CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil - Appeal No. 89 of 1952. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment dated June 27, 1951, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta in Appeals Nos. 94 and 142 of 1950 arising out of the Award of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Madras (published in the Fort St. George Gazette, Madras, dated October 3, (1950). C. Chatterjee (S. N. Mukherjee, with him) for the appellant. C. C. Anthoni Pillai (President, Madras Labour Union) for the respondents. 1952. December 2. The Judgment of the Court Was delivered by MAHAJAN J. MAHAJAN J.-This is an appeal by special leave from a decision dated 27th June, 1951, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Calcutta in appeals Nos. 94 and 142 of 1950, arising out of the award of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Madras.
The relevant facts and circumstances giving rise to the appeal are as follows On 1st November, 1948, 859 night shift operatives of the carding and spinning department of the Carnatic Mills stopped work, some at 4 p.m., some at 4- 30 p.m. and some at 5 p.m. The stoppage ended at 8 p.m. in both the departments. By 10 p.m, the strike ended completely. The apparent cause for the strike was that the management of the Mills had expressed its inability to comply with the request of the workers to declare the forenoon of the 1st November, 1948, as a holiday for solar eclipse.
On the 3rd November, 1948, the management put up a notice that the stoppage of work on the 1st November amounted to an illegal strike and a break in service within the meaning of the Factories Act (XXV of 1934) and that the management had decided that the workers who had participated in the said strike would not be entitled to holidays with pay as provided by the Act.
This position was not accepted by the Madras Labour Union. The Madras Government by an order dated the 11th July, 1949, made under section 10(1) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), referred this dispute along with certain other disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. The adjudicator gave the award which was published in the Gazette on 12th October, 1950. By his award the adjudicator found that there could be little doubt that the stoppage of work by the night shift workers on the night of the last November,, 1948, was a strike, that it was an illegal strike, since the textile industry is notified as a public utility industry and there could be no legal strike without a proper issue of notice in the terms prescribed by the Industrial Disputes Act.
No such notice had been given. In view of this finding he upheld the view of the management that the continuity of service of the workers was broken by the interruption caused by the illegal strike and that as a consequence the workers who participated in such strike were not entitled to annual holidays with pay under section 49-B (1) of the Factories Act. He, however, considered that the total deprivation of leave with pay ordered by the management was a severe punishment and on the assumption that he had power to scrutinize the exercise of the discretion by the management in awarding punishment, reduced the punishment by 50 per cent and held that the workers would be deprived of only half their holidays with pay. The decision of the management was varied to this extent. The Mills as well as the-Union appealed against this decision to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. That Tribunal upheld the contention of the Mills that the adjudicator had no power to interfere with and revise the, discretion of the management exercised by it under section 49-B (1). It also upheld the contention of the Union that what happened on the night of the 1st November did not amount to a strike and did not cause any interruption in the workers service. This is what the Tribunal said- It would be absurd to hold that non-permitted absence from work even for half an hour or less in the course of a working day would be regarded as interruption of service of a workman for the purpose of the said section.
We are inclined to hold that the stoppage of Work for the period for about 2 to 4 hours in the circumstances of the case is not to be regarded as a strike so as to amount to a break in the continuity of service of the workman concerned. In the result the appeal of the Union on this point was allowed and it was ordered that holidays at full rates as provided for in section 49-A of the Factories Act will have to be calculated in respect of the operatives concerned on the footing that there was no break in the continuity of their service by the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948. In this appeal it was contended on behalf of the Mills that on a proper construction of section 49-B (1) of the Factories Act (XXV of 1934) the management was right in its decision that the continuity of service was broken by the interruption caused by the illegal strike and that the workers were not entitled to annual holidays with pay under the said section inasmuch as they would not have completed a period of twelve months continuous service in the factory, and that the non-permitted absence as a result of concerted refusal to work even for 2 to 4 hours in the course of a working day amounts to an illegal strike and consequently an interruption of service of a workman for the purpose of section 49-B. In our judgment, this contention is well founded.
Section 49-B provides- Every worker who has completed a period of twelve months continuous service in a factory shall be allowed, during the subsequent period of twelve months, holidays for a period of ten, or, if a child, fourteen Consecutive days, inclusive of the day or days, if any, on which he is entitled to a holiday under subsection (1) of section 35 Explanation.-A worker shall be deemed to have completed a period of twelve months continuous service in a factory notwithstanding any interruption in service during those twelve months brought about by sickness, accident or authorized leave not exceeding ninety days in the aggregate for all three or by a lookout, or by a strike which is not an illegal strike, or by intermittent periods of involuntary unemployment not exceeding thirty days It is clear that the benefit of this section is not avail- able in cases where the interruption in service is brought about by an illegal strike. Section 2 q ) of the Industrial, Disputes Act (Act XIV of 1947) defines strike as meaning- a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment.
The adjudicator found on the evidence and circumstances of the case that there was concert and combination of the workers in stopping and refusing resume work on the night of the 1st November He observed that the fact that a very large number of leave applications was put in for various reasons pointed to the concerted action and that the appli- cation given by the workers and their representatives also indicated that they were acting in combination both in striking and refusing to go back to work on the ground that they were entitled to leave for the night shift whenever a half a days leave was granted to the day shift workers.
He further hold that the refusal of the workers to resume work in spite of the attempts made by the officers and their own Madras Labour Union representatives indicated that they were not as a body prepared to resume work unless their demand was conceded. In our opinion, the conclusion reached by the adjudicator was clearly right and the conclusion cannot be avoided that the workers were acting in concert. That being so, the action of the workers on the night of the 1st November clearly fell within the definition of the expression strike in section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We have not been able to appreciate the view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal that stoppage of work for a period of two to four hours and such non-permitted absence from work cannot be regarded as strike. Before the adjudicator the only point raised by the Union was that it was a spontaneous and lightning strike but it was not said by them that stoppage of work did not fall within the definition of strike as given in the Act. It cannot be disputed -that there was a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in the Mills and that they were acting in combination and their refusal to go back to work was concerted. All the necessary ingredients,. therefore, of the definition exist in the present case and the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948, amounted to a strike.
It was not a case of an individual workers failure to turn up for work. It was a concerted action on the part of a large number of workers. The Appellate Tribunal was thus in error in not regarding it as a strike and it had no discretion not to regard what in law was a strike as not amounting to a strike. If it cannot be denied that the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948, amounted to a strike, then it was certainly an illegal strike because no notice had been given to the management, the Mills being a public utility industry. It was contended by the President of the Union, who argued the case on behalf of the workers, that the Factories Act had no application to this case, because by a notification of the Government of Madras dated 23rd August, 1946, the Buckingham an Carnatic Mills had been exempted from the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Act and the provisions of sections 49-A and 49-B were not therefore attracted to it and that no substantial question of law in respect to the construction of the section fell to be decided by this Court and that being so, this Court should not entertain this appeal under article 136 of the Constitution. This contention has no validity. The Mills were granted exemption from the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act because their leave rules were in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act. These rules being in similar terms, the decision of the matter depends on the construction of the rules and this in- volves a substantial question of law.
Reliance was next placed on section 49-A of the Factories Act which provides that the provisions of the new Act would not operate to the prejudice of any rights which the workers were entitled to under the earlier rules and it was argued that under the leave rules of the Mills which prevailed prior to the coming into force of the Factories Act, the workers were entitled to privilege leave and there was no provision in those rules similar to the one that has been made in section 49-B or in the new rules and that the Mills had no right to deprive them of leave by reason of the strike.
This contention cannot be sustained because section 49-A (2) of the Factories Act has no application to the case of the Carnatic Mills in view of the notification dated 23rd August, 1946. Lastly, it was urged that the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948, was not a concerted action -on the part of the workers and that several workers in their own individual capacity wanted leave on that date. In our opinion, in view of the facts and circumstances detailed in the adjudicators award this contention cannot be seriously considered. We concur in the view of the facts taken by the adjudicator that the action of the 859 workers on the night of 1st November, 1948, fell within the definition of the word strike as given in section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it was an illegal strike and the workers thus lost the benefit of holidays that they would have otherwise got under the rules. The learned counsel for the appellant undertook on behalf of the management ex gratia that it would condone the default of the workers on 1st November, 1948, and the cessation of work on that night would not be treated as depriving them of the holidays under the rules and we appreciate -the spirit in which this undertaking was given and hope that the workers would also take it in that spirit.
DECISION ??

