.
D
The distinction between cabining and eliminating discretion is also key to understanding the relationship between § 1997e(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), as well as between § 1997e(d)(2) and its surrounding statutory provisions.
Section 1988(b), the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, authorizes a district court to award "a reasonable attorney's fee" to a prevailing party in an action to enforce one or more of several federal civil rights laws. Section 1997e(d) in turn imposes limits on the attorney's fees available under § 1988(b) when the prevailing plaintiff in one of the specified civil-rights actions is a prisoner. In particular, the district court may award attorney's fees to the prisoner only if "the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988," and "the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation" or "the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation." § 1997e(d)(1). In addition, as noted supra, at 788, the district court may not base an award of attorney's fees "on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under [ 18 U.S.C. § 3006A ] for payment of court-appointed counsel" and, if the prisoner-plaintiff was awarded damages, may not award attorney's fees in excess of 150 percent of the monetary judgment. §§ 1997e(d)(2)-(3).
These provisions, of course, do not eliminate a district court's discretion when it comes to the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing prisoner-plaintiff; they merely compress the range of permissible options. A district court still has the discretion to decide whether to award attorney's fees, just as it ordinarily would under § 1988(b) ; it simply must first ensure that the threshold conditions set out in § 1997e(d)(1) are satisfied. A district court likewise still has the discretion to determine what constitutes a reasonable amount of fees to award; it simply must abide by the two 150-percent caps in doing so.
Just as these surrounding statutory provisions in § 1997e(d) set outward bounds on a district court's exercise of discretion while still preserving the exercise of discretion within those bounds, so, too, does § 1997e(d)(2). A district court is not free to require the defendant to pay the entire attorney's fee award, nor is it free to require the prisoner-plaintiff to give up more than 25 percent of his judgment to pay the fee award. But within those boundaries, the district court is free to decide which party should pay what portion of the fee award.
The majority suggests that affording discretion to district courts when it comes to the apportionment of attorney's fee awards is in tension with our adoption of the lodestar method as the presumptive means of calculating a reasonable fee award under § 1988. Ante, at 789. Prior to the lodestar's development, several lower courts utilized 12 "sometimes subjective factors." Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). Because that method "placed unlimited discretion in trial judges and produced disparate results," ibid., this Court endorsed the lodestar approach, pursuant to which a court multiplies "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate," Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984), and then considers whether to make adjustments to that amount, see id., at 898-901, 104 S.Ct. 1541 ; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The majority asserts that adopting Murphy's reading of § 1997e(d)(2) would lead to "exactly the sort of unguided and freewheeling choice" this Court sought to leave behind when it sanctioned the lodestar approach. Ante, at 789. That analogy, however, is inapt.
First, the question before us is whether § 1997e(d)(2) affords district courts any discretion in the apportionment of responsibility for payment of an attorney's fee award, not how district courts reasonably should exercise that discretion. When this Court embraced the lodestar approach, it did so to provide guideposts to district courts as they exercised the discretion granted to them by § 1988(b) to "allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee." By no means did this Court eliminate that exercise of discretion. Rather, the Court has "reemphasize[d] that the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award." Hensley, 461 U.S., at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; see also Blum, 465 U.S., at 902, n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 1541 ("A district court is expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining whether an award is to be made and if so its reasonableness"); id., at 896, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (explaining that the proper standard of review of an attorney's fee award is abuse of discretion). As was the case for the District Court here, that exercise of discretion can include, for example, whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction in hours where a plaintiff did not succeed on all his claims, and whether certain claimed expenses are reasonable. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-26a.
If the majority is concerned that district courts are exercising the apportionment discretion afforded to them by § 1997e(d)(2) in an uneven or unguided manner, the solution is not to read the conferral of discretion out of the statute entirely. Instead, as occurred in the § 1988(b) context, the Court could endorse a method for apportioning attorney's fee awards that can consistently be applied across cases. Just as courts ultimately were capable, through trial-and-error, of discerning an appropriate formula for assessing the reasonableness of a given fee award, see Delaware Valley, 478 U.S., at 562-565, 106 S.Ct. 3088 so, too, are they capable of determining a sound approach to the apportionment decision envisioned by § 1997e(d)(2).
Second, even absent an equivalent method to the lodestar inquiry, § 1997e(d)(2) does not, unlike the old 12-factor analysis for calculating fee awards, afford unlimited discretion. Congress provided express bounds on a district court's apportionment discretion, requiring that it order the prevailing prisoner-plaintiff to contribute at least some part of his money judgment to the fee award but no more than 25 percent.
Finally, it is not obvious that the need for a more regimented approach with respect to calculating the amount of an attorney's fee award under § 1988(b) should dictate the need for a similarly regimented approach with respect to the apportionment of responsibility for that award under § 1997e(d)(2). The two decisions involve fundamentally different inquiries: The first is focused on the prevailing-plaintiff's attorney and is concerned with determining a reasonable value for services rendered in pursuing the action, and the second is focused on the parties and is concerned with assessing the extent to which each party should bear responsibility for payment of those services (within the bounds set by Congress). In light of these distinctions, the Court should hesitate to extrapolate wholesale from the considerations that drove the adoption of the lodestar rule to constrain the apportionment discretion afforded by § 1997e(d)(2).
III
On my reading of the plain text of § 1997e(d)(2) and its surrounding statutory provisions and context, the proper interpretation of the provision is clear: District courts may exercise discretion in choosing the portion of the prisoner-plaintiff's monetary judgment that must go toward the attorney's fee award, so long as that choice is not greater than 25 percent of the judgment. Because the majority holds that a prevailing prisoner-plaintiff must always yield 25 percent of his monetary judgment or, if less, the full amount of the fee award in every case, I respectfully dissent.
See Black's Law Dictionary 1543 (10th ed. 2014) (defining "satisfaction" as "[t]he fulfillment of an obligation; esp., the payment in full of a debt"); 14 Oxford English Dictionary 504 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "satisfy" as "[t]o pay off or discharge fully; to liquidate (a debt); to fulfil completely (an obligation), comply with (a demand)"); Webster's New International Dictionary 2220 (2d ed. 1950) (defining "satisfy" as "1. In general, to fill up to the measure of a want of (a person or a thing); hence, to gratify fully the desire of.... 2. a To pay to the extent of claims or deserts; to give what is due to; as, to satisfy a creditor. b To answer or discharge, as a claim, debt, legal demand, or the like; ... to pay off ").
Even for those of us who might be inclined to entertain it, Mr. Murphy's legislative history argument fails to overcome the textual, contextual, and precedential evidence before us. He points to an early draft of § 1997e(d)(2) that read: "Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is greater than 25 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant." Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. 1279, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(d), p. 16 (1995) (emphasis added). Mr. Murphy admits that the italicized language in the second sentence suggests that it is the size of the attorney's fees award, not some invisible discretion, that determines what the defendant must pay. Yet, he notes, the second sentence was revised in the legislative process and now reads: "If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (emphasis added).
But what exactly does this amendment process prove, even taken on its own terms? It shows that, at some stage of the bill's consideration, its proponents likely shared our understanding that the (still unchanged) first sentence doesn't give district courts the discretion to allocate fees to the defendant as they please. For if such discretion were intended, it would have been incoherent for the drafters to say, in the second sentence, that defendants must pay only "[i]f the award of attorney's fees is greater than 25 percent of the judgment," instead of whenever the district court chooses. Beyond that, the amendment process tells us nothing. Did legislators voting on the measure agree with our interpretation of the first sentence and drop the confirmatory language from the second as flabby duplication? Or did they drop it because, as Mr. Murphy supposes, they thought it erroneous or even just bad policy? Did anyone voting on the measure even think about this question? There is no way to know, and we will not try to guess.
A similar conclusion obtains if one considers the average, rather than the median, damages award in a prisoner-civil-rights action litigated to victory, which in 2012 was $20,815. See Trends in Prisoner Litigation 168 (Table 7).
The average such award in 1993, excluding one extreme outlier of $6.5 million, was $18,800. See Trends in Prisoner Litigation 167; Schlanger, 116 Harv. L. Rev., at 1603.
In fact, even here, where the monetary judgment awarded to Murphy was well above the average award in prisoner-civil-rights cases, 25 percent of the judgment cannot fully discharge the fees awarded to his attorney.
Irrespective of what portion of the judgment the district court ultimately requires the prisoner-plaintiff to contribute to the fee award, the award will always be satisfied, i.e., paid in full, for once the prisoner-plaintiff provides his contribution from the judgment, the defendant will be called upon to contribute the remainder.
Notably, such variation will be far less common under the majority's reading. Given that the fee awards in prisoner-civil-rights victories almost always exceed the monetary judgments, see Part II-A, supra, on the majority's reading, it will be the rare case indeed when the "portion" of the judgment applied to the fee award will be anything other than 25 percent.
Of course, "portion" can gain a more determinate meaning by its surrounding context, as the majority's examples illustrate. See ante, at 793. But § 1997e(d)(2) is not like the recipe that quantifies the initial portion of sugar to be doubled or the statutory provision that describes with geographic precision the lands to be made part of the National Elk Refuge. "[T]o satisfy" simply instructs that some portion of the prisoner-plaintiff's judgment "not to exceed 25 percent" be applied toward the satisfaction of the fee award. See supra, at 789. Section 1997e(d)(2) therefore lacks the clarifying details present in the majority's examples that would give fixed meaning to the word "portion."
Such an apportionment method could, for example, account for a defendant's conduct during the litigation, just as the lodestar method considers the prevailing-plaintiff's conduct in prosecuting the action. A defendant that acts in ways that unnecessarily prolong or complicate the litigation so as to increase the plaintiff's fees reasonably could be asked to bear a greater share of that expense.
Relatedly, the majority indicates concern with the District Court's lack of explanation for its choice of 10 percent. See ante, at 790. That procedural failure can easily be remedied by requiring district courts to explain their apportionment decisions so as to facilitate meaningful appellate review. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_lcdisposition |
ARIZONA v. GANT
No. 07-542.
Argued October 7, 2008
Decided April 21, 2009
Joseph T Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Terry Goddard, Attorney General, Mary R. O’Grady, Solicitor General, Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Randall M. Howe, Former Chief Counsel, and Nicholas D. Acedo, Assistant Attorney General.
Anthony A. Yang argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, former Assistant Attorney General Fisher, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.
Thomas F. Jacobs argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jeffrey T Green
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, Scott D. Makar, Solicitor General, and Craig D. Feiser and Courtney Brewer, Deputy Solicitors General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., of California, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Steven N. Six of Kansas, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Lori Swanson of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, J. B. Van Hallen of Wisconsin, and Bruce A Salzburg of Wyoming; for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. by Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, Richard Weintraub, Michael E. McNeff, Eric B. Edwards, and Bernard J. Farber; for the National Association of Police Organizations, Inc., by William J. Johnson and Devallis Rutledge; and for Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley et al. by Mr. Cooley, pro se, Lael R. Rubin, Brentford J. Ferreira, and Phyllis C. Asayama.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by James J. Tomkovicz, Steven R. Shapiro, and Graham A Boyd; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, Amy Howe, Kevin K. Russell, and Thomas C. Goldstein; and for the National Association of Federal Defenders by Beth S. Brinkmann, Seth M. Galanter, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Lila M. Bateman, Frances H. Pratt, Philip J. Lynch, Judith H. Mizner, and Stephen C. Moss.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car, police officers searched his car and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat. Because Gant could not have accessed his ear to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), did not justify the search in this case. We agree with that conclusion.
Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee’s “ ‘immediate control,’ ” meaning “the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U. S., at 763. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope. Accordingly, we hold that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), and following the suggestion in Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at 632, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
I
On August 25, 1999, acting on an anonymous tip that the residence at 2524 North Walnut Avenue was being used to sell drugs, Tucson police officers Griffith and Reed knocked on the front door and asked to speak to the owner. Gant answered the door and, after identifying himself, stated that he expected the owner to return later. The officers left the residence and conducted a records check, which revealed that Gant’s driver’s license had been suspended and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license.
When the officers returned to the house that evening, they found a man near the back of the house and a woman in a car parked in front of it. After a third officer arrived, they arrested the man for providing a false name and the woman for possessing drug paraphernalia. Both arrestees were handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars when Gant arrived. The officers recognized his car as it entered the driveway, and Officer Griffith confirmed that Gant was the driver by shining a flashlight into the car as it drove by him. Gant parked at the end of the driveway, got out of his car, and shut the door. Griffith, who was about 30 feet away, called to Gant, and they approached each other, meeting 10-to-12 feet from Gant’s car. Griffith immediately arrested Gant and handcuffed him.
Because the other arrestees were secured in the only patrol cars at the scene, Griffith called for backup. When two more officers arrived, they locked Gant in the backseat of their vehicle. After Gant had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car, two officers searched his car: One of them found a gun, and the other discovered a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Gant was charged with two offenses — possession of a narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia (1 e., the plastic bag in which the cocaine was found). He moved to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. Among other things, Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle. When asked at the suppression hearing why the search was conducted, Officer Griffith responded: “Because the law says we can do it.” App. 75.
The trial court rejected the State’s contention that the officers had probable cause to search Gant’s car for contraband when the search began, id., at 18, 30, but it denied the motion to suppress. Relying on the fact that the police saw Gant commit the crime of driving without a license and apprehended him only shortly after he exited his ear, the court held that the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Id., at 37. A jury found Gant guilty on both drug counts, and he was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment.
After protracted state-court proceedings, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The court’s opinion discussed at length our decision in Belton, which held that police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of an arrest of the vehicle’s recent occupant. 216 Ariz. 1, 3-4, 162 R 3d 640, 642-643 (2007) (citing 453 U. S., at 460). The court distinguished Belton as a case concerning the permissible scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest and concluded that it did not answer “the threshold question whether the police may conduct a search incident to arrest at all once the scene is secure.” 216 Ariz., at 4, 162 R 3d, at 643. Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, the court observed that the search-ineident-toarrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer safety and evidence preservation. 216 Ariz., at 4,162 P. 3d, at 643. When “the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol ear, and under the supervision of an officer,” the court concluded, a “warrantless search of the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or prevent the destruction of evidence.” Id., at 5,162 P. 3d, at 644. Accordingly, the court held that the search of Gant’s ear was unreasonable.
The dissenting justices would have upheld the search of Gant's car based on their view that “the validity of a Belton search . . . clearly does not depend on the presence of the Chimel rationales in a particular case.” Id., at 8, 162 P. 3d, at 647. Although they disagreed with the majority’s view of Belton, the dissenting justices acknowledged that “[t]he bright-line rule embraced in Belton has long been criticized and probably merits reconsideration.” 216 Ariz., at 10, 162 P. 3d, at 649. They thus “add[ed their] voice[s] to the others that have urged the Supreme Court to revisit Belton.” Id., at 11, 162 P. 3d, at 650.
The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s petition for certiorari. 552 U. S. 1230 (2008).
II
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914). The exception derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 230-234 (1973); Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763.
In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Ibid. That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid, (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable “in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use” and “in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction” of evidence (emphasis added)). If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E. g., Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367-368 (1964).
In Belton, we considered ChimeVs application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver’s license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked “Supergold” — a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer “ ‘split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway ... so they would not be in physical touching area of each other’ ” and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U. S., at 456.
The New York Court of Appeals found the search unconstitutional, concluding that after the occupants were arrested the vehicle and its contents were “safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police.” State v. Belton, 50 N. Y. 2d 447, 452, 407 N. E. 2d 420, 423 (1980). The State asked this Court to consider whether the exception recognized in Chimel permits an officer to search “a jacket found inside an automobile while the automobile’s four occupants, all under arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle.” Brief in No. 80-328, p. i. We granted certiorari because “courts ha[d] found no workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile.” 453 U. S., at 460.
In its brief, the State argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the jacket was under the officer’s exclusive control. Focusing on the number of arrestees and their proximity to the vehicle, the State asserted that it was reasonable for the officer to believe the arrestees could have accessed the vehicle and its contents, making the search permissible under Chimel. Brief in No. 80-328, at 7-8. The United States, as amicus curiae in support of the State, argued for a more permissive standard, but it maintained that any search incident to arrest must be “ ‘substantially contemporaneous’ ” with the arrest — a requirement it deemed “satisfied if the search occurs during the period in which the arrest is being consummated and before the situation has so stabilized that it could be said that the arrest was completed.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80-328, p. 14. There was no suggestion by the parties or amici that Chimel authorizes a vehicle search incident to arrest when there is no realistic possibility that an arrestee could access his vehicle.
After considering these arguments, we held that when an officer lawfully arrests “the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the automobile” and any containers therein. Belton, 453 U. S., at 460 (footnote omitted). That holding was based in large part on our assumption “that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach.’ ” Ibid.
The Arizona Supreme Court read our decision in Belton as merely delineating “the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile” incident to an arrest, id., at 459. That is, when the passenger compartment is within an arrestee’s reaching distance, Belton supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may be reached. On that view of Belton, the state court concluded that the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable because Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of the search. It also found that no other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.
Gant now urges us to adopt the reading of Belton followed by the Arizona Supreme Court.
Ill
Despite the textual and evidentiary support for the Arizona Supreme Court’s reading of Belton, our opinion has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search. This reading may be attributable to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Belton, in which he characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the “fiction... that the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of an arrestee who has recently been in the car.” Id., at 466. Under the majority’s approach, he argued, “the result would presumably be the same even if [the officer] had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car” before conducting the search. Id., at 468.
Since we decided Belton, Courts of Appeals have given different answers to the question whether a vehicle must be within an arrestee’s reach to justify a vehicle search incident to arrest, but Justice Brennan’s reading of the Court’s opinion has predominated. As Justice O’Connor observed, “lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 624 (opinion concurring in part). Justice Scalia has similarly noted that, although it is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases allowing a search in “this precise factual scenario . . . are legion.” Id., at 628 (opinion concurring in judgment) (collecting cases). Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton “even when . . . the handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.” 541 U. S., at 628 (same).
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception — a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.” 453 U. S., at 460, n. 3. Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
Although it does not follow from Chimel, we also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Thornton, 541 U. S., at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. See, e. g., Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 324 (2001); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113, 118 (1998). But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee’s vehicle and any containers therein.
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant’s car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking in this case. Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license — an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car. Cf. Knowles, 525 U. S., at 118. Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.
IV
The State does not seriously disagree with the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that Gant could not have accessed his vehicle at the time of the search, but it nevertheless asks us to uphold the search of his vehicle under the broad reading of Belton discussed above. The State argues that Belton searches are reasonable regardless of the possibility of access in a given case because that expansive rule correctly balances law enforcement interests, including the interest in a bright-line rule, with an arrestee’s limited privacy interest in his vehicle.
For several reasons, we reject the State’s argument. First, the State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, see New York v. Class, 475 U. S. 106, 112-113 (1986), the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of constitutional protection, see Knowles, 525 U. S., at 117. It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to the privacy of countless individuals. Indeed, the character of that threat implicates the central concern underlying the Fourth Amendment — the concern about giving police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person’s private effects.
At the same time as it undervalues these privacy concerns, the State exaggerates the clarity that its reading of Belton provides. Courts that have read Belton expansively are at odds regarding how close in time to the arrest and how proximate to the arrestee’s vehicle an officer’s first contact with the arrestee must be to bring the encounter within Belton’s purview and whether a search is reasonable when it commences or continues after the arrestee has been removed from the scene. The rule has thus generated a great deal of uncertainty, particularly for a rule touted as providing a “bright line.” See 3 LaFave §7.1(c), at 514-524.
Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety and evidentiary interests. Under our view, Belton and Thornton permit an officer to conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is “dangerous” and might access the vehicle to “gain immediate control of weapons.” Id., at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)). If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 820-821 (1982), authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found. Unlike the searches permitted by Justice Scalia’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Thornton, which we conclude today are reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Ross allows searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader. Finally, there may be still other circumstances in which safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search. Cf. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U. S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that, incident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of those areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding).
These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent occupant justify a search. Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.
V
Our dissenting colleagues argue that the doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to a broad reading of Belton even though the justifications for searching a vehicle incident to arrest are in most cases absent. The doctrine of stare decisis is of course “essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,” but it does not compel us to follow a past decision when its rationale no longer withstands “careful analysis.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 577 (2003).
We have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice. And we would be particularly loath to uphold an unconstitutional result in a case that is so easily distinguished from the decisions that arguably compel it. The safety and evidentiary interests that supported the search in Belton simply are not present in this case. Indeed, it is hard to imagine two cases that are factually more distinct, as Belton involved one officer confronted by four unsecured arrestees suspected of committing a drug offense, and this case involves several officers confronted with a securely detained arrestee apprehended for driving with a suspended license. This case is also distinguishable from Thornton, in which the petitioner was arrested for a drug offense. It is thus unsurprising that Members of this Court who concurred in the judgments in Belton and Thornton also concur in the decision in this case.
We do not agree with the contention in Justice Alito’s dissent (hereinafter dissent) that consideration of police reliance interests requires a different result. Although it appears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years,* many of these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement community may view the State’s version of the Belton rule as an entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is unlawful, individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement “entitlement” to its persistence. Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 393 (1978) (“[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment”). The dissent’s reference in this regard to the reliance interests cited in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000), is misplaced. See post, at 358-359. In observing that “Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture,” 530 U. S., at 443, the Court was referring not to police reliance on a rule requiring them to provide warnings but to the broader societal reliance on that individual right.
The dissent also ignores the checkered history of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Police authority to search the place in which a lawful arrest is made was broadly asserted in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), and limited a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). The limiting views expressed in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz were in turn abandoned in Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947), which upheld a search of a four-room apartment incident to the occupant’s arrest. Only a year later the Court in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 708 (1948), retreated from that holding, noting that the search-incident-to-arrest exception is “a strictly limited” one that must be justified by “something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful arrest.” And just two years after that, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950), the Court again reversed course and upheld the search of an entire apartment. Finally, our opinion in Chimel overruled Rabinowitz and what remained of Harris and established the present boundaries of the search-incident-to-arrest exception. Notably, none of the dissenters in Chimel or the cases that preceded it argued that law enforcement reliance interests outweighed the interest in protecting individual constitutional rights so as to warrant fidelity to an unjustifiable rule.
The experience of the 28 years since we decided Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is unfounded. We now know that articles inside the passenger compartment are rarely “within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach,’ ” 453 U. S., at 460, and blind adherence to Belton’s faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional searches. The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine constitutional violations.
VI
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. Accordingly, the judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
The officer was unable to handcuff the occupants because he had only one set of handcuffs. See Brief for Petitioner in New York v. Belton, O. T. 1980, No. 80-328, p. 3 (hereinafter Brief in No. 80-328).
Compare United States v. Green, 324 F. 3d 375, 379 (CA5 2003) (holding that Belton did not authorize a search of an arrestee’s vehicle when he was handcuffed and lying facedown on the ground surrounded by four police officers 6-to-10 feet from the vehicle), United States v. Edwards, 242 F. 3d 928, 938 (CA10 2001) (finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted while the arrestee was handcuffed in the back of a patrol car), and United States v. Vasey, 834 F. 2d 782, 787 (CA9 1987) (finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted 30-to-45 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police car), with United States v. Hrasky, 453 F. 3d 1099, 1102 (CA8 2006) (upholding a search conducted an hour after the arrestee was apprehended and after he had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car), United States v. Weaver, 433 F. 3d 1104, 1106 (CA9 2006) (upholding a search conducted 10-to-15 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a patrol car), and United States v. White, 871 F. 2d 41, 44 (CA6 1989) (upholding a search conducted after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police cruiser).
The practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car has not abated since we decided Thornton. See, e.g., United States v. Murphy, 221 Fed. Appx. 715, 717 (CA10 2007); Hrasky, 453 F. 3d, at 1100; Weaver, 433 F. 3d, at 1105; United States v. Williams, 170 Fed. Appx. 399, 401 (CA6 2006); United States v. Dorsey, 418 F. 3d 1038, 1041 (CA9 2005); United States v. Osife, 398 F. 3d 1143, 1144 (CA9 2005); United States v. Sumrall, 115 Fed. Appx. 22, 24 (CA10 2004).
Because officers have many means of ensuring the safe arrest of vehicle occupants, it will be the rare case in which an officer is unable to fully effectuate an arrest so that a real possibility of access to the arrestee’s vehicle remains. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.1(c), p. 525 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter LaFave) (noting that the availability of protective measures “ensur[es] the nonexistence of circumstances in which the arrestee’s ‘control’ of the car is in doubt”). But in such a case a search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79, 84 (1987); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 760-761 (1969); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 480-484 (1965); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 389-392 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 624-625 (1886); see also 10 C. Adams, The Works of John Adams 247-248 (1856). Many have observed that a broad reading of Belton gives police limitless discretion to conduct exploratory searches. See 3 LaFave § 7.1(c), at 527 (observing that Belton creates the risk “that police will make custodial arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits”); see also United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d 889, 894 (CA9 1999) (Trott, J., concurring) (observing that Belton has been applied to condone “purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a ear to see what they might find”); State v. Pallone, 2001 WI 77, ¶¶ 87-90,236 Wis. 2d 162, 203-204, and n. 9, 613 N. W. 2d 568, 588, and n. 9 (2000) (Abrahamson, C. J., dissenting) (same); State v. Pierce, 136 N. J. 184, 211, 642 A. 2d 947, 961 (1994) (same).
Compare United States v. Caseres, 533 F. 3d 1064, 1072 (CA9 2008) (declining to apply Belton when the arrestee was approached by police after he had exited his vehicle and reached his residence), with Rainey v. Commonwealth, 197 S. W. 3d 89, 94-95 (Ky. 2006) (applying Belton when the arrestee was apprehended 50 feet from the vehicle), and Black v. State, 810 N. E. 2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when the arrestee was apprehended inside an auto repair shop and the vehicle was parked outside).
Compare McLaughlin, 170 F. 3d, at 890-891 (upholding a search that commenced five minutes after the arrestee was removed from the scene), United States v. Snook, 88 F. 3d 605, 608 (CA8 1996) (same), and United States v. Doward, 41 F. 3d 789, 793 (CA1 1994) (upholding a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene), with United States v. Lugo, 978 F. 2d 631, 634 (CA10 1992) (holding invalid a search that commenced after the arrestee was removed from the scene), and State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 427-428, 512 A. 2d 160, 169 (1986) (holding invalid a search that continued after the arrestee was removed from the scene).
At least eight States have reached the same conclusion. Vermont, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, New York, Oregon, and Wyoming have declined to follow a broad reading of Belton under their state constitutions. See State v. Bander, 181 Vt. 392, 401, 924 A. 2d 38, 46-47 (2007); State v. Eckel, 185 N. J. 523, 540, 888 A. 2d 1266, 1277 (2006); Camacho v. State, 119 Nev. 395, 399-400, 75 P. 3d 370, 373-374 (2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P. 2d 476, 488-489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, 123 N. M. 628, 636 (Ct. App.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107, 127 N. M. 752 (Ct. App.); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45, 57, 669 A. 2d 896, 902 (1995); People v. Blasich, 73 N. Y. 2d 673, 678, 541 N. E. 2d 40, 43 (1989); State v. Fesler, 68 Ore. App. 609, 612, 685 P. 2d 1014, 1016-1017 (1984). And a Massachusetts statute provides that a search incident to arrest may be made only for the purposes of seizing weapons or evidence of the offense of arrest. See Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 161-162, 448 N. E. 2d 1264, 1266-1267 (1983) (citing Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 276, § 1 (West 2006)).
Justice Auto’s dissenting opinion also accuses us of “overruling]” Belton and Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004), “even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.” Post, at 355. Contrary to that claim, the narrow reading of Belton we adopt today is precisely the result Gant has urged. That Justice Auto has chosen to describe this decision as overruling our earlier cases does not change the fact that the resulting rule of law is the one advocated by respondent.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Belton, 453 U. S., at 463, for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420, 444 (1981), Justice Thomas joined the Court’s opinion in Thornton, 541 U. S. 615, and Justice Scaua and Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment in that case, id., at 625.
Because a broad reading of Belton has been widely accepted, the doctrine of qualified immunity will shield officers from liability for searches conducted in reasonable reliance on that understanding. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state or territory of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. | What is the state of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
3
] | sc_casesourcestate |
NORTH CAROLINA v. ALFORD
No. 14.
Argued November 17, 1969 — Reargued October 14, 1970—
Decided November 23, 1970
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and HarlaN, Stewart, and BlackmuN, JJ., joined. Blach, J., filed a statement-concurring in the judgment, post, p. 39. BreN-NAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 39.
Jacob L. Safron reargued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Robert Morgan, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Andrew A. Vanore, Jr., joined in and adopted by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Joe Purcell of Arkansas, David P. Buckson of Delaware, William J. Scott of Illinois, John B. Breckinridge óf Kentucky, Joe T. Patterson of Mississippi, find Robert L. Woodahl of Montana; by the Government of the Virgin Islands; and by the National District Attorneys Association.
Doris R. Bray, by appointment of the Court, 394 U. S. 1010, reargued the cause and filed briefs for appellee.
Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Michael Melts-ner, Ñorman C. Amaker, Charles Stephen Ralston, Anthony G. Amsterdam, J. LeVonne Chambers, and James E. Ferguson II filed a brief for Albert Bobby Childs et al. as amici curiae.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 2, 1963, Alford was indicted for first-degree murder, a capital offense under North Carolina law. The court appointed an attorney to represent him, and this attorney questioned all but one of the various witnesses who appellee said would substantiate his claim of innocence. The witnesses, however, did-not support Alford’s story but gave statements that strongly ■ indicated his guilt. Faced with strong evidence of guilt and no substantial evidentiary support for the claim of innocence, Alford’s attorney recommended that he .plead guilty, but .left the ultimate decision to Alford himself. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to a charge of. second-degree murder, and on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty to the reduced charge.
Before the plea was finally accepted by the trial court, the court heard the sworn testimony of a police officer who summarized the State’s case. Two other witnesses besides Aiford were also heard. Although there was no eyewitness to the crime, the testimony indicated that shortly before the killing Alford took his gun from his house, stated his intention to kill the victim, and returned home with the declaration that he had carried out the killing. After the summary presentation of the State’s case, Alford took the stand and testified that he had not committed the murder but that he was pleading guilty because he faced the.threat of the death penalty if he did not do so. In response to the questions of his counsel, he acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of -the difference between second- and first-degree murder and of his rights in case he chose to go to trial. The trial court then asked appellee if, in light of his denial of guilt, he still desired to plead guilty to second-degree murder and appellee answered, “Yes, sir. I plead guilty on — from the circumstances that he [Alford’s attorney] told me.” - After eliciting information about Alford’s prior criminal record, which was a long one, the trial court sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment, the maximum penalty for second-degree, murder.
• Alford sought post-conviction relief in the state court. Among the claims raised was the claim that his plea of guilty was invalid because it was the product of fear and coercion. After a hearing, the state court in 1965 found that the plea was “willingly, knowingly, and understandingly” made on the advice of competent counsel and in the face of a strong prosecution case. Subsequently, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, first in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, and then in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Both courts denied, the writ on the basis of the state court’s findings that Alford yoluntarily and knowingly agreed to plead guilty. In 1967, Alford again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Dis-. trict Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. That court, without an evidentiary, hearing, again denied relief on the grounds that the guilty plea was voluntary and waived all defenses and nonjurisdictional' defects in any prior stage of the proceedings, and that the findings of the state court in 1965 clearly required rejection of Alford’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of-counsel prior to pleading guilty. On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed on the ground that Alford’s guilty plea was made involuntarily. 405 F. 2d 340. (1968). In reaching itá conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968), which the court read to require invalidation of the North Carolina statutory framework for the imposition of the death penalty because North Carolina statutes encouraged defendants to waive constitutional rights by the promise of no more than life imprisonment if a guilty plea was offered and accepted. Conceding that Jackson did not require the automatic invalidation of pleas of guilty entered under the North Carolina statutes, the Court of Appeals ruled that Alford’s guilty plea was involuntary because its principal .motivation was fear of the death penalty. By this standard, even if both the judge and the jury had possessed the 4)0wer to impose the death, penalty for first-degree murder or if guilty pleas to capital charges had not been permitted, Alford’s plea of guilty to second-degree murder should still have been rejected because impermissibly induced by his desire to eliminate the possibility of a death sentence. We noted probable jurisdiction. 394 U. S. 956 (1969). We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.
We held in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), that a plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for the defendant’s desire to avoid.a possible death penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years was not for that reason compelled within the meaning óf it 3 Fifth Amendment. , Jackson established no new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. Th,e standard was' and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses .of action open to. the defendant. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 242 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368. U. S. 487, 493 (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223 (1927). That he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice, especially where the defendant was represented'by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would be to the defendant’s' advantage; The standard fashioned and applied by the Court of Appeals was therefore erroneous and we would, without more, vacate and remand the case for further proceedings with respect to any other claims of Alford .which are properly before that court, if it were not for' oth.er 'circumstances appearing in the record which might seem to warrant an affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
As previously recounted, after Alford’s plea of guilty was offered and the State’s case was placed before the judge, Alford denied that he had committed the murder but reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty to avoid a possible death sentence and to limit the penalty to the 30- ' year maximum provided for second-degree murder. Ordinarily; a judgment of conviction resting on a plea of guilty is justified by the defendant’s admission that he committed the crime charged against him and his consent that judgment be entered without a trial of any kind. The plea usually subsumes both elements, and justifiably so, even though there is no separate, express admission by the defendant that he committed the particular acts claimed to constitute the crime charged in the indictment. See Brady v. United States, supra, at 748; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969). Here Alford entered his plea but accompanied it with the statement- that he had not shot the victim:.
If Alford’s statements were to be credited as sincere assertions of his innocence, there obviously existed a factual and legal dispute between him and the State. Without more, it might be argued that the conviction entered on his guilty plea was invalid, since his assertion . of innocence negatived any admission of guilt, which, as we observed last Term in Brady, is normally “[c]entral to the piea and the foundation for entering judgment against the defendant . . . .” 397 U. S., at 748.
In addition to Alford’s statement, however, the court had heard an account of the events on the night of the murder, including information from Alford’s acquaintances that he had departed from his home with his gun stating his intention to kill and that he had later declared that he had carried out his intention. Nor had Alford wavered in his desire to have the trial court determine his guilt without, a jury trial. Although denying the charge against him, he nevertheless preferred the dispute between him and the State to be settled by the judge in the context of a guilty plea proceeding rather than by a formal trial. ' Thereupon, with the State’s telling evidence and Alford’s denial before it. the trial court proceeded to convict and sentence Alford for second-degree murder.
State and lower federal courts are divided upon whether a guilty plea can be accepted when it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only a waiver of trial but no admission of guilt. Some courts, giving expression to the principle that “[o]ur law only authorizes a conviction where guilt is shown,” Harris v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 126, 131, 172 S. W. 975, 977 (1915), require that trial judges reject such pleas. See, e. g., Hulsey v. United States, 369 F. 2d 284, 287 (CA5 1966); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 255-257 (SDNY 1966); People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 81 N. W. 2d 667 (1957); State v. Reali, 26 N. J. 222, 139 A. 2d 300 (1958); State v. Leyba, 80 N. M. 190, 193, 453 P. 2d 211, 214 (1969); State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 2d 358, 361-364, 261 P. 2d 400/402-403 (1953). But others have concluded that they should not “force any defense on a defendant in a criminal case/’ particularly' when advancement of the defense might “end in disaster . . . .” Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569, 570 (DC 1961). They have argued that, since “guilt, or the degree of guilt, is at times uncertain and elusive,” “[a]n accused, though believing in or entertaining doubts.respecting his innocence, might reasonably conclude a jury would be convinced of his guilt and that he would fare better in the sentence by pleading guilty . . . .” McCoy v. United States, 124 U. S. App. D. C. 177, 179, 363 F. 2d 306, 308 (1966). As one state court observed nearly a century ago, “[rjeasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead, . . . [and] [h]e must be permitted to judge for himself in this respect.” State v. Kaufman, 51 Iowa 578, 580, 2 N. W. 275, 276 (1879) (dictum). Accord, e. g., Griffin v. United States, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 108, 405 F. 2d 1378 (1968); Bruce v. United States, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 336, 342-343, 379 F. 2d 113, 119-120 (1967); City of Burbank v. General Electric Co., 329 F. 2d 825, 835 (CA9 1964) (dictum); State v. Martinez, 89 Idaho 129, 138, 403 P. 2d 597, 602-603 (1965); People v. Hetherington, 379 Ill. 71, 39 N. E. 2d 361 (1942); State ex rel. Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 307-308, 116 N. W. 2d 666, 672 (1962); Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A. 2d 294 (1969). 4 Cf. United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVullee, 424 F. 2d 457 (CA2 1970).
This Court has not confrontéd this precise issue, but prior decisions do yield relevant principles. ' In Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), Lynch, who had been charged in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia with drawing and negotiating bad checks, • a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of one year in jail, sought to enter a plea of guilty, but the trial, judge refused to accept the plea since a psychiatric report in the judge’s possession indicated that. Lynch had been suffering from “a manic depressive psychosis, at the time of the crime - charged,” and hence might. have been not guilty by reason of insanity. Although at the subsequent trial Lynch did not rely on the insanity defense, he was found' not guilty by reason of insanity and committed for an indeterminate period to a mental institution. On habeas corpus, the Court ordered his release, construing the "congressional legislation seemingly authorizing the commitment as not reaching a' case where the accused preferred a guilty plea to a plea of insanity. The Court expressly refused to rule that Lynch had an absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted, see id., at 719, but implied that there would havé been no constitutional error had his-plea been accepted even though evidence before the judge indicated that there was a valid defense.
The issue ■ in Hudson v. United States, 272 U. S. 451 (1926), was whether a federal court has power to impose a prison sentence after accepting a plea of nolo contendere, a plea by which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty. The Court held that a trial court does have such power, and, except for the cases which were rejected in Hudson, the federal courts have uniformly followed this rule', even in cases involving moral turpitude. Bruce v. United States, supra, at 343 n. 20, 379 F. 2d, at 120 n. 20 (dictum). See, e. g., Lott v. United States, 367 U. S. 421 (1961) (fraudulent evasion of income tax); Sullivan v. United States, 348 U. S. 170 (1954) (ibid.); Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F. 2d 541 (CA5 1938) (espionage); Pharr v. United States, 48 F. 2d 767 (CA6 1931) (misapplication of bank funds); United States v. Bagliore, 182 F. Supp. 714 (EDNY 1960) (receiving stolen property). Implicit in the nolo con-tendere cases is a recognition, that the Constitution does not bar imposition of a prison sentence upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence,.
These cases would be directly in point if Alford had simply insisted on his plea but refused to admit the crime. The fact that his plea was denominated a plea of guilty rather than a plea of nolo contendere is of no constitutional significance with respect to the issue now before us, for the Constitution is concerned with the practical consequences, not the formal categorizations, of state law. See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708, 712 (1961); Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 266 (1960). Cf. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 630-632 (1959). Thus,, while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.
Nor can we perceive any material difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence when, as in the instant case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt. Here the State had a strong case of first-degree murder against Alford. Whether he realized or disbelieved his guilt, he insisted on his plea because in his view he had absolutely nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading. Because of the overwhelming evidence against him, a trial was precisely what neither Alford nor his attorney- desired. Confronted with the choice between a trial for- first-degree murder, on the one hand, and a plea of guilty to second-, degree murder, on the other, Alford quite reasonably chose the latter and thereby limited the maximum penalty to a 30-year term. When his plea is viewed in light of the evidence against him, which substantially negated his claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could test whether the plea was being intelligently entered, see McCarthy v. United States, supra, at 466-467 (1969), its validity-cannot be. seriously questioned. In view of the strong factual basis for the plea demonstrated by the State and Alford's clearly expressed desire to enter it despite his professed belief in'his innocence, we hold that the trial judge did not commit constitutional error in accepting it.
Relying on United States v. Jackson, supra, Alford now argues in effect that the State should not have allowed him this choice but should have insisted on proving him guilty of murder in the first degree. The States in their wisdom may take this course by statute or otherwise and may prohibit the practice of accepting pleas to lesser included offenses under any circumstances. But this is not the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. The prohibitions against involuntary or unintelligent pleas should not be relaxed, but neither should an exercise-in arid logic render those constitutional guarantees counterproductive and put in jeopardy the very human values they were meant to preserve.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was in error to find Alford’s plea of guilty invalid because it was made to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. That court’s judgment directing the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black, while adhering to his belief that. United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, was wrongly decided, concurs in the judgment and in substantially.all of the opinion in this case.
Under North Carolina law, first-degree murder is-punished with, death unless the jury recommends that the punishment shall be life imprisonment:
X“A murder which shall be perpetrated by-means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any .other .kind of willful, deliberate'and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt' to perpetrate any arson,' rape, robbery, burglary, o'r other felony, shall be 'deemed to be murder in the-first degree and shall be punished with death:. Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s prison, and the-court shall 'sy'instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than two nor more than'thirty years in the State’s prison.” N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1969).
At the time Alford pleaded guilty, North Carolina law provided that' if a guilty plea to a charge of first-degree murder was accepted by the prosecution and the court, the penalty would be life imprison-. ment rather than death. The provision permitting guilty pleas in capital cases was repealed in 1969. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 792-795 (1970). Though under-.present North Caro--lina law it is not possible for a defendant to plead guilty tea capital charge, it seemingly remains possible for a person charged with a , capital offense to plead-guilty to a lesser charge.
After giving his version of the events of the night of the murder, Alford stated:
“I pleaded guilty on second ‘degree murder because they said there is too much evidence, but I ain’t shot no man, but I take the fault for the other man. We never had an argument in our , life' and I just pleaded guilty because they said if I didn’t they would gas me for it, and that is all.”
In response to questions from his attorney, Alford affirmed that he had consulted several times with his attorney and with members of his family and had been informed of his rights if he chose to plead not guilty. Alford then reaffirmed his decision to plead guilty to second-degree murder:
“Q [by Alford’s attorney]. And you authorized me to tender a plea of guilty to second degree murder before the court?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And in doing that, that you have again affirmed your decision on that point?
“A. Well, I’m still pleading .that you all got me to plead guilty.' I plead the other way, circumstantial evidence; that the jury will prosecute me on — on the second. You told me to plead guilty, right. I don’t — I’m not' guilty but-1 plead guilty.”
At the state court hearing on post-conviction relief, the testimony confirmed that Alford had been fully informed by his attorney as to his rights on a plea of not guilty and as to the consequences of a plea of guilty. Since the record in this case affirmatively indicates that Alford was aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty and of the rights waived by the plea, no issues of substance under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (1960), would be presented even if that case was held applicable to the events here in question.
Before Alford was sentenced, the trial judge asked Alford about prior convictions. Alford answered that, among other things, he had served six years of a ten-year sentence for murder, had been convicted nine times for armed robbery, and had been convicted for transporting stolen goods, forgery, and carrying a concealed weapon. App. 9-11.
See n. 1, supra
Thus if Alford had; entered the same plea in the same way in 1969 after the statute authorizing guilty pleas to capital charges had- been repealed, see n. 1, supra, the result reached by the Court of Appeals should have been the same under that court’s reasoning.
A third approach has been to decline to rule .definitively that a trial judge must either accept or reject an otherwise valid plea containing a protestation of innocence, but to leave that decision to his sound discretion. See Maxwell v. United States, 368 F. 2d 735, 738-739 (CA9 1966).
Courts have defined the plea of nob contendere in a variety of different ways, describing it, on the one hand, as “in effect, a plea of guilty,” United States v. Food & Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 974, 979 (SD Cal: 1942), aff’d,139 F. 2d 973 (CA9 1943), and on the other, as a query directed to the court to determine the defendant’s guilt. State v. Hopkins, 27 Del. 306, 88 A. 473 (1913). See generally Lott v. United States, 367 U. S. 421, 426-427 (1961), id., at 427-430 (Clark, J., dissenting), 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law • § 497.. As a result, it is impossible to state precisely what a defendant does admit when he enters a nolo plea in a way that will consistently fit all the cases.
Hudson v. United States, supra, was also ambiguous. In one place, the Court called the plea “an admission of guilt for the purposes of the case,” id., at 455, but in another, the Court quoted an English authority who had defined the plea as one “where a defendant, in a case not capital, doth not directly own himself guilty ...” Id., at 453, quoting 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas, of the Crown 466 (8th ed. 1824).
The plea may have originated in the early medieval practice by which defendants wishing to avoid imprisonment would seek to make an end of the matter (finem facere) by offering to .pay a sum of money to the king. See 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 517 (2d <?d. 1909). ■ An. early 15th-century case indicated that a defendant did not admit his guilt when he sought such a compromise, but merely “that he put himself on the grace of our Lord, the King, and asked that he might be allowed to pay a fine (petit se admittit per finem).” Anon.¡ Y. B. Hil. '9 Hen. 6, f. 59, pi. 8 (1431). A 16th-century authority noted that a deféndant who so pleaded “putteth hym selfe in Gratiam Regime without anye inore, or by Protéstation that hee is not guiltie . . . ,” W. Lambard, Eirenareha 427 (1581), while an 18th-century case distinguished between a nolo plea and a jury verdict of guilty, noting that in the former the defendant could introduce evidence of innocence in mitigation of punishment, whereas in the latter such evidence was precluded by the finding of actual guilt. Queen v. Templeman, 1 Salk. 55, 91 Eng. Rep. 54 (K. B. 1702).
Throughout its history, that is, the pléa of nolo contendere has been viewed not.as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for leniency. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 preserves this distinction in its requirement that a court cannot accept a guilty plea “unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea”; there is no similar requirement for pleas of nolo con-tendere, since it was thought desirable to permit defendants to plead nolo without making any inquiry into their actual guilt. See Notes of Advisory Committee to Rule 11.
Blum v. United States, 196 F. 269 (CA7 1912); Shapiro v. United States, 196 F. 268 (CA7 1912); Tucker v. United States, 196 F. 260 (CA71912).
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring- that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted-unless there is a factual basis for the plea, see, e. g., Griffin v. United States, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 108, 110, 405 F. 2d 1378, 1380 (1968); Bruce v. United States, supra, at 342, 379 F. 2d, at 119 (1967); Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 433 Pa. 177, 249 A. 2d 294 (1969); and until the judge taking .the plea has inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the "waiver of trial and.the claim of innocence. See, e. g., People v. Serrano, 15 N. Y. 2d 304, 308-309, 206 N. E. 2d 330, 332 (1965); State v. Branner, 149 N. C. 559, 563, 63 S. E. 169, 171 (1908). See also Kreuter v. United States, 201 F, 2d 33, 36 (CA10 1952).
In the federal courts, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 expressly provides that a court “shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.”
Our holding does not mean that a.trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute •right, under the Constitution to have his guilty "plea accepted by the court, see! Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S., at 719 (by implication), although the States may by statute or otherwise confer such a right. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from accepting ■ guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence. Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Próc. 11, which gives a trial judge discretion to “refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . .” We need not now delineate the scope of that' discretion.
North Carolina no longer permits pleas of guilty to capital charges but it appears that pleas of guilty may still be offered to lesser included offenses. See n. 1, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
54
] | sc_respondent |
BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA et al.
No. 04-1264.
Argued November 29, 2005
Decided February 21, 2006
Scaua, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 449. Auto, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Christopher Landau argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Amy L. Brown and Pierre H. Bergeron.
F. Paul Bland, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Michael J. Quirk, Arthur H. Bryant, E. Clayton Yates, Christopher C. Casper, and Richard A. Fisher
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Seth P. Waxman, Christopher R. Lipsett, Eric J. Mogilnicki, Robin S. Conrad, and Amor D. Sarwal; for the Community Financial Services Association of America by James T. McIntyre; for the Florida Bankers Association et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; and for the Financial Service Centers of America, Inc., et al. by Gerald Goldman and Robert E. Rockford.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Florida et al. by Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General of Florida, Christopher M. Rise, Solicitor General, and Erick M. Figlio, Deputy Solicitor General, by Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: David W. Márquez of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Mike Beebe of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, John Suthers of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Spagnoletti of the District of Columbia, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lawrence Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Gregory D. Stumbo of Kentucky, Steve Rowe of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Tom Reilly of Massachusetts, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Mike McGrath of Montana, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Kelly Ayotte of New Hampshire, Patricia Madrid of New Mexico, Eliot Spitzer of New York, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Jim Petro of Ohio, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Tom Corbett of Pennsylvania, Patrick Lynch of Rhode Island, Larry Long of South Dakota, Paul Summers of Tennessee, Greg Abbott of Texas, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Rob McKenna of Washington, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, Peggy A Lautenschlager of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; for AARP by Deborah Zuckerman and Michael Schuster; for Law Professors by Richard M. Alderman, Brian H. Bix, Robert W. Gordon, Jeffrey W. Stempel, and Katherine V. W. Stone; for the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al. by- Amanda Quester; for the University of Wisconsin Law Professors by David S. Schwartz and Joel Rogers; and for Samuel Glazer by Kenneth D. Schwartz.
A brief of amicus curiae was filed for Theis Research, Inc., by Paul R. Johnson.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We decide whether a court or an arbitrator should consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration provision is void for illegality.
I
Respondents John Cardegna and Donna Reuter entered into various deferred-payment transactions with petitioner Buckeye Check Cashing (Buckeye), in which they received cash in exchange for a personal check in the amount of thie cash plus a finance charge. For each separate transaction they signed a “Deferred Deposit and Disclosure Agreement” (Agreement), which included the following arbitration provisions:
“1. Arbitration Disclosure By signing this Agreement, you agree that i[f] a dispute of any kind arises out of this Agreement or your application therefore or any instrument relating thereto, th[e]n either you or we or third-parties involved can choose to have that dispute resolved by binding arbitration as set forth in Paragraph 2 below....
“2. Arbitration Provisions Any claim, dispute, or controversy . . . arising from or relating to this Agreement ... or the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire Agreement (collectively ‘Claim’), shall be resolved, upon the election of you or us or said third-parties, by binding arbitration .... This arbitration Agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9 U. S. C. Sections 1-16. The arbitrator shall apply applicable substantive law constraint [sic] with the FA A and applicable statu[t]es of limitations and shall honor claims of privilege recognized by law . . . .” App. 36, 38, 40, 42.
Respondents brought this putative class action in Florida state court, alleging that Buckeye charged usurious interest rates and that the Agreement violated various Florida lending and consumer-protection laws, rendering it criminal on its face. Buckeye moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, holding that a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a claim that a contract is illegal and void ab initio. The District Court of Appeal of Florida for the Fourth District reversed, holding that because respondents did not challenge the arbitration provision itself, but instead claimed that the entire contract was void, the agree-. ment to arbitrate was enforceable, and the question of the contract’s legality should go to the arbitrator.
Respondents appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful “ ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature . . . .’” 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (2005) (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. App. 2000)). We granted certiorari. 545 U. S. 1127 (2005).
II
A
To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §§ 1-16. Section 2 embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts:
“A written provision in ... a contract... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
Challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” can be divided into two types. One type challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. See, e. g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1,4-5 (1984) (challenging the agreement to arbitrate as void under California law insofar as it purported to cover claims brought under the state Franchise Investment Law). The other challenges the contract as a whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e. g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid. Respondents’ claim is of this second type. The crux of the complaint is that the contract as a whole (including its arbitration provision) is rendered invalid by the usurious finance charge.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), we addressed the question of who — court or arbitrator — decides these two types of challenges. The issue in the case was “whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the federal court, or whether the matter is to be referred to the arbitrators.” Id., at 402. Guided by §4 of the FA A, we held that “if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself — an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate — the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.” Id., at 403-404 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). We rejected the view that the question of “severability” was one of state law, so that if state law held the arbitration provision not to be severable a challenge to the contract as a whole would be decided by the court. See id., at 400, 402-403.
Subsequently, in Southland Corp., we held that the FAA “create[d] a body of federal substantive law,” which was “applicable in state and federal courts.” 465 U. S., at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected the view that state law could bar enforcement of §2, even in the context of state-law claims brought in state court. See id., at 10-14; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 270-273 (1995).
B
Prima Paint and Southland answer the question presented here by establishing three propositions. First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this arbitration law applies in state as well as federal courts. The parties have not requested, and we do not undertake, reconsideration of those holdings. Applying them to this case, we conclude that because respondents challenge the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by an arbitrator, not a court.
In declining to apply Prima Paint’s rule of severability, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the distinction between void and voidable contracts. “Florida public policy and contract law,” it concluded, permit “no severable, or salvageable, parts of a contract found illegal and void under Florida law.” 894 So. 2d, at 864. Prima Paint makes this conclusion irrelevant. That case rejected application of state severability rules to the arbitration agreement without discussing whether the challenge at issue would have rendered the contract void or voidable. See 388 U. S., at 400-404. Indeed, the opinion expressly disclaimed any need to decide what state-law remedy was available, id., at 400, n. 3 (though Justice Black’s dissent asserted that state law rendered the contract void, id., at 407). Likewise in Southland, which arose in state court, we did not ask whether the several challenges made there — fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the California Franchise Investment Law — would render the contract void or voidable. We simply rejected the proposition that the enforceability of the arbitration agreement turned on the state legislature’s judgment concerning the forum for enforcement of the state-law cause of action. See 465 U. S., at 10. So also here, we cannot accept the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that enforceability of the arbitration agreement should turn on “Florida public policy and contract law,” 894 So. 2d, at 864.
c
Respondents assert that Prima Paints rule of severability does not apply in state court. They argue that Prima Paint interpreted only §§3 and 4 — two of the FAA’s procedural provisions, which appear to apply by their terms only in federal court — but not § 2, the only provision that we have applied in state court. This does not accurately describe Prima Paint. Although § 4, in particular, had much to do with Prima Paint’s understanding of the rule of sever-ability, see 388 U. S., at 403-404, this rule ultimately arises out of §2, the FAA’s substantive command that arbitration agreements be treated like all other contracts. The rule of severability establishes how this equal-footing guarantee for “a written [arbitration] provision” is to be implemented. Respondents’ reading of Prima Paint as establishing nothing more than a federal-court rule of procedure also runs contrary to Southland’s understanding of that case. One of the bases for Southland’s application of §2 in state court was precisely Prima Paints “reli[ance] for [its] holding on Congress’ broad power to fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.” 465 U. S., at 11; see also Prima Paint, supra, at 407 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Court here holds that the [FAA], as a matter of federal substantive law ...” (emphasis added)). Southland itself refused to “believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal-court jurisdiction.” 465 U. S., at 15.
Respondents point to the language of §2, which renders “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” “a written provision in” or “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of” a “contract.” Since, respondents argue, the only arbitration agreements to which §2 applies are those involving a “contract,” and since an agreement void ab initio under state law is not a “contract,” there is no “written provision” in or “controversy arising out of” a “contract,” to which §2 can apply. This argument echoes Justice Black’s dissent in Prima Paint: “Sections 2 and 3 of the Act assume the existence of a valid contract. They merely provide for enforcement where such a valid contract exists.” 388 U. S., at 412-413. We do not read “contract” so narrowly. The word appears four times in § 2. Its last appearance is in the final clause, which allows a challenge to an arbitration provision “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (Emphasis added.) There can be no doubt that “contract” as used this last time must include contracts that later prove to be void. Otherwise, the grounds for revocation would be limited to those that rendered a contract voidable — which would mean (implausibly) that an arbitration agreement could be challenged as voidable but not as void. Because the sentence’s final use of “contract” so obviously includes putative contracts, we will not read the same word earlier in the same sentence to have a more narrow meaning. We note that neither Prima Paint nor Southland lends support to respondents’ reading; as we have discussed, neither case turned on whether the challenge at issue would render the contract voidable or void.
* * *
It is true, as respondents assert, that the Prima Paint rule permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in a contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void. But it is equally true that respondents’ approach permits a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable. Prima Paint resolved this conundrum — and resolved it in favor of the separate enforceability of arbitration provisions. We reaffirm today that, regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Auto took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The issue of the contract’s validity is different from the issue whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was ever concluded. Our opinion today addresses only the former, and does not speak to the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents (and by the Florida Supreme Court), which hold that it is for courts to decide whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract, Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F. 2d 851 (CA11 1992), whether the signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal, Sandvik AB v. Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F. 3d 99 (CA3 2000); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F. 3d 587 (CA7 2001), and whether the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent, Spahr v. Secco, 330 F. 3d 1266 (CA10 2003).
In pertinent part, §4 reads:
“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court [with jurisdiction] ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in á manner provided for in such agreement.... [U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement....”
Our more natural reading is confirmed by the use of the word “contract” elsewhere in the United States Code to refer to putative agreements, regardless of whether they are legal. For instance, the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, states that “[e]very contract, combination ... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade [is] hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U. S. C. § 1. Under respondents’ reading of “contract,” a bewildering circularity would result: A contract illegal because it was in restraint of trade would not be a “contract” at all, and thus the statutory prohibition would not apply. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"antitrust (except in the context of mergers and union antitrust)",
"mergers",
"bankruptcy (except in the context of priority of federal fiscal claims)",
"sufficiency of evidence: typically in the context of a jury's determination of compensation for injury or death",
"election of remedies: legal remedies available to injured persons or things",
"liability, governmental: tort or contract actions by or against government or governmental officials other than defense of criminal actions brought under a civil rights action.",
"liability, other than as in sufficiency of evidence, election of remedies, punitive damages",
"liability, punitive damages",
"Employee Retirement Income Security Act (cf. union trust funds)",
"state or local government tax",
"state and territorial land claims",
"state or local government regulation, especially of business (cf. federal pre-emption of state court jurisdiction, federal pre-emption of state legislation or regulation)",
"federal or state regulation of securities",
"natural resources - environmental protection (cf. national supremacy: natural resources, national supremacy: pollution)",
"corruption, governmental or governmental regulation of other than as in campaign spending",
"zoning: constitutionality of such ordinances, or restrictions on owners' or lessors' use of real property",
"arbitration (other than as pertains to labor-management or employer-employee relations (cf. union arbitration)",
"federal or state consumer protection: typically under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit Acts",
"patents and copyrights: patent",
"patents and copyrights: copyright",
"patents and copyrights: trademark",
"patents and copyrights: patentability of computer processes",
"federal or state regulation of transportation regulation: railroad",
"federal and some few state regulations of transportation regulation: boat",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation:truck, or motor carrier",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: pipeline (cf. federal public utilities regulation: gas pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of transportation regulation: airline",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: electric power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: nuclear power",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: oil producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas producer",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: gas pipeline (cf. federal transportation regulation: pipeline)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: radio and television (cf. cable television)",
"federal and some few state regulation of public utilities regulation: cable television (cf. radio and television)",
"federal and some few state regulations of public utilities regulation: telephone or telegraph company",
"miscellaneous economic regulation"
] | [
16
] | sc_issue_8 |
REGIONS HOSPITAL v. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
No. 96-1375.
Argued December 1, 1997
Decided February 24, 1998
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scaua, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 464.
Ronald N. Sutter argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Lisa Schiavo Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wax-man, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, Barbara C. Biddle, Neil H. Koslowe, Harriet S. Rabb, Henry R. Goldberg, and Thomas W. Coons.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 9202(a) of the Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 151, 171-175, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(h) (GME Amendment), provides: “The Secretary [of Health and Human Services] shall determine, for the hospital’s cost reporting period that began during fiscal year 1984, the average amount recognized as reasonable under this subehapter for direct graduate medical education costs of the hospital for each full-time-equivalent resident.” § 1395ww(h)(2)(A). The Amendment directs the Secretary to use the 1984 amount, adjusted for inflation, to calculate a hospital’s graduate medical education (GME) reimbursement for subsequent years. § 1395ww(h) (2). The Secretary interprets the GME Amendment to permit a second audit of the 1984 GME costs to ensure accurate future reimbursements, even though the GME costs had been audited previously. 42 CFR § 413.86(e) (1996). This case presents the question whether the Secretary’s “reaudit” rule is a reasonable interpretation of the GME Amendment. We conclude that it is.
I
A
Under the Medicare Act and its implementing regulations, 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq., the costs of certain educational programs for interns and residents, known as GME programs, are “allowable eost[s]” for which a hospital (a provider) may receive reimbursement. 42 CFR § 413.85(a) (1996). At the close of each fiscal year, the provider prepares a “cost repor[t].” § 405.1801(b). That report, which serves as the basis for its total allowable Medicare reimbursement, shows the provider’s costs and the percentage of those costs allocated to Medicare services. §§ 413.20(b), 413.24(f). The provider files the report with a “fiscal intermediary,” usually an insurance company, designated by the Secretary. 42 U. S. C. § 1395h. The intermediary examines the cost report, audits it when found necessary, and issues a written “notice of amount of program reimbursement” (NAPR). The NAPR determines the total amount payable to the provider for Medicare services during the reporting period, 42 CFR § 405.1803 (1996), and is subject to review by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), the Secretary, and ultimately the courts. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395oo(a), (b), (f)(1); 42 CFR §§ 405.1835, 405.1837 (1996).
By regulation, the Secretary may reopen, within three years, any determination by a fiscal intermediary, the PRRB, or the Secretary herself “to revise any matter in issue at any such proceedings.” § 405.1885(a). In other words, the Secretary can recoup excessive (or correct insufficient) reimbursement for a given year so long as the Secretary acts within the three-year reopening window.
In April 1986, Congress changed the method for calculating reimbursable GME costs. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(h). In lieu of discrete annual determinations of “reasonable cost ... actually incurred,” § 1395x(v)(1)(A), Congress designated a baseline year, 1984, for cost determinations, i. e., costs “recognized as reasonable” for that year would serve as the base figure used to calculate GME reimbursements for all subsequent years. The GME Amendment directed the Secretary to determine a per-resident amount by dividing each provider’s 1984 GME costs “recognized as reasonable” by the number of full-time-equivalent residents working for the provider in 1984. § 1395ww(h)(2)(A). The 1984 per-resident amount, adjusted for inflation, would then be used to determine the provider’s GME reimbursements for all fiscal years “beginning on or after July 1, 1985.” Note following 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww, p. 1131. The provider’s reimbursable costs for a particular year would be computed by multiplying the inflation-adjusted 1984 per-resident amount by the provider’s weighted number of full-time-equivalent residents, as determined by § 1395ww(h)(4), and the hospital’s Medicare patient load, § 1395ww(h)(3)(C).
In September 1988, the Secretary published a proposed regulation to implement the GME Amendment. At that time, the Secretary reported reason to believe some “questionable” GME costs had been “erroneously reimbursed” to providers for their 1984 fiscal year, the period Congress designated in 1986 to serve continually as the base year. 53 Fed. Reg. 36591 (1988). To prevent perpetuation of past mistakes under the new GME cost-reimbursement methodology, the Secretary proposed to give fiscal intermediaries re-auditing authority to ensure that future payments would be based on an “accurate” determination of providers’ 1984 GME costs. Id., at 36591-36592. The final regulation, published in September 1989, instructs intermediaries to verify each hospital’s base-year GME costs and its average number of full-time-equivalent residents; exclude from those base-year GME costs “any nonallowable or misclassified costs, including those previously allowed under . . . this chapter”; and, upon the hospital’s request, include GME costs miselas-sified as operating costs during the base period. 42 CFR §§ 413.86(e)(1)(ii)(AMC) (1996).
The Secretary made clear that the reaudit rule permitted no recoupment of excess reimbursement for years in which the reimbursement determination had become final. 54 Fed. Reg. 40302 (1989). Rather, the rule sought to prevent future overpayments and to permit recoupment of prior excess reimbursement only for years in which the reimbursement determination had not yet become final. Id., at 40301, 40302; 42 CFR § 413.86(e)(1)(iii) (1996).
B
Regions Hospital (Hospital), the petitioner, is a teaching hospital eligible for GME cost reimbursement. On February 28, 1986, the Hospital received from its intermediary an NAPR for the 1984 reporting period which reflected total 1984 GME costs of $9,892,644. A reaudit commenced in late 1990 ultimately yielded a determination that the.Hospital’s total allowable 1984 GME costs were $5,916,868. The recomputed average per-resident amount was $49,805, in contrast to the original $70,662. The Secretary sought to use this recomputed amount to determine reimbursements for future years and past years within the three-year reopening window of § 405.1885. The reaudit determination would not be used to recoup excessive reimbursement paid to the Hospital for its 1984 GME costs, for the three-year window had already closed on that year.
On appeal to the PRRB, the Hospital challenged the validity of the reaudit rule. The PRRB responded that it lacked authority to invalidate the Secretary’s regulation, and the Hospital sought expedited judicial review under 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f)(1). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled for the Secretary. Adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund v. Shalala, 987 F. 2d 790 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 1064 (1994), the District Court concluded that the language of § 1395ww(h)(2)(A) was ambiguous, and that the Secretary’s reaudit regulation reasonably interpreted Congress’ prescription. The District Court also held that the reauditing did not impose an impermissible “retroactive rule.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a-8a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, following Tulane. Si. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. v. Shalala, 91 F. 3d 57 (1996). In a similar case, the Sixth Circuit, rejecting Tulane, saw no ambiguity in the GME Amendment and alternately held that even if the provision lacked clarity, the Secretary’s interpretation was unreasonable. Toledo Hospital v. Shalala, 104 F. 3d 791, 797-801 (1997), cert. pending, No. 96-2046. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 520 U. S. 1250 (1997), and now affirm the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.
II
The Hospital argues that the Secretary’s reaudit regulation is an impermissible retroactive rule and, on that account alone, is invalid. It is an argument we need not linger over. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244 (1994), explained that “ ‘the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place,’ ” id., at 265 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)), but further clarified that a prescription “‘is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation,’ ” 511 U. S., at 270, n. 24 (quoting Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427, 435 (1922)). The reaudit rule accords with Landgraf’s instruction. The rule calls for application of the cost-reimbursement principles in effect at the time the costs were incurred. A correct application of those principles, not the application of any new reimbursement principles, is the rule’s objective. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 207 (1988) (regulation at issue impermissibly invoked a new substantive standard as a basis for recouping sums previously paid to hospitals). Furthermore, the Secretary’s reaudits leave undisturbed the actual 1984 reimbursements and reimbursements for any later cost-reporting year on which the three-year reopening window had closed. The adjusted reasonable cost figures resulting from the re-audits are to be used solely to calculate reimbursements for still open and future years. See supra, at 454.
Understandably, there is no Circuit split on this issue. - Although holding against the Secretary on other grounds, the Sixth Circuit concisely stated why the reaudit rule “does not amount to an impermissibly retroactive regulation”: The rule “require[s] a determination based upon events occurring in the base year,” but “it does not change the standards under which the base year costs are to be determined.” Toledo Hospital v. Shalala, 104 F. 3d, at 795.
l — I HH HH
We turn, next, to the question that has divided the Circuits: Is the Secretary’s interpretation of § 1395ww(h)(2)(A), embodied in the reaudit rule, entitled to deference? Under the formulation now familiar, when we examine the Secretary’s rule interpreting a statute, we ask first whether “the intent of Congress is clear” as to “the precise question at issue.” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842 (1984). If, by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” id., at 843, n. 9, we determine that Congress’ intent is clear, “that is the end of the matter,” id., at 842. But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 843. If the agency’s reading fills a gap or defines a term in a reasonable way in light of the Legislature’s design, we give that reading controlling weight, even if it is not the answer “the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 843, n. 11.
A
We must decide whether Congress, under §1395ww(h) (2)(A), intended to prohibit the Secretary from ensuring an accurate GME base-year amount by reauditing a provider’s statement of 1984 GME costs for past errors, outside the Secretary’s three-year reopening window. Put another way, does “shall determine” for the baseline year 1984 the “amount recognized as reasonable” inevitably refer to the amount originally, or on reopening within three years, recognized as reasonable; or could the statute plausibly be read to mean, in light of the new methodology making 1984 critical for all subsequent years, an “amount recognized as reasonable” through a reauditing process designed to catch errors that, if perpetuated, could grossly distort future reimbursements?
Separate provisions of the Medicare Act speak clearly to the timing of other “recognized as reasonable” determinations. For example, 42 U. S. C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A) permits the Secretary to “provide for the establishment of limits [on certain costs] to be recognized as reasonable based on estimates of the costs necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services.” (Emphasis added.) Section 1395uu(c)(1)(B), which concerns payments to promote the closing or converting of underutilized hospital facilities, directs the Secretary, in determining the hospital’s proper “transitional allowance,” to acknowledge the “outstanding portion of actual debt obligations previously recognized as reasonable for purposes of reimbursement.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 1395ww(h)(2)(A), in contrast, is silent on the matter of time, and therefore, we think, ambiguous. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that “the phrase 'recognized as reasonable,’ by itself, does not tell us whether Congress means to refer the Secretary to action already taken or to give directions on actions about to be taken.” Tulane, 987 F. 2d, at 796. In other words, the phrase “recognized as reasonable” might mean costs the Secretary (1) has recognized as reasonable for 1984 GME cost-reimbursement purposes, or (2) will recognize as reasonable as a base for future GME calculations.
The Hospital urges that Congress could not have intended “recognized as reasonable” to mean two separate amounts: one for 1984 itself; and a lower, recalculated amount once the Secretary, cognizant that 1984 had become the base year for subsequent determinations, checked and discovered miscalculations. Why this must be so is not apparent. As the Secretary said, it is “hard to believe that Congress intended that misclassified and nonallowable costs [would] continue' to be recognized through the GME payment indefinitely.” 54 Fed. Reg. 40301 (1989).
We face these choices. Congress meant either for the Secretary to calculate future reimbursements using the figure emerging through regular NAPR review and the three-year reopening window, or for the Secretary to use the figure recognized as reasonable at a later time, informed by a more careful assessment. The Secretary realized, tardily, that the Hospital’s reimbursement for 1984 (like that granted many other providers) was inconsistent with the reasonableness standards under the Medicare Act and its implementing regulations. Congress likely assumed that the Secretary would act in time to adjust the 1984 costs to achieve accuracy both in 1984 reimbursements and in future calculations. Had Congress contemplated that the Secretary would not have responded to the 1986 GME Amendment swiftly enough to catch 1984 NAPR errors within the Secretary’s three-year reopening period, what would the Legislature have anticipated as the proper administrative course? Error perpetuation until Congress plugged the hole? Or the Secretary’s exercise of authority to effectuate the Legislature’s overriding purpose in the Medicare scheme: reasonable (not excessive or unwarranted) cost reimbursement?
While the Hospital’s reading of the GME Amendment is plausible, it is not the “only possible interpretation.” See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U. S. 83, 89 (1990). As Judge Wald wrote in her opinion for the D. C. Circuit: “Context is all, and ... we believe the use of the 1984 figures for the indefinite future cautions . . . against a reading of [‘recognized as reasonable’] that allows no elbow room for adjustments [to correct] prior miscalculations or errors.” Tulane, 987 F. 2d, at 796. Because the Hospital’s construction is not an inevitable one, we turn to the Secretary’s position, examining its reasonableness as an interpretation of the governing legislation.
B
The purpose of the GME Amendment was to “limit payments to hospitals” for GME costs. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-453, p. 482 (1985) (emphasis added). The Secretary’s reaudit rule brings the base-year calculation in line with Congress’ pervasive instruction for reasonable cost reimbursement. The rule does not permit recoupment of any time-barred 1984 overpayment, but it enables the Secretary, for open and future years, to carry out that official’s responsibility to reimburse only reasonable costs, and to prevent payment of uncovered, improperly classified, or excessive costs. See supra, at 454.
Until the GME Amendment in 1986, GME costs were determined annually; one year’s determination did not control a later year’s reimbursement. The GME Amendment, which called for a base-year GME cost determination that would control payments in later years, became law at a time when other Medicare changes were underway, including installation of a new prospective payment system (PPS). See 54 Fed. Reg. 40301 (1989) (acknowledging that GME costs were not given prompt scrutiny “because of the many changes that were taking place in Medicare generally”). The GME Amendment introduced the new statutory concept of per-resident GME costs; it was this innovation that caused the Secretary “to examine GME costs that ha[d] been reimbursed in the past and to question the significant variation in costs that ha[d] been allowed.” 53 Fed. Reg. 36593 (1988).
Concerned that providers may have been reimbursed erroneously, the Secretary attempted to assure reimbursement in future and still open years of reasonable costs, but no more. To accomplish this, the Secretary endeavored to strip from the base-period amount improper costs, e.g., physician costs for activities unrelated to the GME program, malprae-tice costs, and excessive administrative and general service costs. The Secretary so proceeded on the assumption that Congress, when it changed the system for GME cost reimbursement, surely did not want to cement misclassified and nonallowable costs into future reimbursements, thus perpetuating literally million-dollar mistakes.
The Hospital maintains it is “irrational” to assume Congress intended the Secretary to reaudit 1984 GME costs outside the three-year reopening window of 42 CFR § 405.1885(a) (1996). We disagree. Because the period for reassessing 1984 NAPRs had closed, the Secretary’s re-auditing rule, by design, could affect only the base-year per-resident calculation used to compute reimbursements from 1985 onward. In effect, the Secretary altered the reopening period prescribed in the agency’s regulations by lengthening the time for base-year GME cost correction. The Secretary did not enlarge the time the agency had to seek repayment of excess reimbursements in years closed under the three-year prescription; rather, the Secretary extended only the time for determining the proper amount of reimbursement due in subsequent years.
The GME Amendment necessitated comprehensive regulations, and the reaudit rule was formulated and issued as part of the full set of regulations. Viewed in the context of other, contemporaneous changes in Medicare and the Secretary’s decision not to pursue recoupment of 1984 GME reimbursements, the three-year gap from the 1986 enactment of the GME Amendment to release of the Secretary’s final regulations in 1989 was not exorbitant. As the D. C. Circuit said, three years is “not an unreasonable period for developing, proposing, permitting comment, and finalizing a regulatory framework for a complex statutory scheme.” Tulane, 987 F. 2d, at 797.
The Hospital also contends Congress would not have endorsed reauditing as a fair measure, because fading memories, changes in personnel, and discarded records make it unreasonable to demand that providers “reprove” their base-year GME costs. We note these countervailing considerations. Providers can challenge the accuracy of specific auditing principles in individual eases. 42 CFR § 413.86(e) (1)(v) (1996). Providers dissatisfied with the Secretary’s determination may seek judicial review under 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f)(1). For providers who discarded their 1984 records, the Secretary offered “an equitable solution” permitting them, during the reaudit, “to furnish documentation from cost reporting periods subsequent to the base period in support of the allocation of physician compensation costs in the GME bas[e] period.” See 55 Fed. Reg. 36063 (1990). Furthermore, the reaudit rule allowed providers to request upward adjustment in their reimbursable PPS hospital-specific rate if the GME reaudit revealed previously claimed GME costs that should have been classified as operating costs eligible for PPS reimbursement. 42 CFR § 413.86(j) (1)(i) (1996).
Finally, the Hospital argues that because 42 CFR §§405.1807 and 405.1885(a) (1996) render an intermediary’s determination “final and binding” after three years, the Secretary’s reaudit regulation violates principles of issue preclusion. The initial 1984 GME cost determination, however, was made under the pre-GME Amendment regime, when “final and binding” referred only to year-by-year determination. An issue determined for one year (1984 only) is not the same as a base-year determination to be carried forward into the unlimited future. Furthermore, the base-year cost calculation was derived from an intermediary’s determination in an NAPR, without a hearing before the PRRB on the reasonableness of the costs. Absent actual and adversarial litigation about base-year GME costs, principles of issue preclusion do not hold fast. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353 (1877) (“[T]he judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted .... [T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated.” (emphasis added)); cf. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Skalala, 512 U. S. 504, 517 (1994) (declining to bind Secretary to GME cost determination previously made by intermediary).
In sum, we agree with the Secretary that the reaudit rule is not impermissibly retroactive, and that it “reflects a reasonable interpretation of the law.” Thus, it “merits our approbation.” Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U. S. 392, 409 (1996). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
When the petitioner filed its petition and briefs with the Court, it was known as “St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center.” It changed its name to “Regions Hospital” on September 15, 1997.
The Hospital also raises the specter of the Secretary perpetually re-auditing the base-year costs. Here, the Secretary had a compelling reason to reaudit the base-year costs, for those costs, under the new GME scheme, would be projected far into the future. The Administrative Procedure Act, 80 Stat. 392, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., which requires a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” see § 706(2)(A), should protect the Hospital from any future reaudits performed without legitímate reason.
Congress more firmly instructed that the Secretary, no later than December 31, 1987, “shall report” to specific Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives on the need for revisions to provide greater uniformity in approved full-time-equivalent resident amounts. The date set for the report was inside the three-year reopening window. Note following 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww; see post, at 468. Missing the deadline by some years, the Secretary did not file the required report until March 24, 1992. The Secretary’s failure to meet the deadline, a not uncommon occurrence when heavy loads are thrust on administrators, does not mean that official lacked power to act beyond it. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U. S. 253, 260 (1986) (even though the Secretary of Labor did not meet a “shall” statutory deadline, the Court “would be most reluctant to. conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action”).
The Hospital contends Congress did not delegate authority to the Secretary specifically to reaudit the 1984 base-year amount, in contrast to its express delegation to “establish rules” for computing the number of full-time-equivalent residents under § 1395ww(h)(4). But “the concept of reasonable costs already was a mainstay of Medicare statutes and regulations, [so] there was no need to establish any new rulemaking authority for its determination.” Tulane, 987 F. 2d, at 795, n. 5 (citations omitted). See 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395x(v)(1)(A), 1895hh(a)(1).
The dissent acknowledges that, “in reasonable’ is ambiguous,” post, at 466, but finds clarity when those words are read “in their entire context,” ibid. We agree that context counts and stress in this regard what the Court has said “[o]ver and over”: “‘In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ ” United States Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S. 439, 455 (1993) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849)).
The PPS scheme established fixed payment rates, based on patient diagnosis, for a provider’s operating costs of furnishing in-patient care to program beneficiaries. See 42 U. S. C. § 1395ww(d); Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U. S. 402, 406, n. 8 (1998). Costs incurred in connection with GME programs were excluded from the PPS scheme. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1395ww(a)(4) and (d)(1)(A).
In fact, the Hospital took advantage of the Secretary’s “equitable solution.” Because the Hospital did not maintain base-year records reflecting physician time for teaching medical students, it used 1989 and 1990 time studies in endeavoring to establish the accuracy of its allocation of 1984 GME costs. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
CIUCCI v. ILLINOIS.
No. 157.
Argued March 13, 1958.
Decided May 19, 1958.
George N. Leighton argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Loring B. Moore and William R. Ming, Jr.
William G. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Latham Castle, Attorney General, and Theodore G. Maheras, Assistant Attorney General.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner was charged in four separate indictments with murdering his wife and three children, all of whom, with bullet wounds in their heads, were found dead in a burning building during the early hours of December 5, 1953. In three successive trials, petitioner was found guilty of the first degree murder of his wife and two of his children. At each of the trials the prosecution introduced into evidence details of all four deaths. Under Illinois law the jury is charged with the responsibility of fixing the penalty for first degree murder from 14 years’ imprisonment to death. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1957, c. 38, § 360. At the first two trials, involving the death of the wife and one of the children, the jury fixed the penalty at 20 and 45 years’ imprisonment respectively. At the third trial, involving the death of a second child, the penalty was fixed at death. On appeal the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, 8 Ill. 2d 619, 137 N. E. 2d 40, and we granted certiorari to consider petitioner’s claim that this third trial violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 353 U. S. 982.
It is conceded that under Illinois law each of the murders, although apparently taking place at the same time, constituted a separate crime and it is undisputed that evidence of the entire occurrence was relevant in each of the three prosecutions. In his brief in this Court petitioner has appended a number of articles which had appeared in Chicago newspapers after the first and second trials attributing to the prosecution certain statements expressing extreme dissatisfaction with the prison sentences fixed by the jury and announcing a determined purpose to prosecute petitioner until a death sentence was obtained. Neither these articles nor their subject matter is included in the record certified to this Court from the Supreme Court of Illinois.
The five members of the Court who join in this opinion are in agreement that upon the record as it stands no violation of due process has been shown. The State was constitutionally entitled to prosecute these individual offenses singly at separate trials, and to utilize therein all relevant evidence, in the absence of proof establishing that such a course of action entailed fundamental unfairness. Hoag v. New Jersey, ante, pp. 464, 467; see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Harlan, although believing that the matters set forth in the aforementioned newspaper articles might, if established, require a ruling that fundamental unfairness existed here, concur in the affirmance of the judgment because this material, not being part of the record, and not having been considered by the state courts, may not be considered here.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is affirmed, with leave to petitioner to institute such further proceedings as may be available to him for the purpose of substantiating the claim that he was deprived of due process.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the state associated with the respondent. If the respondent is a federal court or federal judge, note the "state" as the United States. The same holds for other federal employees or officials. | What state is associated with the respondent? | [
"Alabama",
"Alaska",
"American Samoa",
"Arizona",
"Arkansas",
"California",
"Colorado",
"Connecticut",
"Delaware",
"District of Columbia",
"Federated States of Micronesia",
"Florida",
"Georgia",
"Guam",
"Hawaii",
"Idaho",
"Illinois",
"Indiana",
"Iowa",
"Kansas",
"Kentucky",
"Louisiana",
"Maine",
"Marshall Islands",
"Maryland",
"Massachusetts",
"Michigan",
"Minnesota",
"Mississippi",
"Missouri",
"Montana",
"Nebraska",
"Nevada",
"New Hampshire",
"New Jersey",
"New Mexico",
"New York",
"North Carolina",
"North Dakota",
"Northern Mariana Islands",
"Ohio",
"Oklahoma",
"Oregon",
"Palau",
"Pennsylvania",
"Puerto Rico",
"Rhode Island",
"South Carolina",
"South Dakota",
"Tennessee",
"Texas",
"Utah",
"Vermont",
"Virgin Islands",
"Virginia",
"Washington",
"West Virginia",
"Wisconsin",
"Wyoming",
"United States",
"Interstate Compact",
"Philippines",
"Indian",
"Dakota"
] | [
16
] | sc_respondentstate |
OHIO v. ROBINETTE
No. 95-891.
Argued October 8, 1996
Decided November 18, 1996
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Con-nor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 40. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 45.
Carley J. Ingram argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
on Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Paul A. Engel-mayer, and Joseph C. Wyderko. brief for
mayer, James D. Ruppert argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were bama et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. leyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph P. Ma-zurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Bennett of South Dakota, Charles W. Bursen of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., by Fred E. lnbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Bernard J. Farber.
Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jeffrey M. Gamso filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Sheryl Gordon McCloud; and for the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by W. Andrew Hasselbach.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised that he is “free to go” before his consent to search will be recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not.
This case arose on a stretch of Interstate 70 north of Dayton, Ohio, where the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour because of construction. Respondent Robert D. Robi-nette was clocked at 69 miles per hour as he drove his car along this stretch of road, and was stopped by Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office. New-some asked for and was handed Robinette’s driver’s license, and he ran a computer check which indicated that Robinette had no previous violations. Newsome then asked Robinette to step out of his car, turned on his mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license.
At this point, Newsome asked, “One question before you get gone: ]A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?” App. to Brief for Respondent 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Robinette answered “no” to these questions, after which Deputy Newsome asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented. In the car, Deputy Newsome discovered a small amount of marijuana and, in a film container, a pill which was later determined to be methylenedioxymeth-amphetamine (MDMA). Robinette was then arrested and charged with knowing possession of a controlled substance, MDMA, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2925.11(A) (1993).
Before trial, Robinette unsuccessfully sought to suppress this evidence. He then pleaded “no contest,” and was found guilty. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the search resulted from an unlawful detention. The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a divided vote, affirmed. 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695 (1995). In its opinion, that court established a bright-line prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these circumstances:
“The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in one’s person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase At this time you legally are free to go’ or by words of similar import.” Id., at 650-651, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696.
We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1157 (1996), to review this per se rule, and we now reverse. to
per se We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision. Respondent contends that we lack such jurisdiction because the Ohio decision rested upon the Ohio Constitution, in addition to the Federal Constitution. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), when “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” Id., at 1040-1041. Although the opinion below mentions Art. I, §14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing (a section which reads identically to the Fourth Amendment), the opinion clearly relies on federal law nevertheless. Indeed, the only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases, except for one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution.
Our jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that these citations appear in the body of the opinion, while, under Ohio law, “[the] Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of its cases.” See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257, 259 (1976). When the syllabus, as here, speaks only in general terms of “the federal and Ohio Constitutions,” it is permissible for us to turn to the body of the opinion to discern the grounds for decision. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562, 566 (1977).
Respondent Robinette also contends that we may not reach the question presented in the petition because the Supreme Court of Ohio also held, as set out in the syllabus paragraph (1):
“When the motivation behind a police officer’s continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure.” 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696.
In reliance on this ground, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that when Newsome returned to Robinette’s car and asked him to get out of the car, after he had determined in his own mind not to give Robinette a ticket, the detention then became unlawful.
Respondent failed to make any such argument in his brief in opposition to certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 15.2. We believe the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a “predicate to an intelligent resolution” of the question presented, and therefore “fairly included therein.” This Court’s Rule 14.1(a); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252, 258-259, n. 5 (1980). The parties have briefed this issue, and we proceed to decide it.
We think that under our recent decision it. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996) (decided after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the present case), the subjective intentions of the officer did not make the continued detention of respondent illegal under the Fourth Amendment. As we made clear in Whren, “ ‘the fact that [an] officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.’ . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id., at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 138 (1978)). And there is no question that, in light of the admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy Newsome was objectively justified in asking Robinette to get out of the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 111, n. 6 (1977) (“We hold . . . that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures”).
We now turn to the merits of the question presented. We have long held that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248, 250 (1991). Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.
In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), we expressly disavowed any “litmus-paper test” or single “sentence or . . . paragraph . . . rule,” in recognition of the “endless variations in the facts and circumstances” implicating the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 506. Then, in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 (1988), when both parties urged “bright-line rule[s] applicable to all investigatory pursuits,” we rejected both proposed rules as contrary to our “traditional contextual approach.” Id., at 572-573. And again, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), when the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure, we reversed, reiterating that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter.” Id., at 439.
We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), it was argued that such a consent could not be valid unless the defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We rejected this argument: “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.” Id., at 227. And just as it “would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning,” id., at 231, so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.
The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances,” id., at 248-249. The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Respondent and his amici ask us to take this opportunity to depart from Michigan v. Long. We are no more persuaded by this argument now than we were two Terms ago, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995), and we again reaffirm the Long presumption. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"involuntary confession",
"habeas corpus",
"plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise",
"retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)",
"search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)",
"search and seizure, vehicles",
"search and seizure, Crime Control Act",
"contempt of court or congress",
"self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)",
"Miranda warnings",
"self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution",
"right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)",
"line-up",
"discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)",
"double jeopardy",
"ex post facto (state)",
"extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous",
"extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence",
"extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom",
"extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)",
"extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance",
"extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)",
"extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity",
"confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous",
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: assault",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous",
"jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)",
"speedy trial",
"miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)"
] | [
5
] | sc_issue_1 |
WEADE et al. v. DICHMANN, WRIGHT & PUGH, INC.
No. 179.
Argued February 1, 1949.
Decided June 27, 1949.
William E. Leahy argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Michael F. Keogh, J. Robert Carey, Richard H. Love,.Edward L. Breeden, Jr., Walter E. Hoffman and William J. Hughes, Jr.
Leavenworth Colby argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General. Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison and Paul A. Sweeney.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court,
On August 3, 1945, at Old Point Comfort, Virginia, petitioners, Mrs. Lillian A. Weade and Mrs. Roberta L, Stinemeyer, purchased tickets and embarked as passengers on the Meteor, a steamboat owned by the United States through the War Shipping Administration and operating between Norfolk, Virginia, and Washington, D. C. The ladies retired to their stateroom about 11:00 p. m. and because of the warm weather opened both the glass and the shutter of the window which faced onto the boat deck. During the night the second cook of the Meteor entered the stateroom through the open window and raped. Mrs. Weade, who was sleeping in the lower berth. -Mrs. Stinemeyer suffered fright and shock from witnessing this atrocity. The perpetrator of the crime was subsequently tried, convicted, and executed.
This case involves the liability of a general agent to passengers under a contract similar to that discussed in Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, ante, p. 783, decided this day. The agency agreement covered passenger boats through an addendum to the contract providing for additional services by the general agent.
Petitioners, Lillian A. Weade and her husband, instituted a civil action for damages against respondent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The husband alleged as his damages loss of consortium and the expenses of the hospitalization of his wife. Petitioner Mrs. Stinemeyer brought a separate civil action for her damages in the same court. Jurisdiction in both actions was based on diversity of citizenship, and the two civil actions were consolidated for trial. In addition Mrs. Weade filed a libel in admiralty against the United States, which action has been continued pending the final determination of the present proceedings.
The complaint of Mr. and Mrs. Weade alleged, so far as now important, that the steamboat was operated as a common carrier by respondent and that petitioners were injured through the failure of respondent to provide adequate protection for its passengers from the personal misconduct of its employees, and through the failure to. use due care in the selection of reliable, careful, and competent employees. The complaint of Mrs. Stinemeyer is substantially the same as to the specifications of negligence, though it did not assert that respondent itself was a common carrier, but did allege that the injury occurred through the act of respondent’s employees. The respondent’s answer denied that the vessel was operated by it as a common carrier and that the master and crew of the vessel were its employees. The answer further alleged that the vessel was operated by the War Shipping Administration, and that respondent only performed certain services for the owner of the ship as general agent in accordance with the standard service agreement.
The jury as triers of fact in this civil proceeding were instructed as a matter of law that by virtue of the contract respondent was the actual operator of the vessel as a common carrier owing the highest degree of care to its passengers. The trial judge further charged that, as a common carrier, this duty to exercise the highest degree of care extended to all acts of the carrier and included the providing of safe accommodations and protection for passengers, the providing of a suitable number of watchmen, and the selection of competent, careful, and sober employees. The jury returned verdicts for petitioners, and the trial judge denied the motion of the respondent for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, stating as his reason therefor: “While the case of Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Incorporated, 328 U. S. 707, is not precisely in point, it is my view that it is controlling so far as the liability of the defendant is concerned.” On appeal-the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that under Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, respondent was not the owner pro hac vice in possession and control of the vessel and thus could not be liable as a common carrier for the safety of the passengers. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh v. Weade, 168 F. 2d 914.
Under our holding today , in No. 351, Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, ante, p. 783, the instructions referred to above were erroneous. Respondent was not the owner pro hac vice, was not a common carrier operating the vessel, and was not the employer of the master or crew. The trial of the' present proceeding revolved around these questions and did not concern the problem of negligence on the part of respondent or of its own agents in handling the ship or créw on voyage as an agent of the United States as distinguished from an employer of the master and crew or owner pro hac vice.
Petitioners urge in point 3 of their brief as a ground for upholding the decision of the trial court that respondent, because of the duties imposed upon it by the General Agency Agreement, was liable as a common carrier as far as the public was concerned. In support of» this contention they point to the duties of the general agent to issue tickets, maintain the vessel in the service directed by the United States, maintain terminals and offices, arrange for the loading and unloading of passengers, arrange for advertising, provision the ship, and procure officers and crew for hire by the master. The performance of such shoreside' duties, however, does not make the agent liable as a common carrier to the public or anyone.
At the insistence of the Navy, the War Shipping Administration in-1945 instituted a nightly service of two steamboats between Norfolk and Washington. The name given to this service was the Washington-Hampton Roads Line, and the Meteor was one of the two vessels employed therein. These two vessels were assigned to respondent as general agent by a passenger addendum to the standard GAA 4-4-42 agreement, under which respondent had been general agent for some twenty cargo vessels. It will be noted that, under Article 3A (f) of the addendum, the general agent was to arrange for the transportation of passengers and to issue tickets for this purpose. The ticket, which is set out in the margin,4 bears the express notation that the steamboat line was “Operated by United States of America, War Shipping Administration,” and. that respondent was serving in the capacity of an agent.
Respondent’s duties were to service the ships and to “arrange for the transportation” of passengers on them. The duty of a common carrier, on the other hand, is to transport for hire whoever employs it. Here the contract called for the actual transportation to bé carried out by the War Shipping Administration. The respondent’s duties ended at the shore ling. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, supra. The cases cited by petitioner holding a transportation agent liable as a common carrier involve situations where the actual movement of goods or passengers was carried out by the agent. Under the contract respondent here was not in any way engaged in the carriage of passengers between Norfolk and Washington and had never held itself out to the public as ready to engage in such traffic. As a mere arranger of transportation it does not incur the liability of a common carrier.
Apart from their reliance upon respondent’s control of the vessel on voyage under the agency contract, petitioners further argue that respondent as an agent is independently liable for its negligence in procuring unsuitable crew members. This theory of liability was not relied upon at the trial.. Instructions upon the point were not given or requésted. The court did charge that as principal and operator of the vessel the respondent was responsible for any tort committed by the steamship personnel and as a common carrier was under the duty to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of the passengers including the selection of personnel. It was upon the basis of respondent’s liability as common carrier that petitioners developed their causes of action, and upon that theory the jury, under the instructions discussed above, returned a verdict in their favor. At the conclusion of the trial judge’s charge, counsel for petitioners stated,. “If your Honor please, we have no exceptions.” Under these circumstances, error cannot be urged as to this point. See Rule 8(1), Supreme Court of the United States;- Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; United States v. Atkinson, 297 U. S. 157.
. By the decision below, the trial court was directed to enter a judgment for respondent, which had filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As there were suggestions in the complaint and evidence of alleged liability of respondent to petitioners for respondent’s own negligence while acting as general agent, this direction should not have been given. See Brady v. Roosevelt S. S. Co., 317 U. S. 575. The decision is modified so as to eliminate the direction to enter judgment.
We express no opinion as to what circumstances might fix liability upon the respondent for its own actions as general agent.
Affirmed as modified.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Rutledge dissent.
See note 3, infra, and 46 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. § 306.44.
See Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, ante, p. 783.
“Whereas,, the United States of America (Herein called the ‘United States’) acting by and through the Administrator, War Shipping Administration, and Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc. (herein called the ‘General Agent’) entered into an Agreement (Contract-WSA-4098) dated January 9, 1943 (herein called the ‘Service Agreement’) whereby the United States appointed the General Agent as its agent to manage and conduct the business of cargo vessels assigned to it by the United States; and
“Whereas, it is desirable to have as far as practicable both cargo vessels and passenger vessels operated under the uniform provisions of one agreement.
“Now, Therefore:
“The United States and the General Agent agree that passenger vessels heretofore or hereafter allocated to the General Agent to conduct the business of the vessels as agent of the United States shall be. governed by the provisions of the Service Agreement modified as follows:
“Section 1. Article 3A of the Service Agreement is hereby amended by adding.a provision following subsection (e) thereof as follows:
“‘(f) Shall arrange for the transportation of passengers when so directed, and issue or cause to be issued to such passengers customary passenger tickets. After a uniform passenger ticket shall have been adopted by the United States, such passenger ticket shall be used in all cases as soon as practicable after receipt thereof by the General Agent. Pending the issuance of such uniform passenger ticket, the General Agent may continue to use its customary form of passenger ticket.’
“Section 2. The vessels to which the Service Agreement will apply by operation of this Part II, are as listed on Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereof, and such additional vessels as may from time to time be assigned to the General Agent by letter agreement.
■■“In witness whereof . . . .”
“Issued by
“Washington-Hampton Roads Line
“Operated by United States of America, War Shipping Administration
“One First Class Passage
“Norfolk, or Old Point Comfort Va. to Washington, D. C.
“Subject to the Following contract:
“This ticket is void unless officially stamped and dated.
“Baggage valuation is limited- to $100 for and adult and $50 for a child, unless purchaser hereof declares a greater valuation at time baggage is presented for transportation and pays excess valuation charges according to tariff rates, rules and regulations.
“The company will under no circumstances be responsible for any moneys or valuables unless deposited with the Purser on Steamer,, nor will they be responsible for any baggage unless properly checked.
“This ticket is limited for passage within thirty days from date of sale stamped on back.
“Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, Inc., Agent.
“I. S. Walker-, Gen. Passenger Agent.”
Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7, 22; Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U. S. 207, 211; United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 249 U. S. 296, 305-306. Cf. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 444; I. C. C. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 220 U. S. 235.
United States v. Brooklyn Terminal, 249 U. S. 296; Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 213.
See 2 Restatement, Agency § 358.
Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U. S. 571; Cone v. West Virginia Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
136
] | sc_petitioner |
UNITED STATES v. RYAN
No. 758.
Argued April 26, 1971
Decided May 24, 1971
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Jerome M. Feit argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Wilson, and Philip R. Monahan.
Herbert J. Miller, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Raymond G. Larroca and Nathan Lewin.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In March of 1968, respondent was served with a subpoena duces tecum commanding him to produce before a federal grand jury all books, records, and documents of five named companies doing business in Kenya. He moved, on several grounds, to quash the subpoena. The District Court denied the motion to quash and, in light of respondent’s claim that Kenya law forbids the removal of books of account, minute books, and lists of members from the country without consent of its Registrar of Companies, ordered him to attempt to secure such consent and, if unsuccessful, to make the records available for inspection in Kenya. The Court of Appeals, 430 F. 2d 658 (CA9 1970), held that by directing respondent to make application to a Kenyan official for release of some of the records, the District Court had done “more than deny a motion to quash; it in effect granted a mandatory injunction.” Id., at 659. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the order was appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1) and, reaching the merits, reversed. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1008 (1971). We conclude that the District Court’s order was not appeal-able, and reverse.
Respondent asserts no challenge to the continued validity of our holding in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940), that one to whom a subpoena is directed may not appeal the denial of a motion to quash that subpoena but must either obey its commands or refuse to do so and contest the validity of the subpoena if he is subsequently cited for contempt on account of his failure to obey. Respondent, however, argues that Cob-bledick does not apply in the circumstances before us because, he asserts, unless immediate review of the District Court’s order is available to him, he will be forced to undertake a substantial burden in complying with the subpoena, and will therefore be “powerless to avert the mischief of the order.” Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7, 13 (1918).
We think that respondent’s assertion misapprehends the thrust of our cases. Of course, if he complies with the subpoena he will not thereafter be able to undo the substantial effort he has exerted in order to comply. But compliance is not the only course open to respondent. If, as he claims, the subpoena is unduly burdensome or otherwise unlawful, he may refuse to comply and litigate those questions in the event that contempt or similar proceedings are brought against him. Should his contentions be rejected at that time by the trial court, they will then be ripe for appellate review. But we have consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice between compliance with a trial court’s order to produce prior to any review of that order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal. Cobbledick v. United States, supra; Alexander v. United States, 201 U. S. 117 (1906); cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251 (1966); DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121 (1962); Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394 (1957). Only in the limited class of cases where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review whatsoever of an individual’s claims have we allowed exceptions to this principle. We have thus indicated that review is available immediately of a denial of a motion for the return of seized property, where there is no criminal prosecution pending against the movant. See DiBella v. United States, supra, at 131-132. Denial of review in such circumstances would mean that the Government might indefinitely retain the property without any opportunity for the movant to assert on appeal his right to possession. Similarly, in Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S., at 12-13, we allowed immediate review of an order directing a third party to produce exhibits which were the property of appellant and, he claimed, immune from production. To have denied review would have left Perlman “powerless to avert the mischief of the order,” id., at 13, for the custodian could hardly have been expected to risk a citation for contempt in order to secure Perlman an opportunity for judicial review. In the present case, however, respondent is free to refuse compliance and, as we have noted, in such event he may obtain full review of his claims before undertaking any burden of compliance with the subpoena. Perlman, therefore, has no application in the situation before us.
Finally, we do not think that the District Court’s order was rendered a temporary injunction appealable under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1) by its inclusion of a provision requiring respondent to seek permission from the Kenyan authorities to remove some of the documents from that country, and in the event that permission was denied to permit Government officials access to the documents in Kenya. The subpoena, if valid, placed respondent under a duty to make in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply with it, and respondent himself had asserted that compliance would be in violation of Kenya law unless permission to remove was properly obtained. Read against this background, the District Court’s order did nothing more than inform respondent before the event of what efforts the District Court would consider sufficient attempts to comply with the subpoena. We cannot imagine that respondent would be prosecuted for contempt if he produced the documents as required but without attempting to obtain permission from the authorities in Kenya. The additional provisions in the order added nothing to respondent’s burden and, if anything, rendered the burden of compliance less onerous. They did not convert denial of a motion to quash into an appealable injunctive order.
Reversed.
The District Court ordered that:
“I. The motion of [respondent] to quash the subpoena duces tecum is denied.
“II. [Respondent] will produce, with the exception of the books of account, minute books and the list of members, before the Federal grand jury at Los Angeles, California, on September 11, 1968, the books, records, papers and documents of Ryan Investment, Ltd., of Nairobi, Kenya, and Mawingo, Ltd., of Nanyuki and Nairobi, Kenya, doing business as The Mount Kenya Safari Club, referred to in the . . . subpoena duces tecum served on [respondent].
“III. [Respondent] shall forthwith make application to the Registrar of Companies in Kenya to release the books of account, minute books, and list of members so that [respondent] may produce these books, records, papers and documents at the Federal grand jury held at Los Angeles, California, on September 11, 1968, provided that if [respondent] is unable to secure the consent of the Registrar of Companies of Kenya, then [respondent] will malee available to agents of the United States Department of Justice and/or the United States Department of the Treasury the books Of account, minute books, and list of members, of Ryan Investment, Ltd., and Mawingo, Ltd., and these agents may inspect and make copies of these books and records.” App. 63-64.
The statute provides, in pertinent part, that: “The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions . . . .”
In such event, of course, respondent could still object to the introduction of the subpoenaed material or its fruits against him at a criminal trial. United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966).
Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U. S. 307 (1967), is not to the contrary. Our holding that the claims there sought to be asserted were not open on review of petitioners’ contempt convictions was based upon the availability of review of those claims at an earlier stage. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_casedisposition |
ROBERTS v. SEA-LAND SERVICES, INC., et al.
No. 10-1399.
Argued January 11, 2012
Decided March 20, 2012
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 113.
Joshua T. Gülelan II argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Pozzi and Charles Robinowitz.
Joseph R. Palmore argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, and M. Patricia Smith. Peter D. Keisler argued the cause for respondent Sea-Land Services, Inc. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, Eric D. McArthur, and Frank B. Hugg.
Jeffrey R. White filed a brief for the American Association for Justice as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Justice Sotomayor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., caps benefits for most types of disability at twice the national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an injured employee is “newly awarded compensation.” § 906(c). We hold that an employee is “newly awarded compensation” when he first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to benefits, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on his behalf.
I
A
The LHWCA “is a comprehensive scheme to provide compensation ‘in respect of disability or death of an employee ... if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States.’ ” Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 294 (1995) (quoting § 903(a)); An employee’s compensation depends on the severity of his disability and his preinjury pay. A totally disabled employee, for example, is entitled to two-thirds of his preinjury average weekly wage as long as he remains disabled. • §§ 908(a)-(b), 910.
Section 906, however, sets a cap on compensation. Disability benefits, “shall not exceed” twice “the applicable national average weekly wage.” § 906(b)(1). The national average weekly wage — “the national average weekly earnings of production or nonsupervisory workers on private non-agricultural payrolls,” §902(19) — is recalculated by the Secretary of Labor each fiscal year. § 906(b)(3). For most types of disability, the “applicable” national average weekly wage is the figure for the fiscal year in which a beneficiary is “newly awarded compensation,” and the cap remains constant as long as benefits continue. § 906(c).
Consistent with the central bargain of workers’ compensation regimes — limited liability for employers; certain, prompt recovery for employees — the LHWCA requires that employers pay benefits voluntarily, without formal administrative proceedings. Once an employee provides notice of a disabling injury, his employer must pay compensation “periodically, promptly, and directly . . . without an award, except where liability to pay compensation is controverted.” § 914(a). In general, employers pay benefits without contesting liability. See Pallas Shipping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U. S. 529, 532 (1983). In the mine run of cases, therefore, no compensation orders issue.
If an employer controverts, or if an employee contests his employer’s actions with respect to his benefits, the dispute advances to the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). See 20 CFR §§702.251-702.262 (2011). The OWCP district directors “are empowered to amicably and promptly resolve such problems by informal procedures.” §702.301. A district director’s informal disposition may result in a compensation order. § 702.315(a). In practice, however, “many pending claims are amicably settled through voluntary payments .without the necessity of a formal order.” Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 422 U. S. 1, 4, n. 4 (1975). If informal resolution fails, the district director refers the dispute to an administrative law judge (ALJ). See 20 CFR §§702.316, 702.331-702.351. An ALJ’s decision after a hearing culminates in the entry of a compensation order. 33 U. S. C. §§ 919(c)-(e).
B
In fiscal year 2002, petitioner Dana Roberts slipped and fell on a patch of ice while employed at respondent Sea-Land Services’ marine terminal in Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Roberts injured his neck and shoulder and did not return to work. On receiving notice of his disability, Sea-Land (except for a 6-week period in 2003) voluntarily paid Roberts benefits absent a compensation order until fiscal year 2005. When Sea-Land discontinued voluntary payments, Roberts filed an LHWCA claim, and Sea-Land controverted. In fiscal year 2007, after a hearing, an ALJ awarded Roberts benefits at the statutory maximum rate of $966.08 per week. This was twice the national average weekly wage for fiscal year 2002, the fiscal year when Roberts became disabled.
Roberts moved for reconsideration, arguing that the “applicable” national average weekly wage was the figure for fiscal year 2007, the fiscal year when he was “newly awarded compensation” by the ALJ’s order. The latter figure would have entitled Roberts to $1,114.44 per week. The ALJ denied reconsideration, and the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board (or BRB) affirmed, concluding that “the pertinent maximum rate is determined by the date the disability commences.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, holding that an employee “is ‘newly awarded compensation’ within the meaning of [§ 906(c)] when he first becomes entitled to compensation.” Roberts v. Director, OWCP, 625 P. 3d 1204, 1208 (2010) (per curiam). We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. 1066 (2011), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits with respect to the time when a beneficiary is “newly awarded compensation,” and now affirm.
II
Roberts contends that “awarded compensation” means “awarded compensation in a formal order.” Sea-Land, supported by the Director, OWCP, responds that “awarded compensation” means “statutorily entitled to compensation because of disability.” The text of § 906(c), standing alone, admits of either interpretation. But “our task is to fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.” FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385, 389 (1959). Only the interpretation advanced by Sea-Land and the Director makes §906 a working part of the statutory scheme; supplies an administrable rule that results in equal treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries; and avoids gamesmanship in the claims process. In light of these contextual and structural considerations, we hold that an employee is “newly awarded compensation” when he first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to benefits under the Act, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on his behalf.
A
We first consider “whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997). The LHWCA does not define “awarded,” but in construing the Act, as with any statute, “‘we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.’ ” Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 519 U. S. 248, 255 (1997) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U. S. 103, 108 (1990)). At first blush, Roberts’ position is appealing. In ordinary usage, “award” most often means “give by judicial decree” or “assign after careful judgment.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 152 (2002); see also, e. g., Black’s Law Dictionary 157 (9th ed. 2009) (“grant by formal process or by judicial decree”).
But “award” can also mean “grant,” or “confer or bestow upon.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 152; see also ibid. (1971 ed.) (same). The LHWCA “grants” benefits to disabled employees, and so can be said to “award” compensation by force of its entitlement-creating provisions. Indeed, this Court has often said that statutes “award” entitlements. See, e. g., Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U. S. 586, 591 (2010) (referring to “statutes that award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party”); Barber v. Thomas, 560 U. S. 474, 493 (2010) (appendix to majority opinion) (statute “awards” good-time credits to federal prisoners); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 271 (1988) (Ohio statute “awards a tax credit”); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U. S. 493, 500 (1939) (California workers’ compensation statute “award[s] compensation for injuries to an employee”); see also, e. g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U. S. 1, 28 (1991) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Materialman’s and mechanic’s lien statutes award an interest in real property to workers”). Similarly, this Court has described an employee’s survivors as “having been ‘newly awarded’ death benefits” by virtue of the employee’s death, without any reference to a formal order. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Rasmussen, 440 U. S. 29, 44, n. 16 (1979) (quoting § 906(c)’s predecessor provision, 33 U. S. C. § 906(d) (1976 ed.)).
In short, the text of § 906(c), in isolation, is indeterminate.
B
Statutory language, however, “cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989). In the context of the LHWCA’s comprehensive, reticulated regime for worker benefits — in which § 906 plays a pivotal role — “awarded compensation” is much more sensibly interpreted to mean “statutorily entitled to compensation because of disability.”
1
Section 906 governs compensation in all LHWCA cases. As explained above, see supra, at 98, the LHWCA requires employers to pay benefits voluntarily, and in the vast majority of cases, that is just what occurs. Under Roberts’ interpretation of § 906(c), no employee receiving voluntary payments has been “awarded compensation,” so none is subject to an identifiable maximum rate of compensation. That' result is incompatible with the Act’s design. Section 906(b)(1) caps “[c]ompensation for disability or death (other than compensation for death required ... to be paid in a lump sum)” at twice “the applicable national average weekly wage, as determined by the Secretary under paragraph (3).” Section 906(b)(3), in turn, directs the Secretary to “determine” the national average weekly wage before each fiscal year begins on October 1 and provides that “[s]uch determination shall be the applicable national average weekly wage” for the coming fiscal year. And § 906(c), in its turn, provides that “[d]eterminations under subsection (b)(3) . . . with respect to” a fiscal year “shall apply to ... those newly awarded compensation during such” fiscal year. Through a series of cross-references, the three provisions work together to cap disability benefits.
By its terms, and subject to one express exception, § 906(b)(1) specifies that the cap applies globally, to all disability claims. But all three provisions interlock, so the cap functions as Congress intended only if § 906(c) also applies globally, to all such cases. See, e. g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000) (“A court must... interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569 (1995))). If Roberts’ interpretation were correct, § 906(c) would have no application at all in the many cases in which no formal orders issue, because employers make voluntary payments or the parties reach informal settlements. We will not construe § 906(c) in a manner that renders it “entirely superfluous in all but the most unusual circumstances.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 29 (2001).
Recognizing this deficiency in his reading of § 906(c), Roberts proposes that orders issue in every case, so that employers can lock in the caps in effect at the time their employees become disabled. This is a solution in search of a problem. Under settled LHWCA practice, orders are rare. Roberts’ interpretation would set needless administrative machinery in motion and would disrupt the congressionally preferred system of voluntary compensation and informal dispute resolution. The incongruity of Roberts' proposal is highlighted by his inability to identify a vehicle for the entry of an order in an uncontested case. Section 919(c), on which Roberts relies, applies only if an employee has filed a claim. Likewise, 20 CFR § 702.315(a) applies only in the case of a claim or an employer’s notice of controversion. See §702.301. We doubt that an employee will file a claim for the sole purpose of assisting his employer in securing a lower cap. And we will not read § 906(c) to compel an employer to file a baseless notice of controversion. Cf. 33 U. S. C. §§ 928(a), (d) (providing for assessment of attorney’s fees and costs against employers who controvert unsuccessfully). Roberts suggests that employers could threaten to terminate benefits in order to induce their employees to file claims, and thus initiate the administrative process. Construing any workers’ compensation regime to encourage gratuitous confrontation between employers and employees strikes us as unsound. .
