PETITIONER: <NAME> Vs. RESPONDENT: <NAME> & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT26/09/1989 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) RAY, <NAME> (J) CITATION: 1990 AIR 209 1989 SCR Supl. (1) 292 1990 SCC (1) 445 JT 1989 (4) 38 1989 SCALE (2)677 ACT: Criminal Trial--Criminal charge must be brought home- Proved beyond all reasonable doubt-abetment separate and distinct offence--Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. HEADNOTE: <NAME>, daughter of <NAME> was married to <NAME> in November, 1962. She died on 25th June, 1983 at about 2.30 P.M. It was alleged, she committed sui- cide because of the harassment, constant taunts and cruel behaviour of her in-laws towards her and persistent demand for dowry and insinnuations that she was carrying an ille- gitimate child. It is alleged, provoked by the aforesaid conduct and behaviour she committed suicide. The father-in- law, mother-in-law and the husband of the deceased have been the abetters of the crime and the deceased died of second to third degree burns. The learned Additional Sessions Judge on the totality of evidence on record held that the accused were guilty of abetment to suicide and as such punishable under Section 306 of the I.P.C. On appeal by the accused <ORG> was of the view that the guilt of the accused had not been proved and as such acquitted them. The complainant and father of the deceased aggrieved by the order of <ORG> preferred these appeals by way of special leave to appeal. This Court holding that the order of acquittal made by <ORG> is not sustainable and affirming the conviction of the accused under section 306 of I.P.C. and the sentence imposed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, HELD: (Per <NAME> ) Abetment is a sepa- rate and distinct offence provided the thing abetted is an offence. Abetment does not involve the actual commission of the crime abetted; it is a crime apart. [295G] Criminal charges must be brought home and proved beyond all reasonable doubts. While civil case may be proved by mere preponderance of evidence, in criminal cases the prose- cution must prove the 293 charge beyond reasonable doubt. There must not be any 're- asonable doubt' of the guilt of the accused in respect of the particular offence charged. The courts must strictly be satisfied that no innocent person-innocent in the sense of not being guilty of the offence of which he is charged--is convicted. even at the risk of letting of some guilty per- sons. Even after the introduction of S. 493A of the I.P.C. and S. 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, the proof must be beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but there is no absolute standard in either of the cases. [296C-F] The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts of lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Let- ting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law. [296F] (Per <NAME> Ray, J): Circumstantial evidence as well as the prosecution witnesses in the instant case clearly prove beyond doubt that the accused instigated and abetted Ravind- er Kaur, deceased in the commission of the offence by com- mitting suicide by burning herself. [306G] The findings arrived at by <ORG> after consid- ering and weighing the entire evidences are unexceptional. The findings arrived at by <ORG> without consider- ing properly the circumstantial evidence as well as the evidences of the prosecution witnesses cannot be sustained. As such the findings of <ORG> are liable to be reversed and set aside. [306H; 307A] The suicide having been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage in accordance with the provisions of Section 113A the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by the husband and his relations. Therefore, the findings arrived at by the Additional Ses- sions Judge are quite in accordance with the provisions of this section and the findings of <ORG> that the accused persons could not be held to have instigated or abetted the commission of offence, is not sustainable in law. [308C-D] Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act was inserted in the Statute Book by Act 46 of 1983 whereas the offence under Section 306 , I.P.C . was committed on June, 23, 1983 i.e. prior to the insertion of the 294 said provisions in the Indian Evidence Act . [308E] Bardendra Kumar Ghosh, 52 ILR Cal. 197. Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions,  AC 1. <NAME> v. <NAME>,  AC 462, <NAME> v. <NAME>,  2 AET 458 at 459. <CITATION> with <CITATION> and Anr.,  I SCC 244, <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 11 at 30. <NAME> v. <NAME>,  A.C. 643. <NAME>' v. <NAME>,  I AER 93, <CITATION> . 1989 3 SC 1, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44 P. 510 & P. 574, refered to. JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 600-601 of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.1986 of <ORG> in Crl. Revn. No. 434 and 1295 of 1984.

Ms. <NAME>, Ms. <NAME> and <NAME> for the Appellant.

