JUDGMENT

1. These writ appeals have been referred to a Full Bench for considering the question whether the existing holders of stage carriage permits are entitled to submit representations and are also entitled to be heard before <ORG> (hereinafter referred to as <ORG>) when it is considering fresh applications filed after 1-7-1989. under Section 70 read with Sections 71 , 72 and 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Incidentally the question has arisen whether the said existing operators are entitled to copies of the applications filed by new applicants under Rule 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). As the points arising in all the writ appeals are common it will be sufficient to refer to the facts in W.A. No. 795 of 1990 arising out of W.P. No. 14987 of 1989. The writ petitioner therein (respondent in the writ appeal) is holding a pucca stage carriage permit on the town service route in Gutur town from Syamalanagar to Sivareddipalem via Pattabhipuram, Kanakaragunta Gate, <ORG> and old Bus Stand, the distance of which is 8 K.Ms., is running 24 single trips per day. The petitioner states that there is one more bus in his route making 24 single trips per day, that there are 22 buses having 7 K.Ms. of common sector from Syamalanagar to <ORG> bus stand, in all making 440 single trips per day and that there are about 100 buses belonging to the <ORG> covering the above route fully. According to, the petitioner there is no existing need to provide any additional transport facilities in the above route or on its sector and that even the existing transport facilities are more than the need and he states that he is suffering heavy loss for want of passengers in his bus. He also states that he is the oldest operator on the said route. Coming to know that certain fresh applications have been made for grant of pucca stage carriage permits on certain routes in Guntur town covering his route, the writ petitioner filed an application dated 17-10-1989 before the Secretary, <ORG>, Guntur (1st appellant), requesting him to furnish him certified copies of various new applications filed, covering the petitioner's route with a view to enable him "to file representation against the (sic) end to approach higher authorities if necessary". The 1st appellant refused to grant the same by endorsement dated 21-10-1989 stating that it is not possible to comply with the request as there are a number of applications received for grant of stage carriage permits on various sectors of the town. It was further stated that the writ petitioner may as well ascertain the information from the copy of the agenda published in the notice board of the office of the <ORG> Then the petitioner filed the present writ petition stating that under Rule 166 of the Rules he is entitled to certified copies of the said applications. The petitioner also contended that there is no need to grant any permit on the route, that no traffic survey was conducted to find out the need, that there are no representations from the public for additional transport facilities and that no permit can legally be granted unless such need is first established. Thus the very receipt of applications is illegal. According to the petitioner, the agenda of the meeting will be published only on the date of consideration of the applications by the <ORG> that the agenda does not contain all the particulars mentioned in the various applications and that therefore the writ petitioner cannot make any effective representation. The meeting was proposed to take place on 27-10-1989 and the permits were to be granted on the routes overlapping the writ petitioner's route, he would suffer irreparable loss and hardship. The petitioner therefore prays for the issue of a writ of Certiorari for quashing the orders of the 1st appellant dated 21-10-1989, refusing to grant certified copies and for a positive direction for furnishing certified copies of all applications filed for grant of pucca stage carriage permits on the town service route. Pending the writ petition he prayed for stay of consideration of the applications by the <ORG> on 27-10-1989 as also to the subsequent grant of pucca stage carriage permits or temporary permits. In W. A. No. 796/90 (arising out of W.P. 14969/89 the writ petitioner asked for certified copies of other applications for representing to higher authorities also.