2
Using the national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an employee becomes disabled coheres with the LHWCA’s administrative structure. Section 914(b) requires an employer to pay benefits within 14 days of notice of an employee’s disability. To do so, an employer must be able to calculate the cap. An employer must also notify the Department of Labor of voluntary payments by filing a form that indicates, inter alia, whether the “maximum rate is being paid.” Dept, of Labor, Form LS-206, Payment of Compensation Without Award (rev. Aug. 2011), online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/ls-206.pdf. On receipt of this form, an OWCP claims examiner must verify the rate of compensation in light of the applicable cap. See Dept, of Labor, Longshore (DLHWC) Procedure Manual §2-n201(3)(b)(3) (hereinafter Longshore Procedure Manual), online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwe/lspm/lspm2-201.htm. It is difficult to see how an employer can apply or certify a national average weekly wage other than the one in effect at the time an employee becomes disabled. An employer is powerless to predict when an employee might file a claim, when a compensation order might issue, or what the national average weekly wage will be at that later time. Likewise for a claims examiner.
Moreover, applying the national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which an employee becomes disabled, advances the LHWCA’s purpose to compensate disability, defined as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury.” 33 U. S. C. §902(10) (emphasis added). Just as the LHWCA takes “the average weekly wage of the injured employee at the time of the injury” as the “basis upon which to compute compensation,” § 910, it is logical to apply the national average weekly wage for the same point in time. Administrative practice has long treated the time of injury as the relevant date. See, e.g., Dept, of Labor, Longshore Act Coverage and Benefits, Pamphlet LS-560 (rev. Dec. 2003) (“Compensation payable under the Act may not exceed 200% of the national average weekly wage, applicable at the time of injury”), online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dIhwc/ LS-560pam.htm; Dept, of Labor, Workers’ Compensation Under the Longshoremen’s Act, Pamphlet LS-560 (rev. Nov. 1979) (same); see also, e. g., Dept, of Labor, LHWCA Bulletin No. 11-01, p. 2 (2010) (national average weekly wage for particular fiscal year applies to “disability incurred during” that fiscal year).
Applying the national average weekly wage at the time of onset of disability avoids disparate treatment of similarly situated employees. Under Roberts’ reading, two employees who earn the same salary and suffer the same injury on the same day could be entitled to different rates of compensation based on the happenstance of their obtaining orders in different fiscal years. We can imagine no reason why Congress would have intended, by choosing the words “newly awarded compensation,” to differentiate between employees based on such an arbitrary criterion.
8
Finally, using the national average weekly wage for the fiscal year in which disability commences discourages gamesmanship in the claims process. If the fiscal year in which an order issues were to determine the cap, the fact that the national average weekly wage typically rises every year with inflation, see n. 2, supra, would become unduly significant. Every employee affected by the cap would seek the entry of a compensation order in a later fiscal year. Even an employee who has been receiving compensation at the proper rate for years would be well advised to file a claim for greater benefits in order to obtain an order at a later time. Likewise, an employee might delay the adjudicatory process to defer the entry of an order. And even in an adjudicated case where an employer is found to have paid benefits at the proper rate, an ALJ would adopt the later fiscal year’s national average weekly wage, making the increased cap retroactively applicable to all of the employer’s payments. Roberts candidly acknowledges that his position gives rise to such perverse incentives. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58-59. We decline to adopt a rule that would reward employees with windfalls for initiating unnecessary administrative proceedings, while simultaneously punishing employers who have complied fully with their statutory obligations.
III
We find Roberts’ counterarguments unconvincing.
A
First, Roberts observes that some provisions of the LHWCA clearly use “award” to mean “award in a formal order,” and contends that the same must be true of “awarded compensation” in § 906(c). We agree that the Act sometimes uses “award” as Roberts urges. Section 914(a), for example, refers to the payment of compensation “to the person enti-tied thereto, without an award,” foreclosing the equation of “entitlement” and “award” that we adopt with respect to § 906(c) today. But the presumption that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning . . . readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent.” General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 595 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e. g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U. S. 200, 213 (2001). Here, we find the presumption overcome because several provisions of the Act would make no sense if “award” were read as Roberts proposes. Those provisions confirm today’s holding because they too, in context, use “award” to denote a statutory entitlement to compensation because of disability.
For example, § 908(c)(20) provides that “[p]roper and equitable compensation not to exceed $7,500 shall be awarded for serious disfigurement.” Roberts argues that § 908(e)(20) “necessarily contemplates administrative action to fix the amount of the liability and direct its payment.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 11. In Roberts’ view, no disfigured employee may receive benefits without invoking the administrative claims process. That argument, however, runs counter to §908’s preface, which directs that “[compensation for disability shall be paid to the employee,” and to § 914(a), which requires the payment of compensation “without an award.” It is also belied by employers’ practice of paying § 908(c)(20) benefits voluntarily. See, e. g., Williams-McDowell v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., No. 99-0627 etc., 2000 WL 35928576, *1 (BRB, Mar. 15, 2000) (per curiam); Evans v. Bergeron Barges, Inc., No. 98-1641, 1999 WL 35135283, *1 (BRB, Sept. 3, 1999) (per curiam). In light of the LHWCA’s interest in prompt payment and settled practice, “awarded” in § 908(c)(20) can only be better read, as in § 906(c), to refer to a disfigured employee’s entitlement to benefits.
Likewise, § 908(d)(1) provides that if an employee who is receiving compensation for a scheduled disability dies before receiving the full amount of compensation to which the schedule entitles him, “the total amount of the award unpaid at the time of death shall be payable to or for the benefit of his survivors.” See also § 908(d)(2). Roberts’ interpretation of “award” would introduce an odd gap: Only survivors of those employees who were receiving schedule benefits pursuant to orders — not survivors of employees who were receiving voluntary payments — would be entitled to the unpaid balances due their decedents. There is no reason why Congress would have chosen to distinguish between survivors in this manner. And the Benefits Review Board has quite sensibly interpreted § 908(d) to mean that “an employee has a vested interest in benefits which accrue during his lifetime, and, after he dies, his estate is entitled to those benefits, regardless of when an award is made.” Wood v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 28 BRBS 27, 36 (1994) (per curiam).
Finally, § 933(b) provides: "For the purpose of this subsection, the term ‘award’ with respect to a compensation order means a formal order issued by the deputy commissioner, an administrative law judge, or Board.” Unless award may mean something other than “award in a compensation order,” this specific definition would be unnecessary. Roberts contends that this provision', enacted in 1984, “was indeed ‘unnecessary’ ” in light of Pallas Shipping. Brief for Petitioner 29; see 461 U. S., at 534 (“The term ‘compensation order’ in the LHWCA refers specifically to an administrative award of compensation following proceedings with respect to the claim”). Roberts’ argument offends the canon against superfluity and neglects that § 933(b) defines the term “award,” whereas Pallas Shipping defines the term “compensation order.” Moreover, Congress’ definition of “award,” which tracks Roberts’ preferred interpretation, was carefully limited to § 933(b). Had Congress intended to adopt a universal definition of “award,” it could have done so in § 902, the LHWCA’s glossary. Read in light of the “duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S.. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted), § 933(b) debunks Roberts’ argument that the Act always uses “award” to mean “award in a formal order” and confirms that “award” has other meanings.
B
Next, Roberts notes that this Court has refused to read the statutory phrase “person entitled to compensation” in § 933(g) to mean “person awarded compensation.” See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992) (“[A] person entitled to compensation need not be receiving compensation or have had an adjudication in his favor”). In Roberts’ view, the converse must also be true: “[A]warded compensation” in § 906(c) cannot mean “entitled to compensation.” But Cowart’s reasoning does not work in reverse. Cowart did not construe § 906(c) or the term “award,” but relied on the uniform meaning of the phrase “person entitled to compensation” in the LHWCA. See id., at 478-479. As just explained, the LHWCA contains no uniform meaning of the term “award.” Moreover, Cowart did not hold that the groups of “employees entitled to compensation” and “employees awarded compensation” were mutually exclusive. The former group includes the latter: The entry of a compensation order is a sufficient but not necessary condition for membership in the former, ¿fee id» at 477.
c
Finally, Roberts contends that his interpretation furthers the LHWCA’s purpose of providing' employees with prompt compensation by encouraging employers to avoid delay and expedite administrative proceedings. But Roberts’ remedy would also punish employers who voluntarily pay benefits at the proper rate from the time of their employees’ injuries. These employers would owe benefits under the higher cap applicable in any future fiscal year when their employees chose to file claims. And Roberts’ remedy would offer no relief at all to the many beneficiaries entitled to less than the statutory maximum rate.
The more measured deterrent to employer tardiness is interest that “accrues from the date a benefit came due, rather than from the date of the ALJ’s award.” Matulic v. Director, OWCP, 154 F. 3d 1052, 1059 (CA9 1998). The Director has long taken the position that “interest is a necessary and inherent component of 'compensation’ because it ensures that the delay in payment of compensation does not diminish the amount of compensation to which the employee is entitled.” Sproull v. Director, OWCP, 86 F. 3d 895, 900 (CA9 1996); see also, e. g., Strachan Shipping Co. v. Wedemeyer, 452 F. 2d 1225, 1229 (CA5 1971). Moreover, “[t]imely [cjontroversion does not relieve the responsible party from paying interest on unpaid compensation.” Longshore Procedure Manual §8-201, online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/ dlhwc/lspm/lspm8-201.htm. Indeed, the ALJ awarded Roberts interest “on each unpaid installment of compensation from the date the compensation became due.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 108, Order ¶⅛.
* * *
We hold that an employee is “newly awarded compensation” when he first becomes disabled and thereby becomes statutorily entitled to benefits, no matter whether, or when, a compensation order issues on his behalf. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 906 provides, in pertinent part:
“(b) Maximum rate of compensation
“(1) Compensation for disability or death (other than compensation for death required ... to be paid in a lump sum) shall not exceed an amount equal to 200 per centum of the applicable national average weekly wage, as determined by the Secretary under paragraph (3).
“(3) As soon as practicable after June 30 of each year, and in any event prior to October 1 of such year, the Secretary shall determine the national average weekly wage for the three consecutive calendar quarters ending June 30. Such determination shall be the applicable national average weekly wage for the period beginning with October 1 of that year and ending with September 30 of the next year....
“(c) Applicability of determinations
“Determinations under subsection (b)(3) . . . with respect to a period shall apply to employees or survivors currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such period, as well as those newly awarded compensation during such period.”
For those “currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits,” §906(c), the cap is adjusted each fiscal year — and typically increases, in step with the usual inflation-driven rise in' the national average weekly wage. See Dept, of Labor, Division of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation (DLHWC), NAWW Information, online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/NAWWinfo.htm (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 16, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Section 906(e)’s “currently receiving compensation” clause is not at issue here.
In fiscal year 1971, only 209 cases out of the 17,784 in which compensation was paid resulted in orders. Hearings on S. 2318 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 757-758 (1972). Congress enacted §906⅛ predecessor provision, which included the “newly awarded compensation” clause, in 1972. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, § 5, 86 Stat. 1253.
Compare 625 F. 3d 1204 (time of entitlement) with Wilkerson v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 125 F. 3d 904 (CA5 1997) (time of order), and Boroski v. DynCorp Int'l, 662 F. 3d 1197 (CA11 2011) (same).
Justice Ginsburg’s view, not advanced by any party, is that an employee is “awarded compensation” when his employer “voluntarily pays compensation or is officially ordered to do so.” Post, at 115 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). But reading “awarded compensation” as synonymous with “receiving compensation” is further from the ordinary meaning of “award” than the Court’s approach: A person who slipped and fell on a negligently maintained sidewalk would not say that she had been “awarded money damages” if the business responsible for the sidewalk voluntarily paid her hospital bills. Cf. post, at 115-116.
Moreover, if Congress had intended “awarded compensation” to mean “receiving compensation,” it could have said so — as, in fact, it did in § 906(c)’s parallel clause, which pertains to beneficiaries “currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death.” See nn. 1-2, supra. Justice Ginsburg’s reading denies effect to Congress’ textual shift, and therefore “runs afoul of the usual rule that ‘when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.’ ” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 711, n. 9 (2004).
Nor is Justice Ginsburg’s reliance on a single sentence of legislative history persuasive. See post, at 116-117. True, a Senate Committee Report described those “newly awarded compensation” as those “who begin receiving compensation.” S. Rep. No. 92-1125, p. 18 (1972). But a subsequent House Committee Report did not. Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 92-1441, p. 15 (1972) (statute provides a “method for determining maximum and minimum compensation (to be applicable to persons currently receiving compensation as well as those newly awarded compensation)”). The legislative materials are a wash.
Justice Ginsburg ⅛ approach is either easily circumvented or unworkable. For example, Justice Ginsburg determines that Roberts is entitled to the fiscal year 2002 maximum rate from March 11, 2002, to July 15, 2003, because Sea-Land was making voluntary payments during that time. Post, at 118. But SeaTLand was paying Roberts $933.82 per week, less than the $966.08 that the ALJ found Roberts was entitled to receive. Compare App. to Pet. for Cert. 101 with id., at 107, Order ¶1. If any voluntary payment suffices, regardless of an employee’s actual entitlement, then an employer can hedge against a later finding of liability by paying the smallest- amount to which the Act might entitle an employee but controverting liability as to the remainder. See, e. g., R. M. v. Sabre Personnel Assoc., Inc., 41 BRBS 727, 730 (2007). An employer who controverts is not subject to the Act’s delinquency penalty. See 33 U. S. C. § 914(e). Perhaps Justice Ginsburg gives Sea-Land the benefit of the doubt because its voluntary payments were close to Roberts’ actual entitlement. But if that is so, then how close is close enough?
Roberts accurately notes that in some cases, the time of injury and the time of onset of disability differ. We have observed that “the LHWCA does not compensate physical injury alone but the disability produced by that injury.” Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 297 (1995). From that principle, lower courts have rightly concluded that when dates of injury and onset of disability diverge, the latter is the relevant date for determining the applicable national average weekly wage. See, e.g., Service Employees Int’l, Inc. v. Director, OWCP, 595 F. 3d 447, 456 (CA2 2010); Kubin v. Pro-Football, Inc., 29 BRBS 117 (1995) (per curiam).
Likewise, in a small group of cases — those in which disability lasts more than 3 but less than 15 days — the time of onset of disability and the time of entitlement will differ. See § 906(a) (“No compensation shall be allowed for the first three days of the disability . . . Provided, however, That in case the injury results in disability of more than fourteen days the compensation shall be allowed from the date of the disability”). In these cases, the relevant date is that on which disability and entitlement coincide: the fourth day after the onset of disability.
Other LHWCA provisions, read in context, also use award to mean “award in a formal order.” For example, §§ 913(a) and 928(b), like § 914(a), refer to the payment of compensation “without an award.” And the LHWCA distinguishes between voluntary payments and those due under an order for purposes of punishing employer delinquency. Compare § 914(e) (10 percent penalty for late payment of “compensation payable without an award”) with § 914(f) (20 percent penalty for late payment of “compensation, payable under the terms of an award”).
Sections 908(c)(1) to (20) set forth a “schedule” of particular injuries that entitle an employee “to receive two-thirds of his average weekly wages for a specific number of weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity has actually been impaired.” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268, 269 (1980). For example, an employee who loses an arm is entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly wage for 312 weeks. § 908(c)(1).
Roberts’ interpretation also would afford unwarranted significance to the entry of an order in other circumstances, resulting in arbitrary distinctions within other classes of beneficiaries. For example, § 908(c)(22) provides that if an employee suffers from more than one scheduled disability, the “awards” for each “shall run consecutively.” Under Roberts’ interpretation, §908(c)(22) would require consecutive payments only for employees who were receiving scheduled disability benefits pursuant to orders; those receiving voluntary payments presumably would be entitled to concurrent payments. See §§ 914(a) — <b). That result would conflict with § 908(c)(22)’s text, which states that consecutive payments must be made “[i]n any case” involving multiple scheduled disabilities. See, e. g., Thornton v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 44 BRBS 111 (2010) (per curiam).
Similarly, § 910(h)(1) sets out two formulas for increasing benefits for pre-1972 disability or death in light of the higher rates Congress provided in the 1972 LHWCA amendments. The first applies to those receiving compensation at the then-applicable maximum rate; the second applies to those “awarded compensation ... at less than the maximum rate.” See Dept, of Labor, OWCP Bulletin No. 10-73, Adjustment of Compensation for Total Permanent Disability or Death Prior to LS/HW Amendments of 1972, pp. 2-4 (1973). Roberts’ interpretation would make the second formula applicable only to beneficiaries receiving less than the maximum rate pursuant to orders, not to all such beneficiaries. Again, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended this distinction, nor has OWCP applied it. See ibid, (prescribing a “uniform” method for computing the increase in all “[cjases being compensated at less than the maximum rate,” with no reference to the existence of an order).
Thus, as under Justice Ginsburg’s approach, an employer who controverts still “runs the risk” of greater liability if an AU awards an employee compensation at some point subsequent to the onset of disability. See post, at 117.
Because “newly awarded compensation,” read in context, is unambiguous, we do not reach respondents’ argument that the Director’s interpretation of § 906(e) is entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).
As the Court notes, the maximum rate for a given fiscal year applies to two groups of injured workers: those who are “newly awarded compensation during such [year],” and those who are “currently receiving compensation for permanent total disability or death benefits during such [year].” 33 U. S. C. § 906(c). Ante, at 102, n. 5. Contrary to the Court’s charge, I do not read “newly awarded compensation” as synonymous with “currently receiving compensation.” See ibid. An injured worker who is “currently receiving compensation” in a given fiscal year was “newly awarded compensation” in a previous year. My interpretation therefore gives “effect to Congress’ textual shift,” ibid.: It identifies two distinct groups of workers who are entitled to a given year’s maximum rate. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify whether administrative action occurred in the context of the case prior to the onset of litigation. The activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. To determine whether administration action occurred in the context of the case, consider the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations. | Did administrative action occur in the context of the case? | [
"No",
"Yes"
] | [
1
] | sc_adminaction_is |
MUNAF et al. v. GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 06-1666.
Argued March 25, 2008
Decided June 12, 2008
Then-Deputy Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for respondents in No. 06-1666 and petitioners in No. 07-394. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Daryl Joseffer, Douglas N. Letter, Jonathan H. Levy, and Lewis S. Yelin.
Joseph Margulies argued the cause for petitioners in No. 06-1666 and respondents in No. 07-394. With him on the brief were Aziz Z. Huq, Jonathan Hafetz, and Eric M. Freedman.
Together with No. 07-394, Geren, Secretary of the Army, et al. v. Omar et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in No. 06-1666 and affirmance in No. 07-394 were filed for the American Bar Association by William H. Neukom, David J. Cynamon, and Matthew J. MacLean; for the Associated Press et al. by Paul M. Smith; for the Constitution Project et al. by Christopher T. Hardman, Sharon Bradford Franklin, and John IK Whitehead; for Former U. S. Diplomats and National Security Specialists by Harold Hongju Koh; for Non-Governmental Organizations by John J. Gibbons, Lawrence S. Lustberg, Baher Azmy, and Jenny-Brooke Condon; and for M. Cherif Bassiouni et al. by Richard M. Zuckerman.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed in both cases for the National Institute of Military Justice by Daniel S. Floyd and Stephen A Saltzburg; and for Professors of Constitutional Law and of the Federal Courts by Daniel F Kolb and Judith Resnik.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) is an international coalition force operating in Iraq composed of 26 different nations, including the United States. The force operates under the unified command of United States military officers, at the request of the Iraqi Government, and in accordance with United Nations (U. N.) Security Council Resolutions. Pursuant to the U. N. mandate, MNF-I forces detain individuals alleged to have committed hostile or warlike acts in Iraq, pending investigation and prosecution in Iraqi courts under Iraqi law.
These consolidated cases concern the availability of habeas corpus relief arising from the MNF-I’s detention of American citizens who voluntarily traveled to Iraq and are alleged to have committed crimes there. We are confronted with two questions. First, do United States courts have jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of American citizens challenging their detention in Iraq by the MNF-I? Second, if such jurisdiction exists, may district courts exercise that jurisdiction to enjoin the MNF-I from transferring such individuals to Iraqi custody or allowing them to be tried before Iraqi courts?
We conclude that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition. Under circumstances such as those presented here, however, habeas corpus provides petitioners with no relief.
I
Pursuant to its U. N. mandate, the MNF-I has “ ‘the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.’” App. G to Pet. for Cert. in No. 07-394, p. 74a, ¶ 10 (quoting U. N. Security Council, U. N. Doc. S/Res/1546, ¶ 10 (June 2004)). To this end, the MNF-I engages in a variety of military and humanitarian activities. The multinational force, for example, conducts combat operations against insurgent factions, trains and equips Iraqi security forces, and aids in relief and reconstruction efforts:
MNF-I forces also detain individuals who pose a threat to the security of Iraq. The Government of Iraq retains ultimate responsibility for the arrest and imprisonment of individuals who violate its laws, but because many of Iraq’s prison facilities have been destroyed, the MNF-I agreed to maintain physical custody of many such individuals during Iraqi criminal proceedings. MNF-I forces are currently holding approximately 24,000 detainees. An American military unit, Task Force 134, oversees detention operations and facilities in Iraq, including those located at Camp Cropper, the detention facility currently housing Shawqi Omar and Mohammad Munaf (hereinafter petitioners). The unit is under the command of United States military officers who report to General David Petraeus.
A
Petitioner Shawqi Omar, an American-Jordanian citizen, voluntarily traveled to Iraq in 2002. In October 2004, Omar was captured and detained in Iraq by U. S. military forces operating as part of the MNF-I during a raid of his Baghdad home. Omar is believed to have provided aid to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq — by facilitating his group’s connection with other terrorist groups, bringing foreign fighters into Iraq, and planning and executing kidnapings in Iraq. The MNF-I searched his home in an effort to capture and detain insurgents who were associated with al-Zarqawi. The raid netted an Iraqi insurgent and four Jordanian fighters along with explosive devices and other weapons.
The captured insurgents gave sworn statements implicating Omar in insurgent cell activities. The four Jordanians testified that they had traveled to Iraq with Omar to commit militant acts against American and other Coalition forces. Each of the insurgents stated that, while living in Omar’s home, they had surveilled potential kidnap victims and conducted weapons training. The insurgents explained that Omar’s fluency in English allowed him to lure foreigners to his home in order to kidnap and sell them for ransom.
Following Omar’s arrest, a three-member MNF-I Tribunal composed of American military officers concluded that Omar posed a threat to the security of Iraq and designated him a “security internee.” The tribunal also found that Omar had committed hostile and warlike acts, and that he was an enemy combatant in the war on terrorism. In accordance with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, Omar was permitted to hear the basis for his detention, make a statement, and call immediately available witnesses.
In addition to the review of his detention by the MNF-I Tribunal, Omar received a hearing before the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB) — a nine-member board composed of six representatives of the Iraqi Government and three MNF-I officers. The CRRB, like the MNF-I Tribunal, concluded that Omar’s continued detention, was necessary because he posed a threat to Iraqi security. At all times since his capture, Omar has remained in the custody of the United States military operating as part of the MNF-I.
Omar’s wife and son filed a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Omar’s behalf in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Omar v. Harvey, 479 F. 3d 1, 4 (CADC 2007). After the Department of Justice informed Omar that the MNF-I had decided to refer him to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) for criminal proceedings, his attorney sought and obtained a preliminary injunction barring Omar’s “remov[al]... from United States or MNF-I custody.” App. C to Pet. for Cert, in No. 07-394, at 59a. The order directed that
“the [United States], their agents, servants, employees, confederates, and any persons acting in concert or participation with them, or having actual or implicit knowledge of this Order . . . shall not remove [Omar] from United States or MNF-I custody, or take any other action inconsistent with this court’s memorandum opinion.” Ibid.
The United States appealed and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. Omar, 479 F. 3d 1. The Court of Appeals first upheld the District Court’s exercise of habeas jurisdiction, finding that this Court’s decision in Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U. S. 197 (1948) (per curiam), did not preclude review. The Court of Appeals distinguished Hirota on the ground that Omar, unlike the petitioner in that case, had yet to be convicted by a foreign tribunal. 479 F. 3d, at 7-9. The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used to enjoin release. Id., at 11. It therefore construed the injunction only to bar transfer to Iraqi custody and upheld the District Court’s order insofar as it prohibited the United States from: (1) transferring Omar to Iraqi custody, id., at 11-13; (2) sharing details concerning any decision to release Omar with the Iraqi Government, id., at 13; and (3) presenting Omar to the Iraqi Courts for investigation and prosecution, id., at 14.
Judge Brown dissented. She joined the panel’s jurisdictional ruling, but would have vacated the injunction because, in her view, the District Court had no authority to enjoin a transfer that would allow Iraqi officials to take custody of an individual captured in Iraq — something the Iraqi Government “undeniably h[ad] a right to do.” Id., at 19. We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1074 (2007).
B
Petitioner Munaf, a citizen of both Iraq and the United States, voluntarily traveled to Iraq with several Romanian journalists. He was to serve as the journalists’ translator and guide. Shortly after arriving in Iraq, the group was kidnaped and held captive for two months. After the journalists were freed, MNF-I forces detained Munaf based on their belief that he had orchestrated the kidnapings.
A three-judge MNF-I Tribunal conducted a hearing to determine whether Munaf’s detention was warranted. The MNF-I Tribunal reviewed the facts surrounding Munaf’s capture, interviewed witnesses, and considered the available intelligence information. Munaf was present at the hearing and had an opportunity to hear the grounds for his detention, make a statement, and call immediately available witnesses. At the end of the hearing, the tribunal found that Munaf posed a serious threat to Iraqi security, designated him a “security internee,” and referred his case to the CCCI for criminal investigation and prosecution.
During his CCCI trial, Munaf admitted on camera and in writing that he had facilitated the kidnaping of the Romanian journalists. He also appeared as a witness against his alleged co-conspirators. Later in the proceedings, Munaf recanted his confession, but the CCCI nonetheless found him guilty of kidnaping. On appeal, the Iraqi Court of Cassation vacated Munaf’s conviction and remanded his case to the CCCI for further investigation. In re Hikmat, No. 19/Pub. Comm’n/2007, p. 5 (Feb. 19, 2008). The Court of Cassation directed that Munaf was to “remain in custody pending the outcome” of further criminal proceedings. Ibid.
Meanwhile, Munaf’s sister filed a next-friend petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (2006). The District Court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that this Court’s decision in Hirota controlled: Munaf was “in the custody of coalition troops operating under the aegis of MNF-I, who derive their ultimate authority from the United Nations and the MNF-I member nations acting jointly.” 456 F. Supp. 2d, at 122.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 482 F. 3d 582 (2007) (hereinafter Munaf). The Court of Appeals, “[cjonstrained by precedent,” agreed with the District Court that Hirota controlled and dismissed Munaf’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. 482 F. 3d, at 583. It distinguished the prior opinion in Omar on the ground that Munaf, like the habeas petitioner in Hirota but unlike Omar, had been convicted by a foreign tribunal. 482 F. 3d, at 583-584.
Judge Randolph concurred in the judgment. Id., at 585. He concluded that the District Court had improperly dismissed for want of jurisdiction because “Munaf is an American citizen . . . held by American forces overseas.” Ibid. Nevertheless, Judge Randolph would have held that Munaf’s habeas petition failed on the merits. Id., at 586. He relied on this Court’s holding in Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524, 529 (1957), that a “sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,” and concluded that the fact that the United States was holding Munaf because of his conviction by a foreign tribunal was conclusive, ibid.
We granted certiorari and consolidated the Omar and Munaf cases. 552 U. S. 1074 (2007).
II
The Solicitor General argues that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over the detainees’ habeas petitions because the American forces holding Omar and Munaf operate as part of a multinational force. Brief for Federal Parties 17-36. The habeas statute provides that a federal district court may entertain a habeas application by a person held “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States,” or “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 2241(c)(1), (3). MNF-I forces, the argument goes, “are not operating solely under United States authority, but rather ‘as the agent of’ a multinational force.” Brief for Federal Parties 23 (quoting Hirota, 338 U. S., at 198). Omar and Munaf are thus held pursuant to international authority, not “the authority of the United States,” § 2241(c)(1), and they are therefore not within the reach of the habeas statute. Brief for Federal Parties 17-18.
The United States acknowledges that Omar and Munaf are American citizens held overseas in the immediate “ ‘physical custody’ ” of American soldiers who answer only to an American chain of command. Id., at 21. The MNF-I itself operates subject to a unified American command. Id., at 23. “[A]s a practical matter,” the Government concedes, it is “the President and the Pentagon, the Secretary of Defense, and the American commanders that control what . . . American soldiers do,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, including the soldiers holding Munaf and Omar. In light of these admissions, it is unsurprising that the United States has never argued that it lacks the authority to release Munaf or Omar, or that it requires the consent of other countries to do so.
We think these concessions the end of the jurisdictional inquiry. The Government’s argument — that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over American citizens held by American forces operating as multinational agents — is not easily reconciled with the text of § 2241(c)(1). See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 172 (2001) (‘We begin, as always, with the language of the statute”). That section applies to persons held “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States.” §2241(c)(1). An individual is held “in custody” by the United States when the United States official charged with his detention has “the power to produce” him. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 574 (1885); see also § 2243 (“The writ... shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained”). The disjunctive “or” in § 2241(c)(1) makes clear that actual custody by the United States suffices for jurisdiction, even if that custody could be viewed as “under . . . color of” another authority, such as the MNF-I.
The Government’s primary contention is that the District Courts lack jurisdiction in these cases because of this Court’s decision in Hirota. That slip of a case cannot bear the weight the Government would place on it. In Hirota, Japanese citizens sought permission to file habeas corpus applications directly in this Court. The petitioners were non-citizens detained in Japan. They had been convicted and sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East — an international tribunal established by General Douglas MacArthur acting, as the Court put it, in his capacity as “the agent of the Allied Powers.” 338 U. S., at 198. Although those familiar with the history of the period would appreciate the possibility of confusion over who General MacArthur took orders from, the Court concluded that the sentencing tribunal was “not a tribunal of the United States.” Ibid. The Court then held that, “[ujnder the foregoing circumstances,” United States courts had “no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences” imposed by that tribunal. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court denied the petitioners leave to file their habeas corpus applications, without further legal analysis. Ibid.
The Government argues that the multinational character of the MNF-I, like the multinational character of the tribunal at issue in Hirota, means that it too is not a United States entity subject to habeas. Reply Brief for Federal Parties 5-7. In making this claim, the Government acknowledges that the MNF-I is subject to American authority, but contends that the same was true of the tribunal at issue in Hirota. In Hirota, the Government notes, the petitioners were held by the United States Eighth Army, which took orders from General MacArthur, 338 U. S., at 199 (Douglas, J., concurring), and were subject to an “unbroken” chain of U. S. command, ending with the President of the United States, id., at 207.
The Court in Hirota, however, may have found it significant, in considering the nature of the tribunal established by General MacArthur, that the Solicitor General expressly contended that General MacArthur, as pertinent, was not subject to United States authority. The facts suggesting that the tribunal in Hirota was subject to an “unbroken” United States chain of command were not among the “foregoing circumstances” cited in the per curiam opinion disposing of the case, id., at 198. They were highlighted only in Justice Douglas’s belated opinion concurring in the result, published five months after that per curiam. Id., at 199, n.*. Indeed, arguing before this Court, Solicitor General Perlman stated that General MacArthur did not serve “under the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” that his duty was “to obey the directives of the Far Eastern Commission and not our War Department,” and that “no process that could be issued from this court . . . would have any effect on his action.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in Hirota v. MacArthur, O. T. 1948, No. 239, pp. 42, 50, 51. Here, in contrast, the Government acknowledges that our military commanders do answer to the President.
Even if the Government is correct that the international authority at issue in Hirota is no different from the international authority at issue here, the present “circumstances” differ in another respect. These cases concern American citizens while Hirota did not, and the Court has indicated that habeas jurisdiction can depend on citizenship. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 781 (1950); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466, 486 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). See also Munaf, 482 F. 3d, at 584 (“[W]e do not mean to suggest that we find the logic of Hirota especially clear or compelling, particularly as applied to American citizens”); id., at 585 (Randolph, J., concurring in judgment). “Under the foregoing circumstances,” we decline to extend our holding in Hirota to preclude American citizens held overseas by American soldiers subject to a United States chain of command from filing habeas petitions.
III
We now turn to the question whether United States district courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our Armed Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign’s territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal prosecution. The nature of that question requires us to proceed “with the circumspection appropriate when this Court is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our international relations.” Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U. S. 354, 383 (1959). Here there is the further consideration that those issues arise in the context of ongoing military operations conducted by American forces overseas. We therefore approach these questions cognizant that “courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.” Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U. S. 518, 530 (1988).
In Omar, the District Court granted and the D. C. Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction that, as interpreted by the Court of Appeals, prohibited the United States from (1) effectuating “Omar’s transfer in any form, whether by an official handoff or otherwise,” to Iraqi custody, 479 F. 3d, at 12; (2) sharing details concerning any decision to release Omar with the Iraqi Government, id., at 13; and (3) “presenting Omar to the [Iraqi courts] for trial,” id., at 14. This is not a narrow injunction. Even the habeas petitioners do not defend it in its entirety. They acknowledge the authority of the Iraqi courts to begin criminal proceedings against Omar and wisely concede that any injunction “clearly need not include a bar on ‘information-sharing.’” Brief for Habeas Petitioners 61. As Judge Brown noted in her dissent, such a bar would impermissibly “enjoin the United States military from sharing information with an allied foreign sovereign in a war zone.” Omar, supra, at 18.
We begin with the basics. A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy,” 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, p. 129 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (footnotes omitted); it is never awarded as of right, Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 440 (1944). Rather, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things, “a likelihood of success on the merits.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U. S. 418, 428 (2006) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975)). But one searches the opinions below in vain for any mention of a likelihood of success as to the merits of Omar’s habeas petition. Instead, the District Court concluded that the “jurisdictional issues” presented questions “so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.” Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23-24, 27 (DC 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).
The D. C. Circuit made the same mistake. In that court’s view, the “only question before [it] at th[at] stage of the litigation relate[d] to the district court’s jurisdiction.” 479 F. 3d, at 11. As a result, the Court of Appeals held that it “need not address” the merits of Omar’s habeas claims: Those merits had “no relevance.” Ibid.
A difficult question as to jurisdiction is, of course, no reason to grant a preliminary injunction. It says nothing about the “likelihood of success on the merits,” other than making such success more unlikely due to potential impediments to even reaching the merits. Indeed, if all a “likelihood of success on the merits” meant was that the district court likely had jurisdiction, then preliminary injunctions would be the rule, not the exception. In light of these basic principles, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to grant a preliminary injunction on the view that the “jurisdictional issues” in Omar’s case were tough, without even considering the merits of the underlying habeas petition.
What we have said thus far would require reversal and remand in each of these cases: The lower courts in Munaf erred in dismissing for want of jurisdiction, and the lower courts in Omar erred in issuing and upholding the preliminary injunction. There are occasions, however, when it is appropriate to proceed further and address the merits. This is one of them.
Our authority to address the merits of the habeas petitioners’ claims is clear. Review of a preliminary injunction “is not confined to the act of granting the injunctio[n], but extends as well to determining whether there is any insuperable objection, in point of jurisdiction or merits, to the maintenance of [the] bill, and, if so, to directing a final decree dismissing it.” City and County of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 136 (1913). See also Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282, 287 (1940) (“If insuperable objection to maintaining the bill clearly appears, it may be dismissed and the litigation terminated’” (quoting Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, N. Y, 253 U. S. 136, 141 (1920))). This has long been the rule: “By the ordinary practice in equity as administered in England and this country,” a reviewing court has the power on appeal from an interlocutory order “to examine the merits of the case .. . and upon deciding them in favor of the defendant to dismiss the bill.” North Carolina R. Co. v. Story, 268 U. S. 288, 292 (1925). Indeed, “[t]he question whether an action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim is one of the most common issues that may be reviewed on appeal from an interlocutory injunction order.” 16 Wright & Miller, Jurisdiction and Related Matters §3921.1, p. 32 (2d ed. 1996).
Adjudication of the merits is most appropriate if the injunction rests on a question of law and it is plain that the plaintiff cannot prevail. In such cases, the defendant is entitled to judgment. See, e. g., Deckert, supra, at 287; North Carolina R. Co., supra, at 292; City and County of Denver, supra, at 136.
Given that the present cases involve habeas petitions that implicate sensitive foreign policy issues in the context of ongoing military operations, reaching the merits is the wisest course. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 584-585 (1952) (finding the case ripe for merits review on appeal from stay of preliminary injunction). For the reasons we explain below, the relief sought by the habeas petitioners makes clear under our precedents that the power of the writ ought not to be exercised. Because the Government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it is appropriate for us to terminate the litigation now.
IV
The habeas petitioners argue that the writ should be granted in their cases because they have “a legally enforceable right” not to be transferred to Iraqi authority for criminal proceedings under both the Due Process Clause and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARR Act), div. G, 112 Stat. 2681-761, and because they are innocent civilians who have been unlawfully detained by the United States in violation of the Due Process Clause. Brief for Habeas Petitioners 48-52. With respect to the transfer claim, petitioners request an injunction prohibiting the United States from transferring them to Iraqi custody. With respect to the unlawful detention claim, petitioners seek “release” — but only to the extent that release would not result in “unlawful” transfer to Iraqi custody. Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. Both of these requests would interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to “punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders.” Wilson, 354 U. S., at 529. We accordingly hold that the detainees’ claims do not state grounds upon which habeas relief may be granted, that the habeas petitions should have been promptly dismissed, and that no injunction should have been entered.
A
Habeas corpus is “governed by equitable principles.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438 (1963). We have therefore recognized that “prudential concerns,” Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 686 (1993), such as comity and the orderly administration of criminal justice, may “require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power,” Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 539 (1976).
The principle that a habeas court is “not bound in every ease” to issue the writ, Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251 (1886), follows from the precatory language of the habeas statute, and from its common-law origins. The habeas statute provides only that a writ of habeas corpus “may be granted,” § 2241(a) (emphasis added), and directs federal courts to “dispose of [habeas petitions] as law and justice require,” § 2243. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 278 (2008). Likewise, the writ did not issue in England “as of mere course,” but rather required the petitioner to demonstrate why the “extraordinary power of the crown” should be exercised, 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 132 (1768); even then, courts were directed to “do as to justice shall appertain,” 1 id., at 131 (1765). The question, therefore, even where a habeas court has the power to issue the writ, is “whether this be a case in which [that power] ought to be exercised.” Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 201 (1830) (Marshall, C. J.).
At the outset, the nature of the relief sought by the habeas petitioners suggests that habeas is not appropriate in these cases. Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507; 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release. See, e. g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). But here the last thing petitioners want is simple release; that would expose them to apprehension by Iraqi authorities for criminal prosecution — precisely what petitioners went to federal court to avoid. At the end of the day, what petitioners are really after is a court order requiring the United States to shelter them from the sovereign government seeking to have them answer for alleged crimes committed within that sovereign’s borders.
The habeas petitioners do not dispute that they voluntarily traveled to Iraq, that they remain detained within the sovereign territory of Iraq today, or that they are alleged to have committed serious crimes in Iraq. Indeed, Omar and Munaf both concede that, if they were not in MNF-I custody, Iraq would be free to arrest and prosecute them under Iraqi law. See Tr. in Omar, No. 06-5126 (CADC), pp. 48-49, 59 (Sept. 11, 2006); Tr. in Mohammad, No. 06-1455 (DC), pp. 15-16 (Oct. 10, 2006). There is, moreover, no question that Munaf is the subject of ongoing Iraqi criminal proceedings and that Omar would be but for the present injunction. Munaf was convicted by the CCCI, and while that conviction was overturned on appeal, his case was remanded to and is again pending before the CCCI. The MNF-I referred Omar to the CCCI for prosecution at which point he sought and obtained an injunction that prohibits his prosecution. See 479 F. 3d, at 16, n. 3 (Brown, J., dissenting in part) (“ ‘[Omar] has not yet had a trial or even an investigative hearing in the CCCI due to the district court’s unprecedented injunction’ ” (citing Opposition to Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief in Munaf v. Harvey, No. 06-5324 (CADC, Oct. 25, 2006), pp. 18-19)).
Given these facts, our cases make clear that Iraq has a sovereign right to prosecute Omar and Munaf for crimes committed on its soil. As Chief Justice Marshall explained nearly two centuries ago, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.” Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116,136 (1812). See Wilson, supra, at 529 (“A sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction”); Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 15, n. 29 (1957) (opinion of Black, J.) (“[A] foreign nation has plenary criminal jurisdiction . . . over all Americans . . . who commit offenses against its laws within its territory”); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U. S. 470, 479 (1956) (nations have a “sovereign right to try and punish [American citizens] for offenses committed within their borders,” unless they “have relinquished [their] jurisdiction” to do so).
This is true with respect to American citizens who travel abroad and commit crimes in another nation whether or not the pertinent criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by our Constitution. “When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people.” Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 123 (1901).
The habeas petitioners nonetheless argue that the Due Process Clause includes a “[f]reedom from unlawful transfer” that is “protected wherever the government seizes a citizen.” Brief for Habeas Petitioners 48. We disagree. Not only have we long recognized the principle that a nation state reigns sovereign within its own territory, we have twice applied that principle to reject claims that the Constitution precludes the Executive from transferring a prisoner to a foreign country for prosecution in an allegedly unconstitutional trial.
In Wilson, 354 U. S. 524, we reversed an injunction similar to the one at issue here. During a cavalry exercise at the Camp Weir range in Japan, Girard, a Specialist Third Class in the United States Army, caused the death of a Japanese woman. Id., at 525-526. After Japan indicted Girard, but while he was still in United States custody, Girard filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Ibid. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the United States, enjoining the “proposed delivery of [Girard] to the Japanese Government.” Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 27 (1957). In the District Court’s view, to permit the transfer to Japanese authority would violate the rights guaranteed to Girard by the Constitution. Ibid.
We granted certiorari, and vacated the injunction. 354 U. S., at 529-530. We noted that Japan had exclusive jurisdiction “to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,” unless it had surrendered that jurisdiction. Id., at 529. Consequently, even though Japan had ceded some of its jurisdiction to the United States pursuant to a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement, the United States could waive that jurisdiction — as it had done in Girard’s case — and the habeas court was without authority to enjoin Girard’s transfer to the Japanese authorities. Id., at 529-530.
Likewise, in Neely, supra, this Court held that habeas corpus was not available to defeat the criminal jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, even when application of that sovereign’s law would allegedly violate the Constitution. Neely — the habeas petitioner and an American citizen — was accused of violating Cuban law in Cuba. Id., at 112-113. He was arrested and detained in the United States. Id., at 113. The United States indicated its intent to extradite him, and Neely filed suit seeking to block his extradition on the grounds that Cuban law did not provide the panoply of rights guaranteed him by the Constitution of the United States. Id., at 122. We summarily rejected this claim: “The answer to this suggestion is that those [constitutional] provisions have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country.” Ibid. Neely alleged no claim for which a “discharge on habeas corpus” could issue. Id., at 125. Accordingly, the United States was free to transfer him to Cuban custody for prosecution.
In the present cases, the habeas petitioners concede that Iraq has the sovereign authority to prosecute them for alleged violations of its law, yet nonetheless request an injunction prohibiting the United States from transferring them to Iraqi custody. But as the foregoing cases make clear, habeas is not a means of compelling the United States to harbor fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted authority to prosecute them.
Petitioners’ “release” claim adds nothing to their “trans.fer” claim. That claim fails for the same reasons the transfer claim fails, given that the release petitioners seek is release in a form that would avoid transfer. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48; App. 40 (coupling Munaf’s claim for release with a request for order requiring the United States to bring him to a U. S. court); App. 123 (same with respect to Omar). Such “release” would impermissibly interfere with Iraq’s “exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,” Wilson, supra, at 529; the “release” petitioners seek is nothing less than an order commanding our forces to smuggle them out of Iraq. Indeed, the Court of Appeals in Omar’s case took the extraordinary step of upholding an injunction that prohibited the Executive from releasing Omar — the quintessential habeas remedy — if the United States shared information about his release with its military ally, Iraq. 479 F. 3d, at 13. Habeas does not require the United States to keep an unsuspecting nation in the dark when it releases an alleged criminal insurgent within its borders.
Moreover, because Omar and Munaf are being held by United States Armed Forces at the behest of the Iraqi Government pending their prosecution in Iraqi courts, Mohammed, 456 F. Supp. 2d, at 117, release of any kind would interfere with the sovereign authority of Iraq “to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,” Wilson, supra, at 529. This point becomes clear given that the MNF-I, pursuant to its U. N. mandate, is authorized to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,” App. G to Pet. for Cert. in No. 07-394, at 74a, ¶ 10, and specifically to provide for the “internment [of individuals in Iraq] where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security,” id., at 86a.
While the Iraqi Government is ultimately “responsible for [the] arrest, detention and imprisonment” of individuals who violate its laws, S. C. Res. 1790, Annex I, ¶ 4, p. 6, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007), the MNF-I maintains physical custody of individuals like Munaf and Omar while their cases are being heard by the CCCI, Mohammed, supra, at 117. Indeed, Munaf is currently held at Camp Cropper pursuant to the express order of the Iraqi courts. See In re Hikmat, No. 19/Pub. Comm’n/2007, at 5 (directing that Munaf “remain in custody pending the outcome” of further Iraqi proceedings). As that court order makes clear, MNF-I detention is an integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice. MNF-I forces augment the Iraqi Government’s peacekeeping efforts by functioning, in essence, as its jailor. Any requirement that the MNF-I release a detainee would, in effect, impose a release order on the Iraqi Government.
The habeas petitioners acknowledge that some interference with a foreign criminal system is too much. They concede that “it is axiomatic that an American court does not provide collateral review of proceedings in a foreign tribunal.” Brief for Habeas Petitioners 39 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 700 (2004)). We agree, but see no reason why habeas corpus should permit a prisoner detained within a foreign sovereign’s territory to prevent a trial from going forward in the first place. It did not matter that the habeas petitioners in Wilson and Neely had not been convicted. 354 U. S., at 525-526; 180 U. S., at 112-113. Rather, “the same principles of comity and respect for foreign sovereigns that preclude judicial scrutiny of foreign convictions necessarily render invalid attempts to shield citizens from foreign prosecution in order to preempt such non-reviewable adjudications.” Omar, supra, at 17 (Brown, J., dissenting in part).
To allow United States courts to intervene in an ongoing foreign criminal proceeding and pass judgment on its legitimacy seems at least as great an intrusion as the plainly barred collateral review of foreign convictions. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398,417-418 (1964) (“ ‘To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly “imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations” ’ ” (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1918); punctuation omitted)).
There is of course even more at issue here: Neither Neely nor Wilson concerned individuals captured and detained within an ally’s territory during ongoing hostilities involving our troops. Neely involved a charge of embezzlement; Wilson the peacetime actions of a serviceman. Yet in those cases we held that the Constitution allows the Executive to transfer American citizens to foreign authorities for criminal prosecution. It would be passing strange to hold that the Executive lacks that same authority where, as here, the detainees were captured by our Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in what the Government refers to as “an active theater of combat.” Brief for Federal Parties 16.
Such a conclusion would implicate not only concerns about interfering with a sovereign’s recognized prerogative to apply its criminal law to those alleged to have committed crimes within its borders, but also concerns about unwarranted judicial intrusion into the Executive’s ability to conduct military operations abroad. Our constitutional framework “requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters.” Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 94 (1953). Those who commit crimes within a sovereign’s territory may be transferred to that sovereign’s government for prosecution; there is hardly an exception to that rule when the crime at issue is not embezzlement but unlawful insurgency directed against an ally during ongoing hostilities involving our troops.
B
1
Petitioners contend that these general principles are trumped in their cases because their transfer to Iraqi custody is likely to result in torture. This allegation was raised in Munaf’s petition for habeas, App. 39, ¶46, but not in Omar’s. Such allegations are of course a matter of serious concern, but in the present context that concern is to be addressed by the political branches, not the Judiciary. See M. Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 921 (2007) (“Habeas corpus has been held not to be a valid means of inquiry into the treatment the relator is anticipated to receive in the requesting state”).
This conclusion is reflected in the cases already cited. Even with respect to claims that detainees would be denied constitutional rights if transferred, we have recognized that it is for the political branches, not the Judiciary, to assess practices in foreign countries and to determine national policy in light of those assessments. Thus, the Court in Neely concluded that an American citizen who “commits a crime in a foreign country” “cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may prescribe for its own people,” but went on to explain that this was true “unless a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations between that country and the United States.” 180 U. S., at 123. Diplomacy was the means of addressing the petitioner’s concerns.
By the same token, while the Court in Wilson stated the general principle that a “sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,” it recognized that this rule could be altered by diplomatic agreement in light of particular concerns — as it was in that case — and by a decision of the Executive to waive jurisdiction granted under that agreement— as it was in that case. 354 U. S., at 529. See also Kinsella, 351 U. S., at 479 (alteration of jurisdictional rule through “carefully drawn agreements”). This recognition that it is the political branches that bear responsibility for creating exceptions to the general rule is nothing new; as Chief Justice Marshall explained in the Schooner Exchange, “exemptions from territorial jurisdiction . . . must be derived from the consent of the sovereign of the territory” and are “rather questions of policy than of law, that they are for diplomatic, rather than legal discussion.” 7 Cranch, at 143, 146. The present concerns are of the same nature as the loss of constitutional rights alleged in Wilson and Neely, and are governed by the same principles.
The Executive Branch may, of course, decline to surrender a detainee for many reasons, including humanitarian ones. Petitioners here allege only the possibility of mistreatment in a prison facility; this is not a more extreme case in which the Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway. Indeed, the Solicitor General states that it is the policy of the United States not to transfer an individual in circumstances where torture is likely to result. Brief for Federal Parties 47; Reply Brief for Federal Parties 23. In these cases the United States explains that, although it remains concerned about torture among some sectors of the Iraqi Government, the State Department has determined that the Justice Ministry — the department that would have authority over Munaf and Omar — as well as its prison and detention facilities have “ ‘generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner needs.’” Ibid. The Solicitor General explains that such determinations are based on “the Executive’s assessment of the foreign country’s legal system and . . . the Executivefs]. . . ability to obtain foreign assurances it considers reliable.” Brief for Federal Parties 47.
The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinations — determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area. See The Federalist No. 42, p. 279 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations”). In contrast, the political branches are well situated to consider sensitive foreign policy issues, such as whether there is a serious prospect of torture at the hands of an ally, and what to do about it if there is. As Judge Brown noted, “we need not assume the political branches are oblivious to these concerns. Indeed, the other branches possess significant diplomatic tools and leverage the judiciary lacks.” 479 F. 3d, at 20, n. 6 (dissenting opinion).
Petitioners briefly argue that their claims of potential torture may not be readily dismissed on the basis of these principles because the FARR Act prohibits transfer when torture may result. Brief for Habeas Petitioners 51-52. Neither petitioner asserted a FARR Act claim in his petition for habeas, and the Act was not raised in any of the certiorari filings before this Court. Even in their merits brief in this Court, the habeas petitioners hardly discuss the issue. Id., at 17, 51-52, 57-58. The Government treats the issue in kind. Reply Brief for Federal Parties 24-26. Under such circumstances we will not consider the question.
2
Finally, the habeas petitioners raise the additional argument that the United States may not transfer a detainee to Iraqi custody, not because it would be unconstitutional to do so, but because the “[Government may not transfer a citizen without legal authority.” Brief for Habeas Petitioners 54. The United States, they claim, bears the burden of “identifying] a treaty or statute that permits it to transfer the[m] to Iraqi custody.” Id., at 49.
The habeas petitioners rely prominently on Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U. S. 5 (1936), where we ruled that the Executive may not extradite a person held within the United States unless “legal authority” to do so “is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty,” id., at 9. But Valentine is readily distinguishable. It involved the extradition of an individual from the United States; this is not an extradition case, but one involving the transfer to a sovereign’s authority of an individual captured and already detained in that sovereign’s territory. In the extradition context, when a “‘fugitive criminal’” is found within the United States, “ ‘there is no authority vested in any department of the government to seize [him] and surrender him to a foreign power,’” in the absence of a pertinent constitutional or legislative provision. Ibid. But Omar and Munaf voluntarily traveled to Iraq and are being held there. They are therefore subject to the territorial jurisdiction of that sovereign, not of the United States. Moreover, as we have explained, petitioners are being held by the United States, acting as part of the MNF-I, at the request of and on behalf of the Iraqi Government. It would be more than odd if the Government had no authority to transfer them to the very sovereign on whose behalf, and within whose territory, they are being detained.
The habeas petitioners further contend that this Court’s decision in Wilson supports their argument that the Executive lacks the discretion to transfer a citizen absent a treaty or statute. Brief for Habeas Petitioners 54-55. Quite the opposite. Wilson forecloses it. The only “authority” at issue in Wilson — a Status of Forces Agreement — seemed to give the habeas petitioner in that case a right to be tried by an American military tribunal, not a Japanese court. 354 U. S., at 529. Nevertheless, in light of the background principle that Japan had a sovereign interest in prosecuting crimes committed within its borders, this Court found no “constitutional or statutory” impediment to the United States’s waiver of its jurisdiction under the agreement. Id., at 530.
* * *
Munaf and Omar are alleged to have committed hostile and warlike acts within the sovereign territory of Iraq during ongoing hostilities there. Pending their criminal prosecution for those offenses, Munaf and Omar are being held in Iraq by American forces operating pursuant to a U. N. mandate and at the request of the Iraqi Government. Petitioners concede that Iraq has a sovereign right to prosecute them for alleged violations of its law. Yet they went to federal court seeking an order that would allow them to defeat precisely that sovereign authority. Habeas corpus does not require the United States to shelter such fugitives from the criminal justice system of the sovereign with authority to prosecute them.
For all the reasons given above, petitioners state no claim in their habeas petitions for which relief can be granted, and those petitions should have been promptly dismissed. The judgments below and the injunction entered against the United States are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join, concurring.
The Court holds that “[ujnder circumstances such as those presented here,. .. habeas corpus provides petitioners with no relief.” Ante, at 680. The Court’s opinion makes clear that those circumstances include the following: (1) Omar and Munaf “voluntarily traveled to Iraq.” Ante, at 694. They are being held (2) in the “territory” of (3) an “ally” of the United States, ante, at 700, (4) by our troops, see ante, at 685, (5) “during ongoing hostilities” that (6) “involv[e] our troops,” ante, at 700. (7) The government of a foreign sovereign, Iraq, has decided to prosecute them “for crimes committed on its soil.” Ante, at 694. And (8) “the State Department has determined that... the department that would have authority over Munaf and Omar... as well as its prison and detention facilities have generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner needs.” Ante, at 702 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because I consider these circumstances essential to the Court’s holding, I join its opinion.
The Court accordingly reserves judgment on an “extreme case in which the Executive has determined that a detainee [in United States custody] is likely to be tortured but decides to transfer him anyway.” Ibid. I would add that nothing in today’s opinion should be read as foreclosing relief for a citizen of the United States who resists transfer, say, from the American military to a foreign government for prosecution in a case of that sort, and I would extend the caveat to a case in which the probability of torture is well documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it. Although the Court rightly points out that any likelihood of extreme mistreatment at the receiving government’s hands is a proper matter for the political branches to consider, see ante, at 700-701, if the political branches did favor transfer it would be in order to ask whether substantive due process bars the Government from consigning its own people to torture. And although the Court points out that habeas is aimed at securing release, not protective detention, see ante, at 693-694, habeas would not be the only avenue open to an objecting prisoner; “where federally protected rights [are threatened], it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief,” Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946).
As noted above, Munaf’s conviction was subsequently vacated by an Iraqi appellate court, and he is awaiting a new trial.
These cases concern only American citizens and only the statutory reach of the writ. Nothing herein addresses jurisdiction with respect to alien petitioners or with respect to the constitutional scope of the writ.
The circumstances in Hirota differ in yet another respect. The petitioners in that ease sought an original writ, filing their motions for leave to file habeas petitions “in this Court.” 338 U. S., at 198. There is, however, some authority for the proposition that this Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction only over “ ‘cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party,’ ” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803) (quoting U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, cl. 2), and Congress had not granted the Court appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
The habeas petitioners claim that the injunction only bars Omar’s presentation to the Iraqi courts and that the CCCI trial can go forward in Omar’s absence. The injunction is not so easily narrowed. It was entered on the theory that Omar might be “presented to the CCCI and in that same day, be tried, [and] convicted,” thus depriving the United States district courts of jurisdiction. Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (DC 2006). Petitioners’ interpretation makes no sense under that theory: If a conviction would deprive the habeas court of jurisdiction, a trial, with or without the defendant, could result in just such a jurisdiction-divesting order.
The United States has in fact entered into treaties that provide procedural protections to American citizens tried in other nations. See, e. g., North Atlantic Treaty: Status of Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U. S. T. 1802, T. I. A. S. No. 2846, Art. VII, ¶ 9 (guaranteeing arrested members of the Armed Forces and their civilian dependents, inter alia, an attorney, an interpreter, and a prompt and speedy trial, as well as the right to confront witnesses, obtain favorable witnesses, and communicate with a representative of the United States).
We hold that these habeas petitions raise no claim for relief under the FARR Act and express no opinion on whether Munaf and Omar may be permitted to amend their respective pleadings to raise such a claim on remand. Even if considered on the merits, several issues under the FARR Act claim would have to be addressed. First, the Act speaks to situations where a detainee is being “return[ed]” to “a country.” FARR Act § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (“It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the United States”); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 U. N. T. S. 85, Art. 3, 23 I. L. M. 1027, 1028 (“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” (emphasis added)). It is not settled that the Act addresses the transfer of an individual located in Iraq to the Government of Iraq; arguably such an individual is not being “returned” to “a country” — he is already there.
Second, claims under the FARR Act may be limited to certain immigration proceedings. See. § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681-822 (“[Njothing in this section shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this section, or any other determination made with respect to the application of the policy set forth in [this section], except as part of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to [8 U. S. C. § 1252 (2000 ed. and Supp. V]”). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
11
] | sc_certreason |
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. PROCTER & GAMBLE CO.
No. 342.
Argued February 13, 1967.
Decided April 11, 1967.
Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Turner, Richard A. Posner and James Mcl. Henderson.
Frederick W. R. Pride and Kenneth C, Royall argued the cause for respondent. With them on the brief was Robert D. Larsen.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a proceeding initiated by the Federal Trade Commission charging that respondent, Procter & Gamble Co., had acquired the assets of Clorox Chemical Co. in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18. The charge was that Procter’s acquisition of Clorox might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the production and sale of household liquid bleaches.
Following evidentiary hearings, the hearing examiner rendered his decision in which he concluded that the acquisition was unlawful and ordered divestiture. On appeal, the Commission reversed, holding that the record as then constituted was inadequate, and remanded to the examiner for additional evidentiary hearings. 58 F. T. C. 1203. After the additional hearings, the examiner again held the acquisition unlawful and ordered divestiture. The Commission affirmed the examiner and' ordered divestiture. 63 F. T. C. —. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth" Circuit reversed and directed that the Commission’s complaint be dismissed. 358 F. 2d 74. We find that the Commission’s' findings were amply supported by the evidence, and that the Court of Appeals erred.
As indicated by the Commission in its painstaking and illuminating report, it does not particularly aid analysis to talk, of this merger in conventional terms, namely, horizontal or vertical or conglomerate. This merger may most appropriately be described as a “product-extension merger,” as the Commission stated. The facts are not disputed, and a summary will demonstrate the correctness of the Commission’s decision.
At the time of the merger, in 1957, Clorox was the leading manufacturer in the heavily concentrated household liquid bleach industry. It is agreed that household liquid bleach is the relevant line of commerce. The product is used in the home as a germicide and disinfectant, and, more importantly, as a whitening agent in washing clothes and fabrics. It is a distinctive product with no close substitutes. Liquid bleach is a low-price, high-turnover consumer product sold mainly through grocery stores and supermarkets. The relevant geographical market is the Nation and a series of regional markets. Because of high shipping costs and low sales price, it is not feasible to ship the product more than 300 miles from its point of manufacture. Most manufacturers are limited to competition within a single region since they have but one plant. Clorox is the only firm selling nationally; it has 13 plants distributed throughout the Nation. Purex, Clorox’s closest competitor in size, does not distribute its bleach, in the northeast or mid-Atlantic States; in 1957, Purex’s bleach was available in less than 50% of the national market.
At the time of the acquisition, Clorox was the leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach, with 48.8% of the national sales — annual sales of slightly less than $40,000,000. Its market share had been steadily increasing for the five years prior to the merger. Its nearest rival was Purex, which manufactures a number of products other than household liquid bleaches, including abrasive cleaners, toilet soap, and detergents. Purex accounted for 15.7% of the household liquid bleach market. The industry is highly concentrated; in 1957, Clorox and Purex accounted for almost 65% of the Nation's household liquid bleach sales, and, together with four other firms, for almost 80%. The remaining 20% was divided among over 200 small producers. Clorox had total assets of $12,000,000; only eight producers had assets in excess of $1,000,000 and very few had assets of more than $75,000.
In light of the territorial limitations on distribution, national figures do not give an accurate picture of Clorox’s dominance in- the various regions. Thus, Clorox’s seven principal competitors did no business in New England, the mid-Atlantic States, or metropolitan New' York. Clorox’s share of the sales in those areas was 56%, 72%, and 64% respectively. Even in regions where its principal competitors were active, Clorox maintained a dominant position. Except in metropolitan Chicago and the west-central 'States- Clorox accounted for at least 39%, and often a much higher percentage, of liquid bleach sales. °
Since all liquid bleach is chemically identical, advertising and sales promotion are vital. In 1957 Clorox spent almost $3,700,000 on advertising, imprinting the value of its bleach in the mind of the consumer. In addition, it spent $1,700,000 for other promotional activities. The Commission found that these heavy expenditures went far to explain why Clorox maintained so high a market share despite the fact that its brand, though chemically indistinguishable from rival brands, retailed for a price equal to or, in -many instances, higher than its competitors.
Procter is a large, diversified manufacturer of low-price, high-turnover household products sold through grocery, drug, and department stores. Prior to its acquisition of Clorox, it did not produce household liquid bleach. Its 1957 sales were in excess of $1,100,000,000 from which it realized profits of more than $67,000,000; ' its assets were over $500,000,000. Procter has been marked by rapid growth and diversification. It has successfully developed and introduced a number of new products. Its primary activity is in the general area of soaps, detergents, and cleansers; in 1957, of total domestic sales, more than one-half (over $500,000,000) were in this field. Procter was the dominant factor in this area. It accounted for 54.4%' of all packaged detergent sales. The industry is heavily concentrated — Procter and its nearest competitors, Colgate-Palmolive and Lever Brothers, account for 80% of the market.
In the marketing of soaps, detergents, and cleansers, as in the marketing of household liquid bleach, advertising and sales promotion are vital. In 1957, Procter was the Nation’s largest advertiser, spending more than $80,000,000 on advertising and an additional $47,000,000 on sales promotion. Due to its tremendous volume, Procter receives substantial discounts from the media. As a multiproduct producer Procter enjoys substantial advantages in advertising and sales promotion. Thus, it can and does feature several products in its promotions, reducing the printing, mailing, and other costs for each product. It also purchases network programs on behalf of several products, enabling it to give each product network exposure at a fraction of the cost per product that a firm with only one product to advertise would incur.
Prior to the acquisition, Procter was in the course of diversifying into product lines related to its basic detergent-soap-cleanser business. Liquid bleach was a distinct possibility since packaged detergents — Procter’s primary product line — and liquid bleach are used eom-plementarily in washing clothes and fabrics, and in general household cleaning. As noted by the Commission:
“Packaged detergents — Procter’s most important product category — and household liquid bleach are used complementarily, not only in the washing of' clothes and fabrics, but also in general household cleaning, since liquid bleach'is a germicide and disinfectant as well as a whitener. From the consumer’s viewpoint, then, packaged detergents' and liquid bleach are closely related products. Blit the area of relatedness between products of Procter and of Clorox is wider. Household cleansing agents in general, like household liquid bleach, are low-cost, high-turnover household consumer goods marketed chiefly through grocery stores and pre-sold to the consumer by the manufacturer through mass advertising and sales promotions. Since products of both parties to the merger are sold to the same customers, at the same stores, and by the. same merchandising methods, the possibility arises of significant integration at both the marketing and distribution levels.” 63 F. T. C.-,-.
The decision to acquire Clorox was the result of a study conducted by Procter’s promotion department designed to determine the advisability of entering the liquid bleach industry. The initial report noted the ascendancy of liquid bleach in the large and expanding household bleach market, and recommended that Procter purchase Clorox rather than enter independently. Since a large investment would be needed to obtain a satisfactory market share, acquisition of the industry’s leading firm was attractive. “Taking over the Clorox business . . . could be a way of achieving a dominant position in the liquid bleach market quickly, which would pay out reasonably well.” 63 F. T. C., at —. The initial report predicted that Procter’s “sales, distribution and manufacturing setup” could increase • Clorox’s share of the markets in areas where it was low. The final report confirmed the conclusions of the initial report and emphasized that Procter could make more effective use of Clorox’s advertising budget and that the merger would facilitate advertising economies. A few months later, Procter acquired the assets of Clorox in the name of a wholly owned subsidiary, the Clorox Company, in exchange for Procter stock.
The Commission found that the acquisition might substantially lessen competition. The findings ánd reasoning of the Commission need be only briefly summarized. The Commission found that the' substitution of Procter with its huge assets and advertising advantages for the already dominant Clorox would dissuade new entrants and discourage active competition from the firms already in the industry due to fear of retaliation by Procter. The Commission thought it relevant that retailers might be induced to give Clorox preferred shelf space since it would be manufactured by Procter, which also produced a number of other products marketed by the retailers. There was also the danger that Procter might underprice Clorox in order to drive out competition, and subsidize the underpricing with revenue from other products. The Commission carefully reviewed the effect of the acquisition on the structure of the industry, noting that “[t]he practical tendency of the . . . merger ... is to transform the liquid bleach industry into an arena of big business competition only, with the few small firms that have not disappeared through merger eventually falling by the wayside, unable .to compete with their giant rivals.” 63 F. T. C., at —. Further, the merger would seriously diminish potential competition by eliminating Procter' as a potential entrant into the industry. Prior to the merger, the Commission found, Procter was the most likely prospective entrant, and absent the merger would have remained on the periphery, restraining Clorox from exercising its market power. If Procter had actually entered, Clorox’s dominant position would have been eroded and the concentration of the industry.reduced. The Commission stated that it had not placed reliance on post-acquisition evidence in holding the merger unlawful. ,
The Court of Appeals said that the Commission’s finding of illegality had been based on "treacherous conjecture,” mere possibility and suspicion. 358 F. 2d 74, 83. It dismissed the fact that Clorox controlled almost 50% of the industry, that two firms controlled 65%, and that six firms controlled 80% with the observation that “[tjhe fact that in addition to *the six . . . producers sharing eighty per cent of the market, there were two hundred smaller producers . . . would not seem to indicate anything unhealthy about the market conditions.” Id., at 80. It dismissed the finding that Procter, with its huge resources and prowess, would have more leverage than Clorox with the statement that it was. Clorox which had the “knowhow” in the industry, and that Clorox’s finances were adequate for its purposes. Ibid. As for the possibility that Procter would use its tremendous advertising budget and volume discounts to push Clorox, the court found “it difficult to base a finding of illegality on discounts in advertising.” 358 F. 2d, at 81. It rejected the Commission’s finding that the merger eliminated the potential competition of Procter because “[tjhere was no reasonable probability that Procter would have entered the household liquid bleach market but for the merger.” 358 F. 2d, at 83. “There was no evidence tending to prove that Procter ever intended to enter this field on its own.” 358 F. 2d, at 82. Finally, “[tjhere was no evidence that Procter at any time in the past engaged in predatory practices, or that it intended to do. so in the future.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals also heavily relied on post-acquisition “evidence ... to the effect that the other producers subsequent to the merger were selling more .bleach for more money than ever before” (358 F. 2d, at 80), and that “[tjhere [had] been no significant change in Clorox’s market share in the' four years subsequent to the merger” (ibid.), and concluded that “[tjhis evidence certainly does not prove anti-competitive effects of the merger.” Id., at 82. The Court of Appeals, in our view, misapprehended the standards for its review .and the standards applicable in a § 7 proceeding.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of market power in their incipiency. The core question is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, and necessarily requires a prediction of the merger’s impact on competition, present and future. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294; United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321. The section can deal only with probabilities, not with certainties. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, at 323; United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U. S. 158. And there is certainly no requirement that the anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called into play. If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in théir incipiency would be frustrated.
All merjrers are within the reach of § 7, and all must be tested by the same standard, whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical, conglomerate or other. As noted by the Commission, this merger is neither horizontal, vertical, nor conglomerate. _ Since the products of the acquired company are complementary to those of the acquiring company and may be produced with similar facilities, marketed through the same channels and in the same manner, and advertised by the same media, the Commission aptly called this acquisition a “produet-extension merger”:
“By this acquisition . . . Procter has not diversified its interests in the sense of expanding into a substantially different, unfamiliar market or industry. Rather, it has entered a market which adjoins, as it were, those markets in which it is already established, and which is virtually indistinguishable from them insofar as the problems and techniques of marketing the product to thé ultimate consumer are concérned. As a high official of Procter put it, commenting on the acquisition of Clorox, ‘While this is a completely new business for us, taking us for the first time into the marketing of a household bleach and disinfectant, we are thoroughly at home in the field of manufacturing and marketing low . priced, rapid turn-over consumer products.’ ” . 63 F. T. C. —, —.
The anticompetitive effects with which this product-extension merger is fraught can easily be seén: (1) the substitution of. the powerful acquiring firm for the smaller, but already dominant, firm, may substantially reduce the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively competing; (2) the acquisition eliminates the potential competition of. the acquiring firm.
The liquid bleach industry was already oligopolistic before the acquisition, and price competition was certainly not as vigorous as it would have been if the industry were competitive. Clorox enjoyed a dominant position nationally, and its position approached monopoly proportions in certain areas. The existence of some 200 fringe firms certainly does not belie that fact. Nor does the fact, relied upon by the court below, that, after the merger, producers other than Clorox “were selling more bleach for more money than ever before.” 358 F. 2d, at 80. In the same period, Clorox increased its share from 48.8% to 52%. The interjection of Procter into the market considerably changed the. situation. There is every reason to assume that the smaller firms would become more cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. It is. probable that Procter would -'tyecome the price leader and that oligopoly would become ^fnore rigid.
The acquisition may also have the tendency of raising the barriers to new entry. The major competitive weapon in the successful marketing of bleach is advertising. Clorox was limited in this area by its relatively , small budget and its inability to obtain substantial discounts. By contrast, Procter’s budget was much larger; and, although it would not devote its entire budget to advertising Clorox, it could divert a large portion to meet the short-term threat of a new entrant. Procter would be able to use its volume discounts to advantage in advertising Clorox. Thus, a new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox.
Possible economies cannot be used as a' defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, at 344.
The Commission also found that the acquisition of Clorox by Procter eliminated Procter as a potential competitor. The Court of Appeals declared that this finding was not supported by evidence because there was no evidence that Procter's management had ever intended to enter the industry independently and that Procter had never attempted to enter. The evidence, however, clearly shows that Procter was the most likely entrant. Procter had recently launched a new abrasive cleaner in' an industry similar to the liquid bleach industry, and had wrested leadership from a brand that had enjoyed even a larger market share than had Clorox. Procter was engaged in a vigorous program of diversifying into product lines closely related to its basic products. Liquid bleach was a natural avenue of diversification since it is •complementary to Procter’s products, is sold to the same customers through the same channels, and is advertised and merchandised in the same manner. Procter had sub- ' stantial advantages in advertising and sales promotion, which, as we have seen, are vital to the success of liquid bleach. No manufacturer had a patent on the product or its manufacture, necessary information relating to manufacturing methods and processes was readily available, there was no shortage of raw material, and the . machinery.and equipment required for a plant of efficient capacity were available at reasonable cost. Procter’s management was experienced in producing and marketing-goods similar to- liquid bleach. Procter had considered the possibility of independently entering but decided against it because the acquisition of Clorox would enable Procter to capture a more commanding share of the market.
It is clear that the existence of Procter at the edge of the industry exerted considerable influence on the market. First, the market behavior of the liquid bleach industry was influenced by each firm’s predictions. of the market behavior ■ of its competitors, actual and potential. Second, the barriers to entry by a firm of Procter’s size and with its advantages were not significant. • There is no indication that the barriers were so high that the price Procter would have to charge would be above the price that would maximize the profits of the existing firms. Third, the number of potential entrants was not so large that the elimination of one would be insignificant. Few firms would have the temerity to challenge a firm as solidly entrenched as Clorox. Fourth, Procter was found by the Commission to be the most likely entrant. These findings of the Commission were amply supported by the evidence.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm and enforce the
Commission’s order.
r. . , , It is so ordered.
Mb. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and ho corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of. the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”
A pure conglomerate merger is one in which there are no economic relationships between the acquiring and the acquired firm.
The barriers to entry have been raised both for entry by new firms and for entry into, new geographical markets by established firms. The latter aspect is demonstrated by Purex’s lesson in Erie, Pennsylvania. In October 1957, Purex selected Erie, Pennsylvania— where it had not sold previously — as an area in which to test the salability, under competitive conditions, of a new bleach. The leading brands in Erie were Clorox, with 52%, and the “101” brand, sold by Gardner Manufacturing Company, with 29% of the market. Purex launched an advertising and promotional campaign to obtain a broad distribution in a short time, and in five months captured 33% of the Erie market. Clorox’s share dropped to 35% and 101 ⅛ to 17%. Clorox responded by offering its bleach at reduced prices, and then added an offer of a $l-value ironing board cover for 500 with each purchase of Clorox at the reduced price. It also • increased its advertising with television spots. The result was to restore Clorox’s lost market share and, indeed, to increase it slightly. Purex’s share fell to 7%.
Since the merger Purex has acquired the fourth largest producer of bleach, John Puhl Products Company, which owned and marketed “Fleecy White” brand in geographic .markets which Purex was anxious to enter. One of the reasons for this acquisition, according to Purex’s president, was that:
“Purex had been unsuccessful in expanding its market position geographically on Purex liquid bleach. The economics of the bleach business, and the strong competitive factors as illustrated by our experience in Erie, Pennsylvania, make it impossible, in our judgment, for us to expand our market on liquid bleach.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
112
] | sc_respondent |
SEATTLE TIMES CO., dba THE SEATTLE TIMES, et al. v. RHINEHART et al.
No. 82-1721.
Argued February 21, 1984
Decided May 21, 1984
Evan L. Schwab argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were P. Cameron DeVore and Bruce E. H. Johnson.
Malcolm L. Edwards argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Charles K. Wiggins
James C. Goodale, John G. Koeltl, Burt Neuborne, Charles S. Sims, W. Terry Maguire, Anthony Epstein, Erwin G. Krasnow, Bruce W. Sanford, J. Laurent Scharff, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., and Donald F. Luke filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process.
I
Respondent Rhinehart is the spiritual leader of a religious group, the Aquarian Foundation. The Foundation has fewer than 1,000 members, most of whom live in the State of Washington. Aquarian beliefs include life after death and the ability to communicate with the dead through a medium. Rhinehart is the primary Aquarian medium.
In recent years, the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin have published stories about Rhinehart and the Foundation. Altogether 11 articles appeared in the newspapers during the years 1973, 1978, and 1979. The five articles that appeared in 1973 focused on Rhinehart and the manner in which he operated the Foundation. They described seances conducted by Rhinehart in which people paid him to put them in touch with deceased relatives and friends. The articles also stated that Rhinehart had sold magical “stones” that had been “expelled” from his body. One article referred to Rhinehart’s conviction, later vacated, for sodomy. The four articles that appeared in 1978 concentrated on an “extravaganza” sponsored by Rhinehart at the Walla Walla State Penitentiary. The articles stated that he had treated 1,100 inmates to a 6-hour-long show, during which he gave away between $35,000 and $50,000 in cash and prizes. One article described a “chorus line of girls [who] shed their gowns and bikinis and sang . . . .” App. 25a. The two articles that appeared in 1979 referred to a purported connection between Rhinehart and Lou Ferrigno, star of the popular television program, “The Incredible Hulk.”
Rhinehart brought this action in the Washington Superior Court on behalf of himself and the Foundation against the Seattle Times, the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin, the authors of the articles, and the spouses of the authors. Five female members of the Foundation who had participated in the presentation at the penitentiary joined the suit as plaintiffs. The complaint alleges that the articles contained statements that were “fictional and untrue,” and that the defendants— petitioners here — knew, or should have known, they were false. According to the complaint, the articles “did and were calculated to hold [Rhinehart] up to public scorn, hatred and ridicule, and to impeach his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, reputation as a person and in his profession as a spiritual leader.” Id., at 8a. With respect to the Foundation, the complaint also states: “[T]he articles have, or may have had, the effect of discouraging contributions by the membership and public and thereby diminished the financial ability of the Foundation to pursue its corporate purposes.” Id., at 9a. The complaint alleges that the articles misrepresented the role of the Foundation’s “choir” and falsely implied that female members of the Foundation had “stripped off all their clothes and wantonly danced naked . . . .” Id., at 6a. The complaint requests $14,100,000 in damages for the alleged defamation and invasions of privacy.
Petitioners filed an answer, denying many of the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses. Petitioners promptly initiated extensive discovery. They deposed Rhinehart, requested production of documents pertaining to the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and served extensive interrogatories on Rhinehart and the other respondents. Respondents turned over a number of financial documents, including several of Rhinehart’s income tax returns. Respondents refused, however, to disclose certain financial information, the identity of the Foundation’s donors during the preceding 10 years, and a list of its members during that period.
Petitioners filed a motion under the State’s Civil Rule 37 requesting an order compelling discovery. In their supporting memorandum, petitioners recognized that the principal issue as to discovery was respondents’ “refusa[l] to permit any effective inquiry into their financial affairs, such as the source of their donations, their financial transactions, uses of their wealth and assets, and their financial condition in general.” Record 350. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing in particular that compelled production of the identities of the Foundation’s donors and members would violate the First Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association. Respondents also moved for a protective order preventing petitioners from disseminating any information gained through discovery. Respondents noted that petitioners had stated their intention to continue publishing articles about respondents and this litigation, and their intent to use information gained through discovery in future articles.
In a lengthy ruling, the trial court initially granted the motion to compel and ordered respondents to identify all donors who made contributions during the five years preceding the date of the complaint, along with the amounts donated. The court also required respondents to divulge enough membership information to substantiate any claims of diminished membership. Relying on In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 598 F. 2d 176 (1979), the court refused to issue a protective order. It stated that the facts alleged by respondents in support of their motion for such an order were too conclusory to warrant a finding of “good cause” as required by Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(c). The court stated, however, that the denial of respondents’ motion was “without prejudice to [respondents’] right to move for a protective order in respect to specifically described discovery materials and a factual showing of good cause for restraining defendants in their use of those materials.” Record 16.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in which they renewed their motion for a protective order. They submitted affidavits of several Foundation members to support their request. The affidavits detailed a series of letters and telephone calls defaming the Foundation, its members, and Rhinehart — including several that threatened physical harm to those associated with the Foundation. The affiants also described incidents at the Foundation’s headquarters involving attacks, threats, and assaults directed at Foundation members by anonymous individuals and groups. In general, the affidavits averred that public release of the donor lists would adversely affect Foundation membership and income and would subject its members to additional harassment and reprisals.
Persuaded by these affidavits, the trial court issued a protective order covering all information obtained through the discovery process that pertained to “the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.” App. 65a. The order prohibited petitioners from publishing, disseminating, or using the information in any way except where necessary to prepare for and try the case. By its terms, the order did not apply to information gained by means other than the discovery process. In an accompanying opinion, the trial court recognized that the protective order would restrict petitioners’ right to publish information obtained by discovery, but the court reasoned that the restriction was necessary to avoid the “chilling effect” that dissemination would have on “a party’s willingness to bring his case to court.” Record 63.
Respondents appealed from the trial court’s production order, and petitioners appealed from the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both. 98 Wash. 2d 226, 654 P. 2d 673 (1982). With respect to the protective order, the court reasoned:
“Assuming then that a protective order may fall, ostensibly, at least, within the definition of a ‘prior restraint of . free expression’, we are convinced that the interest of the judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is sufficient to meet the ‘heavy burden’ of justification. The need to preserve that integrity is adequate to sustain a rule like CR 26(c) which authorizes a trial court to protect the confidentiality of information given for purposes of litigation.” Id., at 256, 654 P. 2d, at 690.
The court noted that “[t]he information to be discovered concerned the financial affairs of the plaintiff Rhinehart and his organization, in which he and his associates had a recognizable privacy interest; and the giving of publicity to these matters would allegedly and understandably result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression.” Id., at 256-257, 654 P. 2d, at 690. Therefore, the court concluded, the trial court had not abused its discretion in issuing the protective order.
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized that its holding conflicts with the holdings of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 257, 598 F. 2d 176 (1979), and applies a different standard from that of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F. 2d 108 (1981). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 464 U. S. 812 (1983). We affirm.
HH I — I H-l
Most States, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 179 (1977). Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” It further provides that discovery is not limited to matters that will be admissible at trial so long as the information sought “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 26(b)(1); Trust Fund Services v. Aro Glass Co., 89 Wash. 2d 758, 763, 575 P. 2d 716, 719 (1978); cf. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2008 (1970).
The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the Rules, the only express limitations are that the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties. If a litigant fails to comply with a request for discovery, the court may issue an order directing compliance that is enforceable by the court’s contempt powers. Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 37(b).
Petitioners argue that the First Amendment imposes strict limits on the availability of any judicial order that has the effect of restricting expression. They contend that civil discovery is not different from other sources of information, and that therefore the information is “protected speech” for First Amendment purposes. Petitioners assert the right in this-' case to disseminate any information gained through discovery. They do recognize that in limited circumstances, not thought to be present here, some information may be restrained. They submit, however:
“When a protective order seeks to limit expression, it may do so only if the proponent shows a compelling governmental interest. Mere speculation and conjecture are insufficient. Any restraining order, moreover, must be narrowly drawn and precise. Finally, before issuing such an order a court must determine that there are no alternatives which intrude less directly on expression.” Brief for Petitioners 10.
We think the rule urged by petitioners would impose an unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion of a trial court to oversee the discovery process.
<1
It is, of course, clear that information obtained through civil discovery authorized by modern rules of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court. In this case, as petitioners argue, there certainly is a public interest in knowing more about respondents. This interest may well include most — and possibly all — of what has been discovered as a result of the court’s order under Rule 26(b)(1). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a litigant has an unrestrained right to disseminate information that has been obtained through pretrial discovery. For even though the broad sweep of the First Amendment seems to prohibit all restraints on free expression, this Court has observed that “[f]reedom of speech . . . does not comprehend the right to speak on any subject at any time.” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 394-395 (1950).
The critical question that this case presents is whether a litigant’s freedom comprehends the right to disseminate information that he has obtained pursuant to a court order that both granted him access to that information and placed restraints on the way in which the information might be used. In addressing that question it is necessary to consider whether the “practice in question [furthers] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression” and whether “the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); see Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976).
A
At the outset, it is important to recognize the extent of the impairment of First Amendment rights that a protective order, such as the one at issue here, may cause. As in all civil litigation, petitioners gained the information they wish to disseminate only by virtue of the trial court’s discovery processes. As the Rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (“The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information”). Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations. See In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 287, 598 F. 2d, at 206-207 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Moreover, pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not open to the public at common law, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 389 (1979), and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. See id., at 396 (Burger, C. J., concurring); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1983). Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.
Finally, it is significant to note that an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 399 (Powell, J., concurring). As in this case, such a protective order prevents a party from disseminating only that information obtained through use of the discovery process. Thus, the party may disseminate the identical information covered by the protective order as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court’s processes. In sum, judicial limitations on a party’s ability to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicates the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context. Therefore, our consideration of the provision for protective orders contained in the Washington Civil Rules takes into account the unique position that such orders occupy in relation to the First Amendment.
B
Rule 26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Procunier, supra, at 413. The Washington Civil Rules enable parties to litigation to obtain information “relevant to the subject matter involved” that they believe will be helpful in the preparation and trial of the case. Rule 26, however, must be viewed in its entirety. Liberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Because of the liberality of pretrial discovery permitted by Rule 26(b)(1), it is necessary for the trial court to have the authority to issue protective orders conferred by Rule 26(c). It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse. This abuse is not limited to matters of delay and expense; discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties. The Rules do not distinguish between public and private information. Nor do they apply only to parties to the litigation, as relevant information in the hands of third parties may be subject to discovery.
There is an opportunity, therefore, for litigants to obtain— incidentally or purposefully — information that not only is irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to reputation and privacy. The government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of abuse of its processes. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 176-177 (1979); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U. S. 131, 145-146 (1888). As stated by Judge Friendly in International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963), “[w]hether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ... we have no question as to the court’s jurisdiction to do this under the inherent ‘equitable powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices’ ” (citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, supra). The prevention of the abuse that can attend the coerced production of information under a State’s discovery rule is sufficient justification for the authorization of protective orders.
C
We also find that the provision for protective orders in the Washington Rules requires, in itself, no heightened First Amendment scrutiny. To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required. The Legislature of the State of Washington, following the example of the Congress in its approval of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has determined that such discretion is necessary, and we find no reason to disagree. The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery. The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.
V
The facts in this case illustrate the concerns that justifiably may prompt a court to issue a protective order. As we have noted, the trial court’s order allowing discovery was extremely broad. It compelled respondents — among other things — to identify all persons who had made donations over a 5-year period to Rhinehart and the Aquarian Foundation, together with the amounts donated. In effect the order would compel disclosure of membership as well as sources of financial support. The Supreme Court of Washington found that dissemination of this information would “result in annoyance, embarrassment and even oppression.” 98 Wash. 2d, at 257, 654 P. 2d, at 690. It is sufficient for purposes of our decision that the highest court in the State found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order pursuant to a constitutional state law. We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a protective order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment.
The judgment accordingly is
Affirmed.
The record is unclear as to whether all five of the female plaintiffs participated in the “chorus line” described in the 1978 articles. The record also does not disclose whether any of the female plaintiffs were mentioned by name in the articles.
Although the complaint does not allege specifically that the articles caused a decline in membership of the Foundation, respondents’ answers to petitioners’ interrogatories raised this issue. In response to petitioners’ request that respondents explain the damages they are seeking, respondents claimed that the Foundation had experienced a drop in membership in Hawaii and Washington “from about 300 people to about 150 people, and [a] concurrent drop in contributions.” Record 503.
Affirmative defenses included contentions that the articles were substantially true and accurate, that they were privileged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that the statute of limitations had run as to the 1973 articles, that the individual respondents had consented to any invasions of privacy, and that respondents had no reasonable expectation of privacy when performing before 1,100 prisoners.
Rhinehart also refused to reveal the current address of his residence. He submitted an affidavit stating that he had relocated out of fear for his safety and that disclosure of his current address would subject him to risks of bodily harm. Petitioners promptly moved for an order compelling Rhinehart to give his address and the trial court granted the motion.
Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 37 provides in relevant part: “A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply to the court in the county where the deposition was taken, or in the county where the action is pending, for an order compelling discovery . . .
The Halkin decision was debated by the courts below. Prior to Halkin, the only Federal Court of Appeals to consider the question directly had understood that the First Amendment did not affect a trial court’s authority to restrict dissemination of information produced during pretrial discovery. See International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F. 2d 403, 407-408 (CA2 1963). Halkin considered the issue at length. Characterizing a protective order as a “paradigmatic prior restraint,” Halkin held that such orders require close scrutiny. The court also held that before a court should issue a protective order that restricts expression, it must be satisfied that “the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest which intrudes less directly on expression.” 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 272, 598 F. 2d, at 191 (footnotes omitted).
Rule 26(e) provides:
“Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the county where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court. ...”
Rule 26(c) is typical of the provisions adopted in many States.
The relevant portions of the protective order state:
“2. Plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order is granted with respect to information gained by the defendants through the use of all of the discovery processes regarding the financial affairs of the various plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of the various plaintiffs.
“3. The defendants and each of them shall make no use of and shall not disseminate the information defined in paragraph 2 which is gained through discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering party to prepare and try the case. As a result, information gained by a defendant through the discovery process may not be published by any of the defendants or made available to any news media for publication or dissemination. This protective order has no application except to information gained by the defendants through the use of the discovery processes.” App. 65a.
Although the Washington Supreme Court assumed, arguendo, that a protective order could be viewed as an infringement on First Amendment rights, the court also stated:
“A persuasive argument can be made that when persons are required to give information which they would otherwise be entitled to keep to themselves, in order to secure a government benefit or perform an obligation to that government, those receiving that information waive the right to use it for any purpose except those which are authorized by the agency of government which exacted the information.” 98 Wash. 2d, at 239, 654 P. 2d, at 681.
The Washington Supreme Court also held that, because the protective order shields respondents from “abuse of the discovery privilege,” respondents could not object to the order compelling production. We do not consider here that aspect of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision.
See n. 6, supra.
In San Juan Star, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered and rejected Halkin’s approach to the constitutionality of protective orders. Although the San Juan court held that protective orders may implicate First Amendment interests, the court reasoned that such interests are somewhat lessened in the civil discovery context. The court stated: “In general, then, we find the appropriate measure of such limitations in a standard of ‘good cause’ that incorporates a ‘heightened sensitivity’ to the First Amendment concerns at stake . . . .” 662 F. 2d, at 116.
The holding of the Supreme Court of Washington is consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in International Products Corp. v. Koons 326 F. 2d, at 407-408.
See Bushman v. New Holland Division, 83 Wash. 2d 429, 433, 618 P. 2d 1078, 1080 (1974). The Washington Supreme Court has stated that when the language of a Washington Rule and its federal counterpart are the same, courts should look to decisions interpreting the Federal Rule for guidance. American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 81 Wash. 2d 34, 37-38, 499 P. 2d 869, 871 (1972). The Washington Rule that provides for the scope of civil discovery and the issuance of protective orders is virtually identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rules 26(b) and (c) with Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26(b) and (c).
Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(1), identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) in effect at the time, provides in full:
“In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
Under Rules 30 and 31, a litigant may depose a third party by oral or written examination. The litigant can compel the third party to be deposed and to produce tangible evidence at the deposition by serving the third party with a subpoena pursuant to Rule 45. Rule 45(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to quash or modify a subpoena of tangible evidence “if it is unreasonable and oppressive.” Rule 45(f) provides: “Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued.”
In addition to its contempt power, Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a trial court to enforce an order compelling discovery by other means including, for example, regarding designated facts as established for purposes of the action. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A).
Although litigants do not “surrender their First Amendment rights at the courthouse door,” In re Halkin, 194 U. S. App. D. C., at 268, 598 F. 2d, at 186, those rights may be subordinated to other interests that arise in this setting. For instance, on several occasions this Court has approved restriction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal defendant. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 563 (1976); id., at 601, and n. 27 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U. S. 308, 310-311 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 361 (1966). “In the conduct of a case, a court often finds it necessary to restrict the free expression of participants, including counsel, witnesses, and jurors.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 104, n. 21 (1981).
Discovery rarely takes place in public. Depositions are scheduled at times and places most convenient to those involved. Interrogatories are answered in private. Rules of Civil Procedure may require parties to file with the clerk of the court interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admissions, and deposition transcripts. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 5(d). Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily provide that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed or that they be filed under seal. See ibid.; Wash. Super. Ct. Civ. Rule 26(c). Federal district courts may adopt local rules providing that the fruits of discovery are not to be filed except on order of the court. See, e. g., C. D. Cal. Rule 8.3; S. D. N. Y. Civ. Rule 19. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could serve as a source of public information, access to that source customarily is subject to the control of the trial court.
See Comments of the Advisory Committee on the 1983 Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26, 28 U. S. C. App., pp. 729-730 (1982 ed., Supp. I). In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153 (1979), the Court observed: “There have been repeated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. But until and unless there are major changes in the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse.” Id., at 176-177 (footnote omitted); see also id., at 179 (Powell, J., concurring). But abuses of the Rules by litigants, and sometimes the inadequate oversight of discovery by trial courts, do not in any respect lessen the importance of discovery in civil litigation and the government’s substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the discovery process.
Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 488-491 (1975). Rule 26(c) includes among its express purposes the protection of a “party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.” Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.
The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the importance of ensuring that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the courts: “[A]s the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted publicity, individuals may well forgo the pursuit of their just claims. The judicial system will thus have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that the people will be reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a right as valuable as that of speech itself.” 98 Wash. 2d 226, 254, 654 P. 2d 673, 689 (1982). Cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U. S. 508, 510 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 429-431 (1963).
In addition, heightened First Amendment scrutiny of each request for a protective order would necessitate burdensome evidentiary findings and could lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals, as this case illustrates. See, e. g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (ED Pa. 1981).
It is apparent that substantial government interests were implicated. Respondents, in requesting the protective order, relied upon the rights of privacy and religious association. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Washington also emphasized that the right of persons to resort to the courts for redress of grievances would have been “chilled.” See n. 22, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
157
] | sc_casesource |
PILOT LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. DEDEAUX
No. 85-1043.
Argued January 21, 1987
Decided April 6, 1987
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John E. Nolan, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on.the briefs were Paul J. Ondrasik, Jr., Antonia B. Ianniello, George F. Woodliff III, and David L. Bacon.
William C. Walker, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William L. Denton.
Erwin N. Griswold, Jack H. Blaine, Phillip E. Stano, and John P. Dineen filed a brief for the American Council of Life Insurance et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Christopher J. Wright, George R. Salem, and Allen H. Feldman filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq., pre-empts state common law tort and contract actions asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan.
I
In March 1975, in Gulfport, Mississippi, respondent Everate W. Dedeaux injured his back in an accident related to his employment for Entex, Inc. (Entex). Entex had at this time a long term disability employee benefit plan established by purchasing a group insurance policy from petitioner, Pilot Life Insurance Co. (Pilot Life). Entex collected and matched its employees’ contributions to the plan and forwarded those funds to Pilot Life; the employer also provided forms to its employees for processing disability claims, and forwarded completed forms to Pilot Life. Pilot Life bore the responsibility of determining who would receive disability benefits. Although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 1975 accident, Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years. During the following three years Dedeaux’s benefits were reinstated and terminated by Pilot Life several times.
In 1980, Dedeaux instituted a diversity action against Pilot Life in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Dedeaux’s complaint contained three counts: “Tortious Breach of Contract”; “Breach of Fiduciary Duties”; and “Fraud in the Inducement.” App. 18-23. Dedeaux sought “[djamages for failure to provide benefits under the insurance policy in a sum to be determined at the time of trial,” “[gjeneral damages for mental and emotional distress and other incidental damages in the sum of $250,000.00,” and “[pjunitive and exemplary damages in the sum of $500,000.00.” Id., at 23-24. Dedeaux did not assert any of the several causes of action available to him under ERISA, see infra, at 53.
At the close of discovery, Pilot Life moved for summary judgment, arguing that ERISA pre-empted Dedeaux’s common law claim for failure to pay benefits on the group insurance policy. The District Court granted Pilot Life summary judgment, finding all Dedeaux’s claims pre-empted. App. to Pet. Cert. 16a.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, primarily on the basis of this Court’s decision in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724 (1985). See 770 F. 2d 1311 (1985). We granted certiorari, 478 U. S. 1004 (1986), and now reverse.
II
In ERISA, Congress set out to
“protect . . . participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.” §2, as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1001(b).
ERISA comprehensively regulates, among other things, employee welfare benefit plans that, “through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,” provide medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, or death. § 3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1).
Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation:
“Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” § 514(a), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (pre-emption clause).
“Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” § 514(b)(2)(A), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (saving clause).
“Neither an employee benefit plan . . . nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.” § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b) (2)(B) (deemer clause).
To summarize the pure mechanics of the provisions quoted above: If a state law “relate[s] to . . . employee benefit plan[s],” it is pre-empted. § 514(a). The saving clause excepts from the pre-emption clause laws that “regulat[e] insurance.” § 514(b)(2)(A). The deemer clause makes clear that a state law that “purport[s] to regulate insurance” cannot deem an employee benefit plan to be an insurance company. § 514(b)(2)(B).
“[T]he question whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent. ‘ “The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”’” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S. 202, 208 (1985), quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978), quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963). We have observed in the past that the express preemption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to “establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.” Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 523 (1981). As we explained in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 98 (1983):
“The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited pre-emption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected those provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that section’s preemptive scope was as broad as its language. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1090, p. 383 (1974).”
The House and Senate sponsors emphasized both the breadth and importance of the pre-emption provisions. Representative Dent described the “reservation to Federal authority [of] the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans” as ERISA’s “crowning achievement.” 120 Cong. Rec. 29197 (1974). Senator Williams said:
“It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law.” Id., at 29933.
See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 99-100, n. 20 (describing remarks of Sen. Javits).
In Metropolitan Life, this Court, noting that the preemption and saving clauses “perhaps are not a model of legislative drafting,” 471 U. S., at 739, interpreted these clauses in relation to a Massachusetts statute that required minimum mental health care benefits to be provided Massachusetts residents covered by general health insurance policies. The appellants in Metropolitan Life argued that the state statute, • as applied to insurance policies purchased by employee health care plans regulated by ERISA, was pre-empted.
The Court concluded, first, that the Massachusetts statute did “relate to . . . employee benefit plants],” thus placing the state statute within the broad sweep of the pre-emption clause, § 514(a). Metropolitan Life, supra, at 739. However, the Court held that, because the state statute was one that “regulate[d] insurance,” the saving clause prevented the state law from being pre-empted. In determining whether the Massachusetts statute regulated insurance, the Court was guided by case law interpreting the phrase “business of insurance” in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq.
Given the “statutory complexity” of ERISA’s three preemption provisions, Metropolitan Life, supra, at 740, as well as the wide variety of state statutory and decisional law arguably affected by the federal pre-emption provisions, it is not surprising that we are again called on to interpret these provisions.
Ill
There is no dispute that the common law causes of action asserted in Dedeaux’s complaint “relate to” an employee benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA’s express preemption clause, § 514(a). In both Metropolitan Life, supra, and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, at 96-100, we noted the expansive sweep of the pre-emption clause. In both cases “[t]he phrase ‘relate to’ was given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law ‘relatéis] to’ a benefit plan ‘in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.’” Metropolitan Life, supra, at 739, quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 97. In particular we have emphasized that the preemption clause is not limited to “state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, supra, at 98. The common law causes of action raised in Dedeaux’s complaint, each based on alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, undoubtedly meet the criteria for pre-emption under § 514(a).
Unless these common law causes of action fall under an exception to § 514(a), therefore, they are expressly pre-empted. Although Dedeaux’s complaint pleaded several state common law causes of action, before this Court Dedeaux has described only one of the three counts — called “tortious breach of contract” in the complaint, and “the Mississippi law of bad faith” in respondent’s brief — as protected from the preemptive effect of § 514(a). The Mississippi law of bad faith, Dedeaux argues, is a law “which regulates insurance,” and thus is saved from pre-emption by § 514(b)(2)(A).
In Metropolitan Life, we were guided by several considerations in determining whether a state law falls under the saving clause. First, we took what guidance was available from a “common-sense view” of the language of the saving clause itself. 471 U. S., at 740. Second, we made use of the case law interpreting the phrase “business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq., in interpreting the saving clause. Three criteria have been used to determine whether a practice falls under the “business of insurance” for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act:
“[FJirst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.” Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U. S. 119, 129 (1982) (emphasis in original).
In the present case, the considerations weighed in Metropolitan Life argue against the assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith is a state law that “regulates insurance.”
As early as 1915 the Mississippi Supreme Court had recognized that punitive damages were available in a contract case when “the act or omission constituting the breach of the contract amounts also to the commission of a tort.” See Hood v. Moffett, 109 Miss. 757, 767, 69 So. 664, 666 (1915) (involving a physician’s breach of a contract to attend to a woman at her approaching “accouchement”). In American Railway Express Co. v. Bailey, 142 Miss. 622, 631, 107 So. 761, 763 (1926), a case involving a failure of a finance company to deliver to the plaintiff the correct amount of money cabled to the plaintiff through the finance company’s offices, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that punitive damages could be available when the breach of contract was “attended by some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or gross negligence, which amounts to an independent tort.” In Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239 (1977), the Mississippi Supreme Court, citing D. L. Fair Lamber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944) (breach of contract was accompanied by “the breaking down and destruction of another’s fence”), American Railway Express Co. v. Bailey, supra, and Hood v. Moffett, supra, upheld an award of punitive damages against a defendant insurance company for failure to pay on a credit life policy. Since Veal, the Mississippi Supreme Court has considered a large number of cases in which plaintiffs have sought punitive damages from insurance companies for failure to pay a claim under an insurance contract, and in a great many of these cases the court has used the identical formulation, first stated in Bailey, of what must “attend” the breach of contract in order for punitive damages to be recoverable. See, e. g., Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 902 (1986); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242, 248 (1985); Consolidated American Life Ins. Co. v. Toche, 410 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (1982); Gulf Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 389 So. 2d 920, 922 (1980); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 379 So. 2d 321, 322 (1980); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Smith, 357 So. 2d 119, 121 (1978); Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Crews, 341 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (1977). Recently the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that “[w]e have come to term an insurance carrier which refuses to pay a claim when there is no reasonably arguable basis to deny it as acting in ‘bad faith,’ and a lawsuit based upon such an arbitrary refusal as a ‘bad faith’ cause of action.” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mississippi, Inc. v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d 833, 842 (1984).
Certainly a common-sense understanding of the phrase “regulates insurance” does not support the argument that the Mississippi law of bad faith falls under the saving clause. A common-sense view of the word “regulates” would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically directed toward that industry. Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of contract, and not merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under Mississippi law.
Neither do the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors support the assertion that the Mississippi law of bad faith “regulates insurance.” Unlike the mandated-benefits law at issue in Metropolitan Life, the Mississippi common law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of policyholder risk. The state common law of bad faith may be said to concern “the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.” The connection to the insurer-insured relationship is attenuated at best, however. In contrast to the mandated-benefits law in Metropolitan Life, the common law of bad faith does not define the terms of the relationship between the insurer and the insured; it declares only that, whatever terms have been agreed upon in the insurance contract, a breach of that contract may in certain circumstances allow the policyholder to obtain punitive damages. The state common law of bad faith is therefore no more “integral” to the insurer-insured relationship than any State’s general contract law is integral to a contract made in that State. Finally, as we have just noted, Mississippi’s law of bad faith, even if associated with the insurance industry, has developed from general principles of tort and contract law available in any Mississippi breach of contract case. Cf. Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F. 2d 1358 (CA10 1971) (general state arbitration statutes do not regulate the business of insurance under the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., 408 F. 2d 606 (CA2 1969) (same). Accordingly, the Mississippi common law of bad faith at most meets one of the three criteria used to identify the “business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and used in Metropolitan Life to identify laws that “regulat[e] insurance” under the saving clause.
In the present case, moreover, we are obliged in interpreting the saving clause to consider not only the factors by which we were guided in Metropolitan Life, but also the role of the saving clause in ERISA as a whole. On numerous occasions we have noted that “““[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.””” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U. S. 36, 43 (1986), quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U. S. 207, 221 (1986) (quoting Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270, 285 (1956) (in turn quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849))). Because in this case, the state cause of action seeks remedies for the improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan, our understanding of the saving clause must be informed by the legislative intent concerning the civil enforcement provisions provided by ERISA § 502(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a).
The Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, argues that Congress clearly expressed an intent that the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA § 502(a) be the exclusive vehicle for actions by ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits, and that varying state causes of action for claims within the scope of § 502(a) would pose an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18-19. We agree. The conclusion that § 502(a) was intended to be exclusive is supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history in which Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of § 502(a) was modeled on the exclusive remedy provided by §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U. S. C. § 185.
The civil enforcement scheme of § 502(a) is one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated purposes of ERISA. The civil enforcement scheme is sandwiched between two other ERISA provisions relevant to enforcement of ERISA and to the processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan. Section 501, 29 U. S. C. § 1131, authorizes criminal penalties for violations of the reporting and disclosure provisions of ERISA. Section 503, 29 U. S. C. § 1133, requires every employee benefit plan to comply with Department of Labor regulations on giving notice to any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits has been denied, and affording a reasonable opportunity for review of the decision denying the claim. Under the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a), a plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to enforce the participant’s rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan administrator’s improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or beneficiary may also bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and under this cause of action may seek removal of the fiduciary. §§ 502(a)(2), 409. In an action under these civil enforcement provisions, the court in its discretion may allow an award of attorney’s fees to either party. § 502(g). See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U. S. 134, 147 (1985). In Russell, we concluded that ERISA’s breach of fiduciary duty provision, § 409(a), 29 U. S. C. § 1109(a), provided no express authority for an award of punitive damages to a beneficiary. Moreover, we declined to find an implied cause of action for punitive damages in that section, noting that “ ‘[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement.’” Russell, supra, at 147, quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 97 (1981). Our examination of these provisions made us “reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.” Russell, supra, at 147.
In sum, the detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans. The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. “The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted . . . provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.” Russell, supra, at 146 (emphasis in original).
The deliberate care with which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the civil enforcement provision. The legislative history demonstrates that the pre-emptive force of § 502(a) was modeled after § 301 of the LMRA.
The Conference Report on ERISA describing the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) says:
“Under the conference agreement, civil actions may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits due under the plan, to clarify rights to receive future benefits under the plan, and for relief from breach of fiduciary responsibility. . . . [W]ith respect to suits to enforce benefit rights under the plan or to recover benefits under the plan which do not involve application of the title I provisions, they may be brought not only in U. S. district courts but also in State courts of competent jurisdiction. All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section SOI of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 191ft ” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 327 (1974) (emphasis added).
Congress was well aware that the powerful pre-emptive force of § 301 of the LMRA displaced all state actions for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization, even when the state action purported to authorize a remedy unavailable under the federal provision. Section 301 pre-empts any “state-law claim [whose resolution] is substantially dependent upon the analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U. S., at 220. As we observed in Allis-Chalmers, the broad pre-emptive effect of §301 was first analyzed in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 (1962). In Lucas Flour the Court found that “[t]he dimensions of §301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute.” Id., at 103. “[I]n enacting §301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.” Id., at 104. Indeed, for purposes of determining federal jurisdiction, this Court has singled out §301 of the LMRA as having “pre-emptive force ... so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ‘for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.’ Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law . . . .” Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 23 (1983), referring to Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U. S. 557 (1968).
Congress’ specific reference to § 301 of the LMRA to describe the civil enforcement scheme of ERISA makes clear its intention that all suits brought by beneficiaries or participants asserting improper processing of claims under ERISA-regulated plans be treated as federal questions governed by § 502(a). See also H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, p. 12 (1973), reprinted in 2 Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of ERISA, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 2359 (Comm. Print 1976) (“The uniformity of decision which the Act is designed to foster will help administrators, fiduciaries and participants to predict the legality of proposed actions without the necessity of reference to varying state laws”); 120 Cong. Rec. 29933 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams) (suits involving claims for benefits “will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act”); id., at 29942 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (“[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans”). The expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire comparison of ERISA’s § 502(a) to § 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies available to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under § 502(a) could be supplemented or supplanted by varying state laws.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S., at 746, this Court rejected an interpretation of the saving clause of ERISA’s express pre-emption provisions, § 514(b) (2)(A), 29 U. S. C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), that saved from pre-eruption “only state regulations unrelated to the substantive provisions of ERISA,” finding that “[njothing in the language, structure, or legislative history of the Act” supported this reading of the saving clause. Metropolitan Life, however, did not involve a state law that conflicted with a substantive provision of ERISA. Therefore the Court’s general observation — that state laws related to ERISA may also fall' under the saving clause — was not focused on any particular relationship or conflict between a substantive provision of ERISA and a state law. In particular, the Court had no occasion to consider in Metropolitan Life the question raised in the present case: whether Congress might clearly express, through the structure and legislative history of a particular substantive provision of ERISA, an intention that the federal remedy provided by that provision displace state causes of action. Our resolution of this different question does not conflict with the Court’s earlier general observations in Metropolitan Life.
Considering the common-sense understanding of the saving clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act factors defining the business of insurance, and, most importantly, the clear expression of congressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme be exclusive, we conclude that Dedeaux’s state law suit asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated plan is not saved by § 514(b)(2)(A), and therefore is pre-empted by § 514(a). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Decisional law that “regulates insurance” may fall under the saving clause. The saving clause, § 514(b)(2)(A), covers “any law of any State.” For purposes of § 514, “[t]he term ‘State law’ includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.” 29 U. S. C. §§ 1144(e)(1) and (2).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides, in relevant part: “The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” 15 U. S. C. § 1012(a).
Section 502(a), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a), provides:
“A civil action may be brought—
“(1) by a participant or beneficiary—
“(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section [concerning requests to the administrator for information], or
“(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
“(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title [breach of fiduciary duty];
“(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
“(4) by the Secretary, or by a participant, or beneficiary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation of 1025(e) of this title [information to be furnished to participants];
“(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this subsection, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subehapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any provision of this subchapter;
“(6) by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under subsection (i) of this section.”
Because we conclude that Dedeaux’s state common law claims fall under the ERISA pre-emption clause and are not rescued by the saving clause, we need, not reach petitioner’s argument that when an insurance company is engaged in the processing and review of claims for benefits under an employee benefit plan, it is acting in place of the plan’s trustees and should be protected from direct state regulation by the deemer clause. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
73
] | sc_respondent |
DALLAS COUNTY, ALABAMA, et al. v. REESE ET AL.
No. 74-1077.
Decided May 19, 1975
Per Curiam.
Appellees are residents of the city of Selma, Ala., who brought this action to challenge the system by which members of the Dallas County, Ala., Commission are elected. The system, which is established by a state statute, provides for countywide balloting for each of the four commission members, but requires that a member be elected from each of four residency districts. Appellees’ constitutional claim was premised on the fact that the populations of the four districts vary widely, with the result that only one resident of the city of Selma can be a member of the commission, although the city contains about one-half of the county’s population.
After extensive discovery, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama entered summary judgment for appellants, Dallas County and the members of the Dallas County Commission. The court relied heavily on our decision in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112 (1967), and concluded:
,“[T]he fundamental principle of representative government has been fulfilled in that each County Commissioner’s tenure depends upon the vote of the qualified voters from the countywide electorate. This fact alone requires each County Commissioner to represent the county and not his own residential area.” Jurisdictional Statement 15-16.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the case en banc and reversed, 8-6. 505 F. 2d 879 (1974). The majority concluded that the unequal residency districts diluted the votes of city residents, and that the resulting discrimination was invidious. .It distinguished Dusch on the basis of the particular facts of that- case, which involved seven council members elected from unequal residency boroughs, and four council members who could live anywhere in the city; according to the Court of Appeals, the effect was to assure that a majority of the 11-man council could not be assembled without the cooperation of either one “representative” of the heavily populated boroughs or of one member of unrestricted residency. In the present case, on the other hand, the structure of the commission is such that the three commissioners who reside outside of Selma can control the commission, even though they “represent” only a slight majority of the population. The dissenters in the Court of Appeals thought that Dusch controlled. We agree, and reverse the Court of Appeals.
