Filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Chikodi by one Tukaram Shidappa Borgavi alias Teli (since deceased) and his son Mallappa Tukaram Borgavi alis Teli (1st respondent herein) against the appellants for the redemption of certain mortgaged property and possession thereof free from encumbrances and for other ancillary reliefs. The mortgaged property consists of R. S. No. 301 which is Devasthan Inam Lands burdened with the obligation to supply oil for Nand Deep, i.e., keeping a lamp always burning before Shri Tholaba Deity in the village of Nipani. The said property originally belonged to two brothers Shiddappa and Annappa. The khata of the land, however, stood in the name of Shiddappa as the registered occupant under s. 74 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bombay Act V of 1879). The facts material for our present purpose may now be stated. On January 23, 1888, Shiddappa and Annappa executed a usufructuary mortgage (Ex.D-51) in favour of Lalchand Bhavanchand Gujar and Tuljaram Bhavanchand Gujar for Rs. 1,300 made up of Rs. 1,100 due under a previous mortgage and Rs. 200 presently advanced in cash. That deed provided that the mortgage money would be repaid within a period of three years and that the mortgagors would pay the judi and incur the expenses of the Nand Deep and that on failure of the mortgagors to meet the said out goings, the mortgagees would incur the said expenses and add the same to their claim on the mortgage. On March 10, 1900, Shiddappa alone executed a simple mortgage (Ex. D-52) for Rs. 600 in favour of the same mortgagees.
 A part of the consideration for this simple mortgage consisted of moneys borrowed by both the brothers on bonds executed by both of them. This simple mortgage deed provided that the mortgagees would bear the expenses of the Nand Deep and debit the same to the mortgagors in the mortgage account. On March 22, 1900, before the simple mortgage deed was presented for registration, Shidappa, who was the registered occupant, gave a Rajinama under s. 74 of the Bombay Revenue Code recording his desire to submit an unconditional surrender of the above mentioned khata of R. No. 307 from the end of the then current year. On the same day, the mortgagees by a Kabuliyat prayed that the occupancy in the mortgaged property may be granted to them. Both the Rajinama and the Kabuliyat were sanctioned by the Mamlatdar on May 5,1900. Shiddappa having died, Annappa in 1905 applied to the Mamlatdar alleging that the mortgaged property was Devasthan Inam and praying for the cancellation of the transfer in favour of the mortgagees and for placing the mortgaged property in his name. This application was rejected.
 In 1907 Shiddappas son Tukaram (the original first plaintiff herein)and Annappa, the brother of Shiddappa, filed suits against the mortgagees for accounts to be taken under the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act. That suit having been dismissed, they appealed to the District Court, Belgaum, but that appeal was dismissed on March 15, 1909. Annappa again applied for the lands being put in his possession, but that application also was rejected on August 4, 1910. Thereafter, in 1911 Annappa and Tukaram, the brother and son respectively of Shiddappa, filed C. S. No. 362 of 1911 under the same Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act for the same reliefs. That suit was also dismissed and the appeal there from met with a like fate on March 17,1914. In 1922 Annappa died without any issue. The mortgagee Lalchand died issueless and the mortgagee Tuljaram died leaving a son named Lilachand Tuljaram who became entitled to the entire mortgage securities. On November 1, 1937, Tukaram and, his son Ganpat, alleging that they were the legal representatives of both Shiddappa and Annappa, filed Original Suit No. 586 of 1937, out of which this appeal arises, against the appellants Lilachand and his three sons for the redemption of the mortgages. In the written statement the defendants-appellants pleaded that the deceased Shiddappa having sold the mortgaged property to the mortgagees, the equity of redemption became extinguished and that as Shiddappa alone was the registered occupant, the Rajinama given by him, was valid and binding on Annappa. They further alleged that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the deceased Annappa, for the latter had died after having transferred his interests in the mortgaged properties to others.
 It transpires that Annappa died in 1922 after having made and published his last will and testament bequeathing his interest in the mortgaged properties to one Krishna Kallappa, that Krishna Kallappa applied for Letters of Administration in respect of Annappas estate and that in spite of the opposition of Tukaram, Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed was granted to Krishna Kallappa. Krishna Kallappa having died, his four sons were added as party defendants to this suit and then on their own application they were transposed to the category of plaintiffs. The trial Court held that the Rajinama executed by Shiddappa did not extinguish the title of the mortgagors in the mortgaged property, that the plaintiffs were agriculturists, that they were bound to pay the amount also under the simple mortgage and that on taking accounts the mortgages had redeemed themselves. Accordingly the trial court passed a decree for possession declaring that both the mortgages had been satisfied. The mortgagees, defendants 1 to 4, appealed to the District Court, Belgaum, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1940. The District Court held that by the Rajinama, Shiddappa intended to convey the title in the suit land to the mortgagees and hence Shiddappas heirs, the plaintiffs 1 and 2, could not claim redemption of Shiddappas one half share in the suit land. As regards Annappas share, the learned Judge held that the Rajinama had not the effect of transferring the interest of Annappa to the mortgagees and that inasmuch as the mortgages were subsisting, the defendants could not acquire title by adverse possession. In this view he allowed the appeal in part with the result that the suit was dismissed so far as the claims of plaintiffs 1 and 2 were concerned but the claims of plaintiffs 3 to 6 as the legal representatives of Annappa were upheld and they were allowed to redeem Annappas one half share of and in the mortgaged property on payment of one half of the amounts due under the two mortgages. The mortgagee-defendants 1 to 4 appealed to the High Court in Second Appeal No. 754 of 1942 against that part of the decree which rejected their claim to Annappas share and the plaintiffs 1 and 2 also filed Second Appeal No. 1011 of 1942 against the dismissal of their claim for redemption of one half share of Shiddappa in the mortgaged property.
 Both the appeals were disposed of by a common judgment by Weston, J. The learned Judge held that, so far as Shiddappas share was concerned, the Rajinama was a complete relinquishment of his interest, but as regards Annappas share, he agreed with the District Judges conclusion that Shiddappa could not bind Annappas share by the Rajinama and in this view of the matter he dismissed both the appeals. Against this decree both the parties preferred Letters Patent Appeals, namely, L.P.A. No. 22 of 1945 which was filed by defendants 1 to 4 and L.P.A. No. 16 of 1945 which was filed by plaintiffs 1 and 2. The Division Bench dismissed both the appeals. The present plaintiff No. 1, the son of Tukaram (the deceased son of Shiddappa who was the original plaintiff No. 1) has not come up to this Court and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench has become final so far as he is concerned. The High Court having refused to grant leave to appeal to this Court, the mortgagees defendants 1 to 4 applied to and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal against the decision of the Division Bench in so far as it upheld the rejection of their claims to Annappas half share in the mortgaged property. Hence the present appeal. The plaintiffs respondents, who are the legal representatives of Annappa and against whom the present appeal is directed, have not entered appearance in this appeal. Learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal urges that the Rajinama and the Kabuliyat taken together evidenced a transfer of title from the mortgagors to the mortgagees and, therefore, operated to extinguish the equity of redemption not only of Shiddappa but also of Annappa, for there is sufficient evidence on record that Shiddappa was the manager and karta of the joint family and that in the matter of passing the Rajinama he had acted in that capacity and, therefore, the Rajinama was binding on his brother Annappa.
 As pointed out by the Division Bench in their judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal, this case of Shiddappa having acted as karta was nowhere made by the defendants-appellants in their written statement and, in agreement with the High Court, we declined to allow learned advocate for the appellants to make out such a new case. This case being thus out of the way, learned advocate for the appellants urges that under s. 74 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, as Shiddappa was the registered occupant, the Rajinama filed by him operated upon the entire occupancy and amounted to a relinquishment of the rights of both the brothers Shiddappa and Annappa. Section 74 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act, as it stood at all material times, ran as follows An occupant may, by giving written notice to the Mamlatdar or Mahalkari, relinquish his occupancy, either absolutely or in favour of a specified person provided that such relinquishment applied to the entire occupancy or to whole survey numbers, or recognized shares of Survey Numbers. An absolute relinquishment shall be deemed to to have effect from the close of the current year, and notice thereof must be given before the 31st March in such year, or before such other date as may be from time to time prescribed in this behalf for each district by the Governor in Council. A relinquishment in favour of a specified person may be made at any time. When there are more occupants than one, the notice of relinquishment must be given by the registered occupant and the person, if any, in whose favour an occupancy is relinquished, or, if such occupancy is relinquished in favour of more persons than one, the principal of such persons, must enter into a written agreement to become the registered occupant, and his name shall thereupon be substituted in the records for that of the previous registered occupant. Reliance is placed on the concluding paragraph of the section which provides that when a relinquishment is made in favour of more persons than one the principal one of such persons must enter into a written agreement to become the registered occupant and his name shall thereupon be substituted in the records for that of the previous registered occupant.
 This provision, it is said, makes it clear that so far as the revenue authorities are concerned, it is the registered occupant who represents the entire occupancy and the fact that the notice of relinquishment must, under the section, be given by the registered occupant also supports the contention that the Rajinama passed by the registered occupant binds all the occupants. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The concluding paragraph of the section clearly recognises that a relinquishment may be in favour of more persons than one. It is true that the principal one of such persons must enter into a written agreement to become the registered occupant. This is for facilitating the purpose of the Code but it does not mean that the other persons in whose favour the occupancy is relinquished cease to have any right. That their right as occupants remains is clearly recognised by the opening paragraph of the section which gives an occupant a right to relinquish his occupancy either absolutely or in favour of a specified person. This right is given to all occupants, if there are more than one, for the singular includes the plural. It is true that where there are more occupants than one, the notice of relinquishment on behalf of any occupant must be given by the registered occupant. That does not mean, in the absence of any specific pleading and cogent proof, that a notice of relinquishment given by the registered occupant must necessarily be a notice on behalf of all occupants or any particular occupant other than the registered occupant, or that the registered occupant has the right to give such a notice without reference to the other occupants so as to effect their interest in the occupancy.
 Turning to the Rajinama, it is clear that Shiddappa did not purport to file, the same on behalf of Annappa nor had he any right to do so by reason only of his being the registered occupant. In Lalchand Sakharam Marwadi v. Khendu Kedu Ughade (1) one out of four brother mortgagors, who was the registered occupant of the mortgage land, passed a Rajinama of the land in favour of the mortgagee, who executed a Kabuliyat for the same. The remaining three mortgagors sued to redeem the mortgage alleging that the Rajinama passed by their brother conveyed only his interest and nothing more. It was held that though the conveying brother was a co-mortgagor with the plaintiffs, he had no right to sell their interest in the equity of redemption and that, so far as they, were concerned, he was in the same position as an outsider. It is true that no specific reference was made in the judgment to s. 74 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, but the actual decision in that case, the facts of which are very similar to those of the instant case, quite clearly indicates the courts understanding of the law applicable to those facts and that law was nothing but the provisions of s. 74 of the Code. In our opinion, on a correct interpretation of s. 74, where there are more occupants than one in respect of the same occupancy each occupant has his own rights and the fact of registration of one of them as the registered occupant attracts the operation of the Code and confers certain rights or imposes certain obligations on the registered occupant as laid down in the Code but does not take away the rights of other occupants.
 It is true that if any of the occupants other than the registered occupant desires to relinquish his occupancy. he cannot himself give a notice of relinquishment but must give it by and through the registered occupant Nevertheless the registered occupant, in the absence of any authority, express or implied, to be clearly pleaded and strictly proved, has no inherent or independent (1) 22 Bom L.R. 1431, right to give any such notice so as to affect the interests of the other occupants.
DECISION ??