In our judgment, this contention is well founded.

the management had decided that the workers who had participated in the said strike would not be entitled to holidays with pay as provided by the Act.

In our opinion, the conclusion reached by the adjudicator was clearly right and the conclusion cannot be avoided that the workers were acting in concert.

That being so, the action of the workers on the night of the 1st November clearly fell within the definition of the expression strike in section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

It cannot be disputed -that there was a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in the Mills and that they were acting in combination and their refusal to go back to work was concerted.

The Mills were granted exemption from the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act because their leave rules were in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act

These rules being in similar terms, the decision of the matter depends on the construction of the rules and this in- volves a substantial question of law.

section 49-A (2) of the Factories Act has no application to the case of the Carnatic Mills in view of the notification dated 23rd August, 1946

On 1st November, 1948, 859 night shift operatives of the carding and spinning department of the Carnatic Mills stopped work, some at 4 p.m., some at 4- 30 p.m. and some at 5 p.m

The stoppage ended at 8 p.m. in both the departments. By 10 p.m, the strike ended completely

The apparent cause for the strike was that the management of the Mills had expressed its inability to comply with the request of the workers to declare the forenoon of the 1st November, 1948, as a holiday for solar eclipse

The Mills as well as the-Union appealed against this decision to the Labour Appellate Tribunal

The Appellate Tribunal was thus in error in not regarding it as a strike and it had no discretion not to regard what in law was a strike as not amounting to a strike.

In our opinion, the conclusion reached by the adjudicator was clearly right and the conclusion cannot be avoided that the workers were acting in concert.