2. The learned single Judge by his order dated 29-3-1989 allowed the writ petitions partly holding that the existing operators were entitled to have certified copies of the applications filed by third parties before the 1st or 2nd appellant if there was common sector between the route granted to the writ petitioner and the route for which fresh applications are made for grant of stage carriage permits and the impugned order was quashed. The <ORG> was further directed before taking a decision to grant fresh permits to consider the representations of the existing operators who are likely to be affected by reason of the grant of fresh permit. The learned single Judge referred to the provisions of Sections 47(1) and 57(3) , (4), (5) of the old Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 and Sections 70 , 71(1) , (2), (3) and 90 of the new Motor Vehicles Act as also Rules 132, 166 and 179 of the new Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 and came to the conclusion that the procedure contemplated by the new Act for grant of stage carriage permits did not result in a total exclusion of principles of natural justice. The provisions of Rule 132, according to him, clearly negated such an assumption inasmuch as the proviso to the said rule unequivocally laid down that the <ORG> shall give adequate notice of the meetings and of the business to be transacted at the meetings, "for the information of such persons who being interested in the particular business to be transacted." He held that it was not the intention of the Rule making authority that the information relating to the transaction of the business should be confined only to the applicants for the stage carriage permits. If that were the intention, the rule could have mentioned that the information was to be given to "such persons being interested in the particular business". Under the new Rule 179, the <ORG> has to-bear in mind several guiding principles including whether the new operators are financially sound and whether their performance has been satisfactory. The existing operators, the learned Judge said, cannot make a representation unless they could know the contents of the applications filed by the fresh applicants. Any increase in the permits or in the change of timings would affect their business and if so they would be entitled to prefer revision petitions under Sec. 90 of the new Act before <ORG>. An existing operator will not be able to file an effective revision if he could not file a representation before the <ORG> The business transacted under Rule 132 cannot be said to be purely administrative in character without any likelihood of the interest of others being affected. Even in respect of administrative actions the principles of natural justice apply. The learned Judge referred to <CITATION> , ; <CITATION> , for the aforesaid proposition. He also relied upon the prevailing practice even after the commencement of the New Act, of representations being called for from existing operators. According to him, the words "other relevant documents" in Rule 166 include the applications made by new applicants for grant of permits which might partly or wholly cover the routes of the existing operators. At the pre-decisional stage before <ORG> there could be enquiry into the question whether the existing operators are "interested in an appeal or revision" within the meaning of the said words in Rule 166. The principle of natural justice was clearly embodied in Rule 132. According to the learned Judge, it is possible that grant of copies might be cumbersome if a large number of applications are filed but the <ORG> can evolve its own procedure by fixing some time limit for making representations and quoted <CITATION> , .

3. It is against the above said judgment of the learned single Judge that the present batch of writ appeals have been preferred and have later been referred to the Full Bench by a Division Bench of this Court.

4. The case for the appellants has been argued by the learned Advocate General. <NAME>, Sri <NAME>, Smt. Vinobha Devi who appeared for the new applicants supported his contention. For the writ petitioners (respondents in appeals) arguments were submitted by <NAME> and <NAME>.

5. The point arising before <ORG> can be stated as follows: Whether the existing operators on a route are entitled to file representations before <ORG> while the said <ORG> is dealing with grant of stage carriage permits to fresh applicants under Section 72 read with Ss. 70, 71 and 80 of the Motor Vehicles Act , 1988 and whether the existing operators can also claim a right to be heard before the <ORG> and claim, for the aforesaid purposes, a right under Rule 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules for grant of certified copies of the applications made by fresh applicants?

6. The Motor Vehicles Act , 1988 has been brought into force with effect from 1-7-1989. It is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. The Statement of Objects and Reasons mentions that the Act is passed after taking into account the changes in the said transport technology, pattern of passengers and freight movements, development of the road net-work in the country and particularly the improved techniques in the motor vehicles management. Various committees like <ORG>, <ORG>, <ORG> and <ORG>-mission have gone into different aspects of the road transport and have recommended the updating, simplification and rationalisation of the law. A working group constituted in January, 1984 submitted proposals for a comprehensive new legislation. The said working group took into account the suggestions made by various bodies and institutions like <ORG>, <ORG> and other transport organisation as also manufacturers and.general public, besides, the said group obtained the comments of the State Governments and discussed the same at a meeting of the Transport Ministers of all the States and of the Union Territories. Some of the factors suggested for consideration therein are as follows:-- (a) The fast increasing number of both commercial vehicles and personal vehicles in the country; (b) the need for encouraging adoption of higher technology in automotive sector; (c) the greater flow-of passengers and freight with the least impediments so that islands of isolation are not created leading to regional or local imbalances; (d) concern for road safety standard and pollution control measures, standards for transportation of hazardous and explosive material; (e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalisations for private sector operations in the road transport field; and (f) the need for effective ways of tracking down traffic offenders. It is further mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that the legislation has been prepared in the light of the above background and among the various items provided therein include, liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits on non-nationalised rules, <ORG> permits also national permits for goods carriages.