Shiddappa alone executed a simple mortgage (Ex. D-52) for Rs. 600 in favour of the same mortgagees.
 A part of the consideration for this simple mortgage consisted of moneys borrowed by both the brothers on bonds executed by both of them.

Shidappa, who was the registered occupant, gave a Rajinama under s. 74 of the Bombay Revenue Code recording his desire to submit an unconditional surrender of the above mentioned khata of R. No. 307 from the end of the then current year.

On the same day, the mortgagees by a Kabuliyat prayed that the occupancy in the mortgaged property may be granted to them. Both the Rajinama and the Kabuliyat were sanctioned by the Mamlatdar on May 5,1900.

It is true that where there are more occupants than one, the notice of relinquishment on behalf of any occupant must be given by the registered occupant

Turning to the Rajinama, it is clear that Shiddappa did not purport to file, the same on behalf of Annappa nor had he any right to do so by reason only of his being the registered occupant

for Rs. 600 in favour of the same mortgagees.
 A part of the consideration for this simple mortgage consisted of moneys borrowed by both the brothers on bonds executed by both of them

This simple mortgage deed provided that the mortgagees would bear the expenses of the Nand Deep and debit the same to the mortgagors in the mortgage account.

S. No. 362 of 1911 under the same Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act for the same reliefs. That suit was also dismissed and the appeal there from met with a like fate on March 17,1914.

In 1922 Annappa died without any issue. The mortgagee Lalchand died issueless and the mortgagee Tuljaram died leaving a son named Lilachand Tuljaram who became entitled to the entire mortgage securities

The mortgaged property consists of R. S. No. 301 which is Devasthan Inam Lands burdened with the obligation to supply oil for Nand Deep, i.e., keeping a lamp always burning before Shri Tholaba Deity in the village of Nipani

The said property originally belonged to two brothers Shiddappa and Annappa. The khata of the land, however, stood in the name of Shiddappa as the registered occupant under s. 74 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879

The present plaintiff No. 1, the son of Tukaram (the deceased son of Shiddappa who was the original plaintiff No. 1) has not come up to this Court and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench has become final so far as he is concerned.

Turning to the Rajinama, it is clear that Shiddappa did not purport to file, the same on behalf of Annappa nor had he any right to do so by reason only of his being the registered occupant.

We are unable to accept this argument as correct.

That their right as occupants remains is clearly recognised by the opening paragraph of the section which gives an occupant a right to relinquish his occupancy either absolutely or in favour of a specified person.

This right is given to all occupants, if there are more than one, for the singular includes the plural.

Accordingly the trial court passed a decree for possession declaring that both the mortgages had been satisfied.

The District Court held that by the Rajinama, Shiddappa intended to convey the title in the suit land to the mortgagees and hence Shiddappas heirs, the plaintiffs 1 and 2, could not claim redemption of Shiddappas one half share in the suit land.

The Division Bench dismissed both the appeals.

The plaintiffs respondents, who are the legal representatives of Annappa and against whom the present appeal is directed, have not entered appearance in this appeal.

In Lalchand Sakharam Marwadi v. Khendu Kedu Ughade

It was held that though the conveying brother was a co-mortgagor with the plaintiffs, he had no right to sell their interest in the equity of redemption and that, so far as they, were concerned, he was in the same position as an outsider.

Both the Rajinama and the Kabuliyat were sanctioned by the Mamlatdar on May 5,1900.

They further alleged that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the deceased Annappa, for the latter had died after having transferred his interests in the mortgaged properties to others.

The mortgagees, defendants 1 to 4, appealed to the District Court, Belgaum, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 322 of 1940.

Against this decree both the parties preferred Letters Patent Appeals, namely, L.P.A.

The mortgaged property consists of R. S. No. 301 which is Devasthan Inam Lands burdened with the obligation to supply oil for Nand Deep, i.e., keeping a lamp always burning before Shri Tholaba Deity in the village of Nipani.

On March 10, 1900, Shiddappa alone executed a simple mortgage (Ex. D-52) for Rs. 600 in favour of the same mortgagees.

This simple mortgage deed provided that the mortgagees would bear the expenses of the Nand Deep and debit the same to the mortgagors in the mortgage account.

it does not mean that the other persons in whose favour the occupancy is relinquished cease to have any right.

this case of Shiddappa having acted as karta was nowhere made by the defendants-appellants in their written statement and, in agreement with the High Court, we declined to allow learned advocate for the appellants to make out such a new case.

It is true that the principal one of such persons must enter into a written agreement to become the registered occupant.

This is for facilitating the purpose of the Code

It is true that if any of the occupants other than the registered occupant desires to relinquish his occupancy. he cannot himself give a notice of relinquishment but must give it by and through the registered occupant

The concluding paragraph of the section clearly recognises that a relinquishment may be in favour of more persons than one.