That being so, the action of the workers on the night of the 1st November clearly fell within the definition of the expression strike in section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

All the necessary ingredients,. therefore, of the definition exist in the present case and the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948, amounted to a strike.

The stoppage ended at 8 p.m. in both the departments. By 10 p.m, the strike ended completely.

The apparent cause for the strike was that the management of the Mills had expressed its inability to comply with the request of the workers to declare the forenoon of the 1st November, 1948, as a holiday for solar eclipse.

This position was not accepted by the Madras Labour Union.

The decision of the management was varied to this extent.

That Tribunal upheld the contention of the Mills that the adjudicator had no power to interfere with and revise the, discretion of the management exercised by it under section 49-B (1).

It also upheld the contention of the Union that what happened on the night of the 1st November did not amount to a strike and did not cause any interruption in the workers service.

In our judgment, this contention is well founded.

We have not been able to appreciate the view expressed by the Appellate Tribunal that stoppage of work for a period of two to four hours and such non-permitted absence from work cannot be regarded as strike.

It cannot be disputed -that there was a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in the Mills and that they were acting in combination and their refusal to go back to work was concerted.

It was not a case of an individual workers failure to turn up for work.

It was a concerted action on the part of a large number of workers.

The Mills were granted exemption from the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act because their leave rules were in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV-A of the Factories Act.

These rules being in similar terms, the decision of the matter depends on the construction of the rules and this in- volves a substantial question of law.

This contention cannot be sustained because section 49-A (2) of the Factories Act has no application to the case of the Carnatic Mills in view of the notification dated 23rd August, 1946.

The adjudicator gave the award which was published in the Gazette on 12th October, 1950.

The Mills as well as the-Union appealed against this decision to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

Lastly, it was urged that the stoppage of work on 1st November, 1948, was not a concerted action -on the part of the workers and that several workers in their own individual capacity wanted leave on that date.

In our opinion, in view of the facts and circumstances detailed in the adjudicators award this contention cannot be seriously considered.

It was not a case of an individual workers failure to turn up for work. It was a concerted action on the part of a large number of workers.

it was not said by them that stoppage of work did not fall within the definition of strike as given in the Act.

acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding

The adjudicator found on the evidence and circumstances of the case that there was concert and combination of the workers in stopping and refusing resume work on the night of the 1st November

section 49-A (2) of the Factories Act has no application to the case of the Carnatic Mills in view of the notification dated 23rd August, 1946.

or by a strike which is not an illegal strike

It is clear that the benefit of this section is not avail- able in cases where the interruption in service is brought about by an illegal strike.