Dusch reaffirmed the principle enunciated in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438 (1965), that when an official's “tenure depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district.” Because the districts in the present plan are used “merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation,” ibid.; Dusch v. Davis, supra, at 115, each commissioner represents the citizens of the entire county and not merely those of the district in which he resides. We think that this teaching of Dusch and of Fortson v. Dorsey was all but ignored by the Court of Appeals, which chose instead to focus on a factual element of Dusch which was accorded absolutely no significance in the opinion in that case. Nor do we understand what significance could be attached to the presence of council members subject to no residence requirement, given the basic teaching that elected officials represent all of those who elect them, and not merely those who are their neighbors.
The Court of Appeals was, of course, correct in recognizing that Dusch does not entirely insulate a plan such as this from constitutional attack. As that opinion noted: “If a borough’s resident on the council represented in fact only the borough, . . . different conclusions might follow.” 387 U. S., at 116. Similarly, in Dusch we approvingly quoted a portion of the District Court’s opinion, including the following passage:
“ ‘As the plan becomes effective, if it then operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population, it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.’ ” Id., at 117.
We think it clear, however, that Dusch contemplated that a successful attack raising such a constitutional question must be based on findings in a particular case that a plan in fact operates impermissibly to dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population. Rather than basing its decision on a factual conelusion of this sort, the Court of Appeals relied on a theoretical presumption to reach its determination that residents of Selma were victims of invidious discrimination. That theoretical presumption is that elected officials will represent the districts in which they reside rather than the electorate which chooses them. But that is precisely the proposition rejected in Dusch.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Act No. 328, § 6, Acts of Alabama (Feb. 8, 1901) (as amended). Our appellate jurisdiction is based on 28 U. S. C. §1254(2).
The Judge of Probate of Dallas County is ex officio chairman of the commission, and votes in the case of a tie vote among the commissioners. He is elected by countywide ballot and may reside anywhere within the county.
As shown by the 1970 official census, the population of each of the residency districts is as follows:
City of Selma................................. 27,379
West ......................................... 6,209
South ........................................ 14,203
Fork ......................................... 7,505
Judge Bell concurred in part and dissented in part. He would have remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of invidious discrimination.
In fashioning this distinction of Dusch, the Fifth Circuit relied on a prior decision of a panel of that court, Keller v. Gilliam, 454 F. 2d 55 (1972). According to the Court of Appeals, and for the reasons stated in the text, “[i]n Keller, as in the present case, preserving majority rule was not possible, and the plan was struck down.” 505 F. 2d 879, 885 (1974).
Given the populations of the four residence districts, see n. 3, supra, it is difficult to understand how the Fifth Circuit’s distinction of Dusch is applicable even to the facts of this case. According to the 1970 census, the city district has a population of 27,379, while the three rural districts have a combined population of 27,917. Thus should the commissioners who reside in the rural districts vote together, their control of the commission does in fact reflect their "representation” of a majority of the county’s population. Nor is it possible in any other fashion to obtain a majority of the commission without the votes of either commissioners “representing” a majority of the county’s population or of the Judge of Probate whose residency is unrestricted. These facts have no bearing on our disposition of this ease, but they do seem to be inconsistent with the rationale on which the Court of Appeals based its decision. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
33
] | sc_caseorigin |
Andrew KISELA
v.
Amy HUGHES.
No. 17-467.
Supreme Court of the United States
April 2, 2018.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Andrew Kisela, a police officer in Tucson, Arizona, shot respondent Amy Hughes. Kisela and two other officers had arrived on the scene after hearing a police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife. They had been there but a few minutes, perhaps just a minute. When Kisela fired, Hughes was holding a large kitchen knife, had taken steps toward another woman standing nearby, and had refused to drop the knife after at least two commands to do so. The question is whether at the time of the shooting Kisela's actions violated clearly established law.
The record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, shows the following.
In May 2010, somebody in Hughes' neighborhood called 911 to report that a woman was hacking a tree with a kitchen knife. Kisela and another police officer, Alex Garcia, heard about the report over the radio in their patrol car and responded. A few minutes later the person who had called 911 flagged down the officers; gave them a description of the woman with the knife; and told them the woman had been acting erratically. About the same time, a third police officer, Lindsay Kunz, arrived on her bicycle.
Garcia spotted a woman, later identified as Sharon Chadwick, standing next to a car in the driveway of a nearby house. A chain-link fence with a locked gate separated Chadwick from the officers. The officers then saw another woman, Hughes, emerge from the house carrying a large knife at her side. Hughes matched the description of the woman who had been seen hacking a tree. Hughes walked toward Chadwick and stopped no more than six feet from her.
All three officers drew their guns. At least twice they told Hughes to drop the knife. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Hughes, Chadwick said "take it easy" to both Hughes and the officers. Hughes appeared calm, but she did not acknowledge the officers' presence or drop the knife. The top bar of the chain-link fence blocked Kisela's line of fire, so he dropped to the ground and shot Hughes four times through the fence. Then the officers jumped the fence, handcuffed Hughes, and called paramedics, who transported her to a hospital. There she was treated for non-life-threatening injuries. Less than a minute had transpired from the moment the officers saw Chadwick to the moment Kisela fired shots.
All three of the officers later said that at the time of the shooting they subjectively believed Hughes to be a threat to Chadwick. After the shooting, the officers discovered that Chadwick and Hughes were roommates, that Hughes had a history of mental illness, and that Hughes had been upset with Chadwick over a $20 debt. In an affidavit produced during discovery, Chadwick said that a few minutes before the shooting her boyfriend had told her Hughes was threatening to kill Chadwick's dog, named Bunny. Chadwick "came home to find" Hughes "somewhat distressed," and Hughes was in the house holding Bunny "in one hand and a kitchen knife in the other." Hughes asked Chadwick if she "wanted [her] to use the knife on the dog." The officers knew none of this, though. Chadwick went outside to get $20 from her car, which is when the officers first saw her. In her affidavit Chadwick said that she did not feel endangered at any time. Ibid. Based on her experience as Hughes' roommate, Chadwick stated that Hughes "occasionally has episodes in which she acts inappropriately," but "she is only seeking attention." 2 Record 108.
Hughes sued Kisela under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 862 F.3d 775 (2016).
The Court of Appeals first held that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, was sufficient to demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 782. The court next held that the violation was clearly established because, in its view, the constitutional violation was obvious and because of Circuit precedent that the court perceived to be analogous. Id., at 785. Kisela filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Over the dissent of seven judges, the Court of Appeals denied it. Kisela then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court. That petition is now granted.
In one of the first cases on this general subject, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Court addressed the constitutionality of the police using force that can be deadly. There, the Court held that "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Id., at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694.
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), the Court held that the question whether an officer has used excessive force "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Ibid. And "[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Id., at 396-397, 109 S.Ct. 1865.
Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment when he used deadly force against Hughes. For even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred-a proposition that is not at all evident-on these facts Kisela was at least entitled to qualified immunity.
"Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam ) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam ).
Although "this Court's caselaw does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." White, 580 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 551 (internal quotation marks omitted). "In other words, immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has " 'repeatedly told courts-and the Ninth Circuit in particular-not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.' " City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775-1776, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ); see also Brosseau, supra, at 198-199, 125 S.Ct. 596.
"[S]pecificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Use of excessive force is an area of the law "in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case," and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent "squarely governs" the specific facts at issue. Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 309 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis deleted). Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise "hazy border between excessive and acceptable force" and thereby provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful. Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Of course, general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers." White, 580 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the general rules set forth in "Garner and Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside an 'obvious case.' " Ibid. Where constitutional guidelines seem inapplicable or too remote, it does not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An officer "cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it." Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014). That is a necessary part of the qualified-immunity standard, and it is a part of the standard that the Court of Appeals here failed to implement in a correct way.
Kisela says he shot Hughes because, although the officers themselves were in no apparent danger, he believed she was a threat to Chadwick. Kisela had mere seconds to assess the potential danger to Chadwick. He was confronted with a woman who had just been seen hacking a tree with a large kitchen knife and whose behavior was erratic enough to cause a concerned bystander to call 911 and then flag down Kisela and Garcia. Kisela was separated from Hughes and Chadwick by a chain-link fence; Hughes had moved to within a few feet of Chadwick; and she failed to acknowledge at least two commands to drop the knife. Those commands were loud enough that Chadwick, who was standing next to Hughes, heard them. This is far from an obvious case in which any competent officer would have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate the Fourth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals made additional errors in concluding that its own precedent clearly established that Kisela used excessive force. To begin with, "even if a controlling circuit precedent could constitute clearly established law in these circumstances, it does not do so here." Sheehan, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1776. In fact, the most analogous Circuit precedent favors Kisela. See Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110 (C.A.9 2005). In Blanford, the police responded to a report that a man was walking through a residential neighborhood carrying a sword and acting in an erratic manner. Id., at 1112. There, as here, the police shot the man after he refused their commands to drop his weapon (there, as here, the man might not have heard the commands). Id., at 1113. There, as here, the police believed (perhaps mistakenly), that the man posed an immediate threat to others. Ibid. There, the Court of Appeals determined that the use of deadly force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 1119. Based on that decision, a reasonable officer could have believed the same thing was true in the instant case.
In contrast, not one of the decisions relied on by the Court of Appeals- Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (C.A.9 2001), Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864 (C.A.9 2011), and Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (C.A.9 1997) -supports denying Kisela qualified immunity. As for Deorle, this Court has already instructed the Court of Appeals not to read its decision in that case too broadly in deciding whether a new set of facts is governed by clearly established law. Sheehan, 572 U.S., at ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1775-1777. Deorle involved a police officer who shot an unarmed man in the face, without warning, even though the officer had a clear line of retreat; there were no bystanders nearby; the man had been "physically compliant and generally followed all the officers' instructions"; and he had been under police observation for roughly 40 minutes. 272 F.3d, at 1276, 1281-1282. In this case, by contrast, Hughes was armed with a large knife; was within striking distance of Chadwick; ignored the officers' orders to drop the weapon; and the situation unfolded in less than a minute. "Whatever the merits of the decision in Deorle, the differences between that case and the case before us leap from the page." Sheehan, supra, at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1776.
Glenn, which the panel described as "[t]he most analogous Ninth Circuit case," 862 F.3d, at 783, was decided after the shooting at issue here. Thus, Glenn "could not have given fair notice to [Kisela]" because a reasonable officer is not required to foresee judicial decisions that do not yet exist in instances where the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are far from obvious. Brosseau, 543 U.S., at 200, n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 596. Glenn was therefore "of no use in the clearly established inquiry." Brosseau, supra, at 200, n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 596. Other judges brought this mistaken or misleading citation to the panel's attention while Kisela's petition for rehearing en banc was pending before the Court of Appeals. 862 F.3d, at 795, n. 2 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The panel then amended its opinion, but nevertheless still attempted to "rely on Glenn as illustrative, not as indicative of the clearly established law in 2010." Id., at 784, n. 2 (majority opinion). The panel failed to explain the difference between "illustrative" and "indicative" precedent, and none is apparent.
The amended opinion also asserted, for the first time and without explanation, that the Court of Appeals' decision in Harris clearly established that the shooting here was unconstitutional. Id., at 785. The new mention of Harris replaced a reference in the panel's first opinion to Glenn -the case that postdated the shooting at issue here. Compare 841 F.3d 1081, 1090 (C.A.9 2016) ("As indicated by Glenn and Deorle, ... that right was clearly established"), with 862 F.3d, at 785 ("As indicated by Deorle and Harris, ... that right was clearly established").
The panel's reliance on Harris "does not pass the straight-face test." 862 F.3d, at 797 (opinion of Ikuta, J.). In Harris, the Court of Appeals determined that an FBI sniper, who was positioned safely on a hilltop, used excessive force when he shot a man in the back while the man was retreating to a cabin during what has been referred to as the Ruby Ridge standoff. 126 F.3d, at 1202-1203. Suffice it to say, a reasonable police officer could miss the connection between the situation confronting the sniper at Ruby Ridge and the situation confronting Kisela in Hughes' front yard.
For these reasons, the petition for certiorari is granted; the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed; and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Officer Andrew Kisela shot Amy Hughes while she was speaking with her roommate, Sharon Chadwick, outside of their home. The record, properly construed at this stage, shows that at the time of the shooting: Hughes stood stationary about six feet away from Chadwick, appeared "composed and content," Appellant's Excerpts of Record 109 (Record), and held a kitchen knife down at her side with the blade facing away from Chadwick. Hughes was nowhere near the officers, had committed no illegal act, was suspected of no crime, and did not raise the knife in the direction of Chadwick or anyone else. Faced with these facts, the two other responding officers held their fire, and one testified that he "wanted to continue trying verbal command[s] and see if that would work." Id., at 120. But not Kisela. He thought it necessary to use deadly force, and so, without giving a warning that he would open fire, he shot Hughes four times, leaving her seriously injured.
If this account of Kisela's conduct sounds unreasonable, that is because it was. And yet, the Court today insulates that conduct from liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity, holding that Kisela violated no "clearly established" law. See ante, at 1152 - 1154. I disagree. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hughes, as the Court must at summary judgment, a jury could find that Kisela violated Hughes' clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by needlessly resorting to lethal force. In holding otherwise, the Court misapprehends the facts and misapplies the law, effectively treating qualified immunity as an absolute shield. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
This case arrives at our doorstep on summary judgment, so we must "view the evidence ... in the light most favorable to" Hughes, the nonmovant, "with respect to the central facts of this case." Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam ). The majority purports to honor this well-settled principle, but its efforts fall short. Although the majority sets forth most of the relevant events that transpired, it conspicuously omits several critical facts and draws premature inferences that bear on the qualified-immunity inquiry. Those errors are fatal to its analysis, because properly construing all of the facts in the light most favorable to Hughes, and drawing all inferences in her favor, a jury could find that the following events occurred on the day of Hughes' encounter with the Tucson police.
On May 21, 2010, Kisela and Officer-in-Training Alex Garcia received a " 'check welfare' " call about a woman chopping away at a tree with a knife. 862 F.3d 775, 778 (C.A.9 2016). They responded to the scene, where they were informed by the person who had placed the call (not Chadwick) that the woman with the knife had been acting "erratically." Ibid. A third officer, Lindsay Kunz, later joined the scene. The officers observed Hughes, who matched the description given to the officers of the woman alleged to have been cutting the tree, emerge from a house with a kitchen knife in her hand. Hughes exited the front door and approached Chadwick, who was standing outside in the driveway.
Hughes then stopped about six feet from Chadwick, holding the kitchen knife down at her side with the blade pointed away from Chadwick. Hughes and Chadwick conversed with one another; Hughes appeared "composed and content," Record 109, and did not look angry. See 862 F.3d, at 778. At no point during this exchange did Hughes raise the kitchen knife or verbally threaten to harm Chadwick or the officers. Chadwick later averred that, during the incident, she was never in fear of Hughes and "was not the least bit threatened by the fact that [Hughes] had a knife in her hand" and that Hughes "never acted in a threatening manner." Record 110-111. The officers did not observe Hughes commit any crime, nor was Hughes suspected of committing one. See 862 F.3d, at 780.
Nevertheless, the officers hastily drew their guns and ordered Hughes to drop the knife. The officers gave that order twice, but the commands came "in quick succession." Id., at 778. The evidence in the record suggests that Hughes may not have heard or understood the officers' commands and may not have been aware of the officers' presence at all. Record 109-110, 195, 323-324 (Officer Kunz's testimony that "it seemed as though [Hughes] didn't even know we were there," and "[i]t was like she didn't hear us almost"); id., at 304 (Officer Garcia's testimony that Hughes acted "almost as if we weren't there"). Although the officers were in uniform, they never verbally identified themselves as law enforcement officers.
Kisela did not wait for Hughes to register, much less respond to, the officers' rushed commands. Instead, Kisela immediately and unilaterally escalated the situation. Without giving any advance warning that he would shoot, and without attempting less dangerous methods to deescalate the situation, he dropped to the ground and shot four times at Hughes (who was stationary) through a chain-link fence. After being shot, Hughes fell to the ground, screaming and bleeding from her wounds. She looked at the officers and asked, " 'Why'd you shoot me?' " Id., at 308. Hughes was immediately transported to the hospital, where she required treatment for her injuries. Kisela alone resorted to deadly force in this case. Confronted with the same circumstances as Kisela, neither of his fellow officers took that drastic measure.
II
Police officers are not entitled to qualified immunity if "(1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was 'clearly established at the time.' " District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ). Faithfully applying that well-settled standard, the Ninth Circuit held that a jury could find that Kisela violated Hughes' clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. That conclusion was correct.
A
I begin with the first step of the qualified-immunity inquiry: whether there was a violation of a constitutional right. Hughes alleges that Kisela violated her Fourth Amendment rights by deploying excessive force against her. In assessing such a claim, courts must ask "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). That inquiry "requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id., at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 ; see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). All of those factors (and others) support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a jury could find that Kisela's use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable. 862 F.3d, at 779-782. Indeed, the panel's resolution of this question was so convincing that not a single judge on the Ninth Circuit, including the seven who dissented from denial of rehearing en banc, expressly disputed that conclusion. See id., at 791-799 (opinion of Ikuta, J.). Neither does the majority here, which simply assumes without deciding that "a Fourth Amendment violation occurred." Ante, at 1152.
First, Hughes committed no crime and was not suspected of committing a crime. The officers were responding to a "check welfare" call, which reported no criminal activity, and the officers did not observe any illegal activity while at the scene. The mere fact that Hughes held a kitchen knife down at her side with the blade pointed away from Chadwick hardly elevates the situation to one that justifies deadly force.
Second, a jury could reasonably conclude that Hughes presented no immediate or objective threat to Chadwick or the other officers. It is true that Kisela had received a report that a woman matching Hughes' description had been acting erratically. But the police officers themselves never witnessed any erratic conduct. Instead, when viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes, the record evidence of what the police encountered paints a calmer picture. It shows that Hughes was several feet from Chadwick and even farther from the officers, she never made any aggressive or threatening movements, and she appeared "composed and content" during the brief encounter.
Third, Hughes did not resist or evade arrest. Based on this record, there is significant doubt as to whether she was aware of the officers' presence at all, and evidence suggests that Hughes did not hear the officers' swift commands to drop the knife.
Finally, the record suggests that Kisela could have, but failed to, use less intrusive means before deploying deadly force. 862 F.3d, at 781. For instance, Hughes submitted expert testimony concluding that Kisela should have used his Taser and that shooting his gun through the fence was dangerous because a bullet could have fragmented against the fence and hit Chadwick or his fellow officers. Ibid. ; see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 (C.A.9 2010) (noting that "police are required to consider what other tactics if any were available to effect the arrest" and whether there are "clear, reasonable, and less intrusive alternatives" (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Consistent with that assessment, the other two officers on the scene declined to fire at Hughes, and one of them explained that he was inclined to use "some of the lesser means" than shooting, including verbal commands, because he believed there was time "[t]o try to talk [Hughes] down." Record 120-121. That two officers on the scene, presented with the same circumstances as Kisela, did not use deadly force reveals just how unnecessary and unreasonable it was for Kisela to fire four shots at Hughes. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2020, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ("We analyze [the objective reasonableness] question from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Taken together, the foregoing facts would permit a jury to conclude that Kisela acted outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment by shooting Hughes four times.
B
Rather than defend the reasonableness of Kisela's conduct, the majority sidesteps the inquiry altogether and focuses instead on the "clearly established" prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. Ante, at 1152. To be " 'clearly established' ... [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). That standard is not nearly as onerous as the majority makes it out to be. As even the majority must acknowledge, ante, at 1152, this Court has long rejected the notion that "an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful," Anderson, 483 U.S., at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. "[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). At its core, then, the "clearly established" inquiry boils down to whether Kisela had "fair notice" that he acted unconstitutionally. See ibid. ; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam ) ("[T]he focus" of qualified immunity "is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful").
The answer to that question is yes. This Court's precedents make clear that a police officer may only deploy deadly force against an individual if the officer "has probable cause to believe that the [person] poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others." Garner, 471 U.S., at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694 ; see also Graham, 490 U.S., at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. It is equally well established that any use of lethal force must be justified by some legitimate governmental interest. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) ; Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 313-314, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Consistent with those clearly established principles, and contrary to the majority's conclusion, Ninth Circuit precedent predating these events further confirms that Kisela's conduct was clearly unreasonable. See Brosseau, 543 U.S., at 199, 125 S.Ct. 596 ("[A] body of relevant case law" may " 'clearly establish' " the violation of a constitutional right); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 746, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (KENNEDY, J., concurring) ("[Q]ualified immunity is lost when plaintiffs point either to 'cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident' or to 'a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful' " (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) )). Because Kisela plainly lacked any legitimate interest justifying the use of deadly force against a woman who posed no objective threat of harm to officers or others, had committed no crime, and appeared calm and collected during the police encounter, he was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (2001) proves the point. In that case, the police encountered a man who had reportedly been acting "erratically." Id., at 1276. The man was "verbally abusive," shouted " 'kill me' " at the officers, screamed that he would " 'kick [the] ass' " of one of the officers, and "brandish[ed] a hatchet at a police officer," ultimately throwing it "into a clump of trees when told to put it down." Id., at 1276-1277. The officers also observed the man carrying an unloaded crossbow in one hand and what appeared to be "a can or a bottle of lighter fluid in the other." Id., at 1277. The man discarded the crossbow when instructed to do so by the police and then steadily walked toward one of the officers. Ibid. In response, that officer, without giving a warning, shot the man in the face with beanbag rounds. Id., at 1278. The man suffered serious injuries, including multiple fractures to his cranium and the loss of his left eye. Ibid .
The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity to the officer, concluding that his use of force was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. Id ., at 1285-1286. The court held, "Every police officer should know that it is objectively unreasonable to shoot ... an unarmed man who: has committed no serious offense, is mentally or emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning of the imminent use of such a significant degree of force, poses no risk of flight, and presents no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of the officer or other individuals." Id., at 1285.
The same holds true here. Like the man in Deorle, Hughes committed no serious crime, had been given no warning of the imminent use of force, posed no risk of flight, and presented no objectively reasonable threat to the safety of officers or others. In fact, Hughes presented even less of a danger than the man in Deorle, for, unlike him, she did not threaten to "kick [their] ass," did not appear agitated, and did not raise her kitchen knife or make any aggressive gestures toward the police or Chadwick. If the police officers acted unreasonably in shooting the agitated, screaming man in Deorle with beanbag bullets, a fortiori Kisela acted unreasonably in shooting the calm-looking, stationary Hughes with real bullets. In my view, Deorle and the precedent it cites place the unlawfulness of Kisela's conduct " 'beyond debate.' " Wesby, 583 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 590.
The majority strains mightily to distinguish Deorle, to no avail. It asserts, for instance, that, unlike the man in Deorle, Hughes was "armed with a large knife." Ante, at 1154. But that is not a fair characterization of the record, particularly at this procedural juncture. Hughes was not "armed" with a knife. She was holding "a kitchen knife-an everyday household item which can be used as a weapon but ordinarily is a tool for safe, benign purposes"-down at her side with the blade pointed away from Chadwick. 862 F.3d, at 788 (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). Hughes also spoke calmly with Chadwick during the events at issue, did not raise the knife, and made no other aggressive movements, undermining any suggestion that she was a threat to Chadwick or anyone else. Similarly, the majority asserts that Hughes was "within striking distance" of Chadwick, ante, at 1154, but that stretches the facts and contravenes this Court's repeated admonition that inferences must be drawn in the exact opposite direction, i.e., in favor of Hughes. See Tolan, 572 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 1866-1867. The facts, properly viewed, show that, when she was shot, Hughes had stopped and stood still about six feet away from Chadwick. Whether Hughes could "strik[e]" Chadwick from that particular distance, even though the kitchen knife was held down at her side, is an inference that should be drawn by the jury, not this Court.
The majority next posits that Hughes, unlike the man in Deorle, "ignored the officers' orders to drop the" kitchen knife. Ante, at 1154. Yet again, the majority here draws inferences in favor of Kisela, instead of Hughes. The available evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that Hughes did not hear or register the officers' swift commands and that Kisela, like his fellow officers on the scene, should have realized that as well. See supra, at 1156 - 1157. Accordingly, at least at the summary-judgment stage, the Court is mistaken in distinguishing Deorle based on Hughes' ostensible disobedience to the officers' directives.
The majority also implies that Deorle is distinguishable because the police in that case observed the man over a 40-minute period, whereas the situation here unfolded in less than a minute. Ante, at 1154. But that fact favors Hughes, not Kisela. The only reason this case unfolded in such an abrupt timeframe is because Kisela, unlike his fellow officer, showed no interest in trying to talk further to Hughes or use a "lesser means" of force. See Record 120-121, 304.
Finally, the majority passingly notes that "this Court has already instructed the Court of Appeals not to read [Deorle ] too broadly." Ante, at 1154 (citing City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775-1777, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) ). But the Court in Sheehan concluded that Deorle was plainly distinguishable because, unlike in Deorle, the officers there confronted a woman who "was dangerous, recalcitrant, law-breaking, and out of sight." 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1776. As explained above, however, Hughes was none of those things: She did not threaten or endanger the officers or Chadwick, she did not break any laws, and she was visible to the officers on the scene. See supra, at 1155 - 1157. Thus, there simply is no basis for the Court's assertion that " 'the differences between [Deorle ] and the case before us leap from the page.' " Ante, at 1154 (quoting Sheehan, 575 U.S., at ----, 135 S.Ct., at 1776 ).
Deorle, moreover, is not the only case that provided fair notice to Kisela that shooting Hughes under these circumstances was unreasonable. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has held that the use of deadly force against an individual holding a semiautomatic rifle was unconstitutional where the individual "did not point the gun at the officers and apparently was not facing them when they shot him the first time." Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 325 (1991). Similarly, in Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (1997), the Ninth Circuit held that the officer unreasonably used deadly force against a man who, although armed, made "no threatening movement" or "aggressive move of any kind." Id., at 1203. Both Curnow and Harris establish that, where, as here, an individual with a weapon poses no objective and immediate threat to officers or third parties, law enforcement cannot resort to excessive force. See Harris, 126 F.3d, at 1201 ("Law enforcement officers may not shoot to kill unless, at a minimum, the suspect presents an immediate threat to the officers, or is fleeing and his escape will result in a serious threat of injury to persons").
If all that were not enough, decisions from several other Circuits illustrate that the Fourth Amendment clearly forbids the use of deadly force against a person who is merely holding a knife but not threatening anyone with it. See, e.g., McKinney v. DeKalb County, 997 F.2d 1440, 1442 (C.A.11 1993) (affirming denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to officer who shot a person holding a butcher knife in one hand and a foot-long stick in the other, where the person threw the stick and began to rise from his seated position); Reyes v. Bridgwater, 362 Fed.Appx. 403, 404-405 (C.A.5 2010) (reversing grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to officer who shot a person holding a kitchen knife in his apartment entryway, even though he refused to follow the officer's multiple commands to drop the knife); Duong v. Telford Borough, 186 Fed.Appx. 214, 215, 217 (C.A.3 2006) (affirming denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to officer who shot a person holding a knife because a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff was sitting down and pointing the knife away from the officer at the time he was shot and had not received any warnings to drop the knife).
Against this wall of case law, the majority points to a single Ninth Circuit decision, Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110 (2005), as proof that Kisela reasonably could have believed that Hughes posed an immediate danger. But Blanford involved far different circumstances. In that case, officers observed a man walking through a neighborhood brandishing a 2 ½-foot cavalry sword; officers commanded the man to drop the sword, identified themselves as police, and warned " 'We'll shoot.' " Id., at 1112-1113. The man responded with "a loud growling or roaring sound," which increased the officers' concern that he posed a risk of harm. Id., at 1113. In an effort to "evade [police] authority," the man, while still wielding the sword, tried to enter a home, thus prompting officers to open fire to protect anyone who might be inside. Id., at 1113, 1118. The Ninth Circuit concluded that use of deadly force was reasonable in those circumstances. See id., at 1119.
This case differs significantly from Blanford in several key respects. Unlike the man in Blanford, Hughes held a kitchen knife down by her side, as compared to a 2 ½-foot sword; she appeared calm and collected, and did not make threatening noises or gestures toward the officers on the scene; she stood still in front of her own home, and was not wandering about the neighborhood, evading law enforcement, or attempting to enter another house. Moreover, unlike the officers in Blanford, Kisela never verbally identified himself as an officer and never warned Hughes that he was going to shoot before he did so. Given these significant differences, no reasonable officer would believe that Blanford justified Kisela's conduct. The majority's conclusion to the contrary is fanciful.
* * *
In sum, precedent existing at the time of the shooting clearly established the unconstitutionality of Kisela's conduct. The majority's decision, no matter how much it says otherwise, ultimately rests on a faulty premise: that those cases are not identical to this one. But that is not the law, for our cases have never required a factually identical case to satisfy the "clearly established" standard. Hope, 536 U.S., at 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508. It is enough that governing law places "the constitutionality of the officer's conduct beyond debate." Wesby, 583 U.S., at ----, 138 S.Ct., at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Hughes, it is "beyond debate" that Kisela's use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable, he was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
III
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear to me that the Court of Appeals got it right. But even if that result were not so clear, I cannot agree with the majority's apparent view that the decision below was so manifestly incorrect as to warrant "the extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal." Major League Baseball Players Assn. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 512-513, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). "A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error." Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) ("Summary reversals of courts of appeals are unusual under any circumstances"). This is not such a case. The relevant facts are hotly disputed, and the qualified-immunity question here is, at the very best, a close call. Rather than letting this case go to a jury, the Court decides to intervene prematurely, purporting to correct an error that is not at all clear.
This unwarranted summary reversal is symptomatic of "a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court's resources" in qualified-immunity cases. Salazar-Limon v. Houston, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1277, 1282, 197 L.Ed.2d 751 (2017) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As I have previously noted, this Court routinely displays an unflinching willingness "to summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers the protection of qualified immunity" but "rarely intervene[s] where courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases." Id., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1282-1283 ; see also Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev. 45, 82 (2018) ("[N]early all of the Supreme Court's qualified immunity cases come out the same way-by finding immunity for the officials"); Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 1219, 1244-1250 (2015). Such a one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.
The majority today exacerbates that troubling asymmetry. Its decision is not just wrong on the law; it also sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the public. It tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably unreasonable conduct will go unpunished. Because there is nothing right or just under the law about this, I respectfully dissent.
The majority insists that reliance on Harris fails the " 'straight-face test' " because Harris involved an FBI sniper on a hilltop who shot a man while he was retreating to a cabin during a standoff. Ante, at 1154 (quoting 862 F.3d, at 797 (opinion of Ikuta, J.)). If anything, though, the context of Harris could be viewed as more dangerous than the context here because, unlike Hughes, the suspect in Harris had engaged in a firefight with other officers the previous day, during which an officer was shot. See 126 F.3d, at 1193-1194. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_lcdisposition |
PERRY et al. v. THOMAS
No. 86-566.
Argued April 28, 1987
Decided June 15, 1987
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and BRENNAN, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., post, p. 493, and O’CONNOR, J., post, p. 494, filed dissenting opinions.
Peter Brown Dolan argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Maren E. Nelson.
Bruce Gelber argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee.
Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal we decide whether §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., which mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements, pre-empts § 229 of the California Labor Codé, which provides that actions for the collection of wages may be maintained “without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §229 (West 1971).
I
Appellee, Kenneth Morgan Thomas, brought this action m California Superior Court against his former employer, Kidder, Peabody & Co. (Kidder, Peabody), and two of its employees, appellants Barclay Perry and James Johnston. His complaint arose from a dispute over commissions on the sale of securities. Thomas alleged breach of contract, conversion, civil conspiracy to commit conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty, for which he sought compensatory and punitive damages. After Thomas refused to submit the dispute to arbitration, the defendants sought to stay further proceedings in the Superior Court. Perry and Johnston filed a petition in the Superior Court to compel arbitration; Kidder, Peabody invoked diversity jurisdiction and filed a similar petition in Federal District Court. Both petitions sought arbitration under the authority of §§2 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
The demands for arbitration were based on a provision found in a Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration form, which Thomas completed and executed in connection with his application for employment with Kidder, Peabody. That provision states:
“I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations with which I register . . . .” App. 33a.
Rule 347 of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (1975), with which Thomas registered, provides that
“[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the instance of any such party . . . .” App. 34a.
Kidder, Peabody sought arbitration as a member organization of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Perry and Johnston relied on Thomas’ allegation that they had acted in the course and scope of their employment and argued that, as agents and employees of Kidder, Peabody, they were beneficiaries of the arbitration agreement.
Thomas opposed both petitions on the ground that § 229 of the California Labor Code authorized him to maintain an action for wages, defined to include commissions, despite the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. He relied principally on this Court’s decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117 (1973), which had also considered the validity of § 229 in the face of a pre-emption challenge under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Thomas maintained that the decision in Ware stood for the proposition that the State’s interest in protecting wage earners outweighs the federal interest in uniform dispute resolution.
The Superior Court denied appellants’ petition to compel arbitration. Thomas v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Civ. Action No. C529105 (Los Angeles County, Apr. 23, 1985) (reprinted at App. 128a-129a). The court characterized Ware as “controlling authority” which held that, “in accordance with California Labor Code Section 229, actions to collect wages may be pursued without regard to private arbitration agreements.” Id., at 129a. It further concluded that since Thomas’ claims for conversion, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty were ancillary to his claim for breach of contract and differed only in terms of the remedies sought, they should also be tried and not severed for arbitration. Id., at 128a-129a. The Superior Court did not address Thomas’ contention that Perry and Johnston were “not parties” to the arbitration agreement, id., at 78a, and therefore lacked a contractual basis for asserting the right to arbitrate, an argument Thomas characterizes as one of “standing.”
Before the California Court of Appeal, appellants argued that Ware resolved only the narrow issue whether § 229 was pre-empted by Rule 347’s provision for arbitration, given the promulgation of that Rule by the NYSE pursuant to § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 885, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78f, and the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to review and modify the NYSE Rules pursuant to § 19 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. §78s. See 414 U. S., at 135. It was appellants’ contention that, despite an indirect reference to the Federal Arbitration Act in footnote 15 of the Ware opinion, the pre-emptive effect of § 2 of the Act was not at issue in that case.
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. Thomas v. Perry, 2d Civ. No. B014485 (2d Dist., Div. 5, Apr. 10, 1986) (reprinted at App. 139a-142a). It read Ware’s single reference to the Federal Arbitration Act to imply that the Court had refused to hold § 229 pre-empted by that Act and the litigants’ agreement to arbitrate disputes pursuant to Rule 347. Thus, the Court of Appeal held that a claim for unpaid wages brought under § 229 was not subject to compulsory arbitration, notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement. App. 140a-141a. Like the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal also rejected appellants’ argument, based on this Court’s decision in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213 (1985), that the ancillary claims for conversion, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty were severable from the breach-of-contract claim and should be arbitrated. App. 142a. Finally, the Court of Appeal refused to consider Thomas’ argument that Perry and Johnston lacked “standing” to enforce the arbitration agreement. The court concluded that Thomas had raised this argument for the first time on appeal. Id., at 140a, n. 1.
The California Supreme Court denied appellants’ petition for review. Id., at 144a. We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 982 (1986), and now reverse.
I — I I — I
“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983). Enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, this body of substantive law is enforceable in both state and federal courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1984) (§2 held to pre-empt a provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that California courts had interpreted to require judicial consideration of claims arising under that law). As we stated in Keating, “[i]n enacting §2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Id., at 10. “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.” Id., at 16 (footnote omitted). Section 2, therefore, embodies a clear federal policy of requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. “We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law.” Keating, supra, at 11.
In Ware, which also involved a dispute between a securities broker and his former employer, we rejected a Supremacy Clause challenge to § 229 premised in part on the contention that, because the 1934 Act had empowered the NYSE to promulgate rules and had given the SEC authority to review and modify these rules, a private agreement to be bound by the arbitration provisions of NYSE Rule 347 was enforceable as a matter of federal substantive law, and pre-empted state laws requiring resolution of the dispute in court. But the federal substantive law invoked in Ware emanated from a specific federal regulatory statute governing the securities industry — the 1934 Act. We examined the language and policies of the 1934 Act and found “no Commission rule or regulation that specifie[d] arbitration as the favored means of resolving employer-employee disputes,” 414 U. S., at 135, or that revealed a necessity for “nationwide uniformity of an exchange’s housekeeping affairs.” Id., at 136. The fact that NYSE Rule 347 was outside the scope of the SEC’s authority of review militated against finding a clear federal intent to require arbitration. Id., at 135-136. Absent such a finding, we could not conclude that enforcement of California’s §229 would interfere with the federal regulatory scheme. Id., at 139-140.
By contrast, the present appeal addresses the pre-emptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act, a statute that embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause. Its general applicability reflects that “[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered . . . .” Byrd, 470 U. S., at 221. We have accordingly held that these agreements must be “rigorously enforce[d].” Ibid.; see Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, ante, at 226; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 625-626 (1985). This clear federal policy places § 2 of the Act in unmistakable conflict with California’s § 229 requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes. Therefore, under the Supremacy Clause, the state statute must give way.
The oblique reference to the Federal Arbitration Act in footnote 15 of the Ware decision, 414 U. S., at 135, cannot fairly be read as a definitive holding to the contrary. There, the Court noted a number of decisions as having “endorsed the suitability of arbitration to resolve federally created rights.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Footnote 15 did not address the issue of federal pre-emption of state-created rights. Rather, the import of the footnote was that the reasoning— and perhaps result — in Ware might have been different if the 1934 Act “itself ha[d] provided for arbitration.” Ibid.
Our holding that §2 of the Federal Arbitration Act preempts § 229 of the California Labor Code obviates any need to consider whether our decision in Byrd, supra, at 221, would have required severance of Thomas’ ancillary claims for conversion, civil conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty from his breach-of-contract claim. We likewise decline to reach Thomas’ contention that Perry and Johnston lack “standing” to enforce the agreement to arbitrate any of these claims, since the courts below did not address this alternative argument for refusing to compel arbitration. However, we do reject Thomas’ contention that resolving these questions in appellants’ favor is a prerequisite to their having standing under Article III of the Constitution to maintain the present appeal before this Court. As we perceive it, Thomas’ “standing” argument simply presents a straightforward issue of contract interpretation: whether the arbitration provision inures to the benefit of appellants and may be construed, in light of the circumstances surrounding the litigants’ agreement, to cover the dispute that has arisen between them. This issue may be resolved on remand; its status as an alternative ground for denying arbitration does not prevent us from reviewing the ground exclusively relied upon by the courts below.
hH I — I I — I
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Section 2 provides, in relevant part:
“A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9U. S. C. §2.
Section 4 mandates judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements where a party has failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate. 9 U. S. C. § 4.
Section 200(a) of the California Labor Code defines “wages” to include amounts earned on a “commission basis.” Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 200(a) (West 1971). The California Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal held below that the commissions at issue in this case fall within the statutory definition. App. 128a, 140a.
The Federal District Court gave this ruling preclusive effect and entered a final order dismissing Kidder, Peabody’s petition in the parallel proceeding. Kidder, Peabody & Co. v. Thomas, Civ. Action No. 85-1257RJK (CD Cal., Sept. 29, 1986) (reprinted at App. 245a); id., at 235a.
Having concluded that this Court’s decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U. S. 117 (1973), was dispositive, the California Superior Court also did not address Thomas’ alternative argument that the arbitration agreement in this case constitutes an unconscionable, unenforceable contract of adhesion because “(a) the selection of arbitrators is made by the New York Stock Exchange and is presumptively biased in favor of management; and (b) the denial of meaningful. . . discovery is unduly oppressive and frustrates an employee’s claim for relief.” App. 74a.
The Court of Appeal rejected appellants’ contention that amendments to the 1934 Act since this Court’s decision in Ware removed the theoretical underpinnings of that decision by expanding the scope of the SEC’s authority under § 19 to review and modify NYSE rules. See 15 U. S. C. § 78s(c). Appellants continue to make this argument, in their appeal before this Court, as an alternative basis for distinguishing Ware. Brief for Appellants 17-20 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-75, pp. 22-38 (1975); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F. 2d 348, 356-359 (CA2), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 948 (1978)). However, because we rest our decision exclusively on the Federal Arbitration Act, we decline to consider the pre-emptive effect of the amended 1934 Act as it relates to Thomas’ agreement to be bound by NYSE Rule 347.
Objecting to appellants’ request for a formal Statement of Decision from the Superior Court following summary denial of their motion to compel, Thomas argued that appellants had “no standing” to seek an order compelling arbitration. App. 120a. Perry and Johnston replied that their “standing” to seek arbitration inhered in their status as agents and employees of Kidder, Peabody, and as beneficiaries of the agreement between Kidder, Peabody and Thomas. Id., at 124a. In response, Thomas simply argued that Perry and Johnston had submitted no supporting evidence to show they had acted as agents for Kidder, Peabody. Id., at 132a. The Superior Court did not amend a Proposed Statement of Decision, see id., at 128a-129a, to address these arguments, and it was formally adopted as the Statement of Decision from which Perry and Johnston appealed. Id., at 135a.
Having based its decision “squarely on Ware,” the Court of Appeal also declined to reach Thomas’ alternative ground for supporting the Superior Court’s decision not to compel arbitration: his contention that the arbitration provision constitutes an unconscionable, unenforceable contract of adhesion. Id., at 141a, n. 3; see n. 4, supra.
Jurisdiction over this appeal is provided by 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 6-8 (1984).
First among the decisions cited in footnote 15 was Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), in which the Court resolved a conflict between the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the Federal Arbitration Act by holding that the policies of the former prevailed and that an arbitration agreement, for which enforcement was sought under the latter, was invalid. No federal pre-emption question was presented.
Only the unexplained citation to Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), could be construed as a reference to principles of federal pre-emption. However, that case provides no support for Thomas’ position. It arose as a diversity action in which one party to a contract containing an arbitration clause asserted a right under state law to judicial resolution of his claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract. The Court held that, while § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act authorized judicial determination of a claim that the arbitration clause itself had been procured through fraud, a court could not decide whether fraud had induced the making and performance of the contract generally since this claim fell within the broad scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Id., at 404. The Court dismissed the argument that the asserted right to judicial resolution adhered in state substantive law which a federal court sitting in diversity was bound to follow under the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). It reasoned instead that Congress had enacted the substantive provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act pursuant, in part, to its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce, 388 U. S., at 404-406, a distinction which endows these provisions with pre-emptive force under the Supremacy Clause.
We also decline to address Thomas’ claim that the arbitration agreement in this ease constitutes an unconscionable, unenforceable contract of adhesion. This issue was not decided below, see nn. 4 and 6, supra, and may likewise be considered on remand.
We note, however, the choice-of-law issue that arises when defenses such as Thomas’ so-called “standing” and unconscionability arguments are asserted. In instances such as these, the text of § 2 provides the touchstone for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of federal common law envisioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, see Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983), “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. § 2 (emphasis added). Thus state law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with this requirement of § 2. See Prima Paint, supra, at 404; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S., at 16-17, n. 11. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
MERCANTILE NATIONAL BANK AT DALLAS v. LANGDEAU, RECEIVER.
No. 14.
Argued February 27-28, 1962.
Restored to the- calendar for reargument April 2, 1962.-
Reargued December 5, 1962.—
Decided January 21, 1963.
Hubert D. Johnson and Marvin S. Sloman reargued the cause for appellants. With them on the briefs was Neth L. Leachman.
William E. Cureton and Quentin Keith reargued the cause for appellee. With them on the briefs was Cecil C. Rotsch.
Together with No. 15, Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Langdeau, Receiver, also on appeal from the same Court.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee, the receiver for a Texas insurance company-in liquidation in the Ninety-eighth District Court of Travis County, Texas, brought an action in that court against the two national banks who are appellants here and against 143 other parties, alleging a conspiracy to defraud the insurance company and claiming damages jointly and severally in the amount of 15 million dollars. Each appellant filed a plea of privilege, as provided by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that it was located in Dallas County, Texas, and was therefore immune from suit in Travis County under the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5198 (1878), 12 U. S. C. § 94, which provides:
“Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
Appellee, on the other hand, relied upon Texas Insurance Code, Art. 21.28, Section 4 of which provides:
“(f) New Lawsuits. The court of competent jurisdiction of the county in which the delinquency proceedings are pending under this Article shall have venue to hear and determine all action or proceedings instituted after the commencement of delinquency proceedings by or against the insurer or receiver.”
The pleas of the banks were overruled and they appealed, it being agreed that the only issue for review was whether 12 U. S. C. § 94 entitled appellants to have the action transferred to the state court in Dallas County or whether the state venue provision contained in § 4 (f) of the Insurance Code was controlling. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and sustained the pleas of privilege on the ground that 12 U. S. C. § 94 required an action against a national bank to be brought in the county of its location. The Texas Supreme Court, however, refused to accept § 94 as prohibiting a suit against petitioners in Travis County when a state venue statute expressly permitted it. 161 Tex. 349, 341 S. W. 2d 161. On the one hand, the court interpreted § 94 as permissive only, not mandatory, and on the other, as having been repealed by an omnibus repealing clause in an 1882 statute subsequently absorbed into 28 U. S. C. § 1348. Appellants brought the cases here under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2) and, because of the finality question, we postponed ruling upon our jurisdiction until the merits were considered. 368 U. S. 809.
I.
The question of our appellate jurisdiction is quite similar to the one considered in Construction Laborers v. Curry, ante, p. 542, although there the jurisdiction of any and all state courts was at issue and here the inquiry is only as to which state court has proper venue to entertain an action against two national banks. Nonetheless, a substantial claim, appealable under state law, is made that a federal statute, rather than a state statute, determines in which state court a national bank may be sued and, as in Curry, prohibits further proceedings against the defendants in the state court in which the suit is now pending. This is a separate and independent matter, anterior to the merits and not enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action. Moreover, we believe that it serves the policy underlying the requirement of finality in 28 U. S. C. § 1257 to determine now in which state court appellants may be tried rather than to subject them, and appellee, to long and complex litigation which may all be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question of venue is postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings. Accordingly, we note our jurisdiction to hear these appeals under § 1257 (2) and turn now to the question of whether appellants may be sued in the Travis County court.
II.
The roots of this problem reach back to the National Banking Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665, replaced a year later by the Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99. National banks are federal instrumentalities and the power of Congress over them is extensive. “National banks are quasi-public institutions, and for the purpose for which they are instituted are national in their character, and, within constitutional limits, are subject to the control of Congress and are not to be interfered with by state legislative or judicial action, except so far as the lawmaking power of the Government may permit.” Van Reed v. People’s Nat. Bank, 198 U. S. 554, 557. Unquestionably Congress had authority to prescribe the manner and circumstances under which the banks could sue or be sued in the courts and it addressed itself to this matter in the 1863 Act.
By § 11 of that Act the banking associations were given general corporate powers, among them the power to “sue and be sued ... in any court of law or equity as fully as natural persons.” This section, if the teaching of Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, is observed, conferred no jurisdiction upon the courts but merely endowed the banks with power to sue and be sued in the courts as corporations. Congress, however, had more to say about this subject. Section 59 of the 1863 Act provided that suits by and against any association under the Act could be had in any federal court held within the district in which the association was established. No mention was made of suits in state courts. If the law had remained in this form, there might well have been grave doubt about the suability of national banks in the state courts, as this Court noted in First Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 428. The next year, however, Congress expressly exercised its power to permit national banks to be sued in certain state courts as well as in federal courts. Section 57 of the 1864 Act carried forward the former § 59 and also added that “suits . . . may be had ... in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases . . . The phrase “suits . . . may be had” was, in every respect, appropriate language for the purpose of specifying the precise courts in which Congress consented to have national banks subject to suit and we believe Congress intended that in those courts alone could a national bank be sued against its will.
We would not lightly conclude that a congressional enactment has no purpose or function. We must strive to give appropriate meaning to each of the provisions of Title 12 and its predecessors. See United States v. Menasche, 348 TJ. S. 528, 539; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152. Appellee, however, would have us hold that any state court could entertain a suit against a national bank as long as state jurisdictional and venue requirements were otherwise satisfied. Such a ruling, of course, would render altogether meaningless a congressional enactment permitting suit to be brought in the bank’s home county. This we are unwilling to do, particularly in light of the history of § 57. That section was omitted from Title 62 (National Banks) of the Revised Statutes of 1873, but at the same time, there were included in Title 13 (The Judiciary) provisions granting the federal courts jurisdiction over suits by and against national banks brought in the district of their residence. These express provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the federal courts apparently did not solve the entire problem, for § 5198 of Title 62, Revised Statutes, was amended in 1875 by adding to it provisions substantially identical to § 57 of the 1864 Act. Thus for a second time Congress specified the precise federal and state courts in which suits against national banks could be brought.
All of the cases in this Court which have touched upon the issue here are in accord with our conclusion that national banks may be sued only in those state courts in the county where the banks are located. Notable among these is Charlotte Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 132 U. S. 141, which involved a suit against a national bank brought in a county other than that in which the bank was located. This Court stated that § 57 conferred a personal privilege on the banks exempting them from suits in state courts outside their home counties. However, since the bank in that case had not objected at the trial to the location of the suit but' raised the issue for the first time on appeal, the Court held that the § 57 privilege had been waived.
Thus, we find nothing in the statute, its history or the cases in this Court to support appellee’s construction of this statute. On the contrary, all these sources convince us that the statute must be given a mandatory reading.
The consequence of our decision, appellee says, is that a litigant will be unable to join two national banks in the same action in the state courts if they are located in different counties or in the federal courts if they are located in different districts. But aside from not being presented by these cases, such a situation is a matter for Congress to consider. Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 1391 (a), (b), 1401; Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F. 2d 550, 552 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See also, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U. S. 379, 384.
Similarly, even if all of the 145 defendants may not be sued in one proceeding in Dallas County with the same facility as they may in Travis County, this, of course, is insufficient basis for departing from the command of the federal statute. Nevertheless, though we have no intention of venturing an opinion on matters of Texas procedure, particularly when the parties were in disagreement about them in argument before this Court, we are aware of the recent ruling of the Texas Supreme Court, Langdeau v. Burke Investment Co., - Tex. -, 358 S. W. 2d 553, holding Texas Insurance Code, Art. 21.28 (4), permissive, not mandatory, thus not restricting the receiver to suits in the receivership court. We have also noted that Texas procedural rules might very well permit the transfer of the entire case to Dallas County. Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. 89; Tunstill v. Scott, 138 Tex. 425, 160 S. W. 2d 65; Terrell v. Kohler, 48 S. W. 2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.). Moreover, Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. 164 appears to permit dismissal of suits without prejudice when a plea of improper venue is sustained, see Luck v. Welch, 243 S. W. 2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App., ref. n. r. e.); Wiley v. Joiner, 223 S. W. 2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.), opening the way for a new suit which Article 1995 (4) indicates could be brought in Dallas County.
Appellee, finally, attempts to avoid his venue problem entirely by denying the very existence of § 5198, Rev. Stat. (1878). Section 5198, appellee says, was repealed by the proviso to § 4 of the Act of July 12, 1882:
“[T]he jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association . . . shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States .... And all laws and parts of laws of the United States inconsistent with this proviso be, and the same are hereby, repealed.”
It is also said that 28 U. S. C. § 1348, derived from the Act of March 3, 1887, re-enacts § 4 of the 1882 Act, in somewhat modified form, thus continuing the congressional intent to repeal § 5198 to the extent that it prescribes the venue of suits in state courts. See 161 Tex., at 356, 341 S. W. 2d, at 166.
Since § 4 of the Act of 1882 and its successors do not expressly repeal § 5198, appellee’s contention is necessarily one of implied repeal requiring some manifest inconsistency or positive repugnance between the two statutes. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199. We find neither here. Section 5198, as construed in the Charlotte Nat. Bank case, is essentially a venue statute governing the proper location of suits against national banks in either federal or state courts, whereas § 4 of the 1882 Act and the 1887 Act were designed to overcome the effect of §§ 563 and 629 Rev. Stat. which allowed national banks to sue and be sued in the federal district and circuit courts solely because they were national banks, without regard to diversity, amount in controversy or the existence of a federal question in the usual sense. Section 4 apparently sought to limit, with exceptions, the access of national banks to, and their suability in, the federal courts to the same extent to which non-national banks are so limited.
Decisions of this Court have recognized that § 4 purported to deal with no more than matters of federal jurisdiction. As we observed in Continental National Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119, 123-124:
“The necessary effect of this legislation was to make national banks . . . citizens of the States in which they were respectively located, and to withdraw’ from them the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States simply on the ground that they were created by and exercised their powers under acts of Congress. No other purpose can be imputed to Congress than to effect that result.”
See also Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v. Cooper, 120 U. S. 778. Moreover, nothing in the subsequent history of this statute, now 28 U. S. C. § 1348, warrants the conclusion that Congress sought, even by implication, to relax the venue restrictions of § 5198.
The provisions of § 5198 are fully effective and must be recognized when they are duly raised. The judgments of the Texas Supreme Court are reversed and the causes remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice- Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, while agreeing with the Court that the judgments are “final,” dissent on the merits of the controversy.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see post, p. 572.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
1. The Act of February 25, 1863, c. 58:
“Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That every association formed pursuant to the provisions of this act may make and use a common seal, and shall have succession by the name designated in its articles of association and for the period limited therein, not, however, exceeding twenty years from the passage of this act; by such name may make contracts, sue and be sued, complain and defend in any court of law or equity as fully as natural persons . . . .” 12 Stat. 668.
“Sec. 59. And be it further enacted, That suits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association under this act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established.” 12 Stat. 681.
2. The Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106:
“Sec. 8. ... Such association . . . may make contracts, sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity as fully as natural persons.” 13 Stat. 101; Rev. Stat. § 5136 (1873).
“Sec. 57. ... That suits, actions, and proceedings, against any association under this act, may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established; or in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases: Provided, however, That all proceedings to enjoin the comptroller under this act shall be had in a circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, held in the district in which the association is located.” 13 Stat. 116-117.
3. Section 57 was omitted from Title 62, National Banks, in the Revised Statutes of 1873. It was added to § 5198 of Title 62, National Banks, by the Act of February 18, 1875, c. 80, 18 Stat. 320. Section 5198, as amended, reads as follows:
“Sec. 5198. The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiving the same; provided such action is commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred. That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this title may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar'cases.” (Amendment in italics.)
4. The portion of § 5198, Rev. Stat. (1878), relating to suits in federal and state courts, derived from § 57 of the 1864 Act, now appears as 12 U. S. C. § 94:
Ҥ 94. Venue of suits.
“Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases.”
Title 12 has not as yet been enacted into positive law.
5. Revised Statutes of T873, Title 13, The Judiciary, c. 3, District Courts — Jurisdiction.
“Sec. 563. the district courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: . . . Fifteenth. Of all suits by or against any association established under any law providing for national banking associations within the district for which the court is held.”
Revised Statutes of 1873, Title 13, The Judiciary, c. 7, Circuit Court — Jurisdiction.
“Sec. 629. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: . . . Tenth. Of all suits by or against any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under any law providing for national banking associations.”
These provisions were derived from that part of § 57 of the 1864 Act which conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts.
6. Act of July 12, 1882, e. 290, 22 Stat. 162, an Act to enable national banking associations to extend their corporate existence, and for other purposes. Section 4 of that Act contained the following proviso:
“. . . Provided, however, That the jurisdiction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association established under any law providing for national-banking associations, except suits between them and the United States, or its officers and agents, shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States which do or might do banking business where such national-banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun: And all laws and parts of laws of the United States inconsistent with this proviso be, and the same are hereby, repealed.” 22 Stat. 163.
7. Act of March 3, 1887, c. 373, as amended by the Act of August 13, 1888, c. 866.
“Sec. 4. That all national banking associations established under the laws of the United States shall, for the purposes of all actions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, and all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located; and in such cases the circuit and district courts shall not have jurisdiction other than such as they would have in cases between individual citizens of the same State.
“The provisions of this section shall not be held to affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in cases commenced by the United States or by direction of any officer thereof, or cases for winding up the affairs of any such bank.” 25 Stat. 436.
8. 28 U. S. C. § 1348 contains the present version of the matters covered in the Acts of 1882, 1887 and 1888:
Ҥ 1348. Banking association as party.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, any civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and any action by a banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by such chapter.
“All national banking associations shall, for the purposes of all other actions by or against them, be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”
See Appendix, No. 4. The pertinent national bank legislation appears in the Appendix to this opinion, post, p. 567.
See Appendix, No. 6.
See Appendix, No. 8.
The history of national banking in the United States begins with the First Bank of the United States, chartered in 1791 (1 Stat. 191; see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61), which continued in existence until 1811. 1 Dictionary of American History 155 (1940). The Second Bank was incorporated in 1816, 3 Stat. 266, see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, and terminated in 1836 when its charter was permitted to expire. Ibid.
See Appendix, No. 1.
Ibid.
“[O]nr conclusion on this subject is fortified by the terms of § 57, c. 106, 13 Stat. 116 [the 1864 Act, discussed infra], making controversies concerning national banks cognizable in state courts because of their intimate relation to many state laws and regulations, although without the grant of the act of Congress such controversies would have been federal in character.” 244 U. S., at 428. But cf. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 135.
See Appendix, No. 2.
See Appendix, No. 5.
See Appendix, No. 3.
Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 383, was a suit in state courts against a national bank in default on its notes. The national bank contended that since it was an instrumentality of the Federal Government, it was not subject to suit in state courts. This Court, noting that the suit was in a state court where the bank was located, sustained the power of the state court squarely upon the provisions of § 57. Subsequently, Casey v. Adams, 102 U. S. 66, reaffirmed the mandate of § 57, then Rev. Stat. § 5198, as applied to ordinary transitory actions but held that Congress did not intend it to apply to local, in rem actions. Many years later, in the course of deciding Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461, this Court, in compelling language, pointed out; “For jurisdictional purposes, a national bank is a 'citizen’ of the state in which it is established or located, 28 U. S. C. § 41 (16), and in that district alone can it be sued. 12 U. S. C. § 94.” 331 U. S., at 467.
“This exemption of national banking associations from suits in state courts, established elsewhere than in the county or city in which such associations were located, was, we do not doubt, prescribed for the convenience of those institutions, and to prevent interruption in their business that might result from their books being sent to distant counties in obedience to process from state courts. Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 383, 394; Crocker v. Marine National Bank, 101 Mass. 200 [240]. But, without indulging in conjecture as to the object of the exemption in question, it is sufficient that it was granted by Congress, and, if it had been claimed by the defendant when appearing in the Superior Court of Cleveland County, must have been recognized. The defendant did not, however, choose to claim immunity from suit in that court. It made defence upon the merits, and, having been unsuccessful, prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State, and in the latter tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity granted to it by Congress. This was too late. Considering the object as well as the words of the statute authorizing suit against a national banking asssoeiation to be brought in the proper state court of the county where it is located, we are of opinion that its exemption from suits in other courts of the same State was a personal privilege that it could waive, and which, in this case, the defendant did waive, by appearing and making defence without claiming the immunity granted by Congress. No reason can be suggested why one court of a State, rather than another, both being of the same dignity, should take cognizance of a suit against a national bank, except the convenience of the bank. And this consideration supports the view that the exemption of a national bank from suit in any state court except one of the county or city in which it is located is a personal privilege, which it could claim or not, as it deemed necessary.” 132 U. S.,.at 145.
The lower federal courts have been unanimous in holding the section fully effective and mandatory. Buffum v. Chase Nat. Bank, 192 F. 2d 58 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 944; Leonardi v. Chase Nat. Bank, 81 F. 2d 19 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677; International Refugee Organization v. Bank of America, 86 F- Supp. 884 (S. D. N. Y. 1949); Schmitt v. Tobin, 15 F. Supp. 35 (D. Nev. 1935); Cadle v. Tracy, 4 Fed. Cas. 967, No. 2279 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1873).
The state courts considering the problem are about evenly divided. Some hold that a national bank must be sued in the county where it is situated, Monarch Wine Co. v. Butte, 113 Cal. App. 2d 833, 249 P. 2d 291 (1952); Crocker v. Marine Nat. Bank, 101 Mass. 240 (1869); Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 198 Misc. 312, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 638 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Raiola v. Los Angeles Bank, 133 Misc. 630, 233 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1929); Burns v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 65 N. D. 473, 260 N. W. 253 (1935); Zarbell v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Assn., 52 Wash. 2d 549, 327 P. 2d 436 (1958). Others hold that there is no such requirement on the theory that § 57 of the 1864 Banking Act was impliedly repealed, Fresno Nat. Bank v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. 491, 24 P. 157 (1890); Levitan v. Houghton Nat. Bank, 174 Mich. 566, 140 N. W. 1019 (1913); De Cock v. O’Connell, 188 Minn. 228, 246 N. W. 885 (1933); Stewart v. First Nat. Bank, 93 Mont. 390, 18 P. 2d 801 (1933); Guerra v. Lemburg, 22 S. W. 2d 336 (Tex. Civ. 1929); Brust v. First Nat. Bank, 184 Wis. 15, 198 N. W. 749 (1924), or that the section is to be given a permissive construction, First Nat. Bank v. Alston, 231 Ala. 348, 165 So. 241 (Ala. 1936); Hills v. Burnett, 172 Neb. 370, 109 N. W. 2d 739 (Neb. 1961); Talmage v. Third Nat. Bank, 91 N. Y. 531 (1883); Curlee v. National Bank, 187 N. C. 119, 121 S. E. 194 (1924). See also County of Okeechobee v. Florida Nat. Bank, 112 Ela. 309, 150 So. 124 (1933); Cassatt v. First Nat. Bank, 9 N. J. Misc. 222, 153 A. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Chaffee v. Glens Falls Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 204 Misc. 181; 123 N. Y. S. 2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff’d, 283 App. Div. 793, 128 N. Y. S. 2d 539, appeal denied, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 237.
“Transferred, if Plea Is Sustained.
“If a plea of privilege is sustained, the cause shall not be dismissed, but the court shall transfer said cause to the proper court . . . .” Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. 89 (Vernon 1955).
“Non-Suit.
“At any time before the jury has retired, the plaintiff may take a non-suit, but he shall not thereby prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on his claim for affirmative relief. When the case is tried by the judge, such non-suit may be taken at any time before the decision is announced.” Tex. Rules Civ. Proc. 164 (Vernon 1955).
“Venue, general rule
“4. Defendants in different counties. — If two or more defendants reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any county where one of the defendants resides.” Art. 1995 (4), Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon 1950).
To be sure, Texas law does not permit frivolous joinder of defendants to insure a desired venue, see Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Maples, 127 Tex. 633, 95 S. W. 2d 1300, but nothing before us indicates that appellee will find any difficulty in sustaining his burden to establish that the defendant national banks are residents of Dallas County and that, as he alleges, his cause of action against them has a substantial and valid basis.
See Appendix, No. 6. See note 13, supra, for state cases which have reached the same conclusion.
See Appendix, No. 8.
See Appendix, No. 7.
See Appendix, No. 5.
The proviso to § 4 of the 1882 Act first appeared as an amendment offered on the floor of the House by Representative Hammond, pursuant to the order of the House fixing the assignment of the bill H. R. 4167 as a special order. See 13 Cong. Rec. 3900, 3901. Mr. Hammond succinctly stated the purpose of his amendment as follows: “My amendment, therefore, declares that the jurisdictional limits for and as to a national bank shall be the same as they would be in regard to a State bank actually doing or which might be doing business by its side; that they shall be one and the same.” 13 Cong. Rec., at 4049. Mr. Robinson then asked, “As I understand the gentleman’s proposed amendment, it is simply to this effect, that a national bank doing business within a certain State shall be subject for all purposes of jurisdiction to precisely the same regulations to which a State bank, if organized there, would be subject.” Mr. Hammond replied, “That is all.” Ibid.
The proviso to § 4 of the Act of 1882 is included in the Supplement to the Revised Statutes at 354 (2d ed. 1891), despite the apparent duplication of the Acts of 1887 and 1888, appearing at 614. It does not appear in the 1925 United States Code, the first official restatement since 1878 of all United States statutes presumptively in effect, evidently because the Committee on Revision cited the entire 1882 Act as repealed, 44 Stat. 1833, by the Act of July 1, 1922, c. 257, § 2, 42 Stat. 767. When the 1948 codification of Title 28 was enacted, the proviso to §4 of the Act of 1882 was expressly repealed. 62 Stat. 992, §39 (1948).
The Acts of 1887 and 1888 were repealed when the 1911 codification of the judiciary and judicial procedure provisions was enacted. Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, §297, 36 Stat. 1168. These provisions became § 24 of the Judicial Code of 1911, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 41 (16), and then § 1348 of Title 28 enacted in 1948. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction. The Court uses a variety of means whereby it undertakes to consider cases that it has been petitioned to review. The most important ones are the writ of certiorari, the writ of appeal, and for legacy cases the writ of error, appeal, and certification. For cases that fall into more than one category, identify the manner in which the court takes jurisdiction on the basis of the writ. For example, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), an original jurisdiction and a mandamus case, should be coded as mandamus rather than original jurisdiction due to the nature of the writ. Some legacy cases are "original" motions or requests for the Court to take jurisdiction but were heard or filed in another court. For example, Ex parte Matthew Addy S.S. & Commerce Corp., 256 U.S. 417 (1921) asked the Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a federal judge. Do not code these cases as "original" jurisdiction cases but rather on the basis of the writ. | What is the manner in which the Court took jurisdiction? | [
"cert",
"appeal",
"bail",
"certification",
"docketing fee",
"rehearing or restored to calendar for reargument",
"injunction",
"mandamus",
"original",
"prohibition",
"stay",
"writ of error",
"writ of habeas corpus",
"unspecified, other"
] | [
1
] | sc_jurisdiction |
HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC., et al. v. FALWELL
No. 86-1278.
Argued December 2, 1987
Decided February 24, 1988
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 57. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Alan L. Isaacman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was David O. Carson.
Norman Roy Grutman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jeffrey H. Daichman and Thomas V. Marino.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. by Harriette K. Dorsen, John A '. Powell, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Association of American Editorial Cartoonists et al. by Roslyn A. Mazer and George Kaufmann; for the Association of American Publishers, Inc., by R. Bruce Rich; for Home Box Office, Inc., by P. Cameron DeVore and Daniel M. Waggoner; for the Law & Humanities Institute by Edward de Grazia; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Jane E. Kirtley, Richard M. Schmidt, David Barr, and J. Laurent Scharff; for Richmond Newspapers, Inc., et al. by Alexander Wellford, David C. Kohler, Rodney A. Smolla, William A. Niese, Jeffrey S. Klein, W. Terry Maguire, and Slade R. Met-calf; and for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., by Irwin Karp and I. Fred Koenigsberg.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public affairs, sued petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to recover damages for invasion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court directed a verdict against respondent on the privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a jury. The jury found for petitioners on the defamation claim, but found for respondent on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded damages. We now consider whether this award is consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments- of the United States Constitution.
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the name and picture of respondent and was entitled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time.” This parody was modeled after actual Campari ads that included interviews with various celebrities about their “first times.” Although it was apparent by the end of each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general subject of “first times.” Copying the form and layout of these Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged “interview” with him in which he states that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, “ad parody — not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as “Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.”
Soon after the November issue of Hustler became available to the public, respondent brought this diversity action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia against Hustler Magazine, Inc., Larry C. Flynt, and Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. Respondent stated in his complaint that publication of the ad parody in Hustler entitled him to recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the evidence, the District Court granted a directed verdict for petitioners on the invasion of privacy claim. The jury then found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl. The jury ruled for respondent on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, as well as $50,000 each in punitive damages from petitioners. Petitioners’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against petitioners. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F. 2d 1270 (1986). The court rejected petitioners’ argument that the “actual malice” standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), must be met before respondent can recover for emotional distress. The court agreed that because respondent is concededly a public figure, petitioners are “entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received in [respondent’s] claim for libel.” 797 F. 2d, at 1274. But this does not mean that a literal application of the actual malice rule is appropriate in the context of an emotional distress claim. In the court’s view, the New York Times decision emphasized the constitutional importance not of the falsity of the statement or the defendant’s disregard for the truth, but of the heightened level of culpability embodied in the requirement of “knowing ... or reckless” conduct. Here, the New York Times standard is satisfied by the state-law requirement, and the jury’s finding, that the defendants have acted intentionally or recklessly. The Court of Appeals then went on to reject the contention that because the jury found that the ad parody did not describe actual facts about respondent, the ad was an opinion that is protected by the First Amendment. As the court put it, this was “irrelevant,” as the issue is “whether [the ad’s] publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id., at 1276. Petitioners then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, but this was denied by a divided court. Given the importance of the constitutional issues involved, we granted certiorari. 480 U. S. 945 (1987).
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. “[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty — and thus a good unto itself — but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.” Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 503-504 (1984). We have therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a “false” idea. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 339 (1974). As Justice Holmes wrote, “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are “intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.” Associated Press v. Walker, decided with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665, 673-674 (1944), when he said that “[o]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the fight to criticize public men and measures.” Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks,” New York Times, supra, at 270. “[T]he candidate who vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry ‘Foul!’ when an opponent or an industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 274 (1971).
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in the form of damages. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), we have consistently ruled that a public figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory falsehood, but only if the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id., at 279-280. False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. See Gertz, 418 U. S., at 340, 344, n. 9. But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are “nevertheless inevitable in free debate,” id., at 340, and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual assertions would have an undoubted “chilling” effect on speech relating to public figures that does have constitutional value. “Freedoms of expression require “‘breathing space.’” Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 772 (1986) (quoting New York Times, supra, at 272). This breathing space is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability.
Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because here the State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the person who is the subject of an offensive publication. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562 (1977) (ruling that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to the tort of appropriation of a right of publicity). In respondent’s view, and in the view of the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), we held that even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the First Amendment:
“Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth.” Id., at 73.
Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public figures.
Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject. Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person, literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.” Webster’s New Unabridged Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language 275 (2d ed. 1979). The appeal of the political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically embarrassing events — an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and one-sided. One cartoonist expressed the nature of the art in these words:
“The political cartoon is a weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some politician on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some quarters.” Long, The Political Cartoon: Journalism’s Strongest Weapon, The Quill 56, 57 (Nov. 1962).
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a graphic vendetta against William M. “Boss” Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s “Tweed Ring.” It has been described by one historian of the subject as “a sustained attack which in its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.” M. Keller, The Art and Politics of Thomas Nast 177 (1968). Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was achieved “because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.” C. Press, The Political Cartoon 251 (1981).
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in public and political debate. Nast’s castigation of the Tweed Ring, Walt McDougall’s characterization of Presidential candidate James G. Blaine’s banquet with the millionaires at Delmonico’s as “The Royal Feast of Belshazzar,” and numerous other efforts have undoubtedly had an effect on the course and outcome of contemporaneous debate. Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been considerably poorer without them.
Respondent contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so “outrageous” as to distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm. But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description “outrageous” does not supply one. “Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An “outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 910 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action”). And, as we stated in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978):
“[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.” Id., at 745-746.
See also Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“It is firmly settled that . . . the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers”).
Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are subject to limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation, that speech that is “ ‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking’” is “not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances. ” 438 U. S., at 747. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), we held that a State could lawfully punish an individual for the use of insulting “‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id., at 571-572. These limitations are but recognition of the observation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 758 (1985), that this Court has “long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.” But the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by any exception to the general First Amendment principles stated above.
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,” i. e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. This is not' merely a “blind application” of the New York Times standard, see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 390 (1967), it reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a “public figure” for purposes of First Amendment law. The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. Cl. The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody “was not reasonably believable,” 797 F. 2d, at 1278, and in accordance with our custom we accept this finding. Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional infliction of emotional distress by “outrageous” conduct. But for reasons heretofore stated this claim cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
While the case was pending, the ad parody was published in Hustler Magazine a second time.
The jury found no liability on the part of Flynt Distributing Co., Inc. It is consequently not a party to this appeal.
Under Virginia law, in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct (1) is intentional or reckless; (2) offends generally accepted standards of decency or morality; (3) is causally connected with the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) caused emotional distress that was severe. 797 F. 2d, at 1275, n. 4 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S. E. 2d 145 (1974)).
The court below also rejected several other contentions that petitioners do not raise in this appeal.
Neither party disputes this conclusion. Respondent is the host of a nationally syndicated television show and was the founder and president of a political organization formerly known as the Moral Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author of several books and publications. Who’s Who in America 849 (44th ed. 1986-1987). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
PALMER OIL CORP. et al. v. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORP. et al.
NO. 301.
Argued April 25, 1952.
Decided May 12, 1952.
Mark H. Adams argued the cause for appellants in No. 301. With him on the brief were Charles E. Jones and Coleman Hayes.
Reford Bond, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for appellants in No. 302.
R. M. Williams argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Harry D. Page and Booth Kellough for the Amerada Petroleum Corp., W. H. Brown for the Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., Gentry Lee and R. O. Mason for the Cities Service Oil Co., Villard Martin for the Foster Petroleum Corp., Archie D. Gray and James B. Diggs, Jr. for the Gulf Oil Corp., Earl A. Brown and Robert W. Richards for the Magnolia Petroleum Co., Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner and Mr. Williams for the Phillips Petroleum Co., V. P. Crowe for the Stephens Petroleum Co. et al., M. Darwin Kirk for the Sunray Oil Corp. and Ferrill H. Rogers for the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, appellees.
Per Curiam.
These two appeals challenge the constitutionality of Okla. Stat., 1941 (Cum. Supp. 1949), Tit. 52, §§ 286.1-286.17, providing for unitized management of common sources of supply of oil and gas in Oklahoma. This statute was repealed by the Oklahoma Legislature on May 26, 1951, Okla. Laws 1951, c. 3a, § 16, p. 142, and we ordered the causes continued in order to determine the effect of this repeal on the matters raised in these appeals. 342 U. S. 35 (1951). After being advised by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma that this repeal had no effect on these causes, we noted probable jurisdiction and heard argument.
Appellants contend that this statute and an order issued thereunder by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission impair their contractual rights in violation of U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, and amount to a denial of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, appellants argue that the statute is an unreasonable exercise of the State’s police power and an unreasonable delegation of legislative and judicial power to private groups. In addition, appellants maintain that the statute is too vague and indefinite to furnish the Commission with any reasonable guide for the issuance of orders approving unitization plans, and that the evidence does not support the Commission’s findings of fact.
In the light of our previous decisions, appellants have failed to raise any substantial federal questions and the appeals are therefore dismissed. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179 (1950); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570 (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, as amended, 311 U. S. 614, 615 (1940); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939); Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 435, 436, 437 (1934); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
Dismissed. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
157
] | sc_casesource |
PINTER et al. v. DAHL et al.
No. 86-805.
Argued December 9, 1987
Decided June 15, 1988
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and BRENNAN, White, Marshall, O’ConnoR, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 655. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decisión of the case.
Braden W. Sparks argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners. Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for the Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Daniel L. Goelzer, Paul Gonson, Jacob H. Stillman, and Max Berueffy.
John A. Spinuzzi argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Michael F. Linz.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented by this case are (a) whether the common-law in pari delicto defense is available in a private action brought under § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., for the rescission of the sale of unregistered securities, and (b) whether one must intend to confer a benefit on himself or on a third party in order to qualify as a “seller” within the meaning of § 12(1).
I
The controversy arises out of the sale prior to 1982 of unregistered securities (fractional undivided interests in oil and gas leases) by petitioner Billy J. “B. J.” Pinter to respondents Maurice Dahl and Dahl’s friends, family, and business associates. Pinter is an oil and gas producer in Texas and Oklahoma, and a registered securities, dealer in Texas. Dahl is a California real estate broker and investor, who, at the time of his dealings with Pinter, was a veteran of two unsuccessful oil and gas ventures. In pursuit of further investment opportunities, Dahl employed an oil field expert to locate and acquire oil and gas leases. This expert introduced Dahl to Pinter. Dahl advanced $20,000 to Pinter to acquire leases, with the understanding that they would be held in the name of Pinter’s Black Gold Oil Company and that Dahl would have a right of first refusal to drill certain wells on the leasehold properties. Pinter located leases in Oklahoma, and Dahl toured the properties, often without Pinter, in order to talk to others and “get a feel for the properties.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32. Upon examining the geology, drilling logs, and production history assembled by Pinter, Dahl concluded, in the words of the District Court, that “there was no way to lose.” Ibid.
After investing approximately $310,000 in the properties, Dahl told the other respondents about the venture. Except for Dahl and respondent Grantham, none of the respondents spoke to or met Pinter or toured the properties. Because of Dahl’s involvement in the venture, each of the other respondents decided to invest about $7,500.
Dahl assisted his fellow investors in completing the subscription-agreement form prepared by Pinter. Each letter-contract signed by the purchaser stated that the participating interests were being sold without the benefit of registration under the Securities Act, in reliance on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) Rule 146, 17 CFR §230.146 (1982). In fact, the oil and gas interests involved in this suit were never registered with the Commission. Respondents’ investment checks were made payable to Black Gold Oil Company. Dahl received no commission from Pinter in connection with the other respondents’ purchases.
When the venture failed and their interests proved to be worthless, respondents brought suit against Pinter in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking rescission under § 12(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. §77l(1), for the . unlawful sale of unregistered securities.
In a counterclaim, Pinter alleged that Dahl, by means of fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment of facts, induced Pinter to sell and deliver the securities. Pinter averred that Dahl falsely assured Pinter that he would provide other qualified, sophisticated, and knowledgeable investors with all the information necessary for evaluation of the investment. Dahl allegedly agreed to raise the funds for the venture from those investors, with the understanding that Pinter would simply be the “operator” of the wells. App. 69-73. Pinter also asserted, on the basis of the same factual allegations, that Dahl’s suit was barred by the equitable defenses of estoppel and in pari delicto. Id., at 66-67.
The District Court, after a bench trial, granted judgment for respondent-investors. Id., at 92. The court concluded that Pinter had not proved that the oil and gas interests were entitled to the private-offering exemption from registration. App. to Pet. for Cert. a-37. Accordingly, the court ruled that, because the securities were unregistered, respondents were entitled to rescission pursuant to § 12(1). Ibid.' The court also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Pinter’s counterclaim against Dahl. The District Court made no mention of the equitable defenses asserted by Pinter, but it apparently rejected them.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 787 F. 2d 985 (1986). The court first held that Dahl’s involvement in the sales to the other respondents did not give Pinter an in pari delicto defense to Dahl’s recovery.' Id., at 988. The court concluded that the defense is not available in an action under § 12(1) because that section creates “a strict liability offense” rather than liability based on intentional misconduct. It thereby distinguished our recent decision in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U. S. 299 (1985), where we held that the in pari delicto defense is applicable in an action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), which contains an element of scienter. Noting that Dahl was “as ‘culpable’ as Pinter in the sense that his conduct was an equal producing cause of the illegal transaction,” the court nevertheless held that “[a]b'sent a showing that Dahl’s conduct was ‘offensive to the dictates of natural justice,”’ the in pari delicto defense was not available. 787 F. 2d, at 988, quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U. S. 240, 245 (1933).
The Court of Appeals next considered whether Dahl was himself a “seller” of the oil and gas interests within the meaning of § 12(1), for if he was, the court assumed, he could be held liable in contribution for the other plaintiffs’ claims against Pinter. 787 F. 2d, at 990, and n. 8. Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the court described a statutory seller as “(1) one who parts with title to securities in exchange for consideration or (2) one whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.” Id., at 990. While acknowledging that Dahl’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing the other plaintiffs to purchase securities from Pinter, the court declined to hold that Dahl was a “seller” for purposes of § 12(1). Instead, the court went on to refine its test to include a threshold requirement that one who acts as a “promoter” be “motivated by a desire to confer a direct or indirect benefit on someone other than the person he has. advised to purchase.” 787 F. 2d, at 991. The court reasoned that “a rule imposing liability (without fault or knowledge) on friends and family members who give one another gratuitous advice on investment matters unreasonably interferes with well-established patterns of social discourse.” Ibid. Accordingly, since the court found no evidence that Dahl sought or received any financial benefit in return for his advice, it declined to impose liability on Dahl for “mere gregariousness.” Ibid.
The dissenting judge took issue with the majority’s analysis on both points. First, assuming that this Court’s decision in Bateman Eichler applied to all securities cases, the dissent concluded that Dahl’s suit should be barred by the in pari de-licto doctrine because Dahl was a “catalyst” for the entire transaction and knew that the securities were unregistered. 787 F. 2d, at 991. In addition, the dissent maintained that Dahl’s conduct transformed him into a “seller” of unregistered securities to the other plaintiffs under the Fifth Circuit’s established “substantial factor” test. Id., at 991-992. It added that, even under the majority’s expectation-of-financial-benefit refinement, Dahl’s promotional activities rendered him a “seller” because “[m]ore investors means that the investment program receives the requisite amount of financing at a smaller risk to each investor.” Id., at 992, n. 3.
The Court of Appeals, by an 8-to-6 vote, denied rehearing en banc. 794 F. 2d 1016 (1986). The judges who dissented from that denial asserted that the panel majority’s addition of the financial-benefit requirement to the definition of a “seller,” “has absolutely no foundation in either settled securities law or its underlying policies.” Id., at 1017. They also criticized the panel majority for misinterpreting Bate-man Eichler to limit application of the in pari delicto doctrine to fraud actions under § 10(b). 794 F. 2d, at 1017.
Because of the importance of the issues involved to the administration of the federal securities laws, we granted certiorari. 481 U. S. 1012 (1987).
hH hH
The equitable defense of in pan delicto, which literally means “in equal fault,” is rooted in the common-law notion that a plaintiff’s recovery may be barred by his own wrongful conduct. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 306, and nn. 12 and 13. Traditionally, the defense was limited to situations where the plaintiff bore “at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury,” id., at 307, and where the parties’ culpability arose out of the same illegal act. 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence 399-400 (14th ed. 1918). Contemporary courts have expanded the defense’s application to situations more closely analogous to those encompassed by the “unclean hands” doctrine, where the plaintiff has participated “in some of the same sort of wrongdoing” as the defendant. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U. S. 134, 138 (1968). In Perma Life, however, the Court concluded that this broadened construction is not appropriate in litigation arising under federal regulatory statutes. Ibid. Nevertheless, in separate'opinions, five Justices recognized that a narrow, more traditional formulation should be available in private actions under the antitrust laws. See id., at 145 (White, J., concurring); id., at 147-148 (Fortas, J., concurring in result); id., at 148-149, 151 (Marshall, J., concurring in result); id., at 154-155 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Bateman Eichler, the Court addressed the scope of the in pari delicto defense in the context of an action brought by securities investors under the antifraud provisions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that the broker-dealer and corporate insider defendants had induced the plaintiffs to purchase large quantities of stock by divulging false and materially incomplete information on the pretext that it was accurate inside information. The defendants argued that the scope should be broader where the private cause of action is implied, as in a § 10(b) action, rather than expressly provided by Congress, as in an antitrust action. The Court rejected this distinction, concluding that “the views expressed in Perma Life apply with full force to implied causes of action under the federal securities laws.” 472 U. S., at 310. Accordingly, it held that the in pari delicto defense is available “only where (1) as a direct result of his own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the violations he seeks to redress, and (2) preclusion of suit would not significantly interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and protection of the investing public.” Id., at 310-311. The first prong of this test captures the essential elements of the classic in pari delicto doctrine. See id., at 307. The second prong, which embodies the doctrine’s traditional requirement that public' policy implications be carefully considered before the defense is allowed, see ibid., ensures that the broad judge-made law does not undermine the congressional policy favoring private suits as an important mode of enforcing federal securities statutes. Cf. Perma Life, 392 U. S., at 139-140. Applying this test to the § 10(b) claim before it, the Court concluded that in such tipster-tippee situations, the two factors precluded recognition of the in pari delicto defense. Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 317.
A
We do not share the Court of Appeals’ narrow vision of the applicability of Bateman Eichler. Nothing in this Court’s opinion in that case suggests that the in pari delicto defense is limited to § 10(b) claims. Nor does the opinion suggest that the doctrine applies only when the plaintiff’s fault is intentional or willful.
We feel that the Court of Appeals’ notion that the in pari delicto defense should not be allowed in actions involving strict liability offenses is without support in history or logic. The doctrine traditionally has been applied in any action based on conduct that “transgresses statutory prohibitions.” 2 Restatement of Contracts § 598, Comment.» (1932). Courts have recognized the defense in cases involving strict liability offenses. See, e. g., UFITEC, S. A. v. Carter, 20 Cal. 3d 238, 250, 571 P. 2d 990, 996-997 (1977) (violation of Federal Reserve margin requirements); Miller v. California Roofing Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 136, 130 P. 2d 740 (1942) (sale of stock without permit from State Corporation Commission). One of the premises on which the in pari delicto doctrine is grounded is that “denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an effective means of deterring illegality.” Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 306. The need to deter illegal conduct is not eliminated simply because a statute creates a strict liability offense rather than punishing willful or neglir gent misconduct. Regardless of the degree of scienter, there may be circumstances in which the statutory goal of deterring illegal conduct is served more effectively by preclusion of suit than by recovery. In those circumstances, the in pari delicto defense should be afforded. Cf. A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U. S. 38, 43-44, and n. 2 (1941).
In Bateman Eichler, the Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict of authority “over the proper scope of the in pari delicto defense in securities litigation.” 472 U. S., at 305. The Court formulated the standards under which the defense should be recognized in language applicable generally to federal securities litigation. The formulation was articulated in the specific context of deciding when “a private action for damages [in implied causes of action under the federal securities laws] may be barred on the grounds of the plaintiff’s own culpability.” Id., at 310. Nevertheless, the Court’s rejection of the distinction between implied and express private causes of action, especially when considered in light of the broad question on which the Court granted certio-rari, makes clear that the Court assumed that the in pari de-licto defense should be equally available when Congress expressly provides for private remedies. Thus, we conclude that Bateman Eichler provides the appropriate test for allowance of the in pari delicto defense in a private- action under any of the federal securities laws.
Our task, then, is to determine whether, pursuant to this test, recognition of the defense is proper in a suit for rescission brought under § 12(1) of the Securities Act. All parties in this case, as well as the Commission, maintain that the defense should be available. We agree, but find it necessary to circumscribe the scope of its application.
B
Under the first prong of the Bateman Eichler test, as we have noted above, a defendant cannot escape liability unless, as a direct result of the plaintiff’s own actions, the plaintiff bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the underlying illegality. The plaintiff must be an active, voluntary participant in the unlawful activity that is the subject of the suit. See Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591, 604 (CA5 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976); see also Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 312. “Plaintiffs who are truly in pari delicto are those who have themselves violated the law in cooperation with the defendant.” Perma Life, 392 U. S., at 153 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Unless the degrees of fault are essentially indistinguishable or the plaintiff’s responsibility is clearly greater, the in pari delicto defense should not be allowed, and the plaintiff should be compensated. See id., at 146 (White, J., concurring); id., at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring in result); id., at 149 (Marshall, J., concurring in result); Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 312-314. Refusal of relief to those less blameworthy would frustrate the purpose of the securities laws; it would not serve to discourage the actions of those most responsible for organizing forbidden schemes; and it would sacrifice protection of the general investing public in pursuit of individual punishment. See Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373 (CA10 1964).
In the context of a private action under § 12(1), the first prong of the Bateman Eichler test is satisfied if the plaintiff is at least equally responsible for the actions that render the sale of the unregistered securities illegal — the issuer’s failure to register the securities before offering them for sale, or his failure to conduct the sale in such a manner as to meet the registration exemption provisions. As the parties and the Commission agree, a purchaser’s knowledge that the securities are unregistered cannot, by itself, constitute equal culpability, even where the investor is a sophisticated buyer who may not necessarily need the protection of the Securities Act. Barring the investor’s recovery under the in pari de-licto doctrine, “at least on the basis solely of the buyer’s knowledge of the violation, is so foreign to the purpose of the section that there is hardly a trace of it in the decisions under ... § 12(1).” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1694 (2d ed. 1961). Although a court’s assessment of the relative responsibility of the plaintiff will necessarily vary depending on the facts of the particular case, courts frequently have focused on the extent to which the plaintiff and the defendant cooperated in developing and carrying out the scheme to distribute unregistered securities. See, e. g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F. 2d 1046, 1054 (CA2 1969); Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F. 2d 1283, 1292-1293 (CA4 1978); Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975). In addition, if the plaintiff were found to have induced the issuer not to register, he well might be precluded from obtaining § 12(1) rescission.
Under the second prong of the Bateman Eichler test, a plaintiff’s recovery may be barred only if preclusion of suit does not offend the underlying statutory policies. The primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of material information thought necessary to allow them to make informed investment decisions concerning public offerings of securities in interstate commerce. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119, 124 (1953); A. C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U. S., at 43, and n. 2. See H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The registration requirements are the heart of the Act, and § 12(1) imposes strict liability for violating those requirements. Liability under § 12(1) is a particularly important enforcement tool, because in many instances a private suit is the only effective means of detecting and deterring a seller’s wrongful failure to register securities before offering them for sale. Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F. 2d, at 1293, citing Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d, at 605. See also Bateman Eichler, 472 U. S., at 310.
In our view, where the § 12(1) plaintiff is primarily an investor, precluding suit would interfere significantly with effective enforcement of the securities laws and frustrate the primary objective of the Securities Act. The Commission, too, takes this position. Because the Act is specifically designed to protect investors, even where a plaintiff actively participates in the distribution of unregistered securities, his suit should not be barred where his promotional efforts are incidental to his role as an investor. See Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F. 2d, at 373-374 (plaintiff’s “relationship as a pure investor became adulterated when she actively assisted in selling others but she at no time had the degree of culpability attributed to defendants and should not be considered as in pari delicto,"). Cf. Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385, 389 (Colo. 1960) (barring recovery to plaintiff who participated extensively as promoter of unlawful securities distribution). Thus, the in pari delicto defense may defeat recovery in a § 12(1) action only where the plaintiff’s role in the offering or sale of nonexempted, unregistered securities is more as a promoter than as an investor.
Whether the plaintiff in a particular case is primarily an investor or primarily a promoter depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to trial courts. These factors include the extent of the plaintiff’s financial involvement compared to that of third parties solicited by the plaintiff, compare Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, supra, with Athas v. Day, supra; the incidental nature of the plaintiff’s promotional activities, see Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d, at 980; the benefits received by the plaintiff from his promotional activities; and the extent of the plaintiff’s involvement in the planning stages of the offering (such as whether the plaintiff has arranged an underwriting or prepared the offering materials). We do not mean to suggest that these factors provide conclusive evidence of culpable promotional activity, or that they constitute an exhaustive list of factors to be considered. The courts are free, in the exercise of their sound discretion, to consider whatever facts are relevant to the inquiry.
C
Given the record in this case, we cannot ascertain whether Pinter may successfully assert an in pari delicto defense against Dahl’s §12(1) claim. The District Court’s findings in this case are not adequate to determine whether Dahl bears at least substantially equal responsibility for the failure to register the oil and gas interests or to distribute the securities in a manner that conformed with the statutory exemption, and whether he was primarily a promoter of the offering. The findings indicate, on the one hand, that Dahl may have participated in initiating the entire investment, and that he loaned money to Pinter and solicited his associates’ participation in the venture, but, on the other hand, that Dahl invested substantially more money than the other investor-respondents, expected and received no commission for his endeavors, and drafted none of the offering documents. Furthermore, the District Court made no findings as to who was responsible for the failure to register or for the manner in which the offering was conducted. Those findings will be made on the remand of this case for further proceedings.
Ill
What we have said as to the availability to Pinter of the in pari delicto defense against Dahl’s § 12(1) action does not obviate the need to consider the second question presented by petitioners. We turn now to that issue.
In determining whether Dahl may be deemed a “seller” for purposes of § 12(1), such that he may be held liable for the sale of unregistered securities to the other investor-respondents, we look first at the language of § 12(1). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197 (1976). That statute provides, in pertinent part: “Any person who . . . offers or sells a security” in violation of the registration requirement of the Securities Act “shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him.” 15 U. S. C. §77(. This provision defines the class of defendants who may be subject to liability as those who offer or sell unregistered securities. But the Securities Act nowhere delineates who may be regarded as a statutory seller, and the sparse legislative history sheds no light on the issue. The courts, on their part, have not defined the term uniformly.
At the very least, however, the language of § 12(1) contemplates a buyer-seller relationship not unlike traditional contractual privity. Thus, it is settled that § 12(1) imposes liability on the owner who passed title, or other interest in the security, to the buyer for value. See Loss, at 1016. Dahl, of course, was not a seller in this conventional sense, and therefore may be held liable only if § 12(1) liability extends to persons other than the person who passes title.
A
In common parlance, a person may offer or sell property without necessarily being the person who transfers title to, or other interest in, that property. We need not rely entirely on ordinary understanding of the statutory language, however, for the Securities Act defines the operative terms of §12(1). Section 2(3) defines “sale” or “sell” to include “every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value,” and the terms “offer to sell,” “offer for sale,” or “offer” to include “every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.” 15 U. S. C. § 77b(3). Under these definitions, the range of persons potentially liable under § 12(1) is not limited to persons who pass title. The inclusion of the phrase “solicitation of an offer to buy” within the definition of “offer” brings an individual who engages in solicitation, an activity not inherently confined to the actual owner, within the scope of § 12. See Loss, at 1016; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 206-207 (1933). Indeed, the Court has made clear, in the context of interpreting § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. §77q(a), that transactions other than traditional sales of securities are within the scope of § 2(3) and passage of title is not important. See United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 773 (1979). We there explained: “The statutory terms [“offer” and “sell”], which Congress expressly intended to define broadly, . . . are expansive enough to encompass the entire selling process, including the seller/agent transaction.” Ibid. See also Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981) (“It is not essential under the terms of the Act that full title pass to a transferee for the transaction to be an ‘offer’ or a ‘sale’ ”).
Determining that the activity in question falls within the definition of “offer” or “sell” in § 2(3), however, is only half of the analysis. The second clause of § 12(1), which provides that only a defendant “from” whom the plaintiff “purchased” securities may be liable, narrows the field of potential sellers. Several courts and commentators have stated that the purchase requirement necessarily restricts § 12 primary liability to the owner of the security. E. g., Beck v. Cantor, Fitzgerald & Co., 621 F. Supp. 1547, 1560-1561 (ND Ill. 1985); Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: “Participation” and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 Ford. Urban L. J. 877 (1987); see also Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F. 2d 110, 113 (CA3 1979) (absent some “special relationship” — e. g., control — §12 requires privity between statutory seller and buyer). In effect, these authorities interpret the term “purchase” as complementary to only the term “sell” defined in § 2(3). Thus, an offeror, as defined by § 2(3), may incur § 12 liability only if the offeror also “sells” the security to the plaintiff, in the sense of transferring title for value. Abrams, 15 Ford. Urban L. J., at 922-923.
We do not read § 12(1) so restrictively. The purchase requirement clearly confines § 12 liability to those situations in which a sale has taken place. Thus, a prospectiye buyer has no recourse against a person who touts unregistered securities to him if he does not purchase the securities. Loss, at 884. The requirement, however, does riot exclude solicitation from the category of activities that may render a person liable when a sale has taken place. A natural reading of the statutory language would include in the statutory seller status at least some persons who urged the buyer to purchase. For example, a securities vendor’s agent who solicited the purchase would commonly be said, and would be thought by the buyer, to be among those “from” whom the buyer “purchased,” even though the agent himself did not pass title. See Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. 2d 988, 990 (CA1) (finding broker acting as agent of the owner liable as a statutory seller), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 705 (1940).
The Securities Act does not define the term “purchase.” The soundest interpretation of the term, however, is as a correlative to both “sell” and “offer,” at least to the extent that the latter entails active solicitation of an offer to buy. This interpretation is supported by the history of the phrase “offers or sells,” as it is used in § 12(1). As enacted in 1933, § 12(1) imposed liability on “[a]ny person who . . . sells a security.” 48 Stat. 84. The statutory definition of “sell” included “offer” and the activities now encompassed by that term, including solicitation. Id., at 74. The words “offer or” were added to § 12(1) by the 1954 amendments to the Securities Act, when the original definition of “sell” in § 2(3) was split into separate definitions of “sell” and “offer” in order to accommodate changes in §5. 68 Stat. 683, 686. Since “sells” and “purchases” have obvious correlative meanings, Congress’ express definition of “sells” in the original Securities Act to include solicitation suggests that the class of those from whom the buyer “purchases” extended to persons who solicit him. The 1954 amendment to § 12(1) was intended to preserve existing law, including the liability provisions of the Act. H. R. Rep. No. 1542, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1036, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1954); Loss, at 884. Hence, there is no reason to think Congress intended to narrow the meaning of “purchased from” when it amended the statute to include “solicitation” in the statutory definition of “offer” alone.
The applicability of § 12 liability to brokers and others who solicit securities purchases has been recognized frequently since the passage of the Securities Act. It long has been “quite clear,” that when a broker acting as agent of one of the principals to the transaction successfully solicits a purchase, he is a person from whom the buyer purchases within the meaning of § 12 and is therefore liable as a statutory seller. See Loss, at 1016. Indeed, courts had found liability on this basis prior to the 1954 amendment of the statute. See, e. g., Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854, 858 (Neb. 1954), aff’d sub nom. Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F. 2d 868, 873 (CA8 1955) (principal and its agents); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F. 2d 875, 879 (CA2 1948) (seller’s broker); Cady v. Murphy, supra (seller’s broker); Boehm v. Granger, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 246, 248 (Sup. 1943), aff’d, 268 App. Div. 855, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 845 (1944) (buyer’s broker). Had Congress intended liability to be restricted to those who pass title, it could have effectuated its intent by not adding the phrase “offers or” when it split the definition of “sell” in § 2(3).
An interpretation of statutory seller that includes brokers and others who solicit offers to purchase securities furthers the purposes of the Securities Act — to promote full and fair disclosure of information to the public in the sales of securities. In order to effectuate Congress’ intent that § 12(1) civil liability be in terrorem, see Douglas & Bates, 43 Yale L. J., at 173; Shulman, 43 Yale L. J., at 227, the risk of its invocation should be felt by solicitors of purchases. The solicitation of a buyer is perhaps the most critical stage of the selling transaction. It is the first stage of a traditional securities sale to involve the buyer, and it is directed at producing the sale. In addition, brokers and other solicitors are well positioned to control the flow of information to a potential purchaser, and, in fact, such persons are the participants in the selling transaction who most often disseminate material information to investors. Thus, solicitation is the stage at which an investor is most likely to be injured, that is, by being persuaded to purchase securities without full and fair information. Given Congress’ overriding goal of preventing this injury, we may infer that Congress intended solicitation to fall under the mantle of § 12(1).
Although we conclude that Congress intended § 12(1) liability to extend to those who solicit securities purchases, we share the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Congress did not intend to impose rescission based on strict liability on a person who urges the purchase but whose motivation is solely to benefit the buyer. When a person who urges another to make a securities purchase acts merely to assist the buyer, not only is it uncommon to say that the buyer “purchased” from him, but it is also strained to describe the giving of gratuitous advice, even strongly or enthusiastically, as “soliciting.” Section 2(3) defines an offer as a “solicitation of an offer to buy ... for value.” The person who gratuitously urges another to make a particular investment decision is not, in any meaningful sense, requesting value in exchange for his suggestion or seeking the value the titleholder will obtain in exchange for the ultimate sale. The language and purpose of § 12(1) suggest that liability extends only to the person who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner. If he had such a motivation, it is fair to say that the buyer “purchased” the security from him and to align him with the owner in a rescission action.
B
Petitioner is not satisfied with extending § 12(1) primary liability to one . who solicits securities sales for financial gain. Pinter assumes, without explication, that liability is not limited to the person who actually parts title with the securities, and urges us to validate, as the standard by which additional defendant-sellers are identified, that version of the “substantial factor” test utilized by the Fifth Circuit before the refinement espoused in this case. Under that approach, grounded in tort doctrine, a nontransferor § 12(1) seller is defined as one "whose participation in the buy-sell transaction is a substantial factor in causing the transaction to take place.” Pharo v. Smith, 621 F. 2d 656, 667 (CA5 1980). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Dahl would be liable as a statutory seller under this test. 787 F. 2d, at 990.
We do not agree that Congress contemplated imposing § 12(1) liability under the broad terms petitioners advocate. There is no support in the statutory language or legislative history for expansion of § 12(1) primary liability beyond persons who pass title and persons who “offer,” including those who “solicit” offers. Indeed, § 12’s failure to impose express liability for mere participation in unlawful sales transactions suggests that Congress did not intend that the section impose liability on participants collateral to the offer or sale. When Congress wished to create such liability, it had little trouble doing so. Cf. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 572 (1979).
The deficiency of the substantial-factor test is that it divorces the analysis of seller status from any reference to the applicable statutory language and from any examination of §12 in the context of the total statutory scheme. Those courts that have adopted the approach have not attempted to ground their analysis in the statutory language. See n. 25, supra. Instead, they substitute the concept of substantial participation in the sales transaction, or proximate causation of the plaintiff’s purchase, for the words “offers or sells” in §12. The “purchase from” requirement of §12 focuses on the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff-purchaser. The substantial-factor test, on the other hand, focuses on the defendant’s degree of involvement in the securities transaction and its surrounding circumstances. Thus, although the substantial-factor test undoubtedly embraces persons who pass title and who solicit the purchase of unregistered securities as statutory sellers, the test also would extend § 12(1) liability to participants only remotely related to the relevant aspects of the sales transaction. Indeed, it might expose securities professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their professional services, to § 12(1) strict liability for rescission. The buyer does not, in any meaningful sense, “purchas[e] the security from” such a person.
Further, no congressional intent to incorporate tort law doctrines of reliance and causation into § 12(1) emerges from the language or the legislative history of the statute. Indeed, the striet liability nature of the statutory cause of action suggests the opposite. See Douglas & Bates, 43 Yale L. J., at 177. By injecting these concepts into § 12(1) litigation, the substantial-factor test introduces an element of uncertainty into an area that demands certainty and predictability. As the Fifth Circuit has conceded, the test affords no guidelines for distinguishing between the defendant whose conduct rises to a level of significance sufficient to trigger seller status, and the defendant whose conduct is not sufficiently integral to the sale. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F. 2d, at 667. None of the courts employing the approach has articulated what measure of participation qualifies a person for seller status, and logically sound limitations would be difficult to develop. As a result, decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, offering little predictive value to participants in securities transactions. See Croy v. Campbell, 624 F. 2d 709, 714 (CA5 1980); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F. 2d, at 667. We find it particularly unlikely that Congress would have ordained sub silentio the imposition of strict liability on such an unpredictably defined class of defendants.
Not surprisingly, Pinter makes no attempt to justify the substantial-factor test as a matter of statutory construction. Instead, the sole justification Pinter advances is that extending § 12 liability pursuant to the test protects investors and serves the “remedial purposes” of the Securities Act. See also, e. g., Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (ND Ohio 1964). The Court has acknowledged that “it is proper for a court to consider . . . policy considerations in construing terms in [the federal securities] Acts.” Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U. S. 681, 695, n. 7 (1985). And the Court has recognized that Congress had “broad remedial goals” in enacting the securities laws and providing civil reme-dies. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 200; Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967). Accordingly, the Court itself has construed securities law provisions “ ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’” Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 (1963). But the Court never has conducted its analysis entirely apart from the statutory language. “The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S., at 578. The ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act must rest primarily on the language of that section. See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 472 (1977). The broad remedial goals of the Securities Act are insufficient justification for interpreting a specific provision “‘more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.’” Touche Ross, 442 U. S., at 578, quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). We must assume that Congress meant what it said.
The substantial-factor test reaches participants in sales transactions who do not even arguably fit within the definitions set out in § 2(3); it “would add a gloss to the operative language of [§ 12(1)] quite different from its commonly accepted meaning.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 199. We conclude that Congress did not intend such a gross departure from the statutory language. Accordingly, we need not entertain Pinter’s policy arguments. Being merely a “substantial factor” in causing the sale of unregistered securities is not sufficient in itself to render a defendant liable under § 12(1).
C
We are unable to determine whether Dahl may be held liable as a statutory seller under § 12(1). .The District Court explicitly found that “Dahl solicited each of the other plaintiffs (save perhaps Grantham) in connection with the offer, purchase, and receipt of their oil and gas interests.” App. to Pet. for Cert. a-34. We cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous. It is not clear, however, that Dahl had the kind of interest in the sales that make him liable as a statutory seller. We do know that he received no commission from Pinter in connection with the other sales, but this is not conclusive. Typically, a person who solicits the purchase will have sought or received a personal financial benefit from the sale, such as where he “anticipat[es] a share of the profits,” Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F. 2d, at 1288, or receives a brokerage commission, Cady v. Murphy, 113 F. 2d, at 990. But a person who solicits the buyer’s purchase in order to serve the financial interests of the owner may properly be liable under § 12(1) without showing that he expects to participate in the benefits the owner enjoys.
The Court of Appeals apparently concluded that Dahl was motivated entirely by a gratuitous desire to share an attractive investment opportunity with his friends and associates. See 787 F. 2d, at 991. This conclusion, in our view, was premature. The District Court made no findings that focused on whether Dahl urged the other purchases in order to further some financial interest of his own or of Pinter. Accordingly, further findings are necessary to assess Dahl’s liability.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Petitioners are Pinter, individually and d.b.a. Black Gold Oil Company, Pinter Energy Company, and Pinter Oil Company. Throughout this opinion, we often refer to petitioners collectively as “Pinter.”
Respondents are Maurice Dahl, Gary Clark, W. Grantham, Robert J. Daniele, Charles Dahl, Dowayne C. Bockman, Ray Dilbeck, Richard Koon, Art Overgaard, Jack Yeager, Accra Tronics Seals Corp., and Aaron Heller. These are Dahl’s brother, his accountant, his partner in a construction business, the bank officer handling his construction loans, his construction-business insurance agent, a business owned by a longtime friend, and other business associates and friends of Maurice Dahl. See App. 101-104.
The venture included still others who were either interested in additional ventures organized by Pinter or were new investors who met Pinter through sources other than Dahl. Those investors are not parties to this litigation.
Specifically, each document recited:
“WHEREAS the parties constitute a predetermined and limited group of sophisticated and knowledgeable well informed investors who desire to arrange for participation in an oil and/or gas drilling venture as an investment and do declare that it is not for the purpose of reselling their interest therein. (These participating interests are being sold without the benefit of registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and on reb-anee of rule 146 thereunder).” App. 95.
See also n. 4, infra.
Rule 146 was rescinded, effective June 30,1982, by SEC Release No. 33-6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (1982), and superseded by provisions of Regulation D, 17 CFR, p. 425 (1987).
Section 12 provides:
“Any person who — (1) offers or sells a security in violation of section [5] . . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him,, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.”
Section 5, 15 U. S. C. § 77e, referred to in § 12, states, in pertinent part, that if a security is unregistered, it is unlawful for a person to sell or deliver the security in interstate commerce.
A number of exemptions, however, enable an issuer to avoid the registration requirement of the Securities Act. One of these, § 4(2), 15 U. S. C. §77d(2), commonly referred to as the “private-offering” exemption, relieves from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.” See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U. S. 119 (1953) (establishing criteria for determining whether an offering fits the private-offering exemption).
In 1974, the Commission sought to provide “objective standards” under §4(2) by adopting Rule 146. Rule 146 — Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering, Securities Act Rel. No. 33-5487 (effective June 10, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 15261 (1974), CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. ¶ 2710, p. 2902. It has been said that the Rule, which is now superseded by provisions of Regulation D, see n. 3, supra, provided that a transaction by an issuer would not be deemed to involve a public offering within the meaning of § 4(2) if it was part of an offering that met the following conditions:
“[T]he offering must 1) not be made by any means or form of general solicitation or advertising; 2) be made only to those persons whom the issuer has reasonable grounds to believe are of knowledge and experience which would enable them to evaluate the merits of the issue or who are financially able to bear the risk; 3) be made only to those persons who have access to the same kind of information as would be contained in a registration statement. Under this rule, the issuer must have reasonable grounds to believe, and must believe, that there are no more than thirty-five purchasers from the issuer.” Mary S. Krech Trust v. Lakes Apartments, 642 F. 2d 98, 101 (CA5 1981).
See 3 H. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law §4.05[2] (1981 ed.). Pinter sought to take advantage of this “safe harbor” in issuing the oil and gas interests involved in this case.
In addition to their § 12(1) claim, respondents alleged that Pinter made material misrepresentations regarding the oil and gas properties and his oil experience, thereby entitling them to damages under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1987), and to rescission under § 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77i(2). Respondents also asserted pendent claims under Texas and California law. None of these additional claims is before us.
Pinter apparently meant to contend that Dahl was responsible for the loss of the private-offering exemption from registration under § 4(2) and Rule 146, see n. 4, supra, although Pinter did not make this assertion explicit in his pleadings. Cf. Second Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Defendants Billy J. “B. J.” Pinter, et al., App. 85-86 (claiming that petitioners had met the requirements of the private-offering exemption).
Pinter contended that all the respondents should be estopped from recovery because of Dahl’s fraudulent conduct. He asserted his in pari de-licto defense solely against Dahl.
Having reached this conclusion, the District Court found it unnecessary to consider respondents’ § 12(2) claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37-38. The court rejected respondents’ claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. App. to Pet. for Cert. a-37.
The court also rejected Pinter’s estoppel defense. 787 F. 2d, at 988-989. That holding is not challenged in this Court. We express no view as to whether this equitable defense is available in a § 12(1) action.
Because none of the other plaintiffs sought recovery from Dahl, Dahl’s liability on their claims is at issue only if contribution is available to Pinter.
The Court of Appeals addressed Pinter’s contention that Dahl was liable as a § 12(1) seller and thus should be accountable to Pinter in contribution for the amounts awarded to the other plaintiffs. 787 F. 2d, at 987. It is not entirely clear how this claim was raised below. Pinter’s pleadings do not state an explicit cause of action for contribution against Dahl, although Pinter did move, albeit unsuccessfully, to realign Dahl as a third-party defendant, based on Pinter’s assertion that Dahl was a “seller” of the unregistered securities to the remaining plaintiffs and had made the allegedly actionable misrepresentations to them in connection with the sales. See 1 Record 164-165, 189. Presumably, the Court of Appeals construed Pinter’s affirmative defense for contributory fault and his incorporation of this defense into his counterclaims, as effectively seeking contribution.
Unlike § 11 of the Securities Act, see 15 U. S. C. § 77k(f), § 12 does not expressly provide for contribution. The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether Pinter is entitled to contribution under § 12(1) because it found that Dahl was not a seller for purposes of § 12(1), and therefore would not be the proper subject of a contribution claim. The parties have not raised or addressed the contribution issue before this Court, and we express no view as to whether a right of contribution exists under §12(1).