<NAME> and <NAME> for the Respondents. The following Judgments of the Court were delivered <NAME>, <NAME>, daughter of <NAME>, resident of Amritsar, was married to <NAME> in November, 1982. She died on 25th June, 1983 at about 2.30 p.m. She, it was alleged, committed suicide because of the cruel behaviour of her in-laws soon after her marriage. She used to visit her parents' at Amritsar occa- sionally and during those visits she used to tell them that there was demand for dowry and also taunting of her by the members of the family of her in-laws and also insinuation that she was carrying on illegitimate child. There are sufficient, relevant and acceptable evidence to that effect. It is alleged that provoked by the aforesaid conduct and behaviour-, she committed suicide. The father-in-law, moth- er-in-law and the husband of the accused have been the abettors to the crime. The evidence further established that she died of second to third degree burns on the body, and there was sprawling of kerosene oil on her body and the body was burnt by fire. Accused no. 3--Smt. <NAME>, the mother-in-law of the deceased and the mother of the accused <NAME>, stated in her statement under s. 3  13 Cr. P.C. that she was lying in her house at that time and the de- ceased was cooking food on a kerosene stove, and as such the deceased caught fire accidentally.

Learned Addl. Sessions Judge held that there was absence of burn injuries on the fingertips of the mother-in-law and other members of the family. As mentioned before, the de- ceased was married in November, 1982. After marriage, she used to stay in the house of her-in-laws at Raja Sansi. The deceased used to visit the house of her parents at Amritsar occasionally, as noted before. During these visits she used to tell them that her-in-laws were not happy with the dowry given to the latter. It is further on evidence..that she complained that her in-laws used to taunt her and insisted her tO bring more dowry. It is stated that she complained that the in-laws taunted her that at the time of the mar- riage, her parents did not serve proper meals to the in-laws and their guests. It is further stated that the accused used to tell her that they had been offered by fridge etc. by other parties for the marriage of the accused while she had not brought dowry expected from her parents. It is also on evidence that she was often openly threatened that she would be turned out of the house in case she did not bring more articles. These were all established by the evidence of <NAME>, father of the deceased and his two daugh- ters. It was insinuated of her by the accused that she was carrying an illegitimate child.

On the totality of these evidence on record, it was held by the learned Sessions Judge that the accused were guilty of abetment to suicide and as such punishable under s. 306 of the I.P.C. <ORG> on appeal was of the view that the guilt of the accused had not been proved, and as such acquitted them.

The first thing that is necessary for proving the of- fence is the fact of suicide. Abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided the thing abetted is an offence. Abetment does not involve the actual commission of the crime abetted; it is a crime apart. See the observations of <NAME>, 52 ILR Cal. 197. It was contended on behalf of the accused that there was no direct evidence of the act of suicide by <NAME>. There, indeed, could not be in the circumstances in which she died. She was in the house of her in-laws. There is ample and sufficient evidence that she had complained that she was taunted for bringing meager dowry and that even insinuated that she was carrying 'an illegitimate child'. The aforesaid facts stand established by cogent and reliable evidence. These are grave and serious provocation enough for an ordinary woman in the Indian set up, to do what the deceased is alleged.to have done. There is also evidence that the persons in the house of her in-laws in- cluding the mother-in-law-mother of the accused <NAME>, made no attempt to save her from the burn injuries. The absence of any burn injury in the hands of the people around, indicates and establishes that there was no attempt to save the deceased though she was seen being burnt. The evidence of attitude and conduct of the in-laws--the father-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband after <NAME>, the deceased, got burns in not informing the parents and not taking prompt steps to take her to hospital for giving medical assistance corroborate the inference that these accused connived and abetted the crime. Criminal charges must be brought home and proved beyond all reasona- ble doubt. While civil case may be proved by mere preponder- ance of evidence, in criminal cases the prosecution must prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. See <NAME> v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1942] AC 1, <NAME> v. <NAME>, [1935] AC 462. It is true even today, as much as it was before. There must not be any 'reasonable doubt' about the guilt of the accused in respect of the particular offence charged. The courts must strictly be satisfied that no innocent person, innocent in the sense of not being guilty of the offence of which he is charged, is convicted, even at the risk of letting of some guilty persons. Even after the introduction of s. 498A of the I.P.C. and s. 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, the proof must be beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt. There is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but there is no absolute standard in either of the cases. See the observations of Lord <NAME> in Bater v. Bater,  2 AER 458 at 459 but the doubt must be of a reasonable man. The standard adopted must be the standard adopted by a prudent man which, of course, may vary from case to case, circumstances to circumstances. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fancilful doubts or lingering suspicions and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice, according to law.