Bose, J. The plaintiff appeals. The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay. The plaintiff claims to be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim. The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiffs family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the suit). The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4 (a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act). The following genealogical tree will show the relationship between the parties Bhujangrao Appasaheb (British grantee)
 Daulatrao I (died 24-7-1864) -----------------------------------------------------------------
 Bhujangrao I Malojirao Yeshwantrao alias (died 1881) Annasaheb
 (widow) Krishnabai Daulatrao III Bhujangrao II Daulatrao II (Def. 1) (Def. 2) (died 8-5-1931)
 Bhujangrao III
 The facts are as follows. A common ancestor of the present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saranjam some time before the advent of the British. When they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as possible, to continue such Saranjams, jagirs and inams as had been granted by the earlier rulers, and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B. Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 (The Bombay Rent Free Estates Act 1852) to regulate the mode of recognition and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs. In compliance with this, the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate. He may for convenience be termed the British Grantee. The Register Ex. P-53 shows that the estate consisted of villages. We do not know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows -
 Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British conquest, viz., Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade. On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who dies on the 24th of July, 1864. This Daulatrao I left three sons, bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao and Malojirao. In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession of this Saranjam. A question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the property in British India was partible. They further declared that Bhujangrao I was the head of the family and as such was entitled to a special assignment which was not to exceed a quarter share, for the expenses and duties which might devolve on him by virtue of his position, and that after this had been set aside each of the three brothers was entitled to an equal one-third share in the landed property in India. This judgment is reported in 5 Bom. H. C. R. 161. The duties enumerated at page 170 included, the keeping up of armed retainers for the fort of Gajendragad, and for the improvement of that village, which was the chief seat of this branch of the Ghorpade family, and also to enable him to distribute on ceremonial occasions the customary presents to the junior members of the family. the judgment is dated the 12th of October, 1868. As a consequence a division of the property was effected. Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages. The other two brothers continued joint and took the remainder. But this was only with respect to property situate in British India. The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur. That was left undivided. Bhujangrao I died in 1881 and his younger brother Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) claimed to succeed as the sole their. The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise this claim and permitted Bhujangrao Is widow Krishnabai to adopt a boy from the family and recognised him as the heir in respect of that portion of the estate which lay within the Principality of Kolhapur. This was on the 3rd of February 1882. The Bombay Government followed a similar course regarding the property in British India. On the 26th of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying the following decision
 The adoption was to be recognised and the adapted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father, that is to say, he was to get one-third of the property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family. Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession. Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) was given the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or separating. Finally, the Resolution concluded -
 The two brothers will hold their respective shares as their private property in virtue of the decree of the High Court and the Jahagir will henceforth be restricted to the portion awarded by the High Court to Bhujangrao which the adopted son will now inherit. It should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court in not to be held as a precedent and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed. This position was emphasised by Government in the same year on the 22nd August, 1882. Krishnabai who had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao II, asked that her husbands one-third share in the estate be also treated as private property in the same way as the shares of the other brothers. This prayer was refused and Government stated
 It should be plainly under that Government allow the adoption to be made only in consideration of Bhujangrao one share as well as the portion assigned to him as head of the family being continued to the adopted son as indivisible Jahagir Estate descending in the line of male heirs in the order of primogeniture and subject to no terms whatsoever as to the enjoyment of the same by Krishnabai during her lifetime. The position was re-examined by Government in 1891 and its decision was embodied in the following resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891
 It appears to Government that the whole Gajendragad Estate is Saranjam continuable as here in the fullest sense of the word as interpreted by the Court of Directors in paragraph 9 of their Despatch No. 27 dated 12th December, 1855. It is continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest and should Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars. The property should be dealt with like other Saranjams in the Political Department. In the year 1901 the adopted son Daulatrao II sued Yashwantraos son Bhujangrao II for partition. It will be remembered that in the litigation of 1866, which ended in the Bombay High Courts judgment reported in 5 Bom. H. C. R. 161, Malojirao alone separated and the other two brothers continued joint. The litigation of 1901 put an end to that position. The High Courts judgment dated the 12th of March, 1908, makes it clear that as Government was not a party to that litigation its rights against either or both of the parties were not affected. But as between the parties inter se they were bound by the previous decision and so the adopted sun was entitled to partition and separate possession of such properties as might fall to his share. After this decision was given the two partitioned the property between themselves amicably. In or about the year 1930 a Record of Rights was introduced in fourteen of the villages in the Gajendragad Jahagir and a dispute arise again between the three branches of the family. The District Deputy Collector, after inspecting the records, found that the name of the Khatedar Saranjamdar alone has found place in the village Inam register, in the Saranjam list and the land alienation register. while in the other village records the various members of the family were entered according to the actual wahivat or enjoyment. After due consideration he thought that the interest of Government and the Saranjamdar would be sufficiently safeguarded by allowing the same position to continue. He ordered the entries to be made accordingly. The order also discloses that the matter had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government. In the meanwhile, on the 5th of May, 1898, a set of Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10, of the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and published in the Bombay Gazette. These Rules were republished, probably with some modification, in the Gazette of 8th July, 1901. The portions applicable here were as follows -
 Saranjams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by Government in each case. II. A Saranjam which was decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British Grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest. But Government reserve to themselves their rights for sufficient reason to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the said family, or as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Government. Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate. It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Government unencumbered by any debts, or charges, save such as may be specially imposed by Government itself. VI. No Saranjam shall be capable of sub-division. VII. Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of (certain members of the family enumerated in the Rule). IX. If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is not carried out, Government may, whatever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a portion of it, to be resumed Provision for the members of the Suranjamdars family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed. After the District Deputy Collectors orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8th of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government. This time it passed the following Resolution on the 7th of June, 1932. The Resolution was headed Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No. 91 of the Saranjam List. It reads -
 Resolution - The Governor-in-Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade eldest sun of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder. The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar. The Governor-in-Council agrees with the Commissioner, Southern Division, that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should be continued to them as at present. The Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the plaintiff who is shown as Bhujangrao III in the genealogical tree. The defendants were evidently aggrieved by this, for they filed Suit No. 23 of 1934 against the present plaintiff and the Secretary of State for India in Council praying inter alia that the properties, in that suit, viz., the villages allotted to their shares, were their independent and private properties and in case they were held to be Saranjam properties, they be declared as independent Saranjams, separate, and distinct from the one held by the present plaintiff. This suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action against the present plaintiff but not against the Secretary of State for India in Council. According to defendants I and 2, this was pursuant to an arrangement between the Government and themselves that Government would issue a fresh Resolution in terms of the earlier Resolution dated the 17th of March, 1891. This was done. On the 25th of February, 1936, Government passed the following Resolution -