The appellants-companies, the employers, in these sugar industries also challenge the correctness of the order made by the Industrial Tribunal and confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal awarding the workmen attending the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal, wages, travelling allowance and halting allowance and further directing that the workmen attending these proceedings would be treated on special leave with pay for the period of such attendance. As regards these orders the appellants contend that they run counter to the pronouncements of this Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi (1). This contention, we are bound to say, is correct. Whatever might have been said in support of the view taken by the Tribunals in ordering payment of these allowances and of granting special leave to workmen attending proceedings of necessity, if the question was res integra we are bound by the authority of Punjab National Banks Case (1) to (1) 1957 S.C.R. 220. hold that no such allowances are payable and no such order garanting leave may be made. The order of the Tribunals below allowing travelling allowance and balting allowance and special leave to workmen attending proceedings of necessity, must therefore be set aside.
 Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants, however, has undertaken on their behalf that no restitution will be claimed of allowances which have already been paid. This brings us to the main question in controversy in these appeals. That question is whether retaining allowance should be paid to unskilled workers in these industries during the off season. Disputes over this question have been going on for many years and committee after committee has wrestled with the problem for arriving at a formula acceptable to both employers and labourers but in vain. In 1950 a reference as ultimately made to Mr. Justice B. P. Sinha (as he then was) as regards these disputes about retaining allowance. The award made by him provided for retaining allowance to skilled and semiskilled workmen but none to unskilled workmen. Before the Appellate Tribunal who heard the appeal against that award the labourers and employers came to an agreement that no retaining allowance would be payable to the unskilled workmen. This award was in operation for a period of two years but was thereafter determined by notice given by workmen followed up by similar notice by employers.
 The reference out of which the present appeals arise included several other matters besides retaining allowance to seasonal employees, but with those we are no longer concerned in these appeals. Nor are we concerned with the question of retaining allowance to skilled and semiskilled workmen as that part of the award was not disputed by the present appellants. On the question of retaining allowance the main contentions on behalf of the employers were that agriculture was the primary occupation of these persons and the employment in the sugar factory was merely a subsidiary occupation, that the claim for retaining allowance was really in the nature of unemployment relief which it was the duty of the State and not the industry to give, that the relationship between the employers and these employees does not exist in off season and so no payment of anything in tile character of wages could possibly be claimed by the labour. The Tribunal overruled all these objections. It was of opinion that the working season in the factory completely covers the paddy harvesting season in North Bihar, where most of the factories are situated so that the workmen the bulk of whom belong to the landless labourers class in the rural areas do not obtain employment in the off season.
 It also pointed out that the seasonal employees are entitled to provident fund, gratuity and also bonus and that their connection with the employers is not broken during the off season. Accordingly it awarded retaining allowance of 5 to all unskilled employees-to be paid every year at the beginning of the season when they report themselves to duty. In agreeing with the Tribunals conclusion the Appellate Tribunal pointed out further that the grant of seasonal allowance to unskilled labour in the industry would promote stability, good relations and efficiency. The question whether the retaining allowance should be paid to seasonal workers during the off season is one of great complexity. A measure of the complexity is provided by the conflict in the view expressed by many committees who examined the matter. While it will serve no useful purpose to set out these different views and the reasons given in support thereof, it is proper to mention that with the exception of the Labour Enquiry Committee no committee ever recommended payment of retaining allowance to unskilled workmen, though several of these recommended payment of such allowance to skilled and semi-skilled workmen. When the matter comes before the Tribunals for adjudication they have to decide the matter on the materials before them and it is not possible to derive much assistance from these reports of the committees.
 The real difficulty in coming to a conclusion lies in the fact that while there is no doubt on the one hand of the plight of the seasonal workmen during the off season, if they during such period remain prartically unemployed, there is some force also in the argument that it is neither just nor fair to treat these unfortunate people as the special responsibility of the particular industry or the factory where they are seasonally employed. It is difficult not to agree with the opinion that the relief of unemployment by arranging suitable alternative employment or an alleviation of the distress of such seasonally unemployed persons by providing unemployment insurance benefits or by other modes is primarily the function of the government of the country. To say that, is, however, not to say that the industry where they are seasonally employed should look on unconcerned and play no part in alleviating the distress of the people who have contributed to the prosperity of the industry by their labour, even though for only a part of the year. While these considerations on either side are common to claims for retaining allowance for all seasonal workmen in all industries, the special facts and circumstances of the categories of workmen and different local circumstances in different industries play an important part in deciding the question. Thus skilled and semi-skilled workers have often been able to put forward a strong case by pointing out that the specialized skill acquired by them makes it difficult for them to obtain suitable alternative employment in the off season. Employers also often find it to their own interest to pay such categories of workmen, some retaining allowance as an inducement to them to return to their factories when the season commences. In the present appeals we are concerned with the case of unskilled workmen only.
 It is obvious as has been noticed by both the Tribunals below, that the employers feel that there is such a glut in the supply of unskilled labour in Bihar that retaining allowance or no retaining allowance a sufficient supply will be available for the industries. That is why the employers contend that they ought not to be asked in an industrial adjudication to pay retaining allowance to unskilled labour. We do no think it will be fair to say that merely because the employers have agreed to pay retaining allowance to skilled labour their opposition to such payment of some such allowance to unskilled labour is unjustified. In deciding whether the principles of social justice which it is the aim of industrial adjudication to apply justify the payment of retaining allowance to unskilled workmen in these sugar industries, it is necessary to take into account (a) the opportunities of alternative employment in the off season that will be available to such workmen (b) the degree in which such workmen can be said to have become attached to the particular factory where they work (c) the likely benefit to the industry if such workmen are induced to return to the factory by the incentive of retaining allowance to be paid when the season commences (d) the capacity of the industry to bear the burden of retaining allowance.
 The capacity of the appellant-employers to bear the additional burden resultant from the 5 retaining allowance ordered by the Tribunals below has not been disputed before us. The position is however far from clear as regards the existence of alternative opportunities available to unskilled labour in the Off season. It was found, and we must proceed on the basis, rightly found, that the working season of the sugar industry in North Bihar where most of the factories concerned in the present-appeals are situated, completely covers the paddy harvesting season. That however is slender material for any conclusion as regards the existence of opportunities of alternative employment for these unskilled workmen. The appellate Tribunal has said that the grant of seasonal allowance to unskilled labour in the industry will promote stability, good relations and efficiency. Except in so far as this conclusion is based on the general probability that newly recruited labour at the commencement of the season is likely to be less efficient and less disciplined than men who have worked in previous seasons, this does not appear to have been based on any concrete evidence on the point.
 Nor is it clear from the materials on the record that unskilled workmen employed in a particular factory consider themselves attached to, that factory. It appears to be clear that once the season is over the unskilled workmen cease to have any contractual relations with the employers and may rejoin on the com- mencement of the season or may not rejoin at their sweet will. As regards the observations of the Tribunal that seasonal employees are entitled to the benefit of provident fund, gratuity and also bonus which shows that in fact their connection with the employers is not broken the materials on the record Are too scanty for arriving at any definite conclusion. In consideration of the nature and extent of the materials on the record we are of opinion that for alleviating the distress of unskilled workmen in these sugar factories, with whom we are concerned in the present appeals a much better course will be to raise the wage structure with an eye to this fact that for a part of the off season at least when they remain unemployed than to pay a retaining allowance for the entire off season.
 The appellants counsel readily agrees that the fact that these unskilled workmen find employment in the sugar factories only for a few months and are in comparative difficulty in the matter of finding employment during the remaining months, should be taken into consideration in fixing their wages. We are informed that a Wage Board entrusted with the task of fixing the wages of the workmen concerned in these disputes is sitting at the present time. The interests of both the employers and labour will, we think, be best served if instead of confirming the order made by the Appellate Tribunal as regards the retaining allowance the workmen will raise this question of raising their wages in view of the seasonal nature of their employment before this Wage Board.
DECISION ??

As regards these orders the appellants contend that they run counter to the pronouncements of this Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi (1).

This contention, we are bound to say, is correct.

That question is whether retaining allowance should be paid to unskilled workers in these industries during the off season.

question is whether retaining allowance should be paid to unskilled workers in these industries during the off season.

In agreeing with the Tribunals conclusion the Appellate Tribunal pointed out further that the grant of seasonal allowance to unskilled labour in the industry would promote stability, good relations and efficiency

The order of the Tribunals below allowing travelling allowance and balting allowance and special leave to workmen attending proceedings of necessity, must therefore be set aside.

This contention, we are bound to say, is correct.

The award made by him provided for retaining allowance to skilled and semiskilled workmen but none to unskilled workmen.

It also pointed out that the seasonal employees are entitled to provident fund, gratuity and also bonus and that their connection with the employers is not broken during the off season.

Accordingly it awarded retaining allowance of 5 to all unskilled employees-to be paid every year at the beginning of the season when they report themselves to duty.

In agreeing with the Tribunals conclusion the Appellate Tribunal pointed out further that the grant of seasonal allowance to unskilled labour in the industry would promote stability, good relations and efficiency.

The capacity of the appellant-employers to bear the additional burden resultant from the 5 retaining allowance ordered by the Tribunals below has not been disputed before us.

As regards these orders the appellants contend that they run counter to the pronouncements of this Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal, Delhi (1).