The conscience of the court can never be bound by any rule but that is coming itself dictates the consciousness and prudent exercise of the judgment. Reasonable doubt is simply that degree of doubt which would permit a reasonable and just man to come to a conclusion. Reasonableness of the doubt must be commensurate with the nature of the offence to be investigated.

Having regard to the circumstances of the case, there is no direct evidence indicating the circumstances in which the death took place, the conduct of the accused and the nature of the crime with which the accused was charged, there cannot be any scope of doubt that the learned Sessions Judge was right and the conviction was properly made. This is not a case where there could be two views possible on the facts found and on the facts which could not possibly be found because of i,the nature of the offence. The fact the two view are reasonably possible, is not established by the fact that two different conclusions are reached by two adjudica- tory authorities. The factum of that may be only a piece of evidence, but whether two views at all are possible or not, has to be judged in all circumstances by the Judge, by the logic of the facts found in the background of law. For the reasons aforesaid, I respectfully agree with the judgment and order proposed by my learned brother.

<NAME>, <NAME> Special leave granted.

These appeals are at the instance of <NAME>, the complainant against the judgment and order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 434 SB of 1984 by <ORG> at Chandigarh acquitting the accused-re- spondents of the charge under s. 306 of the Indian Penal Code on setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Session Judge on August 9, 1984 convicting and sentencing all the accused. The appeal was allowed on holding that there was no evidence on record that the ac- cused at the time of commission of suicide by <NAME>, in any way instigated or abetted her to commit suicide and as such the prosecution failed to establish the charge against the accused and their conviction consequently can not be sustained.

The prosecution case is that the deceased, <NAME>, daughter of <NAME>, the complainant was married to <NAME> in November, 1982. After marriage, <NAME> started living in the house of her in-laws at Raja Sansi. She used to visit the house of her parents at Amritsar occasionally and during these visits, she used to tell them that her in-laws were not happy with the dowry given to her and they used to taunt her and insisted her to bring more dowry and that they even used to taunt her that her parents at the time of the marriage did not serve them with proper meals. The accused also used to tell her that they were being offered Fridge etc. by the other parties in the marriage of Accused <NAME> and that she has not brought the dowry expected from her parents. She was often told by them that she would be turned out of the house, in case she did not bring more articles.

In November, 1982, <NAME> visited the house of her in-laws at Raja Sansi where his daughter complained that the behaviour of her in-laws towards her was not cordial and that they were maltreating her for bringing insufficient dowry and they even taunted her that she was carrying an illegitimate child. Hearing these complaints from her daugh- ter, <NAME> brought her daughter to his house at Amritsar, one day prior to Baisakhi, 1983 and his daughter continued to remain at his house for about eight days. There-. after <NAME>, his father <NAME>, accused and his mother <NAME> along with <NAME>, and <NAME>, maternal uncles of <NAME> came to the house of <NAME> at Amritsar and pursuaded that he should send <NAME> with them where- upon <NAME> told them that his daughter complained against the ill-treatment and cruel behaviour towards her for bringing insufficient dowry and they also taunted her for this as well as for her illegitimate child and put pressure on her to bring more dowry. So he was reluctant to send her daughter back to her in-laws. <NAME> called <NAME>, President of <ORG>, Smt. <NAME>, a social worker living in the neighbourhood of <NAME> and one <NAME> to his house and all these complaints and grievances were repeated in presence of these persons. The accused assured him that in future they would not maltreat and taunt her and that he would not receive any complaint against them. They also assured him that in future they would not ask her to bring more dowry. On these assurances of the accused, <NAME> sent his daughter with the accused to Raja Sansi, the house of the accused.