 Resolution-After careful consideration the Governor-in-Council is pleased to confirm the decision in Government, Resolution (Political Department) No. 1769 dated the 17th of March, 1891, and to declare that the whole of the Gajendragad Estate shall be continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam on the conditions stated in the said Resolution. Having regard, however, to the manner in which different portions of the estate have been held by different branches of the family, the Governor-in-Council, in modification of the orders contained in Government esolution No. 8969 dated the 7th June, 1932, is pleased to direct that the portions of the said estate held by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade, respectively, shall henceforth be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares in the said estate held by the said persons as representatives, respectively, of three branches of the Ghorpade family. Each of the said de facto shares shall be continuable hereditarily as such as if it were a separate Saranjam estate in accordance with the rules made for the continuance of Saranjams by the Governor-in-Council in exercise of the powers referred to in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act, 1852, and section 2 (3) of the Bombay Summary Settlement Act (VII of 1863) and such special orders as the Governor-in-Council may make in regard to the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or in regard to the said share. The recognition of the aforesaid shares and their entry in the Revenue Records as separate shares shall not be deemed to amount to a recognition of the estate of Gajendragad as in any manner partible or alienable and shall not in any way affect the right of Government to treat the said estate as an entire impartible and inalienable Saranjam estate. The Governor-in-Council further directs that the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of sub-division and shall not in any way be alienated or encumbered except in accordance with the rules and orders referred to above
 The present suit is an attack on the action of Government in passing this Resolution. The first and second defendants are the present representatives of the other branches of the family and the third defendant is the Province of Bombay (now the State of Bombay). The plaint states -
 Government can have an jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full benefit of all the rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam. The Order of Government of the 8th February, 1930 is, therefore, ultra vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff
 Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are not entitled to any right or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saranjam which according to the G. K. is continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam, such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers in any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam. The cause of action arose in April 1938 and the resolution and the entry being ultra vires is not binding
 As this is a suit claiming for relief primarily against defendants 1 and 2 defendant 3 is made a party to the suit in order to enable Government (defendant 3) to give proper effect to the decision of Government of the 17th March, 1891 and of 7th June, 1932, as against defendants 1 and 2 who have no right to the position which they claim
 The reliefs prayed for are -
 That it be declared that defendants 1 and 2 have no right to go behind the order of the Government as per Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, under which plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as the sole Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by them as mere potgi holders. That in consequence of his position of a sole Saranjamdar the plaintiff alone at any rate during his lifetime has the sole right to the rights and privileges appertaining to the post of a sole Saranjamdar to wit, to be consulted in the appointment of the village officers in all the villages appertaining to the Saranjam estate, but assigned to defendants 1 and 2 for potgi
 Defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from doing any acts or taking any steps in contravention of the aforesaid right of the plaintiff. That it be declared that defendant 3 (Government) have no right to change the Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, and at any rate during the lifetime of the plaintiff. The first Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the merits holding that Government had the right to amend its Resolution in the way it did. The lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on three grounds (1) that the two previous decisions of 1868 and 1908 operate as res judicata, (2) that the impugned Resolution is intra vires and (3) that section 4 (a) and (d) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court. In second appeal the High Court only considered the question of jurisdiction and, agreeing, with the lower appellate Court on the point, dismissed the appeal but it granted the plaintiff leave no appeal to this Court. The only question we have to consider is the one of jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (Bombay Act X of 1876), runs -
 Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to -
 (a) claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam
 It was strenuously contended that this is not a claim against the Crown but one against the first and second defendants. That in my opinion is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and reliefs (a) and (d). In any event, Mr. Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant and those portions of the plaint which sought relief against it. He said he was not prepared to do so. I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party. I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4 (a). The next question is whether, assuming that to be the case, it is also one relating to lands held as Saranjam. So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that is clearly the case. Paragraph 9 of the plaint challenges Governments jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff of the full benefit of all rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam. these rights cannot exist apart from the lands which form part of the Saranjam estate and the implication of the prayer is that Government has, for example, no right to resume the Saranjam either under Rule V on the death of the last Saranjamdar or under Rule IX during his lifetime. (It is to be observed that a resumption under Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance of those entitled to it out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed. These revenues can only come out of the land. Relief (d) in the prayer clause seeks a declaration that Government has to right to change Resolution No. 8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932. That Resolution directly relates to the land because it directs that the Gajendragad Saranjam he resumed and the Collector is directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the village of the Saranjam estate etc. It is impossible to contend that this is not a claim relating to lands held as Saranjam. It was next argued that if that be the case the claim against Government can be dismissed and the plaintiff can at least be given the reliefs claimed against the other two defendants. These, it was contended, do not relate to land and in any event are not claims against the Crown. In my opinion this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately. That is evident enough from paragraph 10 of the plaint. In paragraph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is challenged and in paragraph 10 the plaintiff explains that therefore the first and second defendants are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar. One of those rights, as we have been from Rules VII and IX, is to take the revenues of the entire estate in order that he might fulfil his obligation regarding the payment of maintenance to certain members of the family and if the defendants claim to hold their lands under the orders of Government and the plaintiff insists on retaining Government as a party in order that it may be bound by the decree he wants against the other defendants it is obvious that his claim against these defendants cannot be separated from his claim against the Government. In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders. There are two decisions of the Bombay High Court which have taken this view. Basalingappagouda v. The Secretary of State for India (28 Bom. L.R. 651) was a Watan case Government had recognised the second defendant as the Watandar. Plaintiff sued Government and the second defendant and sought a declaration and injunction. On being faced with the dilemma that the suit against Government did not lie because of section 4 (a) (3) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876, he asked the Court, as here to leave the Government out of consideration and decree his claim against the second defendant alone. The learned Judges held that that would amount to striking out the main relief sought against both the defendants and would change the character of the suit and added that as long as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit, such a declaration could not be granted. In the other case, Basangauda v. The Secretary of State (32 Bom. L.R. 1370) Beaumont C.J. and Baker J. took the same view. They said -
 Mr. Gumaste, who appears for the appellant, says that his claim is not a claim against the Government but in that case be ought to strike out the Government. He is not prepared to strike out the Government because if he does they will not be bound by these proceedings and will follow the decision of their revenue tribunals. Therefore, he wants to make the Government a party in order that they may be bound. But, if they remain a party, it seems to me that there is a claim against them relating to property appertaining to the office of an hereditary officer, although no doubt it is quite true that the appellant does not desire to get any order against the Government as to the way in which the property should be dealt with or anything of the sort, and he only wants a declaration as to his title which will bind Government. They held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted. It was next contended, on the strength of a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji (74 I.A. 103) that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether Government acted in excess of its powers and that that question must be decided first. In my opinion, this decision does not apply here. Their Lordships were dealing with a case falling under section 4 (b) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876. That provides that -
 no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to
 (b) objections to the amount or incidence of any assessment of land revenue authorised by the Provincial Government. As pointed out by Strangman K. C. on behalf of the plaintiff respondent, authorised must mean duly authorised and in that particular case the impugned assessment would not be duly authorised if the Government Resolution of 11-4-1930 purporting to treat the agreement relied on by the respondent as cancelled and authorising the levy of the full assessment was ultra vires under section 211 of the Land Revenue Code. Thus, before the exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction under section 4 (b) could come into play, the Court had to determine the issue of ultra vires. Consequently, their Lordships held that that question was outside the scope of the bar. But the position here is different. We are concerned here with section 4 (a) under that no question about an authorised act of Government arises. The section is general and bars all claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam. That is to say, even if the Government act is relation to such lands was ultra vires, a claim impugning the validity of such an act would fall within the scope of the exclusion in clause (a) provided it relates to such land. There is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only relief sought against Government is a declaration. One set of decision holds that that does not amount to a claim against Government. Dattatraya Vishwanath v. The Secretary of State for India I.L.R. 1948 Bom. 809 at 820 is typical of that view.
 DECISION ??