7. Though the contentions of the learned counsel for the writ petitioners covered a large ground, we wish to make it clear even at the outset, that we do not propose to decide by hypothetical questions. It is neither necessary nor desirable for us to go into every aspect of the changes brought about by the new Act. We have therefore confined our decision to a very narrow compass consisting of only three inter-related questions concerning stage carriage permits, firstly, whether the existing operators have a legal right to file representations opposing the applications of new applicants after the commencement of the new Act; secondly, whether the existing operators have a right to be heard before fresh stage-carriage permits are granted; and thirdly whether, at the stage of grant of new stage carriage permits, the existing operators can claim a legal right, under R. 166, for grant of copies of the applications filed by the new applicants, for the limited purpose of enabling the existing operators to file representations. We are here concerned with the city town route services in Guntur, whose population is not more than five lakhs.

8. Under the old Act, the procedure contained in S. 47(1) required the factors stated in sub-clauses (a) to (f) thereof to be taken into account by the R.T.A. and it was further specifically provided in S. 47(1) that the R.T.A.:

"Shall also take into consideration any representation made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provisions of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by <ORG>, or by any local authority, or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies."

That would mean that existing operators, or recognised associations local or police authorities could file representations before the <ORG> objecting to grant of permit to new applicants. S. 47(3) further permitted the <ORG> to 'limit' the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in the region or in any specified area or on any specified route within the region. Adverting to S. 47(3) , <ORG> has, however, pointed out in <CITATION> , that while fixing the limit of the number of stage carriages under S.47(3) by the <ORG>, the said authority need not take into consideration any representation of the nature men-tioned in S. 47(1) nor hear the existing operators. <ORG> further pointed out tbat representations mentioned in S.47(l) are referable to representations contemplated by S. 57(3) of the Act. These representations are those made by existing operators to the <ORG>, after the publication of an application for a stage carriage permit. <ORG> further observed that representations contemplated by S. 47(1) and S. 57(3) are representations by existing operators made subsequent to the application for grant of permit and therefore, these representations do not however enter the field of determination of number of stage carriages under S. 47(3) of the (old) Act. The deliberations decision under S. 47(3) as to the number of permits are confined to the <ORG>'s administrative policy based on factors mentioned in S.47(1) and at the stage of S.47(3), there is no question of hearing the existing operators. Thus, even under the old Act, at the stage of limiting the number of permits under S. 47(3) there was no legal right vested in the existing operators either to file representations or to a right of hearing. A right to send representations and to a hearing was given before the <ORG> under S.57(3) only at the stage of actual grant of permit to the new operators.

9. Under the old Act, S. 57(3) provided that if any person filed an application for a permit, the same should be available for inspection, that <ORG> should publish the application and contents thereof and further state that representations (by existing operators) would be received, if sent, within particular time. If the grant of new applications was to result in exceeding the number of permits limited by Sec. 47(3), the applications were to be 'summarily' rejected. In other cases, the existing operators so representing should, under S. 57(5) be heard in the public hearing of the applications of the applicant.

10. The above procedure is changed under the New Act. We shall therefore compare Sec. 47(1) of the old Act and Sec. 71(1) of the new Act; and again Sec. 57(3) & (5) of the old Act and Sec. 80(2) of the new Act.