For about two months, <NAME> did not receive any information from his daughter and so he sent his two daughters <NAME> and <NAME> to Raja Sansi to the house of the in:laws of <NAME> to enquire about her welfare. The said daughters of <NAME> went to the house of the in-laws of <NAME> on June 23, 1983 that is, two days prior to the death of <NAME>. The de- ceased complained to them about the torture as well as cruel behaviour of her in-laws, as before and they have not stopped maltreating her and torturing her and she was not happy there. On June 25, 1983 at about 6.30 p.m., <NAME>, maternal uncle of <NAME> came to the shop of <NAME> at Amritsar and informed him that his daugh- ter committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body and then setting herself on fire and that she was lying at <ORG>, Amritsar. <NAME> immediately went to the hospital and found the dead body of her daughter lying in the dead house. It has been alleged that <NAME> committed suicide on June 25, 1983 at 2.30 p.m. having fed up with the cruel behaviour of her in-laws. The appellant alongwith the mem- bers of his family stayed in the hospital. On June 26, 1983, <NAME>, <ORG>, Ajnala came to the dead house at Amritsar at about 5 p.m. and examined the dead body of <NAME>. He recorded the statements of <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>.

The statement of <NAME> was reproduced in the Roznamcha, and the statements of <NAME> and <NAME>, President of <ORG> and <NAME> though disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused yet <NAME>, A.S.I. and even <NAME>, D.S.P., Ajnala Police Station did not register the case for extraneous reasons. On June 27, 1983, Dr. <NAME>, Medical Offi- cer, <ORG>, Amritsar conducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of <NAME> and found 2nd to third degree burns on the body of deceased. <NAME> alongwith his daughters and <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and others met the S.S.P. Amritsar in this regard and the investigation of the case was then entrusted by S.S.P. to <NAME>, S.P. (Head Quar- ters) Amritsar who summoned <NAME> and other per- sons and recorded their statements on July 23, 1983. All the three accused were charged for an offence under s. 306 of the Indian Penal Code and they pleaded not guilty to the charge framed against them. The accused no. 3 Smt. <NAME>, the mother of the accused, <NAME> stated in her statement under s. 313 Cr. P.C. that she was lying in her house at the time and the deceased was cooking food in the kitchen on a kerosene stove and she caught fire accidentally.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the absence of burn injuries on the fingertips of the mother-in-law or other members of the family as evident from the statement of D.W. 1, Jaswant Singh, ruled out the story of accidental fire as set up by the defence. He further held referring to the provisions of s. 113A of the Evidence Act that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case it may be presumed that the ac- cused persons have abetted the suicide committed by the deceased and they fail to reverse this prosecution case by any evidence. Accordingly, the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar convicted the accused under s. 306  and sen- tenced them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years each and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000 each, in default of payment of fine the accused shall be further liable to rigorous imprisonment for four months.

The accused-respondents preferred an appeal being Crimi- nal Appeal No. 454 of 1984 in <ORG> and Haryana. The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence was set aside on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the charge against the accused persons. Hence this appeal by special leave has been filed by the complainant.

It has been contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the cruel behaviour, mal- treatment and taunts for not bringing sufficient dowry have been made to the deceased, <NAME>, soon after her coming to the house of her in-laws. It has also been urged that in November, 1982 she complained of her in-laws' iII- treatment and taunts to his father and her father took her to his house. It has also been urged that the accused <NAME> and his father accused <NAME> and other relatives of the accused met the deceased father at his house and requested him to send his daughter to the house of her in-laws and assured them that they would not maltreat her or taunt her or torture her for not bringing sufficient dowry. These assurances were given in the presence of <NAME>, the President of <ORG>, and <NAME>, a social worker and one <NAME>. <NAME>, father of the deceased on these assurances given by the accused and their relations sent his daughter, <NAME> to her in laws house. It has also been urged that on June 23, 1983 the two daughters <NAME> and <NAME> were sent by <NAME> to the house of the in- laws of <NAME> to enquire about her welfare. <NAME>, PW-7 stated in her statement under s. 161 Cr. P.C. that her sister <NAME> complained them about the same iII-treatment by her husband continuing in the same manner as before and as such she was not happy. This was reported by them to their father at Amritsar. It has also been urged that all the three accused taunted the deceased, <NAME> that she was carrying an illegitimate child. Being depressed with these taunts and iII-treatment the deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene on her person and setting her to fire. The evidences of PW-4 <NAME>, father of the deceased and the evidence of PW-7 <NAME> as well as evidence of PW-6 <NAME> were duly considered by the trial court and the trial court clearly found the accused persons guilty of the offence of abetting the sui- cide committed by the deceased. The court of appeal below had wrongly found that the prosecution could not prove charge against the accused and set aside the order of con- viction and sentence made by the trial court and acquitted the accused. It has been urged in this connection that the defence that it was a case of accidental fire and not of suicide was also not believed by the trial court and the trial court gave very cogent and plausible reasons for not believing this story and holding that it was a case of suicide committed by the deceased <NAME> by the taunts and ill-treatment made to her by her in laws and this forced her to take her own life by suicide. It has been submitted that the accused have abetted the commission of suicide by <NAME>, deceased and the accused are, therefore, guilty of the said charge. The order of acquittal made by <ORG> is not sustainable in these circum- stances.