Disputes over this question have been going on for many years and committee after committee has wrestled with the problem for arriving at a formula acceptable to both employers and labourers but in vain.

the opportunities of alternative employment in the off season that will be available to such workmen

Nor is it clear from the materials on the record that unskilled workmen employed in a particular factory consider themselves attached to, that factory.

while there is no doubt on the one hand of the plight of the seasonal workmen during the off season, if they during such period remain prartically unemployed


The brief facts necessary for present purposes are that the appellant was appointed as a foot- constable in 1931 in the Punjab Police and was dismissed on January 25, 1944. Shortly before, he was acting as an Assistant Sub-Inspector and actually working as a Police Censor. The charge against him was that while he was working as Police Censor, he detained certain letters illegally and had copies and photo- graphs made of them and later used these copies and photographs for blackmail. He was consequently reverted to his substantive post of head constable on January 14, 1944. Thereafter on January 21, 1944, an enquiry was started against him by the Superintendent of Police and he was eventually dismissed. He went in appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, which was dismissed. He then went in revision to the Inspector General of Police, which also failed.
 Finally he made several representations and memorials to the Punjab Government but without avail. Consequently the present suit was filed by the appellant in February 1949. The plaint as originally filed, after narrating the facts relating to the appellants service, merely stated that the charge of misconduct was brought against the appellant on account of enmity and that the departmental enquiry made by the Superintendent of Police was arbitrary and not according to law, rules and regulations prescribed for the same. Besides this vague general allegation, the only specific grievance made out by the appellant in the plaint was that the Superintendent of Police had dismissed him without recording his defence evidence and without giving him an opportunity to produce the same. The appellant amended the plaint later and added one more grievance, namely, that he had been appointed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police and could only have been dismissed by him and not by the Superintendent of Police.
 As to the Departmental enquiry, certain further defects therein were pointed out besides the allegation already made that his defence had not been taken and that he had not been given an opportunity to produce it. Those further defects were (i) that he was not permitted to engage counsel, (ii) that he was not allowed full opportunity to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses, and
 that he was not asked by the enquiry officer to state what he had to say in answer to the charge against him and was not permitted to file a written-statement explaining the alleged incriminating circumstances against him. The suit was opposed on behalf of the Punjab Government and among others their main defence was that the enquiry was in accordance with the Regulations and was not arbitrary. It was also denied that no opportunity had been given to the appellant to lead defence evidence or to cross-examine prosecution witnesses or to make his own statement in answer to the charge. It was admitted that permission was refused to engage a counsel but it was finally averred that taking the enquiry as a whole there was no such defect in its conduct as to invalidate it or call for interference by the courts. Three issues, all of a general nature, were framed by the trial court, namely-- Whether the plaintiffs dismissal is void, illegal, inoperative and wrongful and what is its effect ? Whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to go into the question of the validity of the departmental enquiry ? Whether the suit for a declaration lies and is competent and why ? It is unfortunate that the specific points raised by the appellant whatever they were were not made the subject- matter of specific issues. However, the trial court came to the conclusion that the case of the appellant was governed by s. 240(3) of the Government India Act, 1935 and it was reinforced in this conclusion by the Police Regulations which, according to it, provided for the same safeguards as were contained in s. 240(3). It therefore held that as s. 240(3) had not been complied with, the dismissal was void and illegal As to the other two issues relating to the jurisdiction of civil courts they were decided in favour of the appellant.
 There was an appeal to the District Judge by the Punjab Government. The District Judge agreed with the conclusions of the trial court on the applicability of s. 240(3) to the case of the appellant and further referred to an amendment in the Police Regulations which required that before an order of dismissal or reduction in rank is made, the officer to be punished shall be produced before the officer empowered to punish him and shall be informed of the charges proved against him and called upon to show cause why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed. The District Judge was conscious that this amendment in the Regulations was made in September 1946 long after the dismissal of the appellant and therefore would not apply to the appellants case but he overruled this contention on the ground that the rule was merely declaratory of the law and only removed the ambiguity that might have arisen because of s. 243 of the Government of India Act. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
 Then followed a second appeal by the Punjab Government to the High Court. The High Court held that s. 240(3) did Dot apply to the case of the appellant and that s. 243 was the governing section. In consequence the High Court further held that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of s. 240(3) and as the amendment to the Police Regulations which brought in the substance of s. 240(3) therein was made after the dismissal of the appellant, he could not take advantage of it. As to the enquiry, the High Court held that though there might have been minor procedural defects in the enquiry it was on the whole substantially in accordance with the Regulations and principles of natural justice and could not therefore be held to be invalid. The High Court pointed out that there was no serious contraven- tion of the Regulations and the witnesses who had appeared were cross-examined by the appellant who was also called upon to produce his defence within 48 hours. He however did not choose to do so and wanted a postponement which was refused and thereafter the Superintendent of Police proceeded to dismiss him. Learned counsel for the appellant challenges the cor- erectness of the view taken by the High Court and three points have been urged on his behalf before us, namely, (1) s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act applied to police officers of subordinate rank and there was nothing in s. 243 which took away from such officers the protection of s. 240(3) (2) Even if the Police Regulations alone applied, there was such violation of the relevant regulations as to vitiate the enquiry proceedings and (3) The Superintendent of Police could not hold a departmental enquiry as a criminal offence had been committed, and reliance in this connection was placed on ss. 29 and 35 of the Police Act, No. V of 1861. Re. (1). Section 243 of the Government of India Act appears in Chapter 11 of Part X dealing with Civil Services.
 That Chapter begins with s. 240 and sub-s. (3) thereof provides that no member of a civil service or holding any civil post in India shall be dismissed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Section 243 however is in these terms- Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks of the various police forces in India shall be such as may be determined by or under the Act relating to those forces respectively. Obviously s. 243 was a special provision with regard to subordinate ranks of police forces in India and it is not in dispute that the appellant belonged to the subordinate ranks. Therefore according to s. 243, the conditions of service of the subordinate ranks are governed by or under the Acts relating to police forces and s. 240(3) can have no application to them. The non obstante clause of s. 243 makes it clear that so far as the subordinate ranks of police forces in India are concerned, a. 243 will apply and not the earlier provisions including s. 240(3). We are therefore of opinion that in view of the special provisions in s. 243 relating to the subordinate ranks of police forces in India (to which the appellant undoubtedly belonged), s. 240(3) would have no application.
 We may in this connection refer to the judgment of the Privy Council in North- West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (1), where it was held that the non obstante clause in s. 243 excluded the operation of s. 240(2) in the case of subordinate ranks of police forces in India and that conditions of service included the right of dismissal. (1) 1948 F.C.R. 103. That case dealt with s. 240(2) but the same reasoning would in our opinion apply to s. 240(3). As has already been pointed out by the learned District Judge, the substance of s. 240(3) was brought into the Police Regulations in September 1946 long after the appellant had been dismissed and would therefore not apply to the appellant. He would therefore not be entitled to the second notice under s. 240(3) as explained in I. M. Lalls case by the Privy Council (See High Commissioner for India High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lall (1)). Nor was such notice necessary under the Police Regulations as they existed at the time of the appellants dismissal.
DECISION ??

Whether the suit for a declaration lies and is competent and why ?

There was an appeal to the District Judge by the Punjab Government.

Then followed a second appeal by the Punjab Government to the High Court.

and photo- graphs made of them and later used these copies and photographs for blackmail.

He went in appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, which was dismissed.

He then went in revision to the Inspector General of Police, which also failed.

Whether the suit for a declaration lies and is competent and why ?

Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this chapter

it is not in dispute that the appellant belonged to the subordinate ranks.