(A) "Sec. 47(1) (old Act) : Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit:-- (1) <ORG> shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely: --

(a) the interests of the public generally;

(b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken;

(c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served;

(d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service;

(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending;

(f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area;

and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provisions of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by <ORG>, or by any local authority, or police authority within whose juris,-diction any part of the proposed route or area lies:

Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owner."

"Sec. 71(1) (new Act):-- Procedure of <ORG> in considering application for stage carriage permit:-- (1) A <ORG> shall, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of this Act :

Provided that such permit for a route of fifty Kilometres or less shall be granted only to an individual or a <ORG> undertaking."

Note:-- (S.71(3) indicates procedure for limiting the number of permits in town with population not less than S lakhs).

(B) Sec. 57 (old Act):-- Procedure in applying for and granting permits:-- (3) On receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit <ORG> shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the <ORG> and shall publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted and the date, not being less than thirty days from such publication, on which and the time and place at which the application and any representations received will be considered;

Provided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with the modifications would have the effect of increasing the number of vehicles operating in the region or in any area or on any route within the region under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-sec. (3) of S. 47 or sub-sec. (2) of S. 55 , as the case may be, <ORG> may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in this subsection.

(5) When any representation such as is referred to in sub-sec. (3) is made, <ORG> shall dispose of the application at a public hearing at which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard either in person or by a duly authorised representative."

"S. 80(2) (new Act):-- Procedure in applying for and granting permits:-- (2) <ORG> shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act Provided that <ORG> may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under cl. (a) of sub-sec. (3) of S.71 or of contract carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under cl.(a) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 74 :

Provided further that where <ORG> refuses an application for the grant of permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter."

11. It is important to note that there is no reference to any representation in S.7(1) of the New Act, which corresponds to S. 47(1) of the old Act. All that S. 71(1) states is that the <ORG> shall, while considering the applications for stage carriage permit, have regard to "the objects of the Act". While S. 47(3) of the old Act permitted the <ORG> to limit permits in all routes without reference to the extent of population, the new S. 71(3) permits such a limit to number of permits to be imposed only in towns with population of not less than 5 lakhs, that too provided <ORG> and <ORG>

ment so direct, as stated in S. 71(3) of the new Act. There is also no reference to the factors (a) to (f) referred to in S. 47(3) or to the filing of any representations by the existing operators of associations, local authority or police authorities. Nor is there any reference to submission of representations in S. 80(2) of the new Act which corresponds to S. 57(3) of the old Act. Further, under the first proviso to S. 80(2) , the applications for permits are liable for summary rejection if the grant thereof will result in exceeding the number of permits limited under S. 71(3) for city routes in towns with population of not less than five lakhs. Under the second proviso to S. 80(2) , a right of hearing is limited to the applicant alone and if the permit is to be refused, reasons shall have to be given.

12. So far as the right of existing operators to send representations and seek a right of hearing are concerned, identical questions arose in the <ORG> of Uttar Pradesh after the <ORG> amendment in <ORG> Act 25 of 1972. By that amendment, S.47(1) was amended by omitting the right of representation to existing operators given under the Central Act . However that right in so far as local and police authorities were/concerned was retained. It was held by a Division Bench of <ORG> in <NAME> v. <ORG> that, after the <ORG> amendment, the right of representation by existing operators has ceased to exist as the said provision is dropped.