The learned counsel, Mr. <NAME> has made three fold submissions before this Court. The first submission is that the case of suicide committed by the deceased <NAME> was not proved and as such the conviction on the charge of s. 306 I.P.C . as made by the trial court was not sustain- able. He has further submitted that the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubts that the deceased committed suicide. The next submission made is that the evidences produced on behalf of the prosecution are meagre and do not prove that the accused had abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased <NAME>. The prosecution did not prove that there was any instigation by the accused persons charged with the offence in this case. <ORG> has rightly held that the prosecution failed to prove the ingre- dients of s. 306 of the  and acquitted the accused of the charge under s. 306 . This order of acquittal should not be interfered with by this Court in this appeal. It has been lastly contended that if two reasonable views could be taken of evidences, one in favour of the accused and the other against them the appellate court should not interfere in such case and set aside the order of acquittal. As regards the first submission that the case of suicide has not been proved, it is relevant to mention that in the FIR (Ex. PF) lodged by the complainant it has been specifi- cally stated that due to constant harassment of <NAME> by the accused persons for having brought less dowry in her marriage as well as due to constant taunts and also torture, the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on her and burnt herself and afterwards she died. It has been further stated in the FIR that the complainant apprehended that some quarrel must have happened on the day of the incident between his daughter, <NAME> and her husband <NAME>, father-in-law <NAME> and mother-in-law <NAME> before she took the extreme step. P.W. 4, <NAME> has also stated in his deposition that his daughter used to tell them that her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law always taunted her saying that her parents had not given sufficient dowry during the marriage and had not even served them with proper meals at the time of marriage. He further stated that on 25th June, 1983 at 6.30 p.m. <NAME>, maternal uncle of <NAME> came to shop and told him that his daughter had committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body and then setting her on fire. In his statement under Section 161 , Cr. P.C. recorded on 23rd July, 1983 he also stated that her two daughters namely <NAME> and <NAME> (P.W. 7) who visited Raja Sansi to meet their sister, <NAME> two days before the incident were told by her deceased daughter that her in-laws often taunted her for not bringing sufficient dowry. It has also been stated by him that the accused taunted her daughter saying that she was carrying an illegal child which is a great defame for them. It has also been stated that "due to the bad treatment meted out towards his daughter <NAME> at the hands of her husband, <NAME>, her mother-inlaw, <NAME> and her father-in-law, <NAME> that she had not brought scooter and fridge and had brought less dowry in her marriage they had forced her to put kerosene oil on her body and commit suicide and as they often taunted her saying that she had begotten immoral and illegal pregnancy and for this reason she had committed suicide and thus had lost her life."

Furthermore, though the house of the accused persons is not far off yet the information was given not by his son-in-law or other members of the family promptly but it was given by the maternal uncle of the son-in-law, <NAME> at 6.30 p.m. to the appellant although the incident occurred at about 2.30 p.m. It is also evident that the deceased, <NAME> who had second to third degree burns on her person was brought to the hospital in the evening and the doctor, P.W. I immediately examined her and declared that she was already dead. Another most pertinent question which has been decided by <ORG> is that the de- fence story as stated by her mother-in-law, <NAME> in her examination under section 3  13 Cr. P.C. that it was a case of accidental fire and not a case of suicide, was falsified by the absence of burn injuries on the finger tips of the mother-in-law or other members of the family. <ORG> rightly held "that the intending circumstances show that she was not allowed to move till the process of burning had become irrecoverable and till she succumbed to her injuries."