The dissent addressed the “seller” issue in the context of Pinter’s asserted in pari delicto defense. In its view, Dahl’s role as a seller of the unregistered securities “put him in the same boat as Pinter,” making him vulnerable to that defense. 787 F. 2d, at 991. The dissent also indicated that it “would go further” and hold that “Pinter is entitled to contribution from Dahl since Dahl is at least equally culpable for the sale to the other plaintiffs.” Id., at 995, n. 5.
The Court of Appeals found that this conclusion was compelled by its decision in Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F. 2d 1069 (1972). See 787 F. 2d, at 987-988. That case, we note, does not discuss the in pari delicto defense. Accord, 794 F. 2d 1016, 1017 (1986) (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing of the present case en banc).
Among the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue, the Fifth Circuit is alone in concluding that the defense is unavailable. The defense, however, rarely has succeeded on the facts of any particular case. See, e. g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F. 2d 1283, 1294 (CA4 1978); Woolf v. S. D. Cohn & Co., 515 F. 2d 591, 604 (CA5 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U. S. 944 (1976); Malamphy v. Real-Tex Enterprises, Inc., 527 F. 2d 978 (CA4 1975); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F. 2d 1046, 1054 (CA2 1969); Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F. 2d 371, 373-374 (CA10 1964). Commentators also have suggested that the defense should be available under proper circumstances in actions under § 12(1). See, e. g., Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 662-663 (1971-1972); Note, In Pari Delicto Under the Federal Securities Laws: Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 345, 359-362 (1987).
The panel dissent below expresséd concern that failure to provide the in pari delicto defense in these circumstances would allow sophisticated investors who purchase unregistered securities to place themselves in a no-lose situation. If the venture proves profitable, the buyer comes out ahead. If the investment goes bad, the buyer can sue to recover his investment in a § 12(1) action. See 787 F. 2d, at 995. The statute, however, permits such maneuvers. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L. J. 227, 246-247 (1933) (Shulman); accord, L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1003, n. 74 (2d ed. 1988) (Loss). Section 12(l)’s deterrent effect is achieved, to a great extent, by a provision allowing suits for a full year following sale. See 15 U. S. C. § 77m. Thus, the purchaser of unregistered securities may keep his securities and reap his profit if the securities perform well during the year, but rescind the sale if they do not. See, e. g., Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F. 2d 370 (CA9 1961). Although this provision may appear to offend a sense of fair play, allowing the investor to sue, regardless of his knowledge of the violation when he purchased the securities, furthers the interest of the Securities Act: the seller then has strong incentive to comply with the registration disclosure provisions. These provisions are concerned with affording the unsophisticated investor information necessary to make a knowledgeable investment decision. Permitting the sophisticated investor to recover also serves to protect the unknowing and innocent investor.
Courts have discerned beneath the registration provisions the same broad policies as those furthered by the securities laws generally: protection of investors as a group, not as individuals, and the need for a healthy economy constantly purged by full disclosure. See, e. g., SEC v. North American Research & Development Corp., 280 F. Supp. 106, 121 (SDNY 1968) (purpose of § 5 is to protect public investors through disclosure), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 424 F. 2d 63 (CA2 1970). See generally, 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 178-179 (2d ed. 1961) (aim of registration provision is “ ‘to protect honest enterprise . . . ; to restore the confidence of the prospective investor . . . ; to bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has grown timid . . . ; and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consumer power’”), quoting S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933).
The parties vigorously dispute whether Pinter has a valid defense under the in pari delicto doctrine. Pinter argues that Dahl was a “preeminent factor in the violations he seeks to redress. ” Brief for Petitioners 29. He maintains that the venture would not have been undertaken or, at least, completed, had it not been for Dahl’s involvement. According to Pinter, Dahl’s responsibility for causing the unlawful sales was at least substantially equal to his own. Nevertheless, Pinter-concedes that nothing in the record indicates whether Dahl was a participant in the decision not to register the securities, although Pinter would infer that Dahl was aware of the duty to register. See id., at 27.
Dahl contends that his actions were not of equal fault to those of Pinter. He suggests that Pinter, as the issuer of the securities, was entirely responsible for the failure to register and to fulfill the requirements of Rule 146, although he points to no evidence in the record to support either position. Dahl further argues, in a conclusory fashion, that he was not a promoter of any of the securities in which his co-respondents invested. Finally, he asserts that he should be permitted to recover because “Pinter made the first step in the dissemination of unregistered securities and he will be more responsive to the deterrent pressure of potential sanctions.” Brief for Respondents 98.
In dictum, the Court of Appeals ventured that even if it were to apply the Bateman Eichler standard, Pinter would not be permitted to advance an in pari delicto defense against Dahl’s recovery. 787 F. 2d, at 989, n. 6. Because the court did not have our delineation today of the proper inquiry regarding § 12(1) actions, and because we conclude that the District Court’s findings were insufficient to conduct this analysis, the Court of Appeals’ views on this point are not conclusive of the issue.
Even if the Court of Appeals were ultimately to conclude that Dahl’s actions bar his recovery against Pinter pursuant to the in pari delicto doctrine, that conclusion would not resolve the issue whether, based on Dahl’s actions as a “seller” under § 12(1), Dahl might be held liable for contribution as to the remaining investor-respondents’ claims against Pinter. We therefore are constrained to address, as did the Court of Appeals, whether Dahl is a “seller” for purposes of § 12(1).
Section 12 was adapted from common-law (or equitable) rescission, Loss, at 888, which provided for restoration of the status quo by requiring the buyer to return what he received from the seller. The statute, however, differs significantly from the source material. In particular, it permits the buyer who has disposed of the security to sue for damages — “the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon.” 15 U. S. C. §771. This damages calculation results in what is the substantial equivalent of rescission. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S. 647, 655-656 (1986); Loss, at 886; Shulman, 43 Yale L. J., at 244.
In addition, § 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77o, makes a “controlling person” liable for the § 12 liability of a controlled person. That provision is not at issue in this ease.
The “offers or sells” and the “purchasing such security from him” language that governs § 12(1) also governs § 12(2), which provides a securities purchaser with a similar reseissionary cause of action for misrepresentation. See 15 U. S. C. § 111. Most courts and commentators have not defined the defendant class differently for purposes of the two provisions. See, e. g., Pharo v. Smith, 621 F. 2d 656, 665-668, and nn. 6-8 (CA5 1980); Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 261, and nn. 144 and 145 (1983-1984). See also Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F. 2d 875, 878 (CA2 1943) (“Clearly the word [sell] has the same meaning in subdivision (2) as in subdivision (1) of section 12”).
The question whether anyone beyond the transferor of title, or immediate vendor, may be deemed a seller for purposes of § 12 has been litigated in actions under both § 12(1) and § 12(2). Decisions under § 12(2) addressing the “seller” question are thus relevant to the issue presented to us in this case, and, to that extent, we discuss them here. Nevertheless, this case does not present, nor do we take a position on, the scope of a statutory seller for purposes of § 12(2).
One important consequence of this provision is that § 12(1) imposes liability on only the buyer’s immediate seller; remote purchasers are precluded from bringing actions against remote sellers. Thus, a buyer cannot recover against his seller’s seller. Loss, at 1023-1024; Douglas & Bates, 43 Yale L. J., at 177.
It is noteworthy that in 1940 Congress considered a proposal that would have excluded the solicitation clause from the definition of “sell” in §2(3). See S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 1-2 (1940), as introduced, 86 Cong. Rec. 6026 (1940). This amendment clearly would have reduced the meaning of the term “sell” to transferring title for value and would have eliminated the potential for liability of brokers or other persons soliciting a sale of securities. The proposal was not adopted.
Those commentators who argue that § 12 confines seller status to the transferor maintain that the section’s provision of rescissionary relief supports their conclusion. E. g., Abrams, 15 Ford. Urban L. J., at 924. There is authority at common law, however, for granting a plaintiff rescission against a defendant who was not a party to the contract in question, in particular, against the agent of the vendor. See, e. g., Keskal v. Modrakowski, 249 N. Y. 406, 408, 164 N. E. 333 (1928); Peterson v. McManus, 187 Iowa 522, 545-549, 172 N. W. 460, 468-470 (1919). Indeed, there is nothing incongruous about forcing a broker or other solicitor to assume ownership of the securities. When rescission is predicated on fraud, rather than based on contract theory, privity is not essential. Loss, at 1017, quoting Gordon v. Burr, 506 F. 2d 1080, 1085 (CA2 1974) (“[A]s between the innocent purchaser and the wrongdoer who, though not a privy to the fraudulent contract, nonetheless induced the victim to make the purchase, equity requires the wrongdoer to restore the victim to the status quo”). In any event, there is no reason to think that Congress wanted to bind itself to the common-law notion of the circumstances in which rescission is an appropriate remedy. The Court, in the context of § 12(2), has noted that Congress enabled investors to demand rescission upon tender of the securities to the defendant, in part because of the additional measure of deterrence provided by rescission as compared to a purely compensatory measure of damages. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U. S., at 659. Thus, we may infer that Congress, in order to effectuate its goals, chose to impose this relief on any defendant it classified as a statutory seller, regardless of the fact that such imposition was somewhat inconsistent with the use of rescission at common law. Congress chose rescission for its effects; there is no indication that Congress employed the remedy for its delineation of potential defendants.
The Fifth Circuit’s test is only one of several approaches that have emerged in expanding § 12 liability beyond the security titleholder. See generally O’Hara, Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 921 (1983-1984); Rapp, Expanded Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act: When Is a Seller Not a Seller?, 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 445 (1977); Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Proximate Cause-Substantial Factor Approach Limited by a Duty of Inquiry, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 361 (1983); Comment, Attorneys and Participant Liability Under § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 1982 Ariz. S. L. J. 529. All but one of these theories reflect the courts’ views of who constitutes a § 12 seller. The remaining approach — the aiding and abetting theory — is actually a method by which courts create secondary liability in persons other than the statutory seller. See, e. g., Mayer v. Oil Field Systems Corp., 803 F. 2d 749, 756 (CA2 1986); In re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (SDNY 1973); see also Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605. F. 2d 110, 113-114 (CA3 1979) (leaving open whether aiding and abetting liability is available). Because this case deals exclusively with primary liability under § 12(1), we need not consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under that section. Compare Comment, 1982 Ariz. S. L. J., at 550-577 (endorsing aiding and abetting liability under § 12(2)); Ruder, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 620-644 (same), with Abrams, 15 Ford. Urban L. J., at 942-947 (disapproving secondary liability under § 12); O’Hara, 31 UCLA L. Rev., at 979-1002 (arguing that any form of participant liability, whether primary or secondary, is inappropriate under § 12(2)).
The substantial-factor test reflects a conviction that § 12 liability “must lie somewhere between the narrow view, which holds only the parties to the sale, and the too-liberal view which would hold all who remotely participated in the events leading up to the transaction.” Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (ND Ohio 1964). That court elected to “borrow a phrase from the law of negligence” and to premise liability on proximate cause. It imposed § 12(1) liability on the issuer that transferred title and the issuer’s president, vice president, and another employee. The Fifth Circuit adopted the proximate cause rationale in Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F. 2d 680, 693 (1971) (holding that promoters of a nationwide franchising scheme were § 12 sellers), and two years later refined the doctrine to impose liability on defendants whose actions were a “ ‘substantial factor’ ” in causing a plaintiff’s purchases. See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F. 2d 617, 622 (CA5 1973) (affirming § 12(1) judgment against a brokerage firm and its representative who touted unregistered securities and arranged for their purchase by the plaintiff).
A number of courts have followed that view. See Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F. 2d, at 1287-1288 (§ 12(1)); Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F. 2d 359, 363 (CA4 1986) (§ 12(2)); Davis v. Avco Financial Services, Inc., 739 F. 2d 1057, 1067 (CA6 1984) (§ 12(2)), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1005 (1985); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F. 2d 779, 785 (CA8 1981) (§ 12 generally); Foster v. Jesup & Lament Securities Co., 759 F. 2d 838, 843-844 (CA11 1985) (§ 12 generally).
The Ninth Circuit has shaped its own version of the test. See Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F. 2d 927, 930 (1985) (imposing § 12 liability on “ ‘partid-pants’ whose acts are “both necessary to and a substantial factor in the sales transaction’ ”). See also SEC v. Rogers, 790 F. 2d 1450, 1456 (CA9 1986) (explaining that the “necessary” and “substantial factor” prongs require separate showings: “The first prong . . . requires a defendant’s participation to be a ‘but for’ cause of the unlawful sale, and the second requires the participation to be more than ‘de minimis’ ”).
Congress knew of the collateral participation concept and employed it in the Securities Act and throughout its unified program of securities regulation. Liabilities and obligations expressly grounded in participation are found elsewhere in the Act, see, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 77b(ll) (defining “underwriter,” who is liable under § 5, as including direct and indirect participants), and in the later Roosevelt administration securities Acts. For example, § 9 of the 1934 Act, passed by the same Congress that enacted the Securities Act, creates a private right of action that expressly imposes liability on participants. 15 U. S. C. §78i(e). See Abrams, 15 Ford. Urban L. J., at 925-937.
Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. §77k, lends strong support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to extend § 12 primary liability to collateral participants in the unlawful securities sales transaction. That section provides an express cause of action for damages to a person acquiring securities pursuant to a registration statement that misstates or omits a material fact. Section 11(a) explicitly enumerates the various categories of persons involved in the registration process who are subject to suit under that section, including many who are participants in the activities leading up to the sale. There are no similar provisions in § 12, and therefore we may conclude that Congress did not intend such persons to be defendants in § 12 actions.
For similar reasons, we reject the Commission’s suggestion that persons who “participate in soliciting the purchase” may be liable as statutory sellers. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae 22. The Commission relies on Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F. 2d 1046 (CA2 1969), where the court held that an attorney who had been “a party to the solicitation” of the plaintiff-purchaser was liable under § 12(1) because he had placed the brokerage firm for which he worked in a position “to tackle [the purchaser] for the money” owed on an investment he had made. Id., at 1053. Although in Katz the attorney spoke directly to the plaintiff prior to the delivery of money in plaintiff’s investment, the “party to a solicitation” concept could easily embrace those who merely assist in another’s solicitation efforts. See Schneider, 51 Tenn. L. Rev., at 273 (suggesting that the Katz approach allows courts to interpret solicitation activities “rather broadly”). It is difficult to. see more than a slight difference between this approach and the participation theory, which we have concluded does not comport with Congress’ intent.
Even in the tort law context, the substantial-factor test is recognized as inadequate for determining whether the defendant’s conduct was so significant and important a cause that the law should extend responsibility for the conduct to the consequences that occurred. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 42, pp. 244, 248 (4th ed. 1971).
We observe, however, that although every rule that extends liability serves on some level to protect investors, the substantial-factor test does not necessarily further the remedial purposes of § 12(1). Imposing a strict liability rescission remedy on those who are only tangentially involved with the sale might result in less and poorer information to investors, rather than more and better information. Because strict liability is involved, once a person became involved in the transaction, even peripherally, it would be impossible to avoid the risk of liability. There is little danger that this risk will deter true sellers from giving information, for they have no other way to go about their business. They also have the most control over conducting the sale in a manner that avoids liability. For those more attenuated to the sales transaction, however, who have far less, if any, control over the transaction, the harshness of § 12(1) might deter them from assisting. Particularly since the test produces unpredictable results, it risks over-deterring activities related to lawful securities sales.
Of course, on remand the Court of Appeals may find it necessary to address some of the difficult and unsettled questions raised by the dissent concerning the availability of contribution in § 12(1) cases in general and in this case in particular. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
MORRIS, SUPERINTENDENT, SOUTHERN OHIO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY v. MATHEWS
No. 84-1636.
Argued November 4, 1985
Decided February 26, 1986
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 248. Brennan, J., post, p. 257, and Marshall, J., post, p. 258, filed dissenting opinions.
Richard David Drake, Assistant Attorney General of Ohio, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General.
Michael George Dane argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward F. Marek.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether a state appellate court provided an adequate remedy for a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, by modifying a jeopardy-barred conviction to that of a lesser included offense that is not jeopardy barred.
I
On February 17,1978, respondent James Michael Mathews and Steven Daugherty robbed the Alexandria Bank in Alexandria, Ohio. After an automobile chase, the police finally surrounded the two men when they stopped at a farmhouse. Soon thereafter, the police heard shots fired inside the house, and respondent then emerged from the home and surrendered to police. When the officers entered the house, they found Daugherty dead, shot once in the head and once in the chest. The police also found the money stolen from the bank hidden in the pantry.
Once in custody, respondent gave a series of statements to law enforcement officials. In his first statement, given one hour after his surrender, respondent claimed that Daugherty and another man had forced him to aid in the bank robbery by threatening to kill both respondent and his girlfriend. Respondent denied shooting Daugherty. In the second statement, given the same day, respondent again denied shooting Daugherty, but admitted that no other man was involved with the robbery, and that he and Daugherty alone had planned and performed the crime.
Two days later, respondent gave a third statement to police in which he again confessed to robbing the bank. Respondent also related that after he and Daugherty arrived at the farmhouse, he had run back out to their van to retrieve the stolen money, and on his way back inside, he “heard a muffled shot from inside the house.” App. 4. Upon investigation, respondent discovered that Daugherty had shot himself in the head. Respondent claimed that Daugherty was still conscious, and called to him by name. Ibid.
The County Coroner initially ruled Daugherty’s death to be a suicide. The Coroner made this determination, however, before receiving the results of an autopsy performed by a forensic pathologist. This report indicated that Daugherty had received two wounds from the same shotgun. The initial shot had been fired while Daugherty was standing, and entered the left side of his face. This shot fractured Daugherty’s skull, and the mere force of the blast would have rendered him immediately unconscious. This wound was not fatal. The second shot was fired while Daugherty was lying on his back, and was fired directly into his heart from extremely close range. This shot was instantaneously fatal. As a result of this evidence, the Coroner issued a supplemental death certificate, listing “multiple gun shot wounds” as the cause of death. Record 295.
Based on the Coroner’s first opinion that Daugherty took his own life, the State did not charge respondent with Daugherty’s death. Instead, he was indicted under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2911.01 (Supp. 1984) on aggravated robbery charges. Respondent pleaded guilty on May 17 and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of from 7 to 25 years.
Two days after entering his guilty plea, respondent made the first of two statements in which he admitted having shot Daugherty. Respondent maintained that Daugherty initially had shot himself in the head, and that he was still alive when respondent discovered him after returning to the farmhouse with the stolen money. Acting on the theory that, if Daugherty were dead, respondent could claim that he was kidnaped and had not voluntarily robbed the bank, respondent “put [the gun] an inch or two from [Daugherty’s] chest and pulled the trigger.” App. 6. Respondent’s second statement, given one week later, reiterated these same points. Id., at 8-16.
■On June 1, 1978, the State charged respondent with the aggravated murder of Steven Daugherty. Ohio Rev. Code §2903.01 (1982) defines aggravated murder, in part, as “purposely causing] the death of another . . . while fleeing immediately after committing . . . aggravated robbery.” The aggravated robbery referred to in the indictment was the armed robbery of the Alexandria Bank to which respondent had previously pleaded guilty. The state trial court denied respondent’s pretrial motion to dismiss the aggravated murder indictment as violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge instructed the jury as to the elements of the offense of aggravated murder. The judge also instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of murder as follows:
“If you find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of aggravated murder, your verdict must be guilty of that crime and in that event you will not consider any lesser offense.
“But if you find that the State failed to prove the killing was done while the defendant was committing or fleeing immediately after committing aggravated robbery, but that the killing was nonetheless purposely done, you will proceed with your deliberations and decide whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the lesser crime or murder.
“The crime of murder is distinguished from aggravated murder by the State’s failure to prove that the killing was done while the defendant was committing or fleeing immediately after committing the crime of aggravated robbery.” App. 21.
The jury found respondent guilty of aggravated murder, and the court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment.
Respondent appealed his conviction, claiming that his trial for aggravated murder following his conviction for aggravated robbery violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ohio Court of Appeals, Fifth Judicial District, affirmed his conviction, State v. Mathews, CA No. 2578 (Licking County, Aug. 9, 1979), and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to grant discretionary review. State v. Mathews, No. 79-1342 (Dec. 7, 1979). This Court granted respondent’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U. S. 410 (1980). Mathews v. Ohio, 448 U. S. 904 (1980).
On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the Double Jeopardy Clause, as construed by this Court in Vitale, barred respondent’s conviction for aggravated murder. State v. Mathews, No. 2578 (Licking County, Nov. 7, 1980). The court noted, however, that § 2903.01 defines aggravated murder as purposely causing the death of another while committing certain felonies, and that §2903.02 defines murder simply as purposely causing the death of another. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-26. In respondent’s trial, therefore, “if all the facts relating to the aggravated robbery of which he was convicted are excluded from consideration of the court and jury, the defendant was still charged with and convicted of murder in that he did purposely cause the death of Steven Daugherty on the date charged.” Ibid. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction of aggravated murder to murder and reduced respondent’s sentence to an indefinite term of from 15 years to life. Id., at A-27. Once again, the Ohio Supreme Court denied respondent’s motion to appeal, and this Court denied his subsequent petition for certiorari review. Mathews v. Ohio, 451 U. S. 975 (1981).
Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Applying the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals, the District Court denied respondent’s petition. Mathews v. Marshall, No. C-1-81-834 (WD Ohio, Apr. 19, 1983).
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. Mathews v. Marshall, 754 F. 2d 158 (1985). Although refusing to hold that in a case like this a new trial on the nonbarred charge is always necessary, the court held that “a conviction obtained in violation of the double jeopardy clause cannot be modified if the defendant can show that there was a ‘reasonable possibility that he was prejudiced’ by the double jeopardy violation,” and that “‘an exceedingly small showing . . . would suffice.’” Id., at 162, quoting Graham v. Smith, 602 F. 2d 1078, 1083 (CA2 1979). Apparently agreeing with respondent’s assertion that “evidence was admitted in his trial for aggravated murder that would not have been admissible in a trial for murder,” and stating that the jury “may have [been] prejudiced” by that evidence, the court concluded that respondent had established a sufficient possibility of prejudice to warrant a new trial on the murder charge. Mathews v. Marshall, supra, at 162.
We granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1134 (1985), and now reverse.
II
As an initial matter, we note several issues that are not in dispute. First, the State concedes that under our cases the prosecution of respondent for aggravated murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Similarly, respondent concedes that the Clause would not prevent the State from trying him for murder. Next, all of the courts that have reviewed this case have agreed that, in finding respondent guilty of aggravated murder, the jury necessarily found that he “purposely cause[d] the death of another,” which is the definition of murder under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2903.02 (1982). See n. 4, supra. Finally, this is not a “harmless error” case: allowing respondent to be tried for aggravated murder was error, and it was not in any sense harmless. With these considerations aside, the only issue before us is whether reducing respondent’s conviction for aggravated murder to a conviction for murder is an adequate remedy for the double jeopardy violation.
Respondent argues that, because the trial for aggravated murder should never have occurred, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the State from taking advantage of the jeopardy-barred conviction by converting it into a conviction for the lesser crime of murder. He submits that a new trial must be granted whether or not there is a showing of prejudice.
Respondent relies heavily on Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323 (1970), but his reliance is misplaced. Price was tried for murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter. After that conviction was reversed on appeal, there was another trial for murder and another conviction of the lesser crime of manslaughter. We held that the second conviction could not stand because Price had been impliedly acquitted of murder at the first trial and could not be tried again on that charge. Id., at 329. Nor could we “determine whether or not the murder charge against petitioner induced the jury to find him guilty of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter rather than to continue to debate his innocence.” Id., at 331.
This holding in Price did not impose an automatic retrial rule whenever a defendant is tried for a jeopardy-barred crime and is convicted of a lesser included offense. Rather, the Court relied on the likelihood that the conviction for manslaughter had been influenced by the trial on the murder charge — that the charge of the greater offense for which the jury was unwilling to convict also made the jury less willing to consider the defendant’s innocence on the lesser charge. That basis for finding or presuming prejudice is not present here. The jury did not acquit Mathews of the greater offense of aggravated murder, but found him guilty of that charge and, a fortiori, of the lesser offense of murder as well.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), also strongly indicates that to prevail here, Mathews must show that trying him on the jeopardy-barred charge tainted his conviction for the lesser included offense. Benton was tried for both larceny and burglary. The jury acquitted him on the larceny count, but found him guilty of burglary. His conviction was later set aside because the jury had been improperly sworn. Benton again was tried for both burglary and larceny, and the second jury found him guilty of both offenses. The Maryland Court of Appeals held there had been no double jeopardy violation, but we disagreed, ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause required setting aside the larceny conviction and sentence. Id., at 796-797.
Benton urged that his burglary conviction must also fall because certain evidence admitted at his second trial would not have been admitted had he been tried for burglary alone. This evidence, he claimed, prejudiced the jury and influenced their decision to convict him of burglary. We rejected that argument, saying both that “[i]t [was] not obvious on the face of the record that the burglary conviction was affected by the double jeopardy violation,” and that we should not make this kind of evidentiary determination “unaided by prior consideration by the state courts.” Id., at 798 (footnote omitted). We thus vacated the judgment of the Maryland court, and remanded for further proceedings.
Neither Benton nor Price suggests that a conviction for an unbarred offense is inherently tainted if tried with a jeopardy-barred charge. Instead, both cases suggest that a new trial is required only when the defendant shows a reliable inference of prejudice. We perceive no basis for departing from this approach here; for except that murder was a lesser offense included in the aggravated murder charge rather than a separate charge, there is no difference between this case and Benton for double jeopardy purposes.
Accordingly, we hold that when a jeopardy-barred conviction is reduced to a conviction for a lesser included offense which is not jeopardy barred, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted of the nonjeopardy-barred offense absent the presence of the jeopardy-barred offense. In this situation, we believe that a “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984). After all, one of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent multiple prosecutions and to protect an individual from suffering the embarrassment, anxiety, and expense of another trial for the same offense, Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188 (1957). In cases like this, therefore, where it is clear that the jury necessarily found that the defendant’s conduct satisfies the elements of the lesser included offense, it would be incongruous always to order yet another trial as a means of curing a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The Court of Appeals thus was correct in rejecting respondent’s per se submission, but it was nevertheless too ready to find that he had made the necessary showing of prejudice. First, the court’s “reasonable possibility” standard, which could be satisfied by “an exceedingly small showing,” was not sufficiently demanding. To prevail in a case like this, the defendant must show that, but for the improper inclusion of the jeopardy-barred charge, the result of the proceeding probably would have been different.
Second, the Court of Appeals appeared to agree with respondent that certain evidence admitted at his trial would not have been admitted in a separate trial for murder, but it did not expressly say so, nor did it refer to any Ohio authorities. Mathews v. Marshall, 754 F. 2d, at 162. The State submits that under Ohio law, conduct of a defendant tending to show either “his motive or intent,” or his “scheme, plan or system,” is admissible, “notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2945.59 (1982). See generally State v. Moorehead, 24 Ohio St. 2d 166, 169, 265 N. E. 2d 551, 553 (1970). We normally accept a court of appeals’ view of state law, but if this case turns on the admissibility of the challenged evidence in a separate trial for murder, the issue deserves a more thorough consideration by the lower court.
Finally, the court’s observation that the admission of questionable evidence “may have prejudiced the jury” falls far short of a considered conclusion that if the evidence at issue was not before the jury in a separate trial for murder, there is a reasonable probability that respondent would not have been convicted.
Because the Court of Appeals’ legal and factual basis for ordering the writ of habeas corpus to issue was seriously flawed, its judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.01 (Supp. 1984) states:
“(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such attempt or offense, shall do either of the following:
“(1) Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control;
“(2) Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another.
“(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated robbery, an aggravated felony of the first degree.”
Respondent was also indicted for theft of the van used in the robbery and for burglary.
Respondent's handwritten statement, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
“At that time I ask steve were the money was and he said it was still out in the van. I tould him to cover me I was going out in the van to get the money. He said to me right before I went out to be careful and then I went out to the van, and when I was out there getting ready to come back in I heard a muffled shot and I ran in and yelled for steve. I then heard something like a moning up stairs. I then ran up stairs and seen steve laying there on the floor. He had shot himself somewere in the head and was bleeding pretty bad. He then seen me and said mike, mike, in a moning, and I said oh fuck, he still had the gun in his hand and was trying to load it up but failed and droped it And he then said to me mike mike in a moning voice please shot me. ... I knew he was in a lot of pain and I couldn’t really shot him even though he was in pretty bad shape. But I really didn’t want to, but then I said to myself real quick that if he was dead I could say that I was kidnapped. And they couldn’t prove that I robbed the bank. So I took 1 shell that was laying in steve hand and put it in the gun and I then I put it about an inch or two from his chest and pulled the trigger. I really don’t know much after that but the gun was dropped on the floor not to far from steve body. I then run down stairs and looked for a place to hid the money.” App. 5-6.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2903.01 (1982) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson, aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or escape.
“(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.”
Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 2903.02 (1982) provides as follows:
“(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another.
“(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.”
The Ohio Court of Appeals relied, in part, on Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 31, which states:
“(C) Conviction of lesser offense. The defendant may be found not guilty of the offense charged but guilty of an attempt to commit it if such an attempt is an offense at law. When the indictment, information, or complaint charges an offense, including degrees, or if lesser offenses are included within the offense charged, the defendant may be found not guilty of the offense charged but guilty of an inferior degree thereof, or of a lesser included offense.”
The court also cited Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(A)(4):
“(4) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law. If the evidence shows the defendant is not guilty of the degree of crime for which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may modify the verdict or finding accordingly, without granting or ordering a new trial, and shall pass sentence on such verdict or finding as modified.”
The dissenting judge was of the view that, even in a separate trial on the murder charges, the rules of evidence would allow the State “to prove the surrounding circumstances, including the facts surrounding the just-completed bank robbery.” 754 F. 2d at 162 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2945.59 (1982) provides as follows:
“In any criminal case in which the defendant’s motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in doing an act is material, any acts of the defendant which tend to show his motive or intent, the absence of mistake or accident on his part, or the defendant’s scheme, plan, or system in doing the act in question may be proved, whether they are contemporaneous with or prior or subsequent thereto, notwithstanding that such proof may show or tend to show the commission of another crime by the defendant.”
Similarly, Ohio Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
“(B) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
3
] | sc_lcdisposition |
FARMER v. BRENNAN, WARDEN, et al.
No. 92-7247.
Argued January 12, 1994
Decided June 6, 1994
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., post, p. 851, and Stevens, J., post, p. 858, filed concurring opinions. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 858.
Elizabeth Alexander argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Alvin J. Bronstein, by appointment of the Court, 510 U. S. 941, and Steven R. Shapiro.
Deputy Solicitor General Bender argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Amy L. Wax, Barbara L. Herwig, and Robert M. Loeb.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Montana Defender Project by Jeffrey T. Renz; for the D. C. Prisoners’ Legal Services Project, Inc., by Alan A Pemberton and Jonathan M. Smith; and for Stop Prisoner Rape by Frank M. Dunbaugh.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, and Andrew H. Baida, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of Maryland et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance, joined by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: Jimmy Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Charles E. Cole, Attorney General of Alaska, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General of Georgia, Robert A Marks, Attorney General of Hawaii, Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Jay Nixon, Attorney General of Missouri, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Fred DeVesa, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, Jan Graham, Attorney General of Utah, Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General of Virginia, James E. Doyle, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A prison official’s “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. See Helling v. McKinney 509 U. S. 25 (1993); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). This case requires us to define the term “deliberate indifference,” as we do by requiring a showing that the official was subjectively aware of the risk.
I
The dispute before us stems from a civil suit brought by petitioner, Dee Farmer, alleging that respondents, federal prison officials, violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to petitioner’s safety. Petitioner, who is serving a federal sentence for credit card fraud, has been diagnosed by medical personnel of the Bureau of Prisons as a transsexual, one who has “[a] rare psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,” and who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change. American Medical Association, Encyclopedia of Medicine 1006 (1989); see also American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 74-75 (3d rev. ed. 1987). For several years before being convicted and sentenced in 1986 at the age of 18, petitioner, who is biologically male, wore women’s clothing (as petitioner did at the 1986 trial), underwent estrogen therapy, received silicone breast implants, and submitted to unsuccessful “black market” testicle-removal surgery. See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F. 2d 319, 320 (CA7 1993). Petitioner’s precise appearance in prison is unclear from the record before us, but petitioner claims to have continued hormonal treatment while incarcerated by using drugs smuggled into prison, and apparently wears clothing in a feminine manner, as by displaying a shirt “off one shoulder,” App. 112. The parties agree that petitioner “projects feminine characteristics.” Id., at 51, 74.
The practice of federal prison authorities is to incarcerate preoperative transsexuals with prisoners of like biological sex, see Farmer v. Haas, supra, at 320, and over time authorities housed petitioner in several federal facilities, sometimes in the general male prison population but more often in segregation. While there is no dispute that petitioner was segregated at least several times because of violations of prison rules, neither is it disputed that in at least one penitentiary petitioner was segregated because of safety concerns. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (MD Pa. 1988).
On March 9, 1989,. petitioner was transferred for disciplinary reasons from the Federal Correctional Institute in Oxford, Wisconsin (FCI-Oxford), to the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana (USP-Terre Haute). Though the record before us is unclear about the security designations of the two prisons in 1989, penitentiaries are typically higher security facilities that house more troublesome prisoners than federal correctional institutes. See generally Federal Bureau of Prisons, Facilities 1990. After an initial stay in administrative segregation, petitioner was placed in the USP-Terre Haute general population. Petitioner voiced no objection to any prison official about the transfer to the penitentiary or to placement in its general population. Within two weeks, according to petitioner’s allegations, petitioner was beaten and raped by another inmate in petitioner’s cell. Several days later, after petitioner claims to have reported the incident, officials returned petitioner to segregation to await, according to respondents, a hearing about petitioner’s HIV-positive status.
Acting without counsel, petitioner then filed a Bivens complaint, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971); Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980). As defendants, petitioner named respondents: the warden of USP-Terre Haute and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (sued only in their official capacities); the warden of FCI-Oxford and a case manager there; and the Director of the Bureau of Prisons North Central Region Office and an official in that office (sued in their official and personal capacities). As later amended, the complaint alleged that respondents either transferred petitioner to USP-Terre Haute or placed petitioner in its general population despite knowledge that the penitentiary had a violent environment and a history of inmate assaults, and despite knowledge that petitioner, as a transsexual who “projects feminine characteristics,” would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by some USPTerre Haute inmates. This allegedly amounted to a deliberately indifferent failure to protect petitioner’s safety, and thus to a violation of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights. Petitioner sought compensatory and punitive damages, and an injunction barring future confinement in any penitentiary, including USP-Terre Haute.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment supported by several affidavits, to which petitioner responded with an opposing affidavit and a cross-motion for summary judgment; petitioner also invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), asking the court to delay its ruling until respondents had complied with petitioner’s pending request for production of documents. Respondents then moved for a protective order staying discovery until resolution of the issue of qualified immunity, raised in respondents’ summary judgment motion.
Without ruling on respondents’ request to stay discovery, the District Court denied petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion and granted summary judgment to respondents, concluding that there had been no deliberate indifference to petitioner’s safety. The failure of prison officials to prevent inmate assaults violates the Eighth Amendment, the court stated, only if prison officials were “reckless in a criminal sense,” meaning that they had “actual knowledge” of a potential danger. App. 124. Respondents, however, lacked the requisite knowledge, the court found. “[Petitioner] never expressed any concern for his safety to any of [respondents]. Since [respondents] had no knowledge of any potential danger to [petitioner], they were not deliberately indifferent to his safety.” Ibid.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit summarily affirmed without opinion. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 811 (1993), because Courts of Appeals had adopted inconsistent tests for “deliberate indifference.” Compare, for example, McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA7 1991) (holding that “deliberate indifference” requires a “subjective standard of recklessness”), cert, denied, 503 U. S. 907 (1992), with Young v. Quinlan, 960 F. 2d 351, 360-361 (CA3 1992) (“[A] prison official is deliberately indifferent when he knows or should have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate”).
II
A
The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 349 (1981), but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment,” Helling, 509 U. S., at 31. In its prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992). The Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 526-527 (1984). See Helling, supra, at 31-32; Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210, 225 (1990); Estelle, 429 U. S., at 103. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189, 198-199 (1989).
In particular, as the lower courts have uniformly held, and as we have assumed, “prison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F. 2d 556, 558 (CA1) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 823 (1988); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S., at 303 (describing “the protection [an inmate] is afforded against other inmates” as a “conditio[n] of confinement” subject to the strictures of the Eighth Amendment). Having incarcerated “persons [with] demonstrated proclivities] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct,” Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at 526, having stripped them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course. Cf. DeShaney, supra, at 199-200; Estelle, supra, at 103-104. Prison conditions may be “restrictive and even harsh,” Rhodes, supra, at 347, but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another serves no “legitimate penological objective,” Hudson v. Palmer, supra, at 548 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), any more than it squares with “‘evolving standards of decency,’” Estelle, supra, at 102 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes, supra, at 347.
It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Our cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, “sufficiently serious,” Wilson, supra, at 298; see also Hudson v. McMillian, supra, at 5; a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Rhodes, supra, at 347. For a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See Helling, supra, at 35.
The second requirement follows from the principle that “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson, 501 U. S., at 297 (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted). To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Ibid.; see also id., at 302-303; Hudson v. McMillian, supra, at 8. In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety, Wilson, supra, at 302-303; see also Helling, supra, at 34-35; Hudson v. McMillian, supra, at 5; Estelle, supra, at 106, a standard the parties agree governs the claim in this case. The parties disagree, however, on the proper test for deliberate indifference, which we must therefore undertake to define.
B
1
Although we have never paused to explain the meaning of the term “deliberate indifference,” the case law is instructive. The term first appeared in the United States Reports in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S., at 104, and its use there shows that deliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence. In considering the inmate’s claim in Estelle that inadequate prison medical care violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, we distinguished “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners,” ibid., from “negligente] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition,” id., at 106, holding that only the former violates the Clause. We have since read Estelle for the proposition that Eighth Amendment liability requires “more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 812, 319 (1986).
While Estelle establishes that deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, the cases are also clear that it is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. That point underlies the ruling that “application of the deliberate indifference standard is inappropriate” in one class of prison cases: when “officials stand accused of using excessive physical force.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S., at 6-7; see also Whitley, supra,, at 320. In such situations, where the decisions of prison officials are typically made “ fin haste, under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance,’ ” Hudson v. McMillian, supra, at 6 (quoting Whitley, supra, at 320), an Eighth Amendment claimant must show more than “indifference,” deliberate or otherwise. The claimant must show that officials applied force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” 503 U. S., at 6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), or, as the Court also put it, that officials used force with “a knowing willingness that [harm] occur,” id., at 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard of purposeful or knowing conduct is not, however, necessary to satisfy the mens rea requirement of deliberate indifference for claims challenging conditions of confinement; “the very high state of mind prescribed by Whitley does not apply to prison conditions cases.” Wilson, supra, at 302-303.
With deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or knowledge at the other, the Courts of Appeals have routinely equated deliberate indifference with recklessness. See, e. g., LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA11 1993); Manarite v. Springfield, 957 F. 2d 953, 957 (CA1 1992); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F. 2d 1435, 1443 (CA9 1991); McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F. 2d, at 347; Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F. 2d 848, 851-852 (CA4 1990); Martin v. White, 742 F. 2d 469, 474 (CA8 1984); see also Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 269 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.
That does not, however, fully answer the pending question about the level of culpability deliberate indifference entails, for the term recklessness is not self-defining. The civil law generally calls a person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known. See Prosser and Keeton § 34, pp. 213-214; Restatement (Second) of Torts §500 (1965). The criminal law, however, generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 850-851 (3d ed. 1982); J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 115-116, 120,128 (2d ed. 1960) (hereinafter Hall); American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(c), and Comment 3 (1985); but see Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 175-178 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (adopting an objective approach to criminal recklessness). The standards proposed by the parties in this case track the two approaches (though the parties do not put it that way): petitioner asks us to define deliberate indifference as what we have called civil-law recklessness, and respondents urge us to adopt an approach consistent with recklessness in the criminal law.
We reject petitioner’s invitation to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference. We hold instead that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach comports best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. See Prosser and Keeton §§ 2, 34, pp. 6, 213-214; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U, S. C. §§2671-2680; United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150 (1963). But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.
In Wilson v. Seiter, we rejected a reading of the Eighth Amendment that would allow liability to be imposed on prison officials solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison conditions. See 501 U. S., at 299-302. As we explained there, our “cases mandate inquiry into a prison official’s state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.” Id., at 299. Although “state of mind,” like “intent,” is an ambiguous term that can encompass objectively defined levels of blameworthiness, see 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§3.4, 3.5, pp. 296-300, 313-314 (1986) (hereinafter La-Fave & Scott); United States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394, 404 (1980), it was no accident that we said in Wilson and repeated in later cases that Eighth Amendment suits against prison officials must satisfy a “subjective” requirement. See Wilson, supra, at 298; see also Helling, 509 U. S., at 35; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S., at 8. It is true, as petitioner points out, that Wilson cited with approval Court of Appeals decisions applying an objective test for deliberate indifference to claims based on prison officials’ failure to prevent inmate assaults. See 501 U. S., at 303 (citing CortesQuinones v. Jimenez-Nettleskip, 842 F. 2d, at 560; and Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F. 2d 1049, 1057-1058 (CADC 1987)). But Wilson cited those cases for the proposition that the deliberate indifference standard applies to all prison-conditions claims, not to undo its holding that the Eighth Amendment has a “subjective component.” 501 U. S., at 298. Petitioner’s purely objective test for deliberate indifference is simply incompatible with Wilson’s holding.
To be sure, the reasons for focusing on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was (or is), rather than what it should have been (or should be), differ in the Eighth Amendment context from that of the criminal law. Here, a subjective approach isolates those who inflict punishment; there, it isolates those against whom punishment should be inflicted. But the result is the same: to act recklessly in either setting a person must “consciously disregar[d]” a substantial risk of serious harm. Model Penal Code ■§ 2.02(2)(c).
At oral argument, the Deputy Solicitor General advised against frank adoption of a criminal-law mens rea requirement, contending that it could encourage triers of fact to find Eighth Amendment liability only if they concluded that prison officials acted like criminals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 39-40. We think this concern is misdirected. Bivens actions against federal prison officials (and their 42 U. S. C. § 1983 counterparts against state officials) are civil in character, and a court should no more allude to the criminal law when enforcing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause than when applying the Free Speech and Press Clauses, where we have also adopted a subjective approach to recklessness. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U. S. 657,688 (1989) (holding that the standard for “reckless disregard” for the truth in a defamation action by a public figure “is a subjective one,” requiring that “the defendant in fact entertained serioús doubts as to the truth of his publication,” or that “the defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of... probable falsity”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That said, subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the test for “deliberate indifference” under the Eighth Amendment.
2
Our decision that Eighth Amendment liability requires consciousness of a risk is thus based on the Constitution and our cases, not merely on a parsing of the phrase “deliberate indifference.” And we do not reject petitioner’s arguments for a thoroughly objective approach to deliberate indifference without recognizing that on the crucial point (whether a prison official must know of a risk, or whether it suffices that he should know) the term does not speak with certainty. Use of “deliberate,” for example, arguably requires nothing more than an act (or omission) of indifference to a serious risk that is voluntary, not accidental. Cf. Estelle, 429 U. S., at 105 (distinguishing “deliberate indifference” from “accident” or “inadvertence]”). And even if “deliberate” is better read as implying knowledge of a risk, the concept of constructive knowledge is familiar enough that the term “deliberate indifference” would not, of its own force, preclude a scheme that conclusively presumed awareness from a risk’s obviousness.
Because “deliberate indifference” is a judicial gloss, appearing neither in the Constitution nor in a statute, we could not accept petitioner’s argument that the test for “deliberate indifference” described in Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989), must necessarily govern here. In Canton, interpreting Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, we held that a municipality can be liable for failure to train its employees when the municipality’s failure shows “a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants.” 489 U. S., at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). In speaking to the meaning of the term, we said that “it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id., at 390; see also id., at 390, n. 10 (elaborating). Justice O’Connor’s separate opinion for three Justices agreed with the Court’s “obvious[ness]” test and observed, that liability is appropriate when policymakers are “on actual or constructive notice” of the need to train, id., at 396 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). It would be hard to describe the Canton understanding of deliberate indifference, permitting liability to be premised on obviousness or constructive notice, as anything but objective.
Canton’s objective standard, however, is not an appropriate test for determining the liability of prison officials under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in our cases. Section 1983, which merely provides a cause of action, “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 330 (1986). And while deliberate indifference serves under the Eighth Amendment to ensure that only inflictions of punishment carry liability, see Wilson, 501 U. S., at 299-300, the “term was used in the Canton case for the quite different purpose of identifying the threshold for holding a city responsible for the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained agents,” Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 124 (1992), a purpose the Canton Court found satisfied by a test permitting liability when a municipality disregards “obvious” needs. Needless to say, moreover, considerable conceptual difficulty would attend any search for the subjective state of mind of a governmental entity, as distinct from that of a governmental official. For these reasons, we cannot accept petitioner’s argument that Canton compels the conclusion here that a prison official who was unaware of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate may nevertheless be held liable under the Eighth Amendment if the risk was obvious and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it.
We are no more persuaded by petitioner’s argument that, without an objective test for deliberate indifference, prison officials will be free to ignore obvious dangers to inmates. Under the test we adopt today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his .knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Cf. 1 C. Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27, p. 141 (14th ed. 1978); Hall 115. We doubt that a subjective approach will present prison officials with any serious motivation “to take refuge in the zone between ‘ignorance of obvious risks’ and ‘actual knowledge of risks.’” Brief for Petitioner 27. Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, cf. Hall 118 (cautioning against “confusing a mental state with the proof of its existence”), and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. Cf. LaFave & Scott §3.7, p. 335 (“[I]f the risk is obvious, so that a reasonable man would realize it, we might well infer that [the defendant] did in fact realize it; but the inference cannot be conclusive, for we know that people are not always conscious of what reasonable people would be conscious of”). For example, if an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, ór expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.” Brief for Respondents 22.
Nor may a prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault. The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage to his future health,” Helling, 509 U. S., at 35, and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk. See Brief for Respondents 15 (stating that a prisoner can establish exposure to a sufficiently serious risk of harm “by showing that he belongs to an identifiable group of prisoners who are frequently singled out for violent attack by other inmates”). If, for example, prison officials were aware that inmate “rape was so common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep [but] instead ... would leave their beds and spend the night clinging to the bars nearest the guards’ station,” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 681-682, n. 3 (1978), it would obviously be irrelevant to liability that the officials could not guess beforehand precisely who would attack whom. Cf. Helling, supra, at 33 (observing that the Eighth Amendment requires a remedy for exposure of inmates to “infectious maladies” such as hepatitis and venereal disease “even though the possible infection might not affect all of those exposed”); Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N. E. 2d 902 (1944) (affirming conviction for manslaughter under a law requiring reckless or wanton conduct of a nightclub owner who failed to protect patrons from a fire, even though the owner did not know in advance who would light the match that ignited the fire or which patrons would lose their lives); State v. Julius, 185 W. Va. 422, 431-432, 408 S. E. 2d 1, 10 — 11 (1991) (holding that a defendant may be held criminally liable for injury to an unanticipated victim).
Because, however, prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have inflicted punishment, it remains open to the officials to prove that they were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety. That a trier of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious, in other words, does not mean that it must do so. Prison officials charged with deliberate indifference might show, for example, that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger, or that they knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.
In addition, prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted. A prison official’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “‘reasonable safety,’ ” Helling, supra, at 33; see also Washington v. Har per, 494 U. S., at 225; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S., at 526-527, a standard that incorporates due regard for prison officials’ “unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions,” Spain v. Procunier, 600 F. 2d 189, 193 (CA9 1979) (Kennedy, J.); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 547-548, 562 (1979). Whether one puts it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reásonably cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
We address, finally, petitioner’s argument that a subjective deliberate indifference test will unjustly require prisoners to suffer physical injury before obtaining court-ordered correction of objectively inhumane prison conditions. “It would,” indeed, “be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.” Helling, supra, at 33. But nothing in the test we adopt today clashes with that common sense. Petitioner’s argument is flawed for the simple reason that “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923). Consistently with this principle, a subjective approach to deliberate indifference does not require a prisoner seeking “a remedy for unsafe conditions [to] await a tragic event [such as an] actua[l] assaul[t] before obtaining relief.” Helling, supra, at 33-34.
In a suit such as petitioner’s, insofar as it seeks injunctive relief to prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm, “the subjective factor, deliberate indifference, should be determined in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct,” Helling, supra, at 36: their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter. An inmate seeking an injunction on the ground that there is “a contemporary violation of a nature likely to continue,” United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U. S. 326, 333 (1952), must adequately plead such a violation; to survive summary judgment, he must come forward with evidence from which it can be inferred that the defendant-officials were at the time suit was filed, and are at the time of summary judgment, knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they will continue to do so; and finally to establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the continuance of that disregard during the remainder of the litigation and into the future. In so doing, the inmate may rely, in the district court’s discretion, on developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions, as the defendants may rely on such developments to establish that the inmate is not entitled to an injunction. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(d); 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1504-1510, pp. 177-211 (2d ed. 1990). If the court finds the Eighth Amendment’s subjective and objective requirements satisfied, it may grant appropriate injunctive relief. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S., at 685-688, and n. 9 (upholding order designed to halt “an ongoing violation” in prison conditions that included extreme overcrowding, rampant violence, insufficient food, and unsanitary conditions). Of course, a district court should approach issuance of injunctive orders with the usual caution, see Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 562 (warning courts against becoming “enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations”), and may, for example, exercise its discretion if appropriate by giving prison officials time to rectify the situation before issuing an injunction.
That prison officials’ “current attitudes and conduct,” Helling, 509 U. S., at 36, must be assessed in an action for injunctive relief does not mean, of course, that inmates are free to bypass adequate internal prison procedures and bring their health and safety concerns directly to court. “An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity,” Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 235 (1943), and any litigant making such an appeal must show that the intervention of equity is required. When a prison inmate seeks injunctive relief, a court need not ignore the inmate’s failure to take advantage of adequate prison procedures, and an inmate who needlessly bypasses such procedures may properly be compelled to pursue them. Cf. 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (authorizing district courts in § 1983 actions to require inmates to exhaust “such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available”). Even apart from the demands of equity, an inmate would be well advised to take advantage of internal prison procedures for resolving inmate grievances. When those procedures produce results, they will typically do so faster than judicial processes can. And even when they do not bring constitutionally required changes, the inmate’s task in court will obviously be much easier.
Accordingly, we reject petitioner’s arguments and hold that a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
III
A
Against this backdrop, we consider whether the District Court’s disposition of petitioner’s complaint, summarily affirmed without briefing by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, comports with Eighth Amendment principles. We conclude that the appropriate course is to remand.
In granting summary judgment to respondents on the ground that petitioner had failed to satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s subjective requirement, the District Court may have placed decisive weight on petitioner’s failure to notify respondents of a risk of harm. That petitioner “never expressed any concern for his safety to any of [respondents],” App. 124, was the only evidence the District Court cited for its conclusion that there was no genuine dispute about respondents' assertion that they “had no knowledge of any potential danger to [petitioner],” ibid. But with respect to each of petitioner’s claims, for damages and for injunctive relief, the failure to give advance notice is not dispositive. Petitioner may establish respondents’ awareness by reliance on any relevant evidence. See supra, at 842.
The summary judgment record does not so clearly establish respondents’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of subjective knowledge that we can simply assume the absence of error below. For example, in papers filed in opposition to respondents’ summary-judgment motion, petitioner pointed to respondents’ admission that petitioner is a “non-violent” transsexual who, because of petitioner’s “youth and feminine appearance” is “likely to experience a great deal of sexual pressure” in prison. App. 50-51, 73-74. And petitioner recounted a statement by one of the respondents, then warden of the penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, who told petitioner that there was “a high probability that [petitioner] could not safely function at USP-Lewisburg,” id., at 109, an incident confirmed in a published District Court opinion. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp., at 1342; see also ibid. (“Clearly, placing plaintiff, a twenty-one year old transsexual, into the general population at [USP-]Lewisburg, a [high-]security institution, could pose a significant threat to internal security in general and to plaintiff in particular”).
We cannot, moreover, be certain that additional evidence is unavailable to petitioner because in denying petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion for additional discovery the District Court may have acted on a mistaken belief that petitioner’s failure to notify was dispositive. Petitioner asserted in papers accompanying the Rule 56(f) motion that the requested documents would show that “each defendant had knowledge that USP-Terre Haute was and is, a violent institution with a history of sexual assault, stabbings, etc., [and that] each defendant showed reckless disregard for my safety by designating me to said institution knowing that I would be sexually assaulted.” App. 105-106. But in denying the Rule 56(f) motion, the District Court stated that the requested documents were “not shown by plaintiff to be necessary to oppose defendants’ motion for summary judgment,” id., at 121, a statement consistent with the erroneous view that failure to notify was fatal to petitioner’s complaint.
Because the District Court may have mistakenly thought that advance notification was a necessary element of an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, we think it proper to remand for reconsideration of petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion and, whether additional discovery is permitted or not, for application of the Eighth Amendment principles explained above.
B
Respondents urge us to affirm for reasons not relied on below, but neither of their contentions is so clearly correct as to justify affirmance.
With respect to petitioner’s damages claim, respondents argue that the officials sued in their individual capacities (officials at FCI-Oxford and the Bureau of Prisons North Central Region office) were alleged to be liable only for their transfer of petitioner from FCI-Oxford to USP-Terre Haute, whereas petitioner “nowhere alleges any reason for believing that these officials, who had no direct responsibility for administering the Terre Haute institution, would have had knowledge of conditions within that institution regarding danger to transsexual inmates.” Brief for Respondents 27-28. But petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion alleged just that. Though respondents suggest here that petitioner offered no factual basis for that assertion, that is not a ground on which they chose to oppose petitioner’s Rule 56(f) motion below and, in any event, is a matter for the exercise of the District Court’s judgment, not ours. Finally, to the extent respondents seek affirmance here on the ground that officials at FCI-Oxford and the Bureau of Prisons regional office had no power to control prisoner placement at Terre Haute, the record gives at least a suggestion to the contrary; the affidavit of one respondent, the warden of USP-Terre Haute, states that after having been at USP-Terre Haute for about a month petitioner was placed in administrative segregation “pursuant to directive from the North Central Regional Office” and a “request... by staff at FCI-Oxford.” App. 94-95. Accordingly, though we do not reject respondents’ arguments about petitioner’s claim for damages, the record does. not permit us to accept them as a basis for affirmance when they were not relied upon below. Respondents are free to develop this line of argument on remand.
With respect to petitioner’s claim for injunctive relief, respondents argued in their merits brief that the claim was “foreclosed by [petitioner’s] assignment to administrative detention status because of his high-risk HIV-positive condition, ... as well as by the absence of any allegation . .. that administrative detention status poses any continuing threat of physical injury to him.” Brief for Respondents 28-29. At oral argument, however, the Deputy Solicitor General informed us that petitioner was no longer in administrative detention, having been placed in the general prison population of a medium-security prison. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26. He suggested that affirmance was nevertheless proper because “there is no present threat” that petitioner will be placed in a setting where he would face a “continuing threat of physical injury,” id., at 26, but this argument turns on facts about the likelihood of a transfer that the District Court is far better placed to evaluate than we are. We leave it to respondents to present this point on remand.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Petitioner also sought an order requiring the Bureau of Prisons to place petitioner in a “co-eorrectional facility” (i. e., one separately housing male and female prisoners but allowing coeducational programming). Petitioner tells us, however, that the Bureau no longer operates such facilities, and petitioner apparently no longer seeks this relief.
Other Court of Appeals decisions to the same effect include Villante v. Department of Corrections, 786 F. 2d 516, 519 (CA2 1986); Young v. Quinlan, 960 F. 2d 351, 361-362 (CA3 1992); Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F. 2d 977, 979 (CA4 1987); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F. 2d 1220, 1224 (CA5 1986); Roland v. Johnson, 856 F. 2d 764, 769 (CA6 1988); Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F. 2d 646, 649-650 (CA7 1988); Martin v. White, 742 F. 2d 469, 474 (CA8 1984); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F. 2d 457, 459 (CA9 1986); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559,572 (CA10 1980); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F. 2d 1526, 1535 (CA11 1993); and Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F. 2d 1049, 1057 (CADC 1987).
At what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment purposes is a question this case does not present, and we do not address it.
Between the poles lies “gross negligence” too, but the term is a “nebulous” one, in practice typically meaning little different from recklessness as generally understood in the civil law (which we discuss later in the text). See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §34, p. 212 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton).
See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5 (suggesting that a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he “knew facts which rendered an unreasonable risk obvious; under such circumstances, the defendant should have known of the risk and will be charged with such knowledge as a matter of law”); see also Brief for Petitioner 20-21.
See Brief for Respondents 16 (asserting that deliberate indifference requires that a prison “official must know of the risk of harm to which an inmate is exposed”).
Appropriate allusions to the criminal law would, of course, be proper during criminal prosecutions under, for example, 18 U. S. C. §242, which sets criminal penalties for deprivations of rights under color of law.
While the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official may show that the obvious escaped him, see infra, at 844, he would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist (as when a prison official is aware of a high probability of facts indicating that one prisoner has planned an attack on another but resists opportunities to obtain final confirmation; or when a prison official knows that some diseases are communicable and that a single needle is being used to administer flu shots to prisoners but refuses to listen to a subordinate who he strongly suspects will attempt to explain the associated risk of transmitting disease). When instructing juries in deliberate indifference cases with such issues of proof, courts should be careful to ensure that the requirement of subjective culpability is not lost. It is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person would have known, or that the defendant should have known, and juries should be instructed accordingly.
If, for example, the evidence before a district court establishes that an inmate faces an objectively intolerable risk of serious injury, the defendants could not plausibly persist in claiming lack of awareness, any more than prison officials who state during the litigation that they will not take reasonable measures to abate an intolerable risk of which they are aware could claim to be subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, and in deciding whether an inmate has established a continuing constitutional violation a district court may take such developments into account. At the same time, even prison officials who had a subjectively culpable state of mind when the lawsuit was filed could prevent issuance of an injunction by proving, during the litigation, that they were no longer unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of harm and that they would not revert to their obduracy upon cessation of the litigation.
The District Court’s opinion is open to the reading that it required not only advance notification of a substantial risk of assault, but also advance notification of a substantial risk of assault posed by a particular fellow prisoner. See App. 124 (referring to “a specific threat to [a prisoner’s] safety”). The Eighth Amendment, however, imposes no such requirement. See supra, at 842-844. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
26
] | sc_respondent |
UNITED STATES v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND IN THE COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, et al.
No. 253.
Argued January 9, 1953.
Decided April 6, 1953.
Assistant Attorney General Kirks argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings and Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney.
Frederick A. Ballard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joseph W. Wyatt.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This nine-year-old proceeding is for the condemnation of certain easements in land and title to sewer mains which together comprise the sewerage system of Belle Haven, a residential subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. It was brought under the authority of Title II, § 202 of the Act of June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361, and a rider on the Appropriation Act of July 15, 1943, 57 Stat. 565, both amendments to the Lanham Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, 42 U. S. C. § 1521 et seq. Questions important in the administration of the Act moved us to grant certiorari, 344 U. S. 812, to review the dismissal of the government petition. 196 F. 2d 657, aff’g 101 F. Supp. 172.
During World War II, defense housing needs in the Washington area led the government to construct a large sewer project to serve defense housing properties in Fair-fax County. It sought to utilize, as a part of its trunk-line sewer, existing easements containing sewer pipes in the system originally constructed by respondent Belle Haven Realty Corporation. Negotiations produced an agreement under which the corporation, still holder of the fee, was to accept nominal compensation for its sewer properties on the condition that the government take the entire system and that the final order protect the Belle Haven householders against any future charges for its use. The government then filed a condemnation petition together with a declaration of taking and deposited estimated just compensation of $2. Possession was taken under court order, Belle Haven’s outfalls into the Potomac River blocked off, and its sewage diverted into the government’s trunk-line system. In .1948, a group of Belle Haven householders intervened as defendants, alleging that the government had leased the integrated system to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and that the latter had undertaken to assess a use charge of $2 per month against each householder in Belle Haven subdivision. The intervenors claimed that they were the equitable owners in fee of the Belle Haven system since the developing corporation had included its construction cost in the purchase price of their lots, that they had been granted easements of user in that system and that the use charges assessed exceeded reasonable maintenance and operation costs. The prayer was that the court, in lieu of direct compensation for their interests, protect them against having to contribute to the amortization of the integrated system. The court decided that the householders had acquired implied easements in the Belle Haven system for which they were entitled to claim compensation, and intervention was granted. 89 F. Supp. 571. But the district judge held that he could not make an award in the form of a limitation on future use charges and he denied a temporary injunction against the collection of current bills. 89 F. Supp. 567. The in-tervenors then amended their answer to attack the taking as unauthorized under the Lanham Act. The Belle Haven Realty Corporation, which had not previously answered the government’s petition, did so in 1950, claiming it was the legal owner of the system and entitled to its present reproduction cost, less depreciation, as just compensation.
The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Lanham Act, as amended, required the consent of the intervenors as well as the realty corporation, that the corporation had only conditionally consented to the taking and that the householders had not consented at all. While the Court of Appeals approved the trial court’s reading of the statutory consent requirement, it declined to base its affirmance on that ground because, “It is perfectly clear . . . that the power of condemnation given by the Lanham Act extends only to lands or interests in lands; . . . there is nothing in the act which authorizes the condemnation of a public works system such as this.” 196 F. 2d 657, 662, relying on Puerto Rico R. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 131 F. 2d 491.
The original Lanham Act of October 14,. 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, was designed to provide relief for defense areas found by the President to be suffering from an existing or impending housing shortage. In such cases, the Federal Works Administrator was empowered to acquire “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” for construction sites by purchase, donation, exchange, lease or condemnation. The quoted language describing the kind of property which the Administrator could condemn was carried over into Title II of the Act, added in 1941, which extended the statute to public works shortages in defense areas. “Public work,” as defined, included sewers and sewage facilities. § 201. While the general language “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” included within § 202 of Title II of the Lanham Act appears to authorize the taking here, United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 242, 243, n. 13 (1946), it is not necessary to depend on that section alone. In 1943, the Act was amended to provide that “none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .” 57 Stat. 565, 42 U. S. C. § 1534, note. The 1943 amendment was in effect when the present petition was filed and its applicability here is common ground among the parties. It explicitly authorized the condemnation of such property subject to the conditions stated.
In this connection, we do not believe that the consent requirement bars acquisitions by condemnation. This interpretation would strip it of significance since the other means of acquiring property described in the statute necessarily rest on consensual transactions. Although condemnation is sometimes regarded as a taking without the owner’s consent, 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1, it is not anomalous to provide for such consent which can, in effect, represent an election to have value determined by a court rather than by the parties. In addition, “friendly” condemnation proceedings are often used to obtain clear title where price is already settled. Cf. Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271 (1939). Thus construed, all of the statutory terms are given effect.
Here, the consent of Belle Haven Realty Corporation was implicit in its promise to accept-nominal damages. That consent cannot be characterized as conditional. Indeed, the corporation’s answer, filed six years later, recognized this; rather than resisting the taking, it merely asserted a claim for more than nominal compensation.
Whether the intervening householders were “owners” whose consent was required is a different matter. Their interests were regarded by both courts below as implied easements or rights of user in the sewer system. It is true that easement holders have been held to be “owners” as that term is used in condemnation statutes. Swanson v. United States, 156 F. 2d 442, 445; United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 (1910); cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). But the relevant question in those cases is whether the holders of such interests are entitled to compensation under the Constitution. The compensability of these interests is not in issue here; it follows that the cases on which inter-venors rely are not controlling. In deciding who are “owners” here, we look to the scheme of the Act itself. We think it unlikely that, in providing for the condemnation of public works, Congress at the same time intended to make preliminary negotiations so cumbersome as to virtually nullify the power granted. Yet the interpretation pressed by respondents would have that effect. It would compel the government, before taking public works, to deal with the holder of every servitude to which the property might be subject. We hold that intervenors were not “owners” under the 1943 amendment and that the government was not required before condemning to engage in a round robin to secure from each of them a self-serving “Barkis is willin’.”
We do not pass on other issues raised by respondents, some of which if decided adversely to the government might be cured by amendment, and others we deem not ripe for adjudication because of factual questions not yet resolved.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“Sec. 202. Whenever the President finds that in any area or locality an acute shortage of public works or equipment for public works necessary to the health, safety, or welfare of persons engaged in national-defense activities exists or impends which would impede national-defense activities, and that such public works or equipment cannot otherwise be provided when needed, or could not be provided without the imposition of an increased excessive tax burden or an unusual or excessive increase in the debt limit of the taxing or borrowing authority in which such shortage exists, the Federal Works Administrator is authorized, with the approval of the President, in order to relieve such shortage—
“(a) To acquire, . . . improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands by purchase, donation, exchange, lease ... or condemnation ... for such public works.”
“. . . none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .”
Since the district judge deemed himself unable to order the government to restore the Belle Haven system to its original condition, the householders were remitted by dismissal of the condemnation petition to a separate action for any compensable damage they suffered because of the taking. Under this ruling, the property taken would remain part of the integrated system whether title is in the government or the realty corporation. In each case, the rights of the householders, if any, to an award remain to be determined. One effect of upholding the condemnation is to have that question tried on remand in this proceeding. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"due process: miscellaneous (cf. loyalty oath), the residual code",
"due process: hearing or notice (other than as pertains to government employees or prisoners' rights)",
"due process: hearing, government employees",
"due process: prisoners' rights and defendants' rights",
"due process: impartial decision maker",
"due process: jurisdiction (jurisdiction over non-resident litigants)",
"due process: takings clause, or other non-constitutional governmental taking of property"
] | [
6
] | sc_issue_4 |
Maetta VANCE, Petitioner
v.
BALL STATE UNIVERSITY.
No. 11-556.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Nov. 26, 2012.
Decided June 24, 2013.
Daniel R. Ortiz, Charlottesville, VA, for Petitioner.
Sri Srinivasan, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting neither party.
Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for Respondents.
David T. Goldberg, Donahue & Goldberg, LLP, New York, NY, Daniel R. Ortiz, Counsel of Record, University of Virginia School of Law, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Charlottesville, VA, for Petitioner.
Scott E. Shockley, Lester H. Cohen, Shawn A. Neal, Defur Voran LLP, Muncie, IN, Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Jessica E. Phillips, Roman Martinez, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we decide a question left open in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), namely, who qualifies as a "supervisor" in a case in which an employee asserts a Title VII claim for workplace harassment?
Under Title VII, an employer's liability for such harassment may depend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim's co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a "supervisor," however, different rules apply. If the supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. Id., at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, supra, at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Under this framework, therefore, it matters whether a harasser is a "supervisor" or simply a co-worker.
We hold that an employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit.
I
Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a substitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services. In 1991, BSU promoted Vance to a part-time catering assistant position, and in 2007 she applied and was selected for a position as a full-time catering assistant.
Over the course of her employment with BSU, Vance lodged numerous complaints of racial discrimination and retaliation, but most of those incidents are not at issue here. For present purposes, the only relevant incidents concern Vance's interactions with a fellow BSU employee, Saundra Davis.
During the time in question, Davis, a white woman, was employed as a catering specialist in the Banquet and Catering division. The parties vigorously dispute the precise nature and scope of Davis' duties, but they agree that Davis did not have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline Vance. See No. 1:06-cv-1452-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 4247836, at *12 (S.D.Ind., Sept. 10, 2008) ("Vance makes no allegations that Ms. Davis possessed any such power"); Brief for Petitioner 9-11 (describing Davis' authority over Vance); Brief for Respondent 39 ("[A]ll agree that Davis lacked the authority to take tangible employments [sic ] actions against petitioner").
In late 2005 and early 2006, Vance filed internal complaints with BSU and charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging racial harassment and discrimination, and many of these complaints and charges pertained to Davis. 646 F.3d 461, 467 (C.A.7 2011). Vance complained that Davis "gave her a hard time at work by glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and intimidating her." Ibid. She alleged that she was "left alone in the kitchen with Davis, who smiled at her"; that Davis "blocked"
her on an elevator and "stood there with her cart smiling"; and that Davis often gave her "weird" looks. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Vance's workplace strife persisted despite BSU's attempts to address the problem. As a result, Vance filed this lawsuit in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming, among other things, that she had been subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. In her complaint, she alleged that Davis was her supervisor and that BSU was liable for Davis' creation of a racially hostile work environment. Complaint in No. 1:06-cv-01452-SEB-TAB (SD Ind., Oct. 3, 2006), Dkt. No. 1, pp. 5-6.
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of BSU. 2008 WL 4247836, at *1. The court explained that BSU could not be held vicariously liable for Davis' alleged racial harassment because Davis could not " 'hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline' " Vance and, as a result, was not Vance's supervisor under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of that concept. See id., at *12 (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elect. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (C.A.7 2002) ). The court further held that BSU could not be liable in negligence because it responded reasonably to the incidents of which it was aware. 2008 WL 4247836, *15.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 646 F.3d 461. It explained that, under its settled precedent, supervisor status requires " 'the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee.' " Id., at 470 (quoting Hall,supra, at 355 ). The court concluded that Davis was not Vance's supervisor and thus that Vance could not recover from BSU unless she could prove negligence. Finding that BSU was not negligent with respect to Davis' conduct, the court affirmed. 646 F.3d, at 470-473.
II
A
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This provision obviously prohibits discrimination with respect to employment decisions that have direct economic consequences, such as termination, demotion, and pay cuts. But not long after Title VII was enacted, the lower courts held that Title VII also reaches the creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory work environment.
In the leading case of Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (1971), the Fifth Circuit recognized a cause of action based on this theory. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (describing development of hostile environment claims based on race). The Rogers court reasoned that "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 454 F.2d, at 238. The court observed that "[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers." Ibid. Following this decision, the lower courts generally held that an employer was liable for a racially hostile work environment if the employer was negligent, i.e., if the employer knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment but failed to take remedial action. See Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 768-769, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
When the issue eventually reached this Court, we agreed that Title VII prohibits the creation of a hostile work environment. See Meritor, supra, at 64-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399. In such cases, we have held, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was so pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment were altered. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993).
B
Consistent with Rogers, we have held that an employer is directly liable for an employee's unlawful harassment if the employer was negligent with respect to the offensive behavior. Faragher, 524 U.S., at 789, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Courts have generally applied this rule to evaluate employer liability when a co-worker harasses the plaintiff.
In Ellerth and Faragher, however, we held that different rules apply where the harassing employee is the plaintiff's "supervisor." In those instances, an employer may be vicariously liable for its employees' creation of a hostile work environment. And in identifying the situations in which such vicarious liability is appropriate, we looked to the Restatement of Agency for guidance. See, e.g., Meritor, supra, at 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399; Ellerth, supra, at 755, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Under the Restatement, "masters" are generally not liable for the torts of their "servants" when the torts are committed outside the scope of the servants' employment. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2), p. 481 (1957) (Restatement). And because racial and sexual harassment are unlikely to fall within the scope of a servant's duties, application of this rule would generally preclude employer liability for employee harassment. See Faragher, supra, at 793-796, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, supra, at 757, 118 S.Ct. 2257. But in Ellerth and Faragher, we held that a provision of the Restatement provided the basis for an exception. Section 219(2)(d) of that Restatement recognizes an exception to the general rule just noted for situations in which the servant was "aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation." Restatement 481; see Faragher,supra, at 802-803, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, supra, at 760-763, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Adapting this concept to the Title VII context, Ellerth and Faragher identified two situations in which the aided-in-the-accomplishment rule warrants employer liability even in the absence of negligence, and both of these situations involve harassment by a "supervisor" as opposed to a co-worker. First, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable "when a supervisor takes a tangible employment action," Ellerth, supra, at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257; Faragher, supra, at 790, 118 S.Ct. 2275 -i.e., "a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. We explained the reason for this rule as follows: "When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation.... A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. The decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors." Id., at 761-762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. In those circumstances, we said, it is appropriate to hold the employer strictly liable. See Faragher, supra, at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth,supra, at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
Second, Ellerth and Faragher held that, even when a supervisor's harassment does not culminate in a tangible employment action, the employer can be vicariously liable for the supervisor's creation of a hostile work environment if the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defense. We began by noting that "a supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation." Ellerth, supra, at 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257; see Faragher, 524 U.S., at 803-805, 118 S.Ct. 2275. But it would go too far, we found, to make employers strictly liable whenever a "supervisor" engages in harassment that does not result in a tangible employment action, and we therefore held that in such cases the employer may raise an affirmative defense. Specifically, an employer can mitigate or avoid liability by showing (1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities that were provided. Faragher, supra, at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. This compromise, we explained, "accommodate[s] the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees." Id., at 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
The dissenting Members of the Court in Ellerth and Faragher would not have created a special rule for cases involving harassment by "supervisors." Instead, they would have held that an employer is liable for any employee's creation of a hostile work environment "if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent in permitting the [offending] conduct to occur." Ellerth,supra, at 767, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Faragher, supra, at 810, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (same).
C
Under Ellerth and Faragher, it is obviously important whether an alleged harasser is a "supervisor" or merely a co-worker, and the lower courts have disagreed about the meaning of the concept of a supervisor in this context. Some courts, including the Seventh Circuit below, have held that an employee is not a supervisor unless he or she has the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline the victim. E.g., 646 F.3d, at 470 ; Noviello v. Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96 (C.A.1 2005) ; Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (C.A.8 2004). Other courts have substantially followed the more open-ended approach advocated by the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance, which ties supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another's daily work. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126-127 (C.A.2 2003) ; Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245-247 (C.A.4 2010) ; EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999), 1999 WL 33305874, at *3 (hereinafter EEOC Guidance).
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 567 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 23, 183 L.Ed.2d 673 (2012).
III
We hold that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a "significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, supra, at 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257. We reject the nebulous definition of a "supervisor" advocated in the EEOC Guidance and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals. Petitioner's reliance on colloquial uses of the term " supervisor" is misplaced, and her contention that our cases require the EEOC's abstract definition is simply wrong.
As we will explain, the framework set out in Ellerth and Faragher presupposes a clear distinction between supervisors and co-workers. Those decisions contemplate a unitary category of supervisors, i.e., those employees with the authority to make tangible employment decisions. There is no hint in either decision that the Court had in mind two categories of supervisors: first, those who have such authority and, second, those who, although lacking this power, nevertheless have the ability to direct a co-worker's labor to some ill-defined degree. On the contrary, the Ellerth / Faragher framework is one under which supervisory status can usually be readily determined, generally by written documentation. The approach recommended by the EEOC Guidance, by contrast, would make the determination of supervisor status depend on a highly case-specific evaluation of numerous factors.
The Ellerth / Faragher framework represents what the Court saw as a workable compromise between the aided-in-the-accomplishment theory of vicarious liability and the legitimate interests of employers. The Seventh Circuit's understanding of the concept of a "supervisor," with which we agree, is easily workable; it can be applied without undue difficulty at both the summary judgment stage and at trial. The alternative, in many cases, would frustrate judges and confound jurors.
A
Petitioner contends that her expansive understanding of the concept of a "supervisor" is supported by the meaning of the word in general usage and in other legal contexts, see Brief for Petitioner 25-28, but this argument is both incorrect on its own terms and, in any event, misguided.
In general usage, the term "supervisor" lacks a sufficiently specific meaning to be helpful for present purposes. Petitioner is certainly right that the term is often used to refer to a person who has the authority to direct another's work. See, e.g., 17 Oxford English Dictionary 245 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the term as applying to "one who inspects and directs the work of others"). But the term is also often closely tied to the authority to take what Ellerth and Faragher referred to as a "tangible employment action." See, e.g ., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2296, def. 1(a) (1976) ("a person having authority delegated by an employer to hire, transfer, suspend, recall, promote, assign, or discharge another employee or to recommend such action").
A comparison of the definitions provided by two colloquial business authorities illustrates the term's imprecision in general usage. One says that "[s]upervisors are usually authorized to recommend and/or effect hiring, disciplining, promoting, punishing, rewarding, and other associated activities regarding the employees in their departments." Another says exactly the opposite: "A supervisor generally does not have the power to hire or fire employees or to promote them." Compare Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257 ("Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor").
If we look beyond general usage to the meaning of the term in other legal contexts, we find much the same situation. Sometimes the term is reserved for those in the upper echelons of the management hierarchy. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2021(18) (defining the "supervisor" of a school within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs as "the individual in the position of ultimate authority at a Bureau school"). But sometimes the term is used to refer to lower ranking individuals. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (defining a supervisor to include "any individual having authority ... to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment"); 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(4)(A) (providing that an eligible Medicaid beneficiary who receives care through an approved self-directed services plan may "hire, fire, supervise, and manage the individuals providing such services"). Although the meaning of the concept of a supervisor varies from one legal context to another, the law often contemplates that the ability to supervise includes the ability to take tangible employment actions. See, e.g., 5 CFR §§ 9701.511(a)(2), (3) (2012) (referring to a supervisor's authority to "hire, assign, and direct employees ... and [t]o lay off and retain employees, or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade, band, or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees or, with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion or from any other appropriate source"); § 9701.212(b)(4) (defining "supervisory work" as that which "may involve hiring or selecting employees, assigning work, managing performance, recognizing and rewarding employees, and other associated duties"). In sum, the term "supervisor" has varying meanings both in colloquial usage and in the law. And for this reason, petitioner's argument, taken on its own terms, is unsuccessful.
More important, petitioner is misguided in suggesting that we should approach the question presented here as if "supervisor" were a statutory term. "Supervisor" is not a term used by Congress in Title VII. Rather, the term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and Faragher as a label for the class of employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability. Accordingly, the way to understand the meaning of the term "supervisor" for present purposes is to consider the interpretation that best fits within the highly structured framework that those cases adopted.
B
In considering Ellerth and Faragher , we are met at the outset with petitioner's contention that at least some of the alleged harassers in those cases, whom we treated as supervisors, lacked the authority that the Seventh Circuit's definition demands. This argument misreads our decisions.
In Ellerth, it was clear that the alleged harasser was a supervisor under any definition of the term: He hired his victim, and he promoted her (subject only to the ministerial approval of his supervisor, who merely signed the paperwork). 524 U.S., at 747, 118 S.Ct. 2257.Ellerth was a case from the Seventh Circuit, and at the time of its decision in that case, that court had already adopted its current definition of a supervisor. See Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (1988). See also Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033, n. 1 (C.A.7 1998) (discussing Circuit case law). Although the en banc Seventh Circuit in Ellerth issued eight separate opinions, there was no disagreement about the harasser's status as a supervisor. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (1997) (per curiam ). Likewise, when the case reached this Court, no question about the harasser's status was raised.
The same is true with respect to Faragher . In that case, Faragher, a female lifeguard, sued her employer, the city of Boca Raton, for sexual harassment based on the conduct of two other lifeguards, Bill Terry and David Silverman, and we held that the city was vicariously liable for Terry's and Silverman's harassment. Although it is clear that Terry had authority to take tangible employment actions affecting the victim, see 524 U.S., at 781, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (explaining that Terry could hire new lifeguards, supervise their work assignments, counsel, and discipline them), Silverman may have wielded less authority, ibid. (noting that Silverman was " responsible for making the lifeguards' daily assignments, and for supervising their work and fitness training"). Nevertheless, the city never disputed Faragher's characterization of both men as her "supervisors." See App., O.T. 1997, No. 97-282, p. 40 (First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6-7); id ., at 79 (Answer to First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 6-7) (admitting that both harassers had "supervisory responsibilities" over the plaintiff). In light of the parties' undisputed characterization of the alleged harassers, this Court simply was not presented with the question of the degree of authority that an employee must have in order to be classified as a supervisor. The parties did not focus on the issue in their briefs, although the victim in Faragher appears to have agreed that supervisors are employees empowered to take tangible employment actions. See Brief for Petitioner, O.T. 1997, No. 97-282, p. 24 ("Supervisors typically exercise broad discretionary powers over their subordinates, determining many of the terms and conditions of their employment, including their raises and prospects for promotion and controlling or greatly influencing whether they are to be dismissed").
For these reasons, we have no difficulty rejecting petitioner's argument that the question before us in the present case was effectively settled in her favor by our treatment of the alleged harassers in Ellerth and Faragher .
The dissent acknowledges that our prior cases do "not squarely resolve whether an employee without power to take tangible employment actions may nonetheless qualify as a supervisor," but accuses us of ignoring the "all-too-plain reality" that employees with authority to control their subordinates' daily work are aided by that authority in perpetuating a discriminatory work environment. Post, at 2458 - 2459 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). As Ellerth recognized, however, "most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the agency relation," and consequently "something more" is required in order to warrant vicarious liability. 524 U.S., at 760, 118 S.Ct. 2257. The ability to direct another employee's tasks is simply not sufficient. Employees with such powers are certainly capable of creating intolerable work environments, see post, at 2459 - 2460 (discussing examples), but so are many other co-workers. Negligence provides the better framework for evaluating an employer's liability when a harassing employee lacks the power to take tangible employment actions.
C
Although our holdings in Faragher and Ellerth do not resolve the question now before us, we believe that the answer to that question is implicit in the characteristics of the framework that we adopted.
To begin, there is no hint in either Ellerth or Faragher that the Court contemplated anything other than a unitary category of supervisors, namely, those possessing the authority to effect a tangible change in a victim's terms or conditions of employment. The Ellerth / Faragher framework draws a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors. Co-workers, the Court noted, "can inflict psychological injuries" by creating a hostile work environment, but they "cannot dock another's pay, nor can one co-worker demote another." Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Only a supervisor has the power to cause "direct economic harm" by taking a tangible employment action. Ibid . "Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.... Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates." Ibid . (emphasis added). The strong implication of this passage is that the authority to take tangible employment actions is the defining characteristic of a supervisor, not simply a characteristic of a subset of an ill-defined class of employees who qualify as supervisors.
The way in which we framed the question presented in Ellerth supports this understanding. As noted, the Ellerth / Faragher framework sets out two circumstances in which an employer may be vicariously liable for a supervisor's harassment. The first situation (which results in strict liability) exists when a supervisor actually takes a tangible employment action based on, for example, a subordinate's refusal to accede to sexual demands. The second situation (which results in vicarious liability if the employer cannot make out the requisite affirmative defense) is present when no such tangible action is taken. Both Ellerth and Faragher fell into the second category, and in Ellerth, the Court couched the question at issue in the following terms: "whether an employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill the threat." 524 U.S., at 754, 118 S.Ct. 2257. This statement plainly ties the second situation to a supervisor's authority to inflict direct economic injury. It is because a supervisor has that authority-and its potential use hangs as a threat over the victim-that vicarious liability (subject to the affirmative defense) is justified.
Finally, the Ellerth / Faragher Court sought a framework that would be workable and would appropriately take into account the legitimate interests of employers and employees. The Court looked to principles of agency law for guidance, but the Court concluded that the " malleable terminology" of the aided-in-the-commission principle counseled against the wholesale incorporation of that principle into Title VII case law. Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Instead, the Court also considered the objectives of Title VII, including "the limitation of employer liability in certain circumstances." Id ., at 764, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that we adopt today is one that can be readily applied. In a great many cases, it will be known even before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a supervisor, and in others, the alleged harasser's status will become clear to both sides after discovery. And once this is known, the parties will be in a position to assess the strength of a case and to explore the possibility of resolving the dispute. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment. By contrast, under the approach advocated by petitioner and the EEOC, supervisor status would very often be murky-as this case well illustrates.
According to petitioner, the record shows that Davis, her alleged harasser, wielded enough authority to qualify as a supervisor. Petitioner points in particular to Davis' job description, which gave her leadership responsibilities, and to evidence that Davis at times led or directed Vance and other employees in the kitchen. See Brief for Petitioner 42-43 (citing record); Reply Brief 22-23 (same). The United States, on the other hand, while applying the same open-ended test for supervisory status, reaches the opposite conclusion. At least on the present record, the United States tells us, Davis fails to qualify as a supervisor. Her job description, in the Government's view, is not dispositive, and the Government adds that it would not be enough for petitioner to show that Davis "occasionally took the lead in the kitchen." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 (U.S. Brief).
This disagreement is hardly surprising since the EEOC's definition of a supervisor, which both petitioner and the United States defend, is a study in ambiguity. In its Enforcement Guidance, the EEOC takes the position that an employee, in order to be classified as a supervisor, must wield authority " 'of sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser explicitly or implicitly in carrying out the harassment.' " Id., at 27 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a (EEOC Guidance)). But any authority over the work of another employee provides at least some assistance, see Ellerth, supra, at 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257, and that is not what the United States interprets the Guidance to mean. Rather, it informs us, the authority must exceed both an ill-defined temporal requirement (it must be more than "occasiona[l]") and an ill-defined substantive requirement ("an employee who directs 'only a limited number of tasks or assignments' for another employee ... would not have sufficient authority to qualify as a supervisor." U.S. Brief 28 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 92a (EEOC Guidance)); U.S. Brief 31.
We read the EEOC Guidance as saying that the number (and perhaps the importance) of the tasks in question is a factor to be considered in determining whether an employee qualifies as a supervisor. And if this is a correct interpretation of the EEOC's position, what we are left with is a proposed standard of remarkable ambiguity.
The vagueness of this standard was highlighted at oral argument when the attorney representing the United States was asked to apply that standard to the situation in Faragher, where the alleged harasser supposedly threatened to assign the plaintiff to clean the toilets in the lifeguard station for a year if she did not date him. 524 U.S., at 780, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Since cleaning the toilets is just one task, albeit an unpleasant one, the authority to assign that job would not seem to meet the more-than-a-limited-number-of-tasks requirement in the EEOC Guidance. Nevertheless, the Government attorney's first response was that the authority to make this assignment would be enough. Tr. of Oral Arg. 23. He later qualified that answer by saying that it would be necessary to "know how much of the day's work [was] encompassed by cleaning the toilets." Id., at 23-24. He did not explain what percentage of the day's work (50%, 25%, 10%?) would suffice.
The Government attorney's inability to provide a definitive answer to this question was the inevitable consequence of the vague standard that the Government asks us to adopt. Key components of that standard-"sufficient" authority, authority to assign more than a "limited number of tasks," and authority that is exercised more than "occasionally"-have no clear meaning. Applying these standards would present daunting problems for the lower federal courts and for juries.
Under the definition of "supervisor" that we adopt today, the question of supervisor status, when contested, can very often be resolved as a matter of law before trial. The elimination of this issue from the trial will focus the efforts of the parties, who will be able to present their cases in a way that conforms to the framework that the jury will apply. The plaintiff will know whether he or she must prove that the employer was negligent or whether the employer will have the burden of proving the elements of the Ellerth / Faragher affirmative defense. Perhaps even more important, the work of the jury, which is inevitably complicated in employment discrimination cases, will be simplified. The jurors can be given preliminary instructions that allow them to understand, as the evidence comes in, how each item of proof fits into the framework that they will ultimately be required to apply. And even where the issue of supervisor status cannot be eliminated from the trial (because there are genuine factual disputes about an alleged harasser's authority to take tangible employment actions), this preliminary question is relatively straightforward.
The alternative approach advocated by petitioner and the United States would make matters far more complicated and difficult. The complexity of the standard they favor would impede the resolution of the issue before trial. With the issue still open when trial commences, the parties would be compelled to present evidence and argument on supervisor status, the affirmative defense, and the question of negligence, and the jury would have to grapple with all those issues as well. In addition, it would often be necessary for the jury to be instructed about two very different paths of analysis, i.e., what to do if the alleged harasser was found to be a supervisor and what to do if the alleged harasser was found to be merely a co-worker.
Courts and commentators alike have opined on the need for reasonably clear jury instructions in employment discrimination cases. And the danger of juror confusion is particularly high where the jury is faced with instructions on alternative theories of liability under which different parties bear the burden of proof. By simplifying the process of determining who is a supervisor (and by extension, which liability rules apply to a given set of facts), the approach that we take will help to ensure that juries return verdicts that reflect the application of the correct legal rules to the facts.
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, see post, at 2461 - 2462, 2463 - 2464, this approach will not leave employees unprotected against harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable ways. In such cases, the victims will be able to prevail simply by showing that the employer was negligent in permitting this harassment to occur, and the jury should be instructed that the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the employer was negligent. The nature and degree of authority possessed by harassing employees varies greatly, see post, 2459 - 2460 (offering examples), and as we explained above, the test proposed by petitioner and the United States is ill equipped to deal with the variety of situations that will inevitably arise. This variety presents no problem for the negligence standard, which is thought to provide adequate protection for tort plaintiffs in many other situations. There is no reason why this standard, if accompanied by proper instructions, cannot provide the same service in the context at issue here.
D
The dissent argues that the definition of a supervisor that we now adopt is out of touch with the realities of the workplace, where individuals with the power to assign daily tasks are often regarded by other employees as supervisors. See post, at 2456 - 2457, 2458 - 2461. But in reality it is the alternative that is out of touch. Particularly in modern organizations that have abandoned a highly hierarchical management structure, it is common for employees to have overlapping authority with respect to the assignment of work tasks. Members of a team may each have the responsibility for taking the lead with respect to a particular aspect of the work and thus may have the responsibility to direct each other in that area of responsibility.
Finally, petitioner argues that tying supervisor status to the authority to take tangible employment actions will encourage employers to attempt to insulate themselves from liability for workplace harassment by empowering only a handful of individuals to take tangible employment actions. But a broad definition of "supervisor" is not necessary to guard against this concern.
As an initial matter, an employer will always be liable when its negligence leads to the creation or continuation of a hostile work environment. And even if an employer concentrates all decisionmaking authority in a few individuals, it likely will not isolate itself from heightened liability under Faragher and Ellerth . If an employer does attempt to confine decisionmaking power to a small number of individuals, those individuals will have a limited ability to exercise independent discretion when making decisions and will likely rely on other workers who actually interact with the affected employee. Cf. Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 509 (C.A.7 2004) (Rovner, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Although they did not have the power to take formal employment actions vis-à-vis [the victim], [the harassers] necessarily must have had substantial input into those decisions, as they would have been the people most familiar with her work-certainly more familiar with it than the off-site Department Administrative Services Manager"). Under those circumstances, the employer may be held to have effectively delegated the power to take tangible employment actions to the employees on whose recommendations it relies. See Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257.
IV
Importuning Congress, post, at 2465 - 2466, the dissent suggests that the standard we adopt today would cause the plaintiffs to lose in a handful of cases involving shocking allegations of harassment, see post, at 2459 - 2461. However, the dissent does not mention why the plaintiffs would lose in those cases. It is not clear in any of those examples that the legal outcome hinges on the definition of "supervisor." For example, Clara Whitten ultimately did not prevail on her discrimination claims-notwithstanding the fact that the Fourth Circuit adopted the approach advocated by the dissent, see Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 243-247 (2010) -because the District Court subsequently dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction. See Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., No. 8:08-0218-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 2757005, at *3 (D.S.C., July 12, 2010). And although the dissent suggests that Donna Rhodes' employer would have been liable under the dissent's definition of "supervisor," that is pure speculation: It is not clear that Rhodes suffered any tangible employment action, see Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 243 F.Supp.2d 810, 817 (N.D.Ill.2003), and no court had occasion to determine whether the employer could have established the affirmative defense (a prospect that is certainly feasible given that there was evidence that the employer had an " adequate anti-harassment policy in place," that the employer promptly addressed the incidents about which Rhodes complained, and that "Rhodes failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided," Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d, at 507). Finally, the dissent's reliance on Monika Starke's case is perplexing given that the EEOC ultimately did obtain relief (in the amount of $50,000) for the harassment of Starke, see Order of Dismissal in No. 1:07-cv-0095-LRR (ND Iowa, Feb. 2, 2013), Dkt. No. 380, Exh. 1, ¶ 1, notwithstanding the fact that the court in that case applied the definition of "supervisor" that we adopt today, see EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 684 (C.A.8 2012).
In any event, the dissent is wrong in claiming that our holding would preclude employer liability in other cases with facts similar to these. Assuming that a harasser is not a supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her employer was negligent in failing to prevent harassment from taking place. Evidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed would be relevant. Thus, it is not true, as the dissent asserts, that our holding "relieves scores of employers of responsibility" for the behavior of workers they employ. Post, at 2462.
The standard we adopt is not untested. It has been the law for quite some time in the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, see, e.g., Noviello v. Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96 (C.A.1 2005) ; Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (C.A.8 2004) ; Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1033-1034, and n. 1 (C.A.7 1998) -i.e., in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. We are aware of no evidence that this rule has produced dire consequences in these 14 jurisdictions.
Despite its rhetoric, the dissent acknowledges that Davis, the alleged harasser in this case, would probably not qualify as a supervisor even under the dissent's preferred approach. See post, at 2465 ("[T]here is cause to anticipate that Davis would not qualify as Vance's supervisor"). On that point, we agree. Petitioner did refer to Davis as a "supervisor" in some of the complaints that she filed, App. 28; id., at 45, and Davis' job description does state that she supervises Kitchen Assistants and Substitutes and "[l]ead[s] and direct[s]" certain other employees, id., at 12 - 13. But under the dissent's preferred approach, supervisor status hinges not on formal job titles or "paper descriptions" but on "specific facts about the working relationship." Post, at 2465 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Turning to the "specific facts" of petitioner's and Davis' working relationship, there is simply no evidence that Davis directed petitioner's day-to-day activities. The record indicates that Bill Kimes (the general manager of the Catering Division) and the chef assigned petitioner's daily tasks, which were given to her on "prep lists." No. 1:06-cv-1452-SEB-JMS, 2008 WL 4247836, at *7 (S.D.Ind., Sept. 10, 2008) ; App. 430, 431. The fact that Davis sometimes may have handed prep lists to petitioner, see id., at 74, is insufficient to confer supervisor status, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 92a (EEOC Guidance). And Kimes-not Davis-set petitioner's work schedule. See App. 431. See also id., at 212.
Because the dissent concedes that our approach in this case deprives petitioner of none of the protections that Title VII offers, the dissent's critique is based on nothing more than a hypothesis as to how our approach might affect the outcomes of other cases-cases where an employee who cannot take tangible employment actions, but who does direct the victim's daily work activities in a meaningful way, creates an unlawful hostile environment, and yet does not wield authority of such a degree and nature that the employer can be deemed negligent with respect to the harassment. We are skeptical that there are a great number of such cases. However, we are confident that, in every case, the approach we take today will be more easily administrable than the approach advocated by the dissent.
* * *
We hold that an employee is a "supervisor" for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim. Because there is no evidence that BSU empowered Davis to take any tangible employment actions against Vance, the judgment of the Seventh Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
See, e.g., Williams v. Waste Management of Ill., 361 F.3d 1021, 1029 (C.A.7 2004) ; McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1119 (C.A.9 2004) ; Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (C.A.8 2004) ; Noviello v. Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 95 (C.A.1 2005) ; Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (C.A.2 2009) ; Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104-105 (C.A.3 2009).
The Restatement (Third) of Agency disposed of this exception to liability, explaining that "[t]he purposes likely intended to be met by the 'aided in accomplishing' basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborated treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care that a principal owes to third parties with whom it interacts through employees and other agents." 2 Restatement (Third) § 7.08, p. 228 (2005). The parties do not argue that this change undermines our holdings in Faragher and Ellerth .
Faragher and Ellerth involved hostile environment claims premised on sexual harassment. Several federal courts of appeals have held that Faragher and Ellerth apply to other types of hostile environment claims, including race-based claims. See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186, n. 9 (C.A.4 2001) (citing cases reflecting "the developing consensus ... that the holdings [in Faragher and Ellerth ] apply with equal force to other types of harassment claims under Title VII"). But see Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 767, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (stating that, as a result of the Court's decision in Ellerth, "employer liability under Title VII is judged by different standards depending upon whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is alleged"). Neither party in this case challenges the application of Faragher and Ellerth to race-based hostile environment claims, and we assume that the framework announced in Faragher and Ellerth applies to cases such as this one.
The United States urges us to defer to the EEOC Guidance. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26-29 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) ). But to do so would be proper only if the EEOC Guidance has the power to persuade, which "depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements." Id., at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. For the reasons explained below, we do not find the EEOC Guidance persuasive.
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/supervisor.html (all Internet materials as visited June 21, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).
http://management.about.com/od/policiesand procedures/g/supervisor1.html
One outlier that petitioner points to is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Petitioner argues that the NLRA's definition supports her position in this case to the extent that it encompasses employees who have the ability to direct or assign work to subordinates. Brief for Petitioner 27-28.
The NLRA certainly appears to define "supervisor" in broad terms. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the lower courts, however, have consistently explained that supervisory authority is not trivial or insignificant: If the term "supervisor" is construed too broadly, then employees who are deemed to be supervisors will be denied rights that the NLRA was intended to protect. E.g., In re Connecticut Humane Society, 358 NLRB No. 31, 2012 WL 1249565, at *33 (Apr. 12, 2012) ; Frenchtown Acquisition Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 683 F.3d 298, 305 (C.A.6 2012) ; Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 960, 963 (C.A.D.C.1999). Indeed, in defining a supervisor for purposes of the NLRA, Congress sought to distinguish "between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the supervisor vested with such genuine management prerogatives as the right to hire or fire, discipline, or make effective recommendations with respect to such action." S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1947). Cf. NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 511 U.S. 571, 586, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994) (HCRA ) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) ("Through case-by-case adjudication, the Board has sought to distinguish individuals exercising the level of control that truly places them in the ranks of management, from highly skilled employees, whether professional or technical, who perform, incidentally to their skilled work, a limited supervisory role"). Accordingly, the NLRB has interpreted the NLRA's statutory definition of supervisor more narrowly than its plain language might permit. See, e.g., Connecticut Humane Society, supra, at *39 (an employee who evaluates others is not a supervisor unless the evaluation "affect[s] the wages and the job status of the employee evaluated"); In re CGLM, Inc., 350 NLRB 974, 977 (2007) (" 'If any authority over someone else, no matter how insignificant or infrequent, made an employee a supervisor, our industrial composite would be predominantly supervisory. Every order-giver is not a supervisor. Even the traffic director tells the president of the company where to park his car' " (quoting NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 151 (C.A.5 1967) )). The NLRA therefore does not define the term "supervisor" as broadly as petitioner suggests.
To be sure, the NLRA may in some instances define "supervisor" more broadly than we define the term in this case. But those differences reflect the NLRA's unique purpose, which is to preserve the balance of power between labor and management, see HCRA,supra, at 573, 114 S.Ct. 1778 (explaining that Congress amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors in order to address the "imbalance between labor and management" that resulted when "supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with the employer"). That purpose is inapposite in the context of Title VII, which focuses on eradicating discrimination. An employee may have a sufficient degree of authority over subordinates such that Congress has decided that the employee should not participate with lower level employees in the same collective-bargaining unit (because, for example, a higher level employee will pursue his own interests at the expense of lower level employees' interests), but that authority is not necessarily sufficient to merit heightened liability for the purposes of Title VII. The NLRA's definition of supervisor therefore is not controlling in this context.
The dissent suggests that it is unclear whether Terry would qualify as a supervisor under the test we adopt because his hiring decisions were subject to approval by higher management. Post, at 2458, n. 1 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). See also Faragher, 524 U.S., at 781, 118 S.Ct. 2275. But we have assumed that tangible employment actions can be subject to such approval. See Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 762, 118 S.Ct. 2257. In any event, the record indicates that Terry possessed the power to make employment decisions having direct economic consequences for his victims. See Brief for Petitioner in Faragher v. Boca Raton, O.T. 1997, No. 97-282, p. 9 ("No one, during the twenty years that Terry was Marine Safety Chief, was hired without his recommendation. [He] initiated firing and suspending personnel. [His] evaluations of the lifeguards translated into salary increases. [He] made recommendations regarding promotions ..." (citing record)).
Moreover, it is by no means certain that Silverman lacked the authority to take tangible employment actions against Faragher. In her merits brief, Faragher stated that, as a lieutenant, Silverman "made supervisory and disciplinary decisions and had input on the evaluations as well." Id., at 9-10. If that discipline had economic consequences (such as suspension without pay), then Silverman might qualify as a supervisor under the definition we adopt today.
Silverman's ability to assign Faragher significantly different work responsibilities also may have constituted a tangible employment action. Silverman told Faragher, " 'Date me or clean the toilets for a year.' " Faragher, supra, at 780, 118 S.Ct. 2275. That threatened reassignment of duties likely would have constituted significantly different responsibilities for a lifeguard, whose job typically is to guard the beach. If that reassignment had economic consequences, such as foreclosing Faragher's eligibility for promotion, then it might constitute a tangible employment action.
The lower court did not even address this issue. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530, 1547 (C.A.11 1997) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that it was unnecessary to "decide the threshold level of authority which a supervisor must possess in order to impose liability on the employer").
According to the dissent, the rule that we adopt is also inconsistent with our decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). See post, at 2458 - 2459. The question in that case was "whether a constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment ranks as a tangible employment action and therefore precludes assertion of the affirmative defense articulated in Ellerth and Faragher ." Suders,supra, at 140, 124 S.Ct. 2342. As the dissent implicitly acknowledges, the supervisor status of the harassing employees was not before us in that case. See post, at 2458 - 2459. Indeed, the employer conceded early in the litigation that the relevant employees were supervisors, App. in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, O.T. 2003, No. 03-95, p. 20 (Answer ¶ 29), and we therefore had no occasion to question that unchallenged characterization.
The dissent attempts to find ambiguities in our holding, see post, at 15-16, and n. 5, but it is indisputable that our holding is orders of magnitude clearer than the nebulous standard it would adopt. Employment discrimination cases present an almost unlimited number of factual variations, and marginal cases are inevitable under any standard.
See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 179, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ; Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hospital, 438 F.3d 240, 249 (C.A.3 2006) (noting in the context of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), that that "the 'prima facie case and the shifting burdens confuse lawyers and judges, much less juries, who do not have the benefit of extensive study of the law on the subject' " (quoting Mogull v. Commercial Real Estate, 162 N.J. 449, 471, 744 A.2d 1186, 1199 (2000) )); Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (C.A.10 2005) (noting that unnecessarily complicated instructions complicate a jury's job in employment discrimination cases, and "unnecessary complexity increases the opportunity for error"); Sanders v. New York City Human Resources Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (C.A.2 2004) ("Making the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas part of a jury charge undoubtedly constitutes error because of the manifest risk of confusion it creates"); Mogull, supra, at 473, 744 A.2d, at 1200 ("Given the confusion that often results when the first and second stages of the McDonnell Douglas test goes to the jury, we recommend that the court should decide both those issues"); Tymkovich, The Problem with Pretext, 85 Denver Univ. L.Rev. 503, 527-529 (2008) (discussing the potential for jury confusion that arises when instructions are unduly complex and proposing a simpler framework); Grebeldinger, Instructing the Jury in a Case of Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment: Thoroughness or Simplicity? 12 Lab. Law. 399, 419 (1997) (concluding that more straightforward instructions "provid[e] the jury with clearer guidance of their mission"); Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 Brook. L.Rev. 703, 742-743 (1995) (discussing potential for juror confusion in the face of complex instructions); Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 Mich. L.Rev. 234, 262-273 (2001) (discussing the need for a simpler approach to jury instructions in employment discrimination cases).
Cf. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 Boston College L.Rev. 279, 330-334 (2010) (arguing that unnecessary confusion arises when a jury must resolve different claims under different burden frameworks); Monahan, Cabrera v. Jakabovitz -A Common-Sense Proposal for Formulating Jury Instructions Regarding Shifting Burdens of Proof in Disparate Treatment Discrimination Cases, 5 Geo. Mason U.C.R.L.J. 55, 76 (1994) ("Any jury instruction that attempts to shift the burden of persuasion on closely related issues is never likely to be successful").
Similarly, it is unclear whether Yasharay Mack ultimately would have prevailed even under the dissent's definition of "supervisor." The Second Circuit (adopting a definition similar to that advocated by the dissent) remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Mack " 'unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.' " Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 127-128 (2003) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S., at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257). But before it had an opportunity to make any such determination, Mack withdrew her complaint and the District Court dismissed her claims with prejudice. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal in No. 1:00-cv-7778-LAP (SDNY, Oct. 21, 2004), Dkt. No. 63.
Starke herself lacked standing to pursue her claims, see EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 678, and n. 14 (C.A.8 2012), but the Eighth Circuit held that the EEOC could sue in its own name to remedy the sexual harassment against Starke and other CRST employees, see id., at 682. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the type of decision made by the court among the following: Consider "opinion of the court (orally argued)" if the court decided the case by a signed opinion and the case was orally argued. For the 1791-1945 terms, the case need not be orally argued, but a justice must be listed as delivering the opinion of the Court. Consider "per curiam (no oral argument)" if the court decided the case with an opinion but without hearing oral arguments. For the 1791-1945 terms, the Court (or reporter) need not use the term "per curiam" but rather "The Court [said],""By the Court," or "By direction of the Court." Consider "decrees" in the infrequent type of decisions where the justices will typically appoint a special master to take testimony and render a report, the bulk of which generally becomes the Court's decision. This type of decision usually arises under the Court's original jurisdiction and involves state boundary disputes. Consider "equally divided vote" for cases decided by an equally divided vote, for example when a justice fails to participate in a case or when the Court has a vacancy. Consider "per curiam (orally argued)" if no individual justice's name appears as author of the Court's opinion and the case was orally argued. Consider "judgment of the Court (orally argued)" for formally decided cases (decided the case by a signed opinion) where less than a majority of the participating justices agree with the opinion produced by the justice assigned to write the Court's opinion. | What type of decision did the court make? | [
"opinion of the court (orally argued)",
"per curiam (no oral argument)",
"decrees",
"equally divided vote",
"per curiam (orally argued)",
"judgment of the Court (orally argued)",
"seriatim"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiontype |
VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE et al. v. BORAAS et al.
No. 73-191.
Argued February 19-20, 1974
Decided April 1, 1974
Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun; Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., post, p. 10, and Marshall, J., post, p. 12, filed dissenting opinions.
Bernard E. Gegan argued the cause "for appellants. With him on the brief was James J. von Oiste.
Lawrence G. Sager argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Melvin L. Wulf and Burt Neuborne.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Coúrt.
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island’s north shore, of ábout 220 homes inhabited by 700 .people. Its total land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted land use to one-family dwellings excluding, lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-'dwelling houses. The word “family” as used in the.ordi-. 'nance means, “[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriagé, living and cooking • together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.”
Appellees the Dickmans are owners of a house m the village and leased it in December 1971 for a term of 18 mbnths to Michael Truman. Later Bruce Boraas became a colessee. Then Anne Barish moved into the house along with three others. These six are students at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage. When the village served the Dickmans with an “Order to Remedy Violations” of the ordinance, the owners plus three tenants thereupon brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for an injunction and a judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional. The District Court held the ordinance constitutional, 367 F. Supp. 136, and the Court of Appeals reversed, one judge dissenting, 476' F. 2d 806. The case is here by appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1264 (2); and we'noted'probable jurisdiction, 414 U. S. 907.
This case brings to this Court a different phase of localizoning regulations from those we have previously reviewed. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, involved a zoning ordinance classifying land use in a given area into six categories. The Dickmans’ tracts fell under three classifications: U-2, which included two-family dwellings; U-3, which included apartments, hotels, churches, schools, private clubs, hospitals, city hall and the like; and TJ — 6, which included sewage disposal plants, incinerators, scrap storage, cemeteries, oil and gas storage and so on. Heights of buildings were prescribed for each zone; also, the size of land areas required for each kind of. pse was specified. The land in litigation was vacant and being held for industrial development; and evidence was introduced showing that under the restricted-use ordinance the land would be greatly reduced, in value. The claim was-that the landowner, was being deprived of liberty- and property without due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court' sustained the zoning ordinance under the police power of the State, saying that the line “which in this field separates the legitimate from the. illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with- circumstances and conditions.” Id., at 387. And the Court added: “A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, — like a pig in the parlor instead , of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.” Id., at 388; The Court listed as considerations bearing on the constitutionality of zoning ordinances the danger of fire or collapse of buildings, the evils of overcrowding people, and the possibility that “offensive trades, industries, and structures” might “create nuisance” to residential sections. Ibid. But. even those historic police power problems need not loom large or actually be existent in a given case. For the exclusion of “all industrial establishments” does not mean that “only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded.” Ibid. That fact does not invalidate the ordinance; the Court held:
“The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity; Such laws may also find their justification in the fact that, in some fields, the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms of legislation.” Id., at 388-389.
:The main thrust of the case in the mind of the Court was in the exclusion of industries and apartments, and as respects that it commented on the desire to keep residential areas free of “disturbing noises”; “increased traffic”; the hazard of “moving and parked automobile!?”; the “depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities.” Id., at 394. The ordinance was sanctioned because the validity of the legislative classification was “fairly debatable” and therefore could not be said to be wholly arbitrary. Id., at 388.
Our decision in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, sustained a land-use project in the District of Columbia against a landowner’s claim that the taking violated the Due Process Clause and the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ■ The essence of the argument against the law was, while taking property for ridding an area of slums was permissible, taking it “merely to develop a better balanced, more attractive community” was not, id., at 31. We refused to limit the concept of public welfare that may be enhanced by zoning regulations. We' said: .
“Misc.able and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a' blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.
“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and iiiclusive. . . . The values it represents aré spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” Id., at 32-33.
If the ordinance segregated one área only for one race, it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, where the 'Court' invalidated a city ordinance barring a black from acquiring real property in a white residential area by reason of an 1866 Act of Congress, 14 Stat. 27, now 42 U. S. C. § 1982, and an 1870 Act, § 17, 16 Stat. 144, now 42 U. S. C. § 1981,, both enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 U. S., at 78-82. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409.
In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, Seattle had a zoning ordinance that perrhitted a “ ‘philanthropic home for children or for old people’ ” in a particular district “ ‘when the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of two-thirds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building.’ ” Id., at 118. The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconstitutional, saying that the existing owners could “withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may subject the trustee [owner] to their will or caprice.” Id., at 122. Unlike the billboard cases (e. g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526), the Court concluded that the Seattle ordinance was invalid since the proposed home for the aged poor was not shown by its maintenance and construction “to work any injury, inconvenience or annoyance to the community, the district or any peison.” 278 U. S., at 122.
The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: that it interferes with a person’s right to travel; that it interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a State; that it bars people who are uncongenial to the present residents; that it expresses the social preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them; that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of government; that the restriction of those whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomers’ rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern to villagers whether the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation’s experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated society.
We find none of these reasons in the record before us. It is not aimed at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. It involves no “fundamental” right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, Harper v. Virginia Board, 383 U. S. 663; the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; the right of access to the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connect icut, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454. We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be “ 'reasonable, not arbitrary’ ” (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415) and bears “a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objéctive.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76.