13. The said U.P. amendment omitting the right of representation by existing operators, came up for consideration before <ORG> in <CITATION> . . Adverting to the right of a rival operator to object to the grant of the application of other persons, <ORG> referred to Art. 19(l)(g) and (6) of the Constitution of India and held that rival operators have no right to represent against the grant of permit to other persons. Such a right to represent, if it has to be conferred on an existing operator, it can be done only by way of a law made under Art. 19(6) in the interests of the general public. <ORG> observed (in para 8) :

"The fact that some others have also been enabled to obtain permits for running buses cannot constitute a violation of the appellants' rights under the above two cls. ((f) and (g)) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. The above provisions are not intended to grant a monopoly to a few bus operators to the exclusion of other eligible persons. No right guaranteed to any private party by Art. 19 of the Constitution of carrying on trade and business without competition from other eligible persons. Cl. (g) of Art. 19(1) gives a right to all citizens subject to Art. 19(6 ), to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. It is an enabling provision and does not confer a right on those already practising a profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business to exclude and debar fresh eligible entrants from practising that profession or from carrying on that occupation, trade or business. The said provision is not intended to make any profession, business or trade the exclusive preserve of a few persons."

The aforesaid judgment of <ORG>, therefore, makes it clear that an existing operator has no fundamental right to a monopoly of the trade, business or occupa tion and after the omission by the U.P. amending Act of 1972 of the right of representation by existing operators, no such right could be claimed. We may add that viewing the matter from the point of view of the new applicant's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g ), the said right can be fettered only to the extent specified by law made under Art. 19(6). Under the old Act, the fetters on this fundamental right of the new applicant included a right conferred on existing operators and others under Ss.47(1), 57(3), (5) to represent. Those fetters have now been removed under S.71(1) and S.80(2) of the new Act of 1988. An existing operator, in our view, cannot, therefore, claim a right of representation or a right to be heard before the <ORG> These rights have been specifically omitted in the new Act by <ORG>.

14. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners (respondents) however relied upon a later decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> . to contend that the decision in <CITATION> . no longer holds the field. In view of the subsequent statutory changes in <ORG> we are of the view that this contention cannot be accepted. What happened in <ORG> was that, after the <ORG> Amendment of 1972 to the Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 it was found that certain anomalies had arisen in the working thereof, particularly in regard to the provision allowing an unrestricted number of stage carriage permits to be granted. With a view to remedy the situation, the <ORG> Legislature amended the Act again by the <ORG> Act 15 of 1976 permitting restriction of the number of permits. Thereafter the Central Act was also amended by <ORG> in certain respects by Act 47 of 1978. Even so the State Government had issued certain notifications dated 10-1-1981 and 23-1-1981 permitting grant of permits to all eligible applicants without any upper limit. <ORG> held that these notifications were inconsistent with the limitations as to number of permits introduced afresh by the <ORG> Amending Act, 1976 and were bad. Their Lordships referred to the earlier judgment in <CITATION> . and said that the judgment was good as the law stood before the <ORG> Amendment Act , 1976 and that once the <ORG> Legislature had itself changed the law in 1976, the State Government could not have issued notifications inconsistent with the amending Act of 1976. It is, therefore, clear from the judgment in <CITATION> . that <ORG> nowhere-doubted the correctness of its earlier judgment in <CITATION> fact, it stated (at para 19) :

"Without saying anything more on the point, it may be stated that whatever this <ORG> may have observed while considering that provision would not apply now as there is a clear departure made by the <ORG> from that policy when it enacted the new sub-sec. (2) of S.43-A."

We may point out that <ORG> nowhere said in <CITATION> . that even after the U.P. Amendment of 1972, (which are similar to the provisions of the present Act of 1988) omitting the provisions relating to the right of representation and right of hearing to existing operators, the existing operators have a right to represent or a right to be heard before the R.T.A. Hence, this latter decision, far from supporting the writ petitioners, supports the appellants as it reiterates the correctness of <NAME> v. State of U.P. according to the law as it stood before the U.P. Amendment of 1976.