Against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The question there raised was the legality of the assessment of Sales Tax by appellant No. 2, the Deputy Commercial Sales Tax Officer, Saidapet, under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Act IX of 1939), hereinafter termed the Act. The respondent was a partnership firm carrying on tannery business at Chromepet near the city of Madras. Before the year of assessment, i. e., 1952-53, it was taking out licences under the relevant provisions of the Act but it did not renew the licence for the assessment year. When called upon to make a return it did not do so nor did it raise any objection to the notice served on it on February 28, 1954. It was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 10,584 on a turnover of Rs. 6,77,374-4-4. It filed a petition under Art. 226 to quash the assessment order on the ground that the order was illegal and not supported by the authority of law. This contention was accepted by the High Court and the petition was allowed with costs. The consequence of the judgment is that the respondent firm which is not a licensed dealer under the Act is not liable to any sales tax in respect of its dealings in hides and skins.
 Against this judgment and order the appellants have come to this court by special leave. The contention of the respondent firm in the High Court was that under s. 5, cl. (vi) of the Act, the liability to pay sales tax in respect of hides and skins could only be at a single point that the rule limiting the operation of this mode of taxation to licensed dealers was ultra vires and therefore r. 16(5) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939, hereinafter called the Turnover and Assessment Rules, was void and inoperative and had been. so held by the Supreme Court in V. M. Syed Mohammed Co. v. The State of Madras(1) that accepting this interpretation the State of Madras had deleted cl. (5) of r. 16 by G. 0. 450, Revenue, dated February 26, 1954, i.e., two days before the making of the assessment order under dispute that r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules was the only provision imposing a multiple tax in respect of sales of hides and skins by unlicensed dealers and that the imposition of the sales tax after the repeal of that rule was illegal and the tax was without the authority of law.
 It was also contended that in the taxation scheme under the Act, hides and skins, because of their importance in the international market, were excluded from the direct operation of s. 3(1) of the Act which was the general charging section and were given special protection of the single point taxation under s. 5(vi). The (1) 1954 S.C.R. 1117. argument, therefore, was that in the case of sales of hides and skins the general provision was inapplicable and a special rule for taxation was laid down by s. 5(vi) of the Act. The High Court held that in the case of hides and it skins the charge levied by s. 3 is subject to the pro. visions of S. 5 and in the case of licensed dealers in hides and skins, the charging provision is r. 16 of the Turnover and Assessment Rules . The High Court further held that r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules which restricted the benefit of single point taxation to licensed dealers was ultra vires as it contravened s. 5(vi) of the Act and s. 6-A was not applicable to the case of a dealer who did not take out a licence for dealing in hides and skins and further that if r. 16(5) was ultra vires as being in contravention of s. 5(vi), r. 5, of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules (hereinafter called the Sales Tax Rules) which requires the taking out of the licence in order to be able to get the benefit of single point taxation would also be ultra vires. Thus on a true construction of s. 3(1) and s. 5(vi) it was of the opinion that r. 5 of the Sales Tax Rules and r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules were ultra vires and s. 6A was inapplicable to a person who had not taken out a licence. As a consequence it quashed the order of assessment of the respondent firm. In order to decide this appeal it is necessary to refer to and consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the two sets of Rules made thereunder. They are as follows- S. 3(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,- (a) every dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total turnover for such year and A dealer whose total turnover in any year is less than ten thousand rupees shall not be liable to pay any tax for that year under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). For the purposes of this section and the other provisions of this Act, turnover shall be determined in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed
 The taxes under sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be assessed, levied and collected in such manner and in such instalments, if any, as may be prescribed S. 5. Subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, including conditions as to licences and licence fees. the sale of hides and skins, whether tanned or untanned shall be liable to tax under section 3, subsection (1), only at such single point in the series of sales by successive dealers as may be prescribed. S. 6A. If any restrictions or conditions prescribed under section 5 or notified under section 6 are contravened or are not observed by a dealer, or in case a condition so prescribed or notified requires that a licence shall be taken out or renewed, if a licence is not taken out or renewed, by the dealer or if any of the conditions of a licence taken out or renewed by him are contravened or are not observed, the sales of the dealer, with effect from the commencement of the year in which such contravention or non- observance took place, may be assessed to tax or taxes under section 3, as if the provisions of section 5 or of the notification under section 6, as the case may be, did not apply to such sales and notwithstanding that a licence, if any, taken out or renewed by the dealer continued or continues to be in force during the year . MADRAS GENERAL SALES TAX (TURNOVER AND ASSESSMENT) RULES. Rule 4(1). Save as provided in sub-rule (2) the gross turnover of a dealer for the purposes of these rules shall be the amount for which goods are sold by the dealer. In the case of the undermentioned goods turnover of a dealer for the purposes of these rules shall be the amount for which the goods are bought by the dealer. (c) untanned hides and skins bought by a licensed tanner in the State, and (d) untanned hides and skins exported outside the State by a licensed dealer in hides or skins. Rule 15(1). Rules 6 to 13 shall not apply to licensed tanners and other licensed dealers in hides or skins in respect of their dealings in hides or skins but the provisions of this and the following rule shall apply to them in respect of such dealings. Rule 16(1). In the case of hides and skins, the tax payable under section 3(1) shall be levied in accordance with the provisions of this rule. No tax shall be levied on the sale of untanned hides or skins by a licensed dealer in hides or skins except at the stage at which such hides or skins are sold to a tanner in the State or are sold for export outside the State in the case of all untanned hides or skins sold to a tanner in the State, the tax shall be levied from the tanner on the amount for which the hides or skins are bought by him.
 In the case of all untanned hides or skins which are not sold to a tanner in the State but are exported outside the State, the tax shall be levied from the dealer who was the last dealer not exempt from taxation under section 3(3), who buys them in the State on the amount for which they were bought by him. Sale of hides or skins by dealers other than licensed dealers in hides or skins shall,subject to the provisions of section 3, be liable to taxation on each occasion of sale. Rule 5(1) of the ax Rules provides - Every person who (d) deals in hides and or skins whether as a tanner, or otherwise, or shall, if he desires to avail himself of the exemption provided in sections 5 and 8 or of the concession of single point taxation provided in section 6, submit an application in Form 1 for a licence in respect of each of his places of business to the authority specified in sub- rule (2) so as to reach him not later than the 15th day of October, 1939 . The scheme of taxation under the Act is this. Section 3 is the general charging section under which tax is levied in the manner prescribed in the turnover of a dealer, except that a dealer whose turnover is less than Rs. 10,000/- is exempted from sales tax.
 Section 3 envisages multipoint taxation on the total turnover of a dealer. In the case of the sale transactions of certain specified goods set out in s. 5 of the Act an exception is made. That section provides for single point taxation subject to certain prescribed restrictions and conditions. By sub-s. (vi) of that section sales of hides and skins are liable to tax under s.3, sub-s. (1), at one single point in the series of sales by successive dealers. The language of the section (s.5) shows however that this exemption applies subject to certain restrictions and conditions which include conditions as to licences. The rule, which deals with licences is r. 5 of the Sales Tax Rules, the relevant portion of which has already been set out It lays down that if a dealer desires to avail himself of the exemption provided in ss. 5 and 8 or of the concession as to taxation in s. 5 only at a single point, then he must obtain a licence as prescribed in that rule. If the restrictions and conditions contemplated by s. 5 read with the rules are not complied with, certain consequences follow as a result of s. 6-A of the Act which specifically states that where a condition prescribed or notified requires the taking out or the renewal of a licence, then in the case of contravention of such conditions or restrictions the tax is to be levied under s. 3 as if the provisions of s. 5 did not apply to such sales.
 This, therefore, is a clear provision which makes the single point imposition of sales tax on hides and skins to be conditional on observing the condition of taking a licence. The argument of inconsistency between r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules and s. 5(vi) of the Act which was accepted in the High Court receives no support from the language of that section which is a concessional provision for making the sales of hides and skins liable to taxation at a single point but that, as the opening words of the section show, is subject to restrictions and conditions prescribed in the rules and one of these conditions is the taking of a licence. All that r. 16(5) does is to emphasise the consequences of non- observance of the conditions which ss. 5(vi) 6-A have in clear terms prescribed. We find no inconsistency between the rule and the sections of the Act. But it was submitted that this Court on appeal from a judgment of the Madras High Court had sId r. 16(5) to be ultra vires the Act. That contention is based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in V. M. Syed Mohammed Company v. The State of Madras (1) which on appeal was affirmed by this Court (2).
 This contention is not well-founded. In that case, when it was in the Madras High Court, it was contended that the rules did not properly carry out the policy underlying the Act, which was to keep the price of hides and skins at a competitive level for the world market. It was there argued that hides and skins were articles much in demand in the foreign markets and their export was one of the main items of the foreign trade of the State of Madras which enjoyed considerable natural advantage in tanning because of the plentiful supply of Avaram bark which was specially suited for the purpose. It was also argued that untanned hides and skins were acquired locally or by import from other States and were either tanned in the State or exported and therefore the scheme of taxation was to levy the tax at a single point, i.e., at the stage when articles were tanned in the State or exported to foreign countries for tanning. For this reason multiple taxation was violative of s. 5(vi) of the Act. This, it appears, was not disputed by the Government and it was therefore held that r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules was ultra vires. But the question was really (1) (1952) 3 S.T.C. 367. V. M. Syed Mohammed and Company v. The State of Andhra, 1954 S.C.R. 1117. not relevant to the issue as was pointed out by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., at p. 394, where he said- Now the contention of the petitioners is that where there are sales by unlicensed dealers to unlicensed tanners or unlicensed dealers, there is the possibility of multiple taxation and that would be in violation of section 5(vi). It is not disputed on behalf of the Government that Rule 16(5) is repugnant to section 5(vi).
 It must therefore be held to be ultra vires. But this can bring no relief to the petitioners, as they are all licensed tanners and are in no manner hurt by the operation of r. 16(5). This was conceded by the learned Advocate for the petitioners . This case was then brought in appeal to this Court and S. R. Das, J. (as he then was), observed at p. 1121- Lastly, the learned advocate urges that rule 16 (5) clearly contravenes the provisions of section 5(vi) of the Act. This sub-rule has been held to be ultra vires by the High Court, and indeed, the learned Advocate General of Madras did not in the High Court, as before us, dispute that rule 16(5) was repugnant to ,section 5(vi). That sub-rule, however affects only unlicensed dealers and the appellants who are admittedly licensed dealers are not affected by that sub-rule .
DECISION ??

We find no inconsistency between the rule and the sections of the Act.