It is said, however, .that if two-unmarried people can constitute a “family,” there is no reason why three or four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function.
It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live, together.® There is ho evidence to support it; and the -provision of the ordinance bringing within the definition of a “family” two unmarried people belies the charge.
The ordinance places no ban on other forms of association, for a “family”, may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever it likes.
The regimés of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like present urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels with crowds.
A quiet place where yards arc wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The ..police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
The suggestion that the case may be moot need not detain us. A zoning ordinance usually has an impact on the value of the property which it regulates. But in spite of the fact that the precise impact of the ordinance sustained in Euclid on a given piece of property was not blown, 272 U. S., at 397, the Court, considering the matter a controversy in the realm of city planning, sustained the ordinance. Here we are a step closer to the impact of the ordinance on the value of the lessor’s property. He has not only lost six tenants and acquired only two in their place; it is obvious that the scale of rental • values rides on what we decide today. When Berman reached us it was not certain whether an entire tract would be taken or only the buildings on it and a scenic easement. 348 U. S., at 36. But that did not make the case any the less a controversy in the constitutional sense. When Mr. Justice Holmes said for the Court in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155, “property rights may be cut down, and to that extent taken,, without pay,” he stated the issue here. As is true in most zoning cases, the precise impact on value may, at the threshold of litigation over validity, not yet be known.
Reversed.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, is not involved here, as on August 2, 1972, when this federal suit was initiated, no state case had been started. The effect of the “Order to Remedy Violations” was to subject the occupants to liability commencing August 3, 1972. During the litigation the lease expired and it was extended. Anne Parish moved out. Thereafter the other five students left and the owners now hold the home out for sale or rent, including to student groups.
Truman, Boraas, and Parish became appellees but not the other three.
Vermont has- enacted comprehensive statewide land-use controls which direct local boards to develop plans ordering the uses of local land, inter alia, to “create conditions favorable to transportation, health, safety, civic activities and educational and cultural opportunities, [and] reduce the wastes of financial and human resources which result from either excessive congestion or excessive scattering of population . . . ” Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 10, §6042 (1973). Federal legislation has been propose^ designed to assist States and localities in developing such broad' objective land-use guidelines. See Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act, S. Rep. No. 93-197 (1973).
Many references in the development of this thesis are made to F. Turner, The Frontier in American History (1920), with emphasis on his theory that “democracy [is] born of free land.” Id., at 32.
Mr. Justice Holmes made the point .a half century ago..
“When a legal distinction is determined, as no one- doubts that it may be, between night and day, childhood and maturity Or any other extremes, a point has to be fixed or a line has to- be drawn, or gradually picked out .by successive decisions, to mark whEre the change takes place. Looked at byjtself without regard to the necessity behind.it the line or point seems arbitrary. It might-as well or nearly as well be, a little more to one side or the other.. But when it is seen that .a^ line or point there must’ be, -and that there is no mathematical or logical, way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we cam s'ay that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.” Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 41 (dissenting opinion).
“Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, is therefore inapt as there a household containing anyone unrelated to the 'rest was denied food stámps. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the reason, if any, given by the court for granting the petition for certiorari. | What reason, if any, does the court give for granting the petition for certiorari? | [
"case did not arise on cert or cert not granted",
"federal court conflict",
"federal court conflict and to resolve important or significant question",
"putative conflict",
"conflict between federal court and state court",
"state court conflict",
"federal court confusion or uncertainty",
"state court confusion or uncertainty",
"federal court and state court confusion or uncertainty",
"to resolve important or significant question",
"to resolve question presented",
"no reason given",
"other reason"
] | [
0
] | sc_certreason |
BIBB, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF ILLINOIS, et al. v. NAVAJO FREIGHT LINES, INC., et al.
No. 94.
Argued March 30-31, 1959.
Decided May 25, 1959.
William C. Wines, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were Latham Castle-, Attorney General of Illinois, and Raymond S. Sarnow and A. Zola Groves, Assistant Attorneys General.
David Axelrod argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Jack Goodman and Carl L. Steiner.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked in this case to hold that an Illinois statute requiring the use of a certain type of rear fender mudguard on trucks and', trailers operated on the highways of that State conflicts with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The statutory specification for this type of mudguard provides that the guard shall contour the rear wheel, with the inside surface being relatively parallel to the top 90 degrees of the rear 180 degrees of the whole surface. The surface, of the guard must extend downward to within 10 inches from the ground when the truck is loaded to its maximum legal capacity. The guards must be wide enough to cover the width of the protected tire, must be installed not’ more than 6 inches from the tire surface when the vehicle is loaded to maximum capacity, and must have a lip or flaiige on its outer edge of not less than 2 inches.
Appellees, interstate motor carriers holding certificates from the Interstate Commerce. Commission, challenged the constitutionality of the Illinois Act. A specially constituted three-judge District Court concluded that it unduly and unreasonably burdened and obstructed interstate commerce, because it made the conventional or straight mudflap, which is legal in at least 45 States,, illegal in Illinois, and because the statute, taken together with a Rule of the Arkansas Commerce Commission requiring straight mudflaps, rendered the use of the same motor vehicle equipment in both States impossible. The statute was declared to be violative of the Commerce Clause' and appellants were enjoined from enforcing it. 159 F. Supp. 385. An appeal was taken, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U. S. 808.
The power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and pervasive. We have recognized the peculiarly local nature of this subject of safety, and have upheld state statutes applicable alike to interstate and intrastate commerce, despite the fact that they may have an impact on interstate commerce. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374. The regulation of highways “is akin to quarantine measures, game laws, and like local regulations of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks,' with respect to which the state has exceptional scope for the exercise of its regulatory power, and which, Congress not acting,- have been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate commerce.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 783.
These safety measures carry, a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. . Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field. Unless we can conclude on the' whole record.that “the total effect of the. law as a saféty measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it” (Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, pp. 775-776) we must uphold the statute.
The District-Court found that “since it is impossible for a carrier operating in interstate commerce to determine which of its equipment will be used in a particular area, or on a particular day, or days, carriers operating into or through Illinois . . . will be required to equip all their trailers in accordance with the requirements of the Illinois Splash Guard statute.” With two possible exceptions the mudflaps required in those States which have mudguard regulations would not1 meet the standards required by the Illinois statute. The cost of installing the contour mudguards is $30 or more per vehicle. The District Court found that the initial cost of installing those mudguards on all the trucks owned by the.appelle.es ranged, from $4,500 to $45,840. There was also evidence in the record to indicate that the cost of maintenance and replacement of these guards is substantial.
Illinois introduced evidence seeking to establish that contour mudguards had a decided safety factor in that they prevented the throwing of debris into.the faces of-drivers of passing cars and into the windshields of a following vehicle. But the District. Court in its opinion stated that it was “conclusively shown that the contour mud flap possesses no advantages over the conventional or straight mud flap previously required in Illinois and presently required in most of the states” (159 F. Supp., at 388) and that “there is rather convincing. testimony that use of the contour flap creates hazards previously unknown to those using the highways.” Id., at 390. These hazards were found to be occasioned by the fact that this new type of mudguard tended to cause an accumulation of heat in the brake drum, thus decreasing the effectiveness of brakes, and by the fact that they were susceptible of being hit and bumped when the trucks were backed up and of falling off on the highway.
These findings on, cost and on safety áre not the end of our problem. Local regulation of the weight of trucks using the highways upheld in Sproles v. Binford, supra, also involved increased financial bdrdens for interstate carriers. State control of the width and weight of motor trucks and trailers sustained in South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra, involved nice questions of judgment concerning the need of those regulations so far as the issue of safety was concerned. That case also presented the problem whether interstate motor carriers, who were required to replace all equipment or keep out of the State, suffered an unconstitutional restraint on interstate commerce. The matter of safety was said to be one essentially for the legislative judgment;.and the burden of redesigning or replacing eqüipment was said tó be a proper price to exact from interstate and intrastate motor carriers alike. And the same conclusion was reached in Maurer v. Hamilton, supra, where a state law' prohibited any motor carrier from carrying any other vehicle, above the cab of the carrier vehicle or over the head of the operator of that vehicle. Cost taken into consideration with other factors might be relevant in some cases to the issue of burden on commerce. But it has assumed no such proportions here. If we had here only a question whether the cost of adjusting an interstate operation to these new local safety regulations prescribed by Illinois unduly burdened interstate commerce, we would have to sustain the law under the authority of the Sproles, Barnwell, and Maurer- cases. The same result would obtain if we had to resolve the much discussed issues of safety presented in this case.
This case presents a different' issue. The equipment in •the Sproles, Barnwell, and Maurer cases could pass muster in any State, so far as the records in those cases reveal. We were not faced there with the question whether one State could prescribe standards for interstate carriers that, would'conflict with the standards,of another State, making it necessary, say, for an interstate carrier to shift its cargo to differently designed vehicles once another state line was reached. We had a related problem in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, where the Court invalidated a statute of Arizona prescribing a maximum length of 70 cars for freight trains moving through that State. Moi’e' closely in point is Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, where a local law required, a reseating of passengers on .interstate busses entering Virginia in order to comply with a local segregation law. Diverse seating arrangements for people of. different'races imposed by several States interfered, we concluded, with “the need for national.uniformity in the' regulations for interstate, travel.” Id., at 386. Those cases indicate the dimensions of our present problem.
An order .of the ’Arkansas Commerce Commission, already mentioned, requires that trailers operating in that State be equipped with straight or conventional mudflaps. Vehicles equipped to meet the standards of the Illinois statute would riot comply with Arkansas standards, and vice versa. Thus if a trailer is to be operated in both States, mudguards would have to be interchanged, causing a significant delay in an operation where prompt movement may be of the essence. It was found that from two to .four hours of labor are required'to install-or remove a contour mudguard. Moreover, the. contour guard is attached to the trailer by welding and if the trailer is conveying a cargo of explosives (e.- g., for the United States Government) it would be exceedingly dangerous to attempt to weld on a contour mudguard without unloading the trailer.
It’ was also found that the Illinois statute seriously interferes with the “interline” operations of motor carriers — that is to say, with the interchanging of trailers between an originating carrier and another carrier when the latter serves an area not served by the former. These “interline” operations provide a speedy through-service for the shipper. Interlining contemplates the physical ‘transfer of the'entire trailer; there is no unloading and reloading of the cargo. The interlining process is particularly vital in connection with shipment of perishables, which would spoil if .unloaded before reaching their destination, or with the movement of explosives carried under seal. Of course, if the originating carrier never operated in Illinois, it would not be expected to equip its trailers with contour mudguards. Yet if an interchanged trailer of that carrier were hauled to or through Illinois, the statute would require that it contain contour guards. Since carriers which operate in and through Illinois cannot compel the originating carriers to equip their trailers with contour guards, they may be forced to cease interlining with those who do not meet the Illinois Requirements. Over 60 percent of the business of 5 of the 6 plaintiffs, is interline traffic. For the other it constitutes 30 percent. All of the plaintiffs operate exten-siyely in interstate, commerce, and the annual mileage in Illinois of none of them exceeds 7 percent of total mileage.
This in summary is the rather massive showing of burden on interstate commerce which appellees made at the hearing..
Appellants did npt attempt to rebut the appellees’ showing that the statute in questioh severely burdens interstate commerce. Appellants’ .showing, was aimed at establishing that contour mudguards prevented the throwing. of debris into the faces of drivers, of ■ passing cars and into the windshields of a following vehicle. They conducted that, because, the Illinois statute is a reasonable exercise of the police power, a federal court is precluded from weighing the relative merits of the contour mudguard against any other kind of mudguard and must sustain the validity of the statute notwithstanding the extent of the burden it ^imposes 0n interstate commerce. They rely in the main on South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., supra. There is language in that opinion which, read iri; isolation from;such later decisions as Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, and Morgan v. Virginia, supra, would suggest that no showing of burden on interstate commerce is sufficient to invalidate local safety regulations in absence of some element of discrimination against interstate commerce.
The various exercises by the States of their police power stand, however, on an equal footing. All are entitled to the same presumption of validity when challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U. S. 525; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421; Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. Similarly the various state regulatory statutes, are of equal dignity when measured against the Commerce Clause. Local regulations which would pass muster under the ■ Due Process Clause might nonetheless fail to survive other challenges to constitutionality that, bring the Supremacy Clause into play. Like any local law that. conflicts with federal regulatory measures (California Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534; Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U. S. 171), state regulations that run afoul of the policy of free trade reflected in the Commerce Clause must also bow.
This is one of those cases — few in number — where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. This conclusion is especially underlined by the deleterious effect which the Illinois law,will have on the “interline” operation of interstate motor carriers. The conflict between the Arkansas regulation and the Illinois regulation also suggests- that this regulation of mudguards, is not one of those matters “admitting of diversity of treatment according to the special requirements of local conditions,” to use the words of Chief Justice Hughe's in Sproles v. Binford, supra, at 390. A State which insists on a design out of line with the requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its' territory. Such a new safety device — out of line with the requirements of -the other States — may be so compelling that the innovating State need not be the one to give way. But the present showing — balanced against the clear burden on commerce — is far too inconclusive to make this mudguard meet that test.
We deal not with absolutes but with questions of degree. The state legislatures plainly have great leeway in providing safety regulations for all vehicles — interstate as well as local. Óur decisions so hold. Yet the heavy burden which the Illinois mudguard law places on the interstate movement of trucks and trailers seems to us to pass the permissible limits even for safety regulations.
Affirmed.
The state statute (effective July 8, 1957) in relevant part provides:
“It is unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle of the second division upon the highways of this state outside the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town unless such vehicle is equipped with rear fender splash guards which shall comply with the specifications hereinafter provided in this Section; except that any motor vehicle of the second division which is or has been purchased, new or used, prior to August 1, 1957 shall be equipped with rear fender splash guards which are so attached as to prevent the splashing of-mud or water upon the windshield of other motor vehicles and such splash guards on such vehicle shall no); be required to comply with the specifications hereinafter provided in this Section until January 1, 1958.
“The rear fender splash guards shall contour the- wheel in such a manner that the relationship of the inside surface of any such splash guard to the tread surface of the tire or wheel shall be relatively parallel, both laterally and across the wheel, at least throughout the top 90 degrees of the rear 180 degrees of the wheel surface; provided however, on vehicles which have a clearance of less than 5 inches between the top of the tire or wheel and that part of the body of the vehicle directly above the tire or wheel when the vehicle is loaded to maximum legal capacity, the curved portion of the splash guard need only extend from a point directly behind the center of the rear axle and to the rear of the wheel surface upwards to within at least 2 inches of the bottom line of the body when the vehicle is loaded-to maximum legal capacity. On all vehicles to which this Section applies, there shall be a downward extension of the curved surface-which shall end not more than 10 inches from the ground when the vehicle is loaded to maximum legal capacity. This downward extension shall be part of the curved surface or attached directly to said curved surface, but-it need not contour the wheel.
“The splash guards shall be wide enough to.cover the full tread or treads of the tires being protected and shall be installed not more than 6 inches from the tread surface of the tire or wheel when the vehicle is loaded to maximum legal capacity. The splash guard shall have a lip or flange on its outside edge to minimize side throw and splash. The- lip or flange shall extend toward the center of the wheel, and'shall be perpendicular to and extend not less than 2 inches below the inside or bottom surface line.or plane of the guard.
“The splash guards may be constructed of a rigid or flexible material, but shall be attached in such a manner that, regardless of movement, either by the'splash guards or'the vehicle, the splash guards will retain their general parallel relationship to the tread surface of the tire or wheel under all ordinary operating conditions:” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1957, c. 95%, § 218b.
Motor vehi Jes of the second division are defined as “Those vehicles which are designed and usedJor pulling or carrying freight and also those vehicles or motor cars which are designed and used for the carrying of more, than seven persons.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1957, c. 95%, § 99(b).
The specifications are somewhat modified if the clearance between the top of the tire and the body of the vehicle directly above it is less than 5 inches when the vehicle is loaded' to its maximum • legal' capacity.
There are certain exemptions from the statute, but their validity or the validity of the statute in light of them is not questioned here. But see Rudolph Express Co. v. Bibb, 15 Ill. 2d 76, 153 N. E. 2d 820. No contention is here made that the statute discriminates against interstate commerce, and it is clear that its provisions apply alike to vehicles in intrastate as well as in interstate commerce.- Nor is it contended that the statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. People v. Warren, 11 Ill. 2d 420, 143 N. E. 2d 28.
Arkansas Commerce Commission Rule 100, December' 13, 1957
It is Pot argued that there has been a pre-emption of the field by federal regulation. While the Interstate Commerce Commission has, pursuant to § 204 (a) of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 Stat. 546, 49- U. S. C. § 304 (a)), promulgated its Motor Carrier Safety, Regulations to govern vehicles operating in interstate or foreign commerce (see 49 CFR, Pts. 190-197), it has expressly declined to establish any requirements concerning wheel flaps, and has disclaimed any intention to occupy the field or abrogate state regulations not inconsistent with its standards. 54 M. C. C. 337, 354, 358.
Note 4, supra. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
FOURCO GLASS CO. v. TRANSMIRRA PRODUCTS CORP. et al.
No. 310.
Argued April 2, 1957.
Decided April 29, 1957.
Edward S. Irons argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Harold J. Birch.
W. R. Hulbert argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was William W. Rymer, Jr.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent infringement actions, or whether that section is supplemented by 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c).
Section 1400 is titled “Patents and copyrights,” and subsection (b) reads:
“(b) Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”
Section 1391 is titled “Venue generally,” and subsection (c) reads:
“(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.”
Petitioner, Fourco Glass Company, a West Virginia corporation, was sued for patent infringement in the Southern District of New York. It moved to dismiss for lack of venue, because, although it had a regularly established place of business in the district of suit, there was no showing that it had committed any of the alleged acts of infringement there. The District Court held that there had been no showing of any acts of infringement in the district of suit and that venue in patent infringement actions is solely and exclusively governed by § 1400 (b), as a special and specific venue statute applicable to that species of litigation. It accordingly granted the motion and dismissed the action. 133 F. Supp. 531. The Court of Appeals, without passing on the District Court’s ruling that there had been no showing of acts of infringement in the district of suit, reversed, 233 F. 2d 885, 886, holding that proper construction “requires . . . the insertion in” § 1400 (b) “of the definition of corporate residence from” § 1391 (c), and that the two sections, when thus “read together,” mean “that this defendant maybe sued in New York, where it 'is doing business.' ” We granted certiorari because of an asserted conflict with this Court's decision in Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, and to resolve a conflict among the circuits upon the question of venue in patent infringement litigation.
We start our considerations with the Stonite case. The question there — not legally distinguishable from the question here — was whether the venue statute applying specifically to patent infringement litigation (then § 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109) was the sole provision governing venue in those cases, or whether that section was to be supplemented by what was then § 52 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 113), which authorized — just as its recodified counterpart, 28 U. S. C. § 1392 (a), does now — an action, not of a local nature, against two or more defendants residing in different judicial districts within the same state, to be brought in either district. That supplementation, if permissible, would have fixed venue over Stonite Products Company (an inhabitant of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the suit was brought, because its codefendant was an inhabitant of that district.
After reviewing the history of, and the reasons and purposes for, the adoption by Congress of the venue statute applying specifically to patent infringement suits — ground wholly unnecessary to replow here — this Court held “that § 48 is the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and “that Congress did not intend the Act of 1897 [which had become § 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109] to dovetail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil suits, but rather that it alone should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.”
The soundness of the Stonite case is not here assailed, and, unless there has been a substantive change in what was § 48 of the Judicial Code at the time the Stonite ease was decided, on March 9, 1942, it is evident that that statute would still constitute “the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings.”
The question here, then, is simply whether there has been a substantive change in that statute since the Stonite case. If there has been such change, it occurred in the 1948 revision and recodification of the Judicial Code. At the time of the Stonite case the venue provisions of that statute (§48 of the 1911 Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109) read:
“In suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of business.”
The reports of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and of the House, respecting the 1948 revision and recodification of the Judicial Code, make plain that every change made in the text is explained in detail in the Revisers' Notes. As shown by their notes on § 1400 (b), the Revisers placed the venue provisions (quoted above) of old § 48 (28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109), with word changes and omissions later noted, in § 1400 (b), and placed the remainder, or process provisions, with certain word changes, in § 1694 of the 1948 Code. The Revisers’ Notes on § 1400 (b) point out that “Subsection (b) is based on section 109 of title 28, U. S. C., 1940 ed., with the following changes:” (1) “Words 'civil action’ were substituted for 'suit,’ and words 'in law or in equity,’ after 'shall have jurisdiction’ were deleted, in view of Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”; (2) “Words in subsection” (b) 'where the defendant resides’ were substituted for ‘of which the defendant is an inhabitant’ ” because the “Words ‘inhabitant’ and ‘resident,’ as respects venue, are synonymous” [we pause here to observe that this treatment, and the expressed reason for it, seems to negative any intention to make corporations suable, in patent infringement cases, where they are merely “doing business,” because those synonymous words mean domicile, and, in respect of corporations, mean the state of incorporation only. See Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444]; and (3) “Words ‘whether a person, partnership, or corporation’ before ‘has committed’ were omitted as surplusage.”
Statements made by several of the persons having importantly to do with the 1948 revision are uniformly' clear that no changes of law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed.
“The change of arrangement, which placed portions of what was originally a single section in two separated sections cannot be regarded as altering the scope and purpose of the enactment. For it will not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their effect unless such intention is clearly expressed. United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S. 729, 740; United States v. LeBris, 121 U. S. 278, 280; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 302; United States v. Mason, 218 U. S. 517, 525.” Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187, 198-199.
In the light of the fact that the Revisers’ Notes do not express any substantive change, and of the fact that several of those having importantly to do with the revision say no change is to be presumed unless clearly expressed, and no substantive change being otherwise apparent, we hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) made no substantive change from 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109 as it stood and was dealt with in the Stonite case.
The main thrust of respondents’ argument is that § 1391 (c) is clear and unambiguous and that its terms include all actions — including patent infringement actions — against corporations, and, therefore, that the statute should be read, with, and as supplementing, § 1400 (b) in patent infringement actions. That argument is not persuasive, as it merely points up the question and does nothing to answer it. For it will be seen that § 1400 (b) is equally clear and, also, that it deals specially and specifically with venue in patent infringement actions. Moreover, it will be remembered that old § 52 of the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 113) was likewise clear and generally embracive, yet the Stonite case held that it did not supplement the specific patent infringement venue section (then § 48 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. (1940 ed.) § 109). The question is not whether § 1391 (c) is clear and general, but, rather, it is, pointedly, whether § 1391 (c) supplements § 1400 (b), or, in other words, whether the latter is complete, independent and alone controlling in its sphere as was held in Stonite, or is, in some measure, dependent for its force upon the former.
We think it is clear that § 1391 (c) is a general corporation venue statute, whereas § 1400 (b) is a special venue statute applicable, specifically, to all defendants in a particular type of actions, i. e., patent infringement actions. In these circumstances the law is settled that “However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it 'will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment. . . . Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.’ Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208.” MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U. S. 102, 107.
We hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) is the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c). The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded for that court to pass upon the District Court’s ruling that there had been no showing of acts of infringement in the district of suit.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Harlan, believing that the Revisers’ Notes have been given undue weight, Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 61-71, and that they are in any event unclear, dissents for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, 233 F. 2d 885. See also Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F. 2d 469; Lindley, C. J., dissenting in C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F. 2d 410, 415; Denis v. Perfect Parts, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 259; Moore, Commentary on the U. S. Judicial Code, 184-185, 193-194.
Under Rule 12 (b) (3) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
352 U. S. 820.
The Third Circuit, in Ackerman v. Hook, 183 F. 2d 11, the Seventh Circuit in C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F. 2d 410, and the Tenth Circuit, in Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Company, 225 F. 2d 572, as well as numerous District Courts, have held that 28 U. S. C. § 1400 (b) alone controls venue in patent infringement eases, while, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F. 2d 469, and in Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205 F. 2d 660, and several District Courts, have held that the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1391 (c) are to be read into, and as supplementing, § 1400 (b), as the Second Circuit held in this case, and that, hence, a corporation may be sued for patent infringement in any district where it merely “is doing business.”
315 U. S., at 563, 566.
62 Stat. 869.
S. Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2, which contains the statement “Appended to the report are the revisers’ notes to each section, together with accompanying tables. These explain in great detail the source of the law and the changes made in the course of the codification and revision.”
H. R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7, which contains the statement “The reviser’s notes are keyed to sections of the revision and explain in detail every change made in text.”
Mr. William W. Barron, the Chief Reviser of the Code, in his article on “The Judicial Code 1948 Revision,” 8 F. R. D. 439, pointed out, pp. 445-446, that: “. . . no changes of law or policy will be presumed from changes of language in revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed. Mere changes of phraseology indicate no intent to work a change of meaning but merely an effort to state in clear and simpler terms the original meaning of the statute revised.”
Professor James William Moore of Yale University, a special consultant on this revision, stated that: “Venue provisions have not been altered by the revision.” Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 1600 and H. R. 2055, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1969.
Judge Albert B. Maris of the Third Circuit, a member of a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States to collaborate with the congressional committees in carrying forward the work of this revision, stated that: “[C]are has been taken to make no changes in the existing laws which would not meet with substantially unanimous approval.” Id., p. 1959. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"comity: civil rights",
"comity: criminal procedure",
"comity: First Amendment",
"comity: habeas corpus",
"comity: military",
"comity: obscenity",
"comity: privacy",
"comity: miscellaneous",
"comity primarily removal cases, civil procedure (cf. comity, criminal and First Amendment); deference to foreign judicial tribunals",
"assessment of costs or damages: as part of a court order",
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including Supreme Court Rules, application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in civil litigation, Circuit Court Rules, and state rules and admiralty rules",
"judicial review of administrative agency's or administrative official's actions and procedures",
"mootness (cf. standing to sue: live dispute)",
"venue",
"no merits: writ improvidently granted",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question, or a nonsuit",
"no merits: dismissed or affirmed for want of jurisdiction (cf. judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal from federal district courts or courts of appeals)",
"no merits: adequate non-federal grounds for decision",
"no merits: remand to determine basis of state or federal court decision (cf. judicial administration: state law)",
"no merits: miscellaneous",
"standing to sue: adversary parties",
"standing to sue: direct injury",
"standing to sue: legal injury",
"standing to sue: personal injury",
"standing to sue: justiciable question",
"standing to sue: live dispute",
"standing to sue: parens patriae standing",
"standing to sue: statutory standing",
"standing to sue: private or implied cause of action",
"standing to sue: taxpayer's suit",
"standing to sue: miscellaneous",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal district courts or territorial courts",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of federal courts of appeals",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from federal district courts or courts of appeals (cf. 753)",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority on appeal or writ of error, from highest state court",
"judicial administration: jurisdiction or authority of the Court of Claims",
"judicial administration: Supreme Court's original jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: review of non-final order",
"judicial administration: change in state law (cf. no merits: remand to determine basis of state court decision)",
"judicial administration: federal question (cf. no merits: dismissed for want of a substantial or properly presented federal question)",
"judicial administration: ancillary or pendent jurisdiction",
"judicial administration: extraordinary relief (e.g., mandamus, injunction)",
"judicial administration: certification (cf. objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal)",
"judicial administration: resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict between or among other courts",
"judicial administration: objection to reason for denial of certiorari or appeal",
"judicial administration: collateral estoppel or res judicata",
"judicial administration: interpleader",
"judicial administration: untimely filing",
"judicial administration: Act of State doctrine",
"judicial administration: miscellaneous",
"Supreme Court's certiorari, writ of error, or appeals jurisdiction",
"miscellaneous judicial power, especially diversity jurisdiction"
] | [
13
] | sc_issue_9 |
UNITED STATES v. CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND IN THE COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, et al.
No. 253.
Argued January 9, 1953.
Decided April 6, 1953.
Assistant Attorney General Kirks argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings and Assistant Attorney General Mclnerney.
Frederick A. Ballard argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Joseph W. Wyatt.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This nine-year-old proceeding is for the condemnation of certain easements in land and title to sewer mains which together comprise the sewerage system of Belle Haven, a residential subdivision in Fairfax County, Virginia. It was brought under the authority of Title II, § 202 of the Act of June 28, 1941, 55 Stat. 361, and a rider on the Appropriation Act of July 15, 1943, 57 Stat. 565, both amendments to the Lanham Act of October 14, 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, 42 U. S. C. § 1521 et seq. Questions important in the administration of the Act moved us to grant certiorari, 344 U. S. 812, to review the dismissal of the government petition. 196 F. 2d 657, aff’g 101 F. Supp. 172.
During World War II, defense housing needs in the Washington area led the government to construct a large sewer project to serve defense housing properties in Fair-fax County. It sought to utilize, as a part of its trunk-line sewer, existing easements containing sewer pipes in the system originally constructed by respondent Belle Haven Realty Corporation. Negotiations produced an agreement under which the corporation, still holder of the fee, was to accept nominal compensation for its sewer properties on the condition that the government take the entire system and that the final order protect the Belle Haven householders against any future charges for its use. The government then filed a condemnation petition together with a declaration of taking and deposited estimated just compensation of $2. Possession was taken under court order, Belle Haven’s outfalls into the Potomac River blocked off, and its sewage diverted into the government’s trunk-line system. In .1948, a group of Belle Haven householders intervened as defendants, alleging that the government had leased the integrated system to the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and that the latter had undertaken to assess a use charge of $2 per month against each householder in Belle Haven subdivision. The intervenors claimed that they were the equitable owners in fee of the Belle Haven system since the developing corporation had included its construction cost in the purchase price of their lots, that they had been granted easements of user in that system and that the use charges assessed exceeded reasonable maintenance and operation costs. The prayer was that the court, in lieu of direct compensation for their interests, protect them against having to contribute to the amortization of the integrated system. The court decided that the householders had acquired implied easements in the Belle Haven system for which they were entitled to claim compensation, and intervention was granted. 89 F. Supp. 571. But the district judge held that he could not make an award in the form of a limitation on future use charges and he denied a temporary injunction against the collection of current bills. 89 F. Supp. 567. The in-tervenors then amended their answer to attack the taking as unauthorized under the Lanham Act. The Belle Haven Realty Corporation, which had not previously answered the government’s petition, did so in 1950, claiming it was the legal owner of the system and entitled to its present reproduction cost, less depreciation, as just compensation.
The District Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Lanham Act, as amended, required the consent of the intervenors as well as the realty corporation, that the corporation had only conditionally consented to the taking and that the householders had not consented at all. While the Court of Appeals approved the trial court’s reading of the statutory consent requirement, it declined to base its affirmance on that ground because, “It is perfectly clear . . . that the power of condemnation given by the Lanham Act extends only to lands or interests in lands; . . . there is nothing in the act which authorizes the condemnation of a public works system such as this.” 196 F. 2d 657, 662, relying on Puerto Rico R. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 131 F. 2d 491.
The original Lanham Act of October 14,. 1940, 54 Stat. 1125, was designed to provide relief for defense areas found by the President to be suffering from an existing or impending housing shortage. In such cases, the Federal Works Administrator was empowered to acquire “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” for construction sites by purchase, donation, exchange, lease or condemnation. The quoted language describing the kind of property which the Administrator could condemn was carried over into Title II of the Act, added in 1941, which extended the statute to public works shortages in defense areas. “Public work,” as defined, included sewers and sewage facilities. § 201. While the general language “improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands” included within § 202 of Title II of the Lanham Act appears to authorize the taking here, United States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230, 242, 243, n. 13 (1946), it is not necessary to depend on that section alone. In 1943, the Act was amended to provide that “none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .” 57 Stat. 565, 42 U. S. C. § 1534, note. The 1943 amendment was in effect when the present petition was filed and its applicability here is common ground among the parties. It explicitly authorized the condemnation of such property subject to the conditions stated.
In this connection, we do not believe that the consent requirement bars acquisitions by condemnation. This interpretation would strip it of significance since the other means of acquiring property described in the statute necessarily rest on consensual transactions. Although condemnation is sometimes regarded as a taking without the owner’s consent, 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), § 1, it is not anomalous to provide for such consent which can, in effect, represent an election to have value determined by a court rather than by the parties. In addition, “friendly” condemnation proceedings are often used to obtain clear title where price is already settled. Cf. Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271 (1939). Thus construed, all of the statutory terms are given effect.
Here, the consent of Belle Haven Realty Corporation was implicit in its promise to accept-nominal damages. That consent cannot be characterized as conditional. Indeed, the corporation’s answer, filed six years later, recognized this; rather than resisting the taking, it merely asserted a claim for more than nominal compensation.
Whether the intervening householders were “owners” whose consent was required is a different matter. Their interests were regarded by both courts below as implied easements or rights of user in the sewer system. It is true that easement holders have been held to be “owners” as that term is used in condemnation statutes. Swanson v. United States, 156 F. 2d 442, 445; United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333 (1910); cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 378 (1945). But the relevant question in those cases is whether the holders of such interests are entitled to compensation under the Constitution. The compensability of these interests is not in issue here; it follows that the cases on which inter-venors rely are not controlling. In deciding who are “owners” here, we look to the scheme of the Act itself. We think it unlikely that, in providing for the condemnation of public works, Congress at the same time intended to make preliminary negotiations so cumbersome as to virtually nullify the power granted. Yet the interpretation pressed by respondents would have that effect. It would compel the government, before taking public works, to deal with the holder of every servitude to which the property might be subject. We hold that intervenors were not “owners” under the 1943 amendment and that the government was not required before condemning to engage in a round robin to secure from each of them a self-serving “Barkis is willin’.”
We do not pass on other issues raised by respondents, some of which if decided adversely to the government might be cured by amendment, and others we deem not ripe for adjudication because of factual questions not yet resolved.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“Sec. 202. Whenever the President finds that in any area or locality an acute shortage of public works or equipment for public works necessary to the health, safety, or welfare of persons engaged in national-defense activities exists or impends which would impede national-defense activities, and that such public works or equipment cannot otherwise be provided when needed, or could not be provided without the imposition of an increased excessive tax burden or an unusual or excessive increase in the debt limit of the taxing or borrowing authority in which such shortage exists, the Federal Works Administrator is authorized, with the approval of the President, in order to relieve such shortage—
“(a) To acquire, . . . improved or unimproved lands or interests in lands by purchase, donation, exchange, lease ... or condemnation ... for such public works.”
“. . . none of the funds authorized herein shall be used to acquire public works already operated by public or private agencies, except where funds are allotted for substantial additions or improvements to such public works and with the consent of the owners thereof . . . .”
Since the district judge deemed himself unable to order the government to restore the Belle Haven system to its original condition, the householders were remitted by dismissal of the condemnation petition to a separate action for any compensable damage they suffered because of the taking. Under this ruling, the property taken would remain part of the integrated system whether title is in the government or the realty corporation. In each case, the rights of the householders, if any, to an award remain to be determined. One effect of upholding the condemnation is to have that question tried on remand in this proceeding. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
22
] | sc_casesource |
AUCIELLO IRON WORKS, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
No. 95-668.
Argued April 22, 1996
Decided June 3, 1996
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
John D. O’Reilly III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Linda Sher, Norton J. Come, and John Emad Arbab
Jonathan Hiatt, Marsha Berzon, David Silberman, and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether an employer may disavow a collective-bargaining agreement because of a good-faith doubt about a union’s majority status at the time the contract was made, when the doubt arises from facts known to the employer before its contract offer had been accepted by the union. We hold that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) reasonably concluded that an employer challenging an agreement under these circumstances commits an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act), 49 Stat. 452, 453, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (5).
I
Petitioner Auciello Iron Works of Hudson, Massachusetts, had 23 production and maintenance employees during the period in question. After a union election in 1977, the NLRB certified Shopmen’s Local No. 501, a/w International Association of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (Union), as the collective-bargaining representative of Auciello’s employees. Over the following years, the company and the Union were able to negotiate a series of collective-bargaining agreements, one of which expired on September 25, 1988. Negotiations for a new one were unsuccessful throughout September and October 1988, however, and when Auciello and the Union had not made a new contract by October 14, 1988, the employees went on strike. Negotiations continued, nonetheless, and, on November 17, 1988, Auciello presented the Union with a complete contract proposal. On November 18, 1988, the picketing stopped, and nine days later, on a Sunday evening, the Union telegraphed its acceptance of the outstanding offer. The very next day, however, Auciello told the Union that it doubted that a majority of the bargaining unit’s employees supported the Union, and for that reason disavowed the collective-bargaining agreement and denied it had any duty to continue negotiating. Auciello traced its doubt to knowledge acquired before the Union accepted the contract offer, including the facts that 9 employees had crossed the picket line, that 13 employees had given it signed forms indicating their resignation from the Union, and that 16 had expressed dissatisfaction with the Union.
In January 1989, the Board’s General Counsel issued an administrative complaint charging Auciello with violation of §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA. An Administrative Law Judge found that a contract existed between the parties and that Auciello’s withdrawal from it violated the Act. 303 N. L. R. B. 562 (1991). The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision; it treated Auciello’s claim of good-faith doubt as irrelevant and ordered Auciello to reduce the collective-bargaining agreement to a formal written instrument. Ibid. But when the Board applied to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit for enforcement of its order, the Court of Appeals declined on the ground that the Board had not adequately explained its refusal to consider Auciel-lo’s defense of good-faith doubt about the Union’s majority status. 980 F. 2d 804 (1992). On remand, the Board issued a supplemental opinion to justify its position, 317 N. L. R. B. 364 (1995), and the Court of Appeals thereafter enforced the order as resting on a “policy choice [both]... reasonable and . . . quite persuasive.” 60 F. 3d 24, 27 (1995). We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1086 (1996), and now affirm.
II
A
The object of the National Labor Relations Act is industrial peace and stability, fostered by collective-bargaining agreements providing for the orderly resolution of labor disputes between workers and employees. See 29 U. S. C. § 141(b); Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U. S. 27, 38 (1987) (Fall River Dyeing). To such ends, the Board has adopted various presumptions about the existence of majority support for a union within a bargaining unit, the precondition for service as its exclusive representative. Cf. id., at 37-89. The first two are conclusive presumptions. A union “usually is entitled to a conclusive presumption of majority status for one year following” Board certification as such a representative. Id., at 37. A union is likewise entitled under Board precedent to a conclusive presumption of majority status during the term of any collective-bargaining agreement, up to three years. See NLRB v. Burns Int’l Security Services, Inc., 406 U. S. 272, 290, n. 12 (1972); see generally R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining § 9, pp. 54-59 (1976). “These presumptions are based not so much on an absolute certainty that the union’s majority status will not erode,” Fall River Dyeing, 482 U. S., at 38, as on the need to achieve “stability in collective-bargaining relationships.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). They address our fickle nature by “enabling] a union to concentrate on obtaining and fairly administering a collective-bargaining agreement” without worrying about the immediate risk of decertification and by “removing] any temptation on the part of the employer to avoid good-faith bargaining” in an effort to undermine union support. Ibid.
There is a third presumption, though not a conclusive one. At the end of the certification year or upon expiration of the collective-bargaining agreement, the presumption of majority status becomes a rebuttable one. See NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775, 778 (1990); see n. 6, infra. Then, an employer may overcome the presumption (when, for example, defending against an unfair labor practice charge) “by showing that, at the time of [its] refusal to bargain, either (1) the union did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) the employer had a ‘good-faith’ doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of the union’s majority support.” Curtin Matheson, supra, at 778 (emphasis in original). Auciello asks this Court to hold that it may raise the latter defense even after a collective-bargaining contract period has apparently begun to run upon a union’s acceptance of an employer’s outstanding offer.
B
The same need for repose that first prompted the Board to adopt the rule presuming the union’s majority status during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement also led the Board to rule out an exception for the benefit of an employer with doubts arising from facts antedating the contract. The Board said that such an exception would allow an employer to control the timing of its assertion of good-faith doubt and thus to “ ‘sit’ on that doubt and . . . raise it after the offer is accepted.” 317 N. L. R. B., at 370. The Board thought that the risks associated with giving employers such “unilatera[l] control [over] a vital part of the collective-bargaining process,” ibid., would undermine the stability of the collective-bargaining relationship, id., at 374, and thus outweigh any benefit that might in theory follow from vindicating a doubt that ultimately proved to be sound.
The Board’s judgment in the matter is entitled to prevail. To affirm its rule of decision in this case, indeed, there is no need to invoke the full measure of the “considerable deference” that the Board is due, NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., supra, at 786, by virtue of its charge to develop national labor policy, Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 500-501 (1978), through interstitial rulemaking that is “rational and consistent with the Act,” Curtin Matheson, supra, at 787.
It might be tempting to think that Auciello’s doubt was expressed so soon after the apparent contract formation that little would be lost by vindicating that doubt and wiping the contractual slate clean, if in fact the company can make a convincing case for the doubt it claims. On this view, the loss of repose would be slight. But if doubts about the union’s majority status would justify repudiating a contract one day after its ostensible formation, why should the same doubt not serve as well a year into the contract’s term? Au-ciello implicitly agrees on the need to provide some cutoff, but argues that the limit should be expressed as a “reasonable time” to repudiate the contract. Brief for Petitioner 26-32. That is, it seeks case-by-case determinations of the appropriate time for asserting a good-faith doubt in place of the Board’s bright-line rule cutting off the opportunity at the moment of apparent contract formation. Auciello’s desire is natural, but its argument fails to point up anything unreasonable in the Board’s position.
The Board’s approach generally allows companies an adequate chance to act on their preacceptance doubts before contract formation, just as Auciello could have acted effectively under the Board’s rule in this case. Auciello knew that the picket line had been crossed and that a number of its employees had expressed dissatisfaction with the Union at least nine days before the contract’s acceptance, and all of the resignation forms Auciello received were dated at least five days before the acceptance date. During the week preceding the apparent formation of the contract, Auciello had at least three alternatives to doing nothing. It could have withdrawn the outstanding offer and then, like its employees, petitioned for a representation election. See 29 U. S. C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (employee petitions); § 159(c)(1)(B) (employer petitions); NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees, 475 U. S. 192, 198 (1986). “[I]f the Board determines, after investigation and hearing, that a question of representation exists, it directs an election by secret ballot and certifies the result.” Ibid. Following withdrawal, it could also have refused to bargain further on the basis of its good-faith doubt, leaving it to the Union to charge an unfair labor practice, against which it could defend on the basis of the doubt. Cf. Curtin Matheson, 494 U. S., at 778. And, of course, it could have withdrawn its offer to allow it time to investigate while it continued to fulfill its duty to bargain in good faith with the Union. The company thus, had generous opportunities to avoid the presumption before the moment of acceptance.
There may, to be sure, be cases where the opportunity requires prompt action, but labor negotiators are not the least nimble, and the Board could reasonably have thought the price of making more time for the sluggish was too high, since it would encourage bad-faith bargaining. As Auciello would have it, any employer with genuine doubt about a union’s hold on its employees would be invited to go right on bargaining, with the prospect of locking in a favorable contract that it could, if it wished, then challenge. Here, for example, if Auciello had acted before the Union’s telegram by withdrawing its offer and declining further negotiation based on its doubt (or petitioning for decertification), flames would have been fanned, and if it ultimately had been obliged to bargain further, a favorable agreement would have been more difficult to obtain. But by saving its challenge until after a contract had apparently been formed, it could not end up with a worse agreement than the one it had. The Board could reasonably say that giving employers some flexibility in raising their scruples would not be worth skewing bargaining relationships by such one-sided leverage, and the fact that any collective-bargaining agreement might be vulnerable to such a postformation challenge would hardly serve the Act’s goal of achieving industrial peace by promoting stable collective-bargaining relationships. Cf. Fall River Dyeing, 482 U. S., at 38-39; Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 702, 705 (1944).
Nor do we find anything compelling in Auciello’s contention that its employees’ statutory right “to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing” and to refrain from doing so, 29 U. S. C. § 157, compels us to reject the Board’s position. Although we take seriously the Act’s command to respect “the free choice of employees” as well as to “promot[e] stability in collective-bargaining relationships,” Fall River Dyeing, supra, at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted), we have rejected the position that employers may refuse to bargain whenever presented with evidence that their employees no longer support their certified union. “To allow employers to rely on employees’ rights in refusing to bargain with the formally designated union is not conducive to [industrial peace], it is inimical to it.” Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 103 (1954). The Board is accordingly entitled to suspicion when faced with an employer’s benevolence as its workers’ champion against their certified union, which is subject to a decertification petition from the workers if they want to file one. There is nothing unreasonable in giving a short leash to the employer as vindicator of its employees’ organizational freedom.
C
Merits aside, Auciello also claims that the precedent of Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731 (1961), compels reversal, but it does not. In Garment Workers, we held that a bona fide but mistaken belief in a union’s majority status cannot support an employer’s agreement purporting to recognize a union newly organized but as yet uncertified. We upheld the Board’s rule out of concern that an employer and a unión could make a deal giving the union “ ‘a marked advantage over any other [union] in securing the adherence of employees,’” id., at 738 (quoting NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 267 (1938)), thereby distorting the process by which employees elect the bargaining agent of their choice. 366 U. S., at 738-739. Here, in contrast, the Union continued to enjoy a rebuttable presumption of majority support, and the bargaining unit employees had ample opportunity to initiate decertification of the Union but apparently chose not to do so. With entire consistency, the Board may deny employers the power gained from recognizing a union, even when it flows from a good-faith but mistaken belief in a newly organized union’s majority status, and at the same time deny them the power to disturb collective-bargaining agreements based on a doubt (without more) that its employees’ bargaining agent has retained majority status. Good-faith belief can neither force a union’s precipitate recognition nor destroy a recognized union’s contracting authority after the fact by intentional delay. There is, indeed, a symmetry in the two positions.
* * *
We hold that the Board reasonably found an employer’s precontractual, good-faith doubt inadequate to support an exception to the conclusive presumption arising at the moment a collective-bargaining contract offer has been accepted. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Section 8(a) of the NLRA provides:
“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
“(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
“(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.” 29 U.S. C. § 158(a).
Section 7 of the Act provides:
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.” 29 U. S. C. § 157.
The Board has developed a number of criteria to assess whether a collective-bargaining contract has been formed, see, e. g., Appalachian Shale Products Co., 121 N. L. R. B. 1160 (1958), which may not always coincide with those that would govern in the general area of contract law, see Ben Franklin Nat. Bank, 278 N. L. R. B. 986, 993-994 (1986). We accept for purposes of deciding this case the Board’s conclusion that a contract was formed here within the meaning of the Act. Our review of this case is thus limited to the narrow question whether an employer may withdraw from a collective-bargaining contract once formed when it possessed enough evidence to assert a good-faith doubt about the union’s majority status at the time of formation.
Auciello has suggested that the contract itself was invalid ab initio because the Union in fact lacked majority support at the time of accept-anee. Because the substantiation required to make this showing is greater than that required to assert a good-faith doubt, see NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U. S. 775, 788, n. 8 (1990), the Board has not taken a position on whether such a claim could excuse an employer’s decision to repudiate an otherwise valid contract and disavow its duty to bargain with the union. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 7. Auciello concedes that it failed to advance this claim in its answer to the General Counsel’s complaint, Tr. of Oral Arg. 6,28, the Board never considered this question, and Auciello sought certiorari review only of the question whether an employer is bound by a union’s acceptance in this context when “the Employer had a reasonable basis for a good faith doubt.” Pet. for Cert. i. Accordingly, we conclude that this question is not properly before us and decline to address it.
This presumption may be overcome only in unusual circumstances, see, e. g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 98-99 (1954) (union dissolution, inter alia); 3 T. Kheel, Labor Law § 13A.04[5], p. 13A-26 (1995); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining §9, pp. 56-57 (1976), none of which is present here.
Auciello maintains that Curtin Matheson requires reversal here since it appears that the employer in that case asserted its good-faith doubt after the union’s acceptance of the contract offer. Brief for Petitioner 19-21. But the case is not authority on the issue of timing. The question presented was whether the Board “in evaluating an employer’s claim that it had a reasonable basis for doubting a union’s majority support, must presume that striker replacements oppose the union.” Curtin Matheson, 494 U. S., at 777 (emphasis in original). We did not discuss or consider whether the timing of the employer’s assertion should affect the outcome of that case, and the decision does not answer that question.
We assume, without deciding, that the withdrawal of an offer under these circumstances could not serve as a basis for the filing of an unfair labor practice complaint, which might trigger the “blocking charge” rule that the NLRB concedes would be implicated by an employer’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition. See Brief for Respondent 31, n. 10.
We note that in the unusual circumstance in which evidence leading the employer to harbor such a doubt arises at the same time the union accepts the offer, the Board has agreed to examine such occurrences on a case-by-case basis. 317 N. L. R. B. 364, 374-375 (1995). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine whether the decision of the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed was itself liberal or conservative. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. The lower court's decision direction is unspecifiable if the manner in which the Supreme Court took jurisdiction is original or certification; or if the direction of the Supreme Court's decision is unspecifiable and the main issue pertains to private law or interstate relations | What is the ideological direction of the decision reviewed by the Supreme Court? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdispositiondirection |
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE et al.
No. 80-939.
Argued October 6, 1981
Decided November 10, 1981
White, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 43.
Charles N. Steele argued the cause for petitioner in No. 80-939. With him on the brief was Kathleen Imig Perkins. Jan W. Baran argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 80-1129.
Robert F. Bauer argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.
Together with No. 80-1129, National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee et al., also on certio-rari to the same court.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. §431 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), limits the contributions that may be made to candidates or political committees in an election for federal office. One provision of the Act, § 441a(d), authorizes limited expenditures by the national and state committees of a political party in connection with a general election campaign for federal office. After authorizing such expenditures, which otherwise would be impermissible, the section specifies the amount a national committee may spend in connection with a Presidential campaign, §441a(d)(2), and limits the amount that national and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the Senate or the House of Representatives, § 441a(d)(3). In this litigation we examine whether § 441a(d)(3) is violated when a state committee of a political party designates the national senatorial campaign committee of that party as its agent for the purpose of making expenditures allowed by the Act.
I
The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) is a political committee organized specifically to support Republican candidates in elections for the United States Senate. Although the NRSC is authorized by § 441a(h) to contribute up to $17,500 to a candidate for election to the Senate, it is not given authority by § 441a(d) to make expenditures on behalf of such candidates, and it is the position of the Federal Election Commission, the agency charged with enforcement of the Act, that the NRSC may not do so on its own account. The Commission, however, has permitted the NRSC to act as the agent of national and state party committees in making expenditures on their behalf.
In February 1977, in response to an inquiry submitted late in 1976, the Commission issued an Advisory Opinion, 1976-108, that it would be consistent with the Act for the NRSC to spend its own funds in support of congressional candidates as the designated agent of the Republican National Committee (RNC). In April 1977, the Commission issued a regulation, 11 CFR § 110.7(a)(4) (1981), which provides that the national party committees may make expenditures in the general election campaign for President “through any designated agent, including state and subordinate party committees.” On the basis of this regulatory authority, the National Committee of the Democratic Party entered into an agreement specifying the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) as its agent for the expenditure of authorized funds in Senate campaigns. In 1978, certain state Republican Party committees designated the NRSC as their agent for §441a(d)(3) expenditure purposes. Complaints were filed with the Commission challenging this practice as inconsistent with the Act. In dismissing these complaints, the Commission twice ruled by unanimous votes that the agency arrangements were not forbidden by the Act. In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review (MUR) 780 (Jan. 19, 1979); In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission MUR 820 (June 17, 1979). In 1980, certain state committees again designated the NRSC as their agent, and on May 19, the DSCC filed its complaint with the Commission asserting that the NRSC’s agreements with the state committees were contrary to § 441a(d)(3). The complaint did not challenge the contemporaneous agency agreement under which the NRSC acted as the agent of the RNC in connection with the latter’s expenditures under § 441a(d). After considering the report of its General Counsel, the Commission unanimously dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was “no reason to believe” that the agreements violated the Act.
The DSCC petitioned for review in the District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to §437g(a)(8). That court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the decision of the Commission was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Comm’n, No. 80-1903 (DC Aug. 28, 1980) (reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert, of NRSC B4). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the NRSC leave to intervene and reversed the judgment of the District Court after concluding that the “plain language of Section 441a(d)(3) precludes” the agency agreements between state committees and the NRSC. 212 U. S. App. D. C. 374, 383, 660 F. 2d 773, 782. We granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the Commission and the NRSC, 450 U. S. 964 (1981), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I — I I — 1
Although the Court of Appeals first addressed whether and to what extent it should defer to the Commission’s construction of the Act, 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 377, 660 F. 2d, at 776, this discussion and the conclusion that little or no deference was due the Commission were pointless if the court was correct that the agency agreements violated the plain language of the Act as well as the statutory purposes revealed by the legislative history. The interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 275 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965), but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 118 (1978); FMC v. SeatrainLines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 745-746 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U. S. 261, 272 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291 (1965). Accordingly, the crucial issue at the outset is whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the Act. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the Court of Appeals. As we understand the Act and its legislative history, § 441a(d)(3) does not foreclose the use of agency agreements. The Commission thus acted within the authority vested in it by Congress when it determined to permit such agreements.
Section 441a(d)(3) provides as follows:
“The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make any expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds—
“(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of—
“(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certified under subsection (e) of this section); or
“(ii) $20,000; and
“(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other State, $10,000.”
It is evident from its terms that the section does not in so many words forbid the state or national party to designate agents for expenditure purposes. This much is common ground. The Court of Appeals, however, held that because § 441a(d)(3) permits expenditures in congressional campaigns to be made by national and state committees of the political parties, including subordinate committees of the latter, and because the NRSC was neither a national committee nor a state committee, it should not be permitted to make expenditures under any arrangement “by which the special authority of a named entity is transferred to another.” 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 380, 660 F. 2d, at 779. Obviously, §441a(d) (3) does not permit the NRSC to make expenditures in its own right. But, contrary to the Court of Appeals, it does not follow that the NRSC may not act as an agent of a committee that is expressly authorized to make expenditures. In the nature of things, a committee must act through its employees and agents, as the Court of Appeals recognized, and nothing in the statute suggests that a state committee may not designate another committee to be its alter ego and to act in its behalf for the purposes of §441a(d)(3). To foreclose such an arrangement on the grounds that the named agent is not one of the authorized spenders under § 441a(d)(3) would foreclose all agency agreements regardless of the identity of the agent and regardless of the terms of the agency. Nothing in the Act demands that the choices available to the state committee should be so severely restricted.
If the Court of Appeals is correct that any arrangement is forbidden by which an authorized committee empowers another to exercise its spending authority, then neither of the national committees could legally enter into agency relationships with its congressional campaign committees. Yet, both have regularly done so, and respondent DSCC does not challenge these arrangements. Indeed, the DSCC accepts the Commission’s regulation, 11 CFR § 110.7 (1981), as valid and interprets that regulation as authorizing the agency agreements which have existed between the parties’ national committees and the Republican and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees. Moreover, when the Commission, as required by law, submitted the regulation to Congress, neither House expressed disapproval.
Despite this indication that Congress does not look unfavorably upon the NRSC’s sharing in the spending authority of § 441a(d)(3), the Court of Appeals reads such disapproval into Congress’ failure to explicitly provide for such arrangements. To bolster its argument, the court points to §441a(h), which directly authorizes the national party committees, including the Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committees, to contribute up to $17,500 to a senatorial candidate. This argument, if accepted, would only underline that the NRSC may not make additional expenditures on its own account. It does not answer the question whether a state committee may exercise its statutory spending authority by designating the NRSC as its agent for this purpose.
Neither does the legislative history of the Act purport to disapprove agency arrangements. The Court of Appeals refers to the defeat of the Brock Amendment, which would have exempted congressional campaign committees such as the NRSC from the Act’s expenditure limits. 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 381, 660 F. 2d, at 780. But rejection of a proposal to permit congressional campaign committees to make expenditures in their own right does not necessarily affect their capacity to perform agency functions. Moreover, insofar as the intent of Congress is reflected in its failure to adopt a proposed amendment, a contrary — and indeed stronger — inference can be found in the rejection by the 96th Congress of an amendment that would have expressly prohibited the movement of funds between state and national committees of a political party.
It is clear enough to us without saying more that the statute does not expressly or by necessary implication foreclose the agency agreements at issue in this case. But neither does it expressly permit or require such agreements. If this were a direct enforcement action rather than the review of a decision by the administrative agency charged with the enforcement of the statute, it may be that a court could defensibly arrive at the conclusion that agency agreements of this kind should be forbidden. It may also be that the Commission could have construed the statute to forbid the agreements and that a court would have accepted such a construction by the agency. But that is not this case. The Commission, in dismissing the DSCC’s complaint, has determined that agency agreements are not contrary to law and the question is whether the courts should defer to this judgment as a permissible construction of the Act or instead disregard the agency’s view and proceed to construe the statute based on its own view of what would best serve the purpose and policy of the Act.
Ill
The Court of Appeals determined that the Commission’s construction of the Act was entitled to no deference whatsoever. While acknowledging that deference is often appropriately given to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute, the court refused to accord that deference here because of what it perceived as the lack of a reasoned and consistent explanation by the Commission in support of its decision. We agree that the thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency’s reasoning are factors that bear upon the amount of deference to be given an agency’s ruling. See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 287, n. 5 (1978); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). We do not agree, however, that the Commission failed to merit that deference in this case.
Initially, we note that the Commission is precisely the type of agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded. Congress has vested the Commission with “primary and substantial responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 109 (1976), providing the agency with “extensive rulemaking and adjudicative powers.” Id., at 110. It is authorized to “formulate general policy with respect to the administration of this Act,” §437d(a)(9), and has the “sole discretionary power” to determine in the first instance whether or not a civil violation of the Act has occurred. 424 U. S., at 112, n. 153. Moreover, the Commission is inherently bipartisan in that no more than three of its six voting members may be of the same political party, §437c(a)(l), and it must decide issues charged with the dynamics of party politics, often under the pressure of an impending election. For these reasons, Congress wisely provided that the Commission’s dismissal of a complaint should be reversed only if “contrary to law.” §437g(a)(8).
The Commission’s position on the question before us is clear. Since 1976, it consistently has adhered to its construction of § 441a(d)(3) as not forbidding intraparty agency agreements. The Commission has on three separate occasions, all by unanimous votes, rejected the DSCC’s claim. On each occasion the Commission followed the recommendation of its General Counsel. In his first report, the General Counsel emphasized the absence of any specific statutory prohibition of the agency arrangements, and also relied on §441a(a)(4), which permits unlimited transfer of funds among state and national political committees of the same party. The second report, without rejecting any of the earlier arguments, also drew support from a Commission regulation approving similar agency agreements between national level committees. The third report, issued in this case, added an analysis of § 441a(d)(3), reviewed the legislative history, and took note of the fact that Congress had recently amended the Act with knowledge of the Commission’s construction of § 441a(d)(3) and had let that construction stand. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we find the differences in emphasis in the three reports of little significance. All reach the same conclusion, none rejects the arguments of the others. The Commission consistently has upheld the agency agreements; the fact that Commission Counsel has had the luxury of a number of sound arguments on which to base his opinions does not detract from the deference due the agency’s interpretations.
Hence, in determining whether the Commission’s action was “contrary to law,” the task for the Court of Appeals was not to interpret the statute as it thought best but rather the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission’s construction was “sufficiently reasonable” to be accepted by a reviewing court. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U. S. 60, 75 (1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978). To satisfy this standard it is not necessary for a court to find that the agency’s construction was the only reasonable one or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.- Ibid.; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S., at 16; Unemployment Compensation Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U. S. 143, 153 (1946). Under this standard, we think the District Court was correct in accepting the Commission’s judgment.
As we have said, § 441a(d) does not expressly or by implication forbid agency agreements. Although the Court of Appeals and the DSCC are of the view that since the section specifically authorized only two committees — the national and state party committees — to make campaign expenditures, no other committee could make such expenditures either on its own account or on behalf of others. But the opposite reading makes equal sense: Congress, having written the statute so precisely, would have made clear that expenditures by other committees, whether by agency or otherwise, were prohibited.
We also find acceptable the Commission’s view that the agency agreements were logically consistent with §441a (a)(4). That section authorizes the transfer of funds among national, state, and local committees of the same party. There can be little question but that the section applies to the National Republican Senatorial Committee, as that Committee is part of the Republican Party organization. Under that provision, by using direct money transfers, instead of an agency agreement, the national committee could write a check to the state committee for the same amount that it would otherwise have spent directly under the agency agreement. That being so, we agree with the dissent below that the difference is “purely one of form, not substance.” 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 386, 660 F. 2d, at 785.
Money transferred to the state committee presumably would be spent as the state committee decided. Agency agreements, by comparison, might allow the NRSC to determine what expenditures to make on behalf of the state committees. The Court of Appeals made much of this, asserting that the agency arrangements, unlike §441a(a)(4) transfers, reduced the state committees to “legal shells.” The court overlooks that the NRSC easily could insist that funds transferred to a state committee be utilized in a certain manner. Conversely, state committees could retain or share control over how § 441a(d)(3) spending authority is exercised by writing conditions into the agency agreement. More fundamentally, state committees are not obligated to enter into agency agreements in the first place. The delegation of spending authority is an option, not a requirement, and it is an option resting entirely with the state committees.
Finally, the Commission’s interpretation is not inconsistent with any discernible purpose of the Act. In Buckley v. Valeo, we recognized that the primary interest served by the Act is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office. 424 U. S., at 25. It has not been suggested that this basic purpose of the Act is compromised by agency arrangements. Since the limitations on the amount that can be spent under the Act apply with equal force whether a state committee exercises its authority directly or transfers it to one of the party’s national committees, an agency arrangement does not permit the expenditure of a single additional dollar.
Section 441a(d)(3) fits into the general scheme by assuring that political parties will continue to have an important role in federal elections. Although the DSCC would transform this purpose into the more specific objective of stimulating political parties at the state level, none of the limited legislative history concerning the provision supports this view. The legislative discussion of preserving a role for political parties did not differentiate between the state and national branches of the party unit. It is hardly unreasonable to suppose that the political parties were fully capable of structuring their expenditures so as to achieve the greatest possible return. Agency agreements may permit all party committees to benefit from fundraising, media expertise, and economies of scale. In turn, effective use of party resources in support of party candidates may encourage candidate loyalty and responsiveness to the party. Indeed, the very posture of these cases betrays the weakness of respondent’s argument — an argument that, at bottom, features one of the two great American political parties insisting that its rival requires judicial assistance in discovering how a legislative enactment operates to its benefit.
Thus, the absence of a prohibition on the agency arrangements at issue, the lack of a clearly enunciated legislative purpose to that effect, and indeed, the countervailing existence of a transfer mechanism whose presence is difficult to reconcile with the interpretation urged by the Court of Appeals, prevent us from finding that the Commission’s determination was “contrary to law.” Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Expenditures by party committees are known as “coordinated” expenditures and are subject to the monetary limits of §441a(d). See 6 FEC Record, No. 11, p. 6 (Nov. 1980). Party committees are considered incapable of making “independent” expenditures in connection with the campaigns of their party’s candidates. The Commission has, by regulation, forbidden such “independent” expenditures by the national and state party committees, 11 CFR § 110.7(B)(4) (1981), and has indicated in this litigation that the congressional campaign committees fall within that prohibition. See Brief for Petitioner Federal Election Commission in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 10, n. 5 (“[pjarty committees ... are deemed incapable of making independent expenditures”); Brief for Petitioner in No. 80-939, p. 38 (“NRSC is a party committee”). Thus, as the Commission admits: “Absent § 441a(d), party committees could make no expenditures whatsoever in connection with the Congressional campaigns of their party’s candidates.” Brief for Petitioner Federal Election Commission in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 10, n. 5.
In the 1978 senatorial elections, the NRSC spent a total of $2,770,995 under the combined spending authority of the national and state party committees. Jt. App. in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 105.
This section provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved” by the Commission’s dismissal of a complaint may petition the United States District Court for the District of Columbia which “may declare that the dismissal of the complaint or the action, or the failure to act, is contrary to law” and order the Commission to conform with the court’s declaration.
The RNC, not the NRSC, is the “national committee” as defined by 2 U. S. C. §431(14) (1976 ed., Supp. IV): “the organization . . . responsible for the day-to-day operation of such political party at the national level.”
The Court of Appeals’ suggests that it is misleading to characterize the agreements as ones of “agency” because the state committees do not direct how funds are to be raised and spent. We do not understand the lack of such control to be inherent in these arrangements, nor dispositive in deciding whether such agreements can be made under the Act. See infra, at 41. See also n. 6, infra.
The regulation, 11 CFR § 110.7(a)(1) (1981), allows the “national committee of a political party [to] make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of any candidate for President . . . affiliated with the party,” up to “an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States,” the amount authorized by § 441a(d)(2). These expenditures may be made “through any designated agent, including State and subordinate committees.” The regulation goes on to authorize the national committee to make expenditures on behalf of congressional and senatorial candidates of the party.
While the regulation directly authorizes transfers of spending authority only with respect to Presidential campaign expenditures, the significance of the regulation is that it clearly demonstrates that § 441a(d) expenditures do not have to be made directly by the committee specified in the statute.
In its brief before the Court of Appeals, the DSCC expressly stated that it “does not challenge this regulation or the NRSC’s role as agent of the Republican National Committee.” See Brief for Appellant DSCC in No. 80-2074 (CADC), p. 20, n. 16.
The Act requires that before prescribing any rule or regulation the Commission shall transmit the proposed rule and an accompanying statement to the Senate and the House. If neither House disapproves the proposed rule within 30 legislative days, the Commission may proceed to issue the rule. § 438(d).
Section 441a(h) authorizes the “Republican or Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, or the national committee of a political party, or any combination of such committees” to contribute “not more than $17,500” to a senatorial candidate.
By its terms, the provision does not restrict a senatorial campaign committee from making expenditures on behalf of other committees.
During the 1974 legislative debates, Senator Brock proposed an amendment that would have exempted congressional campaign committees from the expenditure limitations of the Act. 120 Cong. Rec. 9549-9551 (1974). The Senate initially adopted the amendment, but reversed itself five days later. Id., at 10062-10064.
Section 113 of H. R. 11315 would have prohibited any “movement of funds” between “the political committees of a national political party (including House and Senate congressional campaign committees of such party) and the political committees of a State committee of a political party ... for the purpose of making contributions to, or expenditures on behalf of, any candidate for Federal office.” H. R. 11315, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). The House rejected a rule for consideration of the bill, 124 Cong. Rec. 7872-7880 (1978). The basis for the rejection may be seen in various comments attacking the bill. Representative Stockman saw the proposed amendment as a “fundamental assault on . . . the continued meaningful role of our political parties.” Id., at 7875. Representative Mikva stated that he “deeply regret[ted] that the committee . . . saw fit to change the party financing.” Id., at 7876.
See First General Counsel’s Report, MUR 780 (Jan. 19, 1978).
This section provides that the limitations on contributions to and by political committees found in §§ 441a(a)(l) and (2) “do not apply to transfers between and among political committees which are national, State, district, or local committees (including any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party.”
See First General Counsel’s Report, MUR 820 (June 19, 1978).
See 11 CFR § 110.7 (1981), supra n. 6.
See First General Counsel’s Report, MUR 1234 (July 11, 1980).
The assertion by the Court of Appeals that the Commission has disavowed the relevance of 11 CFR § 110.7 (1981) in its brief before that court, 212 U. S. App. D. C. 374, 378, 660 F. 2d 773, 777, is belied by its incorporation in the Commission’s brief before this Court. See Brief for Petitioner in No. 939, p. 35.
Nor does the fact that the Commission, following its customary prac-tiee, did not expressly adopt the General Counsel’s report in announcing its decision “depriv[e] a reviewing court of any Commission record on which to base a deferential consideration.” 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 378, n. 3, 660 F. 2d, at 777, n. 3. The Court of Appeals previously has held that the General Counsel’s report to the Commission is sufficient to support the Commission’s dismissal of a complaint. See Hampton v. Federal Election Comm’n, 2 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ¶ 9036, pp. 50,439-50,440 (DC 1977), aff’d No. 77-1546 (CADC July 21, 1978). In this case, the General Counsel’s report was made public simultaneously with the Commission’s ruling. It was the third occasion on which the Commission followed the General Counsel’s advice in this matter. Even without an express statement, it is sufficiently clear that the staff report provides the basis for the Commission’s action.
Section 441a(a)(4) applies to “political committees which are national, state, district or local committees (including any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party.” The DSCC does not challenge the applicability of the transfer provision to national senatorial committees. At one point, the Court of Appeals refused to address the issue for that reason. See 212 U. S. App. D. C., at 382, 660 F. 2d, at 781 (the “issue was not joined before this court”). At another point, however, the court expressed “some doubt” whether §441a(a)(4) encompasses congressional committees. Surely that doubt must be minimal in light of the broad scope of the statutory language, the fact that senatorial campaign committees are identifiable as part of their respective party. See Cong. Rec. 9552 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Baker), and the Congress’ clear intent to include such committees within the scope of §§ 441a(a)(l)-(2), to which §441a(a)(4) serves as an exception. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057, p. 58 (1976) (“the term ‘political committee established or maintained by a national political party’ includes the Senate and House Campaign Committees”). A committee “established or maintained” by a national party would appear to fall squarely within the reach of §441a(a)(4). Indeed, if congressional campaign committees were not considered as part of the national party, their ability to make independent expenditures would seem to escape any limitation prescribed by the Act. See n. 1, supra.
See S. Rep. No. 93-689, p. 7 (1974), reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, p. 103 (1977).
It should be remembered that the section was considered at a time when Congress contemplated total public funding of general election campaigns for federal office. See § 101, S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 71-78 (1974). In that context, statements in Congress about the need to preserve the role of party committees, see, e. g., 120 Cong. Rec. 34372 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cannon); id., at 35136 (remarks of Rep. Frenzel), are properly read as expressing concern over the function of political parties under public campaign finance rather than concern with the role of state committees vis-á-vis party committees at the national level. Thus, by allowing for the pooling of campaign funds, agency agreements increase party resources “to conduct party-wide election efforts.” S. Rep. No. 93-689, supra, at 8, reprinted in Legislative History of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, supra, at 104. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
230
] | sc_petitioner |
FORTNIGHTLY CORP. v. UNITED ARTISTS TELEVISION, INC.
No. 618.
Argued March 13, 1968.
Decided June 17, 1968.
Robert C. Barnard argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were R. Michael Duncan and E. Stratford Smith.
Louis Nizer argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Gerald Meyer, Gerald F. Phillips, and Lawrence S. Lesser.
Solicitor General Griswold filed a memorandum for the United States, as amicus curiae.
Bruce E. Lovett filed a brief for the National Cable Television Association, Inc., as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Warner W. Gardner, William H. Dempsey, Jr., and Douglas A. Anello for the National Association of Broadcasters; by Ambrose Doskow for Broadcast Music, Inc.; by Michael Finkelstein for the All-Channel Television Society; by Irwin Karp for the Authors League of America, Inc.; by Herman Finkelstein, Simon H. Rif kind, Jay H. Topkis, and Paul S. Adler for the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers; by Paul P. Selvin and William Berger for the Writers Guild of America et al., and by Leonard Zissu and Abraham Marcus for the Screen Composers Association of the United States.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner, Fortnightly Corporation, owns and operates community antenna television (CATV) systems in Clarksburg and Fairmont, West Virginia. There were no local television broadcasting stations in that immediate area until 1957. Now there are two, but, because of hilly terrain, most residents of the area cannot receive the broadcasts of any additional stations by ordinary rooftop antennas. Some of the residents have joined in erecting larger cooperative antennas in order to receive more distant stations, but a majority of the householders in both communities have solved the problem by becoming customers of the petitioner’s CATV service.
The petitioner’s systems consist of antennas located on hills above each city, with connecting coaxial cables, strung on utility poles, to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home television sets of individual subscribers. The systems contain equipment to amplify and modulate the signals received, and to convert them to different frequencies, in order to transmit the signals efficiently while maintaining and improving their strength.
During 1960, when this proceeding began, the petitioner’s systems provided customers with signals of five television broadcasting stations, three located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; one in Steubenville, Ohio; and one in Wheeling, West Virginia. The distance between those cities and Clarksburg and Fairmont ranges from 52 to 82 miles. The systems carried all the programming of each of the five stations, and a customer could choose any of the five programs he wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set. The petitioner neither edited the programs received nor originated any programs of its own. The petitioner’s customers were charged a flat monthly rate regardless of the amount of time that their television sets were in use.
The respondent, United Artists Television, Inc., holds copyrights on several motion pictures. During the period in suit, the respondent (or its predecessor) granted various licenses to each of the five television stations in question to broadcast certain of these copyrighted motion pictures. Broadcasts made under these licenses were received by the petitioner’s Clarksburg and Fairmont CATV systems and carried to its customers. At no time did the petitioner (or its predecessors) obtain a license under the copyrights from the respondent or from any of the five television stations. The licenses granted by the respondent to the five stations did not authorize carriage of the broadcasts by CATY systems, and in several instances the licenses specifically prohibited such carriage.
The respondent sued the petitioner for copyright infringement in a federal court, asking damages and injunc-tive relief. The issue of infringement was separately tried, and the court ruled in favor of the respondent. 255 F. Supp. 177. On interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 377 F. 2d 872. We granted certiorari, 389 U. S. 969, to consider an important question under the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended, 17 U. S. C. § 1 et seq.
The Copyright Act does not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work. Instead, § 1 of the Act enumerates several “rights” that are made “exclusive” to the holder of the copyright. If a person, without authorization from the copyright holder, puts a copyrighted work to a use within the scope of one of these “exclusive rights,” he infringes the copyright. If he puts the work to a use not enumerated in § 1, he does not infringe. The respondent’s contention is that the petitioner’s CATY systems infringed the respondent’s § 1 (c) exclusive right to “perform ... in public for profit” (nondramatic literary works) and its § 1 (d) exclusive right to “perform . .. publicly” (dramatic works). The petitioner maintains that its CATV systems did not “perform” the copyrighted works at all.
At the outset it is clear that the petitioner’s systems did not “perform” the respondent’s copyrighted works in any conventional sense of that term, or in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909. But our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which we deal here. In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and television had not been invented. We must read the statutory language of 60 years ago in the light of drastic technological change.
The Court of Appeals thought that the controlling question in deciding whether the petitioner’s CATV systems “performed” the copyrighted works was: “[H]ow much did the [petitioner] do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work?” 377 F. 2d, at 877. Applying this test, the court found that the petitioner did “perform” the programs carried by its systems. But mere quantitative contribution cannot be the proper test to determine copyright liability in the context of television broadcasting. If it were, many people who make large contributions to television viewing might find themselves liable for copyright infringement — not only the apartment house owner who erects a common antenna for his tenants, but the shopkeeper who sells or rents television sets, and, indeed, every television set manufacturer. Rather, resolution of the issue before us depends upon a determination of the function that CATV plays in the total process of television broadcasting and reception.
Television viewing results from combined activity by broadcasters and viewers. Both play active and indispensable roles in the process; neither is wholly passive. The broadcaster selects and procures the program to be viewed. He may produce it himself, whether “live” or with film or tape, or he may obtain it from a network or some other source. He then converts the visible images and audible sounds of the program into electronic signals, and broadcasts the signals at radio frequency for public reception. Members of the public, by means of television sets and antennas that they themselves provide, receive the broadcaster’s signals and reconvert them into the visible images and audible sounds of the program. The effective range of the broadcast is determined by the combined contribution of the equipment employed by the broadcaster and that supplied by the viewer.
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more than a member of a theater audience; he provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into audible sound and visible images. Despite these deviations from the conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act, broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters' perform. Viewers do not perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.
When CATV is considered in this framework, we conclude that it falls on the viewer's side of the line. Essentially, a CATY system no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the viewer’s television set. It is true that a CATV system plays an “active” role in making reception possible in a given area, but so do ordinary television sets and antennas. CATV equipment is powerful and sophisticated, but the basic function the equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television viewer. If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be “performing” the programs he received on his television set. The result would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is that the antenna system is erected and. owned not by its users but by an entrepreneur.
The function of CATV systems has little in common with the function of broadcasters. CATV systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast. Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive. Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have been released to the public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers. We hold that CATV operators, like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform the programs that they receive and carry.
We have been invited by the Solicitor General in an amicus curiae brief to render a compromise decision in this case that would, it is said, accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications, and antitrust policy. We decline the invitation. That job is for Congress. We take the Copyright Act of 1909 as we find it. With due regard to changing technology, we hold that the petitioner did not under that law “perform” the respondent’s copyrighted works.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed
Mu. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case.
For a discussion of CATV systems generally, see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., ante, at 161-164.
In 1960, out of 11,442 occupied housing units in the Clarks-burg area, about 7,900 subscribed to the petitioner’s CATV service; out of 9,079 units in Fairmont, about 5,100 subscribed.
The petitioner’s systems utilized modulating equipment only during the period 1958-1964.
Since 1960, some changes have been made in the stations carried by each of the petitioner’s systems. As of May 1, 1964, the Clarks-burg system was carrying the two local stations and three of the more distant stations, and the Fairmont system was carrying one local station and four of the more distant stations.
Clarksburg and Fairmont are 18 miles apart.
Some CATV systems, about 10%, originate some of their own programs. We do not deal with such systems in this opinion.
The monthly rate ranged from $3.75 to $5, and customers were also charged an installation fee. Increased charges were levied for additional television sets and for commercial establishments.
See, e. g., Fawcett Publications v. Elliot Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 717; Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F. 2d 543, 547-548.
“The fundamental [is] that 'use’ is not the same thing as 'infringement,’ that use short of infringement is to be encouraged ....’’ B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 57 (1967).
“Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have the exclusive right:
“(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;
“(b) To translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art;
“(c) To deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present the copyrighted work in public for profit if it be a lecture, sermon, address or similar production, or other nondramatic literary work; to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, delivered, presented, produced, or reproduced; and to play or perform it in public for profit, and to exhibit, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever. The damages for the infringement by broadcast of any work referred to in this subsection shall not exceed the sum of $100 where the infringing broadcaster shows that he was not aware that he was infringing and that such infringement could not have been reasonably foreseen; and
“(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend my manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever; and
“(e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition; and for the purpose of public performance for profit, and for the purposes set forth in subsection (a) hereof, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced . . . .” 17 U. S. C. § 1.
The Copyright Act does not contain a definition of infringement as such. Rather infringement is delineated in a negative fashion by the § 1 enumeration of rights exclusive to the copyright holder. See M. Nimmer, Copyright § 100 (1968).
See n. 9, supra. We do not reach the petitioner’s claim that the respondent’s animated cartoons are not “literary works.”
See n. 9, supra.
The petitioner also contends that if it did “perform” the copyrighted works, it did not do so “in public.”
Cf. White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U. S. 1.
The legislative history shows that the attention of Congress was directed to the situation where the dialogue of a play is transcribed by a member of the audience, and thereafter the play is produced by another party with the aid of the transcript. EL R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1909).
“While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations not fairly within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because of changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries.” Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411.
A revision of the 1909 Act was begun in 1955 when Congress authorized a program of studies by the Copyright Office. Progress has not been rapid. The Copyright Office issued its report in 1961. Register of Copyrights, Report on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, House Judiciary Committee Print, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). Revision bills were introduced in the House in the Eighty-eighth Congress and in both the House and the Senate in the Eighty-ninth Congress. See H. R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings on H. R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on S. 1006 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). H. R. 4347 was reported favorably by the House Judiciary Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), but not enacted. In the Ninetieth Congress revision bills were again introduced in both the House (H. R. 2512) and the Senate (S. 597). The House bill was again reported favorably, H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), and this time, after amendment, passed by the full House. 113 Cong. Ree. 9021. The bill as reported contained a provision dealing with CATV, but the provision was struck from the bill on the House floor prior to enactment. See n. 33, infra. The House and Senate bills are currently pending before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights.
The court formulated and applied this test in the light of this Court’s decision in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S. 191. See also Society of European Stage Authors & Composers v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 P. Supp. 1. But in Jewell-LaSalle, a hotel received on a master radio set an unauthorized broadcast of a copyrighted work and transmitted that broadcast to all the public and private rooms of the hotel by means of speakers installed by the hotel in each room. The Court held the hotel liable for infringement but noted that the result might have differed if, as in this case, the original broadcast had been authorized by the copyright holder. 283 U. S., at 199, n. 5. The Jeivell-LaSalle decision must be understood as limited to its own facts. See n. 30, injra.
If the broadcaster obtains his program from a network, he receives the electronic signals directly by means of telephone lines or microwave.
Broadcasting is defined under the Communications Act of 1934 as “the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the public . . . .” 47 U. S. C. § 153 (o).
See Hearings on H. R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1312-1318 (1965).
See n. 15, supra.
Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F. 2d 411 (radio broadcast); Associated Music Publishers v. Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F. 2d 852 (radio broadcast of recorded program); Select Theatres Corp. v. Ronzoni Macaroni Co., 59 U. S. P. Q. 288 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.) (radio broadcast of program received from network). Congress in effect validated these decisions in 1952 when it added to § 1 (c) a special damages provision for “infringement by broadcast.” 66 Stat. 752.
“One who manually or by human agency merely actuates electrical instrumentalities, whereby inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the air are made audible to persons who are within hearing, does not 'perform’ within the meaning of the Copyright Law.” Buck v. Debaum, 40 F. 2d 734, 735.
“[T]hose who listen do not perform . . . .” Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. General Electric Co., 16 F. 2d 829.
While we speak in this opinion generally of CATV, we necessarily do so with reference to the facts of this case.
Cf. Lilly v. United States, 238 F. 2d 584, 587:
“[Tjhis community antenna service was a mere adjunct of the television receiving sets with which it was connected . . . .”
The District Court’s decision was based in large part upon its analysis of the technical aspects of the petitioner’s systems. The systems have contained at one time or another sophisticated equipment to amplify, modulate, and convert to different frequencies the signals received — operations which all require the introduction of local energy into the system. The court concluded that the signal delivered to subscribers was not the same signal as that initially received off the air. 255 F. Supp., at 190-195. The Court of Appeals refused to attach significance to the particular technology of the petitioner’s systems, 377 F. 2d, at 879, and we agree. The electronic operations performed by the petitioner’s systems are those necessary to transmit the received signal the length of the cable efficiently and deliver a signal of adequate strength. Most of the same operations are performed by individual television sets and antennas. See Hearings on H. R. 4347 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee, supra, at 1312-1318. Whether or not the signals received and delivered are the “same,” the entire process is virtually instantaneous, and electronic “information” received and delivered is identical. 255 F. Supp., at 192.
Cf. Intermountain Broadcasting & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 315, 325:
“[Broadcasters] and [CATV systems] are not engaged in the same kind of business. They operate in different ways for different purposes.
“[Broadcasters] are in the business of selling their broadcasting time and facilities to the sponsors to whom they look for their profits. They do not and cannot charge the public for their broadcasts which are beamed directly, indiscriminately and without charge through the air to any and all reception sets of the public as may be equipped to receive them.
“[CATV systems], on the other hand, have nothing to do with sponsors, program content or arrangement. They sell community antenna service to a segment of the public for which [broadcasters’] programs were intended but which is not able, because of location or topographical condition, to receive them without rebroadcast or other relay service by community antennae. . . .”
Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 47, vacated on other grounds, 335 F. 2d 348; Report and Order on CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403, 429-430.
It is said in dissent that, “Our major object . . . should be to do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright principles and to business relationships, until the Congress legislates . . . .” Post, at 404. But existing “business relationships” would hardly be preserved by extending a questionable 35-year-old decision that in actual practice has not been applied outside its own factual context, post, at 405, n. 3, so as retroactively to impose copyright liability where it has never been acknowledged to exist before. See n. 18, supra.
Compare, e. g., Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1514 (1967); Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: On a Clear Day You Can See Forever, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1505 (1966); B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 104G106 (1967); Statement of then Acting Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division) Zimmerman, Hearings on S. 1006 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 211-219 (1966).
The Solicitor General would have us hold that CATV systems do perform the programs they carry, but he would have us “imply” a license for the CATV “performances.” This “implied in law” license would not cover all CATV activity but only those instances in which a CATV system operates within the “Grade B Contour” of the broadcasting station whose signal it carries. The Grade B contour is a theoretical FCC concept defined as the outer line along which reception of acceptable quality can be expected at least 90% of the time at the best 50% of locations. Sixth Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905, 3915. Since we hold that the petitioner’s systems did not perform copyrighted works, we do not reach the question of implied license.
The copyright revision bill recently passed by the House, see n. 17, supra, originally contained a detailed and somewhat complex provision covering CATV. H. R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 111. Congressman Poff described the bill in terms of its effect on the District Court’s decision in the present case:
“By, in effect, repealing the court decision which would impose full copyright liability on all CATV’s in all situations, the committee recommends H. R. 2512, which would exempt them in some situations, make them fully liable in some, and provide limited liability in others.” 113 Cong. Rec. 8588.
See H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7, 48-59 (1967). On the House floor the CATV provision was deleted in order to refer the matter to the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, which has jurisdiction over communications. 113 Cong. 8598-8601, 8611-8613, 8618-8622, 8990-8992. In urging deletion of the CATV provision, Congressman Moore said:
“[W]hat we seek to do in this legislation is control CATV by copyright. I say that is wrong. I feel if there is to be supervision of this fast-growing area of news media and communications media, it should legitimately come to this body from the legislative committee that has direct jurisdiction over the same.
"... This bill and the devices used to effect communications policy are not proper functions of copyright . . . .” 113 Cong. Rec. 8599. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
2
] | sc_casedisposition |
UNITED STATES v. MacDONALD
No. 75-1892.
Argued January 9, 1978
Decided May 1, 1978
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Brennan, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Civiletti, and Shirley Baccus-Lobel.
Bernard L. Segal argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael J. Malley and Kenneth A. Letzler.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue whether a defendant, before trial, may appeal a federal district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss an indictment because of an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
I
In February 1970, respondent Jeffrey R. MacDonald was a physician in military service stationed at Fort . Bragg in North Carolina. He held the rank of captain in the Army-Medical Corps.
Captain MacDonald’s wife and their two daughters were murdered on February 17 at respondent’s quarters. Respondent also sustained injury on that occasion. The military police, the Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Fayetteville, N. C., Police Department all immediately began investigations of the crime. On April 6 the CID informed respondent that he was under suspicion and, that same day, he was relieved of his duties and restricted to quarters. On May 1, pursuant to Art. 30 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U. S. C. § 830, the Army charged respondent with the murders. As required by Art. 32 of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 832, an investigating officer was appointed to investigate the crimes and to recommend whether the charges (three specifications of murder, in violation of Art. 118 of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. § 918) should be referred by the general court-martial convening authority (the post commander) to a general court-martial for trial. App. 131.
At the conclusion of the Art. 32 proceeding, the investigating officer filed a report in which he recommended that the charges against respondent be dismissed, and that the civilian authorities investigate a named female suspect. App. 136. On October 23, after review of this report, the commanding general of respondent’s unit accepted the recommendation and dismissed the charges. In December 1970, the Army granted respondent an honorable discharge for reasons of hardship.
Following respondent’s release from the military, and at the request of the Department of Justice, the CID continued its investigation. This was extensive and wide ranging. In June 1972, the CID submitted to the Department of Justice a 13-volume report recommending still further investigation. Supplemental reports were transmitted in November 1972 and August 1973. It was not until August 1974, however, that the Government began the presentation of the case to a grand jury of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. On January 24, 1975, the grand jury indicted respondent on three counts of first-degree murder, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1111. App. 22-23. He was promptly arrested and then released on bail a week later.
On July 29, the District Court denied a number of pretrial motions submitted by respondent. Among these were a motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds and another to dismiss because of the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, 46a, 49a. Relying on United States v. Manon, 404 U. S. 307 (1971), the District Court concluded: “The right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment does not arise until a person has been 'accused’ of a crime, and in this case this did not occur until the indictment had been returned.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. Trial was scheduled to begin in August.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed the trial and allowed an interlocutory appeal on the authority of its decision in United States v. Lansdown, 460 F. 2d 164 (1972). App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed the District Court’s denial of respondent’s motion to. dismiss on speedy trial grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment. 531 F. 2d 196 (1976). The Government’s petition for rehearing, with suggestion for rehearing en banc, was denied by an evenly divided vote. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a.
The Court of Appeals panel majority recognized that the denial of a pretrial motion in a criminal case generally is not appealable. The court, however, offered two grounds for its assumption of jurisdiction in this particular case.. It stated, first, that it considered respondent’s speedy trial claim to be pendent to his double jeopardy claim, the denial of which Lansdown had held to be appealable before trial. Alternatively, although conceding that “[n]ot every speedy trial claim . . . merits an interlocutory appeal,” and that “[generally, this defense should be reviewed after final judgment,” the court stated that it was “the extraordinary nature of MacDonald’s case that persuaded us to allow an interlocutory appeal.” 531 F. 2d, at 199.
On the merits, the majority concluded that respondent had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The dissenting judge without addressing the jurisdictional issue, concluded that respondent’s right to a speedy trial had not been violated. Id., at 209.
Because of the importance of the jurisdictional question to the criminal law, we granted certiorari. 432 U. S. 905 (1977).
II
This Court frequently has considered the appealability of pretrial orders in criminal cases. See, e. g., Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651 (1977); DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S. 121 (1962); Parr v. United States, 351 U. S. 513 (1956) ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940). Just last Term the Court reiterated that interlocutory or “piecemeal” appeals are disfavored. “Finality of judgment has been required as a predicate for federal appellate jurisdiction.” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 656. See also DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S., at 124.
This traditional and. basic principle is currently embodied in 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “all final decisions of the district courts,” both civil and criminal. The rule of finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions because “encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S., at 325. See also DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S., at 126.
This Court in criminal cases has twice departed from the general prohibition against piecemeal appellate- review. Abney v. United States, supra; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1 (1951). In each instance, the Court relied on the final-judgment rule’s “collateral order” exception articulated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 545-547 (1949).
Cohen was a stockholder’s derivative action in which federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Before final judgment was entered, the question arose whether a newly enacted state statute requiring a derivative-suit plaintiff to post security applied in federal court. The District Court held that it did not, and the defendants immediately appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the posting of security. This Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had properly assumed jurisdiction to review the trial judge’s ruling, and affirmed.
The Court’s opinion began by emphasizing the principle— well established even then — that there can be no appeal before final judgment “even from fully consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment in which they will merge. The purpose is to combine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment results.” Id., at 546. The Court’s conclusion that the order appealed from qualified as a “final decision,” within the language of 28 U. S. C. § 1291, however, rested on several grounds. Those grounds were summarized in Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 658:
“First, the District Court’s order had fully disposed of the question of the state security statute’s applicability in federal court; in no sense, did it leave the matter ‘open, unfinished or inconclusive’ [337 U. S., at 546]. Second, the decision was not simply a ‘step toward final disposition of the merits of the case [which would] be merged in final judgment’; rather, it resolved an-issue completely collateral to the cause of action asserted. Ibid. Finally, the decision had involved an important right which would be ‘lost, probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final judgment; hence, to be effective,' appellate review in that special, limited setting had to be immediate. Ibid.”
Two years after the decision in Cohen, the Court applied the “collateral order” doctrine in a criminal.proceeding, holding that an order denying a motion to reduce ball could be reviewed before trial. Stack v. Boyle, supra. Writing separately in that case, Mr. Justice Jackson (the author of Cohen) explained that, like the question of posting security in Cohen, “an order fixing bail can be reviewed without halting the main trial — its issues are entirely independent of the issues to be tried — and unless it can be reviewed before sentence, it never can be reviewed at all.” 342 U. S., at 12.
In Abney, the Court returned to this theme, holding that the collateral-order doctrine permits interlocutory appeal of an order denying a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. In so holding, the Court emphasized the special features of a motion to> dismiss based on double jeopardy. It pointed out, first, that such an, order constitutes “a complete, formal and, in the trial court, a final rejection of a criminal defendant’s double jeopardy claim. There are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee. Hence, Cohen’s threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision is satisfied.” 431 U. S., at 659. Secondly, it noted that “the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue at the accused’s impending criminal trial, i. e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged.” Ibid. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, “the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence.” Id., at
The application to the instant case of the principles enunciated in the above precedents is straightforward. Like the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, a pretrial order rejecting a defendant’s speedy trial claim plainly •'•'lacks the finality traditionally considered indispensable to appellate review,” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 659, that is, such an order obviously is not final in the sense of terminating the criminal proceedings in the trial court. Thus, if such an order may be appealed before trial, it is because it satisfies the criteria identified in Cohen and Abney as sufficient to warrant suspension of the established rules against piecemeal review before final judgment.
We believe it clear that an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds does not satisfy those criteria. The considerations that militated in favor of appealability in Stack v. Boyle, supra, and in Abney v. United States are absent or markedly attenuated in the present case. In keeping with what appear to be the only two other federal cases in which a defendant has sought pretrial review of an order denying his motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds, we hold that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s speedy trial appeal. United States v. Bailey, 512 F. 2d 833 (CA5), cert. dism’d, 423 U. S. 1039 (1975); Kyle v. United States, 211 F. 2d 912 (CA9 1954).
In sharp distinction to a denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, a denial of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds does not represent “a complete, formal and, in the trial court, a final rejection” of the defendant’s claim. Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 659. The resolution of a speedy trial claim necessitates a careful assessment of the particular facts of the case. As is reflected in the decisions of this Court, most speedy trial claims, therefore, are best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial.
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), the Court listed four factors that are to be weighed in determining whether an accused has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. They are the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant has asserted his right, and prejudice to the defendant from the delay. Id., at 530. The Court noted that prejudice to the defendant must be considered in the light of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id., at 532 (footnote omitted).
Before trial, of course, an estimate of the degree to which delay has impaired an adequate defense tends to be speculative. The denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds does not indicate that a like motion made after trial — when prejudice can be better gauged — would also be denied. Hence, pretrial denial of a speedy trial claim can never be considered a complete, formal, and final rejection by the trial court of the defendant’s contention; rather, the question at stake in the motion to dismiss necessarily “remains open, unfinished [and] inconclusive” until the trial court has pronounced judgment. Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546.
Closely related to the “threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision,” Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 659, is the requirement that the order sought to be appealed be “collateral to, and separable from, the principal issue at the accused’s impending criminal trial, i. e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged.” Ibid. In each of the two cases where this Court has upheld a pretrial appeal by a criminal defendant, the order sought to be reviewed clearly fit this description. Abney v. United States (double jeopardy); Stack v. Boyle (bail reduction). As already noted, however, there exists no such divorce between the question of prejudice to the conduct of the defense (which so often is central to an assessment of a speedy trial claim) and the events at trial. Quite the contrary, in the usual case, they are intertwined.
Even if the degree of prejudice could be accurately measured before trial, a speedy trial claim nonetheless would not be sufficiently independent of the outcome of the trial to warrant pretrial appellate review. The claim would be largely satisfied by an acquittal resulting from the prosecution’s failure to carry its burden of proof. The double jeopardy motion in Abney was separable from the issues at trial because “[t]he elements of that claim are completely independent of [the accused’s] guilt or innocence,-” 431 U. S., at 660, since an acquittal would not have eliminated the defendant’s grievance at having been put twice in jeopardy. In contrast, a central interest served by the Speedy Trial Clause is the protection of the factfinding process at trial. The essence of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.
Relatedly, the order sought to be appealed in this case may not accurately be described, in the sense that the description has been employed, as involving “an important right which would be dost, probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final judgment.” Id., at 658, quoting Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. The double jeopardy claim in Abney, the demand for reduced bail in Stack v. Boyle, and the posting of security at issue in Cohen each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial. There perhaps is some superficial attraction in the argument that the right to a speedy trial— by analogy to these other rights — must be vindicated before trial in order to insure that no nonspeedy trial is ever held. Both doctrinally and pragmatically, however, this argument fails. Unlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause does not, either on its face or according to the decisions of this Court, encompass a “right not to be tried” which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all. It is the delay before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. If the factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, supra, combine to deprive an accused of his right to a speedy trial, that loss, by definition, occurs before trial. Proceeding with the trial does not cause or compound the deprivation already suffered.
Furthermore, in most cases, as noted above, it is difficult to make the careful examination of the constituent elements of the speedy trial claim before trial. Appellate courts would be in no better position than trial courts to vindicate a right that had not yet been shown to have been infringed.
IV
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, application of the principles articulated in Cohen and Abney to speedy trial claims compels the conclusion that such claims are n,ot appealable before trial. This in itself is dispositive. Our conclusion, however, is reinforced by the important policy considerations that underlie both the Speedy Trial Clause and 28 U. S. C. § 1291.
Significantly, this Court has emphasized that one of the principal reasons for its strict adherence to the doctrine of finality in criminal cases is that “[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy trial.” DiBella v. United States, 369 U. S., at 126. Fulfillment of this guarantee would be impossible if every pretrial order were appealable.
Many defendants, of course, would be willing to tolerate the delay in a trial that is attendant upon a pretrial appeal in the hope of winning that appeal. The right to a speedy trial, however, “is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused” because “there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S., at 519. See also United States v. Avalos, 541 F. 2d 1100, 1110 (CA5 1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 970 (1977). Among other things, delay may prejudice the prosecution’s ability to prove its case, increase the cost to society of maintaining those defendants subject to pretrial detention, and prolong the period during which defendants released on bail may commit other crimes. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 42 (1970) (Beennan, J., concurring).
Allowing an exception to the rule against pretrial appeals in criminal cases for speedy trial claims would threaten precisely the values manifested in the Speedy Trial Clause. And some assertions of delay-caused prejudice would become self-fulfilling prophecies during the period necessary for appeal.
There is one final argument for disallowing pretrial appeals on speedy trial grounds. As the Court previously has observed, there is nothing about the circumstances that will support a speedy trial claim which inherently limits the availability of the claim. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S., at 521-522, 530. Unlike a double jeopardy claim, which requires at least a colorable showing that the defendant once before has been in jeopardy of federal conviction on the same or a related offense, in every case there will be some period between arrest or indictment and trial during which time “every defendant will either be incarcerated ... or on bail subject to substantial restrictions on his liberty.” Id., at 537 (White, J., concurring). Thus, any defendant can make a pretrial motion for dismissal on speedy trial grounds and, if § 1291 is not honored, could immediately appeal its denial.
V
In sum, we decline to exacerbate pretrial delay by intruding upon accepted principles of finality to allow a defendant whose speedy trial motion has been denied before trial to obtain interlocutory appellate review. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Sixth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
Respondent’s discharge barred any further military proceeding against him. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
There was federal-court jurisdiction because the crimes were committed on a military reservation. 18 U. S. C. §§ 7 (3), 1111, and 3231.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1291 reads:
“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District- Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”
Respondent would rely on United States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307 (1971), to demonstrate that a defendant has a right to appeal before trial the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds. That case, however, is clearly distinguishable. In Marion, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds, and the Government appealed the dismissal to this Court. The appeal was predicated on the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V), which, at the time, provided in relevant part:
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.”
Currently, 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1976 ed.) provides:
“In a criminal case, an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”
Obviously, neither the former version of the statute nor the current one has anything whatsoever to do with a defendant’s right to appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds.
The justifications proffered by the Court of Appeals for its exercise of jurisdiction (see supra, at 852-853) are not persuasive for us. The argument that respondent’s Sixth Amendment claim' was “pendent” to his double jeopardy claim is vitiated by Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 662-663 (1977) (decided after the Court of Appeals filed its opinion), where this Court concluded that a federal court of appeals is without pendent jurisdiction over otherwise nonappealable claims even though they are joined with a double jeopardy claim over which the appellate court does have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See also United States v. Cerilli, 558 E. 2d 697, 699-700 (CA3), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 966 (1977).
The Court of Appeals’ alternative rationale — that it was the “extraordinary nature” of respondent’s claim that merited interlocutory appeal, even though not all speedy trial claims would be so meritorious — is also unpersuasive. “Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular case.” Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 405 (1957). The factual circumstances that underlie a speedy trial claim, however "extraordinary,” cannot establish its independent appealability prior to trial. Under the controlling jurisdictional statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1291, the federal courts of appeals have power to review only “final decisions,” a concept that Congress defined “in terms of categories.” Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S., at 405.
Admittedly, there is value — to all but the most unusual litigant — in triumphing before trial, rather than after it, regardless of the substance of the winning claim. But this truism is not to be confused with the quite distinct proposition that certain claims (because of the substance of the rights entailed, rather than the advantage to a litigant in winning his claim sooner) should be resolved before trial. Double jeopardy claims are paradigmatic.
Certainly, the fact that this Court has held dismissal of the indictment to be the proper remedy when the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated, see Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 (1973), does not mean that a defendant enjoys a “right not to be tried” which must be safeguarded by interlocutory appellate review. Dismissal of the indictment is the proper sanction when a defendant has been granted immunity from prosecution, when his indictment is defective, or, usually, when the only evidence against him was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, however, this has not led the Court to conclude that such defendants can pursue interlocutory appeals. Abney v. United States, 431 U. S., at 663; Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221, 227 (1929); Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 430 (1910).
Of course, an accused who does successfully establish a speedy trial claim before trial will not be tried.
In view of our resolution of the appealability issue, we do not reach the merits of respondent’s motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Similarly, we express no opinion on the District Court’s denial of respondent’s motion to have the indictment dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. The Court of Appeals stated that it had jurisdiction to review the latter claim, 531 F. 2d 196, 199 (1976), but declined to address its merits because of the court’s disposition of respondent’s speedy trial motion. Id., at 209. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the respondent of the case. The respondent is the party being sued or tried and is also known as the appellee. Characterize the respondent as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the respondent by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the respondent is actually single entitiy or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single respondent, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the respondent of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
28
] | sc_respondent |
UTAH PIE CO. v. CONTINENTAL BAKING CO. et al.
No. 18.
Argued January 17, 1967.
Decided April 24, 1967.
Joseph L. Alioto argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
John H. Schafer argued the cause and filed .a brief for Continental Baking Co., Peter W. Billings argued the cause and filed a brief for Carnation Co., and George P. Lamb argued the cause and filed a brief for Pet Milk Co., respondents.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit for treble damages and injunction under §§4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 737, 15 U. S. C. §§ 15 and 26 was brought by petitioner, Utah Pie Company, against respondents, Continental Baking Company, Carnation Company and Pet Milk Company. The complaint charged a conspiracy under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2, and violations by each respondent of § 2(a) of the Clayton. Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a). The jury found for respondents on the conspiracy charge and for petitioner on the price discrimination charge. Judgment was entered for petitioner for damages and attorneys’ fees and respondents appealed on several grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, addressing itself to the single issue of whether the evidence against each of the respondents was sufficient to support a finding of probable injury to competition within the meaning of § 2 (a) and holding that it was not. 349 F. 2d 122. We granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 914. We reverse.
The product involved is frozen dessert pies — apple, cherry, boysenberry, peach, pumpkin, and mince. The period covered by the suit comprised the years 1958,1959, and 1960 and the first eight months of 1961. Petitioner is a Utah corporation which for 30 years has been baking pies in its plant in Salt Lake City and selling them in Utah and surrounding States. It entered the frozen pie business in late 1957. It was immediately successful with its new line and built a new plant in Salt Lake City in 1958; The frozen pie market was a rapidly expanding one: 57,060 dozen frozen pies were sold in the Salt Lake City market in 1958,111,729 dozen in 1959,184,569 dozen in 1960, and 266,908 dozen in 1961. Utah Pie’s share of this market in those years was 66.5%, 34.3%, 45.5%, and 45.3% respectively, its sales volume steadily increasing over the four years. Its financial position also improved. Petitioner is not, however, a large company. At the time of the trial, petitioner operated with only 18 employees, nine of whom were members of the Rigby family, which controlled the business. Its net worth increased from $31,651.98 on October 31, 1957, to $68,802.13 on October 31, 1961. Total sales were $238,000 in the year ended October 31, 1957, $353,000 in 1958, $430,000 in 1959, $504,000 in 1960 and $589,000 in 1961., Its net income or loss for these same years was a loss of $6,461 in 1957, and net income in the remaining years of $7,090, $11,897, $7,636, and $9,216.
Each of the respondents is a large company and each of them is a major factor in the frozen pie market in one or more regions of the country. Each entered the Salt Lake City frozen pie market before petitioner began freezing dessert pies. None of them had a plant in Utah.. By the end of the period involved in this suit Pet had plants in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and California; Continental in Virginia, Iowa, and California; and Carnation in California. The Salt Lake City market was supplied by respondents chiefly from their California operations. They sold primarily on a delivered price basis.
The “Utah” label was petitioner’s proprietary brand. Beginning in 1960, it also sold pies of like grade and quality under the controlled label “Frost ’N’ Flame” to Associated Grocers and in 1961 - it began selling to American Food Stores under the “Mayfresh” label. It also, on. a seasonal basis, sold pumpkin and mince- frozen pies to Safeway under Safeway’s own “Bel-air” label.
The major competitive weapon in. the Utah market was price. The location of petitioner’s plant gave it natural advantages in the Salt Lake City marketing area and it entered the market at a price below. the then, going prices for respondents’ comparable pies. For most of the period involved here its prices were the lowest in the Salt Lake City market. It was, however, challenged by each of the respondents at one time or another and for varying periods. There was ample evidence to show that each of the respondents contributed to what proved to be a deteriorating price structure over the period covered by this suit, and each of the respondents in the course of the ongoing price competition sold frozen pies in the Salt Lake market at prices lower than it sold pies of like grade and quality in other markets considerably closer to its plants.. Utah Pie, which entered the market at a price of $4.15 per dozen at the beginning of the relevant period, was selling “Utah” and “Frost ’N’ Flame” pies for $2.75 per dozen when the instant suit was filed some 44 months later. Pet, which was offering pies at $4.92 per dozen in February 1958, .was offering “Pet-Ritz” and “Bel-air” pies at $3.56 and $3.46 per dozen respectively in March and April 1961. . Carnation’s price in early 1958 was $4.82 per dozen but it was selling at $3.46 per dozen at the conclusion of the period, meanwhile having been down as low as $3.30 per dozen. The price range experienced by Continental during the period covered by this suit ran from a 1958 high of over $5 per dozen to a 1961 low of $2.85 per dozen.
I.
We deal first with petitioner’s case against the Pet Milk Company. Pet entered the frozen pie business in 1955, acquired plants in Pennsylvania and California and undertook a large advertising campaign to market its “Pet-Ritz” brand of frozen pies. Pet’s initial emphasis .was on quality, but in the face of competition from regional and local companies and in an expanding market where price proved to be a crucial factor, Pet was forced to take steps to reduce the price of its pies to the ultimate consumer. These developments had consequences in the Salt Lake City market which, are the substance of petitioner’s case against Pet.
First, Pet successfully concluded an arrangement with Safeway, which is one of the three largest customers for frozen pies in the Salt Lake market, whereby it would sell frozen pies to Safeway under the latter’s own “Belair” label at a price significantly lower than it was selling its comparable “Pet-Ritz” brand in thg same Salt Lake market and elsewhere. The initial price on “Belair” pies was slightly lower than Utah’s price for its “Utah” brand of pies at the time, and near the end of the period the “Bel-air” price was comparable to the “Utah” price but higher than Utah’s “Frost ’N’ Flame” brand. Pet’s Safeway business amounted to 22.8%, 12.3%, and 6.3% of the entire Salt Lake City market for the years 1959, 1960, and 1961, respectively, and to 64%, 44%,- and 22% of Pet’s own Salt Lake City sales for those same years. •
Second, it introduced a 20-ounce economy pie under the “Swiss Miss” label and began selling the new pie in the Salt Lake market in August 1960 at prices ranging from $3.25 to $3.30 for the remainder of the period. This pie was at times sold at a lower price in the Salt Lake City market than it was sold in other markets.
Third, Pet became more competitive with respect .to the prices /or its “Pet-Ritz” proprietary label. For 18 of the relevant 44 months its offering price for Pet-Ritz pies was $4 per dozen or lower, and $3.70 or lower for six of these months. According to the Court of Appeals, in seven of the 44 months Pet’s prices in. Salt Lake were lower than prices charged in the California markets. This was true although selling, in Salt Lake involved a 30- to 35-cent freight cost.
The Court of Appeals first.concluded that Pet’s price differential on sales to Safeway must be put aside in considering injury to competition because in its view* of the evidence the differential had been completely cost justified and because Utah would not in any event have been able to enjoy the' Safeway custom. Second, it concluded that the remaining discriminations on “Pet-Ritz” and “Swiss Miss” pies were an insufficient predicate on which the jury.could have found a reasonably possible injury either to Utah Pie as a competitive force or to competition generally.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals in several respects. First, there was evidence from which the jury could have found considerably more price discrimination by Pet with respect to “Pet-Ritz” and “Swiss Miss” pies than , was considered by the Court of Appeals. In addition to the seven months during which Pet's prices in Salt Lake • were lower than prices in the California markets, there was evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that in 10 additional months the Salt Lake City prices for “Pet-Ritz” pies were discriminatory as compared with sales in western markets other than California. Likewise, with respect to “Swiss Miss” pies, there was evidence in the record from which the jury could have found that in five of the 13 months during which the “Swiss Miss” pies were sold prior to the filing of this suit, prices in Salt Lake City were lower than those charged by Pet in either California or some other western market.
Second, with respect to Pet’s Safeway business, the burden of proving cost justification was on Pet and, in our view, reasonable men could have found that Pet’s lower priced, “Bel-air” sales to Safeway were not cost justified in their entirety. Pet introduced cost data for 1961 indicating a cost saving on the Safeway business greater than the price advantage extended to that customer. These statistics were not particularized for the Salt Lake market, but assuming that they were adequate to justify the 1961 sales, they related to only 24% -of the^ Safeway sales over the relevant period. The evidence concerning the remaining 76% was at best incomplete and inferential. It was insufficient to take the defense of cost justification from the jury, which reasonably could have found a greater incidence of unjustified price discrimination than that allowed by the Court of Appeals’ .view of the evidence.
With respect to whether Utah would have enjoyed Safeway’s business absent the. Pet contract with Safeway, it seems clear that whatever the fact is in this regard, it is not determinative of the impact of that contract on competitors other than Utah and on competition generally. There were other companies seeking the Safeway business, including Continental and Carnation, whose pies may have been excluded from the Safeway shelves by what the jury could have found to be discriminatory sales to Safeway. What is more, Pet’s evidence that Utah’s unwillingness to install quality control equipment prevented Utah from enjoying Safeway’s private label' business is not the only evidence in the record relevant to that question. There was other evidence to the contrary. The jury would not have been compelled to find that Utah Pie could not have gained more of the Safeway business.