We do not find any infirmity in this finding and we also hold on consideration and appraisement of the evidences as well as the circumstances set out hereinbefore that it was not a case of accidental fire but a case of suicide commit- ted by the deceased <NAME> being constantly abused, taunted for bringing less dowry and also being defamed for carrying an illegitimate child. It is pertinent to mention that in the appeal before <ORG> it was not urged on behalf of the accused that the case of suicide was not proved and as such there was no finding by <ORG> on this score. In such circumstances this argument is totally devoid of merit and as such it is not sustainable. It is convenient to refer in this connection the deci- sion cited at the bar in <CITATION> with State of Haryana v. <NAME> and Another,  1 SCC 244 to which one of us (<NAME>) was a party, wherein it has been held that "a plain reading of this provision (S. 306 I.P.C ) shows that before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed sui- cide." This decision is not at all applicable to the instant case in view of our specific finding that the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution clearly establish that the deceased <NAME> committed suicide at the instiga- tion and abetment of the accused persons in the commission of the said offence.

The next argument advanced is that the evidences were too meagre and unreliable to sustain the conviction. It has also been urged that <ORG> considered the evidences and came to a reasonable finding that the prosecution could not prove the ingredients of Section 306 , IPC as there was no instigation by the accused nor there was any conspiracy for the commission of that offence. <ORG> arrived at this finding on some contradictions in the statement of the evidences of P.W. 4, <NAME>, father of the deceased and of P.W. 7, <NAME>, sister of the deceased respectively with their statements made under Section 161 Cr. P.C.

It is convenient to refer in this connection the obser- vation made by this Court in the case of <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 11 at 30 to the following effect:

"It emerges clear that on a criminal prosecu- tion when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it."

We have already referred to the material portions of the FIR as well as all the statements made by P.W. 4 in his evidence as well as his statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. as well as the evidence of P.W. 7 and her statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. On a plain reading of these statements it will be crystal clear that the accused persons since the date when the deceased, <NAME> went to her in-laws' house after the marriage, was mal-treated and was constantly taunted, harassed and tortured for not bringing sufficient dowry from her father and she was taunted for carrying an illegitimate child. The appellant sometime in November, 1982 went to her in-laws house. His daughter, <NAME> complained to him about this torture and constant taunts for not bringing sufficient dowry. On hearing this, her father brought her to his house and after eight days the accused persons, <NAME>, his father <NAME> and two maternal uncles came to the house of the appellant and requested him to send his daughter with them assuring that there would be no further taunts or any iII-treatment by the respondents. The President of <ORG>, <NAME>, P.W. 5 and a social worker, <NAME>, P.W. 6 and another person <NAME> of the same village were called in by <NAME> and in their presence all these talks were held. On the assurances given, <NAME> sent his daughter with them. It is also in evidence that as no information of her was received, <NAME> sent his two other daughters namely <NAME>, P.W. 7 and <NAME>, to the house of the in-laws of the deceased <NAME> to en- quire about her welfare. <NAME> told them that there was no improvement in the treatment meted out to her and she was being taunted and tortured by her in-laws in the same way and she was not happy. Two days thereafter i.e. on 25th June, 1983 at 2.30 P.M. this unfortunate incident occurred. P.W. 7, <NAME> also stated in her deposition to the same effect. In her statement under Section 161 Cr. P.C. she also stated categorically that after about one month of the marriage whenever <NAME> met her she told that her in-laws i.e. the respondents were not treating her well for bringing less dowry. She was also told that the respondents were demanding refrigerator and a scooter. They had also taunted that she was having illegitimate child. She further stated that two days prior to the present occurrence she and her sister, <NAME> went to Raja Sansi to enquire about the welfare of our sister, <NAME> who told them weepingly that she was being beaten by the accused and again was mal-treated for bringing less dowry and scooter and fridge etc. She further stated that the respondents were leveling allegations that she had been carrying an illegiti- mate child and that she should die. It was also stated by her that her mother-in-law, <NAME> was present in the house and she was abusing <NAME> in their presence.