The next question is whether, assuming that to be the case, it is also one relating to lands held as Saranjam. So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that is clearly the case.

In my opinion this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately.

In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders.

In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders.

The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4 (a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act).

The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4 (a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act).

I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4 (a).

The Order of Government of the 8th February, 1930 is, therefore, ultra vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff
 Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are not entitled to any right or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saranjam which according to the G.

The plaintiff appeals. The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay.

The only question is whether the suit is barred by section 4 (a) of Bombay Act X of 1876 (Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act).

I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party. I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4 (a)

The next question is whether, assuming that to be the case, it is also one relating to lands held as Saranjam. So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that is clearly the case

It is impossible to contend that this is not a claim relating to lands held as Saranjam.

There is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only relief sought against Government is a declaration. One set of decision holds that that does not amount to a claim against Government.

accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B. Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 (The Bombay Rent Free Estates Act 1852) to regulate the mode of recognition and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs.

In compliance with this, the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate.

Krishnabai who had been allowed by Government to adopt Daulatrao II, asked that her husbands one-third share in the estate be also treated as private property in the same way as the shares of the other brothers.

It is continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest and should Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars

In the meanwhile, on the 5th of May, 1898, a set of Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10, of the Bombay Rent Free Estates Act of 1852 were drawn up and published in the Bombay Gazette.

The portions applicable here were as follows -
 Saranjams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by Government in each case

A Saranjam which was decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British Grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest

But Government reserve to themselves their rights for sufficient reason to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the said family, or as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Government. Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate

It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Government unencumbered by any debts, or charges, save such as may be specially imposed by Government itself.

K. is continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam, such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers in any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam

The first Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the merits holding that Government had the right to amend its Resolution in the way it did.

They held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted.

The plaintiff claims to be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim

The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiffs family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the suit)

A common ancestor of the present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saranjam some time before the advent of the British.

When they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as possible, to continue such Saranjams, jagirs and inams as had been granted by the earlier rulers

He may for convenience be termed the British Grantee

The Register Ex. P-53 shows that the estate consisted of villages

We do not know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows -
 Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British conquest, viz., Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade

On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who dies on the 24th of July, 1864. This Daulatrao I left three sons, bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao and Malojirao

In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession of this Saranjam

As a consequence a division of the property was effected. Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages. The other two brothers continued joint and took the remainder. But this was only with respect to property situate in British India

The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur

Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession.

It should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court in not to be held as a precedent and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed

The property should be dealt with like other Saranjams in the Political Department. In the year 1901 the adopted son Daulatrao II sued Yashwantraos son Bhujangrao II for partition.

After due consideration he thought that the interest of Government and the Saranjamdar would be sufficiently safeguarded by allowing the same position to continue

He ordered the entries to be made accordingly. The order also discloses that the matter had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government

The only question we have to consider is the one of jurisdiction.

The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay.

The next question is whether, assuming that to be the case, it is also one relating to lands held as Saranjam.