15. We may, in the context of Article 19(1)(g) and (6) also refer to four other rulings of <ORG>. In <NAME> v. R.T.A. Calcutta Region , smaller taxis at cheaper rates were introduced by orders of the R.T.A. and the same was questioned by taxi-owners who were to charge higher rates, on the ground that their business would be affected. The contention was rejected by <ORG> holding that if other persons were also allowed the right to carry on the same occupation and an element of competition was introduced in the business, that did not amount to violation of fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g). In another case in <CITATION> relating to change of location of existing rice-mill which adversely affected the business of another miller in the locality, it was held that a compelitor in the business (owner of another rice-mill), could have no grievance against the grant of permission to another under the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act , 1958 and the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) was subject only to such restrictions as are imposed under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution of India. A similar question arose again under the Bombay <ORG> Regulation Act, 1953 and the Bombay <ORG> Rules (1954) in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578. It was held, on an elaborate consideration of the case-law, that the said Act and Rules did not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trader to lodge an objection in response to a notice published under R.4. The proprietor of a <ORG> theatre holding a licence for exhibiting films had no legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which could be subjected to or threatened with injury as a result of the grant of no objection certificate' to the rival trader. After elaborately discussing the meaning of the words 'aggrieved person' in various laws, <ORG> observed (see para 46):

"Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Ed. by <NAME>, p. 357, para 85). The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it is that such harm done to an individual is again to society at large."

and again stated (para 49):

".......the result of the exercise of discretionary powers, in his (existing licence) favour, will, on balance, be against public policy. It will eliminate healthy competition in this business which is so essential to raise commercial morality; it will tend to perpetuate the appellant's monopoly of cinema * business in the town, and above all, it will in effect, seriously injure the fundamental right of respondents 1 and 2, which they have under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India to carry on trade or business subject to 'reasonable restrictions imposed by law'."

Again, in <CITATION> . the question arose under the M.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act and <NAME> case AIR 1976 SC 578 above referred to, was followed.

16. Viewing therefore from the perspective of Art. 19( 1 )(g)  & (6) of the Constitution of India, it is clear that the existing operators have no 'legal right'to object to the grant of a permit to rival operators. Any injury by way of loss of business to the existing operators cannot, in law, be treated as a 'legal injury'. There would be no legal injury if such injury was the result of exercise of a fundamental right by another person.

17. Learned counsel for the writ peti-

tioners while accepting that there is no express provision in the new Act either in S. 71(1) or S. 80(2) conferring on the existing operators a legal right to file representations or for being heard have, however, contended that such a right has to be 'implied' by law. We shall now refer to this aspect of the matter.

18. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners (respondents) Sri. T. Venkataramana and Sri M. V. Ramana Reddy, referred to <CITATION> (AIR 1967 SC 1267); <CITATION> . ; <CITATION> ;_ National Textile Workers' Union v. <NAME> Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India <NAME> v. State of H.P. ; <CITATION> ; <CITATION> ; <ORG> v. Govt. of A.P. and Re Liverpool Taxi Owners' Assn. (1972) 2 All ER 589 for the proposition that 'whenever an order is passed by any authority which is likely to affect the rights of another person, such person must be given a reasonable opportunity to submit his objections. It is also stated in these decisions that principles of natural justice are to be implied and that there can also be a post-decisional opportunity in certain cases. On the other hand the learned Advocate General has referred to <CITATION> and <CITATION> . to contend that principles of natural justice can be expressly excluded and that such exclusion can be necessarily implied in certain cases.

19. In our view, there can be no quarrel with the general propositions of law referred to above by the learned counsel. No doubt, principles of natural justice can normally be implied even if there is no express provision therefore whenever the rights of a party are affected. But, at the same time, it is equally true that they can be excluded by the statute expressly or by necessary implication. This depends again on the intendment of the legislature, the provisions of the particular statute and the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, once again come back to the question as to what is the position under the new Act of 1988?