The learned Sessions Judge after carefully considering and weighing the evidences held that the witnesses P.W. 4, <NAME>, P.W. 5, <NAME>, President of <ORG>, P.W. 6, Smt. Raj Kumari, social worker and P.W. 7, <NAME> clearly proved that the respondents mal-treated <NAME> for bringing less dowry and they even tortured her for carrying an illegiti- mate child. The said witnesses testified to the greedy and lusty nature of the respondents that they were persistently demanding more money. It has also been held that the worst part of the cruelty was that she was even taunted for carry- ing an illegitimate child. <ORG> also held that a respectable lady cannot bear this kind of false allegation levelled against her and this must have mentally tortured her. Thus the persistent demands of the accused for more money, their tortures and taunts amounted to instigation and abetment that compelled her to do away with her life. This finding was arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on a proper appreciation of the evidences adduced by the prosecution. <ORG> without properly considering and weighing the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and on a wrong appreciation of the evidences found that the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of  Section 306 of I.P.C. It was also held that there was no evidence on record that the accused at the time of commis- sion of suicide by <NAME>, deceased in any way insti- gated or abetted her to commit suicide even though it has been brought but in evidences that the deceased was being maltreated by the accused continuously after her coming to the house of her in-laws. It was further held that the prosecution has singularly failed to establish the charge against the accused and their conviction and sentences were consequently unsustainable.

We have already stated hereinfore that P.W. 4, <NAME>, P.W. 7, <NAME> have clearly stated in their depositions about the ill-treatment, torture and the cruel behaviour meted out to the deceased <NAME> which instigated her to take the extreme step of putting an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body and setting fire. We have also stated hereinbefore that though the incident occurred at 2.30 P.M. the information of the death of <NAME> by burning was given to her father, <NAME> at 6.30 P.M. in his shop at Amritsar. <NAME> with members of his family immediately rushed to the hospital and found the dead body of her daughter in the dead house of the hospital. It is also in evidence that <NAME> was brought to the hospital after much delay when she was already dead.

<ORG> rightly held that in such cases direct evidence is hardly available. It is the circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the accused persons which are to be taken into consideration for adjudicating upon the trust- fulness or otherwise of the prosecution case. We have already referred to hereinbefore the evidences of the prosecution witnesses who clearly testified to the greedy and lusty nature of the accused in that they persist- ently taunted the deceased and tortured her for not having brought sufficient dowry from her father. It is also in evidence that they also taunted her for carrying an illegit- imate child. All these tortures and taunts caused depression to her mind and drove her to take the extreme step of put- ting an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene oil on her person and setting fire. Circumstantial evidence as well as the evidences of the prosecution witnesses clearly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons instigated and abetted <NAME>, deceased in the commission of the offence by committing suicide by burning herself. The find- ings arrived at by <ORG> after considering and weighing the entire evidences are unexceptional. The findings arrived at by <ORG> without considering properly the cir- cumstantial evidence as well as the evidences of the prose- cution witnesses cannot be sustained. As such the findings of <ORG> are liable to be reversed and set aside. <ORG> drew an inference from the conduct of <NAME>, P.W. 4 in making a delay of about 24 hours after receipt of the information regarding her daughter's death to make a statement to the police about the incident with lodging the F.I.R. on the same date, i.e. June 25, 1983 or on the following morning. <ORG>, therefore, held that all these circumstances would raise considerable doubt regarding the veracity of the evidence of these two witness- es (P.W. 4 and P.W. 7) and point an infirmity in their evidence as would render it unsafe to base the conviction of the accused.

It is in evidence of P.W. 4 that he was intimate about the death of his daughter by committing suicide, by the maternal uncle of <NAME>, son-in-law on June 25, 1983 at about 5.30 p.m. He immediately rushed to the hospital with members of his family where his daughter was brought. It is also in his evidence that he stayed there the whole night with his wife and other members of his family near the dead body of his deceased daughter and also on the next day till the dead body was handed over to him after the comple- tion of post martem in the afternoon. The Assistant Sub- Inspector of Police of Ajnala Police Station reached SGTB Hospital on the next day i.e. on June 26, 1983 and got his statement recorded there. It has been rightly held by the Additional Sessions Judge that in the circumstances it cannot be said that there has been any delay in reporting the matter to the police. We fully accept this finding of the Additional Sessions Judge and we also held that the delay in lodging the FIR in the above circumstances does not raise any doubt regarding the veracity of the said two witnesses and there is no infirmity in the evidences of P.W. 4 and P.W. 7 which would render them unsafe to base the conviction of the accused as wrongly observed by the High Court.