The plaintiff claims to be the sole Saranjamdar and seeks certain declarations and other reliefs appropriate to such a claim.

The first and second defendants are members of the plaintiffs family while the third defendant is the State of Bombay (Province of Bombay at the date of the suit).

He may for convenience be termed the British Grantee.

It is continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest and should Government ever sanction an adoption the terms of sanction would be those applicable to Saranjamdars.

The property should be dealt with like other Saranjams in the Political Department.

That in my opinion is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and reliefs (a) and (d).

I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party. I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4 (a).

So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that is clearly the case.

(It is to be observed that a resumption under Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance of those entitled to it out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.

These revenues can only come out of the land.

It is impossible to contend that this is not a claim relating to lands held as Saranjam.

In my opinion this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately.

In my opinion, this decision does not apply here.

But the position here is different. We are concerned here with section 4 (a) under that no question about an authorised act of Government arises.

The section is general and bars all claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam.

That is to say, even if the Government act is relation to such lands was ultra vires, a claim impugning the validity of such an act would fall within the scope of the exclusion in clause (a) provided it relates to such land.

The facts are as follows. A common ancestor of the present parties was given the Gajendragad estate as a Saranjam some time before the advent of the British.

When they arrived on the scene they decided, as far as possible, to continue such Saranjams, jagirs and inams as had been granted by the earlier rulers, and accordingly they framed rules under Schedule B.

Rule 10 of Bombay Act XI of 1852 (The Bombay Rent Free Estates Act 1852) to regulate the mode of recognition and the succession and conditions of tenure to Saranjams, which are analogous to jagirs.

In compliance with this, the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree set out above was recognised by the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate.

We do not know the date of the British recognition but the nature of the tenure is described as follows -
 Continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of British conquest, viz., Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee, son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade.

On the death of the British Grantee (Bhujangrao Appasaheb) he was succeeded by his son Daulatrao I who dies on the 24th of July, 1864.

This Daulatrao I left three sons, bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao and Malojirao.

In the year 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yeshwantrao alias Annasaheb sued Malojirao for possession of this Saranjam.

A question of impartibility was raised but the Bombay High Court declared that the property in British India was partible.

The Bhujangrao mentioned in the Resolution is the plaintiff who is shown as Bhujangrao III in the genealogical tree.

K. is continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam, such as for example in the matter of appointment of the village officers in any of the 27 villages appertaining to the Gajendragad Saranjam.

The first Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the merits holding that Government had the right to amend its Resolution in the way it did.

The lower appellate Court also dismissed the suit on three grounds (1) that the two previous decisions of 1868 and 1908 operate as res judicata, (2) that the impugned Resolution is intra vires and (3) that section 4 (a) and (d) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act bars the jurisdiction of the Court.

In second appeal the High Court only considered the question of jurisdiction and, agreeing, with the lower appellate Court on the point, dismissed the appeal but it granted the plaintiff leave no appeal to this Court.

Relief (d) in the prayer clause seeks a declaration that Government has to right to change Resolution No. 8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932.

That Resolution directly relates to the land because it directs that the Gajendragad Saranjam he resumed and the Collector is directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the village of the Saranjam estate etc.

It was next argued that if that be the case the claim against Government can be dismissed and the plaintiff can at least be given the reliefs claimed against the other two defendants.

These, it was contended, do not relate to land and in any event are not claims against the Crown

That is evident enough from paragraph 10 of the plaint. In paragraph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is challenged and in paragraph 10 the plaintiff explains that therefore the first and second defendants are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar.

In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders.

It was next contended, on the strength of a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reported in Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji (74 I.A. 103) that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether Government acted in excess of its powers and that that question must be decided first.

There is a difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court as to whether section 4 is attracted if the only relief sought against Government is a declaration.

One set of decision holds that that does not amount to a claim against Government. Dattatraya Vishwanath v.

The Secretary of State for India I.L.R. 1948 Bom. 809 at 820 is typical of that view.

The Register Ex. P-53 shows that the estate consisted of villages.

Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages.

The other two brothers continued joint and took the remainder.

But this was only with respect to property situate in British India. The parties also had property in the State of Kolhapur. That was left undivided.

On the 26th of April, 1882, they passed a Resolution embodying the following decision
 The adoption was to be recognised and the adapted son was to occupy the same position as his adoptive father, that is to say, he was to get one-third of the property plus the assignment given to him as head of the family.

Malojirao who had already taken his share of the estate was to continue in possession.

Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) was given the option of remaining joint with the adopted boy or separating.

Finally, the Resolution concluded -
 The two brothers will hold their respective shares as their private property in virtue of the decree of the High Court and the Jahagir will henceforth be restricted to the portion awarded by the High Court to Bhujangrao which the adopted son will now inherit.

It should however be clearly understood that the decision of the High Court in not to be held as a precedent and that no partition of the Jahagir Estate to be continued to the adopted son will ever be allowed.

This position was emphasised by Government in the same year on the 22nd August, 1882.

The portions applicable here were as follows -
 Saranjams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by Government in each case.