Third, the Court of Appeals almost entirely ignored other evidence which provides material support for the jury’s conclusion that Pet’s behavior satisfied the statutory test regarding competitive injury. This evidence bore on the issue of Pet’s predatory intent to injure Utah Pie. As an initial matter, the jury could have con-eluded that Pet’s discriminatory pricing was aimed at Utah Pie; Pet’s own management, as early as 1959, identified Utah Pie as an “unfavorable factor,” one which “d[u]g holes in our operation” and .posed a constant “check” on Pet’s performance in the Salt Lake City market. Moreover, Pet candidly admitted that during the period when it was establishing its relationship with Safeway, it sent into Utah Pie’s plant an industrial spy to seek information that would be of use to Pet in convincing Safeway that Utah Pie was not worthy of its custom. Pet denied that it ever in fact used what it had learned against Utah Pie in competing for Safeway’s business. The parties, however, are not the ultimate judges of credibility. But even giving Pet’s view of the incident a.-measure of weight does not mean the jury was foreclosed from considering the predatory intent underlying Pet’s mode of competition. Finally, Pet does not deny that the evidence showed it suffered substantial losses on its- frozen pie sales during the greater part of the time in volved, in this suit, and there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the losses Pet sustained in Salt Lake City "were greater than those incurred elsewhere. It would not have been an irrational step if the jury concluded- that there was a relationship between price and the losses.
It seems clear to us that the jury heard adequate evidence from which it could have concluded that Pet had engaged in predatory tactics in waging competitive warfare in the Salt Lake City market. Coupled with the incidence of price discrimination attributable to Pet, the evidence as. a whole established, rather than negated, the reasonable possibility that Pet’s behavior produced a lessening of competition proscribed by the Act.
II.
Petitioner’s ease against Continental is not complicated. Continental was a substantial factor in the market in 1957. But its sales of frozen 22-ounce dessert pies, sold under the “Morton” brand, amounted to only 1.3% of the market in 1958, 2.9% in 1959, and 1.8% in 1960. Its problems were primarily that of cost and in turn that of price, the controlling factor in the market. In late 1960 it worked out a cor-packing arrangement in California by which fruit would be processed directly froin the trees into the finished pie without large intermediate packing, storing, and shipping expenses. Having improved its position, it attempted to increase its share of the Salt take City market by utilizing a local broker and offering short-term price concessions in varying amounts. Its efforts for seven months were not spectacularly successful. Then in June 1961, it took ihé steps which are the heart of petitioner’s complaint against it. Effective for the last two weeks of June it offered its 22-ounce frozen apple pies in the Utah area at $2.85 per dozen. It was then selling the same pies at substantially higher prices in other markets. The Salt Lake City price was less than its direct cost plus an allocation for overhead. Utah’s going price at the time for its 24-ounce “Frost ’N* Flame” apple pie sold to Associated Grocers was $3.10 per dozen, and for its “Utah” brand $3.40 per dozen. At its new prices, Continental sold pies to American Grocers in Pocatello, Idaho, and to American Food Stores in Ogden, Utah. Safeway, one of the major buyers in Salt Lake City, also purchased 6,250 dozen, its requirements for about five weeks. Another purchaser ordered 1,000 dozen. Utah’s response was immediate. It reduced its price on all of its apple pies to $2.75 per dozen. Continental refused Safeway’s request to match Utah’s price, but renewed its offer at the same prices effective July 31 for another two-week period. Utah filed suit on September 8, 1961. Continental’s total sales of frozen pies increased from 3,350 dozen in 1960 to 18,800 dozen- in 1961. Its market share increased from 1.8% in 1960 to 8.3% in 1961. The Court of Appeals concluded that Continental’s conduct had had only minimal effect, that it had not injured or weakened Utah Pie as a competitor, that it had not substantially lessened competition and that there was no reasonable possibility that it would do so in the future.
We again differ with the Court of Appeals. Its opinion that Utah was not damaged as a competitive force apparently rested on the fact that Utah’s sales volume continued to climb in 1961 and on the court’s own factual conclusion that Utah was not deprived of any pie business which it otherwise might have had. But this retrospective assessment fails to note that Continental’s discriminatory below-cost price caused Utah Pie to ¡reduce its price to $2.75. The jury was entitled to consider the potential impact of Continental’s price reduction absent any responsive price, cut by Utah Pie. Price was, a major factor in the Salt Lake City market. Safeway, which, had been buying Utah brand pies, immediately reacted and purchased a five-week supply of frozen pies from Continental, thereby temporarily foreclosing the. proprietary brands of Utah and other firms from the Salt Lake City Safeway market. The jury could rationally have concluded that had Utah not lowered its price, Continental, which repeated its offer once, would have continued.it, that Safeway' would jiave continued to buy from Continental and that other buyers, large as well as small, would have followed suit. It could also have reasonably-concluded that a competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in a market of de-t clining prices will in time feel the financial pinch and will be a less effective competitive force.
Even if the impact on Utah Pie as a competitor was negligible, there remain the consequences to others in the market who had to compete not only with Continental’s 22-ounce pie at $2.85 but with Utah’s even lower price of $2.75 per dozen for both its proprietary and controlled labels. Petitioner and respondents were not the only sellers in the Salt Lake City market, although they did account for 91.8% óf the sales in 1961. The evidence was that there were nine other sellers in 1960 who sold 23,473 dozen pies, 12.7% of the total market. In 1961 there were eight other sellers who sold less than the year before — 18,565 dozen or 8.2% of the total— although the total market^had expanded from 184,569 dozen to 226,908 dozen. We think there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find a violation of § 2 (a) by' Continental.
III.
The Carnation Company entered the frozen dessert pie business in 1955 through the acquisition of “Mrs. Leé’s Pies” which was then engaged in manufacturing and selling frozen pies in Utah and elsewhere under the “Simple Simon” label. Carnation also quickly found the. market extremely sensitive to price. Carnation decided, however, not to enter an economy product in the market, and during the period covered by this suit it offered only its quality “Simple Simon” brand. Its primary method of meeting competition in its markets was to offer a variety of discounts and other reductions, and the technique was not unsuccessful. In 1958, for example, Carnation enjoyed 10.3% of the Salt Lake City market, and although its volume of pies sold in that market increased substantially in the next year, its percentage of the market temporarily slipped to 8.6%. JHowever, 1960 was a turnaround year for Carnation in the Salt Lake City market; it more than doubled its volume of sales over the preceding year and thereby gained 12.1% of the .market. And while the price structure in .the..market deteriorated rapidly in 1961 Carnation's;, position remained important.
We need not dwell long upon the case against Carnation, which in some respects is similar to that against Continental and in others more nearly resembles the case against Pet. After Carnation’s temporary setback in 1959 it instituted a new pricing policy to regain business in the Salt Lake City market. The Hew policy involved a slash in price of 600 per dozen pies, which brought Carnation’s price to a level admittedly well below its costs, and well below the other prices prevailing in the market. The impact of the move yras felt immediately, and the two other major sellers in the market reduced their prices. Carnation’s banner year, 1960, in the end involved eight months during which the prices in Salt Lake City were lower than prices charged in other markets. The trend continued during the eight months in 1961 that preceded the filing of the complaint! in this case. In each of those months the Salt Lake City prices charged by Carnation were well below prices charged in other markets, and in all but August 1961 the Salt Lake City delivered price was 200 to 500 lower than the prices charged in distant San Francisco. The Court of Appeals held that only the early 1960 prices could be found to have been below cost. That holding, however, simply overlooks evidence from which the jury could have concluded that throughout 1961 Carnation maintained a below-cost price structure and that Carnation’s discriminatory pricing, no less than that of Pet and Continental, had an important effect on the Salt Lake City market. We cannot say that the evidence precluded the jury from finding it reasonably possible that Carnation’s conduct would injure competition.
IV:
Section 2(a) does not forbid price competition which will probably injure or lessen competition by eliminating competitors, discouraging entry into the market or enhancing the market shares of the dominant' sellers. But Congress has established some ground tules for the game. Sellers may not sell like goods .to different purchasers at different, prices if the result may be to injure competition in either the sellers’ or-the buyers’ market unless such discriminations are justified as permitted by the Act. This case concerns the sellers’- market. In this context, the Court’of Appeals placed heavy emphasis on the .fact that Utah Pie constantly increased its sales volume and continued to make a profit. But we disagree with its apparent view that there is no. reasonably possible injury to competition as long as the volume of sales in a particular market is expanding and at least some of the competitors in the market continue to operate at a profit. Nor do we think that the Act only comes into play to regulate the conduct of price discriminators when their discriminatory prices consistently undercut other competitors. It is true that many of the primary line cases that have reached the courts have involved blatant predatory price discriminations employed with the hope of immediate destruction of a particular competitor. On the question of injury to competition such cases present courts with no difficulty, for such pricing is clearly within the heart of the proscription of the Act. Courts and commentators alike have noted that the existence of predatory intent might bear on the likelihood of injury to competition. In this case there was some evidence of predatory intent with respect to each of these respondents. There was also other evidence upon which the jury could rationally find the requisite injury to competition. The frozen pie market in Salt Lake City was highly competitive. At times Utah Pie was a leader in moving the general level of prices down, and at other times^ each of the respondents also bore responsibility for the downward pressure on the price structure.. 'We believe that the Act reaches price discrimination that erodes competition as much as it does price discrimination that is intended to have immediate destructive impact. In this case, the evidence shows a drastically declining price structure which the jury could rationally attribute to continued or sporadic price discrimination. The jury was entitled to conclude that “the effect of such discrimination,” by each of these respondents,, “may be substantially to lessen competition ... or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any'person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination . . . .” The statutory test is one that necessarily looks forward on the basis of proven conduct in the past. Proper application of that standard here requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Since the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie ease against each of the respondents, it expressly declined to pass on other grounds for reversal presented by the respondents. 349 F. 2d 122, 126. Without intimating any views on the other grounds presented to the Court of Appeals, we reverse its judgment and remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
The Chief Justice took no part in the .decision of this case.
15 U. S. C. § 15 provides that:
“Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
15 U. S. ,C- § 26 provides injunctive relief for private parties from violation of the antitrust laws.
The portion of § 2 (a), relevant to the issue before the Court provides:’
“That it shall be unlawful for ány person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commérce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .”
Respondent Continental by counterclaim charged petitioner with violation of § 2 (a) in respect to certain sales. On this issue the jury found for Continental, and although petitioner failed to move for a directed verdict on the counterclaim before its submission to the jury, the trial judge granted petitioner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the counterclaim, and remanded the issue for a new trial. No question concerning the counterclaim is before the Court.
The order allowing certiorari requested counsel to brief and discuss at oral argument, in addition to the questions presented by the petition, the following questions:
‘T. Whether, if this Court affirms the judgment and order of the Court of Appeals directing the District Court to.enter judgment for respondents, petitioner can then make a motion for new trial under Rule 60 (c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within 10 days of the District Court’s entry of judgment for respondents?"
“2. Whether, if under the order of the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot make a motion for new trial under Rule 50 (c). (2) within 10 days of the District Court’s entry of judgment against him, the order of the Court of Appeals directing the District Court to enter judgment for respondents is compatible with Rule 50 (b) as interpreted by this Court in Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U. S. 212; Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U. S. 571; and Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, 337 U. S. 801?
“3. Whether Rule 50 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the Court of Appeals with any authority to direct the entry of judgment for respondents?”
In the light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach these questions.
Beginning in February 1960 petitioner sold frozen pies to a Spokane, Washington, buyer under the “Sonny Boy” label.
The prices discussed herein refer to those charged for apple pies. The apple flavor has been used as the standard throughout this case, without objection from the parties, and we adhere to the practice here.
The Salt Lake City sales volumes and market shares of the parties to this suit as well as of other sellers during the period at issue were as follows:
1958
Volume Percent
Company {in doz.) of Market
Carnation . 5,863 10.3
Continental . 754 1.3
Utah Pie. 37,969.5 66.5
Pet ... 9,336.5 16.4
Others . 3,137 5.5
Total .. 57,060 100.0
1959
Carnation . 9,625 8.6
Continental . 3,182 2.9
Utah Pie. 38,372 34.3
Pet . 39,639 '35.5
Others . 20,911 18.7
Total . 111,729 100.0
I960
Carnation . 22,371.5 12.1
Continental . 3,350 1.8
Utah Pie... 83,894 45.5
Pet ..’... 51,480 27.9
Others . 23,473.5 12.7
Total . 184,569 100.0.
1961
Company Volume Percent {in doz.) of Market
Carnation' ... 20,067 8.8
Continental .. 18.799.5 8.3
Utah Pie .... 102,690 45.3
, Pet . 66,786 29.4
Others . 18.565.5 ■ 8.2
. Total . 226,908 mO
The Pet-Safeway contract, entered into on January 1, 1960, obligated the Safeway organization to purchase a minimum of 1,000,000 cases (six pies per case) from Pet during the year. The contract was orally renewed for one year and thereafter to the time of the trial the production of “Belair” pies by Pet for Safeway was continued without a formal contract. All of the volume of the Safeway purchases under the contract of course did not find its way to the Salt Lake City market.
Section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act assigns the burden. “Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section . . . ,” 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b). See F. T. C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 44-45; United States v. Borden Co., 370 U. S. 460, 467.
The, only evidence cited by the Court- of Appeals to justify the remaining 76% of Pet’s sales to Safeway was Safeway’s established practice of requiring its sellers to cost justify sales that otherwise would be illegally discriminatory. This practice was incorporated in the Pet-Safeway contract. We are unprepared to hold that a contractual obligation to cost justify price differentials is legally dispositive proof that such differentials are in fact so justified; Pet admitted .that its cost-justification figures were drawn from past performance, so even crediting the data accompanying the 1960 contract regarding ‘cost differences, Pet’s additional evidence would bring under the justification umbrella only the 1959 sales. Thus, at the least, the jury was free to consider the 1960 Safeway sales as inadequately cost justified. Those sales accounted for 12.3% of the entire Salt Lake City market in that year. In the context of this case, the sales to Safeway are particularly relevant since there was evidence that private label sales influenced the general market, in this case depressing overall market prices.
The jury was in fact charged that it could find for petitioner if from respondents’ conduct “there is reasonably likely to be a substantial- injury to competition among sellers of frozen pies in the Utah area.” R,., at 1355. (Emphasis supplied.)
The dangers of predatory price discrimination were recognized in Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115, where such pricing was held violative of § 2 (a). Subsequently, the Court, noted that “the decisions of the federal courts in primary-line-competition cases . . . consistently emphasize the unreasonably low prices and the predatory intent of the defendants.” F. T. C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 548. See also Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F. 2d 356, 369; Maryland Baking Co. v. F. T. C., 243 F. 2d 716; Atlas Building Prod. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F. 2d 950; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F. T. C., 289 F. 2d 835. In the latter case the court went so far as to suggest that:
“If .'. . the projection [to ascertain the future effect of price discrimination] is based upon predatoriness or buccaneeiing, it can reasonably be forecast that an adversé effeet bn competition, may' occur. In that event, the discriminations in their incipiency are such that thSy may have the prescribed effect to establish a violation of § 2 (a). If one engages in the latter type of pricing activity,' a reasonable probability may. be inferred that its willful misconduct may substantially lessen, injure, destroy or prevent competition.” 289 F. 2d, at 843.
Chief Justice Hughes noted in a related antitrust context that “knowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and prediction of consequences.” Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 372, and we do hot think it unreasonable for courts to follow that lead. Although the evidence in this regard against Pet seems obvious, a. jury would be free to ascertain a seller’s intent from. surrounding economic circumstances, which would include persistent unprofitable sales below cost and drastic price cuts ..themselves discriminatory. See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 141-150 (1962), commenting on the Court’s statement in F. T. C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., supra, that “a price reduction below cost tends to establish [predatory] intent.” 363 U. S., at 552. See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F. 2d 481, 486, and Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., supra, at 368, in which the courts recognized the inferential value of sales below cost on the issue of intent.
Seen. 12, supra.
It might be argued that the respondents’ conduct-displayed only fierce competitive instincts. Actual intent to injure another competitor does not; however, fall into that category, and neither, when viewed in the context of the Robinson-Patman Act, do persistent sales below cost and radical price cuts themselves discriminatory. Nor does the fact that á local competitor has a major share of the market make him fair game for discriminatory price cutting free of Robinson-Patman Act proscriptions. “The Clayton Act proscription as to discrimination in price is not nullified merely because of a showing that the existing competition in a particular market had a major share of the sales of the product involved.” Maryland Baking Co., 52 F. T. C. 1679, 1689, aff’d, 243 F. 2d 716. In that case the local competitor’s share of the market when price discrimination began was 91.3%, yet the Federal Trade Commission was not impressed by the argument that the effect of the discrimination had been to terminate a monopoly and to create a competitive market.
Each respondent argues here that prior price discrimination cases in the courts and before the Federal Trade Commission, in which no primary line injury to competition was found, establish a standard which compels affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ holding. But the cases upon which the respondents rely are readily distinguishable. In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F. T. C., 289 F. 2d 835, 839, there was no general decline in price structure attributable to the defendant’s price discriminations, nor was there any evidence that the price discriminations were “a single lethal weapon aimed at a victim for a predatory purpose.” Id., at 842. In Borden Co. v. F. T. C., 339 F. 2d 953, the court reversed the Comnpssion’s decision oh price discrimination in one market for want of sufficient interstate connection, and the Commission’s charge regarding the other market failed to show any lasting impact upon prices caused by the single, isolated incident of price discrimination proved. Absence of proof that the alleged injury was due to challenged price discriminations was determinative in International Milling Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, 1963-1965, ¶¶ 16,494, 16,648. In Uarco, Inc., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, 1963-1965, ¶ 16,807, there was no evidence from which predatory intent could be inferred and no evidence of a long-term market price decline. Similar failure of proof and absence of sales below cost were evident in Quaker Oats Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. Transfer Binder, 1963-1965, ¶ 17,134. Dean Milk Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 17,357, is not to the contrary. There in the one market where the Commission found no primary line injury there was no evidence of a generally declining' price structure. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
3
] | sc_casedisposition |
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS et al. v. BALL et al.
No. 83-990.
Argued December 5, 1984
Decided July 1, 1985
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. BurgeR, C. J., post, p. 398, and O’Connor, J., post, p. 398, filed opinions concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. White, J., post, p. 400, and Rehnquist, J., post, p. 400, filed dissenting opinions.
Kenneth F. Ripple, Special Assistant Attorney General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were William S. Farr, John R. Oostema, Stuart D. Hubbell, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Gerald F. Young, Assistant Attorney General.
Michael W. McConnell argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kuhl, Anthony J. Stein-meyer, and Michael Jay Singer.
A. E. Dick Howard argued the cause for respondents. On the brief was Albert R. Dilley
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA) by Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, and Daniel D. Chazin; and for the United States Catholic Conference by Wilfred R. Caron and John A. Liekweg.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stem, Ronald A. Krauss, Jack D. Novik, Burt Neubome, Charles S. Sims, Justin Finger, and Jeffrey Sinen-sky; for Americans United for Separation of Church and State by Lee Boothby; and for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs et al. by John W. Baker.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan, adopted two programs in which classes for nonpublic school students are financed by the public school system, taught by teachers hired by the public school system, and conducted in “leased” classrooms in the nonpublic schools. Most of the nonpublic schools involved in the programs are sectarian religious schools. This case raises the question whether these programs impermissibly involve the government in the support of sectarian religious activities and thus violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
l-l
<c
At issue m this case are the Community Education and Shared Time programs offered in the nonpublic schools of Grand Rapids, Michigan. These programs, first instituted in the 1976-1977 school year, provide classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local nonpublic schools.
The Shared Time program offers classes during the regular schoolday that are intended to be supplementary to the “core curriculum” courses that the State of Michigan requires as a part of an accredited school program. Among the subjects offered are “remedial” and “enrichment” mathematics, “remedial” and “enrichment” reading, art, music, and physical education. A typical nonpublic school student attends these classes for one or two class periods per week; approximately “ten percent of any given nonpublic school student’s time during the academic year would consist of Shared Time instruction.” Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 546 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (WD Mich. 1982). Although Shared Time itself is a program offered only in the nonpublic schools, there was testimony that the courses included in that program are offered, albeit perhaps in a somewhat different form, in the public schools as well. All of the classes that are the subject of this case are taught in elementary schools, with the exception of Math Topics, a remedial mathematics course taught in the secondary schools.
The Shared Time teachers are full-time employees of the public schools, who often move from classroom to classroom during the course of the schoolday. A “significant portion” of the teachers (approximately 10%) “previously taught in nonpublic schools, and many of those had been assigned to the same nonpublic school where they were previously employed.” Id., at 1078. The School District of Grand Rapids hires Shared Time teachers in accordance with its ordinary hiring procedures. Ibid. The public school system apparently provides all of the supplies, materials, and equipment used in connection with Shared Time instruction. See App. 341.
The Community Education program is offered throughout the Grand Rapids community in schools and on other sites, for children as well as adults. The classes at issue here are taught in the nonpublic elementary schools and commence at the conclusion of the regular schoolday. Among the courses offered are Arts and Crafts, Home Economics, Spanish, Gymnastics, Yearbook Production, Christmas Arts and Crafts, Drama, Newspaper, Humanities, Chess, Model Building, and Nature Appreciation. The District Court found that “[although certain Community Education courses offered at nonpublic school sites are not offered at the public schools on a Community Education basis, all Community Education programs are otherwise available at the public schools, usually as a part of their more extensive regular curriculum.” 546 F. Supp., at 1079.
Community Education teachers are part-time public school employees. Community Education courses are completely voluntary and are offered only if 12 or more students enroll. Because a well-known teacher is necessary to attract the requisite number of students, the School District accords a preference in hiring to instructors already teaching within the school. Thus, “virtually every Community Education course conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools has an instructor otherwise employed full time by the same nonpublic school.” Ibid.
Both programs are administered similarly. The Director of the program, a public school employee, sends packets of course listings to the participating nonpublic schools before the school year begins. The nonpublic school administrators then decide which courses they want to offer. The Director works out an academic schedule for each school, taking into account, inter alia, the varying religious holidays celebrated by the schools of different denominations.
Nonpublic school administrators decide which classrooms will be used for the programs, and the Director then inspects the facilities and consults with Shared Time teachers to make sure the facilities are satisfactory. The public school system pays the nonpublic schools for the use of the necessary classroom space by entering into “leases” at the rate of $6 per classroom per week. The “leases,” however, contain no mention of the particular room, space, or facility leased and teachers’ rooms, libraries, lavatories, and similar facilities are made available at no additional charge. Id., at 1077. Each room used in the programs has to be free of any crucifix, religious symbol, or artifact, although such religious symbols can be present in the adjoining hallways, corridors, and other facilities used in connection with the program. During the time that a given classroom is being used in the programs, the teacher is required to post a sign stating that it is a “public school classroom.” However, there are no signs posted outside the school buildings indicating that public school courses are conducted inside or that the facilities are being used as a public school annex.
Although petitioners label the Shared Time and Community Education students as “part-time public school students,” the students attending Shared Time and Community Education courses in facilities leased from a nonpublic school are the same students who attend that particular school otherwise. Id., at 1078. There is no evidence that any public school student has ever attended a Shared Time or Community Education class in a nonpublic school. Id., at 1097. The District Court found that “[tjhough Defendants claim the Shared Time program is available to all students, the record is abundantly clear that only nonpublic school students wearing the cloak of a ‘public school student’ can enroll in it.” Ibid. The District Court noted that “[wjhereas public school students are assembled at the public facility nearest to their residence, students in religious schools are assembled on the basis of religion without any consideration of residence or school district boundaries.” Id., at 1093. Thus, “beneficiaries are wholly designated on the basis of religion,” ibid., and these “public school” classes, in contrast to ordinary public school classes which are largely neighborhood based, are as segregated by religion as are the schools at which they are offered.
Forty of the forty-one schools at which the programs operate are sectarian in character. The schools of course vary from one another, but substantial evidence suggests that they share deep religious purposes. For instance, the Parent Handbook of one Catholic school states the goals of Catholic education as “[a] God oriented environment which permeates the total educational program,” “[a] Christian atmosphere which guides and encourages participation in the church’s commitment to social justice,” and “[a] continuous development of knowledge of the Catholic faith, its traditions, teachings and theology.” Id., at 1080. A policy statement of the Christian schools similarly proclaims that “it is not sufficient that the teachings of Christianity be a separate subject in the curriculum, but the Word of God must be an all-pervading force in the educational program.” Id., at 1081. These Christian schools require all parents seeking to enroll their children either to subscribe to a particular doctrinal statement or to agree to have their children taught according to the doctrinal statement. The District Court found that the schools are “pervasively sectarian,” id., at 1096, n. 13, and concluded “without hesitation that the purposes of these schools is to advance their particular religions,” id., at 1096, and that “a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission.” Id., at 1084.
B
Respondents are six taxpayers who filed suit against the School District of Grand Rapids and a number of state officials. They charged that the Shared Time and Community Education programs violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). After an 8-day bench trial, the District Court entered a judgment on the merits on behalf of respondents and enjoined further operation of the programs.
Applying the familiar three-part purpose, effect, and entanglement test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the court held that, although the purpose of the programs was secular, their effect was “distinctly impermissible.” 546 F. Supp., at 1093. The court relied in particular on the fact that the programs at issue involved publicly provided instructional services that served nonpublic school students segregated largely by religion on nonpublic school premises. The court also noted that the programs conferred “direct benefits, both financial and otherwise, to the sectarian institutions.” Id., at 1094. Finally, the court found that the programs necessarily entailed an unacceptable level of entanglement, both political and administrative, between the public school systems and the sectarian schools. Petitioners appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 718 F. 2d 1389 (1983). We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1064 (1984), and now affirm.
( — H ► — I
A
The First Amendment’s guarantee that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” as our cases demonstrate, is more than a pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state religion. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 771 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442 (1961). It is also more than a mere injunction that governmental programs discriminating among religions are unconstitutional. See, e. g., Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 216-217 (1963); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 211 (1948). The Establishment Clause instead primarily proscribes “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Nyquist, supra, at 772; see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970). As Justice Black, writing for the Court in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 15-16, stated: “Neither [a State nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. ... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”
Since Everson made clear that the guarantees of the Establishment Clause apply to the States, we have often grappled with the problem of state aid to nonpublic, religious schools. In all of these cases, our goal has been to give meaning to the sparse language and broad purposes of the Clause, while not unduly infringing on the ability of the States to provide for the welfare of their people in accordance with their own particular circumstances. Providing for the education of schoolchildren is surely a praiseworthy purpose. But our cases have consistently recognized that even such a praiseworthy, secular purpose cannot validate government aid to parochial schools when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters religious. For just as religion throughout history has provided spiritual comfort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs are not in accord with particular religions or sects that have from time to time achieved dominance. The solution to this problem adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court is jealously to guard the right of every individual to worship according to the dictates of conscience while requiring the government to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and non-religion. Only in this way can we “make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary” and “sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313 (1952).
We have noted that the three-part test first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 612-613, guides “[t]he general nature of our inquiry in this area,” Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 394 (1983):
“Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ Walz [v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S., at 674].” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 612-613.
These tests “must not be viewed as setting the precise limits to the necessary constitutional inquiry, but serve only as guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the Establishment Clause have been impaired.” Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 359 (1975). We have particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of our children. The government’s activities in this area can have a magnified impact on impressionable young minds, and the occasional rivalry of parallel public and private school systems offers an all-too-ready opportunity for divisive rifts along religious lines in the body politic. See Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 796-798; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 622-624. The Lemon test concentrates attention on the issues — purposes, effect, entanglement — that determine whether a particular state action is an improper “law respecting an establishment of religion.” We therefore reaffirm that state action alleged to violate the Establishment Clause should be measured against the Lemon criteria.
As has often been true in school aid cases, there is no dispute as to the first test. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals found that the purpose of the Community Education and Shared Time programs was “manifestly secular.” 546 F. Supp., at 1085; see also 718 F. 2d, at 1398. We find no reason to disagree with this holding, and therefore go on to consider whether the primary or principal effect of the challenged programs is to advance or inhibit religion.
B
Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature of the institutions in which the programs operate. Of the 41 private schools where these “part-time public schools” have operated, 40 are identifiably religious schools. It is true that each school may not share all of the characteristics of religious schools as articulated, for example, in the complaint in Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 356; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 615. The District Court found, however, that “[b]ased upon the massive testimony and exhibits, the conclusion is inescapable that the religious institutions receiving instructional services from the public schools are sectarian in the sense that a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission.” 546 F. Supp., at 1084; see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 366 (“The very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S., at 671 (“to assure future adherents to a particular faith” is “an affirmative if not dominant policy of church schools”). At the religious schools here — as at the sectarian schools that have been the subject of our past cases — “the secular education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools’ existence. Within that institution, the two are inextricably intertwined.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 657 (opinion of Brennan, J.). See also Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 365-366; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 245, 247-248 (1968).
Given that 40 of the 41 schools in this case are thus “pervasively sectarian,” the challenged public school programs operating in the religious schools may impermissibly advance religion in three different ways. First, the teachers participating in the programs may become involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating particular religious tenets or beliefs. Second, the programs may provide a crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting — at least in the eyes of impressionable youngsters — the powers of government to the support of the religious denomination operating the school. Third, the programs may have the effect of directly promoting religion by impermissibly providing a subsidy to the primary religious mission of the institutions affected.
(1)
Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam); Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 370; Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 619 (“The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion”); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973) (“[T]he State is constitutionally compelled to assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 429 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314 (“Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education . . .”). Such indoctrination, if permitted to occur, would have devastating effects on the right of each individual voluntarily to determine what to believe (and what not to believe) free of any coercive pressures from the State, while at the same time tainting the resulting religious beliefs with a corrosive secularism.
In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), the Court invalidated a statute providing for the loan of state-paid professional staff — including teachers — to nonpublic schools to provide remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, and other services on the premises of the nonpublic schools. Such a program, if not subjected to a “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance,” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 619 (quoted in Meek, supra, at 370), would entail an unacceptable risk that the state-sponsored instructional personnel would “advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in which they serve.” Meek, 421 U. S., at 370. Even though the teachers were paid by the State, “[t]he potential for impermissible fostering of religion under these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present.” Id., at 372. The program in Meek, if not sufficiently monitored, would simply have entailed too great a risk of state-sponsored indoctrination.
The programs before us today share the defect that we identified in Meek. With respect to the Community Education program, the District Court found that “virtually every Community Education course conducted on facilities leased from nonpublic schools has an instructor otherwise employed full time by the same nonpublic school.” 546 F. Supp., at 1079. These instructors, many of whom no doubt teach in the religious schools precisely because they are adherents of the controlling denomination and want to serve their religious community zealously, are expected during the regular schoolday to inculcate their students with the tenets and beliefs of their particular religious faiths. Yet the premise of the program is that those instructors can put aside their religious convictions and engage in entirely secular Community Education instruction as soon as the schoolday is over. Moreover, they are expected to do so before the same religious school students and in the same religious school classrooms that they employed to advance religious purposes during the “official” schoolday. Nonetheless, as petitioners themselves asserted, Community Education classes are not specifically monitored for religious content. App. 353.
We do not question that the dedicated and professional religious school teachers employed by the Community Education program will attempt in good faith to perform their secular mission conscientiously. Cf. Lemon, supra, at 618-619. Nonetheless, there is a substantial risk that, overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to convey during the regular schoolday will infuse the supposedly secular classes they teach after school. The danger arises “not because the public employee [is] likely deliberately to subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather because the pressures of the environment might alter his behavior from its normal course.” Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 247 (1977). “The conflict of functions inheres in the situation.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 617.
The Shared Time program, though structured somewhat differently, nonetheless also poses a substantial risk of state-sponsored indoctrination. The most important difference between the programs is that most of the instructors in the Shared Time program are full-time teachers hired by the public schools. Moreover, although “virtually every” Community Education instructor is a full-time religious school teacher, 546 F. Supp., at 1079, only “[a] significant portion” of the Shared Time instructors previously worked in the religious schools. Id., at 1078. Nonetheless, as with the Community Education program, no attempt is made to monitor the Shared Time courses for religious content. App. 330.
Thus, despite these differences between the two programs, our holding in Meek controls the inquiry with respect to Shared Time, as well as Community Education. Shared Time instructors are teaching academic subjects in religious schools in courses virtually indistinguishable from the other courses offered during the regular religious schoolday. The teachers in this program, even more than their Community Education colleagues, are “performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained.” Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 371. Teachers in such an atmosphere may well subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they teach, while students will perceive the instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious message of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect. As we stated in Meek, “[wjhether the subject is ‘remedial reading,’ ‘advanced reading,’ or simply ‘reading,’ a teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction persists.” Id., at 370. Unlike types of aid that the Court has upheld, such as state-created standardized tests, Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980), or diagnostic services, Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 241-244, there is a “substantial risk” that programs operating in this environment would “be used for religious educational purposes.” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, supra, at 656.
The Court of Appeals of course recognized that respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination in this case. 718 F. 2d, at 1404. But the absence of proof of specific incidents is not dispositive. When conducting a supposedly secular class in the pervasively sectarian environment of a religious school, a teacher may knowingly or unwillingly tailor the content of the course to fit the school’s announced goals. If so, there is no reason to believe that this kind of ideological influence would be detected or reported by students, by their parents, or by the school system itself. The students are presumably attending religious schools precisely in order to receive religious instruction. After spending the balance of their schoolday in classes heavily influenced by a religious perspective, they would have little motivation or ability to discern improper ideological content that may creep into a Shared Time or Community Education course. Neither their parents nor the parochial schools would have cause to complain if the effect of the publicly supported instruction were to advance the schools’ sectarian mission. And the public school system itself has no incentive to detect or report any specific incidents of improper state-sponsored indoctrination. Thus, the lack of evidence of specific incidents of indoctrination is of little significance.
(2)
Our cases have recognized that the Establishment Clause guards against more than direct, state-funded efforts to indoctrinate youngsters in specific religious beliefs. Government promotes religion as effectively when it fosters a close identification of its powers and responsibilities with those of any — or all — religious denominations as when it attempts to inculcate specific religious doctrines. If this identification conveys a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, a core purpose of the Establishment Clause is violated. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 222 (history teaches that “powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies”). As we stated in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 125-126 (1982): “[T]he mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred.” See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981) (finding effect “incidental” and not “primary” because it “does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices”).
It follows that an important concern of the effects test is whether the symbolic union of church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices. The inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted with particular care when many of the citizens perceiving the governmental message are children in their formative years. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, supra, at 274; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 685-686 (1971). The symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.
Our school-aid cases have recognized a sensitivity to the symbolic impact of the union of church and state. Grappling with problems in many ways parallel to those we face today, McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), held that a public school may not permit part-time religious instruction on its premises as a part of the school program, even if participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary and even if the instruction itself is conducted only by non-pubic school personnel. Yet in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), the Court held that a similar program conducted off the premises of the public school passed constitutional muster. The difference in symbolic impact helps to explain the difference between the cases. The symbolic connection of church and state in the McCollum, program presented the students with a graphic symbol of the “concert or union or dependency” of church and state, see Zorach, supra, at 312. This very symbolic union was conspicuously absent in the Zorach program.
In the programs challenged in this case, the religious school students spend their typical schoolday moving between religious school and “public school” classes. Both types of classes take place in the same religious school building and both are largely composed of students who are adherents of the same denomination. In this environment, the students would be unlikely to discern the crucial difference between the religious school classes and the “public school” classes, even if the latter were successfully kept free of religious indoctrination. As one commentator has written:
“This pervasive [religious] atmosphere makes on the young student’s mind a lasting imprint that the holy and transcendental should be central to all facets of life. It increases respect for the church as an institution to guide' one’s total life adjustments and undoubtedly helps stimulate interest in religious vocations. ... In short, the parochial school’s total operation serves to fulfill both secular and religious functions concurrently, and the two cannot be completely separated. Support of any part of its activity entails some support of the disqualifying religious function of molding the religious personality of the young student.” Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 574 (1968).
Consequently, even the student who notices the “public school” sign temporarily posted would have before him a powerful symbol of state endorsement and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some other time during the day.
As Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in the companion case to the case at bar, stated:
“Under the City’s plan public school teachers are, so far as appearance is concerned, a regular adjunct of the religious school. They pace the same halls, use classrooms in the same building, teach the same students, and confer with the teachers hired by the religious schools, many of them members of religious orders. The religious school appears to the public as a joint enterprise staffed with some teachers paid by its religious sponsor and others by the public.” Felton v. Secretary, United States Dept. of Ed., 739 F. 2d 48, 67-68 (1984).
This effect — the symbolic union of government and religion in one sectarian enterprise — is an impermissible effect under the Establishment Clause.
(3)
In Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), the Court stated that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id., at 16. With but one exception, our subsequent cases have struck down attempts by States to make payments out of public tax dollars directly to primary or secondary religious educational institutions. See, e. g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 774-781 (reimbursement for maintenance and repair expenses); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for teacher-prepared tests); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971) (salary supplements for nonpublic school teachers). But see Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 (1980) (permitting public subsidy for certain routinized recordkeeping and testing services performed by nonpublic schools but required by state law).
Aside from cash payments, the Court has distinguished between two categories of programs in which public funds are used to finance secular activities that religious schools would otherwise fund from their own resources. In the first category, the Court has noted that it is “well established . . . that not every law that confers an ‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’ or ‘incidental’ benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 771; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 742-743. In such “indirect” aid cases, the government has used primarily secular means to accomplish a primarily secular end, and no “primary effect” of advancing religion has thus been foünd. On this rationale, the Court has upheld programs providing for loans of secular textbooks to nonpublic school students, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 236-238; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 359-362, and programs providing bus transportation for nonpublic school children, Everson v. Board of Education, supra.
In the second category of cases, the Court has relied on the Establishment Clause prohibition of forms of aid that provide “direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise.” Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 250. In such “direct aid” cases, the government, although acting for a secular purpose, has done so by directly supporting a religious institution. Under this rationale, the Court has struck down state schemes providing for tuition grants and tax benefits for parents whose children attend religious school, see Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 780-794, and programs providing for “loan” of instructional materials to be used in religious schools, see Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 248-251; Meek v. Pittenger, supra, at 365. In Sloan and Nyquist, the aid was formally given to parents and not directly to the religious schools, while in Wolman and Meek, the aid was in-kind assistance rather than the direct contribution of public funds. Nonetheless, these differences in form were insufficient to save programs whose effect was indistinguishable from that of a direct subsidy to the religious school.
Thus, the Court has never accepted the mere possibility of subsidization, as the above cases demonstrate, as sufficient to invalidate an aid program. On the other hand, this effect is not wholly unimportant for Establishment Clause purposes. If it were, the public schools could gradually take on themselves the entire responsibility for teaching secular subjects on religious school premises. The question in each case must be whether the effect of the proffered aid is “direct and substantial,” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 784-785, n. 39, or indirect and incidental. “The problem, like many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S., at 314.
We have noted in the past that the religious school has dual functions, providing its students with a secular education while it promotes a particular religious perspective. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S., at 401-402; Board of Education v. Allen, supra. In Meek and Wolman, we held unconstitutional state programs providing for loans of instructional equipment and materials to religious schools, on the ground that the programs advanced the “primary, religion-oriented educational function of the sectarian school.” Meek, supra, at 364; Wolman, supra, at 248-251. Cf. Wolman, supra, at 243 (upholding provision of diagnostic services, which were “ ‘general welfare services for children that may be provided by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that accrues to church-related schools,’” quoting Meek, supra, at 371, n. 21). The programs challenged here, which provide teachers in addition to the instructional equipment and materials, have a similar — and forbidden — effect of advancing religion. This kind of direct aid to the educational function of the religious school is indistinguishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious school that is most clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause.
Petitioners claim that the aid here, like the textbooks in Allen, flows primarily to the students, not to the religious schools. Of course, all aid to religious schools ultimately “flows to” the students, and petitioners’ argument if accepted would validate all forms of nonideological aid to religious schools, including those explicitly rejected in our prior cases. Yet in Meek, we held unconstitutional the loan of instructional materials to religious schools and in Wolman, we rejected the fiction that a similar program could be saved by masking it as aid to individual students. Wolman, 433 U. S., at 249, n. 16. It follows a fortiori that the aid here, which includes not only instructional materials but also the provision of instructional services by teachers in the parochial school building, “inescapably [has] the primary effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise.” Id., at 250. Where, as here, no meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, “the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction.” Wolman v. Walter, supra, at 264 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Petitioners also argue that this “subsidy” effect is not significant in this case, because the Community Education and Shared Time programs supplemented the curriculum with courses not previously offered in the religious schools and not required by school rule or state regulation. Of course, this fails to distinguish the programs here from those found unconstitutional in Meek. See 421 U. S., at 368. As in Meek, we do not find that this feature of the program is controlling. First, there is no way of knowing whether the religious schools would have offered some or all of these courses if the public school system had not offered them first. The distinction between courses that “supplement” and those that “supplant” the regular curriculum is therefore not nearly as clear as petitioners allege. Second, although the precise courses offered in these programs may have been new to the participating religious schools, their general subject matter-reading, mathematics, etc. — was surely a part of the curriculum in the past, and the concerns of the Establishment Clause may thus be triggered despite the “supplemental” nature of the courses. Cf. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 370-371. Third, and most important, petitioners’ argument would permit the public schools gradually to take over the entire secular curriculum of the religious school, for the latter could surely discontinue existing courses so that they might be replaced a year or two later by a Community Education or Shared Time course with the same content. The average religious school student, for instance, now spends 10% of the schoolday in Shared Time classes. But there is no principled basis on which this Court can impose a limit on the percentage of the religious schoolday that can be subsidized by the public school. To let the genie out of the bottle in this case would be to permit ever larger segments of the religious school curriculum to be turned over to the public school system, thus violating the cardinal principle that the State may not in effect become the prime supporter of the religious school system. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 624-625.
Ill
We conclude that the challenged programs have the effect of promoting religion in three ways. The state-paid instructors, influenced by the pervasively sectarian nature of the religious schools in which they work, may subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense. The symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support for religion to students and to the general public. Finally, the programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects. For these reasons, the conclusion is inescapable that the Community Education and Shared Time programs have the “primary or principal” effect of advancing religion, and therefore violate the dictates of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Nonpublic schools have played an important role in the development of American education, and we have long recognized that parents and their children have the right to choose between public schools and available sectarian alternatives. As The Chief Justice noted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 625: “[Njothing we have said can be construed to disparage the role of church-related elementary and secondary schools in our national life. Their contribution has been and is enormous.” But the Establishment Clause “rest[s] on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S., at 431. Therefore, “[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 625. Because “the controlling constitutional standards have become firmly rooted and the broad contours of our inquiry are now well defined,” Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 761, the position of those lines has by now become quite clear and requires affirmance of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Shared Time and Community Education courses are taught at the elementary and secondary level in nonpublie schools. However, after the District Court found for respondents and enjoined the further operation of the programs, petitioners did not appeal the decision to the extent that it involved “physical education and industrial arts shared time classes at the secondary level and community education classes at the secondary level.” App. 39. Thus, the appeal involved only Shared Time classes at the elementary level, Community Education classes at the elementary level, and the remedial mathematics Shared Time class at the secondary level. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 718 F. 2d 1389, 1390 (CA6 1983). These are the only programs whose constitutionality is now before the Court.
The signs read as follows: “GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOLS’ ROOM. THIS ROOM HAS BEEN LEASED BY THE GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS. THE ACTIVITY IN THIS ROOM IS CONTROLLED SOLELY BY THE GRAND RAPIDS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT.” App. 200.
As would be expected, a large majority of the students attending religious schools belong to the denomination that controls the school. The District Court found, for instance, that approximately 85% of the students at the Catholic schools are Catholic. 546 F. Supp., at 1080.
Twenty-eight of the schools are Roman Catholic, seven are Christian Reformed, three are Lutheran, one is Seventh Day Adventist, and one is Baptist.
Petitioners alleged that respondents lacked taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 (1968), and Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464 (1982). The District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected the standing challenge. We affirm this finding, relying on the numerous cases in which we have adjudicated Establishment Clause challenges by state taxpayers to programs for aiding nonpublic schools. See, e. g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 356-357, n. 6 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 762 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 735 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 478 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 608, 611 (1971); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 3 (1947).
The elementary and secondary schools in this case differ substantially from the colleges that we refused to characterize as “pervasively sectarian” in Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S., at 755-759. See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). Many of the schools in this case include prayer and attendance at religious services as a part of their curriculum, are run by churches or other organizations whose members must subscribe to particular religious tenets, have faculties and student bodies composed largely of adherents of the particular denomination, and give preference in attendance to children belonging to the denomination. 546 F. Supp., at 1080-1084.
Approximately 10% of the Shared Time instructors were previously employed by the religious schools, and many of these were reassigned back to the school at which they had previously taught.
The public school system does include Shared Time teachers in its ordinary teacher evaluation program, which subjects them to evaluation once each year during their first year of teaching and once every three years after that. App. 54, 330.
For instance, this Court has held that prayers conducted at the commencement of a legislative session do not violate the Establishment Clause, in part because of long historical usage and lack of particular sectarian content. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 795 (1983). But we have never indulged a similar assumption with respect to prayers conducted at the opening of the schoolday. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S., at 367-373 (invalidating program providing for state-funded remedial services on religious school premises), with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 244-248 (upholding program providing for similar services at neutral sites off the premises of the religious school).
See n. 2, supra.
This “indirect subsidy” effect only evokes Establishment Clause concerns when the public funds flow to “an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission. . . .” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 743. In this ease, the District Court explicitly found that 40 of the 41 participating nonpublic schools were pervasively religious in this sense. 546 F. Supp., at 1080. For this reason, the inquiry into whether the aid is “direct and substantial” is necessary.
Petitioners also cite Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), which upheld a general tax deduction available to parents of all schoolchildren for school expenses, including tuition to religious schools. Mueller, however, is quite unlike the instant case. Unlike Mueller, the aid provided here is unmediated by the tax code and the “numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children.” Id., at 399.
Because of this conclusion, we need not determine whether aspects of the challenged programs impermissibly entangle the government in religious matters, in violation of the third prong of the Lemon test. But see Aguilar v. Felton, post, p. 402. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the treatment the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed, that is, whether the court below the Supreme Court (typically a federal court of appeals or a state supreme court) affirmed, reversed, remanded, denied or dismissed the decision of the court it reviewed (typically a trial court). Adhere to the language used in the "holding" in the summary of the case on the title page or prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. Exceptions to the literal language are the following: where the Court overrules the lower court, treat this a petition or motion granted; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing refuses to enforce or enjoins the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as reversed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing enforces the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as affirmed; where the court whose decision the Supreme Court is reviewing sets aside the decision of the court, tribunal, or agency which it reviewed, treat this as vacated; if the decision is set aside and remanded, treat it as vacated and remanded. | What treatment did the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed accorded the decision of the court it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"modify",
"remand",
"unusual disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_lcdisposition |
POWEREX CORP. v. RELIANT ENERGY SERVICES, INC., ET AL.
No. 05-85.
Argued April 16, 2007
Decided June 18, 2007
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Auto, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Auto, J., joined, post, p. 239. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 239.
David C. Frederick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Scott H. Angstreich.
Douglas H. Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Mark B. Stern, and H. Thomas Byron III.
Leonard B. Simon argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Pamela M. Parker and William Bernstein.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Government of Canada by Margaret K. Pfeiffer; and for the Province of British Columbia by Roy T Englert, Jr., and Matthew R. Segal.
A brief of amici curiae was filed for Arthur R. Miller .et al. by Brian Wolfman and Mr. Miller, pro se.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), petitioner is an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.” 28 U. S. C. § 1603(b)(2). When we granted certiorari, however, we asked the parties also to address whether the Ninth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction in light of 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d).
I
The procedural history of this case is long and complicated; we recount only what is necessary to resolve the writ before us. The State of California, along with some private and corporate citizens (hereinafter collectively referred to as plaintiffs-respondents), filed suits in California state courts against various companies in the California energy market, alleging that they had conspired to fix prices in violation of California law. Some of those defendants, in turn, filed cross-claims seeking indemnity from, inter alios, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro), and petitioner Powerex. (We shall sometimes refer to these entities collectively as the cross-defendants.) BPA and WAPA are agencies of the United States Government. BC Hydro is a crown corporation of the Canadian Province of British Columbia that is wholly owned by the Province and that all parties agree constitutes a “foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA. See § 1603. Petitioner, also a Canadian corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of BC Hydro.
The cross-defendants removed the entire case to federal court. BC Hydro and petitioner both relied on § 1441(d), which permits a “foreign state,” as defined by the FSIA, see § 1603(a), to remove civil actions brought against it in state court. BPA and WAPA invoked § 1442(a), authorizing removal by federal agencies. Plaintiffs-respondents moved to remand, arguing that petitioner was not a foreign state, and that the cross-claims against BPA, WAPA, and BC Hydro were barred by sovereign immunity. Petitioner opposed remand on the ground that it was a foreign state under the FSIA; the other cross-defendants opposed remand on the ground that their sovereign immunity entitled them to be dismissed from the action outright.
The District Court initially concluded (we assume correctly) that § 1442(a) entitled BPA and WAPA to remove the entire case and that BC Hydro was similarly entitled under § 1441(d). App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. It thus believed that whether the case should be remanded “hinge[d on its] jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims, not whether the actions were properly removed in the first instance.” Ibid. The District Court held that petitioner did not qualify as a foreign sovereign under the FSIA. Id., at 33a-38a. It also decided that BC Hydro enjoyed sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Id., at 21a-33a. And it concluded that BPA and WAPA were immune from suit in state court, which the court believed deprived it of jurisdiction over the claims against those agencies. Id., at 38a-44a. Having reached these conclusions, the District Court remanded the entire case. Id., at 44a.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that it was a foreign sovereign under the FSIA. BPA and WAPA (but not BC Hydro) also appealed, asserting that the District Court, before remanding the case, should have dismissed them from the action in light of their sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs-respondents, for their part, rejoined that both appeals were jurisdictionally barred by § 1447(d) and that the District Court had not erred in any event. The Ninth Circuit rejected the invocation of § 1447(d), holding that that provision did not preclude it from reviewing substantive issues of law that preceded the remand order. California v. NRG Energy Inc., 391 F. 3d 1011, 1022-1023 (2004). It also found that the District Court had jurisdiction over the case because BPA, WAPA, and BC Hydro properly removed the entire action. Id., at 1023. Turning to the merits, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding that petitioner was not a “foreign state” for purposes of the FSIA. Id., at 1025-1026. It also upheld the District Court’s conclusion that BPA, WAPA, and BC Hydro retained sovereign immunity, id., at 1023-1025, but reversed its decision not to dismiss BPA and WAPA before remanding, id., at 1026-1027.
Petitioner sought certiorari review of the Ninth Circuit’s determination that it was not an “organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof” under § 1603(b)(2). We granted certiorari on this question, but asked the parties to address in addition whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal notwithstanding § 1447(d). 549 U. S. 1178 (2007).
II
The authority of appellate courts to review district-court orders remanding removed cases to state court is substantially limited by statute. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) provides (with an exception for certain civil rights cases) that “[a]n order remanding a ease to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” Determining whether the Ninth Circuit was permitted to review the District Court’s remand is, alas, not as easy as one would expect from a mere reading of this text, for we have interpreted § 1447(d) to cover less than its words alone suggest. In Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336, 345-346 (1976), we held that § 1447(d) should be read in pari materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands based on the grounds specified in the latter are shielded by the bar on review mandated by the former. At the time of Thermtron, § 1447(c) stated in relevant part:
“ ‘If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case.’” Id., at 342.
Consequently, Thermtron limited §1447(d)’s application to such remands. Id., at 346. In 1988, Congress amended § 1447(c) in relevant part as follows:
“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under [28 U. S. C. §] 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” § 1016(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4670.
When that version of § 1447(c) was in effect, we thus interpreted § 1447(d) to preclude review only of remands for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 711-712 (1996); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 127-128 (1995).
Although § 1447(c) was amended yet again in 1996, 110 Stat. 3022, we will assume for purposes of this case that the amendment was immaterial to Thermtron’s gloss on § 1447(d), so that the prohibition on appellate review remains limited to remands based on the grounds specified in Quackenbush. We agree with petitioner that the remand order was not based on a defect in removal procedure, so on the foregoing interpretation of Thermtron the remand is immunized from review only if it was based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
A
The principal submission of the Solicitor General and petitioner is that the District Court’s remand order was not based on a lack of “subject matter jurisdiction” within the meaning of § 1447(c) because that term is properly interpreted to cover only “a defect in subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal that rendered the removal itself jurisdictionally improper.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8; see also id., at 8-11; Brief for Petitioner 42-45. Under this interpretation, the District Court’s remand order was not based on a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c), since the cross-defendants other than petitioner were statutorily authorized to remove the whole case in light of their sovereign status. The Ninth Circuit appears to have relied, at least in part, on this rationale. See 391 F. 3d, at 1023.
We reject this narrowing construction of §1447(c)’s unqualified authorization of remands for lack of “subject matter jurisdiction.” Nothing in the text of § 1447(c) supports the proposition that a remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not covered so long as the case was properly removed in the first instance. Petitioner and the Solicitor General do not seriously dispute the absence of an explicit textual limitation. Instead, relying on the statutory history of § 1447(c), they make a three-step argument why the provision is implicitly limited in this manner. First, they note that the pre-1988 version of § 1447(c) mandated remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appeared] that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction,” 28 U. S. C. § 1447(c) (1982 ed.). That version, obviously, authorized remand only for cases that were removed improperly. Second, they contend that the purpose of the 1988 amendment was to impose a time limit for raising nonjurisdictional objections to removal, a contention that is certainly plausible in light of the structure of the amended provision:
“A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” § 1447(c) (1988 ed.).
Finally, they conclude that since the purpose of the amendment was to alter the timing rules, there is no reason to think that Congress broadened the scope of § 1447(c) to authorize the remand of cases that had been properly removed. The language “lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” which was newly added to § 1447(c), must be construed to cover only cases in which removal was jurisdictionally improper at the outset.
But the very statutory history upon which this creative argument relies conclusively refutes it. The same section of the public law that amended § 1447(c) to include the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” also created a new § 1447(e). See § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4670. Section 1447(e), which remains on the books, states:
“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”
This unambiguously demonstrates that a case can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subject-matter jurisdiction that requires remand. A standard principle of statutory construction provides that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning. See, e. g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). That maxim is doubly appropriate here, since the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” was inserted into § 1447(c) and § 1447(e) at the same time. There is no reason to believe that the new language in the former provision, unlike the new language simultaneously inserted two subsections later, covers only cases in which removal itself was jurisdictionally improper. We hold that when a district court remands a properly removed case because it nonetheless lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the remand is covered by § 1447(c) and thus shielded from review by § 1447(d).
B
That holding requires us to determine whether the ground for the District Court’s remand in the present case was lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As an initial matter, it is quite clear that the District Court was purporting to remand on that ground. The heading of the discussion section of the remand order is entitled “Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Removed Actions.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. And the District Court explicitly stated that the remand "issue hinges ... on the Court’s jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims.” Ibid. Were any doubt remaining, it is surely eliminated by the District Court’s order denying a stay of the remand, which repeatedly stated that a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to § 1447(c). See App. 281-286.
• For some Members of this Court, the foregoing conclusion that the District Court purported to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is alone enough to bar review under § 1447(d). See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225, 264 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting). Even assuming, however, that § 1447(d) permits appellate courts to look behind the district court’s characterization, see Kircker v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U. S. 633, 641, n. 9 (2006) (reserving the question), we conclude that appellate review is barred in this case. There is only one plausible explanation of what legal ground the District Court actually relied upon for its remand in the present case. As contended by plaintiffs-respondents, it was the court’s lack of power to adjudicate the claims against petitioner once it concluded both that petitioner was not a foreign state capable of independently removing and that the claims against the other removing cross-defendants were barred by sovereign immunity. Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents 17-21, 25-26. Though we have not passed on the question whether, when sovereign immunity bars the claims against the only parties capable of removing the case, subject-matter jurisdiction exists to entertain the remaining claims, cf. n. 3, infra, the point is certainly debatable. And we conclude that review of the District Court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, to the extent it is permissible at all, should be limited to confirming that that characterization was colorable. Lengthy appellate disputes about whether an arguable jurisdictional ground invoked by the district court was properly such would frustrate the purpose of § 1447(d) quite as much as determining whether the factfinding underlying that invocation was correct. See Kircher, supra, at 649-650 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Moreover, the line between misclassifying a ground as subject-matter jurisdiction and misapplying a proper ground of subject-matter jurisdiction is sometimes elusively thin. To decide the present case, we need not pass on whether § 1447(d) permits appellate review of a district-court remand order that dresses in jurisdictional clothing a patently nonjurisdictional ground (such as the docket congestion invoked by the District Court in Thermtron, 423 U. S., at 344). We hold that when, as here, the District Court relied upon a ground that is colorably characterized as subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate review is barred by § 1447(d).
Petitioner puts forward another explanation for the re-, mand, which we find implausible. Petitioner claims that, because the entire case was properly removed, the District Court had the discretion to invoke a form of supplemental jurisdiction to hear the claims against it, and that its remand rested upon the decision not to exercise that discretion. In short, petitioner contends that the District Court was actually relying on Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 357 (1988), which authorized district courts to remand removed state claims when they decide not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner 45-48; Reply Brief for Petitioner 16-20. It is far from clear, to begin with, (1) that supplemental jurisdiction was even available in the circumstances of this case; and (2) that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d). Assuming those points, however, there is no reason to believe that the District Court’s remand was actually based on this unexplained discretionary decision. The District Court itself never mentioned the possibility of supplemental jurisdiction, neither in its original decision, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a-44a, nor in its order denying petitioner’s motion to stay the remand pending appeal, App. 281-286. To the contrary, as described above, it relied upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction — which, in petitioner’s view of things (but see n. 4, this page) would not include a Cohill remand. Moreover, it does not appear from the record that petitioner ever even argued to the District Court that supplemental jurisdiction was a basis for retaining the claims against it. There is, in short, no reason to believe that an unmentioned nonexercise of Cohill discretion was the basis for the remand.
C
Part of the reason why the Ninth Circuit concluded it had appellate jurisdiction is a legal theory quite different from those discussed and rejected above. Petitioner, along with the other appellants, convinced the court to apply Circuit precedent holding that § 1447(d) does not preclude review of a district court’s merits determinations that precede the remand. See 391 F. 3d, at 1023 (citing, inter alia, Pelleport Investors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, Inc., 741 F. 2d 273, 276-277 (CA9 1984)). Petitioner has not completely abandoned this argument before us, see Brief for Petitioner 50, and it is in any event desirable to address this aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.
The line of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence upon which petitioner relied appears to be invoking our decision in Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U. S. 140 (1934). There the District Court, in a single decree, had entered one order dismissing a cross-complaint against one party, and another order remanding because there was no diversity of citizenship in light of the dismissal. Id., at 142. We held that appellate jurisdiction existed to review the order of dismissal, although we repeatedly cautioned that the remand order itself could not be set aside. Id., at 143-144. The Ninth Circuit’s application of Waco to petitioner’s appeal was mistaken. As we reiterated in Kircher, see 547 U. S., at 645-646, n. 13, Waco does not permit an appeal when there is no order separate from the unreviewable remand order. Here petitioner can point to no District Court order, separate from the remand, to which it objects and to which the issue of its foreign sovereign status is material. Thus, petitioner’s invocation of Wixco amounts to a request for one of two impermissible outcomes: an advisory opinion as to its FSIA status that will not affect any order of the District Court, or a reversal of the remand order. Waco did not, and could not, authorize either form of judicial relief.
D
Finally, petitioner contends, with no textual support, that § 1447(d) is simply inapplicable to a suit removed under the FSIA. It asserts that “§ 1447(d) must yield because Congress could not have intended to grant district judges irrevocable authority to decide questions with such sensitive foreign-relations implications.” Brief for Petitioner 49. We will not ignore a clear jurisdictional statute in reliance upon supposition of what Congress really wanted. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Petitioner’s divination of congressional intent is flatly refuted by longstanding precedent:
“Section 1447(d) applies ‘not only to remand orders made in suits removed under [the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed under any other statutes, as well.’... Absent a clear statutory command to the contrary, we assume that Congress is ‘aware of the universality of th[e] practice’ of denying appellate review of remand orders when Congress creates a new ground for removal.” Things Remembered, 516 U. S., at 128 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U. S. 742, 752 (1946); emphasis deleted and alterations in original).
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to exempt particular classes of remand orders from § 1447(d) when it wishes — both within the text of § 1447(d) itself (which exempts civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1443), and in separate statutes, see, e. g., 12 U. S. C. § 1441a(l)(3)(C), § 1819(b)(2)(C); 25 U. S. C. § 487(d).
We are well aware that § 1447(d)’s immunization of erroneous remands has undesirable consequences in the FSIA context. A foreign sovereign defendant whose case is wrongly remanded is denied not only the federal forum to which it is entitled (as befalls all remanded parties with meritorious appeals barred by § 1447(d)), but also certain procedural rights that the FSIA specifically provides foreign sovereigns only in federal court (such as the right to a bench trial, see 28 U. S. C. § 1330(a); § 1441(d)). But whether that special concern outweighs §1447(d)’s general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits questions, see Kircher, supra, at 640, is a policy debate that belongs in the halls of Congress, not in the hearing room of this Court. As far as the Third Branch is concerned, what the text of § 1447(d) indisputably does prevails over what it ought to have done.
* * *
Section 1447(d) reflects Congress’s longstanding “policy of not permitting interruption of the litigation of the merits of a removed case by prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is removed.” Rice, supra, at 751. Appellate courts must take that jurisdictional prescription seriously, however pressing the merits of the appeal might seem. We hold that § 1447(d) bars appellate consideration of petitioner’s claim that it is a foreign state for purposes of the FSIA. We therefore vacate in part the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand the case with instructions to dismiss petitioner’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
To be dear, we do not suggest that the question whether removal is proper is always different from the question whether the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction, for the two are often identical in light of the general rule that postremoval events do not deprive federal courts-of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e. g., Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 391 (1998). We merely hold that when there is a divergence, such that a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a daim that was properly removed, the consequent remand is authorized by § 1447(c) and appellate review is barred by § 1447(d).
The Court’s opinion in Osborn v. Haley, 549 U. S. 225 (2007), had nothing to say about the scope of review that is permissible under § 1447(d), since it held that § 1447(d) was displaced in its entirety by 28 U. S. C. § 2679(d)(2). See 549 U. S., at 243-244 (reasoning that, of the two forum-determining provisions — 11447(d), the generally applicable section, and §2679(d)(2), a special prescription governing Westfall Act cases — “only one can prevail”).
Petitioner provides no authority from this Court supporting the proposition that a district court presiding over a multiparty removed case can invoke supplemental jurisdiction to hear claims against a party that cannot independently remove when the claims against the only parties authorized to remove are barred by sovereign immunity.
We have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d). See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U. S. 124, 129-130 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the question is open); cf. Cohill, 484 U. S., at 355, n. 11 (discussing the pre-1988 version of § 1447(c)).
The dissent’s belief that there is an implicit FSIA exception to § 1447(d), see post, at 239-244 (opinion of Breyer, J.), rests almost exclusively on our recent decision in Osborn. The dissent reads Osborn to stand for the proposition that any “conflict” between a specific, later-enacted statute and § 1447(d) should be resolved in favor of the former. Post, at 240-241. The reason why the dissent is forced to the parenthetical admission that “Osborn did not say as much,” post, at 240, is because the dissent drastically overreads the case. Osborn held only that § 1447(d) was trumped by the Westfall Act’s explicit provision that removal was conclusive upon the Attorney General’s certification: As between “the two antishuttling commands,” the Court said, “only one can prevail.” 549 U. S., at 244. The opinion was quite clear that the only statutory rivalry with which it was concerned was dueling “antishuttling commands”: “Only in the extraordinary case in which Congress has ordered the intercourt shuttle to travel just one way — from state to federal court — does today’s decision hold sway.” Ibid,. That is why Osborn repeatedly emphasized that Westfall Act certification is “ ‘conclusiv[e] . . . for purposes of removal,”’ id., at 242, 243, an emphasis that the dissent essentially ignores, post, at 240-241.
Osborn is no license for courts to assume the legislative role by characterizing the consequences of § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review as creating a conflict, leaving it to judges to suppress that provision when they think Congress undervalued or overlooked those consequences. The dissent renders a quintessential policy judgment in concluding that appellate “delay is necessary, indeed, crucial,” post, at 242, when the rights of a foreign sovereign are at stake. We have no idea whether this is a wise balancing of the various values at issue here. We are confident, however, that the dissent is wrong to think that it would improve the “law in this democracy,” post, at 244, for judges to accept the lawmaking power that the dissent dangles before them. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states. | What is the issue area of the decision? | [
"Criminal Procedure",
"Civil Rights",
"First Amendment",
"Due Process",
"Privacy",
"Attorneys",
"Unions",
"Economic Activity",
"Judicial Power",
"Federalism",
"Interstate Relations",
"Federal Taxation",
"Miscellaneous",
"Private Action"
] | [
8
] | sc_issuearea |
UPPER SKAGIT INDIAN TRIBE, Petitioner
v.
Sharline LUNDGREN, et vir.
No. 17-387.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 21, 2018.
Decided May 21, 2018.
David S. Hawkins, Sedro-Woolley, WA, for Petitioner.
Ann O'Connell, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner.
Eric D. Miller, Seattle, WA, for respondents.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, Brett E. Legner, Deputy Solicitor General, Chicago, IL, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General, State of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Hector Balderas, Attorney General, State of New Mexico, Santa Fe, NM, Ken Paxton, Attorney General, State of Texas, Austin, TX
Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr., Tyler L. Farmer, Kristin E. Ballinger, John C. Burzynski, Harrigan Leyh Farmer & Thomsen LLP, Seattle, WA, David S. Hawkins, General Counsel, Upper Skagit Indian Tribe, Sedro-Woolley, WA, for Petitioner.
Eric D. Miller, Luke M. Rona, Perkins Coie LLP, Scott M. Ellerby, Mullavey, Prout, Grenley & Foe, LLP, Seattle, WA, Jennifer A. MacLean, Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C., Lauren Pardee Ruben, Perkins Coie LLP, Denver, CO, for Respondents.
Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Lower courts disagree about the significance of our decision in County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992). Some think it means Indian tribes lack sovereign immunity in in rem lawsuits like this one; others don't read it that way at all. We granted certiorari to set things straight. 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 543, 199 L.Ed.2d 423 (2017).
Ancestors of the Upper Skagit Tribe lived for centuries along the Skagit River in northwestern Washington State. But as settlers moved across the Cascades and into the region, the federal government sought to make room for them by displacing native tribes. In the treaty that followed with representatives of the Skagit people and others, the tribes agreed to "cede, relinquish, and convey" their lands to the United States in return for $150,000 and other promises. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927; see Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 676, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979) ; United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312, 333 (W.D.Wash.1974).
Today's dispute stems from the Upper Skagit Tribe's efforts to recover a portion of the land it lost. In 1981, the federal government set aside a small reservation for the Tribe. 46 Fed.Reg. 46681. More recently, the Tribe has sought to purchase additional tracts in market transactions. In 2013, the Tribe bought roughly 40 acres where, it says, tribal members who died of smallpox are buried. The Tribe bought the property with an eye to asking the federal government to take the land into trust and add it to the existing reservation next door. See 25 U.S.C. § 5108 ; 25 C.F.R. § 151.4 (2013). Toward that end, the Tribe commissioned a survey of the plot so it could confirm the property's boundaries. But then a question arose.
The problem was a barbed wire fence. The fence runs some 1,300 feet along the boundary separating the Tribe's land from land owned by its neighbors, Sharline and Ray Lundgren. The survey convinced the Tribe that the fence is in the wrong place, leaving about an acre of its land on the Lundgrens' side. So the Tribe informed its new neighbors that it intended to tear down the fence; clearcut the intervening acre; and build a new fence in the right spot.
In response, the Lundgrens filed this quiet title action in Washington state court. Invoking the doctrines of adverse possession and mutual acquiescence, the Lundgrens offered evidence showing that the fence has stood in the same place for years, that they have treated the disputed acre as their own, and that the previous owner of the Tribe's tract long ago accepted the Lundgrens' claim to the land lying on their side of the fence. For its part, the Tribe asserted sovereign immunity from the suit. It relied upon the many decisions of this Court recognizing the sovereign authority of Native American tribes and their right to "the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2030, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected the Tribe's claim of immunity and ruled for the Lundgrens. The court reasoned that sovereign immunity does not apply to cases where a judge "exercis[es] in rem jurisdiction" to quiet title in a parcel of land owned by a Tribe, but only to cases where a judge seeks to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the Tribe itself. 187 Wash.2d 857, 867, 389 P.3d 569, 573 (2017). In coming to this conclusion, the court relied in part on our decision in Yakima . Like some courts before it, the Washington Supreme Court read Yakima as distinguishing in rem from in personam lawsuits and "establish[ing] the principle that ... courts have subject matter jurisdiction over in rem proceedings in certain situations where claims of sovereign immunity are asserted." 187 Wash.2d, at 868, 389 P.3d, at 574.
That was error. Yakima did not address the scope of tribal sovereign immunity. Instead, it involved only a much more prosaic question of statutory interpretation concerning the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887. See 24 Stat. 388.
Some background helps dispel the misunderstanding. The General Allotment Act represented part of Congress's late Nineteenth Century Indian policy: "to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the society at large." Yakima, supra, at 254, 112 S.Ct. 683 ; In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499, 25 S.Ct. 506, 49 L.Ed. 848 (1905). It authorized the President to allot parcels of reservation land to individual tribal members. The law then directed the United States to hold the allotted parcel in trust for some years, and afterwards issue a fee patent to the allottee. 24 Stat. 389. Section 6 of the Act, as amended, provided that once a fee patent issued, "each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside" and "all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed." 25 U.S.C. § 349.
In 1934, Congress reversed course. It enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, to restore "the principles of tribal self-determination and self-governance" that prevailed before the General Allotment Act. Yakima, 502 U.S., at 255, 112 S.Ct. 683. "Congress halted further allotments and extended indefinitely the existing periods of trust applicable to" parcels that were not yet fee patented. Ibid. ; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 - 462. But the Legislature made no attempt to withdraw lands already conveyed to private persons through fee patents (and by now sometimes conveyed to non-Indians). As a result, Indian reservations today sometimes contain two kinds of land intermixed in a kind of checkerboard pattern: trust land held by the United States and fee-patented land held by private parties. See Yakima, supra, at 256, 112 S.Ct. 683.
Yakima concerned the tax consequences of this checkerboard. Recall that the amended version of § 6 of the General Allotment Act rendered allottees and their fee-patented land subject to state regulations and taxes. 25 U.S.C. § 349. Despite that, in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976), this Court held that § 6 could no longer be read as allowing States to impose in personam taxes (like those on cigarette sales) on transactions between Indians on fee-patented land within a reservation. Id., at 479-481, 96 S.Ct. 1634. Among other things, the Court pointed to the impracticality of using the ownership of a particular parcel within a reservation to determine the law governing transactions taking place upon it. See id., at 478-479, 96 S.Ct. 1634. Despite Moe and some years later, this Court in Yakima reached a different conclusion with respect to in rem state taxes. The Court held that allowing States to collect property taxes on fee-patented land within reservations was still allowed by § 6. Yakima, supra, at 265, 112 S.Ct. 683. Unlike the in personam taxes condemned in Moe, the Court held that imposing in rem taxes only on the fee-patented squares of the checkerboard was "not impracticable" because property tax assessors make "parcel-by-parcel determinations" about property tax liability all the time. Yakima, supra, at 265, 112 S.Ct. 683. In short, Yakima sought only to interpret a relic of a statute in light of a distinguishable precedent; it resolved nothing about the law of sovereign immunity.
Commendably, the Lundgrens acknowledged all this at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Instead of seeking to defend the Washington Supreme Court's reliance on Yakima, they now ask us to affirm their judgment on an entirely distinct alternative ground. At common law, they say, sovereigns enjoyed no immunity from actions involving immovable property located in the territory of another sovereign. As our cases have put it, "[a] prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, ... may be considered as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character of a private individual." Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 145, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). Relying on this line of reasoning, the Lundgrens argue, the Tribe cannot assert sovereign immunity because this suit relates to immovable property located in the State of Washington that the Tribe purchased in the "the character of a private individual."
The Tribe and the federal government disagree. They note that immunity doctrines lifted from other contexts do not always neatly apply to Indian tribes. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) ("[T]he immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not coextensive with that of the States"). And since the founding, they say, the political branches rather than judges have held primary responsibility for determining when foreign sovereigns may be sued for their activities in this country. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ; Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943).
We leave it to the Washington Supreme Court to address these arguments in the first instance. Although we have discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the law and the record that will not expand the relief granted below, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30, 104 S.Ct. 2916, 82 L.Ed.2d 23 (1984), in this case we think restraint is the best use of discretion. Determining the limits on the sovereign immunity held by Indian tribes is a grave question; the answer will affect all tribes, not just the one before us; and the alternative argument for affirmance did not emerge until late in this case. In fact, it appeared only when the United States filed an amicus brief in this case-after briefing on certiorari, after the Tribe filed its opening brief, and after the Tribe's other amici had their say. This Court has often declined to take a "first view" of questions that make their appearance in this posture, and we think that course the wise one today. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005).
The dissent is displeased with our decision on this score, but a contradiction lies at the heart of its critique. First, the dissent assures us that the immovable property exception applies with irresistible force-nothing more than a matter of "hornbook law." Post, at 1657 - 1661 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). But then, the dissent claims that allowing the Washington Supreme Court to address that exception is a "grave" decision that "casts uncertainty" over the law and leaves lower courts with insufficient "guidance." Post, at 1657, 1662 - 1663. Both cannot be true. If the immovable property exception presents such an easy question, then it's hard to see what terrible things could happen if we allow the Washington Supreme Court to answer it. Surely our state court colleagues are no less versed than we in "hornbook law," and we are confident they can and will faithfully apply it. And what if, instead, the question turns out to be more complicated than the dissent promises? In that case the virtues of inviting full adversarial testing will have proved themselves once again. Either way, we remain sanguine about the consequences.
The dissent's other objection to a remand rests on a belief that the immovable property exception was the source of "the disagreement that led us to take this case." Post, at 1656. But this too is mistaken. As we've explained, the courts below and the certiorari-stage briefs before us said precisely nothing on the subject. Nor do we understand how the dissent might think otherwise-for its essential premise is that no disagreement exists, or is even possible, about the exception's scope. The source of confusion in the lower courts that led to our review was the one about Yakima, see supra, at 1651, n., and we have dispelled it. That is work enough for the day. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I join the opinion of the Court in full.
But that opinion poses an unanswered question: What precisely is someone in the Lundgrens' position supposed to do? There should be a means of resolving a mundane dispute over property ownership, even when one of the parties to the dispute-involving non-trust, non-reservation land-is an Indian tribe. The correct answer cannot be that the tribe always wins no matter what; otherwise a tribe could wield sovereign immunity as a sword and seize property with impunity, even without a colorable claim of right.
The Tribe suggests that the proper mode of redress is for the Lundgrens-who purchased their property long before the Tribe came into the picture-to negotiate with the Tribe. Although the parties got off on the wrong foot here, the Tribe insists that negotiations would run more smoothly if the Lundgrens "understood [its] immunity from suit." Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. In other words, once the Court makes clear that the Lundgrens ultimately have no recourse, the parties can begin working toward a sensible settlement. That, in my mind at least, is not a meaningful remedy.
The Solicitor General proposes a different out-of-court solution. Taking up this Court's passing comment that a disappointed litigant may continue to assert his title, see Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 291-292, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983), the Solicitor General more pointedly suggests that the Lundgrens should steer into the conflict: Go onto the disputed property and chop down some trees, build a shed, or otherwise attempt to "induce [the Tribe] to file a quiet-title action." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24. Such brazen tactics may well have the desired effect of causing the Tribe to waive its sovereign immunity. But I am skeptical that the law requires private individuals-who, again, had no prior dealings with the Tribe-to pick a fight in order to vindicate their interests.
The consequences of the Court's decision today thus seem intolerable, unless there is another means of resolving property disputes of this sort. Such a possibility was discussed in the Solicitor General's brief, the Lundgrens' brief, and the Tribe's reply brief, and extensively explored at oral argument-the exception to sovereign immunity for actions to determine rights in immovable property. After all, "property ownership is not an inherently sovereign function." Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 199, 127 S.Ct. 2352, 168 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007). Since the 18th century, it has been a settled principle of international law that a foreign state holding real property outside its territory is treated just like a private individual. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 145, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). The same rule applies as a limitation on the sovereign immunity of States claiming an interest in land located within other States. See Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480-482, 44 S.Ct. 369, 68 L.Ed. 796 (1924). The only question, as the Solicitor General concedes, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25, is whether different principles afford Indian tribes a broader immunity from actions involving off-reservation land.
I do not object to the Court's determination to forgo consideration of the immovable-property rule at this time. But if it turns out that the rule does not extend to tribal assertions of rights in non-trust, non-reservation property, the applicability of sovereign immunity in such circumstances would, in my view, need to be addressed in a future case. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, n. 8, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 n. 8, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (reserving the question whether sovereign immunity would apply if a "plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe[ ] has no alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct"). At the very least, I hope the Lundgrens would carefully examine the full range of legal options for resolving this title dispute with their neighbors, before crossing onto the disputed land and firing up their chainsaws.
We granted certiorari to decide whether "a court's exercise of in rem jurisdiction overcome[s] the jurisdictional bar of tribal sovereign immunity." Pet. for Cert. i; 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 543, 199 L.Ed.2d 423 (2017). State and federal courts are divided on that question, but the Court does not give them an answer. Instead, it holds only that County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S.Ct. 683, 116 L.Ed.2d 687 (1992), "resolved nothing about the law of [tribal] sovereign immunity." Ante, at 1653. Unfortunately, neither does the decision today-except to say that courts cannot rely on County of Yakima . As a result, the disagreement that led us to take this case will persist.
The Court easily could have resolved that disagreement by addressing respondents' alternative ground for affirmance. Sharline and Ray Lundgren-whose family has maintained the land in question for more than 70 years-ask us to affirm based on the "immovable property" exception to sovereign immunity. That exception is settled, longstanding, and obviously applies to tribal immunity-as it does to every other type of sovereign immunity that has ever been recognized. Although the Lundgrens did not raise this argument below, we have the discretion to reach it. I would have done so. The immovable-property exception was extensively briefed and argued, and its application here is straightforward. Addressing the exception now would have ensured that property owners like the Lundgrens can protect their rights and that States like Washington can protect their sovereignty. Because the Court unnecessarily chooses to leave them in limbo, I respectfully dissent.
I
As the Court points out, the parties did not raise the immovable-property exception below or in their certiorari-stage briefs. See ante, at 1653. But this Court will resolve arguments raised for the first time in the merits briefs when they are a " ' "predicate to an intelligent resolution" of the question presented' " and thus " 'fairly included' within the question presented." Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75, n. 13, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996) (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) ; this Court's Rule 14.1). The Court agrees that the immovable-property exception is necessary to an intelligent resolution of the question presented, which is why it remands that issue to the Washington Supreme Court. See ante, at 1653 - 1655. But our normal practice is to address the issue ourselves, unless there are "good reasons to decline to exercise our discretion."
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 397, n. 12, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (plurality opinion).
There are no good reasons here. The Court's only proffered reason is that the applicability of the immovable-property exception is a "grave question" that "will affect all tribes, not just the one before us." Ante, at 1654. The exception's applicability might be "grave," but it is also clear. And most questions decided by this Court will affect more than the parties "before us"; that is one of the primary reasons why we grant certiorari. See this Court's Rule 10(c) (explaining that certiorari review is usually reserved for cases involving "an important question of federal law" that has divided the state or federal courts). Moreover, the Court's decision to forgo answering the question presented is no less "grave." It forces the Lundgrens to squander additional years and resources litigating their right to litigate. And it casts uncertainty over the sovereign rights of States to maintain jurisdiction over their respective territories.
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 1654 - 1655, I have no doubt that our state-court colleagues will faithfully interpret and apply the law on remand. But I also have no doubt that this Court "ha[s] an 'obligation ... to decide the merits of the question presented' " in the cases that come before us. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2117, 2129, 195 L.Ed.2d 382 (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Court should have discharged that obligation here.
II
I would have resolved this case based on the immovable-property exception to sovereign immunity. That exception is well established. And it plainly extends to tribal immunity, as it does to every other form of sovereign immunity.
A
The immovable-property exception has been hornbook law almost as long as there have been hornbooks. For centuries, there has been "uniform authority in support of the view that there is no immunity from jurisdiction with respect to actions relating to immovable property." Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l Law 220, 244 (1951). This immovable-property exception predates both the founding and the Tribe's treaty with the United States. Cornelius van Bynkershoek, a renowned 18th-century jurist, stated that it was "established" that "property which a prince has purchased for himself in the dominions of another ... shall be treated just like the property of private individuals." De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis 22 (G. Laing transl. 2d ed. 1946). His conclusion echoed the 16th-century legal scholar Oswald Hilliger. See ibid. About a decade after Bynkershoek, Emer de Vattel explained that, when "sovereigns have fiefs and other possessions in the territory of another prince; in such cases they hold them after the manner of private individuals." 3 The Law of Nations § 83, p. 139 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916); see also E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations § 115, p. 493 (J. Chitty ed. 1872) ("All landed estates, all immovable property, by whomsoever possessed, are subject to the jurisdiction of the country").
The immovable-property exception is a corollary of the ancient principle of lex rei sitae . Sometimes called lex situs or lex loci rei sitae, the principle provides that "land is governed by the law of the place where it is situated. " F. Wharton, Conflict of Laws § 273, p. 607 (G. Parmele ed., 3d ed. 1905). It reflects the fact that a sovereign "cannot suffer its own laws ... to be changed" by another sovereign. H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 81, p. 114 (1866). As then-Judge Scalia explained, it is "self-evident" that "[a] territorial sovereign has a primeval interest in resolving all disputes over use or right to use of real property within its own domain." Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1521 (C.A.D.C.1984). And because "land is so indissolubly connected with the territory of a State," a State "cannot permit" a foreign sovereign to displace its jurisdiction by purchasing land and then claiming "immunity." Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 451, 578 (1932) (Competence of Courts). An assertion of immunity by a foreign sovereign over real property is an attack on the sovereignty of "the State of the situs." Ibid.
The principle of lex rei sitae was so well established by the 19th century that Chancellor James Kent deemed it "too clear for discussion." 2 Commentaries on American Law 429, n. a (4th ed. 1840). The medieval jurist Bartolus of Sassoferatto had recognized the principle 500 years earlier in his commentary on conflicts of law under the Justinian Code. See Bartolus, Conflict of Laws 29 (J. Beale transl. 1914). Bartolus explained that, "when there is a question of any right growing out of a thing itself, the custom or statute of the place where the thing is should be observed." Ibid. Later authorities writing on conflicts of law consistently agreed that lex rei sitae determined the governing law in real-property disputes. And this Court likewise held, nearly 200 years ago, that "the nature of sovereignty" requires that "[e]very government" have "the exclusive right of regulating the descent, distribution, and grants of the domain within its own boundaries." Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 12, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823) (Story, J.).
The acceptance of the immovable-property exception has not wavered over time. In the 20th century, as nations increasingly owned foreign property, it remained "well settled in International law that foreign state immunity need not be extended in cases dealing with rights to interests in real property." Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning, and Effect, 3 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 33 (1976). Countries around the world continued to recognize the exception in their statutory and decisional law. See Competence of Courts 572-590 (noting support for the exception in statutes from Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, as well as decisions from the United States, Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Germany, and Romania). "All modern authors are, in fact, agreed that in all disputes in rem regarding immovable property, the judicial authorities of the State possess as full a jurisdiction over foreign States as they do over foreign individuals." C. Hyde, 2 International Law 848, n. 33 (2d ed. 1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law reflects this unbroken consensus. Every iteration of the Restatement has deemed a suit concerning the ownership of real property to be "outside the scope of the principle of [sovereign] immunity of a foreign state." Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Proposed Official Draft) § 71, Comment c, p. 228 (1962); see also Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 68(b) (1965) (similar); Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 455(1)(c) (1987) (denying that immunity exists for "claims ... to immovable property in the state of the forum"); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 456(2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, Mar. 22, 2016) (recognizing "jurisdiction over a foreign state in any case in which rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue"). Sovereign immunity, the First Restatement explains, does not bar "an action to obtain possession of or establish an ownership interest in immovable property located in the territory of the state exercising jurisdiction." § 71(b), at 226.
Given the centuries of uniform agreement on the immovable-property exception, it is no surprise that all three branches of the United States Government have recognized it. Writing for a unanimous Court and drawing on Bynkershoek and De Vattel, Chief Justice Marshall noted that "the property of a foreign sovereign is not distinguishable by any legal exemption from the property of an ordinary individual." Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 144-145, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). Thus, "[a] prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction ... and assuming the character of a private individual." Id., at 145. The Court echoed this reasoning over a century later, holding that state sovereign immunity does not extend to "[l]and acquired by one State in another State." Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480, 44 S.Ct. 369, 68 L.Ed. 796 (1924). In 1952, the State Department acknowledged that "[t]here is agreement[,] supported by practice, that sovereign immunity should not be claimed or granted in actions with respect to real property." Tate Letter 984. Two decades later, Congress endorsed the immovable-property exception by including it in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) ("A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States ... in any case ... in which ... rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue"). This statutory exception was "meant to codify the pre-existing real property exception to sovereign immunity recognized by international practice." Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 200, 127 S.Ct. 2352, 168 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court does not question any of the foregoing authorities. Nor did the parties provide any reason to do so. The Government, when asked to identify its "best authority for the proposition that the baseline rule of common law was total immunity, including in rem actions," pointed to just two sources. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10, 26. The first was Hamilton's statement that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis deleted). Yet "property ownership is not an inherently sovereign function," Permanent Mission, supra, at 199, 127 S.Ct. 2352, and Hamilton's general statement does not suggest that immunity is automatically available or is not subject to longstanding exceptions. The Government also cited Schooner Exchange . But as explained above, that decision expressly acknowledges the immovable-property exception.
The Government's unconvincing arguments cannot overcome more than six centuries of consensus on the validity of the immovable-property exception.
B
Because the immovable-property exception clearly applies to both state and foreign sovereign immunity, the only question is whether it also applies to tribal immunity. It does.
Just last Term, this Court refused to "exten[d]" tribal immunity "beyond what common-law sovereign immunity principles would recognize." Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct. 1285, 1292, 197 L.Ed.2d 631 (2017). Tribes are "domestic dependent nations," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831), that "no longer posses[s] the full attributes of sovereignty," United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the "limited character" of their sovereignty, ibid., Indian tribes possess only "the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers," Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). That is why this Court recently declined an invitation to make tribal immunity "broader than the protection offered by state or federal sovereign immunity." Lewis, 581 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1292. Accordingly, because States and foreign countries are subject to the immovable-property exception, Indian tribes are too. "There is no reason to depart from these general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity." Id., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1291.
In declining to reach the immovable-property exception, the Court highlights two counterarguments that the Tribe and the United States have raised for why the exception should not extend to tribal immunity. Neither argument has any merit.
First, the Court notes that "immunity doctrines lifted from other contexts do not always neatly apply to Indian tribes." Ante, at 1654 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) ). But the Court's authority for that proposition merely states that tribal immunity "is not coextensive with that of the States ." Id., at 756, 118 S.Ct. 1700 (emphasis added). Even assuming that is so, it does not mean that the Tribe's immunity can be more expansive than any recognized form of sovereign immunity, including the immunity of the United States and foreign countries. See Lewis, supra, at 1659 - 1660, 137 S.Ct., at 1291-1292. And the Tribe admits that this Court has previously limited tribal immunity to conform with analogous "limitations ... in suits against the United States." Reply Brief 22. No one argues that the United States could claim sovereign immunity if it wrongfully asserted ownership of private property in a foreign country-the equivalent of what the Tribe did here. The United States plainly would be subject to suit in that country's courts. See Competence of Courts 572-590.
Second, the Court cites two decisions for the proposition that "since the founding ... the political branches rather than judges have held primary responsibility for determining when foreign sovereigns may be sued for their activities in this country." Ante, at 1654 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) ; Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588, 63 S.Ct. 793, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943) ). But those cases did not involve tribal immunity. They were admiralty suits in which foreign sovereigns sought to recover ships they allegedly owned. See Verlinden, supra, at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962 (citing cases involving ships allegedly owned by Italy, Peru, and Mexico); Ex parte Peru, supra, at 579, 63 S.Ct. 793 (mandamus action by Peru regarding its steamship). Those decisions were an extension of the common-law principle, recognized in Schooner Exchange , that sovereign immunity applies to vessels owned by a foreign sovereign. See Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-576, 46 S.Ct. 611, 70 L.Ed. 1088 (1926). These cases encourage deference to the political branches on sensitive questions of foreign affairs. But they do not suggest that courts can ignore longstanding limits on sovereign immunity, such as the immovable-property exception. And they do not suggest that courts can abdicate their judicial duty to decide the scope of tribal immunity-a duty this Court exercised just last Term. See Lewis, supra, at 1658 - 1660, 137 S.Ct., at 1290-1292.
In fact, those present at "the founding," ante, at 1654, would be shocked to learn that an Indian tribe could acquire property in a State and then claim immunity from that State's jurisdiction. Tribal immunity is "a judicial doctrine" that is not mandated by the Constitution. Kiowa, 523 U.S., at 759, 118 S.Ct. 1700. It "developed almost by accident," was reiterated "with little analysis," and does not reflect the realities of modern-day Indian tribes. See id., at 756-758, 118 S.Ct. 1700. The doctrine has become quite "exorbitant," Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2055, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting), and it has been implausibly "exten[ded] ... to bar suits arising out of an Indian tribe's commercial activities conducted outside its territory," id., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2045 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
Extending it even further here would contradict the bedrock principle that each State is "entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits." Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 228, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845) ; accord, Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725, 19 L.Ed. 227 (1869) ; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 9, 8 S.Ct. 811, 31 L.Ed. 629 (1888) (collecting cases). Since 1812, this Court has "entertain[ed] no doubt" that "the title to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the law of the place where such land is situate [d]." United States v. Crosby, 7 Cranch 115, 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812) (Story, J.). Justice Bushrod Washington declared it "an unquestionable principle of general law, that the title to, and the disposition of real property, must be exclusively subject to the laws of the country where it is situated."
Kerr v. Devisees of Moon, 9 Wheat. 565, 570, 6 L.Ed. 161 (1824). This Court has been similarly emphatic ever since. See, e.g., Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499, 503, 40 S.Ct. 365, 64 L.Ed. 684 (1920) ("long ago declared"); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321, 10 S.Ct. 557, 33 L.Ed. 918 (1890) ("held repeatedly"); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320, 24 L.Ed. 192 (1877) ("undoubted"); McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 202, 6 L.Ed. 300 (1825) ("an acknowledged principle of law"). Allowing the judge-made doctrine of tribal immunity to intrude on such a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty contradicts the Constitution's design, which " 'leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.' " New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (quoting The Federalist No. 39, at 256).
* * *
The Court's failure to address the immovable-property exception in this case is difficult to justify. It leaves our colleagues in the state and federal courts with little more guidance than they had before. It needlessly delays relief for the Lundgrens, who must continue to litigate the threshold question whether they can litigate their indisputable right to their land. And it does not address a clearly erroneous tribal-immunity claim: one that asserts a sweeping and absolute immunity that no other sovereign has ever enjoyed-not a State, not a foreign nation, and not even the United States.
I respectfully dissent.
Compare 187 Wash.2d 857, 865-869, 389 P.3d 569, 573-574 (2017) (case below); Cass County Joint Water Resource Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land in Highland Twp., 2002 ND 83, 643 N.W.2d 685, 691-693 (2002) (conforming to the Washington Supreme Court's interpretation of Yakima ), with Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe, 2017-NMSC-007, 388 P.3d 977, 986 (2016) (disagreeing); Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Seneca County, 761 F.3d 218, 221 (C.A.2 2014) (same).
The Court does not question the adequacy of the briefing or identify factual questions that need further development. Nor could it. The immovable-property exception received extensive attention in the parties' briefs, see Brief for Respondents 9-26; Reply Brief 13-24, and the Government's amicus brief, see Brief for United States 25-33. Most of the oral argument likewise focused on the immovable-property exception. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-16, 19-29, 34-51, 54-59. And when asked at oral argument what else it could say about the exception if it had more time, the Tribe had no response. See id ., at 19-21.
There is some disagreement about the outer bounds of this exception-for example, whether it applies to tort claims related to the property or to diplomatic embassies. See, e.g., Letter from J. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, to Acting Attorney General P. Perlman (May 19, 1952), 26 Dept. of State Bull. 984, 984-985 (Tate Letter); see also C. Bynkershoek, De Foro Legatorum Liber Singularis 22-23 (G. Laing transl. 2d ed. 1946) (explaining there is "no unanimity" regarding attaching a foreign prince's debts to immovable property). But there is no dispute that it covers suits concerning ownership of a piece of real property used for nondiplomatic reasons. See Tate Letter 984; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28. In other words, there is no dispute that it applies to in rem suits like this one.
Considered "a jurist of great reputation" by Chief Justice Marshall, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 144, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812), "Bynkershoek's influence in the eighteenth century [w]as enormous," Adler, The President's Recognition Power, in The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy 133, 153, n. 19 (G. Adler & L. George eds. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Madison, for example, consulted Bynkershoek's works (on the recommendation of Jefferson) while preparing to draft the Constitution. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 20, 1784), in 4 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 239, 248 (P. Ford ed. 1904); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 16, 1784), in 2 The Writings of James Madison 34, 43 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
De Vattel's work was "a leading treatise" of its era. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 3, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1416 n. 3, ---L.Ed.2d --- (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
In the foreword to his translation of Bartolus, Joseph Henry Beale described him as "the most imposing figure among the lawyers of the middle ages," whose work was "the first and standard statement of the doctrines of the Conflict of Laws." Bartolus, Conflict of Laws, at 9.
See, e.g., F. von Savigny, Conflict of Laws 130 (W. Guthrie transl. 1869) ("This principle [of lex rei sitae ] has been generally accepted from a very early time"); G. Bowyer, Commentaries on Universal Public Law 160 (1854) ("[W]here the matter in controversy is the right and title to land or other immovable property, the judgment pronounced in the forum rei sitae is held conclusive in other countries"); H. Wheaton, Elements of International Law § 81, p. 114 (G. Wilson ed. 1936) ("[T]he law of a place where real property is situated governs exclusively as to the tenure, title, and the descent of such property"); J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 424, p. 708 (rev. 3d ed. 1846) ("The title ... to real property can be acquired, passed, and lost only according to the Lex rei sitae "); J. Westlake, Private International Law *56 ("The right to possession of land can only be tried in the courts of the situs "); L. Bar, International Law 241-242 (G. Gillespie transl. 1883) (noting that, in "the simpler case of immoveables," "[t]he lex rei sitae is the rule"); F. Wharton, 1 Conflict of Laws § 273, p. 607 (G. Parmele ed., 3d ed. 1905) ("Jurists of all schools, and courts of all nations, are agreed in holding that land is governed by the law of the place where it is situated").
The Skagit Tribe entered into its treaty with the United States four decades later. See Treaty of Point Elliott, Apr. 11, 1859, 12 Stat. 927. The treaty does not mention sovereignty or otherwise alter the rule laid out in Schooner Exchange .
This declaration has long been "the official policy of our Government." Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976). The State Department has reaffirmed it on several occasions. See, e.g., Dept. of State, J. Sweeney, Policy Research Study: The International Law of Sovereign Immunity 24 (1963) ("The immunity from jurisdiction of a foreign state does not extend to actions for the determination of an interest in immovable-or real-property in the territory. This limitation on the immunity of the state is of long standing").
These decisions about ships, even on their own terms, undercut the Tribe's claim to immunity here. The decisions acknowledge a "distinction between possession and title" that is "supported by the overwhelming weight of authority" and denies immunity to a foreign sovereign that has "title ... without possession." Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 37-38, 65 S.Ct. 530, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945) ; see, e.g., Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491, 493-501 (S.D.N.Y.1883). That distinction would defeat the Tribe's claim to immunity because the Lundgrens have possession of the land. See 187 Wash.2d 857, 861-864, 389 P.3d 569, 571-572 (2017).
Their shock would not be assuaged by the Government's proposed remedy. The Government suggests that the Lundgrens should force a showdown with the Tribe by chopping down trees or building some structure on the land. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23-24. If the judge-made doctrine of tribal immunity has come to a place where it forces individuals to take the law into their own hands to keep their own land, then it will have crossed the threshold from mistaken to absurd. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
HEINTZ et al. v. JENKINS
No. 94-367.
Argued February 21, 1995
Decided April 18, 1995
Breyek, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
George W. Spellmire argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were D. Kendall Griffith, Bruce L. Carmen, and David M. Schultz.
Daniel A. Edelman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Joanne S. Faulkner and Richard J. Rubin
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bar Association by George E. Bushnell; for the Commercial Law League of America by Manuel H. Newburger and Barbara M. Barron; and for the National Association of Retail Collection Attorneys by Ronald S. Canter and Rosalie B. Levinson.
Robert J. Hobbs, Joan S. Wise, Deborah M. Zuckerman, and Alan Alop filed a brief for the National Consumer Law Center, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Andrew Rosen filed a brief for Sherry Ann Edwards as amicus curiae.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is whether the term “debt collector” in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 91 Stat. 874, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 ed. and Supp. V), applies to a lawyer who “regularly,” through litigation, tries to collect consumer debts. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that it does. We agree with the Seventh Circuit and we affirm its judgment.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits “debt collectorfs]” from making false or misleading representations and from engaging in various abusive and unfair practices. The Act says, for example, that a “debt collector” may not use violence, obscenity, or repeated annoying phone calls, 15 U. S. C. § 1692d; may not falsely represent “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” § 1692e(2)(A); and may not use various “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect” a consumer debt, § 1692f. Among other things, the Act sets out rules that a debt collector must follow for “acquiring location information” about the debtor, § 1692b; communicating about the debtor (and the debt) with third parties, § 1692c(b); and bringing “[l]egal actions,” § 1692i. The Act imposes upon “debt collector[s]” who violate its provisions (specifically described) “[c]ivil liability” to those whom they, e. g., harass, mislead, or treat unfairly. § 1692k. The Act also authorizes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to enforce its provisions. § 1692Z(a). The Act’s definition of the term “debt collector” includes a person “who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed [to]... another.” § 1692a(6). And, it limits “debt” to consumer debt, i. e., debts “arising out of . . . transaction^]” that “are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” § 1692a(5).
The plaintiff in this case, Darlene Jenkins, borrowed money from the Gainer Bank in order to buy a car. She defaulted on her loan. The bank’s law firm then sued Jenkins in state court to recover the balance due. As part of an effort to settle the suit, a lawyer with that law firm, George Heintz, wrote to Jenkins’ lawyer. His letter, in listing the amount she owed under the loan agreement, included $4,173 owed for insurance, bought by the bank because she had not kept the car insured as she had promised to do.
Jenkins then brought this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act suit against Heintz and his firm. She claimed that Heintz’s letter violated the Act’s prohibitions against trying to collect an amount not “authorized by the agreement creating the debt,” § 1692f(l), and against making a “false representation of . . . the . . . amount ... of any debt,” § 1692e(2)(A). The loan agreement, she conceded, required her to keep the car insured “ ‘against loss or damage’ ” and permitted the bank to buy such insurance to protect the car should she fail to do so. App. to Pet. for Cert. 17. But, she said, the $4,173 substitute policy was not the kind of policy the loan agreement had in mind, for it insured the bank not only against “loss or damage” but also against her failure to repay the bank’s car loan. Hence, Heintz’s “representation” about the “amount” of her “debt” was “false”; amounted to an effort to collect an “amount” not “authorized” by the loan agreement; and thus violated the Act.
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court dismissed Jenkins’ Fair Debt Collection lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Act does not apply to lawyers engaging in litigation. However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment, interpreting the Act to apply to litigating lawyers. 25 F. 3d 536 (1994). The Seventh Circuit’s view in this respect conflicts with that of the Sixth Circuit. See Green v. Hocking, 9 F. 3d 18 (1993) (per curiam). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 513 U. S. 959 (1994). And, as we have said, we conclude that the Seventh Circuit is correct. The Act does apply to lawyers engaged in litigation.
There are two rather strong reasons for believing that the Act applies to the litigating activities of lawyers. First, the Act defines the “debt collector[s]” to whom it applies as including those who “regularly collec[t] or attempft] to collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer] debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” § 1692a(6). In ordinary English, a lawyer who regularly tries to obtain payment of consumer debts through legal proceedings is a lawyer who regularly “attempts” to “collect” those consumer debts. See, e. g., Black’s Law Dictionary 263 (6th ed. 1990) (“To collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by personal solicitation or legal proceedings”).
Second, in 1977, Congress enacted an earlier version of this statute, which contained an express exemption for lawyers. That exemption said that the term “debt collector” did not include “any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client.” Pub. L. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875. In 1986, however, Congress repealed this exemption in its entirety, Pub. L. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768, without creating a narrower, litigation-related, exemption to fill the void. Without more, then, one would think that Congress intended that lawyers be subject to the Act whenever they meet the general “debt collector” definition.
Heintz argues that we should nonetheless read the statute as containing an implied exemption for those debt-collecting activities of lawyers that consist of litigating (including, he assumes, settlement efforts). He relies primarily on three arguments.
First, Heintz argues that many of the Act’s requirements, if applied directly to litigating activities, will create harmfully anomalous results that Congress simply could not have intended. We address this argument in light of the fact that, when Congress first wrote the Act’s substantive provisions, it had for the most part exempted litigating attorneys from the Act’s coverage; that, when Congress later repealed the attorney exemption, it did not revisit the wording of these substantive provisions; and that, for these reasons, some awkwardness is understandable. Particularly when read in this light, we find Heintz’s argument unconvincing.
Many of Heintz’s “anomalies” are not particularly anomalous. For example, the Sixth Circuit pointed to § 1692e(5), which forbids a “debt collector” to make any “threat to take action that cannot legally be taken.” The court reasoned that, were the Act to apply to litigating activities, this provision automatically would make liable any litigating lawyer who brought, and then lost, a claim against a debtor. Green, supra, at 21. But, the Act says explicitly that a “debt collector” may not be held liable if he “shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” § 1692k(c). Thus, even if we were to assume that the suggested reading of § 1692e(5) is correct, we would not find the result so absurd as to warrant implying an exemption for litigating lawyers. In any event, the assumption would seem unnecessary, for we do not see how the fact that a lawsuit turns out ultimately to be unsuccessful could, by itself, make the bringing of it an “action that cannot legally be taken.”
The remaining significant “anomalies” similarly depend for their persuasive force upon readings that courts seem unlikely to endorse. For example, Heintz’s strongest “anomaly” argument focuses upon the Act’s provisions governing “[cjommunication in connection with debt collection.” § 1692c. One of those provisions requires a “debt collector” not to “communicate further” with a consumer who “notifies” the “debt collector” that he or she “refuses to pay” or wishes the debt collector to “cease further communication.” § 1692c(c). In light of this provision, asks Heintz, how can an attorney file a lawsuit against (and thereby communicate with) a nonconsenting consumer or file a motion for summary judgment against that consumer?
We agree with Heintz that it would be odd if the Act empowered a debt-owing consumer to stop the “communications” inherent in an ordinary lawsuit and thereby cause an ordinary debt-collecting lawsuit to grind to a halt. But, it is not necessary to read § 1692c(c) in that way — if only because that provision has exceptions that permit communications “to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke” or “intends to invoke” a “specified remedy” (of a kind “ordinarily invoked by [the] debt collector or creditor”). §§ 1692c(c)(2), (3). Courts can read these exceptions, plausibly, to imply that they authorize the actual invocation of the remedy that the collector “intends to invoke.” The language permits such a reading, for an ordinary court-related document does, in fact, “notify” its recipient that the creditor may “invoke” a judicial remedy. Moreover, the interpretation is consistent with the statute’s apparent objective of preserving creditors’ judicial remedies. We need not authoritatively interpret the Act’s conduct-regulating provisions now, however. Rather, we rest our conclusions upon the fact that it is easier to read § 1692c(c) as containing some such additional, implicit, exception than to believe that Congress intended, silently and implicitly, to create a far broader exception, for all litigating attorneys, from the Act itself.
Second, Heintz points to a statement of Congressman Frank Annunzio, one of the sponsors of the 1986 amendment that removed from the Act the language creating a blanket exemption for lawyers. Representative Annunzio stated that, despite the exemption’s removal, the Act still would not apply to lawyers’ litigating activities. Representative Annunzio said that the Act
“regulates debt collection, not the practice of law. Congress repealed the attorney exemption to the act, not because of attorney[s’] conduct in the courtroom, but because of their conduct in the backroom. Only collection activities, not legal activities, are covered by the act.... The act applies to attorneys when they are collecting debts, not when they are performing tasks of a legal nature. . . . The act only regulates the conduct of debt collectors, it does not prevent creditors, through their attorneys, from pursuing any legal remedies available to them.” 132 Cong. Rec. 30842 (1986).
This statement, however, does not persuade us.
For one thing, the plain language of the Act itself says nothing about retaining the exemption in respect to litigation. The line the statement seeks to draw between “legal” activities and “debt collection” activities was not necessarily apparent to those who debated the legislation, for litigating, at first blush, seems simply one way of collecting a debt. For another thing, when Congress considered the Act, other Congressmen expressed fear that repeal would limit lawyers’ “ability to contact third parties in order to facilitate settlements” and “could very easily interfere with a client’s right to pursue judicial remedies.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-405, p. 11 (1985) (dissenting views of Rep. Hiler). They proposed alternative language designed to keep litigation activities outside the Act’s scope, but that language was not enacted. Ibid. Further, Congressman Annunzio made his statement not during the legislative process, but after the statute became law. It therefore is not a statement upon which other legislators might have relied in voting for or against the Act, but it simply represents the views of one informed person on an issue about which others may (or may not) have thought differently.
Finally, Heintz points to a “Commentary” on the Act by the FTC’s staff. It says:
“Attorneys or law firms that engage in traditional debt collection activities (sending dunning letters, making collection calls to consumers) are covered by the [Act], but those whose practice is limited to legal activities are not covered.” Federal Trade Commission — Statements of General Policy or Interpretation Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097, 50100 (1988) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
We cannot give conclusive weight to this statement. The Commentary of which this statement is a part says that it “is not binding on the Commission or the public.” Id., at 50101. More importantly, we find nothing either in the Act or elsewhere indicating that Congress intended to authorize the FTC to create this exception from the Act’s coverage— an exception that, for the reasons we have set forth above, falls outside the range of reasonable interpretations of the Act’s express language. See, e. g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 120-122 (1994); see also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F. 3d 1507, 1513 (CA9 1994) (FTC staff’s statement conflicts with Act’s plain language and is therefore not entitled to deference); Scott v. Jones, 964 F. 2d 314, 317 (CA4 1992) (same).
For these reasons, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that the Act applies to attorneys who “regularly” engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, even when that activity consists of litigation. Its judgment is therefore
Affirmed. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
1
] | sc_casedisposition |
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. J. WEINGARTEN, INC.
No. 73-1363.
Argued November 18, 1974
Decided February 19, 1975
Patrick Hardin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Peter G. Nash, John S. Irving, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher.
Neil Martin argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Jerry Kronenberg and Milton Smith filed a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Board held in this case that respondent employer's denial of an employee's request that her union representative be present at an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action constituted an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8 (a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, because it interfered with, restrained, and coerced the individual right of the employee, protected by § 7 of the Act, “to engage in . . . concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection . 202 N. L. R. B. 446 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that this was an impermissible construction of § 7 and refused to enforce the Board’s order that directed respondent to cease and desist from requiring any employee to take part in an investigatory interview without union representation if the employee requests representation and reasonably fears disciplinary action. 485 F. 2d 1135 (1973). We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument with No. 73-765, Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276. 416 U. S. 969 (1974). We reverse.
I
Respondent operates a chain of some 100 retail stores with lunch counters at some, and so-called lobby food operations at others, dispensing food to take out or eat on the premises. Respondent's sales personnel are represented for collective-bargaining purposes by Retail Clerks Union, Local 455. Leura Collins, one of the sales personnel, worked at the lunch counter at Store No. 2 from 1961 to 1970 when she was transferred to the lobby operation at Store No. 98. Respondent maintains a com-panywide security department staffed by “Loss Prevention Specialists” who work undercover in all stores to guard against loss from shoplifting and employee dishonesty. In June 1972, “Specialist” Hardy, without the knowledge of the store manager, spent two days observing the lobby operation at Store No. 98 investigating a report that Collins was taking money from a cash register. When Hardy’s surveillance of Collins at work turned up no evidence to support the report, Hardy disclosed his presence to the store manager and reported that he could find nothing wrong. The store manager then told him that a fellow lobby employee of Collins had just reported that Collins had purchased a box of chicken that sold for $2.98, but had placed only $1 in the cash register. Collins was summoned to an interview with Specialist Hardy and the store manager, and Hardy questioned her. The Board found that several times during the questioning she asked the store manager to call the union shop steward or some other union representative to the interview, and that her requests were denied. Collins admitted that she had purchased some chicken, a loaf of bread, and some cake which she said she paid for and donated to her church for a church dinner. She explained that she purchased four pieces of chicken for which the price was $1, but that because the lobby department was out of the small-size boxes in which such purchases were usually packaged she put the chicken into the larger box normally used for packaging larger quantities. Specialist Hardy left the interview to check Collins’ explanation with the fellow employee who had reported Collins. This employee confirmed that the lobby department had run out of small boxes and also said that she did not know how many pieces of chicken Collins had put in the larger box. Specialist Hardy returned to the interview, told Collins that her explanation had checked out, that he was sorry if he had inconvenienced her, and that the matter was closed.
Collins thereupon burst into tears and blurted out that the only thing she had ever gotten from the store without paying for it was her free lunch. This revelation surprised the store manager and Hardy because, although free lunches had been provided at Store No. 2 when Collins worked at the lunch counter there, company policy was not to provide free lunches at stores operating lobby departments. In consequence, the store manager and Specialist Hardy closely interrogated Collins about violations of the policy in the lobby department at Store No. 98. Collins again asked that a shop steward be called to the interview, but the store manager denied her request. Based on her answers to his questions, Specialist Hardy prepared a written statement which included a computation that Collins owed the store approximately $160 for lunches. Collins refused to sign the statement. The Board found that Collins, as well as most, if not all, employees in the lobby department of Store No. 98, including the manager of that department, took lunch from the lobby without paying for it, apparently because no contrary policy was ever made known to them. Indeed, when company headquarters advised Specialist Hardy by telephone during the interview that headquarters itself was uncertain whether the policy against providing free lunches at lobby departments was in effect at Store No. 98, he terminated his interrogation of Collins. The store manager asked Collins not to discuss the matter with anyone because he considered it a private matter between her and the company, of no concern to others. Collins, however, reported the details of the interview fully to her shop steward and other union representatives, and this unfair labor practice proceeding resulted.
II
The Board’s construction that § 7 creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his discipline was announced in its decision and order of January 28, 1972, in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N. L. R. B. 197, considered in Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276. In its opinions in that case and in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052, decided May 12, 1972, three months later, the Board shaped the contours and limits of the statutory right.