In order to decide this appeal it is necessary to refer to and consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the two sets of Rules made thereunder.

In order to decide this appeal it is necessary to refer to and consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the two sets of Rules made thereunder

It is not disputed on behalf of the Government that Rule 16(5) is repugnant to section 5(vi).
 It must therefore be held to be ultra vires

But this can bring no relief to the petitioners, as they are all licensed tanners and are in no manner hurt by the operation of r. 16(5)

Against this judgment and order the appellants have come to this court by special leave

(c) untanned hides and skins bought by a licensed tanner in the State, and (d) untanned hides and skins exported outside the State by a licensed dealer in hides or skins.

By sub-s. (vi) of that section sales of hides and skins are liable to tax under s.3, sub-s. (1), at one single point in the series of sales by successive dealers

Against the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras allowing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

This, therefore, is a clear provision which makes the single point imposition of sales tax on hides and skins to be conditional on observing the condition of taking a licence.

That sub-rule, however affects only unlicensed dealers and the appellants who are admittedly licensed dealers are not affected by that sub-rule .

The respondent was a partnership firm carrying on tannery business at Chromepet near the city of Madras.

This contention was accepted by the High Court and the petition was allowed with costs.

The consequence of the judgment is that the respondent firm which is not a licensed dealer under the Act is not liable to any sales tax in respect of its dealings in hides and skins.

The (1) 1954 S.C.R. 1117. argument, therefore, was that in the case of sales of hides and skins the general provision was inapplicable and a special rule for taxation was laid down by s. 5(vi) of the Act.

The language of the section (s.5) shows however that this exemption applies subject to certain restrictions and conditions which include conditions as to licences.

But it was submitted that this Court on appeal from a judgment of the Madras High Court had sId r. 16(5) to be ultra vires the Act.

That contention is based on the judgment of the Madras High Court in V. M. Syed Mohammed Company v.

The State of Madras (1) which on appeal was affirmed by this Court (2).

For this reason multiple taxation was violative of s. 5(vi) of the Act.

This, it appears, was not disputed by the Government and it was therefore held that r. 16(5) of the Turnover and Assessment Rules was ultra vires.

Rule 16(1). In the case of hides and skins, the tax payable under section 3(1) shall be levied in accordance with the provisions of this rule.

Sale of hides or skins by dealers other than licensed dealers in hides or skins shall,subject to the provisions of section 3, be liable to taxation on each occasion of sale.

But the question was really (1) (1952) 3 S.T.C. 367. V. M. Syed Mohammed and Company v. The State of Andhra, 1954 S.C.R. 1117. not relevant to the issue as was pointed out by Venkatarama Ayyar, J.

But this can bring no relief to the petitioners, as they are all licensed tanners and are in no manner hurt by the operation of r. 16(5).

This, therefore, is a clear provision which makes the single point imposition of sales tax on hides and skins to be conditional on observing the condition of taking a licence.

All that r. 16(5) does is to emphasise the consequences of non- observance of the conditions which ss. 5(vi) 6-A have in clear terms prescribed.

In the case of hides and skins, the tax payable under section 3(1) shall be levied in accordance with the provisions of this rule.

if a dealer desires to avail himself of the exemption provided in ss. 5 and 8 or of the concession as to taxation in s. 5 only at a single point, then he must obtain a licence as prescribed in that rule.


The assessee, Her Highness Maharani Kesarkunverba Saheb, the Raj Mata of Morvi State, is the appellant and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, is the respondent. The question that arises for decision is whether the annual cash allowance paid to the appellant in circumstances stated below falls within paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) and is therefore exempt from income-tax. The appellant was receiving from the Morvi State since 1922 an allowance called Jiwai (maintenance allowance). By a resolution dated September 26, 1946, passed by His Highness Lukhdhirji of Morvi, the husband of the appellant, it was resolved that a sum of Rs. 5,000 per month be paid to the appellant and provision be made for the amount by the Treasury Office in the Budget in the same manner as before. On January 21, 1947, His Highness Lukhdhirji abdicated and his son His Highness Mahendra Sinhji succeeded to the rulership. The covenant for the formation of the Kathiawar States Union was signed on January 23, 1948. On February 26, 1948, a resolution was passed by the son of the appellant granting a village, Mota Dahisara, to the appellant. The relevant portion of this resolution was as follows
 From ancient times there has been a tradition in our family to grant a village to the Maharani for her enjoyment in order to maintain her status and dignity. However, since a village remains to be granted accordingly to our revered mother, Akhand-Sau-Bhagyawana Kesar Kunverba Sahib as the Maharani, it is resolved to grant her the village of Mota Dahisara, under (our) control and having the area and boundaries as per annexures hereto. We resolve to grant the said village, for enjoyment to out Maharani, Shri Vijaykunver of Rangpur, after the lifetime of our mother Kesar Kunverba Sahib in accordance with the above tradition. A formal grant was made on March 16, 1948, which was as follows In order to preserve permanently your status and dignity the village of Mouje Mota Dahisarais hereby granted to you as a gift in pursuance of the immemorial tradition of this State The said village and the land etc., thereof have been granted to you in order to maintain your status and dignity as the Queen Mother as stated above. You may enjoy the same in peace exclusively.
 On your death the right of enjoyment of the entire right, together with the restrictions mentioned in the present writing, shall vest in our Akhan Saubhagvanta Maharani Shri Vijay Kunvar of Rangpur. On March 20, 1948, the State of Morvi became a part of the Saurashtra Union. The Government of Saurashtra refused to continue the maintenance allowance or to recognise the grant of the village Mota Dahisara to the appellant. She then made certain representations and after some conferences and some discussion a copy of the order of the Political Department was sent to the appellant in which it was stated that the village would be resumed and an amount calculated on the basis of average revenue of the village for 3 years would be paid to her as cash allowance for lifetime. To this the appellant took objection and her son the Maharaja of Morvi also wrote a letter to the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra stating that the village had been illegally resumed and that her Jiwai had also been stopped. To this the Rajpramukh replied on May 19, 1949, saying that it had been decided that the village would be resumed and a cash allowance in lieu thereof would be paid to the appellant for life and he advised the Maharaja of Morvi not to press the claim as put forward in his letter and also that the appellant should accept the resumption of the village and agree to take a cash allowance instead. The appellant then wrote a letter to the Rajpramukh on May 26, 1949, in which she insisted that she should continue to have the village. On November 19, 1949, the appellants husband wrote to the Regional Commissioner, Mr. Buch, stating that he and her son, the Ruler, had with difficulty persuaded the appellant to accept Rs. 5,000 a month and not to insist on anything more. The following extract from the letter is rather important and is therefore quoted Most ladies are sentimental and she is no exception, and says her Abru would go if she loses her village, so we suggested that if she gets the income of the village, whatever it may be and any amount over and above that will be given to her as Jiwai, making a total of Rs. 60,000 a year with this she can say she got both the things and her prestige will not suffer.
 On March 30, 1950, the Government of Saurashtra passed a resolution that in pursuance of the decision taken at the Jamnagar Conference the grant of the village Mota Dahisara would be resumed and in lieu thereof a cash annuity of Rs. 35,807 would be paid. The appellant was also granted Jiwai as Rajmata of Rs. 24,193 per annum and thus a sum of Rs. 60,000 per annum, i.e., Rs. 5,000 per mensum, was continued to be paid to the appellant. On June 19, 1950, the grant of the village was liable to income-tax because in his view the appellant received that sum in exchange for two assets - right to the old maintenance allowance and the right to enjoy income from the village during her lifetime. On appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the amount of Rs. 35,807 was held to be liable to tax and not the sum of Rs. 24,193. An appeal was then taken to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal which held that the entire sum was exempt from income-tax and super-tax, as it fell within paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Order.
 The Tribunal said In the circumstances of the case stated above, it appears to us that the sum of Rs. 60,000 is exempt from income-tax and super-tax. If you look at the substance of the transaction, it means that the assessee was granted a maintenance allowance of Rs. 60,000. The assessee wanted somehow or other to be associated with the village Mota Dahisara. To her it was a question of prestige. Again the cash annuity of Rs. 35,807 was given to the assessee in lieu of the village Mota Dahisara. The village was granted to her for the purpose of maintaining the assessees status and reputation as the Raj Mata. In other words, the village was given to her for her maintenance. At the instance of the respondent following question was referred under section 6(1) of the Income-tax Act to the High Court Whether there was material for the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 35,807 granted to the assessee was a maintenance allowance exempt within the meaning of paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 ? which was framed by the High Court as follows Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 35,807 granted to the assessee was a maintenance allowance exempt within the meaning of paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 ? The High Court held that Rs. 35,807 and Rs. 24,193 were two distinct heads of cash annuities, the former in lieu of village Mota Dahisara and the latter by way of Jiwai, i.e., maintenance. It was of the opinion that the appellant was granted Jiwai (maintenance) of Rs. 5,000 per month by her husband as from September, 1947. It also held that the grant of the village was not by way of maintenance. After taking into consideration the several documents, that is, the grant, the letter of the appellants son dated March 23, 1949, to the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra, the letter dated November 19, 1949, of the appellants husband to Mr. Buch and the resolution of the Government dated March 30, 1950, the High Court held that under the resolution of the Saurashtra Government the appellant was given a cash annuity of Rs. 35,807 in lieu of the village and not by way of maintenance. Against this judgment, the appellant has come to this court in appeal by special leave.
 The controversy between the parties is confined to the nature of the grant of the village made to the appellant. The appellant contended that the grant of the village was as much maintenance as was the cash allowance which had been made to her before, and therefore it fell within the exemption under paragraph 15(1)(i) of the Order which is as follows
 Any income falling within the following classes shall be exempt from income-tax and super-tax and shall not be included in the total income or total world income of the person receiving them
 any sum which the widow or the mother of a person who was the Ruler of an Indian State receives as her maintenance allowance out of public revenue. The respondent on the other hand submitted that the words of the resolution dated February 26, 1949, and of the grant and particularly the following recitals therein From ancient times there has been a tradition in our family to grant a village to the Maha Rani for her enjoyment in order to maintain her status and dignity showed that the grant of the village was not by way of maintenance but merely to maintain a tradition of the family for keeping up the status and dignity of the appellant, and this, it was submitted, was fortified by the letter of the appellants husband dated November 19, 1949, where His Highness stated that the appellants Abru (prestige) would go if she were to lose the village. Reference in this connection was also made to the appellants letter dated May 26, 1949, wherein she insisted that the village should not be taken away from her as this would be unreasonable, arbitrary and contrary to the spirit of the covenant.
 In our opinion the connection of the appellant is well founded. The Tribunal has found after going into all the documents including the document containing the words to maintain her status and dignity and the letter of the appellants husband to Mr. Buch which mentioned the word Abru that the grant of the village was by way of maintenance and merely because the appellants relations wanted a face-saving device by splitting up the total amount payable per year it would not change the nature of the transaction nor would it change the grant of maintenance made to the appellant into something else.
 The grant of the village was as much by way of maintenance as was the cash allowance called Jiwai. Maintenance must vary according to the position and status of a person. It does not only mean food and raiment. The appellant was the wife of a ruling prince and at the time the grant of the village was made, she was the Raj Mata and therefore neither the use of the words status and dignity nor the reference to ancient usage could in any way change the nature of the grant. It is true that the appellant was anxious to retain the village because that gave her the satisfaction of having agricultural land which would be a tangible asset providing her a sure source of income but, merely because she wanted the village and in the resolution of March 30, 1950, mention is made of a sum an lieu of income from the village, the nature of the grant which in this case was by way of maintenance would not change.
 The question which was referred to the High Court was whether there was material to hold that the sum of Rs. 35,807 was maintenance allowance, but the High Court reformulated this question and after going into various documents it came to a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal and it reversed the findings of the Tribunal and answered the question in a manner suggestive of an appellate rather than advisory jurisdiction.
DECISION ??