II. A Saranjam which was decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British Grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest.

But Government reserve to themselves their rights for sufficient reason to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the said family, or as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Government.

Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate.

It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Government unencumbered by any debts, or charges, save such as may be specially imposed by Government itself.

VI. No Saranjam shall be capable of sub-division.

Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of (certain members of the family enumerated in the Rule).

IX. If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is not carried out, Government may, whatever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a portion of it, to be resumed Provision for the members of the Suranjamdars family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.

After the District Deputy Collectors orders were passed on the 20th of May, 1930, Daulatrao II died on the 8th of May, 1931, and the matter was again taken up by Government.

The Governor-in-Council further directs that the aforesaid shares shall in no case be capable of sub-division and shall not in any way be alienated or encumbered except in accordance with the rules and orders referred to above
 The present suit is an attack on the action of Government in passing this Resolution.

The first and second defendants are the present representatives of the other branches of the family and the third defendant is the Province of Bombay (now the State of Bombay).

The plaint states -
 Government can have an jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full benefit of all the rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam.

The Order of Government of the 8th February, 1930 is, therefore, ultra vires and in no way binding on the present plaintiff
 Defendants 1 and 2, therefore, are not entitled to any right or privileges claimable by the holder of a Saranjam which according to the G.

That it be declared that defendant 3 (Government) have no right to change the Resolution No. 8969 of 7th June, 1932, and at any rate during the lifetime of the plaintiff.

Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant and those portions of the plaint which sought relief against it.

There are two decisions of the Bombay High Court which have taken this view. Basalingappagouda v. The Secretary of State for India (28 Bom.

L.R. 651) was a Watan case Government had recognised the second defendant as the Watandar.

The learned Judges held that that would amount to striking out the main relief sought against both the defendants and would change the character of the suit and added that as long as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit, such a declaration could not be granted.

In the other case, Basangauda v. The Secretary of State (32 Bom.

Beaumont C.J. and Baker J. took the same view.

They held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted.

Their Lordships were dealing with a case falling under section 4 (b) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876. That provides that -
 no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to
 (b) objections to the amount or incidence of any assessment of land revenue authorised by the Provincial Government.

Thus, before the exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction under section 4 (b) could come into play, the Court had to determine the issue of ultra vires.

Consequently, their Lordships held that that question was outside the scope of the bar.

no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to -
 (a) claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam

I am clear that this is a suit against the Crown within the meaning of section 4 (a).

So far as the reliefs sought against Government are concerned, that is clearly the case.

In any event, Mr. Somayya was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant and those portions of the plaint which sought relief against it. He said he was not prepared to do so. I cannot see how a plaintiff can insist on retaining a person against whom he claims no relief as a party.

this is not a suit in which the rights claimed against the other defendants can be divorced from the claim against Government and considered separately.

the plaintiff insists on retaining Government as a party in order that it may be bound by the decree he wants against the other defendants it is obvious that his claim against these defendants cannot be separated from his claim against the Government.

The section is general and bars all claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam. That is to say, even if the Government act is relation to such lands was ultra vires, a claim impugning the validity of such an act would fall within the scope of the exclusion in clause (a) provided it relates to such land.

In paragraph 9 the power of Government to deprive the plaintiff of the rights he claims is challenged and in paragraph 10 the plaintiff explains that therefore the first and second defendants are not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar.

In any event, if the claim against Government is to be ignored it can only be on the basis that its orders cannot be challenged and if the orders stand it is evident that the plaintiff can have no hope of success because both sides hold their respective properties on the basis of those orders.

We are concerned here with section 4 (a) under that no question about an authorised act of Government arises.

The suit relates to a Saranjam estate in the State of Bombay.

Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of (certain members of the family enumerated in the Rule).

If an order passed by Government under Rule VII is not carried out, Government may, whatever the reason may be, direct the Saranjam, or a portion of it, to be resumed Provision for the members of the Suranjamdars family entitled to maintenance shall then be made by Government out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.

Government can have an jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff at any rate during his lifetime of the full benefit of all the rights and privileges appertaining to the holder of a Saranjam.

That in my opinion is an idle contention in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and reliefs (a) and (d).

It is to be observed that a resumption under Rule IX can only be of the land because the rule directs that when the Saranjam is resumed Government itself shall make provisions for the maintenance of those entitled to it out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed. These revenues can only come out of the land.

Relief (d) in the prayer clause seeks a declaration that Government has to right to change Resolution No. 8969 dated the 7th of June, 1932.

That Resolution directly relates to the land because it directs that the Gajendragad Saranjam he resumed and the Collector is directed to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the village of the Saranjam estate etc.

One of those rights, as we have been from Rules VII and IX, is to take the revenues of the entire estate in order that he might fulfil his obligation regarding the payment of maintenance to certain members of the family

There are two decisions of the Bombay High Court which have taken this view.

Basalingappagouda v. The Secretary of State for India (28 Bom. L.R. 651)

plaintiff is entitled to be recognised as the sole Saranjamdar in the Revenue Records and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 are held by them as mere potgi holders.