First, the right inheres in § 7’s guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid and protection. In Mobil Oil, the Board stated:
“An employee’s right to union representation upon request is based on Section 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert for 'mutual aid and protection.’ The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in violation of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. Thus, it is a serious violation of the employee’s individual right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer denies the employee’s request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee’s right to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather than individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action.” Ibid.
Second, the right arises only in situations where the employee requests representation. In other words, the employee may forgo his guaranteed right and, if he prefers, participate in an interview unaccompanied by his union representative.
Third, the employee’s right to request representation as a condition of participation in an interview is limited to situations where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in disciplinary action. Thus the Board stated in Quality:
"We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of work techniques. In such cases there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview, and thus we would then see no reasonable basis for him to seek the assistance of his representative.” 195 N. L. R. B., at 199.
Fourth, exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate employer prerogatives. The employer has no obligation to justify his refusal to allow union representation, and despite refusal, the employer is free to carry on his inquiry without interviewing the employee, and thus leave to the employee the choice between having an interview unaccompanied by his representative, or having no interview and forgoing any benefits that might be derived from one. As stated in Mobil Oil:
“The employer may, if it wishes, advise the employee that it will not proceed with the interview unless the employee is willing to enter the interview unaccompanied by his representative. The employee may then refrain from participating in the interview, thereby protecting his right to representation, but at the same time relinquishing any benefit which might be derived from the interview. The employer would then be free to act on the basis of information obtained from other sources.” 196 N. L. R. B., at 1062.
The Board explained in Quality:
“This seems to us to be the only course consistent with all of the provisions of our Act. It permits the employer to reject a collective .course in situations such as investigative interviews where a collective course is not required but protects the employee’s right to protection by his chosen agents. Participation in the interview is then voluntary, and, if the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the interview will adversely affect his continued employment, or even his working conditions, he may choose to forego it unless he is afforded the safeguard of his representative’s presence. He would then also forego whatever benefit might come from the interview. And, in that event, the employer would, of course, be free to act on the basis of whatever information he had and without such additional facts as might have been gleaned through the interview.” 195 N. L. R. B., at 198-199.
Fifth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview. The Board said in Mobil, “we are not giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predisciplinary discussions which it otherwise was not able to secure during collective-bargaining negotiations.” 196 N. L. R. B., at 1052 n. 3. The Board thus adhered to its decisions distinguishing between disciplinary and investigatory interviews, imposing a mandatory affirmative obligation to meet with the union representative only in the case of the disciplinary interview. Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N. L. R. B. 361 (1967); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968). The employer has no duty to bargain with the union representative at an investigatory interview. “The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have knowledge of them. The employer, however, is free to insist that he is only interested, at that time, in hearing the employee’s own account of the matter under investigation.” Brief for Petitioner 22.
Ill
The Board’s holding is a permissible construction of “concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection” by the agency charged by Congress with enforcement of the Act, and should have been sustained.
The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of § 7 that “[ejmployees shall have the right ... to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 P. 2d 842, 847 (CA7 1973). This is true even though the employee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome; he seeks “aid or protection” against a perceived threat to his employment security. The union representative whose participation he seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular employee’s interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly. The representative’s presence is an assurance to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain his aid and protection if called upon to attend a like interview. Concerted activity for mutual aid or protection is therefore as present here as it was held to be in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F. 2d 503, 505-506 (CA2 1942), cited with approval by this Court in Houston Contractors Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 664, 668-669 (1967):
“ 'When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protection,” although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is “mutual aid” in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.’ ”
The Board’s construction plainly effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act. In § 1, 29 U. S. C. § 151, the Act declares that it is a goal of national labor policy to protect “the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.” To that end the Act is designed to eliminate the “inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers.” Ibid. Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview which he reasonably believes may result in the imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act was designed to eliminate, and bars recourse to the safeguards the Act provided “to redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S. 300, 316 (1965). Viewed in this light, the Board’s recognition that § 7 guarantees an employee’s right to the presence of a union representative at an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline reasonably inheres is within the protective ambit of the section “ ‘read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’ ” NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 124 (1944).
The Board’s construction also gives recognition to the right when it is most useful to both employee and employer. A single employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview. Certainly his presence need not transform the interview into an adversary contest. Respondent suggests nonetheless that union representation at this stage is unnecessary because a decision as to employee culpability or disciplinary action can be corrected after the decision to impose discipline has become final. In other words, respondent would defer representation until the filing of a formal grievance challenging the employer’s determination of guilt after the employee has been discharged or otherwise disciplined. At that point, however, it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The employer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than re-examining them.
IV
The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s construction as foreclosed by that court’s decision four years earlier in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division v. NLRB, 408 F. 2d 142 (1969), and by “a long line of Board decisions, each of which indicates — either directly or indirectly — that no union representative need be present” at an investigatory interview. 485 F. 2d, at 1137.
The Board distinguishes Texaco as presenting not the question whether the refusal to allow the employee to have his union representative present constituted a violation of § 8 (a)(1) but rather the question whether § 8 (a) (5) precluded the employer from refusing to deal with the union. We need not determine whether Texaco is distinguishable. Insofar as the Court of Appeals there held that an employer does not violate § 8 (a)(1) if he denies an employee’s request for union representation at an investigatory interview, and requires him to attend the interview alone, our decision today reversing the Court of Appeals’ judgment based upon Texaco supersedes that holding.
In respect of its own precedents, the Board asserts that even though some “may be read as reaching a contrary conclusion,” they should not be treated as impairing the validity of the Board’s construction, because “[t]hese decisions do not reflect a considered analysis of the issue.” Brief for Petitioner 25. In that circumstance, and in the light of significant developments in industrial life believed by the Board to have warranted a reappraisal of the question, the Board argues that the case is one where “[t]he nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive formula as a comprehensive answer. And so, it is not surprising that the Board has more or less felt its way . . . and has modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating experience.” Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 667, 674 (1961).
We agree that its earlier precedents do not impair the validity of the Board’s construction. That construction in no wise exceeds the reach of § 7, but falls well within the scope of the rights created by that section. The use by an administrative agency of the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decisionmaking. “ 'Cumulative experience’ begets understanding and insight by which judgments . . . are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the administrative from the judicial process.” NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U. S. 344, 349 (1953).
The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board. The Court of Appeals impermissibly encroached upon the Board’s function in determining for itself that an employee has no “need” for union assistance at an investigatory interview. “While a basic purpose of section 7 is to allow employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection, such a need does not arise at an investigatory interview.” 485 F. 2d, at 1138. It is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine whether or not the “need” exists in light of changing industrial practices and the Board’s cumulative experience in dealing with labor-management relations. For the Board has the “special function of applying the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,” NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 236 (1963); see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793, 798 (1945); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 196-197 (1941), and its special competence in this field is the justification for the deference accorded its determination. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U. S., at 316. Reviewing courts are of course not “to stand aside and rubber stamp” Board determinations that run contrary to the language or tenor of the Act, NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291 (1965). But the Board’s construction here, while it may not be required by the Act, is at least permissible under it, and insofar as the Board’s application of that meaning engages in the "difficult and delicate responsibility” of reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management, the balance struck by the Board is “subject to limited judicial review.” NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957). See also NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Brown, supra; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, supra. In sum, the Board has reached a fair and reasoned balance upon a question within its special competence, its newly arrived at construction of § 7 does not exceed the reach of that section, and the Board has adequately explicated the basis of its interpretation.
The statutory right confirmed today is in full harmony with actual industrial practice. Many important collective-bargaining agreements have provisions that accord employees rights of union representation at investigatory interviews. Even where such a right is not explicitly provided in the agreement a "well-established current of arbitral authority” sustains the right of union representation at investigatory interviews which the employee reasonably believes may result in disciplinary action against him. Chevron Chemical Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1066, 1071 (1973).
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to enter a judgment enforcing the Board’s order.
It is so ordered.
Section 8(a)(1), 29 U. S. C. §158 (a)(1), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title.”
Section 7, 29 U. S. C. § 157, provides:
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title.”
Accord: NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F. 2d 1018 (CA4 1973), rev’d, Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276; Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F. 2d 842 (CA7 1973). The issue is a recurring one. In addition to this case and Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., post, p. 276, see Western Electric Co., 205 N. L. R. B. 46 (1973); New York Telephone Co., 203 N. L. R. B. 180 (1973); National Can Corp., 200 N. L. R. B. 1116 (1972); Western Electric Co., 198 N. L. R. B. 82 (1972); Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N. L. R. B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F. 2d 842 (CA7 1973); Lafayette Radio Electronics, 194 N. L. R. B. 491 (1971); Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 834 (1971); United Aircraft Corp., 179 N. L. R. B. 935 (1969), aff’d on another ground, 440 F. 2d 85 (CA2 1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N. L. R. B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N. L. R. B. 839 (1969), aff’d on other grounds, 426 F. 2d 1328 (CA6 1970); Dayton Typographic Service, Inc., 176 N. L. R. B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division, 168 N. L. R. B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F. 2d 142 (CA5 1969); Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149 N. L. R. B. 1432 (1964); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N. L. R. B. 1565 (1964); Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N. L. R. B. 1012 (1945), enforcement denied, 158 F. 2d 607 (CA7 1947). See generally Brodie, Union Representation and the Disciplinary Interview, 15 B. C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1 (1973); Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329 (1974).
The charges also alleged that respondent had violated § 8 (a) (5) by unilaterally changing a condition of employment when, the day after the interview, respondent ordered discontinuance of the free lunch practice. Because respondent’s action was an arbitrable grievance under the collective-bargaining agreement, the Board, pursuant to the deferral-to-arbitration policy adopted in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N. L. R. B. 837 (1971), “dismissed” the § 8 (a) (5) allegation. No issue involving that action is before us.
The Board stated in Quality: “‘Reasonable ground’ will of course be measured, as here, by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case.” 195 N. L. R. B. 197, 198 n. 3. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 608 (19600000000009), the Court announced that it would “reject any rule that requires a probe of an employee’s subjective motivations as involving an endless and unreliable inquiry,” and we reaffirm that view today as applicable also in the context of this case. Reasonableness, as a standard, is prescribed in several places in the Act itself. For example, an employer is not relieved of responsibility for discrimination against an employee “if he has reasonable grounds for believing” that certain facts exist, §§ 8 (a)(3)(A), (B), 29 U. S. C. §§158 (a)(3)(A), (B); also, preliminary injunctive relief against certain conduct must be sought if “the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe” such charge is true, § 10 (l), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (l). See also Congoleum Industries, Inc., 197 N. L. R. B. 534 (1972); Cumberland Shoe Cory., 144 N. L. R. B. 1268 (1963), enforced, 351 F. 2d 917 (CA6 1965).
The key objective fact in this case is that the only exception to the requirement in the collective-bargaining agreement that the employer give a warning notice prior to discharge is "if the cause of such discharge is dishonesty.” Accordingly, had respondent been satisfied, based on its investigatory interview, that Collins was guilty of dishonesty, Collins could have been discharged without further notice. That she might reasonably believe that the interview might result in disciplinary action is thus clear.
“The quantum of proof that the employer considers sufficient to support disciplinary action is of concern to the entire bargaining unit. A slow accretion of custom and practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary disputes. If, for example, the employer adopts a practice of considering [a] foreman’s unsubstantiated statements sufficient to support disciplinary action, employee protection against unwarranted punishment is affected. The presence of a union steward allows protection of this interest by the bargaining representative.” Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329, 338 (1974).
See, e. g., Independent Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 744, 746 (1958): “[Participation by the union representative] might reasonably be designed to clarify the issues at this first stage of the existence of a question, to bring out the facts and the policies concerned at this stage, to give assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express themselves in their cases, and who, when their livelihood is at stake, might in fact need the more experienced kind of counsel which their union steward might represent. The foreman, himself, may benefit from the presence of the steward by seeing the issue, the problem, the implications of the facts, and the collective bargaining clause in question more clearly. Indeed, good faith discussion at this level may solve many problems, and prevent needless hard feelings from arising .... [It] can be advantageous to both parties if they both act in good faith and seek to discuss the question at this stage with as much intelligence as they are capable of bringing to bear on the problem.”
See also Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 647, 651 (1965):
“The procedure . . . contemplates that the steward will exercise his responsibility and authority to discourage grievances where the action on the part of management appears to be justified. Similarly, there exists the responsibility upon management to withhold disciplinary action, or other decisions affecting the employees, where it can be demonstrated at the outset that such action is unwarranted. The presence of the union steward is regarded as a factor conducive to the avoidance of formal grievances through the medium of discussion and persuasion conducted at the threshold of an impending grievance. It is entirely logical that the steward will employ his office in appropriate cases so as to limit formal grievances to those which involve differences of substantial merit. Whether this objective is accomplished will depend on the good faith of the parties, and whether they are amenable to reason and persuasion.”
1 CCH Lab. L. Rep., Union Contracts, Arbitration ¶ 59,520, pp. 84,988-84,989.
The precedents cited by the Court of Appeals are: Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 834 (1971); Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Terminal, 179 N. L. R. B. 976 (1969); Wald Mfg. Co., 176 N. L. R. B. 839 (1969), aff’d, 426 F. 2d 1328 (CA6 1970); Dayton Typographic Service, Inc., 176 N. L. R. B. 357 (1969); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N. L. R. B. 594 (1968); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N. L. R. B. 574 (1967); Dobbs Homes, Inc., 145 N. L. R. B. 1565 (1964). See also NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F. 2d 607 (CA7 1947).
“There has been a recent growth in the use of sophisticated techniques — such as closed circuit television, undercover security-agents, and lie detectors — to monitor and investigate the employees’ conduct at their place of work. See, e. g., Warwick Electronics, Inc., 46 L. A. 95, 97-98 (1966); Bowman Transportation, Inc., 56 L. A. 283, 286-292 (1972); FMC Corp., 46 L. A. 335, 336-338 (1966). These techniques increase not only the employees’ feelings of apprehension, but also their need for experienced assistance in dealing with them. Thus, often, as here and in Mobil, supra, an investigative interview is conducted by security specialists; the employee does not confront a supervisor who is known or familiar to him, but a stranger trained in interrogation techniques. These developments in industrial life warrant a concomitant reappraisal by the Board of their impact on statutory rights. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U. S. 235, 250.” Brief for Petitioner 27 n. 22.
1 BN A Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts 21:22 (General Motors Corp. and Auto Workers, |76a); 27:6 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and Rubber Workers, Art. V (5)); 29:15-29:16 (United States Steel Corp. and United Steelworkers, §§ 8 B [8.4] and [8.7]). See, e. g., the Bethlehem Steel Corp. and United Steelworkers Agreement of 1971, Art. XI, §4 (d), which provided:
“Any Employee who is summoned to meet in an enclosed office with a supervisor for the purpose of discussing possible disciplinary action shall be entitled to be accompanied by the Assistant Grievance Committeeman designated for the area if he requests such representation, provided such representative is available during the shift.”
See also Universal Oil Products Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 832, 834 (1973): “[A]n employee is entitled to the presence of a Committeeman at an investigatory interview if he requests one and if the employee has reasonable grounds to fear that the interview may be used to support disciplinary action against him.” Allied Paper Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 226 (1969); Thrifty Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262 (1968); Waste King Universal Products Co., 46 Lab. Arb. 283, 286 (1966); Dallas Morning News, 40 Lab. Arb. 619, 623-624 (1963); The Arcrods Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 784, 788-789 (1962); Valley Iron Works, 33 Lab. Arb. 769, 771 (1960); Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 57, 60 (1959); Singer Mfg. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 570 (1957); Braniff Airways, Inc., 27 Lab. Arb. 892 (1957); John Lucas & Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 344, 346-347 (1952). Contra, e. g., E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 646, 652 (1957); United Air Lines, Inc., 28 Lab. Arb. 179, 180 (1956). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"arbitration (in the context of labor-management or employer-employee relations) (cf. arbitration)",
"union antitrust: legality of anticompetitive union activity",
"union or closed shop: includes agency shop litigation",
"Fair Labor Standards Act",
"Occupational Safety and Health Act",
"union-union member dispute (except as pertains to union or closed shop)",
"labor-management disputes: bargaining",
"labor-management disputes: employee discharge",
"labor-management disputes: distribution of union literature",
"labor-management disputes: representative election",
"labor-management disputes: antistrike injunction",
"labor-management disputes: jurisdictional dispute",
"labor-management disputes: right to organize",
"labor-management disputes: picketing",
"labor-management disputes: secondary activity",
"labor-management disputes: no-strike clause",
"labor-management disputes: union representatives",
"labor-management disputes: union trust funds (cf. ERISA)",
"labor-management disputes: working conditions",
"labor-management disputes: miscellaneous dispute",
"miscellaneous union"
] | [
16
] | sc_issue_7 |
COLE v. YOUNG et al.
No. 442.
Argued March 6, 1956.
Decided June 11, 1956.
David I. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were James H. Heller and Osmond K. Fraenkel.
Donald B. MacGuineas argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Burger, Samuel D. Slade and Benjamin Forman.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Harlan,
announced by Mr. Justice Burton.
This case presents the question of the meaning of the term “national security” as used in the Act of August 26, 1950, giving to the heads of certain departments and agencies of the Government summary suspension and unreviewable dismissal powers over their civilian employees, when deemed necessary “in the interest of the national security of the United States.”
Petitioner, a preference-eligible veteran under § 2 of the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 387, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 851, held a position in the classified civil service as a food and drug inspector for the New York District of the Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In November 1953, he was suspended without pay from his position, pending investigation to determine whether his employment should be terminated. He was given a written statement of charges alleging that he had “a close association with individuals reliably reported to be Communists” and that he had maintained a “sympathetic association” with, had contributed funds and services to, and had attended social gatherings of an allegedly subversive organization.
Although afforded an opportunity to do so, petitioner declined to answer the charges or to request a hearing, as he had the right to do. Thereafter, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, after “a study of all the documents in [petitioner’s] case,” determined that petitioner’s continued employment was not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security” and ordered the termination of his employment. Petitioner appealed his discharge to the Civil Service Commission, which declined to accept the appeal on the ground that the Veterans’ Preference Act, under which petitioner claimed the right of appeal, was inapplicable to such discharges.
Petitioner thereafter brought an action in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that his discharge was invalid and that the Civil Service Commission had improperly refused to entertain his appeal, and an order requiring his reinstatement in his former position. The District Court granted the respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint. 125 F. Supp. 284. The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed. 96 U. S. App. D. C. 379, 226 F. 2d 337. Because of the importance of the questions involved in the field of Government employment, we granted certiorari. 350 U. S. 900.
Section 14 of the Veterans’ Preference Act, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863, provides that preference eligibles may be discharged only “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service” and, among other procedural rights, “shall have the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,” whose decision is made binding on the employing agency. Respondents concede that petitioner’s discharge was invalid if that Act is controlling. They contend, however, as was held by the courts below, that petitioner’s discharge was authorized by the Act of August 26, 1950, supra, which eliminates the right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission. Thus the sole question for decision is whether petitioner’s discharge was authorized by the 1950 Act.
The 1950 Act provides in material part that, notwithstanding any other personnel laws, the head of any agency to which the Act applies
“may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee of [his agency] .... The agency head concerned may, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the United States, and such determination by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final: . . . .”
The Act was expressly made applicable only to the Departments of State, Commerce, Justice, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Coast Guard, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Resources Board, and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Section 3 of the Act provides, however, that the Act may be extended “to such other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security,” and the President has extended the Act under this authority “to all other departments and agencies of the Government.” While the validity of this extension of the Act depends upon questions which are in many respects common to those determining the validity of the Secretary’s exercise of the authority thereby extended to her, we will restrict our consideration to the latter issue and assume, for purposes of this decision, that the Act has validly been extended to apply to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
The Act authorizes dismissals only upon a determination by the Secretary that the dismissal is “necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security.” That determination requires an evaluation of the risk of injury to the “national security” that the employee’s retention would create, which in turn would seem necessarily to be a function, not only of the character of the employee and the likelihood of his misconducting himself, but also of the nature of the position he occupies and its relationship to the “national security.” That is, it must be determined whether the position is one in which the employee’s misconduct would affect the “national security.” That, of course, would not be necessary if “national security” were used in the Act in a sense so broad as to be involved in all activities of the Government, for then the relationship to the “national security” would follow from the very fact of employment. For the reasons set forth below, however, we conclude (1) that the term “national security” is used in the Act in a definite and limited sense and relates only to those activities which are directly concerned with the Nation’s safety, as distinguished from the general welfare; and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner’s position was affected with the “national security,” as that term is used in the Act. It follows that his dismissal was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence violated the Veterans’ Preference Act.
I.
In interpreting the 1950 Act, it is important to note that that Act is not the only, nor even the primary, source of authority to dismiss Government employees. The general personnel laws — the Lloyd-LaFollette and Veterans’ Preference Acts — authorize dismissals for “such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service,” and the ground which we conclude was the basis for petitioner’s discharge here — a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty — was recognized as a “cause” for dismissal under those procedures as early as 1942. Indeed, the President’s so-called Loyalty Program, Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, which prescribed an absolute standard of loyalty to be met by all employees regardless of position, had been established pursuant to that general authority three years prior to the 1950 Act and remained in effect for nearly three years after its passage. Thus there was no want of substantive authority to dismiss employees on loyalty grounds, and the question for decision here is not whether an employee can be dismissed on such grounds but only the extent to which the summary procedures authorized by the 1950 Act are available in such a case.
, As noted above, the issue turns on the meaning of “national security,” as used in the Act. While that term is not defined in the Act, we think it clear from the statute as a whole that that term was intended to comprehend only those activities of the Government that are directly concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those which contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the general welfare.
Virtually conclusive of this narrow meaning of “national security” is the fact that, had Congress intended the term in a sense broad enough to include all activities of the Government, it would have granted the power to terminate employment “in the interest of the national security” to all agencies of the Government. Instead, Congress specified 11 named agencies to which the Act should apply, the character of which reveals, without doubt, a purpose to single out those agencies which are directly concerned with the national defense and which have custody over information the compromise of which might endanger the country’s security, the so-called “sensitive” agencies. Thus, of the 11 named agencies, 8 are concerned with military operations or weapons development, and the other 3, with international relations, internal security, and the stock-piling of strategic materials. Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the grant of authority to the President, in § 3 of the Act, to extend the Act to such other agencies as he “may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security.” Rather, the character of the named agencies indicates the character of the determination required to be made to effect such an extension. Aware of the difficulties of attempting an exclusive enumeration and of the undesirability of a rigid classification in the face of changing circumstances, Congress simply enumerated those agencies which it determined to be affected with the “national security” and authorized the President, by making a similar determination, to add any other agencies which were, or became, “sensitive.” That it was contemplated that this power would be exercised “from time to time” confirms the purpose to allow for changing circumstances and to require a selective judgment, necessarily implying that the standard to be applied is a less than all-inclusive one.
The limitation of the Act to the enumerated agencies is particularly significant in the light of the fact that Exec. Order No. 9835, establishing the Loyalty Program, was in full effect at the time of the consideration and passage of the Act. In that Order, the President had expressed his view that it was of “vital importance” that all employees of the Government be of “complete and unswerving loyalty” and had prescribed a minimum loyalty standard to be applied to all employees under the normal civil service procedures. Had Congress considered the objective of insuring the “unswerving loyalty” of all employees, regardless of position, as a matter of “national security” to be effectuated by the summary procedures authorized by the Act, rather than simply a desirable personnel policy to be implemented under the normal civil service procedures, it surely would not have limited the Act to selected agencies. Presumably, therefore, Congress meant something more by the “interest of the national security” than the general interest the Nation has in the loyalty of even “nonsensitive” employees.
We can find no justification for rejecting this implication of the limited purpose of the Act or for inferring the unlimited power contended for by the Government. Where applicable, the Act authorizes the agency head summarily to suspend an employee pending investigation and, after charges and a hearing, finally to terminate his employment, such termination not being subject to appeal. There is an obvious justification for the summary suspension power where the employee occupies a “sensitive” position in which he could cause serious damage to the national security during the delay incident to an investigation and the preparation of charges. Likewise, there is a reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information. On the other hand, it is difficult to justify summary suspensions and unreviewable dismissals on loyalty grounds of employees who are not in “sensitive” positions and who are thus not situated where they could bring about any discernible adverse effects on the Nation’s security. In the absence of an immediate threat of harm to the “national security,” the normal dismissal procedures seem fully adequate and the justification for summary powers disappears. Indeed, in view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on loyalty grounds, the need for procedural safeguards seems even greater than in other cases, and we will not lightly assume that Congress intended to take away those safeguards in the absence of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of employees handling defense secrets.
The 1950 Act itself reflects Congress’ concern for the procedural rights of employees and its desire to limit the unreviewable dismissal power to the minimum scope necessary to the purpose of protecting activities affected with the “national security.” A proviso to § 1 of the Act provides that a dismissal by one agency under the power granted by the Act “shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government,” if the Civil Service Commission determines that the employee is eligible for such other employment. That is, the unreviewable dismissal power was to be used only for the limited purpose of removing the employee from the position in which his presence had been determined to endanger the “national security”; it could affect his right to employment in other agencies only if the Civil Service Commission, after review, refused to clear him for such employment. This effort to preserve the employee’s procedural rights to the maximum extent possible hardly seems consistent with an intent to define the scope of the dismissal power in terms of the indefinite and virtually unlimited meaning for which the respondents contend.
Moreover, if Congress intended the term to have such a broad meaning that all positions in the Government could be said to be affected with the “national security,” the result would be that the 1950 Act, though in form but an exception to the general personnel laws, could be utilized effectively to supersede those laws. For why could it not be said that national security in that sense requires not merely loyal and trustworthy employees but also those that are industrious and efficient? The relationship of the job to the national security being the same, its demonstrated inadequate performance because of inefficiency or incompetence would seem to present a surer threat to national security, in the sense of the general welfare, than a mere doubt as to the employee’s loyalty.
Finally, the conclusion we draw from the face of the Act that "national security” was used in a limited and definite sense is amply supported by the legislative history of the Act.
In the first place, it was constantly emphasized that the bill, first introduced as S. 1561 in the 80th Congress and passed as H. R. 7439 in the 81st Congress, was intended to apply, or to be extended, only to “sensitive” agencies, a term used to imply a close and immediate concern with the defense of the Nation. Thus the Senate Committee on Armed Services, in reporting out S. 1561,stated:
“This bill provides authority to terminate employment of indiscreet or disloyal employees who are employed in areas of the Government which are sensitive from the standpoint of national security.
“[Section 3 will permit] the President to determine additional sensitive areas and include such areas in the scope of the authorities contained in this bill.
“Insofar as the [addition of § 3] is concerned, it was recognized by all witnesses that there were other sensitive areas within the various departments of the Government which are now, or might in the future become, deeply involved in national security. . . . In view ... of the fact that there are now and will be in the future other sensitive areas of equal importance to the national security, it is believed that the President should have authority to make a finding concerning such areas and by Executive action place those areas under the authorities contained in this act.”
The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service reported that “The provisions of the bill extend only to departments and agencies which are concerned with vital matters affecting the national security of our Nation.” The committee reports on H. R. 7439 in the next Congress similarly referred to the bill as granting the dismissal power only to the heads of the “sensitive” agencies. While these references relate primarily to the agencies to be covered by the Act, rather than to the exercise of the power within an agency, the standard for both is the same — in the “interests of the national security” — and the statements thus clearly indicate the restricted sense in which “national security” was used. In short, “national security” is affected only by “sensitive” activities.
Secondly, the history makes clear that the Act was intended to authorize the suspension and dismissal only of persons in sensitive positions. Throughout the hearings, committee reports, and debates, the bill was described as being designed to provide for the dismissal of “security risks.” In turn, the examples given of what might be a “security risk” always entailed employees having access to classified materials; they were security risks because of the risk they posed of intentional or inadvertent disclosure of confidential information. Mr. Larkin, a representative of the Department of Defense, which Department had requested and drafted the bill, made this consideration more explicit:
“They are security risks because of their access to confidential and classified material. . . . But if they do not have classified material, why, there is no notion that they are security risks to the United States. They are security risks to the extent of having access to classified material.”
“A person is accused of being disloyal, but is cleared by the loyalty board, because there is not enough evidence against him. If that person is not in a sensitive job, it is not of any further concern to us. We are willing to take the view, that while we might have misgivings about his loyalty, he cannot prejudice our security because he does not have access to any of the classified or top secret material.”
It is clear, therefore, both from the face of the Act and the legislative history, that “national security” was not used in the Act in an all-inclusive sense, but was intended to refer only to the protection of “sensitive” activities. It follows that an employee can be dismissed “in the interest of the national security” under the Act only if he occupies a “sensitive” position, and thus that a condition precedent to the exercise of the dismissal authority is a determination by the agency head that the position occupied is one affected with the “national security.” We now turn to an examination of the Secretary’s action to show that no such determination was made as to the position occupied by petitioner.
II.
The Secretary’s action in dismissing the petitioner was expressly taken pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, promulgated in April 1953 to provide uniform standards and procedures for the exercise by agency heads of the suspension and dismissal powers under the 1950 Act. That Order prescribes as the standard for dismissal, and the dismissal notice given to petitioner contained, a determination by the Secretary that the employee’s retention in employment “is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” Despite this verbal formula, however, it is our view that the Executive Order does not in fact require the agency head to make any determination whatever on the relationship of the employee’s retention to the “national security” if the charges against him are within the categories of the charges against petitioner — that is, charges which reflect on the employee’s loyalty. Rather, as we read the Order, it enjoins upon the agency heads the duty of discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty, irrespective of the character of his job and its relationship to the “national security.” That is, the Executive Order deems an adverse determination as to loyalty to satisfy the requirements of the statute without more.
The opening preamble to the Order recites, among other things, that “the interests of the national security require” that “all” Government employees be persons “of complete and unswerving loyalty.” It would seem to follow that an employee’s retention cannot be “clearly consistent” with the “interests of the national security” as thus defined unless he is “clearly” loyal — that is, unless there is no doubt as to his loyalty. And § 8 (a) indicates that that is in fact what was intended by the Order. That section provides that the investigation of an employee pursuant to the Order shall be designed to develop information “as to whether . . . [his employment] is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security,” and prescribes certain categories of facts to which “such” information shall relate. The first category, §8 (a)(1), includes nonloyalty-oriented facts which, in general, might reflect upon the employee’s reliability, trustworthiness, or susceptibility to coercion, such as dishonesty, drunkenness, sexual perversion, mental defects, or other reasons to believe that he is subject to influence or coercion. Section 8 (a)(1) expressly provides, however, that such facts are relevant only “depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security.” The remaining categories include facts which, in general, reflect upon the employee’s “loyalty,” such as acts of espionage, advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government, sympathetic association with persons who so advocate, or sympathetic association with subversive organizations. § 8 (a) (2)-(8). Significantly, there is wholly absent from these categories — under which the charges against petitioner were expressly framed — any qualification making their relevance dependent upon the relationship of the employee’s position to the national security. The inference we draw is that in such cases the relationship to the national security is irrelevant, and that an adverse “loyalty” determination is sufficient ex proprio vigore to require discharge.
Arguably, this inference can be avoided on the ground that § 8 (a) relates only to the scope of information to be developed in the investigation and not to the evaluation of it by the agency head. That is, while loyalty information is to be developed in all cases regardless of the nature of the employment, that does not mean that the agency head should not consider the nature of the employment in determining whether the derogatory information is sufficient to make the employee’s continued employment not “clearly consistent” with the “national security.” No doubt that is true to the extent that the greater the sensitivity of the position the smaller may be the doubts that would justify termination; the Order undoubtedly leaves it open to an agency head to apply a stricter standard in some cases than in others, depending on the nature of the employment. On the other hand, by making loyalty information relevant in all cases, regardless of the nature of the job, § 8 (a) seems strongly to imply that there is a minimum standard of loyalty that must be met by all employees. It would follow that the agency head may terminate employment in cases where that minimum standard is not met without making any independent determination of the potential impact of the person’s employment on the national security.
Other provisions of the Order confirm the inferences that may be drawn from § 8 (a). Thus § 3 (b) directs each agency head to designate as “sensitive” those positions in his agency “the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security.” By definition, therefore, some employees are admittedly not in a position to bring about such an effect. Nevertheless, the Order makes this distinction relevant only for purposes of determining the scope of the investigation to be conducted, not for purposes of limiting the dismissal power to such “sensitive” positions. Section 3 (a) is more explicit. That provides that the appointment of all employees shall be made subject to an investigation the scope of which shall depend upon the degree of adverse effect on the national security the occupant of the position could bring about, but which “in no event” is to be less than a prescribed minimum. But the sole purpose of such an investigation is to provide a basis for a “clearly consistent” determination. Thus the requirement of a minimum investigation of all persons appointed implies that an adverse “clearly consistent” determination may be made as to any such employee, regardless of the potential adverse effect he could cause to the national security. Finally, the second “Whereas” clause of the preamble recites as a justification for the Order that “all persons . . . privileged to be employed ... [by the Government should] be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards,” thus implying that the Order prescribes minimum standards that all employees must meet irrespective of the character of the positions held, one of which is the “complete and unswerving loyalty” standard recited in the first “Whereas” clause of the preamble.
Confirmation of this reading of the Order is found in its history. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690, had established the Loyalty Program under which all employees, regardless of their positions, were made subject to discharge if there was a “reasonable doubt” as to their loyalty. That Order was expressly revoked by § 12 of the present Executive Order. There is no indication, however, that it was intended thereby to limit the scope of the persons subject to a loyalty standard. And any such implication is negatived by the remarkable similarity in the preambles to the two Orders and in the kinds of information considered to be relevant to the ultimate determinations. In short, all employees were still to be subject to at least a minimum loyalty standard, though under new procedures which do not afford a right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission.
We therefore interpret the Executive Order as meaning that, when “loyalty” charges are involved, an employee may be dismissed regardless of the character of his position in the Government service, and that the agency head need make no evaluation as to the effect which continuance of his employment might have upon the “national security.” We recognize that this interpretation of the Order rests upon a chain of inferences drawn from less than explicit provisions. But the Order was promulgated to guide the agency heads in the exercise of the dismissal power, and its failure to state explicitly what determinations are required leaves no choice to the agency heads but to follow the most reasonable inferences to be drawn. Moreover, whatever the practical reasons that may have dictated the awkward form of the Order, its failure to state explicitly what was meant is the fault of the Government. Any ambiguities should therefore be resolved against the Government, and we will not burden the employee with the assumption that an agency head, in stating no more than the formal conclusion that retention of the employee is not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security,” has made any subsidiary determinations not clearly required by the Executive Order.
From the Secretary’s determination that petitioner’s employment was not “clearly consistent with the interests of national security,” therefore, it may be assumed only that the Secretary found the charges to be true and that they created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s loyalty. No other subsidiary finding may be inferred, however, for, under the Executive Order as we have interpreted it, no other finding was required to support the Secretary’s action.
From our holdings (1) that not all positions in the Government are affected with the “national security” as that term is used in the 1950 Act, and (2) that no determination has been made that petitioner’s position was one in which he could adversely affect the “national security,” it necessarily follows that petitioner’s discharge was not authorized by the 1950 Act. In reaching this conclusion, we are not confronted with the problem of reviewing the Secretary’s exercise of discretion, since the basis for our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the Executive Order and applied by the Secretary is not in conformity with the Act. Since petitioner’s discharge was not authorized by the 1950 Act and hence violated the Veterans’ Preference Act, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 565.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450.
(18 Fed. Reg. 2489, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10491, Oct. 13, 1953, 18 Fed. Reg. 6583.)
WHEREAS the interests of the national security require that all persons privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government, shall be reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States ; and
WHEREAS the American tradition that all persons should receive fair, impartial, and equitable treatment at the hands of the Government requires that all persons seeking the privilege of employment or privileged to be employed in the departments and agencies of the Government be adjudged by mutually consistent and no less than minimum standards and procedures among the departments and agencies governing the employment and retention in employment of persons in the Federal service:
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including section 1753 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (5 U. S. C. 631); the Civil Service Act of 1883 (22 Stat. 403; 5 U. S. C. 632, et seq.); section 9A of the act of August 2, 1939, 53 Stat. 1148 (5 U. S. C. 118 j) ; and the act of August 26, 1950, 64 Stat. 476 (5 U. S. C. 22-1, et seq.), and as President of the United States, and deeming such action necessary in the best interests of the national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. In addition to the departments and agencies specified in the said act of August 26, 1950, and Executive Order No. 10237 of April 26, 1951, the provisions of that act shall apply to all other departments and agencies of the Government.
Sec. 2. The head of each department and agency of the Government shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective program to insure that the employment and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within the department or agency is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
Sec. 3. (a) The appointment of each civilian officer or employee in any department or agency of the Government shall be made subject to investigation. The scope of the investigation shall be determined in the first instance according to the degree of adverse effect the occupant of the position sought to be filled could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, on the national security, but in no event shall the investigation include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person under investigation: Provided, that upon request of the head of the department or agency concerned, the Civil Service Commission may, in its discretion, authorize such less investigation as may meet the requirements of the national security with respect to per-diem, intermittent, temporary, or seasonal employees, or aliens employed outside the United States. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any such person may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, there shall be conducted with respect to such person a full field investigation, or such less investigation as shall be sufficient to enable the head of the department or agency concerned to determine whether retention of such person is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
(b) The head of any department or agency shall designate, or 'cause to be designated, any position within his department or agency the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security as a sensitive position. Any position so designated shall be filled or occupied only by a person with respect to whom a full field investigation has been conducted: Provided, that a person occupying a sensitive position at the time it is designated as such may continue to occupy such position pending the completion of a full field investigation, subject to the other provisions of this order: And provided further, that in case of emergency a sensitive position may be filled for a limited period by a person with respect to whom a full field preappointment investigation has not been completed if the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such action is necessary in the national interest, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency.
Sec. 4. The head of each department and agency shall review, or cause to be reviewed, the cases of all civilian officers and employees with respect to whom there has been conducted a full field investigation under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, and, after such further investigation as may be appropriate, shall re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, such of those cases as have not been adjudicated under a security standard commensurate with that established under this order.
Sec. 5. Whenever there is developed or received by any department or agency information indicating that the retention in employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, such information shall be forwarded to the head of the employing department or agency or his representative, who, after such investigation as may be appropriate, shall review, or cause to be reviewed, and, where necessary, re-adjudicate, or cause to be re-adjudicated, in accordance with the said act of August 26,1950, the case of such officer or employee.
Sec. 6. Should there develop at any stage of investigation information indicating that the employment of any officer or employee of the Government may not be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, the head of the department or agency concerned or his representative shall immediately suspend the employment of the person involved if he deems such suspension necessary in the interests of the national security and, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, the head of the department or agency concerned shall terminate the employment of such suspended officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security, in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950.
Sec. 7. Any person whose employment is suspended or terminated under the authority granted to heads of departments and agencies by or in accordance with the said act of August 26, 1950, or pursuant to the said Executive Order No. 9835 or any other security or loyalty program relating to officers or employees of the Government, shall not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in the same department or agency and shall not be reemployed in any other department or agency, unless the head of the department or agency concerned finds that such reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, which finding shall be made a part of the records of such department or agency: Provided, that no person whose employment has been terminated under such authority thereafter may be employed by any other department or agency except after a determination by the Civil Service Commission that such person is eligible for such employment.
Sec. 8. (a) The investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited, to the following:
(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:
(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.
(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omissions of material facts.
(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.
(iv) An adjudication of insanity, or treatment for serious mental or neurological disorder without satisfactory evidence of cure.
(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.
(2) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding or abetting, another to commit or attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.
(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(5) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.
(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(8) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct.
Sec. 10. Nothing in this order shall be construed as eliminating or modifying in any way the requirement for any investigation or any determination as to security which may be required by law.
Sec. 11. On and after the effective date of this order the Loyalty Review Board established by Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, shall not accept agency findings for review, upon appeal or otherwise. . . .
Sec. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked. For the purposes described in section 11 hereof the Loyalty Review Board and the regional loyalty boards of the Civil Service Commission shall continue to exist and function for a period of one hundred and twenty days from the effective date of this order, and the Department of Justice shall continue to furnish the information described in paragraph 3 of Part III of the said Executive Order No. 9835, but directly to the head of each department and agency.
Sec. 15. This order shall become effective thirty days after the date hereof.
Dwight D. Eisenhower.
The White House,
April 27, 1953.
§ 1. “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), as amended (5 U. S. C. 652), or the provisions of any other law, the Secretary of State; Secretary of Commerce; Attorney General; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Secretary of the Treasury; Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, National Security Resources Board; or the Director, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, may, in his absolute discretion and when deemed necessary in the interest of national security, suspend, without pay, any civilian officer or employee of the Department of State (including the Foreign Service of the United States), Department of Commerce, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force, Coast Guard, Atomic Energy Commission, National Security Resources Board, or National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, respectively, or of their several field services: Provided, That to the extent that such agency head determines that the interests of the national security permit, the employee concerned shall be notified of the reasons for his suspension and within thirty days after such notification any such person shall have an opportunity to submit any statements or affidavits to the official designated by the head of the agency concerned to show why he should be reinstated or restored to duty. The agency head concerned may, following such investigation and review as he deems necessary, terminate the employment of such suspended civilian officer or employee whenever he shall determine such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the national security of the United States, and such determination by the agency head concerned shall be conclusive and final: Provided further, That any employee having a permanent or indefinite appointment, and having completed his probationary or trial period, who is a citizen of the United States whose employment is suspended under the authority of this Act, shall be given after his suspension and before his employment is terminated under the authority of this Act, (1) a written statement within thirty days after his suspension of the charges against him, which shall be subject to amendment within thirty days thereafter and which shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit; (2) an opportunity within thirty days thereafter (plus an additional thirty days if the charges are amended) to answer such charges and to submit affidavits; (3) a hearing, at the employee’s request, by a duly constituted agency authority for this purpose; (4) a review of his case by the agency head, or some official designated by him, before a decision adverse to the employee is made final; and (5) a written statement of the decision of the agency head: Provided further, That any person whose employment is so suspended or terminated under the authority of this Act may, in the discretion of the agency head concerned, be reinstated or restored to duty, and if so reinstated or restored shall be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such suspension or termination in an amount not to exceed the difference between the amount such person would normally have earned during the period of such suspension or termination, at the rate he was receiving on the date of suspension or termination, as appropriate, and the interim net earnings of such person: Provided further, That the termination of employment herein provided shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government: Provided further, That the head of any department or agency considering the appointment of any person whose employment has been terminated under the provisions of this Act may make such appointment only after consultation with the Civil Service Commission, which agency shall have the authority at the written request of either the head of such agency or such employee to determine whether any such person is eligible for employment by any other agency or department of the Government.
“Sec-. 3. The provisions of this Act shall apply to such other departments and agencies of the Government as the President may, from time to time, deem necessary in the best interests of national security. If any departments or agencies are included by the President, he shall so report to the Committees on the Armed Services of the Congress." 64 Stat. 476, 5 IT. S. C. §§ 22-1, 22-3.
§ 1, Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489, set forth in the Appendix, post, p. 558.
Secretary Folsom, the present Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, has been substituted as respondent for the former Secretary Hobby.
§ 6, 37 Stat. 555, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 652.
§ 14, 58 Stat. 390, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 863.
Civil Service War Regulations, § 18.2 (c) (7), September 26, 1942, 5 CFR, Cum. Supp., § 18.2 (c) (7).
Employees dismissed under the Loyalty Program were entitled to review by the Civil Service Commission’s Loyalty Review Board, thus satisfying the requirements of § 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act. See Kutcher v. Gray, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 266, 199 F. 2d 783 (C.A.D.C.Cir.).
Congress’ reluctance to extend such powers to all agencies of the Government is also indicated by the prior legislation. At various times since 1942, similar summary dismissal statutes, of limited duration, had been enacted, but these had been limited to the obviously “sensitive” military departments, 56 Stat. 1053, 63 Stat. 1023, and the State Department, 60 Stat. 458. The 1950 Act, introduced at the request of the Department of Defense, was designed to make the authority permanent, include several other “sensitive” agencies, and afford greater flexibility by permitting the President to extend the Act to other agencies which became “sensitive.” H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4.
S. Rep. No. 1155, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-4.
H. R. Rep. No. 2264, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
H. R. Rep. No. 2330, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 2-5; S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2.
E. g., S. Rep. No. 2158, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2: “The purpose of the bill is to increase the authority of the heads of Government departments engaged in sensitive activities to summarily suspend employees considered to be bad security risks . . . .”
For example, Mr. Murray, the Chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, which had reported the bill, gave the following illustration of the purpose of the bill in opening the debate in the House: “For instance, an employee who is working in some highly sensitive agency doing very confidential, secret defense work and who goes out and gets too much liquor may unintentionally or unwittingly, because of his condition, confide to someone who may be a subversive, secret military information about the character of work he is doing in that department. He is, by his conduct, a bad security risk and should be discharged.” 96 Cong. Rec. 10017.
Hearings, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on H. R. 7439, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 67.
Id., at p. 72.
The relevant portions of the Executive Order, as it stood at the time of petitioner’s suspension and discharge, are printed in the Appendix, post, p. 558.
Section 6 of the Order, which formally prescribes the standards for “termination,” in terms adopts the very language of the statute, “necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security.” Section 7, however, provides that a suspended employee “shall not be reinstated” unless the agency head determines that reinstatement is “clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.” Since nonreinstatement of a suspended employee is equivalent to the termination of his employment, it is apparent that the “clearly consistent” standard of § 7 is the controlling one. See also §§ 2, 8, and 3 (a). In the view we take of the case, we need not determine whether the “clearly consistent” standard is, as petitioner contends, a more onerous one than the “necessary or advisable” standard.
Executive Order No. 9835 recited that it was “of vital importance” that all employees be of “complete and unswerving loyalty”; Exec. Order No. 10450 recites that “the interests of the national security require” that all employees be of “complete and unswerving loyalty.” Executive Order No. 9835 listed six factors to be considered “in connection with the determination of disloyalty” (Pt. V, § 2); these are repeated in substantially identical form in §§ 8 (a) (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Exec. Order No. 10450 as “information as to whether . . . [the employee’s retention] is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.”
That the Secretary. similarly interpreted the Executive Order and did not in fact determine that petitioner’s job was a “sensitive” one is confirmed by the respondents’ concession that petitioner “did not have access to Government secrets or classified material and was not in a position to influence policy against the interests of the Government.” Respondents’ Brief, pp. 3-4; Record, p. 40.
No contention is made that the Executive Order might be sustained under the President’s executive power even though in violation of the Veterans’ Preference Act. There is no basis for such an argument in any event, for it is clear from the face of the Executive Order that the President did not intend to override statutory limitations on the dismissal of employees, and promulgated the Order solely as an implementation of the 1950 Act. Thus § 6 of the Order purports to authorize dismissals only “in accordance with the said Act of August 26, 1950,” and similar references are made in §§ 4, 5, and 7. This explicit limitation in the substantive provisions of the Order is of course not weakened by the inclusion of the “Constitution,” as well as the 1950 and other Acts, in the omnibus list of authorities recited in the Preamble to the Order; it is from the Constitution that the President derives any authority to implement the 1950 Act at all. When the President expressly confines his action to the limits of statutory authority, the validity of the action must be determined solely by the congressional limitations which the President sought to respect, whatever might be the result were the President ever to assert his independent power against that of Congress.
After the date of petitioner’s discharge, this paragraph was amended, by Exec. Order No. 10548, Aug. 2, 1954, 19 Fed. Reg. 4871, to read:
“(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.” | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf. comity: First Amendment)",
"commercial speech, excluding attorneys",
"libel, defamation: defamation of public officials and public and private persons",
"libel, privacy: true and false light invasions of privacy",
"legislative investigations: concerning internal security only",
"federal or state internal security legislation: Smith, Internal Security, and related federal statutes",
"loyalty oath or non-Communist affidavit (other than bar applicants, government employees, political party, or teacher)",
"loyalty oath: bar applicants (cf. admission to bar, state or federal or U.S. Supreme Court)",
"loyalty oath: government employees",
"loyalty oath: political party",
"loyalty oath: teachers",
"security risks: denial of benefits or dismissal of employees for reasons other than failure to meet loyalty oath requirements",
"conscientious objectors (cf. military draftee or military active duty) to military service",
"campaign spending (cf. governmental corruption):",
"protest demonstrations (other than as pertains to sit-in demonstrations): demonstrations and other forms of protest based on First Amendment guarantees",
"free exercise of religion",
"establishment of religion (other than as pertains to parochiaid:)",
"parochiaid: government aid to religious schools, or religious requirements in public schools",
"obscenity, state (cf. comity: privacy): including the regulation of sexually explicit material under the 21st Amendment",
"obscenity, federal"
] | [
5
] | sc_issue_3 |
SOLE, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, et al. v. WYNER et al.
No. 06-531.
Argued April 17, 2007
Decided June 4, 2007
Ginsbubg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Virginia A. Seitz argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Carri S. Leininger and James O. Williams, Jr.
Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Deputy Solicitor General Garre, Michael Jay Singer, and Michael E. Robinson.
Seth M. Galanter argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Beth S. Brinkmann, Randall C. Marshall, James K. Green, and Steven R. Shapiro.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Virginia et al. by Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, William C. Mims, Chief Deputy Attorney General, William E. Thro, State Solicitor General, Stephen R. McCullough, Deputy State Solicitor General, and Dan Schweitzer, by Roberto J. Sdnchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Talis J. Colberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, Dustin McDaniel of Arkansas, John IK Suthers of Colorado, Thurbert E. Baker of peorgia, Mark J. Bennett of Hawaii, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Mike Cox of Michigan, Jeremiah IK (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, George J. Chanos of Nevada, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Thomas IK Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Henry McMaster of South Carolina, Larry Long of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennessee, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, Robert M. McKenna of Washington, Darrell V McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, J. B. Van Hollen of Wisconsin, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming; and for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda and Lawrence Rosenthal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. by Andrew J. Pincus, Charles A Rothfeld, Dana Berliner, John W. Whitehead, Giovanna Shay, Ayesha N. Khan, Richard B. Katskee, Alex J. Luchenitser, Ronald A Lindsay, Brian Woljman, Steven Schwartz, and Judith E. Schaeffer; for the Brennan Center for Justice by Laura W. Brill and Wendy R. Weiser; for the Center for Individual Rights by Michael E. Rosman; and for the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity et al. by Catherine R. Albiston.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
For private actions brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and other specified measures designed to secure civil rights, Congress established an exception to the “American Rule” that “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect [counsel fees] from the loser.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 247 (1975). That exception, codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988(b), authorizes federal district courts, in their discretion, to “allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” This case presents a sole question: Does a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction after an abbreviated hearing, but is denied a permanent injunction after a dispositive adjudication on the merits, qualify as a “prevailing party” within the compass of § 1988(b)?
Viewing the two stages of the litigation as discrete episodes, plaintiffs below, respondents here, maintain that they prevailed at the preliminary injunction stage, and therefore qualify for a fee award for their counsels’ efforts to obtain that interim relief. Defendants below, petitioners here, regard the case as a unit; they urge that a preliminary injunction holds no sway once fuller consideration yields rejection of the provisional order’s legal or factual underpinnings. We agree with the latter position and hold that a final decision on the merits denying permanent injunctive relief ordinarily determines who prevails in the action for purposes of § 1988(b). A plaintiff who achieves a transient victory at the threshold of an action can gain no award under that fee-shifting provision if, at the end of the litigation, her initial success is undone and she leaves the courthouse emptyhanded.
I
In mid-January 2003, plaintiff-respondent T. A. Wyner notified the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) of her intention to create on Valentine’s Day, February 14, 2003, within John D. MacArthur Beach State Park, an antiwar artwork. The work would consist of nude individuals assembled into a peace sign. By letter dated February 6, DEP informed Wyner that her peace sign display would be lawful only if the participants complied with the “Bathing Suit Rule” set out in Fla. Admin. Code Ann. § 62D-2.014(7)(b) (2005). That rule required patrons, in all areas of Florida’s state parks, to wear, at a minimum, a thong and, if female, a bikini top.
To safeguard the Valentine’s Day display, and future expressive activities of the same order, against police interference, Wyner filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on February 12,2003. She invoked the First Amendment’s protection of expressive conduct, and named as defendants the Secretary of DEP and the Manager of MacArthur Beach Park. Her complaint requested immediate injunctive relief against interference with the peace sign display, App. 18, and permanent injunctive relief against interference with “future expressive activities that may include non-erotic displays of nude human bodies,” id., at 19. An exhibit attached to the complaint set out a May 12,1995 Stipulation for Settlement with DEP. Id., at 22-23. That settlement had facilitated a February 19, 1996 play Wyner coordinated at MacArthur Beach, a production involving nude performers. A term of the settlement provided that Wyner would “arrange for placement of a bolt of cloth in a semi-circle around the area where the play [would] be performed,” id., at 23, so that beachgoers who did not wish to see the play would be shielded from the nude performers.
The day after the complaint was filed, on February 13, 2003, the District Court heard Wyner’s emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. Although disconcerted by the hurried character of the proceeding, see id., at 37, 93, 95, the court granted the preliminary injunction. “The choice,” the court explained, “need not be either/or.” Wyner v. Struhs, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1303 (SD Fla. 2003). Pointing to the May 1995 settlement laying out “agreed-upon manner restrictions,” the court determined that “[p]laintiff[’s] desired expression and the interests of the state may both be satisfied simultaneously.” Ibid. In this regard, the court had inquired of DEP’s counsel at the preliminary injunction hearing: “Why wouldn’t the curtain or screen solve the problem of somebody [who] doesn’t want to see . .. nudity? Seems like that would solve [the] problem, wouldn’t it?” App. 86. Counsel for DEP responded: “That’s an option. I don’t think necessarily [defendants] would be opposed to that----” Ibid.; see id., at 74 (testimony of Chief of Operations for Florida Park Service at the preliminary injunction hearing that the Service’s counsel, on prior occasions, had advised: “[I]f they go behind the screen and they liv[e] up to the agreement then it’s okay. If they don’t go behind the screen and they don’t live up to the agreement then it’s not okay.”):
The peace symbol display took place at MacArthur Beach the next day. A screen was put up, apparently by the State, as the District Court anticipated. See id., at 108. See also id., at 94 (District Judge’s statement at the conclusion of the preliminary injunction hearing: “I want to make it clear ... that the [preliminary] injunction doesn’t preclude the department, if it chooses, from using... some sort of barrier____”). But the display was set up outside the barrier, and participants, once disassembled from the peace symbol formation, went into the water in the nude. See id., at 108; Deposition of T. A. Wyner in Case No. 03-80103-CIV (SD Fla., Nov. 14, 2003), pp. 99-100.
. Thereafter, Wyner pursued her demand for a permanent injunction. Her counsel represented that on February 14, 2004, Wyner intended to put on another production at MacArthur Beach, again involving nudity. See App. 107. After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment. At the hearing on the motions, held January 21, 2004, the' District Court asked Wyner’s counsel about the screen put up around the preceding year’s peace symbol display. Counsel acknowledged that the participants in that display ignored the barrier and set up in front of the screen. Id., at 108.
A week later, having unsuccessfully urged the parties to resolve the case as “[they] did before in [the 1995] settlement,” id., at 143, the court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion for summary final judgment. The deliberate failure of Wyner and her co-participants to remain behind the screen at the 2003 Valentine’s Day display, the court concluded, demonstrated that the Bathing Suit Rule’s prohibition of nudity was “no greater than is essential... to protect the experiences of the visiting public.” Wyner v. Struhs, Case No. 03-80103-CIV (SD Fla., Jan. 28, 2004) (Summary Judgment Order), App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. While Wyner ultimately failed to prevail on the merits, the court added, she did obtain a preliminary injunction prohibiting police interference with the Valentine’s Day 2003 temporary art installation, id., at 45a, and therefore qualifiéd as a prevailing party to that extent, see Wyner v. Struhs, Case No. 03-80103-CIV (SD Fla., Aug. 16, 2004) (Omnibus Order), App. to Brief in Opposition 5a-13a. The preliminary injunction could not be revisited at the second stage of the litigation, the court noted, for it had “expired on its own terms.” Id., at 4a. So reasoning, the court awarded plaintiff counsel fees covering the first phase of the litigation.
The Florida officials appealed, challenging both the order granting a preliminary injunction and the award of counsel fees. Wyner, however, pursued no appeal from the final order denying a permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held first that defendants’ challenges to the preliminary injunction were moot because they addressed “a finite event that occurred and ended on a specific, past date.” Wyner v. Struhs, 179 Fed. Appx. 566, 567, n. 1 (2006) (per curiam). The court then affirmed the counsel fees award, reasoning that plaintiff had gained through the preliminary injunction “the primary relief [she] sought,” i. e., the preliminary order allowed her to present the peace symbol display unimpeded by adverse state action. Id., at 569.
Wyner would not have qualified for an award of counsel fees, the court recognized, had the preliminary injunction rested on a mistake of law. Id., at 568, 569-570. But it was “new developments,” the court said, id., at 569, not any legal error, that accounted for her failure “to achieve actual success on the merits at the permanent injunction stage,” id., at 569, n. 7. Plaintiff and others participating in the display, as Wyner’s counsel admitted, did not stay behind the barrier at the peace symbol display, id., at 569; further, the court noted, “a fair reading of the record show[ed] that [p]laintif[f] had no intention of remaining behind a [barrier] during future nude expressive works,” ibid. The likelihood of success shown at the preliminary injunction stage, the court explained, id., at 569, n. 7, had been overtaken by the subsequent “demonstrat[ion] that the less restrictive alternative,” i. e., a cloth screen or other barrier, “was not sufficient to protect the government’s interest,” id., at 569. But that demonstration, the court concluded, did not bar an award of fees, because the “new facts” emerged only at the summary judgment stage. Ibid. We granted certiorari, Struhs v. Wyner, 549 U. S. 1162 (2007), and now reverse.
II
“The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry,” this Court has stated, is “the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute.” Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U. S. 782, 792-793 (1989). See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 760 (1987) (plaintiff must “receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail”); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U. S. 122, 129 (1980) (upholding fees where plaintiffs settled and obtained a consent decree); cf. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 605 (2001) (precedent “counsel[s] against holding that the term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties”). The petitioning state officials maintain that plaintiff here does not satisfy that standard for, as a consequence of the final summary judgment, “[t]he state law whose constitutionality [Wyner] attacked[, i. e., the Bathing Suit Rule,] remains valid and enforceable today.” Brief for Petitioners 3. The District Court left no doubt on that score, the state officials emphasize; ordering final judgment for defendants, the court expressed, in the bottom line of its opinion, its “hope” that plaintiff would continue to use the park, “albeit not in the nude.” Summary Judgment Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 46a.
Wyner, on the other hand, urges that despite the denial of a permanent injunction, she got precisely what she wanted when she commenced this litigation: permission to create the nude peace symbol without state interference. That fleeting success, however, did not establish that she prevailed on the gravamen of her plea for injunctive relief, i. e., her charge that the state officials had denied her and other participants in the peace symbol display “the right to engage in constitutionally protected expressive activities.” App. 18. Prevailing party status, we hold, does not attend achievement of a preliminary injunction that is reversed, dissolved, or otherwise undone by the final decision in the same case.
At the preliminary injunction stage, the court is called upon to assess the probability of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits. See, e. g., Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U. S. 656, 666 (2004); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975). The foundation for that assessment will be more or less secure depending on the thoroughness of the exploration undertaken by the parties and the court. In some cases, the proceedings prior to a grant of temporary relief are searching; in others, little time and resources are spent on the threshold contest.
In this case, the preliminary injunction hearing was necessarily hasty and abbreviated. Held one day after the complaint was filed and one day before the event, the timing afforded the state officer defendants little opportunity to oppose Wyner’s emergency motion. Counsel for the state defendants appeared only by telephone. App. 36. The emergency proceeding allowed no time for discovery, nor for adequate review of documents or preparation and presentation of witnesses. See id., at 38-39. The provisional relief immediately granted expired before appellate review could be gained, and the court’s threshold ruling would have no preclusive effect in the continuing litigation. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals considered the preliminary injunction a moot issue, not fit for reexamination or review, once the display took place. See Summary Judgment Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a; Omnibus Order, App. to Brief in Opposition 3a-4a; 179 Fed. Appx., at 567, n. 1; cf. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477-479 (1990). In short, the provisional relief granted terminated only the parties’ opening engagement. Its tentative character, in view of the continuation of the litigation to definitively resolve the controversy, would have made a fee request at the initial stage premature.
Of controlling importance to our decision, the eventual ruling on the merits for defendants, after both sides considered the case fit for final adjudication, superseded the preliminary ruling. Wyner’s temporary success rested on a premise the District Court ultimately rejected. That court granted preliminary relief on the understanding that a curtain or screen would adequately serve Florida’s interest in shielding the public from nudity that recreational beach users did not wish to see. See supra, at 79-80; 254 F. Supp. 2d, at 1303 (noting that the parties had previously agreed upon “a number of... manner restrictions that are far less restrictive than the total ban on nudity”). At the summary judgment stage, with the benefit of a fuller record, the District Court recognized that its initial assessment was incorrect. Participants in the peace symbol display were in fact unwilling to stay behind a screen that separated them from other park visitors. See Summary Judgment Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. See also App. 108 (acknowledgment by Wyner’s counsel that participants in the February 14, 2003 protest “in effee[t] ignored the screen”). In light of the demonstrated inadequacy of the screen to contain the nude display, the District Court determined that enforcement of the Bathing Suit Rule was necessary to “preserv[e] park aesthetics” and “protect the experiences of the visiting public.” Summary Judgment Order, App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a, 42a.
Wyner contends that the preliminary injunction was not undermined by the subsequent adjudication on the merits because the decision to grant preliminary relief was an “as applied” ruling. In developing this argument, she asserts that the officials engaged in impermissible content-based administration of the Bathing Suit Rule. But the District Court assumed, “for the purposes of [its initial] order,” the content neutrality of the state officials’ conduct. See 254 F. Supp. 2d, at 1302. See also 179 Fed. Appx., at 568, and n. 4 (reiterating that, “for the sake of the preliminary injunction order,” the District Court “assumed content neutrality”). That specification is controlling. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(d) (requiring every injunction to “set forth the reasons for its issuance” and “be specific in terms”). See also Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U. S. 473, 476 (1974) (per curiam) (Rule 65(d) “was designed to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders.”).
The final decision in Wyner’s case rejected the same claim she advanced in her preliminary injunction motion: that the state law banning nudity in parks was unconstitutional as applied to expressive, nonerotic nudity. At the end of the fray, Florida’s Bathing Suit Rule remained intact, and Wyner had gained no enduring “chang[e] [in] the legal relationship” between herself and the state officials she sued. See Texas State Teachers Assn., 489 U. S., at 792.
Ill
Wyner is not a prevailing party, we conclude, for her initial victory was ephemeral. A plaintiff who “secur[es] a preliminary injunction, then loses on the merits as the case plays out and judgment is entered against [her],” has “[won] a battle but los[t] the war.” Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F. 3d 1092, 1096 (CA9 2002). We are presented with, and therefore decide, no broader issue in this case.
We express no view on whether, in the absence of a final decision on the merits of a claim for permanent injunctive relief, success in gaining a preliminary injunction may sometimes warrant an award of counsel fees. We decide only that a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction does not qualify for an award of counsel fees under § 1988(b) if the merits of the case are ultimately decided against her.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The rule reads: “In every area of a park including bathing areas no individual shall expose the human, male or female genitals, pubic area, the entire buttocks or female breast b.elow the top of the nipple, with less than a fully opaque covering.” Fla. Admin. Code Ann. § 62D~2.014(7)(b) (2005).
Wyner was joined by coplaintiff George Simon, who served as a videographer for expressive activities Wyner previously organized at MacArthur Beach. See App. 13. For convenience, we refer to the coplaintiffs collectively as Wyner or plaintiff.
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 600 (2001), held that the term “prevailing party” in the fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 does not “includfe] a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” The dissent in Buekhannon would have deemed such a plaintiff “prevailing,” not because of any temporary relief gained (in that case, a consent stay pending litigation), but because the lawsuit caused the State to amend its laws, terminating the controversy between the parties, and permanently giving plaintiff the real-world outcome it sought. See id,., at 622, 624-625 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). Our decision today is consistent with the views of both the majority and the dissenters in Buekhannon.
In resolving Wyner’s claim for counsel fees, we express no opinion on the dimensions of the First Amendment’s protection for artworks that involve nudity. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1416, AFL-CIO v. ARIADNE SHIPPING CO., LTD., et al.
No. 231.
Argued January 13, 1970
Decided March 9, 1970
Seymour M. Waldman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Louis Waldman, Martin Markson, and Seymour A. Gopman.
Richard M. Leslie argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Thomas H. Anderson.
Solicitor General Griswold, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, and Norton J. Come filed a memorandum for the National Labor Relations Board as amicus curiae.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented here is whether the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq., pre-empts state jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful picketing protesting substandard wages paid by foreign-flag vessels to American longshoremen working in American ports. The Florida courts held that there was no pre-emption, citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U. S. 10 (1963), and lucres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U. S. 24 (1963). We granted certiorari. 396 U. S. 814 (1969). We reverse.
In 1966 the respondents, a Liberian corporation and a Panamanian corporation, operated cruise ships to the Caribbean from Port Everglades and Miami, Florida. Respondent Ariadne Shipping Company operated the S. S. Ariadne, of Liberian registry, with a crew subject to Liberian ship's articles. Respondent Evangeline Steamship Company operated S. S. Bahama Star, of Panamanian registry, with a crew subject to Panamanian ship’s articles. The uncontradicted evidence showed that “[ljoading of the ship, stowage and loading of automobiles, loading cargo and ship stowage” occurred whenever either vessel berthed at Port Everglades or Miami, “[pjart of it [performed] by employees of the ship and some of it by outside labor.” The petitioner is a labor organization representing longshoremen in the Miami area. Although none of those doing the long-shore work for the ships belonged to the union, whenever either vessel docked at Port Everglades or Miami in May 1966, petitioner stationed a picket near the vessel to patrol with a placard protesting that the longshore work was being done under substandard wage conditions. Respondents obtained temporary injunctive relief against the picketing from the Circuit Court for Dade County. That court rejected petitioner’s contention that the subject matter was pre-empted, holding that under McCul-loch the picketing was beyond the reach of the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board, and hence could be enjoined, since it violated Florida law. The temporary injunction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal for the Third District of Florida in a brief per curiam order citing McCulloch and Incres. 195 So. 2d 238 (1967). Thereafter the Circuit Court, without further hearing, made the injunction permanent. The District Court of Appeal again affirmed, although noting that the testimony “tended to show” that the picketing was carried on to protest against the substandard wages paid for the longshore work. 215 So. 2d 51, 53 (1968). The Supreme Court of Florida denied review in an unreported order.
McCulloch and lucres construed the National Labor Relations Act to preclude Board jurisdiction over labor disputes concerning certain maritime operations of foreign-flag vessels. Specifically, Incres, 372 U. S., at 27, held that “maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in 'commerce’ within the meaning of § 2 (6) [of the Act].” See also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138 (1957). This construction of the statute, however, was addressed to situations in which Board regulation of the labor relations in question would necessitate inquiry into the “internal discipline and order” of a foreign vessel, an intervention thought likely to “raise considerable disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well." McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 19.
In Benz a foreign-flag vessel temporarily in an American port was picketed by an American seamen’s union, supporting the demands of a foreign crew for more favorable conditions than those in the ship’s articles which they signed under foreign law, upon joining the vessel in a foreign port. In McCulloch an American seamen’s union petitioned for a representation election among the foreign crew members of a Honduran-flag vessel who were already represented by a Honduran union, certified under Honduran labor law. Again, in lucres the picketing was by an American union formed “for the primary purpose of organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag ships.” 372 U. S., at 25-26. In these cases, we concluded that, since the Act primarily concerns strife between American employers and employees, we could reasonably expect Congress to have stated expressly any intention to include within its coverage disputes between foreign ships and their foreign crews. Thus we could not find such an intention by implication, particularly since to do so would thrust the National Labor Relations Board into “a delicate field of international relations,” Benz, 353 U. S., at 147. Assertion of jurisdiction by the Board over labor relations already governed by foreign law might well provoke “vigorous protests from foreign governments and . . . international problems for our Government,” McCulloch, 372 U. S., at 17, and “invite retaliatory action from other nations,” id., at 21. Moreover, to construe the Act to embrace disputes involving the “internal discipline and order” of a foreign ship would be to impute to Congress the highly unlikely intention of departing from “the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship,” a principle frequently recognized in treaties with other countries. Ibid.
The considerations that informed the Court’s construction of the statute in the cases above are clearly inapplicable to the situation presented here. The participation of some crew members in the longshore work does not obscure the fact that this dispute centered on the wages to be paid American residents, who were employed by each foreign ship not to serve as members of its crew but rather to do casual longshore work. There is no evidence that these occasional workers were involved in any internal affairs of either ship which would be governed by foreign law. They were American residents, hired to work exclusively on American docks as longshoremen, not as seamen on respondents’ vessels. The critical inquiry then is whether the longshore activities of such American residents were within the “maritime operations of foreign-flag ships” which McCulloch, lucres, and Benz found to be beyond the scope of the Act.
We hold that their activities were not within these excluded operations. The American longshoremen’s short-term, irregular and casual connection with the respective vessels plainly belied any involvement on their part with the ships’ “internal discipline and order.” Application of United States law to resolve a dispute over the wages paid the men for their longshore work, accordingly, would have threatened no interference in the internal affairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law. We therefore find that these longshore operations were in “commerce” within the meaning of § 2 (6), and thus might have been subject to the regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board.
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board is exclusive and pre-emptive as to activities that are “arguably subject” to regulation under § 7 or § 8 of the Act. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245 (1959). The activities of petitioner in this case met that test. The union’s peaceful primary picketing to protest wage rates below established area standards arguably constituted protected activity under § 7. See Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U. S. 492, 498-499 (1964); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 499-500 (1953).
■ Reversed.
A picket was also stationed in front of the terminal through which passengers embarked and disembarked. This picket carried a sign alleging that the ships were unsafe, and passed out handbills to the same effect.
The injunctive order was in four paragraphs. Paragraphs 1 and 2 prohibited picketing with signs, or distributing handbills stating, alleging, or inferring that the vessels were unsafe. The petitioner abandoned its appeal from these provisions and they are not before us. Paragraph 4 was set aside on appeal. See n. 3, infra. Paragraph 3 therefore is the only provision under review in this Court. It prohibits petitioner from:
“Picketing or patrolling with signs or placards indicating or inferring that a labor dispute exists between [respondents] and [petitioner], by any statement, legend or language alleging [that respondents] pay their employees substandard wages.”
Initially petitioner directed the picketing not at respondents’ ships but at Eastern Steamship Lines, Inc., a Florida corporation that acted as respondents’ general agent. Eastern obtained a temporary injunction, 193 So. 2d 73 (1966), whereupon petitioner shifted the picketing to the ships themselves.
The Court of Appeal set aside paragraph 4 of the injunction which prohibited “[b]y any manner or by any means, including picketing or the distribution of handbills, inducing or attempting to induce customers and potential customers of [respondents] to cease doing business with [respondents].” 215 So. 2d, at 52 n. 1.
We put to one side situations in which the longshore work, although involving activities on an American dock, is carried out entirely by a ship’s foreign crew, pursuant to foreign ship’s articles.
The Board has reached the same conclusion in similar situations. See, e. g., International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 13, 161 N. L. R. B. 451 (1966); Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 156 N. L. R. B. 753 (1966); New York Shipping Assn., Inc., 116 N. L. R. B. 1183 (1956). Cf. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U. S. 234 (1931).
Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider petitioner’s further contention that in the absence of any evidence of an illegal objective, prohibition of peaceful picketing to publicize substandard wages deprived petitioner of freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court in which the case originated. Focus on the court in which the case originated, not the administrative agency. For this reason, if appropiate note the origin court to be a state or federal appellate court rather than a court of first instance (trial court). If the case originated in the United States Supreme Court (arose under its original jurisdiction or no other court was involved), note the origin as "United States Supreme Court". If the case originated in a state court, note the origin as "State Court". Do not code the name of the state. The courts in the District of Columbia present a special case in part because of their complex history. Treat local trial (including today's superior court) and appellate courts (including today's DC Court of Appeals) as state courts. Consider cases that arise on a petition of habeas corpus and those removed to the federal courts from a state court as originating in the federal, rather than a state, court system. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus begins in the federal district court, not the state trial court. Identify courts based on the naming conventions of the day. Do not differentiate among districts in a state. For example, use "New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York" for all the districts in New York. | What is the court in which the case originated? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims",
"United States Supreme Court"
] | [
159
] | sc_caseorigin |
DIFFENDERFER et al. v. CENTRAL BAPTIST CHURCH OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, INC., et al.
No. 70-47.
Argued December 6, 1971
Decided January 10, 1972
Leo Pfeffer argued the cause for appellant Diffen-derfer. With him on the brief were Richard Yale Feder, Irma Robbins Feder, and Melvin L. Wulf. Howard J. Hollander argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant Paul.
Charles M. Whelan argued the cause for appellee Central Baptist Church of Miami. With him on the brief were Herbert S. Sawyer, Karl B. Block, Jr., and William R. Consedine.
Franklin C. Salisbury and Noel H. Thompson filed a brief for Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State as amicus curiae urging reversal. Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General of Florida, pro se, filed a memorandum.
Per Curiam.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment that Florida Stat. § 192.06 (4) (1967) violates the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States insofar as it authorizes a tax exemption for church property used, inter alia, as a commercial parking lot, and for an injunction requiring appropriate state and local officials to assess and collect taxes against such property. It is brought by citizens and taxpayers of Dade County, Florida, where the property in question is located. The crux of their complaint is that state aid in the form of a tax exemption for church property used primarily for commercial purposes amounts not only to an establishment of the one religion aided, but also to an inhibition on the free exercise of other religions. A three-judge District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281, 2284, upheld the validity of the statute as applied to the property involved herein, 316 F. Supp. 1116 (1970), and plaintiffs appealed to this Court. 28 U. S. C. § 1253. We noted probable jurisdiction on March 1, 1971. 401 U. S. 934.
The Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Inc., is the owner of nearly a full square block of land in downtown Miami which is occupied by church buildings and an offstreet parking lot. The parking facilities are utilized by numerous persons pursuing a variety of church activities. These facilities are also used as a commercial parking lot every day except Sunday. At the time this suit was instituted and decided in the District Court, Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (4) provided for exemption from taxation of:
“All houses of public worship and lots on which they are situated, and all pews or steps and furniture therein, every parsonage and all burying grounds not owned or held by individuals or corporations for speculative purposes, tombs and right of burial . . . .”
Prior to the decision of the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court had held, in a case involving the same property as is involved here, that church parking lots retain their full tax exemption under state law even though they may be used for commercial as well as church purposes. Central Baptist Church v. Dade County, 216 So. 2d 4 (1968). This led to the constitutional challenge in the District Court.
At its 1971 Regular Session, the Florida Legislature repealed § 196.191 (the 1969 successor to § 192.06) and enacted new legislation, approved June 15, 1971, effective December 31, 1971, which provides, in relevant part, that church property is exempt from taxation only if the property is used predominantly for religious purposes and only “to the extent of the ratio that such predominant use bears to the non-exempt use.” Fla. Stat. § 196.192 (2).
We must review the judgment of the District Court in light of Florida law as it now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered. Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602, 604 (1960); cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 281-282 (1969); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 60 (1941). It is clear that the church parking lot that was the subject of the taxpayers’ complaint is no longer fully exempt from taxation. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that the lot is predominantly used for nonreligious purposes, it will receive no exemption whatever. “The case has therefore lost its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, supra, at 48.
This is not a case that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911), nor is it the kind of case that may produce irreparable injury if not decided immediately, see, e. g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969) ; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963). The only relief sought in the complaint was a declaratory judgment that the now repealed Fla. Stat. § 192.06 (4) is unconstitutional as applied to a church parking lot used for commercial purposes and an injunction against its application to said lot. This relief is, of course, inappropriate now that the statute has been repealed.
Because it is possible that appellants may wish to amend their complaint so as to demonstrate that the repealed statute retains some continuing force or to attack the newly enacted legislation, rather than remanding the case to the District Court for dismissal as is our usual practice when a case has become moot pending a decision by this Court, United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39, and n. 2 (1950), we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with leave to the appellants to amend their pleadings. Bryan v. Austin, 354 U. S. 933 (1957).
Judgment will be entered accordingly.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
4
] | sc_casedisposition |
UNITED STATES v. CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. et al.
No. 16.
Argued October 20, 1952.
Decided December 8, 1952.
Assistant Attorney General Baldridge argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Robert W. Ginnane, Paul A. Sweeney and Benjamin Forman.
Albert R. Connelly argued the cause for the Shell Company of Philippine Islands, Ltd. et al., and Leo T. Kissam for Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondents. They also were on a brief for respondents.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Each of the respondent oil companies owned terminal facilities in the Pandacan district of Manila at the time of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. These were used to receive, handle and store petroleum products from incoming ships and to release them for further distribution throughout the Philippine Islands. Wharves, rail and automotive equipment, pumps, pipe lines, storage tanks, and warehouses were included in the property on hand at the outbreak of the war, as well as a normal supply of petroleum products.
News of the Pearl Harbor attack reached Manila early in the morning of December 8, 1941. On the same day, enemy air attacks were mounted against our forces in the Philippines, and thereafter the enemy launched his amphibious assault.
On December 12, 1941, the United States Army, through its Chief Quartermaster,, stationed a control officer at the terminals. Operations continued at respondents’ plants, but distribution of the petroleum products for civilian use was severely restricted. A major share of the existing supplies was requisitioned by the Army.
The military situation in the Philippines grew worse. In the face of the Japanese advance, the Commanding General on December 23, 1941, ordered the withdrawal of all troops on Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula. On December 25, 1941, he declared Manila to be an open city. On that same day, the Chief Engineer on the staff of the Commanding General addressed to each of the oil companies letters stating that the Pandacan oil depots “are requisitioned by the U. S. Army.” The letters further stated: “Any action deemed necessary for the destruction of this property will be handled by the U. S. Army.” An engineer in the employ of one of the com-pañíes was commissioned a first lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers to facilitate this design.
On December 26, he received orders to prepare the facilities for demolition. On December 27, 1941, while enemy planes were bombing the area, this officer met with representatives of the companies. The orders of the Chief Engineer had been transmitted to the companies. Letters from the Deputy Chief of Staff, by command of General MacArthur, also had been sent to each of the oil companies, directing the destruction of all remaining petroleum products and the vital parts of the plants. Plans were laid to carry out these instructions, to expedite the removal of products which might still be of use to the troops in the field, and to lay a demolition network about the terminals. The representatives of Caltex were given, at their insistence, a penciled receipt for all the terminal facilities and stocks of Caltex.
At 5:40 p. m., December 31, 1941, while Japanese troops were entering Manila, Army personnel completed a successful demolition. All unused petroleum products were destroyed, and the facilities were rendered useless to the enemy. The enemy was deprived of a valuable logistic weapon.
After the war, respondents demanded compensation for all of the property which had been used or destroyed by the Army. The Government paid for the petroleum stocks and transportation equipment which were either used or destroyed by the Army, but it refused to compensate respondents for the destruction of the Pandacan terminal facilities. Claiming a constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment to just compensation for these terminal facilities, respondents sued in the Court of Claims. Recovery was allowed. 120 Ct. Cl. 518, 100 F. Supp. 970. We granted certiorari to review this judgment. 343 U. S. 955.
As reflected in the findings of the Court of Claims, there were two rather distinct phases of Army operations in the Pandacan district in December 1941. While the military exercised considerable control over the business operations of respondents’ terminals during the period between December 12 and December 26, there was not, according to the findings below, an assumption of actual physical or proprietary dominion over them during this period. Bound by these findings, respondents do not now question the holding of the Court of Claims that prior to December 27 there was no seizure for which just compensation must be paid.
Accordingly, it is the legal significance of the events that occurred between December 27 and December 31 which concerns us. Respondents concede that the Army had a right to destroy the installations. But they insist that the destruction created a right in themselves to exact fair compensation from the United States for what was destroyed.
The argument draws heavily from statements by this Court in Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1852), and United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623 (1871). We agree that the opinions lend some support to respondents’ view. But the language in those two cases is far broader than the holdings. Both cases involved equipment which had been impressed by the Army for subsequent use by the Army. In neither was the Army’s purpose limited, as it was in this case, to the sole objective of destroying property of strategic value to prevent the enemy from using it to wage war the more successfully.
A close reading of the Mitchell and Russell cases shows that they are not precedent to establish a compensable taking in this case. Nor do those cases exhaust all that has been said by this Court on the subject. In United States v. Pacific R. Co., 120 U. S. 227 (1887), Mr. Justice Field, speaking for a unanimous Court, discussed the question at length. That case involved bridges which had been destroyed during the War Between the States by a retreating Northern Army to impede the advance of the Confederate Army. Though the point was not directly involved, the Court raised the question of whether this act constituted a compensable taking by the United States and answered it in the negative:
“The destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple and defeat him, as destroying his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general. Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their destruction. The necessities of the war called for and justified this. The safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss.”
It may be true that this language also went beyond the precise questions at issue. But the principles expressed were neither novel nor startling, for the common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community— the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved. And what was said in the Pacific Railroad case was later made the basis for the holding in Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297 (1909), where recovery was denied to the owners of a factory which had been destroyed by American soldiers in the field in Cuba because it was thought that the structure housed the germs of a contagious disease.
Therefore, whether or not the principle laid down by Mr. Justice Field was dictum when he enunciated it, we hold that it is law today. In our view, it must govern in this case. Respondents and the majority of the Court of Claims, arguing to the contrary, have placed great emphasis on the fact that the Army exercised “deliberation” in singling out this property, in “requisitioning” it from its owners, and in exercising “control” over it before devastating it. We need not labor over these labels; it may be that they describe adequately what was done, but they do not show the legal consequences of what was done. The “requisition” involved in this case was no more than an order to evacuate the premises which were slated for demolition. The “deliberation” behind the order was no more than a design to prevent the enemy from realizing any strategic value from an area which he was soon to capture.
Had the Army hesitated, had the facilities only been destroyed after retreat, respondents would certainly have no claims to compensation. The Army did not hesitate. It is doubtful that any concern over the legal niceties of the situation entered into the decision to destroy the plants promptly while there was yet time to destroy them thoroughly. Nor do we think it legally significant that the destruction was effected prior to withdrawal. The short of the matter is that this property, due to the fortunes of war, had become a potential weapon of great significance to the invader. It was destroyed, not appropriated for subsequent use. It was destroyed that the United States might better and sooner destroy the enemy.
The terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that the United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of war. This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign. No rigid rules can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses. Each case must be judged on its own facts. But the general principles laid down in the Pacific Railroad case seem especially applicable here. Viewed realistically, then, the destruction of respondents’ terminals by a trained team of engineers in the face of their impending seizure by the enemy was no different than the destruction of the bridges in the Pacific Railroad case. Adhering to the principles of that ease, we conclude that the court below erred in holding that respondents have a constitutional right to compensation on the claims presented to this Court.
Reversed.
“. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
At one point shortly after the outbreak of the war, the Army contemplated leasing respondents’ facilities. But this plan was never put into effect. Respondents continued to operate the plants themselves up to December 26, 1941.
In the Russell case, supra, the Court said, 13 Wall., at 627-628: “Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and impending public danger, in which private property may be impressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of the owner. . . . Exigencies of the kind do arise in time of war or impending public danger, but it is the emergency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives the right, and it is clear that the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified. Such a justification may be shown, and when shown the rule is well settled that the officer taking private property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully proved, is not a trespasser, and that the government is bound to make full compensation to the owner.”
The narrow issue in the case was whether, after the Army rebuilt the bridges it had previously destroyed, the Army could charge for the expense of the rebuilding. On this issue the Court held for the railroad.
120 U. S., at 234.
For earlier cases expressing such principles see, e. g., Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 18-19 (1879); Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 357 (1788); Parham v. The Justices, 9 Ga. 341, 348-349 (1851). See also 2 Kent’s Commentaries (14th ed.) 338.
Cf. Respublica v. Sparhawk, supra, where the following appears, 1 Dall., at 363:
“We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 Vol. of Clarendon’s History, where it is mentioned, that the Lord Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not give directions for, or consent to, the pulling down forty wooden houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c. belonging to the Lawyers of the Temple, then on the Circuit, for fear he should be answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half that great city was burnt.”
Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 787-788 (1948); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517-519 (1944); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 502 (1923). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed. If the case arose under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, note the source as "United States Supreme Court". If the case arose in a state court, note the source as "State Supreme Court", "State Appellate Court", or "State Trial Court". Do not code the name of the state. | What is the court whose decision the Supreme Court reviewed? | [
"U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals",
"U.S. Court of International Trade",
"U.S. Court of Claims, Court of Federal Claims",
"U.S. Court of Military Appeals, renamed as Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces",
"U.S. Court of Military Review",
"U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals",
"U.S. Customs Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit",
"U.S. Tax Court",
"Temporary Emergency U.S. Court of Appeals",
"U.S. Court for China",
"U.S. Consular Courts",
"U.S. Commerce Court",
"Territorial Supreme Court",
"Territorial Appellate Court",
"Territorial Trial Court",
"Emergency Court of Appeals",
"Supreme Court of the District of Columbia",
"Bankruptcy Court",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit",
"U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (includes the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia but not the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has local jurisdiction)",
"Alabama Middle U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Northern U.S. District Court",
"Alabama Southern U.S. District Court",
"Alaska U.S. District Court",
"Arizona U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas Western U.S. District Court",
"California Central U.S. District Court",
"California Eastern U.S. District Court",
"California Northern U.S. District Court",
"California Southern U.S. District Court",
"Colorado U.S. District Court",
"Connecticut U.S. District Court",
"Delaware U.S. District Court",
"District Of Columbia U.S. District Court",
"Florida Middle U.S. District Court",
"Florida Northern U.S. District Court",
"Florida Southern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Middle U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Northern U.S. District Court",
"Georgia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Guam U.S. District Court",
"Hawaii U.S. District Court",
"Idaho U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Central U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Northern U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Southern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Northern U.S. District Court",
"Indiana Southern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Northern U.S. District Court",
"Iowa Southern U.S. District Court",
"Kansas U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky Western U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Middle U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana Western U.S. District Court",
"Maine U.S. District Court",
"Maryland U.S. District Court",
"Massachusetts U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Michigan Western U.S. District Court",
"Minnesota U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Northern U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi Southern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Missouri Western U.S. District Court",
"Montana U.S. District Court",
"Nebraska U.S. District Court",
"Nevada U.S. District Court",
"New Hampshire U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"New Mexico U.S. District Court",
"New York Eastern U.S. District Court",
"New York Northern U.S. District Court",
"New York Southern U.S. District Court",
"New York Western U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Middle U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"North Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Northern Mariana Islands U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Northern U.S. District Court",
"Ohio Southern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Northern U.S. District Court",
"Oklahoma Western U.S. District Court",
"Oregon U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Middle U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania Western U.S. District Court",
"Puerto Rico U.S. District Court",
"Rhode Island U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina U.S. District Court",
"South Dakota U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Middle U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee Western U.S. District Court",
"Texas Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Northern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Southern U.S. District Court",
"Texas Western U.S. District Court",
"Utah U.S. District Court",
"Vermont U.S. District Court",
"Virgin Islands U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Virginia Western U.S. District Court",
"Washington Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Washington Western U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Northern U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia Southern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Eastern U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin Western U.S. District Court",
"Wyoming U.S. District Court",
"Louisiana U.S. District Court",
"Washington U.S. District Court",
"West Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Eastern U.S. District Court",
"South Carolina Western U.S. District Court",
"Alabama U.S. District Court",
"U.S. District Court for the Canal Zone",
"Georgia U.S. District Court",
"Illinois U.S. District Court",
"Indiana U.S. District Court",
"Iowa U.S. District Court",
"Michigan U.S. District Court",
"Mississippi U.S. District Court",
"Missouri U.S. District Court",
"New Jersey Eastern U.S. District Court (East Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New Jersey Western U.S. District Court (West Jersey U.S. District Court)",
"New York U.S. District Court",
"North Carolina U.S. District Court",
"Ohio U.S. District Court",
"Pennsylvania U.S. District Court",
"Tennessee U.S. District Court",
"Texas U.S. District Court",
"Virginia U.S. District Court",
"Norfolk U.S. District Court",
"Wisconsin U.S. District Court",
"Kentucky U.S. Distrcrict Court",
"New Jersey U.S. District Court",
"California U.S. District Court",
"Florida U.S. District Court",
"Arkansas U.S. District Court",
"District of Orleans U.S. District Court",
"State Supreme Court",
"State Appellate Court",
"State Trial Court",
"Eastern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Middle Circuit (of the United States)",
"Southern Circuit (of the United States)",
"Alabama U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Alabama",
"Arkansas U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Arkansas",
"California U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of California",
"Connecticut U.S. Circuit for the District of Connecticut",
"Delaware U.S. Circuit for the District of Delaware",
"Florida U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Florida",
"Georgia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Georgia",
"Illinois U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Illinois",
"Indiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Indiana",
"Iowa U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Iowa",
"Kansas U.S. Circuit for the District of Kansas",
"Kentucky U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Kentucky",
"Louisiana U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Louisiana",
"Maine U.S. Circuit for the District of Maine",
"Maryland U.S. Circuit for the District of Maryland",
"Massachusetts U.S. Circuit for the District of Massachusetts",
"Michigan U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Michigan",
"Minnesota U.S. Circuit for the District of Minnesota",
"Mississippi U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Mississippi",
"Missouri U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Missouri",
"Nevada U.S. Circuit for the District of Nevada",
"New Hampshire U.S. Circuit for the District of New Hampshire",
"New Jersey U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New Jersey",
"New York U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of New York",
"North Carolina U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of North Carolina",
"Ohio U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Ohio",
"Oregon U.S. Circuit for the District of Oregon",
"Pennsylvania U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Pennsylvania",
"Rhode Island U.S. Circuit for the District of Rhode Island",
"South Carolina U.S. Circuit for the District of South Carolina",
"Tennessee U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Tennessee",
"Texas U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Texas",
"Vermont U.S. Circuit for the District of Vermont",
"Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Virginia",
"West Virginia U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of West Virginia",
"Wisconsin U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Wisconsin",
"Wyoming U.S. Circuit for the District of Wyoming",
"Circuit Court of the District of Columbia",
"Nebraska U.S. Circuit for the District of Nebraska",
"Colorado U.S. Circuit for the District of Colorado",
"Washington U.S. Circuit for (all) District(s) of Washington",
"Idaho U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Idaho",
"Montana U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Montana",
"Utah U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Utah",
"South Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of South Dakota",
"North Dakota U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of North Dakota",
"Oklahoma U.S. Circuit Court for (all) District(s) of Oklahoma",
"Court of Private Land Claims"
] | [
2
] | sc_casesource |
UNITED STATES v. IDAHO ex rel. DIRECTOR, IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES
No. 92-190.
Argued March 29, 1993 —
Decided May 3, 1993
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General O’Meara, Edwin S. Kneedler, Peter C. Monson, Robert L. Klarquist, and William B. Lazarus.
Clive J. Strong, Deputy Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General, and David J. Barber, Peter R. Anderson, and Steven W. Strack, Deputy Attorneys General.
Robert T. Anderson, Melody L. McCoy, Walter R. Echo-Hawk, Patrice Kunesh, Carl Ullman, Henry J. Sockbeson, and Dale T. White filed a brief for the Nez Perce Tribe et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General of Oregon, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Jerome S. Lidz, Stephen E. A. Sanders, and Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Alaska et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The McCarran Amendment allows a State to join the United States as a defendant in a comprehensive water right adjudication. 66 Stat. 560, 43 U. S. C. § 666(a). This ease arises from Idaho’s joinder of the United States in a suit for the adjudication of water rights in the Snake River. Under Idaho Code §42-1414 (1990), all water right claimants, including the United States, must pay “filing fees” when they submit their notices of claims. Idaho collects these fees to “finane[e] the costs of adjudicating water rights,” §42-1414; the United States estimates that in its case the fees could exceed $10 million. We hold that the McCarran Amendment does not waive the United States’ sovereign immunity from fees of this kind.
Discovered by the Lewis and Clark expedition, the Snake River — the “Mississippi of Idaho” — is 1,038 miles long and the principal tributary to the Columbia River. It rises in the mountains of the Continental Divide in northwest Wyoming and enters eastern Idaho through the Palisades Reservoir. Near Heise, Idaho, the river leaves the mountains and meanders westerly across southern Idaho’s Snake River plain for the entire breadth of the State — some 400 miles. On the western edge of Idaho, near Weiser, the Snake enters Oregon for a while and then turns northward, forming the Oregon-Idaho boundary for 216 miles. In this stretch, the river traverses Hells Canyon, the Nation’s deepest river gorge. From the northeastern corner of Oregon, the river marks the Washington-Idaho boundary until Lewiston, Idaho, where it bends westward into Washington and finally flows into the Columbia just south of Pasco, Washington. From elevations of 10,000 feet, the Snake descends to 3,000 feet and, together with its many tributaries, provides the only water for most of Idaho. See generally T. Palmer, The Snake River (1991).
This litigation followed the enactment by the Idaho Legislature in 1985 and 1986 of legislation providing for the Snake River Basin Adjudication. That legislation stated that “the director of the department of water resources shall petition the [state] district court to commence an adjudication within the terms of the McCarran [Ajmendment.” Idaho Code §42-1406A(l) (1990). The 1985 and 1986 legislation also altered Idaho’s methods for “financing the costs of adjudicating water rights”; it provided that the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources shall not accept a “notice of claim” from any water claimant unless such notice “is submitted with a filing fee based upon the fee schedule.” §42-1414. “Failure to pay the variable water use fee in accordance with the timetable provided shall be cause for the department to reject and return the notice of claim to the claimant.” Ibid. Idaho uses these funds “to pay the costs of the department attributable to general water rights adjudications” and “to pay for judicial expenses directly relating to the Snake river adjudication.” §§42-1777(1) and (2).
The Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources filed a petition in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District naming the United States and all other water users as defendants. The District Court entered an order commencing the adjudication, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Idaho. In re Snake River Basin Water System, 115 Idaho 1, 764 P. 2d 78 (1988), cert. denied sub nom. Boise-Kuna Irrigation Dist. v. United, States, 490 U. S. 1005 (1989). When the United States attempted to submit its notices of claims unaccompanied by filing fees, the director refused to accept them. The United States then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the state court to compel the director to accept its notices without fees, asserting that the McCarran Amendment does not waive federal sovereign immunity from payment of filing fees. The District Court granted Idaho summary judgment on the immunity issue: “The ordinary, contemporary and common meaning of the language of McCarran is that Congress waived all rights to assert any facet of sovereign immunity in a general adjudication of all water rights . . . which is being conducted in accordance with state law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed by a divided vote. 122 Idaho 116, 832 P. 2d 289 (1992). It concluded that the McCarran Amendment “expresses] a ‘clear intent' of congress to subject the United States to all of the state court processes of an ‘adjudication’ of its water rights with the sole exception of costs.” Id., at 121, 832 P. 2d, at 294. The court also “deeline[d] to read the term judgment for costs as including the term filing fees.” Id., at 122, 832 P. 2d, at 295. Whereas “costs” are charges that a prevailing party may recover from its opponent as part of the judgment, “fees are compensation paid to an officer, such as the court, for services rendered to individuals in the course of litigation.” Ibid. Two justices wrote separate dissents, asserting that the McCarran Amendment does not waive sovereign immunity from filing fees. We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 939 (1992), and now reverse.
The McCarran Amendment provides in relevant part:
“Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.” 43 U.S. C. § 666(a).
According to Idaho, the amendment requires the United States to comply with all state laws applicable to general water right adjudications. Idaho argues that the first sentence of the amendment, the joinder provision, allows joinder of the United States as a defendant in suits for the adjudication of water rights. It then construes the amendment’s second sentence, the pleading provision, to waive the United States’ immunity from all state laws pursuant to which those adjudications are conducted. Idaho relies heavily on the language of the second sentence stating that the United States shall be “deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable.” Because the “filing fees” at issue here are assessed in connection with a comprehensive adjudication of water rights, Idaho contends that they fall within the MeCarran Amendment’s waiver of sovereign immunity.
The United States, on the other hand, contends that the critical language of the second sentence renders it amenable only to state substantive law of water rights, and not to any of the state adjective law governing procedure, fees, and the like. The Government supports its position by arguing that the phrase “the State laws” in the second sentence must be referring to the same “State law” mentioned in the first sentence, and that since the phrase in the first sentence is clearly directed to substantive state water law, the phrase in the second sentence must be so directed as well.
There is no doubt that waivers of federal sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally expressed” in the statutory text. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95 (1990); Department of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U. S. 607, 615 (1992); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 33-34 (1992). “Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States,” Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 137 (1991), and not enlarged beyond what the language of the statute requires, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685-686 (1983). But just as “ ‘we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended[,] . . . [njeither, however, should we assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.’ ” Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 206 (1993) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1979)).
We are unable to accept either party’s contention. The argument of the United States is weak, simply as a matter of grammar, because the critical term in the second sentence is “the State laws,” while the corresponding language in the first sentence is “State law.” And such a construction would render the amendment’s consent to suit largely nugatory, allowing the Government to argue for some special federal rule defeating established state-law rules governing pleading, discovery, and the admissibility of evidence at trial. We do not believe that Congress intended to create such a legal no-man’s land in enacting the MeCarran Amendment. We rejected a similarly technical argument of the Government in construing the MeCarran Amendment in United States v. District Court, County of Eagle, 401 U. S. 520, 525 (1971), saying “[w]e think that argument is extremely technical; and we decline to confine [the MeCarran Amendment] so narrowly.”
We also reject Idaho’s contention. In several of our cases exemplifying the rule of strict construction of a waiver of sovereign immunity, we rejected efforts to assess monetary liability against the United States for what are normal incidents of litigation between private parties. See, e. g., United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 20-21 (1926) (assessment of costs); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 323 (1986) (recovery of interest on judgment); Ohio, supra, at 619-620 (liability for punitive fines). And the McCarran Amendment’s “cost proviso,” of course, expressly forbids the assessment of costs against the United States: “[N]o judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States.”
The Supreme Court of Idaho pointed out in its opinion that “fees” and “costs” mean two different things in the context of lawsuits, 122 Idaho, at 122, 832 P. 2d, at 295, and we agree with this observation. “Fees” are generally those amounts paid to a public official, such as the clerk of the court, by a party for particular charges typically delineated by statute; in contrast, “costs” are those items of expense incurred in litigation that a prevailing party is allowed by rule to tax against the losing party. See 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2666, pp. 173-174 (1983). Before Idaho altered its system for recovering its expenses in conducting comprehensive water right adjudications in 1985 and 1986, Idaho courts, at the time of entry of final judgment, used to proportionately tax the “costs” of the adjudication against all parties to the suit, and not simply against the losing parties. Idaho Code §42-1401 (1948). When Idaho revised this system, many of the items formerly taxed as “costs” to the parties at the conclusion of the adjudication were denominated as “fees,” and required to be paid into court at the outset. This suggests that although the general distinction between fees and costs may be accurate, in the context of this proceeding the line is blurred, indeed.
While we therefore accept the proposition that the critical language of the second sentence of the McCarran Amendment submits the United States generally to state adjective law, as well as to state substantive law of water rights, we do not believe it subjects the United States to the payment of the sort of fees that Idaho sought to exact here. The cases mentioned above dealing with waivers of sovereign immunity as to monetary exactions from the United States in litigation show that we have been particularly alert to require a specific waiver of sovereign inununity before the United States may be held liable for them. We hold that the language of the second sentence making “the State laws” applicable to the United States in comprehensive water right adjudications is not sufficiently specific to meet this requirement.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.-
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed. The information relevant to this variable may be found near the end of the summary that begins on the title page of each case, or preferably at the very end of the opinion of the Court. For cases in which the Court granted a motion to dismiss, consider "petition denied or appeal dismissed". There is "no disposition" if the Court denied a motion to dismiss. | What is the disposition of the case, that is, the treatment the Supreme Court accorded the court whose decision it reviewed? | [
"stay, petition, or motion granted",
"affirmed (includes modified)",
"reversed",
"reversed and remanded",
"vacated and remanded",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part",
"affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part and remanded",
"vacated",
"petition denied or appeal dismissed",
"certification to or from a lower court",
"no disposition"
] | [
3
] | sc_casedisposition |
TEXAS STATE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION et al. v. GARLAND INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
No. 87-1759.
Argued March 1, 1989
Decided March 28, 1989
O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Robert H. Chanin argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Jeremiah A. Collins.
Earl Luna argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Mary Milford.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We must decide today the proper standard for determining whether a party has “prevailed” in an action brought under certain civil rights statutes such that the party is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. This is an issue which has divided the Courts of Appeals both before and after our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require that a party succeed on the “central issue” in the litigation and achieve the “primary relief sought” to be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees under §1988. See, e. g., Simien v. San Antonio, 809 F. 2d 256, 258 (CA5 1987); Martin v. Heckler, 773 F. 2d 1145, 1149 (CA11 1985) (en banc). Most of the other Federal Courts of Appeals have applied a less demanding standard, requiring only that a party succeed on a significant issue and receive some of the relief sought in the lawsuit to qualify for a fee award. See, e. g., Gingras v. Lloyd, 740 F. 2d 210, 212 (CA2 1984); Lampher v. Zagel, 755 F. 2d 99, 102 (CA7 1985); Fast v. School Dist. of Ladue, 728 F. 2d 1030, 1032-1033 (CA8 1984) (en banc); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F. 2d 1124, 1125 (CA9 1983); Nephew v. Aurora, 766 F. 2d 1464, 1466 (CA10 1985). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the “central issue” test and concluded that petitioners here were not prevailing parties under § 1988. Because of the conflicting views in the Courts of Appeals, and because of the importance of the definition of the term “prevailing party” to the application of §1988 and other federal fee shifting statutes, we granted certiorari. 488 U. S. 815 (1988).
HH
On March 31, 1981, petitioners, the Texas State Teachers Association, its local affiliate the Garland Education Association, and several individual members and employees of both organizations brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against respondent Garland Independent School District and various school district officials. Petitioners’ complaint alleged that the school district’s policy of prohibiting communications by or with teachers during the schoolday concerning employee organizations violated petitioners’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In particular, petitioners focused their attack on the school district’s Administrative Regulation 412, which prohibits employee organizations access to school facilities during school hours and proscribes the use of school mail and internal communications systems by employee organizations. The school district’s regulations do permit employee organizations to meet with, or recruit, teachers on school premises before or after the schoolday “upon request and approval by the local school principal.” Brief for Respondents 4-5.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court rejected petitioners’ claims in almost all respects. The court found that under Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37 (1983), the prohibitions on union access to teachers themselves and to internal communication media during school hours were constitutional. App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a-57a. The District Court also rejected petitioners’ claim that the school district’s policies were unconstitutional in that they prohibited teachers’ discussion or promotion of employee organizations among themselves during school hours. Id., at 46a, n. 13. As to teacher discussion of employee organizations, the court found that even if some school officials interpreted the regulations to prohibit such speech, there had been no attempt to enforce such an interpretation. As to teacher-to-teacher speech promoting employee organizations, the court found that the record indicated that the school district did prohibit such speech, but concluded that this prohibition was constitutional. Ibid. The District Court did find for petitioners on one issue: it held that the requirement of school principal approval of teacher meetings with union representatives after school hours was unconstitutionally vague in that no guidelines limited the discretion of the principal’s decision to grant or deny access to the campus. Id., at 58a. The District Court found that this issue was of “minor significance,” since there was no evidence in the record to indicate that school officials had ever denied employee organizations the use of school premises during nonschool hours. Id., at 58a, 60a, n. 26.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 777 F. 2d 1046 (1985). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that petitioners’ claim that.the First Amendment required the school district to allow union representatives access to school facilities during school hours was foreclosed by our decision in Perry. The Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the school district on this claim. Id., at 1050-1053. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the District Court’s analysis of petitioners’ claims relating to teacher-to-teacher discussion of employee organizations during the schoolday. It found that the prohibition of teacher speech promoting union activity during school hours was unconstitutional. Id., at 1054. It also found that there was a distinct possibility that the school district would discipline teachers who engaged in any discussion of employee organizations during the schoolday, and that such a policy had a chilling effect on teachers’ First Amendment rights. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the prohibition on teacher use of internal mail and billboard facilities to discuss employee organizations was unconstitutional. The school district allowed teachers to use these facilities for personal messages of all kinds, and the school district had not shown that the discussion of union activity in these media would be disruptive of its educative mission. Id., at 1055. As to these claims, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. Respondents filed an appeal in this Court, and we summarily affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. See Garland Independent School Dist. v. Texas State Teachers Assn., 479 U. S. 801 (1986).
Petitioners then filed the instant application for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988. The District Court found that under Fifth Circuit precedent petitioners here were not “prevailing parties” within the meaning of § 1988 and thus were ineligible for any fee award. App. to Pet. for Cert. 16a-20a. The court recognized that petitioners had achieved “partial success,” but indicated that “[i]n this circuit the test for prevailing party status is whether the plaintiff prevailed on the central issue by acquiring the primary relief sought.” Id., at 17a, quoting Simien v. San Antonio, 809 F. 2d, at 258. Looking to “the background of the lawsuit” and the claims presented in petitioners’ complaint, the District Court concluded that the central issue in this litigation was the constitutionality of the school district’s policy of limiting employee organizations’ access to teachers and school facilities during school hours. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. Because petitioners did not prevail on this issue, they had not carried the “central issue” in the lawsuit nor achieved “the primary relief sought” and were therefore precluded from recovering attorney’s fees.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment denying petitioners prevailing party status under § 1988. 837 F. 2d 190 (1988). The majority noted that the Fifth Circuit’s “definition of ‘prevailing party’ is narrower than some of the other Federal appellate courts.” Id., at 192. Applying that definition here, the majority found that while petitioners “did succeed on significant secondary issues,” the “main thrust” of their lawsuit was nonetheless the desire to gain access to school campuses during school hours for outside representatives of employee organizations. Id., at 192-193. Thus, under the “central issue” test, the District Court had correctly concluded that petitioners were not prevailing parties eligible for a fee award under § 1988. Judge Goldberg dissented. He argued that the “central issue” test for determining prevailing party status was inconsistent with the congressional purpose in enacting § 1988 and contrary to the decisions of this Court. Id., at 193-197. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I — I
As amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1988, provides m pertinent part:
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424 (1983), we dealt with the application of the attorney’s fee provision of §1988 to a situation much like the one before us today. Respondents in Hensley were patients involuntarily confined in a state mental hospital who brought a broad based challenge to the constitutionality of a number of the institution’s rules and practices. In five of the six general areas where respondents challenged the institution’s practices, the District Court found that conditions fell below those required by the Constitution and granted respondents relief. Respondents then requested a fee award pursuant to § 1988, and the District Court “determined that respondents were prevailing parties under 42 U. S. C. § 1988 even though they had not succeeded on every claim.” Id., at 428. With one exception, the District Court awarded the respondents in Hensley the entire “lodestar” figure, that is, the hours expended in litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. The Court of Appeals affirmed the fee award.
In Hensley this Court sought to clarify “the proper standard for setting a fee award where the plaintiff has achieved only limited success.” Id., at 431. At the outset we noted that no fee award is permissible until the plaintiff has crossed the “statutory threshold” of prevailing party status. In this regard, the Court indicated that “[a] typical formulation is that ‘plaintiffs may be considered “prevailing parties” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit.’ ” Id., at 433, quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F. 2d 275, 278-279 (CA1 1978). The Court then went on to establish certain principles to guide the discretion of the lower courts in setting fee awards in cases where plaintiffs have not achieved complete success. Where the plaintiff’s claims are based on different facts and legal theories, and the plaintiff has prevailed on only some of those claims, we indicated that “[t]he congressional intent to limit [fee] awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim.” Hensley, supra, at 435. In the more typical situation, where the plaintiff’s claims arise out of a common core of facts, and involve related legal theories, the inquiry is more complex. In such a case, we indicated that “the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained.” 461 U. S., at 436. We noted that in complex civil rights litigation, “the plaintiff often may succeed in identifying some unlawful practices or conditions,” but that “the range of possible success is vast,” and the achievement of prevailing party status alone “may say little about whether the expenditure of counsel’s time was reasonable in relation to the success achieved.” Ibid. We indicated that the district courts should exercise their equitable discretion in such cases to arrive at a reasonable fee award, either by attempting to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the award to account for the limited success of the plaintiff. Id., at 437. See also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U. S. 87, 96 (1989).
We think it clear that the “central issue” test applied by the lower courts here is directly contrary to the thrust of our decision in Hensley. Although respondents are correct in pointing out that Hensley did not adopt one particular standard for determining prevailing party status, Hensley does indicate that the degree of the plaintiff’s success in relation to the other goals of the lawsuit is a factor critical to the determination of the size of a reasonable fee, not to eligibility for a fee award at all.
Our decision in Hensley is consistent with congressional intent in this regard. Congress clearly contemplated that interim fee awards would be available “where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on all issues.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 5 (1976); see also H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976). In discussing the availability of fees pendente lite under § 1988, we have indicated that such awards are proper where a party “has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in the trial court or on appeal.” Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U. S. 754, 757 (1980). The incongruence of the “central issue” test in light of the clear congressional intent that interim fee awards be available to partially prevailing civil rights plaintiffs is readily apparent. In this case, our summary affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment for respondents on the union access issues and for petitioners on the teacher-to-teacher communication issues effectively ended the litigation. Because the Court of Appeals found that petitioners had not succeeded on what it viewed as the central issue in the suit, no fees were awarded. Yet, if petitioners’ victory on the teacher-to-teacher communication issue had been only an interim one, with other issues remanded for further proceedings in the District Court, petitioners would have been entitled to some fee award for their successful claims under § 1988. Congress cannot have meant “prevailing party” status to depend entirely on the timing of a request for fees: A prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the litigation.
Nor does the central issue test have much to recommend it from the viewpoint of judicial administration of § 1988 and other fee shifting provisions. By focusing on the subjective importance of an issue to the litigants, it asks a question which is almost impossible to answer. Is the “primary relief sought” in a disparate treatment action under Title VII reinstatement, backpay, or injunctive relief? This question, the answer to which appears to depend largely on the mental state of the parties, is wholly irrelevant to the purposes behind the fee shifting provisions, and promises to mire district courts entertaining fee applications in an inquiry which two commentators have described as “excruciating.” See M. Schwartz & J. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims, Defenses, and Fees §15.11, p. 348 (1986). Creating such an unstable threshold to fee eligibility is sure to provoke prolonged litigation, thus deterring settlement of fee disputes and ensuring that the fee application will spawn a second litigation of significant dimension. In sum, the search for the “central” and “tangential” issues in the lawsuit, or for the “primary,” as opposed to the “secondary,” relief sought, much like the search for the golden fleece, distracts the district court from the primary purposes behind § 1988 and is essentially unhelpful in defining the term “prevailing party.”