In our opinion the connection of the appellant is well founded.

Again the cash annuity of Rs. 35,807 was given to the assessee in lieu of the village Mota Dahisara.

A formal grant was made on March 16, 1948,

The grant of the village was as much by way of maintenance as was the cash allowance called Jiwai.

Against this judgment, the appellant has come to this court in appeal by special leave.

In our opinion the connection of the appellant is well founded.

The appellant was receiving from the Morvi State since 1922 an allowance called Jiwai (maintenance allowance).

with this she can say she got both the things and her prestige will not suffer.


The State of Kerala and the Tahsildars of Kottayam and Kanjirappally Taluks are the appellants, and C.M. Francis Co., a partnership firm, is the first respondent, and the partners of the firm are the remaining respondents. The respondents were doing business in hill produce like pepper, ginger, betelnuts etc., and were assessed to sales tax under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act XI of 1125 (referred to as the Act), for the years 1950 to 1954. The respondents have to pay a sum of Rs. 1,01,716-4-3 as tax. In 1954, proceedings were started against them under s. 13 of the Act, which provides that if the tax is not paid as laid down in that section, the whole of the amount or such part thereof as remains due, may be recovered as if it were an arrears of land revenue. It appears that the pro- ceedings were not fruitful, and a prosecution under s. 19 of the Act was instituted against the partners in the Court of the First Class Magistrate, Ponkunnam. Respondents 2 to 5 pleaded guilty, and the Magistrate passed an order on October 18, 1955 as follows The sentence or other final order A 1 to 4 sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- each and in default to undergo S. 1. for one month each.
 A 1 to 4 admit that they failed to pay on demand by the competent authority, a sum of Rs. 1,01,716-4-3 due from them as sales tax for the years 1950 to 1954. This amount will be realised from A 1 to 4, jointly or severally, individually or collectively under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. for realisation of criminal fines, as if it were a fine imposed by this court on each accused individually and all of them together. Take steps for the realisation. Warrants under s. 386 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were issued to the Collector of Kottayam District for recovery of the arrears of sales tax.
 The authorities, however, started proceedings again under s. 13 of the Act read with the provisions of the Travancore- Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951 (VII of 1951), to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue, and attached some properties belonging to the respondents within the jurisdiction of the second and third appellants, the Tahsildars of Kottayam and Kanjirappally Taluks. The firm thereupon filed the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition or other order or direction to the effect that the proceedings for realisation of the arrears under the Revenue Recovery Act be quashed.
 In the petition, the respondents urged that inasmuch as they were prosecuted under s. 19 of the Act and the Magistrate had issued warrants, the procedure for recovery under s. 13 was not available. They contended that under s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the warrant is to be deemed to be a decree and has to be executed according to civil process applicable to the execution of decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure. They, therefore, submitted that the procedure under s. 19 of the Act was no longer open, and could not be proceeded with. Section 19 of the Act, so far as it is material, reads as follows Any person who (b) fails to pay within the time allowed, any tax assessed on him under this Act, or (d)fraudulently evades the payment of any tax assessed on him shall on conviction by a Magistrate of the first class, be liable to a fine which may extend to one thousand rupees and in the case of a conviction under clause (b), (d) the Magistrate shall specify in the order the tax which the person convicted has failed or evaded to pay and the tax so specified shall be recoverable as if it were a fine under the Code of Criminal Procedure for the timebeing in force.
 In dealing with the question, the learned Judges of the High Court felt that s. 13 of the Act was in the nature of a general law, over which the special procedure prescribed by s. 19 of the Act read with s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to prevail. They, however, thought that, since all the processes available under s. 19 of the Act were also available under s. 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was not necessary to decide what would happen if the proceedings under s. 386 came to nothing. They observed that if the question arose, they would consider it.
 The writ of prohibition was granted by the High Court. The respondents did not appear in this Court. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants, who has drawn our attention to all the relevant provisions of the law. The question which arises is whether s. 19 must be taken to prevail over s. 13 of the Act. Both the sections lay down the mode for recovery of arrears of tax, and, as has already been noticed by the High Court, lead to the application of the process for recovery by attachment and sale of movable and immovable properties, belonging to the tax-evader. It cannot be said that one proceeding is more general than the other, because there is much that is common between them, in so far as the mode of recovery is concerned. Section 19, in addition to recovery of the amount, gives the power to the Magistrate to convict and sentence the offender to fine or in default of payment of fine, to imprisonment.
DECISION ??