It is also convenient to refer to this connection to the provisions of Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which provide that:

"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women--When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any rela- tive of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband."

In the instant case the deceased <NAME> was married to the accused, <NAME> in November, 1982 and she committed suicide on June 25, 1983. It has also been found on a consideration of the circumstantial evidence that she was compelled to take the extreme step of committing suicide as the accused persons had subjected her to cruelty by constant taunts, mal-treatment and also by alleging that she has been carrying an illegitimate child. The suicide having been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage in accordance with the provisions of this Section, the Court may presume having regard to all the other circumstances of the case which we have set out earlier that such suicide has been abetted by the husband and his relations. Therefore, the findings arrived at by the Additional Sessions Judge are quite in accordance with the provisions of this Section and the finding of <ORG> that the accused persons could not be held to have instigate or abetted the commission of offence, is not sustainable in law.

It has been contended on behalf of the accused-respond- ents that Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act was inserted in the Statutes Book by Act 46 of 1983 whereas the offence under Section 306 , I.P.C . was committed on June 23, 1983 i.e. prior to the insertion of the said provision in the Indian Evidence Act . It has, therefore, been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the provi- sions of this Section cannot be taken recourse to while coming to a finding regarding the presumption as to abetment of suicide committed by a marriage woman, against the ac- cused persons.

The provisions of the said Section do not create any new offence and as such it does not create any substantial right but it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective and will be applicable to this case. It is profitable to refer in this connection to Hals- bury's Laws of England, (Fourth Edition), Volume 44 Page 570 wherein it has been stated that:

"The general rule as mat all statutes, other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to mat-

ters of procedure or of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature It has also been stated in the said volume of <ORG> at page 574 that: "The presumption against retrospection does not apply to legislation concerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence; on the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the inten- tion of <ORG>."

In <NAME> v. <NAME>, [1966] A.C. 643 the wife left the husband in 1954 and lived with the co-respondent until August, 1955, when she broke off the association. In 1958 the husband and wife met by chance and sexual intercourse took place. In December, 1962, the husband sought a divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery. During the pendency of the application section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963 came into force on July 31, 1963 which provided that any presumption of condonation which arises from the contin- uance or resumption of marital intercourse may be rebutted on the part of a husband, as well as on the part a of wife, by evidence sufficient to negative the necessary intent. The question arose whether this provision which came into force on July 31, 1963 can be applied in the instant case. It was held that the husband's evidence was admissible in that Section 1 of the Act of 1963 only altered the law as to the admissibility of evidence and the effect which the courts are to give to evidence, so that the rule against giving retrospective effect to Acts of Parliament did not apply. In <NAME> v. <NAME>,  1 AER 93 similar ques- tion arose, it was held that section 2(1) of the Act of 1963 was a procedural provision, for it dealt with the adducing of evidence in relation to an allegation of condonation in any trial after July 31, 1963; accordingly the subsection was applicable, even though the evidence related to events before that date, and the resumption of cohabitation in the present case did not amount, by reason of Section 2(1) , to condonation.

On a conspectus of these decisions, this argument on behalf of the appellant fails and as such the presumption arising under Section 113-A of The Evidence Act has been rightly taken into consideration by <ORG>. It has been urged by referring to the decision in <CITATION> 1989 3 SC 1 that where two views could reasonably be taken the appellate court should not interfere with the order of acquittal made by <ORG>.

In the instant case on a proper consideration and weigh- ing of the evidences the only reasonable view that can be taken is that the cruel behaviour and constant taunts and harassment caused by the accused persons while <NAME>, deceased was in her in-laws house instigated her to commit suicide and in our considered opinion no other rea- sonable view follows from a proper consideration and ap- praisement of the evidences on record. As such the decision cited above is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case.

For the reasons aforesaid we set aside the judgment and order of acquittal passed by <ORG> and affirm the conviction of the accused of the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. and sentence imposed upon them by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar. The respondents will immediately surrender in <ORG>, Amritsar to serve out the remaining period of their sentence.

R.N.J. Appeals allowed.