We think the language of Nadeau v. Helgemoe, quoted in our opinion in Hensley, adequately captures the inquiry which should be made in determining whether a civil rights plaintiff is a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988. If the plaintiff has succeeded on “any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,” the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind. Nadeau, 581 F. 2d, at 278-279. The floor in this regard is provided by our decision in Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755 (1987). As we noted there, “[r]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail. ” Id., at 760. Thus, at a minimum, to be considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant. Id., at 760-761; Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U. S. 1, 3-4 (1988). Beyond this absolute limitation, a technical victory may be so insignificant, and may be so near the situations addressed in Hewitt and Rhodes, as to be insufficient to support prevailing party status. For example, in the context of this litigation, the District Court found that the requirement that nonschool hour meetings be conducted only with prior approval from the local school principal was unconstitutionally vague. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. The District Court characterized this issue as “of minor significance” and noted that there was “no evidence that the plaintiffs were ever refused permission to use school premises during non-school hours.” Id., at 60a, n. 26. If this had been petitioners’ only success in the litigation, we think it clear that this alone would not have rendered them “prevailing parties” within the meaning of § 1988. Where the plaintiff’s success on a legal claim can be characterized as purely technical or de minimis, a district court would be justified in concluding that even the “generous formulation” we adopt today has not been satisfied. See Nadeau, 581 F. 2d, at 279, n. 3; New York City Unemployed and Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 742 F. 2d 718, 724, n. 4 (CA2 1984); Chicano Police Officer’s Assn. v. Stover, 624 F. 2d 127, 131 (CA10 1980) (“Nuisance settlements, of course, should not give rise to a ‘prevailing’ plaintiff”). The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute. Where such a change has occurred, the degree of the plaintiff’s overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award under Hensley, not to the availability of a fee award vel non.
Ill
Application of the principles enunciated above to the case at hand is not difficult. Petitioners here obtained a judgment vindicating the First Amendment rights of public employees in the workplace. Their success has materially altered the school district’s policy limiting the rights of teachers to communicate with each other concerning employee organizations and union activities. Petitioners have thus served the “private attorney general” role which Congress meant to promote in enacting § 1988. They prevailed on a significant issue in the litigation and have obtained some of the relief they sought and are thus “prevailing parties” within the meaning of § 1988. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee consistent with the principles established by our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
1
] | sc_decisiondirection |
SERFASS v. UNITED STATES
No. 73-1424.
Argued December 9, 1974
Decided March 3, 1975
Harry A. Dower argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Barry N. Mosebach.
Edward R. Korman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Petersen, and Deputy Solicitor General Frey.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of an appeal by the United States from a pretrial order dismissing an indictment based on a legal ruling made by the District Court after an examination of records and an affidavit setting forth evidence to be adduced at trial.
I
The material facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, whose military service had been deferred for two years while he was in the Peace Corps, was ordered to report for induction on January 18, 1971. On December 29, 1970, he requested the form for conscientious objectors, Selective Service Form 150, and after submitting the completed form to his local board, he requested an interview. Petitioner met with the local board on January 13, 1971, and thereafter he was informed by letter that it had considered his entire Selective Service file, had “unanimously agreed that there was no change over which [petitioner] had no control,” and had therefore “decided not to re-open [petitioner’s] file.” He was also informed that he was “still under Orders to report for Induction on January 18, 1971 at 5:15 A. M.” Petitioner appeared at the examining station and refused induction on January 18.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging petitioner with willfully failing to report for and submit to induction into the Armed Forces, in violation of 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a). At petitioner’s arraignment he pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. The trial date was set for January 9, 1973. Prior to that time, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the local board did not state adequate reasons for its refusal to reopen his file. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of petitioner stating merely that he had applied for conscientious objector status and that the local board’s letter was the only communication concerning his claim which he had received. At the same time, petitioner moved “to postpone the trial of the within matter which is now scheduled for January 9, 1973, for the reason that a Motion to Dismiss has been simultaneously filed and the expeditious administration of justice will be served best by considering the Motion prior to trial.”
On January 5 the District Court granted petitioner’s motion to continue the trial and set a date for oral argument on the motion to dismiss the indictment. Briefs were submitted, and after hearing oral argument, the District Court entered an order directing the parties to submit a copy of petitioner’s Selective Service file. On July 16, 1973, it ordered that the indictment be dismissed. In its memorandum, the court noted that the material facts were derived from petitioner’s affidavit, from his Selective Service file, and from the oral stipulation of counsel at the argument “that the information which Serfass submitted to the Board establishes a prima facie claim for conscientious objector status based upon late crystallization.” The District Court held that dismissal of the indictment was appropriate because petitioner was “entitled to full consideration of his claim prior to assignment to combatant training and service,” and because the local board’s statement of reasons for refusing to reopen his Selective Service file was “sufficiently ambiguous to be reasonably construed as a rejection on the merits, thereby prejudicing-his right to in-service review.”
The United States appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, asserting jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, as amended by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1890. In a "Motion to Quash Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction” and in his brief, petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because further prosecution was prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected that contention. It concluded that, although no appeal would have been possible in this case under the Criminal Appeals Act as it existed prior to the 1970 amendments, those amendments were “clearly intended to enlarge the Government's right to appeal to include all cases in which such an appeal would be constitutionally permissible.” Relying on its earlier opinion in United States v. Pecora, 484 F. 2d 1289 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that since petitioner had not waived his right to a jury trial, and no jury had been empaneled and sworn at the time the District Court ruled on his motion to dismiss the indictment, jeopardy had not attached and the dismissal was an appealable order. Pécora had held appealable, under the present version of § 3731, a pretrial dismissal of an indictment based on a stipulation of the facts upon which the indictment was based. In this case the Court of Appeals saw “no significant constitutional difference” arising from the fact that “the instant dismissal was based upon the trial court's finding that the defendant had established a defense as a matter of law, rather than upon the finding, as in Pécora, that there were insufficient facts as a matter of law to support a conviction.” In both cases “the pretrial motion of dismissal was based upon undisputed facts raising a legal issue and the defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial,” and in both “denial of the motion to dismiss [would have] entitled the defendant to the jury trial which he ha[d] not waived.”
As to the merits, the Court of Appeals concluded that in Musser v. United States, 414 U. S. 31 (1973), this Court had “placed an abrupt end to [the] line of eases” on which the District Court relied. It held that Musser should be applied retroactively to registrants such as petitioner who refused induction before the case was decided, and that since petitioner’s local board was without power to rule on the merits of a post-induction order conscientious objector claim, his right to in-service review was not prejudiced. Accordingly, it reversed the order of the District Court and remanded the case for trial or other proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits an appeal under § 3731 from a pretrial order dismissing an indictment in these circumstances, we granted certiorari. Petitioner did not seek review of, and we express no opinion with respect to, the holding of the Court of Appeals on the merits.
II
Prior to 1971, appeals by the United States in criminal cases were restricted by 18 U. S. C. § 3731 to categories descriptive of the action taken by a district court, and they were divided between this Court and the courts of appeals. In United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 307-308 (1970), Mr. Justice Harlan aptly described the situation obtaining under the statute as it then read:
“Clarity is to be desired in any statute, but in matters of jurisdiction it is especially important. Otherwise the courts and the parties must expend great energy, not on the merits of dispute settlement, but on simply deciding whether a court has the power to hear a case. When judged in these terms, the Criminal Appeals Act is a failure. Born of compromise, and reflecting no coherent allocation of appellate responsibility, the Criminal Appeals Act proved a most unruly child that has not improved with age. The statute's roots are grounded in pleading distinctions that existed at common law but which, in most instances, fail to coincide with the procedural categories of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not only does the statute create uncertainty by its requirement that one analyze the nature of the decision of the District Court in order to determine whether it falls within the class of common-law distinctions for which an appeal is authorized, but it has also engendered confusion over the court to which an appealable decision should be brought.”
At the same time that this Court was struggling with the “common law distinctions” of former § 3731, the decisions of the Courts of Appeals were demonstrating that, even when apparently straightforward, the language of the statute was deceptive. Thus, although after 1948 § 3731 literally authorized an appeal to a court of appeals whenever an indictment or information was set aside or dismissed except where direct appeal to this Court was authorized, that provision was generally construed, as it was construed by the Court of Appeals in this case, supra, at 381, and n. 4, to authorize an appeal to a court of appeals only if the decision setting aside or dismissing an indictment or information was “based upon a defect in the indictment or information, or in the institution of the prosecution.” United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F. 2d 747, 755 (CA9 1959). See United States v. Ponto, 454 F. 2d 657, 659-663 (CA7 1971). In such fashion, even those “common law distinctions” which were removed from the face of the Criminal Appeals Act by the 1948 amendments were preserved by judicial construction. See United States v. Apex Distributing Co., supra, at 751-755; United States v. DiStefano, 464 F. 2d 845, 847-848 (CA2 1972).
The limits of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and the courts of appeals under former § 3731, as construed, resulted in the inability of the United States to appeal from the dismissal of prosecution in a substantial number of criminal cases. In those cases where appellate jurisdiction lay in this Court, review was limited further by decisions of “the United States not to appeal the dismissal of a prosecution believed to be erroneous, simply because the question involved [was] not deemed of sufficiently general importance to warrant” our attention.
It was against this background that Congress undertook to amend § 3731. The legislative history of the 1970 amendments indicates that Congress was concerned with what it perceived to be two major problems under the statute as then construed: lack of appealability in many cases, and the requirement that certain appeals could be taken only to this Court. See S. Rep. No. 91-1296, pp. 4-18 (1970). Particular concern was expressed with respect to problems of appealability “in selective service cases where judges have reviewed defendants' selective service files before trials and dismissed the indictments after finding that there have been errors by the draft boards.” Id., at 14. Congress was of the view that “earlier versions of section 3731” had been subject to “restrictive judicial interpretations of congressional intent.” Id., at 18. Accordingly, it determined to “assure that the United States may appeal from the dismissal of a criminal prosecution by a district court in all cases where the Constitution permits,” and that “the appeal shall be taken first to a court of appeals.” Id., at 2-3. See id., at 18.
In light of the language of the present version of § 3731, including the admonition that its provisions “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes,” and of its legislative history, it is clear to us that Congress intended to authorize an appeal to a court of appeals in this kind of case so long as further prosecution would not be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We turn to that inquiry.
Ill
Although articulated in different ways by this Court, the purposes of, and the policies which animate, the Double Jeopardy Clause in this context are clear. “The constitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. . . . The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 187-188 (1957). See United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S. 470, 479 (1971); Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323, 326 (1970).
As an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts have found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the concept of “attachment of jeopardy.” See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 480. In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F. 2d 640, 642 (CA10 1936). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 688 (1949). The Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is “put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.” United States v. Jorn, supra, at 479. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 128, 130-131 (1904); United States v. Macdonald, 207 U. S. 120, 127 (1907); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 391-392 (1908); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 429 (1923).
Under our cases jeopardy had not yet attached when the District Court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Petitioner was not then, nor has he ever been, “put to trial before the trier of facts.” The proceedings were initiated by his motion to dismiss the indictment. Petitioner had not waived his right to a jury trial, and, of course, a jury trial could not be waived by him without the consent of the Government and of the court. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 23 (a). See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 312 (1930); Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24 (1965). In such circumstances, the District Court was without power to make any determination regarding petitioner’s guilt or innocence. Petitioner’s defense was raised before trial precisely because “trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining” its validity. United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 60 (1969). See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 (b)(1). His motion to postpone the trial was premised on the belief that “the expeditious administration of justice will be served best by considering the Motion [to dismiss the indictment] prior to trial.” At no time during or following the hearing on petitioner’s motion to dismiss the indictment did the District Court have jurisdiction to do more than grant or deny that motion, and neither before nor after the ruling did jeopardy attach.
IV
Petitioner acknowledges that “formal or technical jeopardy had not attached” at the time the District Court ruled on his motion to dismiss the indictment. However, he argues that because that ruling was based on “ 'evidentiary facts outside of the indictment, which facts would constitute a defense on the merits at trial/ United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501, 506” (1972), it was the “functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits” and “constructively jeopardy had attached.” The argument is grounded on two basic and interrelated premises. First, petitioner argues that the Court has admonished against the use of “technicalities” in interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause, and he contends that the normal rule as to the attachment of jeopardy is merely a presumption which is rebuttable in cases where an analysis of the respective interests of the Government and the accused indicates that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be frustrated by further prosecution. Cf. United States v. Velazquez, 490 F. 2d 29, 33 (CA2 1973). Second, petitioner maintains that the disposition of his motion to dismiss the indictment was, in the circumstances of this case, the “functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits,” and he concludes that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would in fact be frustrated by further prosecution. See United States v. Ponto, 454 F. 2d 657, 663-664 (CA7 1971). We disagree with both of petitioner’s premises and with his conclusion.
It is true that we have disparaged “rigid, mechanical” rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458, 467 (1973). However, we also observed in that case that “the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.” Ibid. Cf. United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S., at 303. Implicit in the latter statement is the premise that the “constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee” are not implicated before that point in the proceedings at which “jeopardy attaches.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S., at 480. As we have noted above, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until a defendant is “put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.” Id., at 479. This is by no means a mere technicality, nor is it a “rigid, mechanical” rule. It is, of course, like most legal rules, an attempt to impart content to an abstraction.
When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial. See Green v. United States, 355 U. S., at 187-188; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 479. Although an accused may raise defenses or objections before trial which are “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue,” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12(b)(1), and although he must raise certain other defenses or objections before trial, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 (b)(2), in neither case is he “subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction.” Green v. United States, supra, at 187. Moreover, in neither case would an appeal by the United States “allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt after having failed with the first.” United States v. Wilson, ante, at 352. See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 484. Both the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its terms demonstrate that it does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier “having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S., at 133. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S., at 329. Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.
Petitioner’s second premise, that the disposition of his motion to dismiss the indictment was the “functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits,” and his conclusion that the policies of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be frustrated by further prosecution in his case need not, in light of the conclusion we reach above, long detain us. It is, of course, settled that “a verdict of acquittal ... is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 671 (1896); Green v. United States, supra, at 188. Cf. Kepner v. United States, supra; Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U. S. 141 (1962). But the language of cases in which we have held that there can be no appeal from, or further prosecution after, an “acquittal” cannot be divorced from the procedural context in which the action so characterized was taken. See United States v. Wilson, ante, at 346-348. The word itself has no talismanic quality for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Compare United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85, 88 (1916), with United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 78 (1911), and United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236-237 (1928). In particular, it has no significance in this context unless jeopardy has once attached and an accused has been subjected to the risk of conviction.
Our decision in United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), is not to the contrary. As we have noted in United States v. Wilson, ante, at 350-351, we do not believe the Court in Sisson intended to express an opinion with respect to the constitutionality of an appeal by the United States from the order entered by the District Court in that case. Moreover, even if we were to take the contrary view, we would reach the same conclusion here. For in Sisson, jeopardy had attached; the order of the District Court was “a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case.” 399 U. S., at 290 n. 19. See id., at 288; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 478 n. 7. Whatever else may be said about Sisson, it does not alter the fundamental principle that an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double jeopardy.
Similarly, petitioner’s reliance on United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972), is misplaced. The question in that case was whether the Court had “jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) to review the District Court’s [pretrial] dismissal of the indictment against appellee.” Id., at 504-505. In the course of concluding that there was jurisdiction, we observed: “Under United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267 (1970), an appeal does not lie from a decision that rests, not upon the sufficiency of the indictment alone, but upon extraneous facts. If an indictment is dismissed as a result of a stipulated fact or the showing of evidentiary facts outside the indictment, which facts would constitute a defense on the merits at trial, no appeal is available. See United States v. Findley, 439 F. 2d 970 (CA1 1971).” 408 U. S., at 506. The question at issue in Brewster, the question decided in Sisson, and the citation of United States v. Findley, demonstrate beyond question that this passage in Brewster was not concerned with the constitutional question which, by virtue of the 1970 amendments to 18 U. S. C. § 3731, is before us in this case.
V
In holding that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that it had jurisdiction of the United States' appeal in this case under 18 U. S. C. § 3731, we of course express no opinion on the question whether a similar ruling by the District Court after jeopardy had attached would have been appealable. Nor do we intimate any view concerning the case put by the Solicitor General, of “a defendant who is afforded an opportunity to obtain a determination of a legal defense prior to trial and nevertheless knowingly allows himself to be placed in jeopardy before raising the defense.” Compare United States v. Findley, 439 F. 2d 970, 973 (CA1 1971), with United States v. Pecora, 484 F. 2d, at 1293-1294. See United States v. Jenkins, 490 F. 2d 868, 880 (CA2 1973), aff’d, ante, p. 358. We hold only that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar an appeal by the United States under 18 U. S. C. § 3731 with respect to a criminal defendant who has not been “put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.” United States v. Jorn, 400 U. S., at 479.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissents, being of the view that the ruling of the District Court was based on evidence which could constitute a defense on the merits and therefore caused jeopardy to attach.
The District Court concluded that petitioner’s defense was properly raised by motion before trial and that, although petitioner had not waived his right to trial by jury, his defense was properly to be determined by the court. Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 12(b)(1), (4). Compare United States v. Ponto, 454 F. 2d 657, 663 (CA7 1971), with United States v. Ramos, 413 F. 2d 743, 744 n. 1 (CA1 1969). See United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 60 (1969); United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 301 (1970); United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77, 83 (1969); 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 12.04 (2d ed. 1975).
In ordering dismissal the District Court relied primarily on United States v. Ziskowski, 465 F. 2d 480 (CA3 1972), and United States v. Folino, No. 72-1974 (CA3 June 29, 1973) (unreported).
Title 18 U. S. C. §3731 provides in pertinent part:
“In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.
“The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”
Prior to the 1970 amendments, which were effective January 2, 1971, 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) authorized an appeal by the United States to a court of appeals in all criminal cases “[f]rom a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this section.” Under this provision, the Court of Appeals concluded, appeals “were permissible only if the dismissal of an indictment was based upon a defect in the indictment or in the institution of the prosecution, rather than upon evidentiary facts outside the face of the indictment which would possibly constitute a defense at trial.”
The Court of Appeals noted that the District Court “expressly found that [petitioner] did not waive his right to a jury trial,” that the procedures for waiver required by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 23 (a) had not been complied with, and that simultaneously with his motion to dismiss the indictment petitioner had filed a motion to postpone the trial.
In Pecora the Court of Appeals distinguished United States v. Hill, 473 F. 2d 759 (CA9 1972), holding unappealable the pretrial dismissal of an indictment alleging the mailing of obscene advertisements, on the grounds that in Hill (1) there was no determination whether the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial and (2) the District Court determined the character of evidence actually entered into the record “so it may be said that jeopardy had attached.” In this case the Court of Appeals concluded that the second distinction between Pécora and Hill did not “permit our holding the instant order unappealable,” and it noted that to the extent Pécora and Hill were inconsistent, it was bound by Pécora.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) provided in pertinent part:
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
“From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment or information, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
“From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts to a court of appeals in all criminal cases, in the following instances:
“From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this section.
“From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this section.”
Provision for appeals in certain cases to the courts of appeals was first made in 1942. Act of May 9, 1942, c. 295, § 1, 56 Stat. 271, codified as former 18 U. S. C. § 682 (1946 ed.). Section 682 provided for an appeal to a court of appeals from “a decision or judgment-quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer or plea in abatement to any indictment or information, or any count thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided by this section.”
Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 844, codified as former 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1946 ed., Supp. II). The reviser’s note states that “[m]inor changes were made to conform to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
Department of Justice Comments on S. 3132, in S. Rep. No. 91-1296, p. 24 (1970). See also letter from Solicitor General Gris-wold to Senator McClellan, id., at 33.
The relevance and significance of the “well considered and carefully prepared” report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring), is not affected by the fact that the amendments proposed by the Committee and adopted without change by the Senate were modified by the House-Senate Conference Committee. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1768, p. 21 (1970). The latter report contains no explanation of the changes made, and the changes themselves are consistent with the intent expressed in the Senate Report. See United States v. Wilson, ante, at 337-339.
This has been the general view of the Courts of Appeals. E. g., United States v. Jenkins, 490 F. 2d 868, 870 (CA2 1973), aff’d, ante, p. 358; United States v. Brown, 481 F. 2d 1035, 1039-1040 (CA8 1973). But see, e. g., United States v. Southern R. Co., 485 F. 2d 309, 312 (CA4 1973).
To the extent the passages referred to deal with the predecessors of the present version of § 3731, they are relevant because of the Court’s view that appeals from orders entered prior to the attachment of jeopardy presented no constitutional problem. See infra, at 392.
Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §§ 3771 and 3772, proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, including amendments to Rule 12, were transmitted to Congress on April 22, 1974. The effective date of the proposed amendments was postponed until August 1, 1975, by Act of July 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 397.
It is clear that Congress intended to overrule Sisson’s construction of former § 3731 in the 1970 amendments. See S. Rep. No. 91-1296, p. 11 (1970); n. 10, supra.
In analyzing Sisson the Court of Appeals in Findley concluded: “Collectively we believe this was an approach not in terms of double jeopardy, but in terms of the land of error section 3731 was intended to cover.” 439 F. 2d 970, 973. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue of the Court's decision. Determine the issue of the case on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. | What is the issue of the decision? | [
"involuntary confession",
"habeas corpus",
"plea bargaining: the constitutionality of and/or the circumstances of its exercise",
"retroactivity (of newly announced or newly enacted constitutional or statutory rights)",
"search and seizure (other than as pertains to vehicles or Crime Control Act)",
"search and seizure, vehicles",
"search and seizure, Crime Control Act",
"contempt of court or congress",
"self-incrimination (other than as pertains to Miranda or immunity from prosecution)",
"Miranda warnings",
"self-incrimination, immunity from prosecution",
"right to counsel (cf. indigents appointment of counsel or inadequate representation)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, death penalty (cf. extra legal jury influence, death penalty)",
"cruel and unusual punishment, non-death penalty (cf. liability, civil rights acts)",
"line-up",
"discovery and inspection (in the context of criminal litigation only, otherwise Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations)",
"double jeopardy",
"ex post facto (state)",
"extra-legal jury influences: miscellaneous",
"extra-legal jury influences: prejudicial statements or evidence",
"extra-legal jury influences: contact with jurors outside courtroom",
"extra-legal jury influences: jury instructions (not necessarily in criminal cases)",
"extra-legal jury influences: voir dire (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"extra-legal jury influences: prison garb or appearance",
"extra-legal jury influences: jurors and death penalty (cf. cruel and unusual punishment)",
"extra-legal jury influences: pretrial publicity",
"confrontation (right to confront accuser, call and cross-examine witnesses)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: confession of error",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy (cf. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: conspiracy)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: entrapment",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: exhaustion of remedies",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: fugitive from justice",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: presentation, admissibility, or sufficiency of evidence (not necessarily a criminal case)",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: stay of execution",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: timeliness",
"subconstitutional fair procedure: miscellaneous",
"Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: assault",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: bank robbery",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: conspiracy (cf. subconstitutional fair procedure: conspiracy)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: escape from custody",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements (cf. statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: financial (other than in fraud or internal revenue)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: firearms",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: fraud",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: gambling",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 USC 1951",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: immigration (cf. immigration and naturalization)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: internal revenue (cf. Federal Taxation)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Mann Act and related statutes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: narcotics includes regulation and prohibition of alcohol",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: obstruction of justice",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: perjury (other than as pertains to statutory construction of criminal laws: false statements)",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: Travel Act, 18 USC 1952",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: war crimes",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: sentencing guidelines",
"statutory construction of criminal laws: miscellaneous",
"jury trial (right to, as distinct from extra-legal jury influences)",
"speedy trial",
"miscellaneous criminal procedure (cf. due process, prisoners' rights, comity: criminal procedure)"
] | [
16
] | sc_issue_1 |
James W. ZIGLAR, Petitioner
v.
Ahmer Iqbal ABBASI, et al.
John D. Ashcroft, Former Attorney General, et al., Petitioners
v.
Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, et al.
Dennis Hasty, et al., Petitioners
v.
Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, et al.
Nos. 15-1358
15-1359
15-1363.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Jan. 18, 2017.
Decided June 19, 2017.
Ian H. Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, for Petitioners in Nos. 15-1358 and 15-1359.
Jeffrey A. Lamken, Washington, DC, for Petitioners in No. 15-1363.
Rachel Meeropol, New York, NY, for Respondents.
Clifton S. Elgarten, Shari Ross Lahlou, Kate M. Growley, Crowell & Moring LLP, Washington, DC, for Dennis Hasty.
Jeffrey A. Lamken, Michael G. Pattillo, Jr., Eric R. Nitz, James A. Barta, MoloLamken LLP, Washington, DC, Britt Hamilton, Sara E. Margolis, MoloLamken LLP, New York, NY, Debra L. Roth, Julia H. Perkins, Shaw Bransford & Roth, Washington, DC, for James Sherman.
Ian Heath Gershengorn, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Curtis E. Gannon, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Douglas N. Letter, Barbara L. Herwig, H. Thomas Byron III, Michael Shih, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners John D. Ashcroft, et al.
William Alden McDaniel, Jr., Ballard Spahr LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Petitioner James W. Ziglar.
Nancy L. Kestenbaum, Joanne Sum-Ping, Jennifer L. Robbins, Matthew Q. Verdin, Covington & Burling LLP, New York, NY, David M. Zionts, Covington & Burling LLP, Washington, DC, Rachel A. Meeropol, Michael Winger, Baher A. Azmy, Shayana Kadidal, Center for Constitutional Rights, Alexander A. Reinert, New York, NY, for Respondents.
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B.
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in this country, and in response to the deaths, destruction, and dangers they caused, the United States Government ordered hundreds of illegal aliens to be taken into custody and held. Pending a determination whether a particular detainee had connections to terrorism, the custody, under harsh conditions to be described, continued. In many instances custody lasted for days and weeks, then stretching into months. Later, some of the aliens who had been detained filed suit, leading to the cases now before the Court.
The complaint named as defendants three high executive officers in the Department of Justice and two of the wardens at the facility where the detainees had been held. Most of the claims, alleging various constitutional violations, sought damages under the implied cause of action theory adopted by this Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Another claim in the complaint was based upon the statutory cause of action authorized and created by Congress under Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). This statutory cause of action allows damages to persons injured by conspiracies to deprive them of the equal protection of the laws.
The suit was commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. After this Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a fourth amended complaint was filed; and that is the complaint to be considered here. Motions to dismiss the fourth amended complaint were denied as to some defendants and granted as to others. These rulings were the subject of interlocutory appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Over a dissenting opinion by Judge Raggi with respect to the decision of the three-judge panel-and a second unsigned dissent from the court's declining to rehear the suit en banc, joined by Judge Raggi and five other judges-the Court of Appeals ruled that the complaint was sufficient for the action to proceed against the named officials who are now before us. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218 (2015) (panel decision); Turkmen v. Hasty, 808 F.3d 197 (2015) (en banc decision).
The Court granted certiorari to consider these rulings. 580 U.S. ---- (2016). The officials who must defend the suit on the merits, under the ruling of the Court of Appeals, are the petitioners here. The former detainees who seek relief under the fourth amended complaint are the respondents. The various claims and theories advanced for recovery, and the grounds asserted for their dismissal as insufficient as a matter of law, will be addressed in turn.
I
Given the present procedural posture of the suit, the Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
A
In the weeks following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks-the worst in American history-the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received more than 96,000 tips from members of the public. See id., at 667, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Some tips were based on well-grounded suspicion of terrorist activity, but many others may have been based on fear of Arabs and Muslims. FBI agents "questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the [September 11] attacks in particular or to terrorism in general." Ibid .
While investigating the tips-including the less substantiated ones-the FBI encountered many aliens who were present in this country without legal authorization. As a result, more than 700 individuals were arrested and detained on immigration charges. Ibid. If the FBI designated an alien as not being "of interest" to the investigation, then he or she was processed according to normal procedures. In other words the alien was treated just as if, for example, he or she had been arrested at the border after an illegal entry. If, however, the FBI designated an alien as "of interest" to the investigation, or if it had doubts about the proper designation in a particular case, the alien was detained subject to a "hold-until-cleared policy." The aliens were held without bail.
Respondents were among some 84 aliens who were subject to the hold-until-cleared policy and detained at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York. They were held in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (or Unit) of the MDC. The complaint includes these allegations: Conditions in the Unit were harsh. Pursuant to official Bureau of Prisons policy, detainees were held in " 'tiny cells for over 23 hours a day.' " 789 F.3d, at 228. Lights in the cells were left on 24 hours. Detainees had little opportunity for exercise or recreation. They were forbidden to keep anything in their cells, even basic hygiene products such as soap or a toothbrush. When removed from the cells for any reason, they were shackled and escorted by four guards. They were denied access to most forms of communication with the outside world. And they were strip searched often-any time they were moved, as well as at random in their cells.
Some of the harsh conditions in the Unit were not imposed pursuant to official policy. According to the complaint, prison guards engaged in a pattern of "physical and verbal abuse." Ibid. Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; twisted their arms, wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened them with violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted their religion.
B
Respondents are six men of Arab or South Asian descent. Five are Muslims. Each was illegally in this country, arrested during the course of the September 11 investigation, and detained in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit for periods ranging from three to eight months. After being released respondents were removed from the United States.
Respondents then sued on their own behalf, and on behalf of a putative class, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Respondents, it seems fair to conclude from the arguments presented, acknowledge that in the ordinary course aliens who are present in the United States without legal authorization can be detained for some period of time. But here the challenge is to the conditions of their confinement and the reasons or motives for imposing those conditions. The gravamen of their claims was that the Government had no reason to suspect them of any connection to terrorism, and thus had no legitimate reason to hold them for so long in these harsh conditions.
As relevant here, respondents sued two groups of federal officials in their official capacities. The first group consisted of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, and former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar. This opinion refers to these three petitioners as the "Executive Officials." The other petitioners named in the complaint were the MDC's warden, Dennis Hasty, and associate warden, James Sherman. This opinion refers to these two petitioners as the "Wardens."
Seeking to invoke the Court's decision in Bivens, respondents brought four claims under the Constitution itself. First, respondents alleged that petitioners detained them in harsh pretrial conditions for a punitive purpose, in violation of the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. Second, respondents alleged that petitioners detained them in harsh conditions because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Third, respondents alleged that the Wardens subjected them to punitive strip searches unrelated to any legitimate penological interest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. Fourth, respondents alleged that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to abuse respondents, in violation of the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment.
Respondents also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which forbids certain conspiracies to violate equal protection rights. Respondents alleged that petitioners conspired with one another to hold respondents in harsh conditions because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin.
C
The District Court dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials but allowed the claims against the Wardens to go forward. The Court of Appeals affirmed in most respects as to the Wardens, though it held that the prisoner abuse claim against Sherman (the associate warden) should have been dismissed. 789 F.3d, at 264-265. As to the Executive Officials, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating respondents' claims. Ibid. As noted above, Judge Raggi dissented. She would have held that only the prisoner abuse claim against Hasty should go forward. Id., at 295, n. 41, 302 (opinion concurring in part in judgment and dissenting in part). The Court of Appeals declined to rehear the suit en banc, 808 F.3d, at 197 ; and, again as noted above, Judge Raggi joined a second dissent along with five other judges, id., at 198. This Court granted certiorari. 580 U.S. ---- (2016).
II
The first question to be discussed is whether petitioners can be sued for damages under Bivens and the ensuing cases in this Court defining the reach and the limits of that precedent.
A
In 1871, Congress passed a statute that was later codified at Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It entitles an injured person to money damages if a state official violates his or her constitutional rights. Congress did not create an analogous statute for federal officials. Indeed, in the 100 years leading up to Bivens, Congress did not provide a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by agents of the Federal Government.
In 1971, and against this background, this Court decided Bivens . The Court held that, even absent statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. See 403 U.S., at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not provide for money damages "in so many words." Id., at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Court noted, however, that Congress had not foreclosed a damages remedy in "explicit" terms and that no "special factors" suggested that the Judiciary should "hesitat[e]" in the face of congressional silence. Id., at 396-397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Court, accordingly, held that it could authorize a remedy under general principles of federal jurisdiction. See id., at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ).
In the decade that followed, the Court recognized what has come to be called an implied cause of action in two cases involving other constitutional violations. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), an administrative assistant sued a Congressman for firing her because she was a woman. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause gave her a damages remedy for gender discrimination. Id., at 248-249, 99 S.Ct. 2264. And in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), a prisoner's estate sued federal jailers for failing to treat the prisoner's asthma. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause gave him a damages remedy for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. See id., at 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. These three cases-Bivens,Davis, and Carlson -represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.
B
To understand Bivens and the two other cases implying a damages remedy under the Constitution, it is necessary to understand the prevailing law when they were decided. In the mid-20th century, the Court followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now. During this "ancien regime, " Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to "provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective" a statute's purpose, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). Thus, as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself. See, e.g., id., at 430-432, 84 S.Ct. 1555 ; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 557, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) ; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) ("The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies").
These statutory decisions were in place when Bivens recognized an implied cause of action to remedy a constitutional violation. Against that background, the Bivens decision held that courts must "adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief" when "federally protected rights have been invaded." 403 U.S., at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (quoting Bell, supra, at 678, 66 S.Ct. 773 ); see also 403 U.S., at 402, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing cases recognizing implied causes of action under federal statutes). In light of this interpretive framework, there was a possibility that "the Court would keep expanding Bivens until it became the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 1139-1140 (2014).
C
Later, the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for damages began to lose their force. In cases decided after Bivens, and after the statutory implied cause-of-action cases that Bivens itself relied upon, the Court adopted a far more cautious course before finding implied causes of action. In two principal cases under other statutes, it declined to find an implied cause of action. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 42, 45-46, 97 S.Ct. 926, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) ; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-69, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court did allow an implied cause of action; but it cautioned that, where Congress "intends private litigants to have a cause of action," the "far better course" is for Congress to confer that remedy in explicit terms. Id., at 717, 99 S.Ct. 1946.
Following this expressed caution, the Court clarified in a series of cases that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the "determinative" question is one of statutory intent.
Sandoval, 532 U.S., at 286, 121 S.Ct. 1511. If the statute itself does not "displa[y] an intent" to create "a private remedy," then "a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute." Id ., at 286-287, 121 S.Ct. 1511 ; see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 23-24, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ; Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536-537, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). The Court held that the judicial task was instead "limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). If the statute does not itself so provide, a private cause of action will not be created through judicial mandate. See Transamerica, supra, at 24, 100 S.Ct. 242.
The decision to recognize an implied cause of action under a statute involves somewhat different considerations than when the question is whether to recognize an implied cause of action to enforce a provision of the Constitution itself. When Congress enacts a statute, there are specific procedures and times for considering its terms and the proper means for its enforcement. It is logical, then, to assume that Congress will be explicit if it intends to create a private cause of action. With respect to the Constitution, however, there is no single, specific congressional action to consider and interpret.
Even so, it is a significant step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials in order to remedy a constitutional violation. When determining whether traditional equitable powers suffice to give necessary constitutional protection-or whether, in addition, a damages remedy is necessary-there are a number of economic and governmental concerns to consider. Claims against federal officials often create substantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification. Congress, then, has a substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government. In addition, the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process are significant factors to be considered. In an analogous context, Congress, it is fair to assume, weighed those concerns in deciding not to substitute the Government as defendant in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (providing that certain provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act do not apply to any claim against a federal employee "which is brought for a violation of the Constitution").
For these and other reasons, the Court's expressed caution as to implied causes of actions under congressional statutes led to similar caution with respect to actions in the Bivens context, where the action is implied to enforce the Constitution itself. Indeed, in light of the changes to the Court's general approach to recognizing implied damages remedies, it is possible that the analysis in the Court's three Bivens cases might have been different if they were decided today. To be sure, no congressional enactment has disapproved of these decisions. And it must be understood that this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose. Bivens does vindicate the Constitution by allowing some redress for injuries, and it provides instruction and guidance to federal law enforcement officers going forward. The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.
Given the notable change in the Court's approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a "disfavored" judicial activity. Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This is in accord with the Court's observation that it has "consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants." Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). Indeed, the Court has refused to do so for the past 30 years.
For example, the Court declined to create an implied damages remedy in the following cases: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) ; a race-discrimination suit against military officers, Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 297, 304-305, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; a substantive due process suit against military officers, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671-672, 683-684, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; a procedural due process suit against Social Security officials, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ; a procedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473-474, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison operator, Malesko, supra, at 63, 122 S.Ct. 515 ; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547-548, 562, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) ; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a private prison, Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012).
When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under a federal statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis. The question is "who should decide" whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts? Bush, 462 U.S., at 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404.
The answer most often will be Congress. When an issue " 'involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,' " it should be committed to " 'those who write the laws' " rather than " 'those who interpret them.' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512-513, 74 S.Ct. 695, 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954) ). In most instances, the Court's precedents now instruct, the Legislature is in the better position to consider if " 'the public interest would be served' " by imposing a " 'new substantive legal liability.' " Schweiker, supra, at 426-427, 108 S.Ct. 2460 (quoting Bush, supra, at 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404 ). As a result, the Court has urged "caution" before "extending Bivens remedies into any new context." Malesko, supra, at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515. The Court's precedents now make clear that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are " 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.' " Carlson, 446 U.S., at 18, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ).
This Court has not defined the phrase "special factors counselling hesitation." The necessary inference, though, is that the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed. Thus, to be a "special factor counselling hesitation," a factor must cause a court to hesitate before answering that question in the affirmative.
It is not necessarily a judicial function to establish whole categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against personal liability claims in the complex sphere of litigation, with all of its burdens on some and benefits to others. It is true that, if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter future violations. Yet the decision to recognize a damages remedy requires an assessment of its impact on governmental operations systemwide. Those matters include the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies. These and other considerations may make it less probable that Congress would want the Judiciary to entertain a damages suit in a given case.
Sometimes there will be doubt because the case arises in a context in which Congress has designed its regulatory authority in a guarded way, making it less likely that Congress would want the Judiciary to interfere. See Chappell, supra, at 302, 103 S.Ct. 2362 (military); Stanley, supra, at 679, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (same); Meyer, supra, at 486, 114 S.Ct. 996 (public purse); Wilkie, supra, at 561-562, 127 S.Ct. 2588 (federal land). And sometimes there will be doubt because some other feature of a case-difficult to predict in advance-causes a court to pause before acting without express congressional authorization. In sum, if there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.
In a related way, if there is an alternative remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action. For if Congress has created "any alternative, existing process for protecting the [injured party's] interest" that itself may "amoun[t] to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, supra, at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588 ; see also Bush, supra, at 385-388, 103 S.Ct. 2404 (recognizing that civil-service regulations provided alternative means for relief); Malesko, 534 U.S., at 73-74, 122 S.Ct. 515 (recognizing that state tort law provided alternative means for relief); Minneci, supra, at 127-130, 132 S.Ct. 617 (same).
III
It is appropriate now to turn first to the Bivens claims challenging the conditions of confinement imposed on respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the Executive Officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Court will refer to these claims as the "detention policy claims." The detention policy claims allege that petitioners violated respondents' due process and equal protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions of confinement; the claims further allege that the Wardens violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting respondents to frequent strip searches. The term "detention policy claims" does not include respondents' claim alleging that Warden Hasty allowed guards to abuse the detainees. That claim will be considered separately, and further, below. At this point, the question is whether, having considered the relevant special factors in the whole context of the detention policy claims, the Court should extend a Bivens -type remedy to those claims.
A
Before allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens, the Court of Appeals did not perform any special factors analysis at all. 789 F.3d, at 237. The reason, it said, was that the special factors analysis is necessary only if a plaintiff asks for a Bivens remedy in a new context. 789 F.3d, at 234. And in the Court of Appeals' view, the context here was not new. Id., at 235.
To determine whether the Bivens context was novel, the Court of Appeals employed a two-part test. First, it asked whether the asserted constitutional right was at issue in a previous Bivens case. 789 F.3d, at 234. Second, it asked whether the mechanism of injury was the same mechanism of injury in a previous Bivens case. 789 F.3d, at 234. Under the Court of Appeals' approach, if the answer to both questions is "yes," then the context is not new and no special factors analysis is required. Ibid.
That approach is inconsistent with the analysis in Malesko . Before the Court decided that case, it had approved a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment against federal prison officials for failure to provide medical treatment. See Carlson, 446 U.S., at 16, n. 1, 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. In Malesko, the plaintiff sought relief against a private prison operator in almost parallel circumstances. 534 U.S., at 64, 122 S.Ct. 515. In both cases, the right at issue was the same: the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. And in both cases, the mechanism of injury was the same: failure to provide adequate medical treatment. Thus, if the approach followed by the Court of Appeals is the correct one, this Court should have held that the cases arose in the same context, obviating any need for a special factors inquiry.
That, however, was not the controlling analytic framework in Malesko . Even though the right and the mechanism of injury were the same as they were in Carlson, the Court held that the contexts were different. 534 U.S., at 70, and n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 515. The Court explained that special factors counseled hesitation and that the Bivens remedy was therefore unavailable. 534 U.S., at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515.
For similar reasons, the holding of the Court of Appeals in the instant suit is inconsistent with this Court's analytic framework in Chappell . In Davis, decided before the Court's cautionary instructions with respect to Bivens suits, see supra, at 1856 - 1858, the Court had held that an employment-discrimination claim against a Congressman could proceed as a Bivens- type action. Davis, 442 U.S., at 230-231, 99 S.Ct. 2264. In Chappell, however, the cautionary rules were applicable; and, as a result, a similar discrimination suit against military officers was not allowed to proceed. It is the Chappell framework that now controls; and, under it, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that this suit did not present a new Bivens context.
The proper test for determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to make a given context a new one, some examples might prove instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.
In the present suit, respondents' detention policy claims challenge the confinement conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level executive policy created in the wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil. Those claims bear little resemblance to the three Bivens claims the Court has approved in the past: a claim against FBI agents for handcuffing a man in his own home without a warrant; a claim against a Congressman for firing his female secretary; and a claim against prison officials for failure to treat an inmate's asthma. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 ; Davis, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 ; Chappell, 462 U.S. 296, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586. The Court of Appeals therefore should have held that this was a new Bivens context. Had it done so, it would have recognized that a special factors analysis was required before allowing this damages suit to proceed.
B
After considering the special factors necessarily implicated by the detention policy claims, the Court now holds that those factors show that whether a damages action should be allowed is a decision for the Congress to make, not the courts.
With respect to the claims against the Executive Officials, it must be noted that a Bivens action is not "a proper vehicle for altering an entity's policy." Malesko, supra, at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515. Furthermore, a Bivens claim is brought against the individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others. "The purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer ." Meyer, 510 U.S., at 485, 114 S.Ct. 996. Bivens is not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates. See Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior ").
Even if the action is confined to the conduct of a particular Executive Officer in a discrete instance, these claims would call into question the formulation and implementation of a general policy. This, in turn, would necessarily require inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and deliberations that led to the policies and governmental acts being challenged. These consequences counsel against allowing a Bivens action against the Executive Officials, for the burden and demand of litigation might well prevent them-or, to be more precise, future officials like them-from devoting the time and effort required for the proper discharge of their duties. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U.S. 367, 382, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (noting "the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties").
A closely related problem, as just noted, is that the discovery and litigation process would either border upon or directly implicate the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation of the policy in question. See Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360, 99 S.Ct. 2800, 61 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979) (noting that disclosure of Executive Branch documents "could inhibit the free flow of advice, including analysis, reports, and expression of opinion within an agency"). Allowing a damages suit in this context, or in a like context in other circumstances, would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (recognizing that " '[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties' " (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) )). These considerations also counsel against allowing a damages claim to proceed against the Executive Officials. See Cheney, supra, at 385, 124 S.Ct. 2576 (noting that "special considerations control" when a case implicates "the Executive Branch's interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications").
In addition to this special factor, which applies to the claims against the Executive Officials, there are three other special factors that apply as well to the detention policy claims against all of the petitioners. First, respondents' detention policy claims challenge more than standard "law enforcement operations." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). They challenge as well major elements of the Government's whole response to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry into sensitive issues of national security. Were this inquiry to be allowed in a private suit for damages, the Bivens action would assume dimensions far greater than those present in Bivens itself, or in either of its two follow-on cases, or indeed in any putative Bivens case yet to come before the Court.
National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Art. II, § 1, § 2. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises "concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). These concerns are even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive or other equitable relief. The risk of personal damages liability is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy.
For these and other reasons, courts have shown deference to what the Executive Branch "has determined ... is 'essential to national security.' " Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 26, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Indeed, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs" unless "Congress specifically has provided otherwise." Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). Congress has not provided otherwise here.
There are limitations, of course, on the power of the Executive under Article II of the Constitution and in the powers authorized by congressional enactments, even with respect to matters of national security. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527, 532-537, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive ... in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake"); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) ("Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law"). And national-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims-a "label" used to "cover a multitude of sins." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 523, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). This " 'danger of abuse' " is even more heightened given " 'the difficulty of defining' " the " 'security interest' " in domestic cases. Ibid. (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313-314, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ).
Even so, the question is only whether "congressionally uninvited intrusion" is "inappropriate" action for the Judiciary to take. Stanley, 483 U.S., at 683, 107 S.Ct. 3054. The factors discussed above all suggest that Congress' failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere oversight, and that congressional silence might be more than "inadvertent." Schweiker, 487 U.S., at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460. This possibility counsels hesitation "in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999.
Furthermore, in any inquiry respecting the likely or probable intent of Congress, the silence of Congress is relevant; and here that silence is telling. In the almost 16 years since September 11, the Federal Government's responses to that terrorist attack have been well documented. Congressional interest has been "frequent and intense," Schweiker, supra, at 425, 108 S.Ct. 2460 and some of that interest has been directed to the conditions of confinement at issue here. Indeed, at Congress' behest, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General compiled a 300-page report documenting the conditions in the MDC in great detail. See 789 F.3d, at 279 (opinion of Raggi, J.) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act required "the Department's Inspector General to review and report semi-annually to Congress on any identified abuses of civil rights and civil liberties in fighting terrorism"). Nevertheless, "[a]t no point did Congress choose to extend to any person the kind of remedies that respondents seek in this lawsuit." Schweiker, 487 U.S., at 426, 108 S.Ct. 2460.
This silence is notable because it is likely that high-level policies will attract the attention of Congress. Thus, when Congress fails to provide a damages remedy in circumstances like these, it is much more difficult to believe that "congressional inaction" was "inadvertent." Id., at 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460.
It is of central importance, too, that this is not a case like Bivens or Davis in which "it is damages or nothing." Bivens, supra, at 410, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); Davis, 442 U.S., at 245, 99 S.Ct. 2264. Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, respondents do not challenge individual instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which due to their very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages actions after the fact. Respondents instead challenge large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners. To address those kinds of decisions, detainees may seek injunctive relief. And in addition to that, we have left open the question whether they might be able to challenge their confinement conditions via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526, n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ("When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making custody illegal").
Indeed, the habeas remedy, if necessity required its use, would have provided a faster and more direct route to relief than a suit for money damages. A successful habeas petition would have required officials to place respondents in less-restrictive conditions immediately; yet this damages suit remains unresolved some 15 years later. (As in Bell and Preiser, the Court need not determine the scope or availability of the habeas corpus remedy, a question that is not before the Court and has not been briefed or argued.) In sum, respondents had available to them " 'other alternative forms of judicial relief.' " Minneci, 565 U.S., at 124, 132 S.Ct. 617. And when alternative methods of relief are available, a Bivens remedy usually is not. See Bush, 462 U.S., at 386-388, 103 S.Ct. 2404 ; Schweiker, supra, at 425-426, 108 S.Ct. 2460 ; Malesko, 534 U.S., at 73-74, 122 S.Ct. 515 ; Minneci, supra, at 125-126, 132 S.Ct. 617.
There is a persisting concern, of course, that absent a Bivens remedy there will be insufficient deterrence to prevent officers from violating the Constitution. In circumstances like those presented here, however, the stakes on both sides of the argument are far higher than in past cases the Court has considered. If Bivens liability were to be imposed, high officers who face personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent and lawful action in a time of crisis. And, as already noted, the costs and difficulties of later litigation might intrude upon and interfere with the proper exercise of their office.
On the other side of the balance, the very fact that some executive actions have the sweeping potential to affect the liberty of so many is a reason to consider proper means to impose restraint and to provide some redress from injury. There is therefore a balance to be struck, in situations like this one, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril. Cf. Stanley, supra, at 681, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (noting that the special-factors analysis in that case turned on "how much occasional, unintended impairment of military discipline one is willing to tolerate"). The proper balance is one for the Congress, not the Judiciary, to undertake. For all of these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred by allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens .
IV
A
One of respondents' claims under Bivens requires a different analysis: the prisoner abuse claim against the MDC's warden, Dennis Hasty. The allegation is that Warden Hasty violated the Fifth Amendment by allowing prison guards to abuse respondents.
The warden argues, as an initial matter, that the complaint does not " 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Applying its precedents, the Court of Appeals held that the substantive standard for the sufficiency of the claim is whether the warden showed "deliberate indifference" to prisoner abuse. 789 F.3d, at 249-250. The parties appear to agree on this standard, and, for purposes of this case, the Court assumes it to be correct.
The complaint alleges that guards routinely abused respondents; that the warden encouraged the abuse by referring to respondents as "terrorists"; that he prevented respondents from using normal grievance procedures; that he stayed away from the Unit to avoid seeing the abuse; that he was made aware of the abuse via "inmate complaints, staff complaints, hunger strikes, and suicide attempts"; that he ignored other "direct evidence of [the] abuse, including logs and other official [records]"; that he took no action "to rectify or address the situation"; and that the abuse resulted in the injuries described above, see supra, at 1853. These allegations-assumed here to be true, subject to proof at a later stage-plausibly show the warden's deliberate indifference to the abuse. Consistent with the opinion of every judge in this case to have considered the question, including the dissenters in the Court of Appeals, the Court concludes that the prisoner abuse allegations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a constitutional violation if a Bivens remedy is to be implied.
Warden Hasty argues, however, that Bivens ought not to be extended to this instance of alleged prisoner abuse. As noted above, the first question a court must ask in a case like this one is whether the claim arises in a new Bivens context, i.e., whether "the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court." Supra, at 1859.
It is true that this case has significant parallels to one of the Court's previous Bivens cases, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15. There, the Court did allow a Bivens claim for prisoner mistreatment-specifically, for failure to provide medical care. And the allegations of injury here are just as compelling as those at issue in Carlson . This is especially true given that the complaint alleges serious violations of Bureau of Prisons policy. See 28 C.F.R. § 552.20 (2016) (providing that prison staff may use force "only as a last alternative after all other reasonable efforts to resolve a situation have failed" and that staff may "use only that amount of force necessary to [ensure prison safety and security]"); § 552.22(j) ("All incidents involving the use of force ... must be carefully documented"); § 542.11 (requiring the warden to investigate certain complaints of inmate abuse).
Yet even a modest extension is still an extension. And this case does seek to extend Carlson to a new context. As noted above, a case can present a new context for Bivens purposes if it implicates a different constitutional right; if judicial precedents provide a less meaningful guide for official conduct; or if there are potential special factors that were not considered in previous Bivens cases. See supra at 1858.
The constitutional right is different here, since Carlson was predicated on the Eighth Amendment and this claim is predicated on the Fifth. See 446 U.S., at 16, 100 S.Ct. 1468. And the judicial guidance available to this warden, with respect to his supervisory duties, was less developed. The Court has long made clear the standard for claims alleging failure to provide medical treatment to a prisoner-"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The standard for a claim alleging that a warden allowed guards to abuse pre-trial detainees is less clear under the Court's precedents.
This case also has certain features that were not considered in the Court's previous Bivens cases and that might discourage a court from authorizing a Bivens remedy. As noted above, the existence of alternative remedies usually precludes a court from authorizing a Bivens action. Supra, at 1858 - 1859. And there might have been alternative remedies available here, for example, a writ of habeas corpus, Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 526, n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; an injunction requiring the warden to bring his prison into compliance with the regulations discussed above; or some other form of equitable relief.
Furthermore, legislative action suggesting that Congress does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counseling hesitation. See supra, at 1858 - 1859. Some 15 years after Carlson was decided, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which made comprehensive changes to the way prisoner abuse claims must be brought in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. So it seems clear that Congress had specific occasion to consider the matter of prisoner abuse and to consider the proper way to remedy those wrongs. This Court has said in dicta that the Act's exhaustion provisions would apply to Bivens suits. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). But the Act itself does not provide for a standalone damages remedy against federal jailers. It could be argued that this suggests Congress chose not to extend the Carlson damages remedy to cases involving other types of prisoner mistreatment.
The differences between this claim and the one in Carlson are perhaps small, at least in practical terms. Given this Court's expressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, however, the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied. Some differences, of course, will be so trivial that they will not suffice to create a new Bivens context. But here the differences identified above are at the very least meaningful ones. Thus, before allowing this claim to proceed under Bivens, the Court of Appeals should have performed a special factors analysis. It should have analyzed whether there were alternative remedies available or other "sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy" in a suit like this one. Supra, at 1859.
B
Although the Court could perform that analysis in the first instance, the briefs have concentrated almost all of their efforts elsewhere. Given the absence of a comprehensive presentation by the parties, and the fact that the Court of Appeals did not conduct the analysis, the Court declines to perform the special factors analysis itself. The better course is to vacate the judgment below, allowing the Court of Appeals or the District Court to do so on remand.
V
One issue remains to be addressed: the claim that petitioners are subject to liability for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Unlike the prisoner abuse claim just discussed, this claim implicates the activities of all the petitioners-the Executive Officials as well as the Wardens-in creating the conditions of confinement at issue here.
The civil-conspiracy prohibition contained in § 1985(3) was enacted as a significant part of the civil rights legislation passed in the aftermath of the Civil War. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-837, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (detailing the legislative history of § 1985(3) );
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99-101, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (same); Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 379, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing § 1985(3) as a "Civil War Era remedial statute"). The statute imposes liability on two or more persons who "conspire ... for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." § 1985(3). In the instant suit, respondents allege that petitioners violated the statute by "agreeing to implement a policy" under which respondents would be detained in harsh conditions "because of their race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin." Assuming these allegations to be true and well pleaded, the question is whether petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.
A
The qualified immunity rule seeks a proper balance between two competing interests. On one hand, damages suits "may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "On the other hand, permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). As one means to accommodate these two objectives, the Court has held that Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to "discretionary functions" performed in their official capacities. Ibid. The doctrine of qualified immunity gives officials "breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011).
The Court's cases provide additional instruction to define and implement that immunity. Whether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the official's acts. Harlow, supra, at 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727. And reasonableness of official action, in turn, must be "assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time [the action] was taken." Anderson, supra, at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S., at 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806. This requirement-that an official loses qualified immunity only for violating clearly established law-protects officials accused of violating "extremely abstract rights." Anderson, supra, at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034.
The Fourth Amendment provides an example of how qualified immunity functions with respect to abstract rights. By its plain terms, the Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, yet it may be difficult for an officer to know whether a search or seizure will be deemed reasonable given the precise situation encountered. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ("It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts"). For this reason, "[t]he dispositive question is 'whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.' " Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam ) (quoting Ashcroft, supra, at 742, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
It is not necessary, of course, that "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful."
Anderson, supra, at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. That is, an officer might lose qualified immunity even if there is no reported case "directly on point." Ashcroft, supra, at 741, 129 S.Ct. 1937. But "in the light of pre-existing law," the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct "must be apparent." Anderson, supra, at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. To subject officers to any broader liability would be to "disrupt the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective performance of their duties." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). For then, both as a practical and legal matter, it would be difficult for officials "reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages." Ibid.
In light of these concerns, the Court has held that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). To determine whether a given officer falls into either of those two categories, a court must ask whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct "was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, supra, at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If so, then the defendant officer must have been either incompetent or else a knowing violator of the law, and thus not entitled to qualified immunity. If not, however-i.e., if a reasonable officer might not have known for certain that the conduct was unlawful-then the officer is immune from liability.
B
Under these principles, it must be concluded that reasonable officials in petitioners' positions would not have known, and could not have predicted, that § 1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the resulting policies that caused the injuries alleged.
At least two aspects of the complaint indicate that petitioners' potential liability for this statutory offense would not have been known or anticipated by reasonable officials in their position. First, the conspiracy recited in the complaint is alleged to have been between or among officers in the same branch of the Government (the Executive Branch) and in the same Department (the Department of Justice). Second, the discussions were the preface to, and the outline of, a general and far-reaching policy.
As to the fact that these officers were in the same Department, an analogous principle discussed in the context of antitrust law is instructive. The Court's precedent indicates that there is no unlawful conspiracy when officers within a single corporate entity consult among themselves and then adopt a policy for the entity. See Copperweld Corp v . Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-771, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984). Under this principle-sometimes called the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine-an agreement between or among agents of the same legal entity, when the agents act in their official capacities, is not an unlawful conspiracy. Ibid. The rule is derived from the nature of the conspiracy prohibition. Conspiracy requires an agreement-and in particular an agreement to do an unlawful act-between or among two or more separate persons. When two agents of the same legal entity make an agreement in the course of their official duties, however, as a practical and legal matter their acts are attributed to their principal. And it then follows that there has not been an agreement between two or more separate people. See id., at 771, 104 S.Ct. 2731 (analogizing to "a multiple team of horses drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver").
To be sure, this Court has not given its approval to this doctrine in the specific context of § 1985(3). See Great American, 442 U.S., at 372, n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2345. There is a division in the courts of appeals, moreover, respecting the validity or correctness of the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine with reference to § 1985 conspiracies. See Hull v. Shuck, 501 U.S. 1261, 1261-1262, 111 S.Ct. 2917, 115 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing the Circuit split); Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1130-1131 (C.A.D.C.2011) (detailing a longstanding split about whether the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine applies to civil rights conspiracies). Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as either approving or disapproving the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine's application in the context of an alleged § 1985(3) violation. The Court might determine, in some later case, that different considerations apply to a conspiracy respecting equal protection guarantees, as distinct from a conspiracy in the antitrust context. Yet the fact that the courts are divided as to whether or not a § 1985(3) conspiracy can arise from official discussions between or among agents of the same entity demonstrates that the law on the point is not well established. When the courts are divided on an issue so central to the cause of action alleged, a reasonable official lacks the notice required before imposing liability. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (noting that it would be "unfair" to subject officers to damages liability when even "judges ... disagree"); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 669-670, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (same).
In addition to the concern that agents of the same legal entity are not distinct enough to conspire with one another, there are other sound reasons to conclude that conversations and agreements between and among federal officials in the same Department should not be the subject of a private cause of action for damages under § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must first show that the defendants conspired-that is, reached an agreement-with one another. See Carpenters, 463 U.S., at 828, 103 S.Ct. 3352 (stating that the elements of a § 1985(3) claim include "a conspiracy"). Thus, a § 1985(3) claim against federal officials by necessity implicates the substance of their official discussions.
As indicated above with respect to other claims in this suit, open discussion among federal officers is to be encouraged, so that they can reach consensus on the policies a department of the Federal Government should pursue. See supra, at 1860 - 1861. Close and frequent consultations to facilitate the adoption and implementation of policies are essential to the orderly conduct of governmental affairs. Were those discussions, and the resulting policies, to be the basis for private suits seeking damages against the officials as individuals, the result would be to chill the interchange and discourse that is necessary for the adoption and implementation of governmental policies. See Cheney, 542 U.S., at 383, 124 S.Ct. 2576 (discussing the need for confidential communications among Executive Branch officials); Merrill, 443 U.S., at 360, 99 S.Ct. 2800 (same).
These considerations suggest that officials employed by the same governmental department do not conspire when they speak to one another and work together in their official capacities. Whether that contention should prevail need not be decided here. It suffices to say that the question is sufficiently open so that the officials in this suit could not be certain that § 1985(3) was applicable to their discussions and actions. Thus, the law respondents seek to invoke cannot be clearly established. It follows that reasonable officers in petitioners' positions would not have known with any certainty that the alleged agreements were forbidden by law. See Saucier, 533 U.S., at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
* * *
If the facts alleged in the complaint are true, then what happened to respondents in the days following September 11 was tragic. Nothing in this opinion should be read to condone the treatment to which they contend they were subjected. The question before the Court, however, is not whether petitioners' alleged conduct was proper, nor whether it gave decent respect to respondents' dignity and well-being, nor whether it was in keeping with the idea of the rule of law that must inspire us even in times of crisis.
Instead, the question with respect to the Bivens claims is whether to allow an action for money damages in the absence of congressional authorization. For the reasons given above, the Court answers that question in the negative as to the detention policy claims. As to the prisoner abuse claim, because the briefs have not concentrated on that issue, the Court remands to allow the Court of Appeals to consider the claim in light of the Bivens analysis set forth above.
The question with respect to the § 1985(3) claim is whether a reasonable officer in petitioners' position would have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful conspiracy. For the reasons given above, the Court answers that question, too, in the negative.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to all of the claims except the prisoner abuse claim against Warden Hasty. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that claim is vacated, and that case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, Justice KAGAN, and Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the Court's opinion except for Part IV-B. I write separately to express my view on the Court's decision to remand some of respondents' claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and my concerns about our qualified immunity precedents.
I
With respect to respondents' Bivens claims, I join the opinion of the Court to the extent it reverses the Second Circuit's ruling. The Court correctly applies our precedents to hold that Bivens does not supply a cause of action against petitioners for most of the alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. It also correctly recognizes that respondents' claims against petitioner Dennis Hasty seek to extend Bivens to a new context. See ante, at 1864.
I concur in the judgment of the Court vacating the Court of Appeals' judgment with regard to claims against Hasty. Ante, at 1867. I have previously noted that " 'Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.' " Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) (concurring opinion) (quoting Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)). I have thus declined to "extend Bivens even [where] its reasoning logically applied," thereby limiting "Bivens and its progeny ... to the precise circumstances that they involved." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This would, in most cases, mean a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals is in order. However, in order for there to be a controlling judgment in this suit, I concur in the judgment vacating and remanding the claims against petitioner Hasty as that disposition is closest to my preferred approach.
II
As for respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), I join Part V of the Court's opinion, which holds that respondents are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court correctly applies our precedents, which no party has asked us to reconsider. I write separately, however, to note my growing concern with our qualified immunity jurisprudence.
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which § 1985(3) and the more frequently litigated § 1983 were originally a part, established causes of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from Government officers who violated federal law. See §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13. Although the Act made no mention of defenses or immunities, "we have read it in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have done so because "[c]ertain immunities were so well established in 1871 ... that 'we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish' them." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) ; accord, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Immunity is thus available under the statute if it was "historically accorded the relevant official" in an analogous situation "at common law," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), unless the statute provides some reason to think that Congress did not preserve the defense, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984).
In some contexts, we have conducted the common-law inquiry that the statute requires. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). For example, we have concluded that legislators and judges are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their official acts because that immunity was well established at common law in 1871. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (judges). We have similarly looked to the common law in holding that a prosecutor is immune from suits relating to the "judicial phase of the criminal process," Imbler, supra, at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984 ; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489-492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) ; but see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131-134, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court in Imbler misunderstood 1871 common-law rules), although not from suits relating to the prosecutor's advice to police officers, Burns, supra, at 493, 111 S.Ct. 1934.
In developing immunity doctrine for other executive officers, we also started off by applying common-law rules. In Pierson, we held that police officers are not absolutely immune from a § 1983 claim arising from an arrest made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute because the common law never granted arresting officers that sort of immunity. 386 U.S., at 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213. Rather, we concluded that police officers could assert "the defense of good faith and probable cause" against the claim for an unconstitutional arrest because that defense was available against the analogous torts of "false arrest and imprisonment" at common law. Id., at 557, 87 S.Ct. 1213.
In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for executive officials, however, we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute. See Wyatt, supra, at 170, 112 S.Ct. 1827 (KENNEDY, J., concurring); accord, Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting). In the decisions following Pierson, we have "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discussing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). Instead of asking whether the common law in 1871 would have accorded immunity to an officer for a tort analogous to the plaintiff's claim under § 1983, we instead grant immunity to any officer whose conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (a Government official is liable under the 1871 Act only if " 'existing precedent ... placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate' " (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) )). We apply this "clearly established" standard "across the board" and without regard to "the precise nature of the various officials' duties or the precise character of the particular rights alleged to have been violated." Anderson, supra, at 641-643, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have not attempted to locate that standard in the common law as it existed in 1871, however, and some evidence supports the conclusion that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine. See generally Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript, at 7-17), online at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896508 (as last visited June 15, 2017).
Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in "interpret [ing] the intent of Congress in enacting" the Act. Malley, supra, at 342, 106 S.Ct. 1092 ; see Burns, supra, at 493, 111 S.Ct. 1934. Our qualified immunity precedents instead represent precisely the sort of "freewheeling policy choice[s]" that we have previously disclaimed the power to make. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tower, supra, at 922-923, 104 S.Ct. 2820 ("We do not have a license to establish immunities from" suits brought under the Act "in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy"). We have acknowledged, in fact, that the "clearly established" standard is designed to "protec[t] the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' effective performance of their duties." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harlow, supra, at 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (explaining that "the recognition of a qualified immunity defense ... reflected an attempt to balance competing values"). The Constitution assigns this kind of balancing to Congress, not the Courts.
In today's decision, we continue down the path our precedents have marked. We ask "whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted," ante, at 1867 (internal quotation marks omitted), rather than whether officers in petitioners' positions would have been accorded immunity at common law in 1871 from claims analogous to respondents'. Even if we ultimately reach a conclusion consistent with the common-law rules prevailing in 1871, it is mere fortuity. Until we shift the focus of our inquiry to whether immunity existed at common law, we will continue to substitute our own policy preferences for the mandates of Congress. In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, dissenting.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), this Court held that the Fourth Amendment provides a damages remedy for those whom federal officials have injured as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment provides a damages remedy to an individual dismissed by her employer (a Member of Congress) on the basis of her sex in violation of the equal protection component of that Amendment's Due Process Clause. And in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment provides a damages remedy to a prisoner who died as a result of prison official's deliberate indifference to his medical needs, in violation of the Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
It is by now well established that federal law provides damages actions at least in similar contexts, where claims of constitutional violation arise. Congress has ratified Bivens actions, plaintiffs frequently bring them, courts accept them, and scholars defend their importance. See J. Pfander, Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror (2017) (canvassing the history of Bivens and cataloguing cases). Moreover, the courts, in order to avoid deterring federal officials from properly performing their work, have developed safeguards for defendants, including the requirement that plaintiffs plead "plausible" claims, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), as well as the defense of "qualified immunity," which frees federal officials from both threat of liability and involvement in the lawsuit, unless the plaintiffs establish that officials have violated " 'clearly established ... constitutional rights,' " id., at 672, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). "[This] Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability 'to any new context or new category of defendants.' " Iqbal, supra, at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) ). But the Court has made clear that it would not narrow Bivens' existing scope. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (guarding against "the evisceration of the Bivens remedy" so that its "deterrent effects ... would [not] be lost").
The plaintiffs before us today seek damages for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. They alleged that federal officials slammed them against walls, shackled them, exposed them to nonstop lighting, lack of hygiene, and the like, all based upon invidious discrimination and without penological justification. See ante, at 1852 - 1853. In my view, these claims are well-pleaded, state violations of clearly established law, and fall within the scope of longstanding Bivens law. For those reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I shall discuss at some length what I believe is the most important point of disagreement. The Court, in my view, is wrong to hold that permitting a constitutional tort action here would "extend" Bivens, applying it in a new context. To the contrary, I fear that the Court's holding would significantly shrink the existing Bivens contexts, diminishing the compensatory remedy constitutional tort law now offers to harmed individuals.
I shall explain why I believe this suit falls well within the scope of traditional constitutional tort law and why I cannot agree with the Court's arguments to the contrary. I recognize, and write separately about, the strongest of the Court's arguments, namely, the fact that plaintiffs' claims concern detention that took place soon after a serious attack on the United States and some of them concern actions of high-level Government officials. While these facts may affect the substantive constitutional questions (e.g., were any of the conditions "legitimate"?) or the scope of the qualified-immunity defense, they do not extinguish the Bivens action itself. If I may paraphrase Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens : In wartime as well as in peacetime, "it is important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy" "for the most flagrant and patently unjustified," unconstitutional "abuses of official power." 403 U.S., at 410-411, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion concurring in judgment); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008).
I
The majority opinion well summarizes the particular claims that the plaintiffs make in this suit. All concern the conditions of their confinement, which began soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks and "lasted for days and weeks, then stretching into months." Ante, at 1851. At some point, the plaintiffs allege, all the defendants knew that they had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks but continued to detain them anyway in harsh conditions. Official Government policy, both before and after the defendants became aware of the plaintiffs' innocence, led to the plaintiffs being held in "tiny cells for over 23 hours a day" with lights continuously left on, "shackled" when moved, often "strip searched," and "denied access to most forms of communication with the outside world." Ante, at 1853 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants detained the plaintiffs in these conditions on the basis of their race or religion and without justification.
Moreover, the prison wardens were aware of, but deliberately indifferent to, certain unofficial activities of prison guards involving a pattern of "physical and verbal abuse," such as "slam[ming] detainees into walls; twist[ing] their arms, wrists, and fingers; [breaking] their bones;" and subjecting them to verbal taunts. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that all the defendants-high-level Department of Justice officials and prison wardens alike-were directly responsible for the official confinement policy, which, in some or all of the aspects mentioned, violated the due process and equal protection components of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint adds that, insofar as the prison wardens were deliberately indifferent to the unofficial conduct of the guards, they violated the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.
I would hold that the complaint properly alleges constitutional torts, i.e.,Bivens actions for damages.
A
The Court's holdings in Bivens, Carlson, and Davis rest upon four basic legal considerations. First, the Bivens Court referred to longstanding Supreme Court precedent stating or suggesting that the Constitution provides federal courts with considerable legal authority to use traditional remedies to right constitutional wrongs. That precedent begins with Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), which effectively placed upon those who would deny the existence of an effective legal remedy the burden of showing why their case was special. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court that
"[t]he very essence of civil liberty [lies] in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id., at 163.
The Chief Justice referred to Blackstone's Commentaries stating that there
" 'is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ... [and that] it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.' " 1 Cranch, at 163.
The Chief Justice then wrote:
"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will [not] deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."Ibid.
He concluded for the Court that there must be something "peculiar" (i.e., special) about a case that warrants "exclu[ding] the injured party from legal redress ... [and placing it within] that class of cases which come under the description of damnum absque injuria- a loss without an injury." Id., at 163-164; but cf. id., at 164 (placing "political" questions in the latter, special category).
Much later, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the Court wrote that,
"where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
See also Bivens, 403 U.S., at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (citing opinions of Justices Cardozo and Holmes to similar effect).
The Bivens Court reiterated these principles and confirmed that the appropriate remedial "adjust[ment]" in the case before it was an award of money damages, the "remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts." Id., at 392, 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Justice Harlan agreed, adding that, since Congress' "general" statutory "grant of jurisdiction" authorized courts to grant equitable relief in cases arising under federal jurisdiction, courts likewise had the authority to award damages-the "traditional remedy at law"-in order to "vindicate the interests of the individual"
protected by the Bill of Rights. Id., at 405-407, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Second, our cases have recognized that Congress' silence on the subject indicates a willingness to leave this matter to the courts. In Bivens, the Court noted, as an argument favoring its conclusion, the absence of an "explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents." Id., at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Similarly, in Davis v. Passman, the Court stressed that there was "no evidence ... that Congress meant ... to foreclose" a damages remedy. 442 U.S., at 247, 99 S.Ct. 2264. In Carlson, the Court went further, observing that not only was there no sign "that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy," but there was also "clear" evidence that Congress intended to preserve it. 446 U.S., at 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 1468.
Third, our Bivens cases acknowledge that a constitutional tort may not lie when "special factors counse[l] hesitation" and when Congress has provided an adequate alternative remedy. 446 U.S., at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. 1468. The relevant special factors in those cases included whether the court was faced "with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' " Bivens, supra, at 396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 or a risk of "deluging federal courts with claims," Davis, supra, at 248, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Carlson acknowledged an additional factor-that damages suits "might inhibit [federal officials'] efforts to perform their official duties"-but concluded that "the qualified immunity accorded [federal officials] under [existing law] provides adequate protection." 446 U.S., at 19, 100 S.Ct. 1468.
Fourth, as the Court recognized later in Carlson, a Bivens remedy was needed to cure what would, without it, amount to a constitutional anomaly. Long before this Court incorporated many of the Bill of Rights' guarantees against the States, see Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992), federal civil rights statutes afforded a damages remedy to any person whom a state official deprived of a federal constitutional right, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (describing this history). But federal statutory law did not provide a damages remedy to a person whom a federal official had deprived of that same right, even though the Bill of Rights was at the time of the founding primarily aimed at constraining the Federal Government. Thus, a person harmed by an unconstitutional search or seizure might sue a city mayor, a state legislator, or even a Governor. But that person could not sue a federal agent, a national legislator, or a Justice Department official for an identical offense. "[Our] 'constitutional design,' " the Court wrote, "would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression." Carlson, supra, at 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) ).
The Bivens Court also recognized that the Court had previously inferred damages remedies caused by violations of certain federal statutes that themselves did not explicitly authorize damages remedies. 403 U.S., at 395-396, 91 S.Ct. 1999. At the same time, Bivens, Davis, and Carlson treat the courts' power to derive a damages remedy from a constitutional provision not as included within a power to find a statute-based damages remedy but as flowing from those statutory cases a fortiori.
As the majority opinion points out, this Court in more recent years has indicated that "expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ' disfavored' judicial activity." Ante, at 1857 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; emphasis added). Thus, it has held that the remedy is not available in the context of suits against military officers, see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298-300, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-684, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; in the context of suits against privately operated prisons and their employees, see Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120, 132 S.Ct. 617, 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) ; Malesko, 534 U.S., at 70-73, 122 S.Ct. 515 ; in the context of suits seeking to vindicate procedural, rather than substantive, constitutional protections, see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460, 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ; and in the context of suits seeking to vindicate two quite different forms of important substantive protection, one involving free speech, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), and the other involving protection of land rights, see Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 551, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007). Each of these cases involved a context that differed from that of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson with respect to the kind of defendant, the basic nature of the right, or the kind of harm suffered. That is to say, as we have explicitly stated, these cases were "fundamentally different from anything recognized in Bivens or subsequent cases." Malesko, supra, at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 (emphasis added). In each of them, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to " 'authoriz[e] a new kind of federal litigation.' " Wilkie, supra, at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588 (emphasis added).
Thus the Court, as the majority opinion says, repeatedly wrote that it was not "expanding" the scope of the Bivens remedy. Ante, at 1856 - 1857. But the Court nowhere suggested that it would narrow Bivens ' existing scope. In fact, to diminish any ambiguity about its holdings, the Court set out a framework for determining whether a claim of constitutional violation calls for a Bivens remedy. See Wilkie, supra, at 549-550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. At Step One, the court must determine whether the case before it arises in a "new context," that is, whether it involves a "new category of defendants," Malesko, supra, at 68, 122 S.Ct. 515 or (presumably) a significantly different kind of constitutional harm, such as a purely procedural harm, a harm to speech, or a harm caused to physical property. If the context is new, then the court proceeds to Step Two and asks "whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, 551 U.S., at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. If there is none, then the court proceeds to Step Three and asks whether there are " 'any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.' " Ibid .
Precedent makes this framework applicable here. I would apply it. And, doing so, I cannot get past Step One. This suit, it seems to me, arises in a context similar to those in which this Court has previously permitted Bivens actions.
B
1
The context here is not "new," Wilkie, supra, at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588 or "fundamentally different" than our previous Bivens cases, Malesko, supra, at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515. First, the plaintiffs are civilians, not members of the military. They are not citizens, but the Constitution protects noncitizens against serious mistreatment, as it protects citizens. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) ("[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country"). Some or all of the plaintiffs here may have been illegally present in the United States. But that fact cannot justify physical mistreatment. Nor does anyone claim that that fact deprives them of a Bivens right available to other persons, citizens and noncitizens alike.
Second, the defendants are Government officials. They are not members of the military or private persons. Two are prison wardens. Three others are high-ranking Department of Justice officials. Prison wardens have been defendants in Bivens actions, as have other high-level Government officials. One of the defendants in Carlson was the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; the defendant in Davis was a Member of Congress. We have also held that the Attorney General of the United States is not entitled to absolute immunity in a damages suit arising out of his actions related to national security. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
Third, from a Bivens perspective, the injuries that the plaintiffs claim they suffered are familiar ones. They focus upon the conditions of confinement. The plaintiffs say that they were unnecessarily shackled, confined in small unhygienic cells, subjected to continuous lighting (presumably preventing sleep), unnecessarily and frequently strip searched, slammed against walls, injured physically, and subject to verbal abuse. They allege that they suffered these harms because of their race or religion, the defendants having either turned a blind eye to what was happening or themselves introduced policies that they knew would lead to these harms even though the defendants knew the plaintiffs had no connections to terrorism.
These claimed harms are similar to, or even worse than, the harms the plaintiffs suffered in Bivens (unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment), Davis (unlawful discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment), and Carlson (deliberate indifference to medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Indeed, we have said that, "[i]f a federal prisoner in a [Bureau of Prisons] facility alleges a constitutional deprivation, he may bring a Bivens claim against the offending individual officer, subject to the defense of qualified immunity." Malesko, 534 U.S., at 72, 122 S.Ct. 515 ; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (Bivens case about prisoner abuse). The claims in this suit would seem to fill the Bivens' bill. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 193, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] [Bivens ] action ... is available to federal pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement").
It is true that the plaintiffs bring their "deliberate indifference" claim against Warden Hasty under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, as in Carlson . But that is because the latter applies to convicted criminals while the former applies to pretrial and immigration detainees. Where the harm is the same, where this Court has held that both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments give rise to Bivens' remedies, and where the only difference in constitutional scope consists of a circumstance (the absence of a conviction) that makes the violation here worse, it cannot be maintained that the difference between the use of the two Amendments is "fundamental." See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) ("due process rights" of an unconvicted person "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner"); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) ("pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all"); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 721, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (detention "incident to removal ... cannot be justified as punishment nor can the confinement or its conditions be designed in order to punish"). See also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 372 (C.A.3 2012) (permitting Bivens action brought by detainee in administrative segregation); Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 493, 496-497 (C.A.2 2006) (detainee alleging failure to provide adequate medical care); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1271, 1275-1276 (C.A.11 2004) (detainee in solitary confinement); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1010-1011 (C.A.9 2002) (due process claims arising from death of immigration detainee); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1293-1296 (C.A.4 1978) (detainee's claim of deliberate indifference to medical need). If an arrestee can bring a claim of excessive force (Bivens itself), and a convicted prisoner can bring a claim for denying medical care (Carlson ), someone who has neither been charged nor convicted with a crime should also be able to challenge abuse that causes him to need medical care.
Nor has Congress suggested that it wants to withdraw a damages remedy in circumstances like these. By its express terms, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) does not apply to immigration detainees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) ("[T]he term 'prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law ..."); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (C.A.9 2002) ("[W]e hold that an alien detained by the INS pending deportation is not a 'prisoner' within the meaning of the PLRA"); LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158, 165 (C.A.D.C.1998) (same); Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680, 683 (C.A.5 1997) (same). And, in fact, there is strong evidence that Congress assumed that Bivens remedies would be available to prisoners when it enacted the PLRA-e.g., Congress continued to permit prisoners to recover for physical injuries, the typical kinds of Bivens injuries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) ; Pfander, Constitutional Torts, at 105-106.
If there were any lingering doubt that the claim against Warden Hasty arises in a familiar Bivens context, the Court has made clear that conditions-of-confinement claims and medical-care claims are subject to the same substantive standard. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ("[ Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ] extended the deliberate indifference standard applied to Eighth Amendment claims involving medical care to claims about conditions of confinement"). Indeed, the Court made this very point in a Bivens case alleging that prison wardens were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's safety. See Farmer, supra, at 830, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
I recognize that the Court finds a significant difference in the fact that the confinement here arose soon after a national-security emergency, namely, the September 11 attacks. The short answer to this argument, in respect to at least some of the claimed harms, is that some plaintiffs continued to suffer those harms up to eight months after the September 11 attacks took place and after the defendants knew the plaintiffs had no connection to terrorism. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 15-1359, p. 280a. But because I believe the Court's argument here is its strongest, I will consider it at greater length below. See Part III-C, infra.
Because the context here is not new, I would allow the plaintiffs' constitutional claims to proceed. The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the defendants were personally involved in imposing the conditions of confinement and did so with knowledge that the plaintiffs bore no ties to terrorism, thus satisfying Iqbal 's pleading standard. See 556 U.S., at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (claims must be "plausible"); see also id., at 699-700, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (BREYER, J., dissenting). And because it is clearly established that it is unconstitutional to subject detainees to punitive conditions of confinement and to target them based solely on their race, religion, or national origin, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-539, and n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ; Davis, 442 U.S., at 236, 99 S.Ct. 2264 ("It is equally clear ... that the Fifth Amendment confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from illegal discrimination"). (Similarly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the plaintiffs' statutory claim, namely, that the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 262-264 (C.A.2 2015). I agree with the Court of Appeals that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See ibid. )
2
Even were I wrong and were the context here "fundamentally different," Malesko, 534 U.S., at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 the plaintiffs' claims would nonetheless survive Step Two and Step Three of the Court's framework for determining whether Bivens applies, see supra, at 1876 - 1877. Step Two consists of asking whether "any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, 551 U.S., at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. I can find no such "alternative, existing process" here.
The Court does not claim that the PLRA provides plaintiffs with a remedy. Ante, at 1874 - 1875. Rather, it says that the plaintiffs may have "had available to them" relief in the form of a prospective injunction or an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ante, at 1863. Neither a prospective injunction nor a writ of habeas corpus, however, will normally provide plaintiffs with redress for harms they have already suffered. And here plaintiffs make a strong claim that neither was available to them-at least not for a considerable time. Some of the plaintiffs allege that for two or three months they were subject to a "communications blackout"; that the prison "staff did not permit them visitors, legal or social telephone calls, or mail"; that their families and attorneys did not know where they were being held; that they could not receive visits from their attorneys; that subsequently their lawyers could call them only once a week; and that some or all of the defendants "interfered with the detainees' effective access to legal counsel." Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report, App. 223, 293, 251, 391; see App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 15-1359, at 253a (incorporating the OIG report into the complaint). These claims make it virtually impossible to say that here there is an "elaborate, comprehensive" alternative remedial scheme similar to schemes that, in the past, we have found block the application of Bivens to new contexts. Bush, 462 U.S., at 385, 103 S.Ct. 2404. If these allegations are proved, then in this suit, it is "damages or nothing." Bivens, 403 U.S., at 410, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
There being no "alternative, existing process" that provides a "convincing reason" for not applying Bivens, we must proceed to Step Three. Wilkie, supra, at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. Doing so, I can find no "special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation before authorizing" this Bivens action. 551 U.S., at 550, 127 S.Ct. 2588. I turn to this matter next.
II
A
The Court describes two general considerations that it believes argue against an "extension" of Bivens. First, the majority opinion points out that the Court is now far less likely than at the time it decided Bivens to imply a cause of action for damages from a statute that does not explicitly provide for a damages claim. See ante, at 1855 - 1856. Second, it finds the "silence" of Congress "notable" in that Congress, though likely aware of the "high-level policies" involved in this suit, did not "choose to extend to any person the kind of remedies" that the plaintiffs here "seek." Ante, at 1861 - 1862 (internal quotation marks omitted). I doubt the strength of these two general considerations.
The first consideration, in my view, is not relevant. I concede that the majority and concurring opinions in Bivens looked in part for support to the fact that the Court had implied damages remedies from statutes silent on the subject. See 403 U.S., at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ; id., at 402-403, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). But that was not the main argument favoring the Court's conclusion. Rather, the Court drew far stronger support from the need for such a remedy when measured against a common-law and constitutional history of allowing traditional legal remedies where necessary. Id., at 392, 396-397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. The Court believed such a remedy was necessary to make effective the Constitution's protection of certain basic individual rights. See id., at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ; id., at 407, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion of Harlan, J.). Similarly, as the Court later explained, a damages remedy against federal officials prevented the serious legal anomaly I previously mentioned. Its existence made basic constitutional protections of the individual against Federal Government abuse (the Bill of Rights' pre-Civil War objective) as effective as protections against abuse by state officials (the post-Civil War, post selective-incorporation objective). See supra, at 1875.
Nor is the second circumstance-congressional silence-relevant in the manner that the majority opinion describes. The Court initially saw that silence as indicating an absence of congressional hostility to the Court's exercise of its traditional remedy-inferring powers. See Bivens, supra, at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999 ; Davis, 442 U.S., at 246-247, 99 S.Ct. 2264. Congress' subsequent silence contains strong signs that it accepted Bivens actions as part of the law. After all, Congress rejected a proposal that would have eliminated Bivens by substituting the U.S. Government as a defendant in suits against federal officers that raised constitutional claims. See Pfander, Constitutional Torts, at 102. Later, Congress expressly immunized federal employees acting in the course of their official duties from tort claims except those premised on violations of the Constitution. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). We stated that it is consequently "crystal clear that Congress views [the Federal Tort Claims Act] and Bivens as [providing] parallel, complementary causes of action." Carlson, 446 U.S., at 20, 100 S.Ct. 1468 ; see Malesko, 534 U.S., at 68, 122 S.Ct. 515 (similar). Congress has even assumed the existence of a Bivens remedy in suits brought by noncitizen detainees suspected of terrorism. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1 (granting qualified immunity-but not absolute immunity-to military and civilian federal officials who are sued by alien detainees suspected of terrorism).
B
The majority opinion also sets forth a more specific list of factors that it says bear on "whether a case presents a new Bivens context." Ante, at 1859. In the Court's view, a "case might differ" from Bivens "in a meaningful way because of [1] the rank of the officers involved; [2] the constitutional right at issue; [3] the generality or specificity of the individual action; [4] the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; [5] the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; [6] the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; [7] or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider." Ante, at 1860. In my view, these factors do not make a "meaningful difference" at Step One of the Bivens framework. Some of them are better cast as "special factors" relevant to Step Three. But, as I see it, none should normally foreclose a Bivens action and none is determinative here. Consider them one by one:
(1) The rank of the officers . I can understand why an officer's rank might bear on whether he violated the Constitution, because, for example, a plaintiff might need to show the officer was willfully blind to a harm caused by lower ranking officers or that the officer had actual knowledge of the misconduct. And I can understand that rank might relate to the existence of a legal defense, such as qualified, or even absolute, immunity. But if -and I recognize that this is often a very big if-a plaintiff proves a clear constitutional violation, say, of the Fourth Amendment, and he shows that the defendant does not possess any form of immunity or other defense, then why should he not have a damages remedy for harm suffered? What does rank have to do with that question, namely, the Bivens question? Why should the law treat differently a high-level official and the local constable where each has similarly violated the Constitution and where neither can successfully assert immunity or any other defense?
(2) The constitutional right at issue . I agree that this factor can make a difference, but only when the substance of the right is distinct. See, e.g., Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (land rights). But, for reasons I have already pointed out, there is no relevant difference between the rights at issue here and the rights at issue in our previous Bivens cases, namely, the rights to be free of unreasonable searches, invidious discrimination, and physical abuse in federal custody. See supra, at 1877 - 1878.
(3) The generality or specificity of the individual action . I should think that it is not the "generality or specificity" of an official action but rather the nature of the official action that matters. Bivens should apply to some generally applicable actions, such as actions taken deliberately to jail a large group of known-innocent people. And it should not apply to some highly specific actions, depending upon the nature of those actions.
(4) The extent of judicial guidance . This factor may be relevant to the existence of a constitutional violation or a qualified-immunity defense. Where judicial guidance is lacking, it is more likely that a constitutional violation is not clearly established. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (Officials are protected by qualified immunity unless "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right"). But I do not see how, assuming the violation is clear, the presence or absence of "judicial guidance" is relevant to the existence of a damages remedy.
(5) The statutory (or other) legal mandate under which the officer was operating . This factor too may prove relevant to the question whether a constitutional violation exists or is clearly established. But, again, assuming that it is, I do not understand why this factor is relevant to the existence of a damages remedy. See Stanley, 483 U.S., at 684, 107 S.Ct. 3054 (the question of immunity is "analytically distinct" from the question whether a Bivens action should lie).
(6) Risk of disruptive judicial intrusion . All damages actions risk disrupting to some degree future decisionmaking by members of the Executive or Legislative Branches. Where this Court has authorized Bivens actions, it has found that disruption tolerable, and it has explained why disruption is, from a constitutional perspective, desirable. See Davis, 442 U.S., at 242, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (Unless constitutional rights "are to become merely precatory, ... litigants who allege that their own constitutional rights have been violated, and who at the same time have no effective means other than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for ... protection"); Malesko, supra, at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 ("The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations"). Insofar as the Court means this consideration to provide a reason why there should be no Bivens action where a Government employee acts in time of security need, I shall discuss the matter next, in Part C.
(7) Other potential special factors . Since I am not certain what these other "potential factors" are and, since the Court does not specify their nature, I would not, and the Court cannot, consider them in differentiating this suit from our previous Bivens cases or as militating against recognizing a Bivens action here.
C
In my view, the Court's strongest argument is that Bivens should not apply to policy-related actions taken in times of national-security need, for example, during war or national-security emergency. As the Court correctly points out, the Constitution grants primary power to protect the Nation's security to the Executive and Legislative Branches, not to the Judiciary. But the Constitution also delegates to the Judiciary the duty to protect an individual's fundamental constitutional rights. Hence when protection of those rights and a determination of security needs conflict, the Court has a role to play. The Court most recently made this clear in cases arising out of the detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. Justice O'Connor wrote that "a state of war is not a blank check." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality opinion). In Boumediene, 553 U.S., at 732-733, 128 S.Ct. 2229 the Court reinforced that point, holding that noncitizens detained as enemy combatants were entitled to challenge their detention through a writ of habeas corpus, notwithstanding the national-security concerns at stake.
We have not, however, answered the specific question the Court places at issue here: Should Bivens actions continue to exist in respect to policy-related actions taken in time of war or national emergency? In my view, they should.
For one thing, a Bivens action comes accompanied by many legal safeguards designed to prevent the courts from interfering with Executive and Legislative Branch activity reasonably believed to be necessary to protect national security. In Justice Jackson's well-known words, the Constitution is not "a suicide pact." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) (dissenting opinion). The Constitution itself takes account of public necessity. Thus, for example, the Fourth Amendment does not forbid all Government searches and seizures; it forbids only those that are "unreasonable." Ordinarily, it requires that a police officer obtain a search warrant before entering an apartment, but should the officer observe a woman being dragged against her will into that apartment, he should, and will, act at once. The Fourth Amendment makes allowances for such "exigent circumstances." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 401, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006) (warrantless entry justified to forestall imminent injury). Similarly, the Fifth Amendment bars only conditions of confinement that are not "reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861. What is unreasonable and illegitimate in time of peace may be reasonable and legitimate in time of war.
Moreover, Bivens comes accompanied with a qualified-immunity defense. Federal officials will face suit only if they have violated a constitutional right that was "clearly established" at the time they acted. Harlow, 457 U.S., at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727.
Further, in order to prevent the very presence of a Bivens lawsuit from interfering with the work of a Government official, this Court has held that a complaint must state a claim for relief that is "plausible." Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[C]onclusory" statements and "[t]hreadbare" allegations will not suffice. Id., at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. And the Court has protected high-level officials in particular by requiring that plaintiffs plead that an official was personally involved in the unconstitutional conduct; an official cannot be vicariously liable for another's misdeeds. Id., at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Finally, where such a claim is filed, courts can, and should, tailor discovery orders so that they do not unnecessarily or improperly interfere with the official's work. The Second Circuit has emphasized the "need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense by dismissing non-meritorious claims against public officials at an early stage of litigation." Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2007). Where some of the defendants are "current or former senior officials of the Government, against whom broad-ranging allegations of knowledge and personal involvement are easily made, a district court" not only "may, but 'must exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the qualified immunity defense ... so that' " those officials " 'are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.' " Id., at 158-159. The court can make "all such discovery subject to prior court approval." Id., at 158. It can "structure ... limited discovery by examining written responses to interrogatories and requests to admit before authorizing depositions, and by deferring discovery directed to high-level officials until discovery of front-line officials has been completed and has demonstrated the need for discovery higher up the ranks." Ibid. In a word, a trial court can and should so structure the proceedings with full recognition that qualified immunity amounts to immunity from suit as well as immunity from liability.
Given these safeguards against undue interference by the Judiciary in times of war or national-security emergency, the Court's abolition, or limitation of, Bivens actions goes too far. If you are cold, put on a sweater, perhaps an overcoat, perhaps also turn up the heat, but do not set fire to the house.
At the same time, there may well be a particular need for Bivens remedies when security-related Government actions are at issue. History tells us of far too many instances where the Executive or Legislative Branch took actions during time of war that, on later examination, turned out unnecessarily and unreasonably to have deprived American citizens of basic constitutional rights. We have read about the Alien and Sedition Acts, the thousands of civilians imprisoned during the Civil War, and the suppression of civil liberties during World War I. See W. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 209-210, 49-50, 173-180, 183 (1998); see also Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866) (decided after the Civil War was over). The pages of the U.S. Reports themselves recite this Court's refusal to set aside the Government's World War II action removing more than 70,000 American citizens of Japanese origin from their west coast homes and interning them in camps, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944) -an action that at least some officials knew at the time was unnecessary, see id., at 233-242, 65 S.Ct. 193 (Murphy, J., dissenting); P. Irons, Justice at War 202-204, 288 (1983). President Franklin Roosevelt's Attorney General, perhaps exaggerating, once said that "[t]he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President." Rehnquist, supra, at 191.
Can we, in respect to actions taken during those periods, rely exclusively, as the Court seems to suggest, upon injunctive remedies or writs of habeas corpus, their retail equivalent? Complaints seeking that kind of relief typically come during the emergency itself, when emotions are strong, when courts may have too little or inaccurate information, and when courts may well prove particularly reluctant to interfere with even the least well-founded Executive Branch activity. That reluctance may itself set an unfortunate precedent, which, as Justice Jackson pointed out, can "li[e] about like a loaded weapon" awaiting discharge in another case. Korematsu, supra, at 246, 65 S.Ct. 193 (dissenting opinion).
A damages action, however, is typically brought after the emergency is over, after emotions have cooled, and at a time when more factual information is available. In such circumstances, courts have more time to exercise such judicial virtues as calm reflection and dispassionate application of the law to the facts. We have applied the Constitution to actions taken during periods of war and national-security emergency. See Boumediene, 553 U.S., at 732-733, 128 S.Ct. 2229 ; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 ; cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952). I should think that the wisdom of permitting courts to consider Bivens actions, later granting monetary compensation to those wronged at the time, would follow a fortiori .
As is well known, Lord Atkins, a British judge, wrote in the midst of World War II that "amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace." Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L. 1941) 244. The Court, in my view, should say the same of this Bivens action.
With respect, I dissent.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
Although we first formulated the "clearly established" standard in Bivens cases like Harlow and Anderson, we have imported that standard directly into our 1871 Act cases. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-244, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (applying the clearly established standard to a § 1983 claim). | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the ideological "direction" of the decision ("liberal", "conservative", or "unspecifiable"). Use "unspecifiable" if the issue does not lend itself to a liberal or conservative description (e.g., a boundary dispute between two states, real property, wills and estates), or because no convention exists as to which is the liberal side and which is the conservative side (e.g., the legislative veto). Specification of the ideological direction comports with conventional usage. In the context of issues pertaining to criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys, consider liberal to be pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial, pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality), pro-child or juvenile, pro-indigent pro-Indian, pro-affirmative action, pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases, pro-female in abortion, pro-underdog, anti-slavery, incorporation of foreign territories anti-government in the context of due process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business violation of due process by exercising jurisdiction over nonresident, pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases, pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in campaign spending pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of mental incompetents, pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student records. In the context of issues pertaining to unions and economic activity, consider liberal to be pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = pro-competition, pro-government, anti-business anti-employer, pro-competition, pro-injured person, pro-indigent, pro-small business vis-a-vis large business pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases, pro-debtor, pro-bankrupt, pro-Indian, pro-environmental protection, pro-economic underdog pro-consumer, pro-accountability in governmental corruption, pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claims anti-union member or employee vis-a-vis union, anti-union in union antitrust, anti-union in union or closed shop, pro-trial in arbitration. In the context of issues pertaining to judicial power, consider liberal to be pro-exercise of judicial power, pro-judicial "activism", pro-judicial review of administrative action. In the context of issues pertaining to federalism, consider liberal to be pro-federal power, pro-executive power in executive/congressional disputes, anti-state. In the context of issues pertaining to federal taxation, consider liberal to be pro-United States and conservative pro-taxpayer. In miscellaneous, consider conservative the incorporation of foreign territories and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states or judcial authority vis-a-vis state or federal legislative authority, and consider liberal legislative veto. In interstate relations and private law issues, consider unspecifiable in all cases. | What is the ideological direction of the decision? | [
"Conservative",
"Liberal",
"Unspecifiable"
] | [
0
] | sc_decisiondirection |
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v. HERMANN et al.
No. 540.
Argued April 25, 1957.
Decided May 6, 1957.
Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Daniel M. Friedman, Franklin M. Stone and Robert Burstein.
Roland E. Ginsburg argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner had instituted an administrative enforcement proceeding against the respondents, a group of individuals and business entities operating as the “Skycoach” air travel system. The Board’s complaint charged violation of its regulations as well as of the Civil Aeronautics Act and sought certain revocation and cease-and-desist orders against respondents. In the course of the proceedings, the Hearing Examiner issued a number of subpoenas duces tecum calling for the production of certain categories of documents of the respondent companies covering specified periods of time. On a motion to quash on the grounds, inter alia, that the subpoenas were vague, excessively broad in scope, and oppressive, both the Hearing Examiner and the Board found that the subpoenas described the documents to be produced with sufficient particularity, were reasonable in scope, and were not oppressive. Upon respondents’ continued refusal to honor the subpoenas, petitioner filed this enforcement proceeding. Initially the trial judge continued the cause for 10 days "on condition that respondents . . . make the documents specified in the administrative subpenas . . . available immediately to the representatives of the Civil Aeronautics Board for examination and copying at the usual places of business of the named respondents . . . Upon the expiration of this period, the court, on a showing that respondents had not complied with this condition, entered an order of enforcement allowing “a sufficient length of time between dates for the production of the documents ... so that the respondents will not be deprived of all of their books and records at the same time.” The court found that it could not say “that any of the documents or things called for in any of the subpoenas are immaterial or irrelevant to the proceedings before the Board . . without an examination of each of the items ordered produced. The Court of Appeals reversed, establishing certain procedural requirements the Board must follow before an enforcement proceeding is in order. 237 F. 2d 359.
As we read the order of the District Court, it duly enforced the Board’s right to call for documents relevant to the issues of the Board’s complaint, with appropriate provisions for assuring the minimum interference with the conduct of the business of respondents. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with instructions to reinstate its enforcement order of May 16, 1955. See § 1004 (b), Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1021, as amended, 49 U. S. C. § 644 (b); Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, 142-143 (1928); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501, 509 (1943). Of course this enforcement order leaves open to the respondents ample opportunities for objecting, on relevant grounds, to the admissibility into evidence of any particular document.
It is so ordered. | What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the petitioner of the case. The petitioner is the party who petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case. This party is variously known as the petitioner or the appellant. Characterize the petitioner as the Court's opinion identifies them.
Identify the petitioner by the label given to the party in the opinion or judgment of the Court except where the Reports title a party as the "United States" or as a named state. Textual identification of parties is typically provided prior to Part I of the Court's opinion. The official syllabus, the summary that appears on the title page of the case, may be consulted as well. In describing the parties, the Court employs terminology that places them in the context of the specific lawsuit in which they are involved. For example, "employer" rather than "business" in a suit by an employee; as a "minority," "female," or "minority female" employee rather than "employee" in a suit alleging discrimination by an employer.
Also note that the Court's characterization of the parties applies whether the petitioner is actually single entity or whether many other persons or legal entities have associated themselves with the lawsuit. That is, the presence of the phrase, et al., following the name of a party does not preclude the Court from characterizing that party as though it were a single entity. Thus, identify a single petitioner, regardless of how many legal entities were actually involved. If a state (or one of its subdivisions) is a party, note only that a state is a party, not the state's name. | Who is the petitioner of the case? | [
"attorney general of the United States, or his office",
"specified state board or department of education",
"city, town, township, village, or borough government or governmental unit",
"state commission, board, committee, or authority",
"county government or county governmental unit, except school district",
"court or judicial district",
"state department or agency",
"governmental employee or job applicant",
"female governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority governmental employee or job applicant",
"minority female governmental employee or job applicant",
"not listed among agencies in the first Administrative Action variable",
"retired or former governmental employee",
"U.S. House of Representatives",
"interstate compact",
"judge",
"state legislature, house, or committee",
"local governmental unit other than a county, city, town, township, village, or borough",
"governmental official, or an official of an agency established under an interstate compact",
"state or U.S. supreme court",
"local school district or board of education",
"U.S. Senate",
"U.S. senator",
"foreign nation or instrumentality",
"state or local governmental taxpayer, or executor of the estate of",
"state college or university",
"United States",
"State",
"person accused, indicted, or suspected of crime",
"advertising business or agency",
"agent, fiduciary, trustee, or executor",
"airplane manufacturer, or manufacturer of parts of airplanes",
"airline",
"distributor, importer, or exporter of alcoholic beverages",
"alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose citizenship is revoked",
"American Medical Association",
"National Railroad Passenger Corp.",
"amusement establishment, or recreational facility",
"arrested person, or pretrial detainee",
"attorney, or person acting as such;includes bar applicant or law student, or law firm or bar association",
"author, copyright holder",
"bank, savings and loan, credit union, investment company",
"bankrupt person or business, or business in reorganization",
"establishment serving liquor by the glass, or package liquor store",
"water transportation, stevedore",
"bookstore, newsstand, printer, bindery, purveyor or distributor of books or magazines",
"brewery, distillery",
"broker, stock exchange, investment or securities firm",
"construction industry",
"bus or motorized passenger transportation vehicle",
"business, corporation",
"buyer, purchaser",
"cable TV",
"car dealer",
"person convicted of crime",
"tangible property, other than real estate, including contraband",
"chemical company",
"child, children, including adopted or illegitimate",
"religious organization, institution, or person",
"private club or facility",
"coal company or coal mine operator",
"computer business or manufacturer, hardware or software",
"consumer, consumer organization",
"creditor, including institution appearing as such; e.g., a finance company",
"person allegedly criminally insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial",
"defendant",
"debtor",
"real estate developer",
"disabled person or disability benefit claimant",
"distributor",
"person subject to selective service, including conscientious objector",
"drug manufacturer",
"druggist, pharmacist, pharmacy",
"employee, or job applicant, including beneficiaries of",
"employer-employee trust agreement, employee health and welfare fund, or multi-employer pension plan",
"electric equipment manufacturer",
"electric or hydroelectric power utility, power cooperative, or gas and electric company",
"eleemosynary institution or person",
"environmental organization",
"employer. If employer's relations with employees are governed by the nature of the employer's business (e.g., railroad, boat), rather than labor law generally, the more specific designation is used in place of Employer.",
"farmer, farm worker, or farm organization",
"father",
"female employee or job applicant",
"female",
"movie, play, pictorial representation, theatrical production, actor, or exhibitor or distributor of",
"fisherman or fishing company",
"food, meat packing, or processing company, stockyard",
"foreign (non-American) nongovernmental entity",
"franchiser",
"franchisee",
"lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual person or organization",
"person who guarantees another's obligations",
"handicapped individual, or organization of devoted to",
"health organization or person, nursing home, medical clinic or laboratory, chiropractor",
"heir, or beneficiary, or person so claiming to be",
"hospital, medical center",
"husband, or ex-husband",
"involuntarily committed mental patient",
"Indian, including Indian tribe or nation",
"insurance company, or surety",
"inventor, patent assigner, trademark owner or holder",
"investor",
"injured person or legal entity, nonphysically and non-employment related",
"juvenile",
"government contractor",
"holder of a license or permit, or applicant therefor",
"magazine",
"male",
"medical or Medicaid claimant",
"medical supply or manufacturing co.",
"racial or ethnic minority employee or job applicant",
"minority female employee or job applicant",
"manufacturer",
"management, executive officer, or director, of business entity",
"military personnel, or dependent of, including reservist",
"mining company or miner, excluding coal, oil, or pipeline company",
"mother",
"auto manufacturer",
"newspaper, newsletter, journal of opinion, news service",
"radio and television network, except cable tv",
"nonprofit organization or business",
"nonresident",
"nuclear power plant or facility",
"owner, landlord, or claimant to ownership, fee interest, or possession of land as well as chattels",
"shareholders to whom a tender offer is made",
"tender offer",
"oil company, or natural gas producer",
"elderly person, or organization dedicated to the elderly",
"out of state noncriminal defendant",
"political action committee",
"parent or parents",
"parking lot or service",
"patient of a health professional",
"telephone, telecommunications, or telegraph company",
"physician, MD or DO, dentist, or medical society",
"public interest organization",
"physically injured person, including wrongful death, who is not an employee",
"pipe line company",
"package, luggage, container",
"political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official",
"indigent, needy, welfare recipient",
"indigent defendant",
"private person",
"prisoner, inmate of penal institution",
"professional organization, business, or person",
"probationer, or parolee",
"protester, demonstrator, picketer or pamphleteer (non-employment related), or non-indigent loiterer",
"public utility",
"publisher, publishing company",
"radio station",
"racial or ethnic minority",
"person or organization protesting racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination",
"racial or ethnic minority student or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"realtor",
"journalist, columnist, member of the news media",
"resident",
"restaurant, food vendor",
"retarded person, or mental incompetent",
"retired or former employee",
"railroad",
"private school, college, or university",
"seller or vendor",
"shipper, including importer and exporter",
"shopping center, mall",
"spouse, or former spouse",
"stockholder, shareholder, or bondholder",
"retail business or outlet",
"student, or applicant for admission to an educational institution",
"taxpayer or executor of taxpayer's estate, federal only",
"tenant or lessee",
"theater, studio",
"forest products, lumber, or logging company",
"person traveling or wishing to travel abroad, or overseas travel agent",
"trucking company, or motor carrier",
"television station",
"union member",
"unemployed person or unemployment compensation applicant or claimant",
"union, labor organization, or official of",
"veteran",
"voter, prospective voter, elector, or a nonelective official seeking reapportionment or redistricting of legislative districts (POL)",
"wholesale trade",
"wife, or ex-wife",
"witness, or person under subpoena",
"network",
"slave",
"slave-owner",
"bank of the united states",
"timber company",
"u.s. job applicants or employees",
"Army and Air Force Exchange Service",
"Atomic Energy Commission",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Air Force",
"Department or Secretary of Agriculture",
"Alien Property Custodian",
"Secretary or administrative unit or personnel of the U.S. Army",
"Board of Immigration Appeals",
"Bureau of Indian Affairs",
"Bonneville Power Administration",
"Benefits Review Board",
"Civil Aeronautics Board",
"Bureau of the Census",
"Central Intelligence Agency",
"Commodity Futures Trading Commission",
"Department or Secretary of Commerce",
"Comptroller of Currency",
"Consumer Product Safety Commission",
"Civil Rights Commission",
"Civil Service Commission, U.S.",
"Customs Service or Commissioner of Customs",
"Defense Base Closure and REalignment Commission",
"Drug Enforcement Agency",
"Department or Secretary of Defense (and Department or Secretary of War)",
"Department or Secretary of Energy",
"Department or Secretary of the Interior",
"Department of Justice or Attorney General",
"Department or Secretary of State",
"Department or Secretary of Transportation",
"Department or Secretary of Education",
"U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission, or Commissioner",
"Equal Employment Opportunity Commission",
"Environmental Protection Agency or Administrator",
"Federal Aviation Agency or Administration",
"Federal Bureau of Investigation or Director",
"Federal Bureau of Prisons",
"Farm Credit Administration",
"Federal Communications Commission (including a predecessor, Federal Radio Commission)",
"Federal Credit Union Administration",
"Food and Drug Administration",
"Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Energy Administration",
"Federal Election Commission",
"Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
"Federal Housing Administration",
"Federal Home Loan Bank Board",
"Federal Labor Relations Authority",
"Federal Maritime Board",
"Federal Maritime Commission",
"Farmers Home Administration",
"Federal Parole Board",
"Federal Power Commission",
"Federal Railroad Administration",
"Federal Reserve Board of Governors",
"Federal Reserve System",
"Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation",
"Federal Trade Commission",
"Federal Works Administration, or Administrator",
"General Accounting Office",
"Comptroller General",
"General Services Administration",
"Department or Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare",
"Department or Secretary of Health and Human Services",
"Department or Secretary of Housing and Urban Development",
"Interstate Commerce Commission",
"Indian Claims Commission",
"Immigration and Naturalization Service, or Director of, or District Director of, or Immigration and Naturalization Enforcement",
"Internal Revenue Service, Collector, Commissioner, or District Director of",
"Information Security Oversight Office",
"Department or Secretary of Labor",
"Loyalty Review Board",
"Legal Services Corporation",
"Merit Systems Protection Board",
"Multistate Tax Commission",
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration",
"Secretary or administrative unit of the U.S. Navy",
"National Credit Union Administration",
"National Endowment for the Arts",
"National Enforcement Commission",
"National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
"National Labor Relations Board, or regional office or officer",
"National Mediation Board",
"National Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Nuclear Regulatory Commission",
"National Security Agency",
"Office of Economic Opportunity",
"Office of Management and Budget",
"Office of Price Administration, or Price Administrator",
"Office of Personnel Management",
"Occupational Safety and Health Administration",
"Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission",
"Office of Workers' Compensation Programs",
"Patent Office, or Commissioner of, or Board of Appeals of",
"Pay Board (established under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970)",
"Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation",
"U.S. Public Health Service",
"Postal Rate Commission",
"Provider Reimbursement Review Board",
"Renegotiation Board",
"Railroad Adjustment Board",
"Railroad Retirement Board",
"Subversive Activities Control Board",
"Small Business Administration",
"Securities and Exchange Commission",
"Social Security Administration or Commissioner",
"Selective Service System",
"Department or Secretary of the Treasury",
"Tennessee Valley Authority",
"United States Forest Service",
"United States Parole Commission",
"Postal Service and Post Office, or Postmaster General, or Postmaster",
"United States Sentencing Commission",
"Veterans' Administration",
"War Production Board",
"Wage Stabilization Board",
"General Land Office of Commissioners",
"Transportation Security Administration",
"Surface Transportation Board",
"U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.",
"Reconstruction Finance Corp.",
"Department or Secretary of Homeland Security",
"Unidentifiable",
"International Entity"
] | [
199
] | sc_petitioner |
Subsets and Splits