The appellant is the U. P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Lucknow, (hereinafter called the company). It appears that the company used to employ Messrs. s M. Choudhary (hereinafter referred to as the contractors) as its contractors for doing certain work for it. The contractors in their turn used to employ a number of persons to carry out the work which they had taken on contract. A dispute arose between the contractors and their workmen in 1956 and an application was made on June 6, 1956, by the workmen before the conciliation board. To this application both the company as well as the contractors were parties and four matters were referred by the workmen to the conciliation board, namely, (i) non-grant of bonus for the years 1953-54 and 1954-55 (ii) nongrant of festival holidays (iii) non-fixation of minimum wages of these workmen at par with the workmen employed by the company and (iv) nonabolition of the contract system. Efforts at conciliation failed and thereupon the Government of Uttar Pradesh made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, No. XXVIII of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act).
 In this reference only three points were referred out of the four which were before the conciliation board, namely, those relating to bonus, festival holidays and payment of wages to these workmen at par with the workmen of the company. The fourth point which was raised before the conciliation board (namely, non-abolition of the contract system) was not referred. The parties to this reference were two, namely-(i) the contractors and (ii) their workmen. The appellant was not a party to this reference. On August 13, 1956, another notification was issued by the U. P. Government under ss. 3, 5 and 8 of the Act by which the company was impleaded as a party to the dispute referred by the notification of July 31, 1956. It is remarkable, however, that the matters of dispute which were specified in the reference dated July 31, 1956, were not amended as they could have been under the proviso to s. 4 of the Act, by adding the fourth point of dispute before the conciliation board, namely, the non-abolition of the contract system. When the matter came up before the industrial court it framed a number of issues and the first and most important issue ran thus Are the workmen concerned employees of the P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Lucknow or of Messrs. S. M. Chaudhary, contractors ? The main objection of the company was that the dispute, if any was between the contractors and their employees and that there was no dispute between the company and its workmen. It was further objected that there was no valid or legal order of the Government referring any dispute between the company and its workmen to the tribunal and therefore the tribunal had no jurisdiction. On the merits it was urged that the workmen concerned were not the workmen of the company and there was no relationship of employer and employee between the company and these workmen and therefore the company could not be regarded as a party to the dispute between the contractors and their workmen. It is therefore clear that the main question which was considered by the tribunal was whether the workmen concerned were the workmen of the company or of the contractors. As the tribunal itself says, the crux of the whole case was whether the workmen concerned were the employees of the company .
 The tribunal went into the evidence in this connection and came to the conclusion that these workmen were in fact and in reality the employees of the company. The main contention on behalf of the company before us is that even assuming that the Government had power under s. 5 read with cl. 12 of G. O. No. U-464 (LL)XXXVI-B- 257(LL)/1954, dated July 14, 1954, to implied the company as a party, the main issue decided by the tribunal was not referred to it and the tribunal could only decide the three matters of dispute included in the order of reference of July 31, 1956. Therefore, in so far as the tribunal went beyond the, three matters of dispute specified in the reference and decided the question whether the workmen concerned were in the employ of the company or of the contractors it was acting without jurisdiction as this matter was never referred to it. We are of opinion that this contention must prevail. As we have already pointed out, there were four matters before the conciliation board including the question of non-abolition of the contract system. Further before the conciliation board not only the contractors but the company was also a party, for obviously the question of non-abolition of the contract system would necessitate the presence of the company as a party to the proceedings.
 When however the Government referred the dispute to the tribunal on July 31, it did not include the fourth item which was before the conciliation board relating to the non-abolition of the contract system among the matters in dispute. It also did not include the company as one of the parties to the dispute, for the reference-order refers only to two parties to the dispute, namely, the contractors and their workmen. On such a reference there could be no jurisdiction in the tribunal to decide the question whether these workmen were the workmen of the company or of the contractors, for such a question was not referred to the tribunal. It is true that on August 13, 1956, the company was impleaded as a party to the dispute referred by the notification of July 31 but the matters in dispute remained unmended, and the question of non-abolition of the contract system or the question whether these workmen were the employees of the company in fact and in reality was not included in the matters of dispute by amendment under the proviso to s. 4 of the Act.
DECISION ??


These appeals are directed against three judgments and orders of the Punjab High Court in three Civil Revisions Nos. 166-D, 167-D and 168-D which were brought by the appellants against three of their tenants under s. 35 of the Delhi Ajmer Rent Control Act (XXXVIII of 1952), hereinafter termed the Act. The appellants in all the three appeals are the landlords and the respondents in the three appeals are three different tenants. The appellants filed three separate suits for the eviction of their three tenants under cl. (g) of proviso to s. 13(1) of the Act on the ground that the premises were bona fide required for purposes of rebuilding. On February 27, 1953, the parties in all the three suits entered into a compromise in the following terms We have compromised the case with the plaintiff. A decree may be passed for Rs. 82/8/- on account of rent in suit and for ejectment in respect of the shop in suit in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants The defendants will vacate the shop by 4-3-53 and hand over possession to the plaintiff and the plaintiff will hand over its possession again (second time) to the defendants within six months from 4-3-53 after constructing it afresh.
 We shall pay such rent as this court will fix . Thereupon the court passed the following order and a decree followed thereon- In terms of the statements of the plaintiff., defendant and counsel for defendants a decree for Rs. 82/8/- on account of rent in suit be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants. Also decree for ejectment be passed in respect of the shop in suit in favour of the plaintiff against the defendants and that the defendants do give possession of the shop in suit by 4-3-53 to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff after constructing it afresh within six months from 4-3-53 give it to the defendants. From out of the money deposited, a sum of Rs. 82/8/- be paid to the plaintiff and the balance returned to the defendants. The defendants shall be responsible to pay the rent fixed by the court . According to the decree the possession was to be given to the appellants on March 4, 1953, but it was actually delivered by the three respondents between March 7 and 15, 1953. On the completion of the building the three respondents filed three separate applications under s. 15 of the Act for their being put into possession. These applications were filed on October 7, 1953. The High Court held that the compromise did not comprise any matter which was not the subject matter of the suit that the respondents could enforce the terms of the decree in the proceedings which they took, i. e., under s. 15 of the Act that time was not of the essence of the compromise and therefore of the decree and consequently in spite of the possession of the premises having been given by the respondents after the date specified in the decree, i. e., March 4, 1953, the respondents were entitled to enforce the decree by execution and apply for possession being restored to them at any rate they could apply for restitution under the inherent powers of the Court.
 Thus the High Court was of the opinion that though s. 15(2) of the Act was not applicable to the proceedings they could be treated as Execution proceedings. Against this judgment and order the appellants have come in appeal to this court by special leave. Under s. 13 of the Act the respondents are protected against eviction excepting for the reasons given in the proviso. The appellants had filed the original suits for eviction under s. 13, proviso (g), which was as under Section 13- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court in favour of the landlord against any tenant including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated) Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied- (g) that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding the premises or for the replacement of the premises by any building or for the erection of other building and that such building or rebuilding cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated . Thus when the suits were brought the provisions of the Act were invoked. The decrees passed were on the basis that the premises were required by the landlord for rebuilding which falls under s. 13 and the decrees also incorporated the requirements of s. 15 which provides- The Court shall, when passing any decree or order on the grounds specified in clause (f) or clause (g) of the proviso to sub. section (1) of section 13 ascertain from the tenant whether he elects to be placed in occupation of the premises or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and if, the tenant so elects, shall record the fact of the election in the decree or order and specify therein the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding, as the case may be. If the tenant delivers possession on or before the date specified in the decree or order, the landlord shall, on the completion of the work of repairs or building or rebuilding place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof.
 If, after the tenant has delivered possession on or before the date specified in the decree or order the landlord fails to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding within one month of the specified date or fails to complete the work in a reasonable time or having completed the work, fails to place the tenant in occupation of the premises in accordance with sub-section (2), the Court may, on the application of the tenant made within one year from the specified date, order the landlord to place the tenant in occupation of the premises or part thereof on the original terms and conditions or to pay to such tenant such compensation as may be fixed by the Court. The compromise, the order and the decree provided (1) that the respondents will vacate their respective shops on March 4, 1953, and hand over possession to the appellants (2) they elected to get back possession after rebuilding,which the appellants agreed to hand back on September 4, 1953 (3) the rent after such possession was to be determined by the court. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the above facts taken with the circumstances that the decree was passed in a suit under s. 13(1), proviso (g), show that this was an order passed and a decree made in accordance with the terms of s. 15 of the Act. It is significant that the respondents themselves made the applications to the court under s. 15 of the Act. For the respondents it was argued that the decree was not one under s. 15 of the Act because the decree was based on a compromise whereby the parties fixed the date of delivery of possession to the appellants fixed the date for completion of the rebuilding and agreed between themselves as to repossession by the respondents.
 It was submitted that although the time for giving delivery to the appellants was fixed in the compromise it was not of the essence of the contract. In our opinion the contentions raised by the appellants are well founded and the appellants must succeed. The suits for eviction were brought within the framework of the Act and were based on the provisions of s. 13, proviso (g). No eviction would have been possible excepting when conditions laid down in s. 13 were satisfied. The decrees which were passed were substantially in accordance with the provisions of s. 15 of the Act and as was contended by the appellants they were decrees under which the premises had to be vacated by the respondents on a specified day. Under that section they had the right to elect and did elect to get possession after rebuilding this possession was to be given by the landlords to the tenants within a reasonable time and six months period was fixed by Consent between the parties and the rent, if the respondents were not put into possession on the same terms as before, was to be settled by court and that is what was done under the terms of the consent decree. The applications for being put into possession which were filed by the respondents were really under s. 15(3) of the Act.
 As the respondents did not deli- ver possession to the appellants on or before the dates specified in the decree the provisions of s. 15 contained in sub-s. (3) of that Act were not available to them and they were ,not entitled to be put into possession as prayed by them. It was argued that the appellants had taken possession of the premises after the specified date without protest and had even accepted rent upto then and were therefore estopped from raising that defence.
DECISION ??