20. We have noticed that under the old Act, there were provisions in Sec. 47(1) as well as S. 57(3) and (5) enabling existing operators to submit their representations and for a hearing to be given to them. But under the new Act, 1988 these provisions have been deliberately dropped by <ORG>. The Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly states that the new Act proposes to liberalise the grant of permits. In such a situation, it is, in our opinion, not open to this Court to imply and read into the new Act, the same provisions which have been deliberately and expressly omitted. The new applicants for grant of stage carriage permits are obviously exercising their fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) to carry on their occupation, trade or business. Such a fundamental right can, no doubt, be restricted by an existing law or a new law, by the imposition of reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public under Art. 19(6). It is for <ORG> from time to time to define the limits up to which the said fundamental right unde'r Art. 19(1)(g) can be reasonably restricted. Under the old Motor Vehicles Act , 1939 the restrictions included one which enabled-an existing operator to represent and also to be heard in opposition. That restriction has now been deliberately removed and thereby the fundamental right of the applicant is not now as restricted as it was before the new Act. Further an existing operator cannot be said to suffer any legal injury (vide <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578) if a new rival operator is proposed to be introduced. These being the factors governing the situation, we are of the view that <ORG> intended to negative any right to the existing operators either to submit their representations or to a right to a hearing under S. 71(1) or S. 80(2) of the new Act. It is therefore not open to the Court to imply principles of natural justice and add further restrictions than what <ORG> considered sufficient, according to its new legislative policy. A similar change in the legislative policy brought about by <ORG> in 1972 has already had the approval of <ORG> and <ORG> as stated in detail earlier.

21. The decision in Re Liver Pool Taxi Owners' Association (1972-2 All ER 589) relied upon by Sri <NAME> for the writ petitioners turned, as stated by <ORG> in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578 on the peculiar facts therein and in particular on the assurance or undertaking given by the officials of <ORG> and cannot help the writ petitioners. There, the number of taxi-cabs had been limited since 1948 to 300 by the licensing authority namely <ORG>. In 1970, after learning that the <ORG> proposed to increase the number of licences, the taxi-cab owners' association took up the matter with the '<ORG>. On 24th July, 1970 and 28th October 1970 the town-clerk of the <ORG> wrote to the solicitors of the association that the interested parties and the association would be fully consulted and heard before any decision was taken. In July, 1971, the matter came up before a sub-committee of the <ORG>, the association was heard and the limits proposed by the Committee were approved by the council and finally on 4th August, the Chairman of the sub-Committee gave an undertaking that no licences additional to the existing 300 licences would be issued until the proposed legislation, which was under consideration, had come into force. But this undertaking was not adhered to later on the ground that it had no legal basis and the <ORG> unilaterally resolved on 22nd December, 1971 to increase the number of licences. <ORG> held that the undertaking that was given was compatible with the <ORG>'s statutory duties and that it could be prohibited from acting contrary to the said undertaking. It is important to notice that under S. 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847, the <ORG> had a right to 'limit' the number of licences. Further, there was an undertaking given on behalf of the <ORG>. Adverting to this decision, it was observed in J. M.

<CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578, by <NAME> as follows (see paras 24, 25):

"It may be noted that in this case, the whole question turned on the effect in law of the , undertaking and whether the applicants had been treated fairly.

Emphasising the 'very special circumstances' of the case, the <ORG> read into the statute, a duty to act fairly in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thus, a corresponding right to be treated fairly was also imported by implication in favour of the applicants. Viewed from this standpoint, the" applicants had an interest recognised in law which was adversely affected by the impugned action. They had suffered a wrong as a result of the unfair treatment on the part of the <ORG>."

The abovesaid English decision is therefore clearly distinguishable. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners attempted to argue that the above English case was not based on the undertaking alone. We are unable to agree with this contention particularly in view of the observations of <ORG>. So far as the decision in <CITATION> . is concerned, that decision related to the locus standi of the petitioner tenant therein to file a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India questioning an exemption granted by the <ORG> under S. 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act , 1976 to the owner of the premises. It was held that though the petitioner had locus standi to file a writ petition, the petitioner's legal rights as such were not affected and also that it had no right to be heard. While locus standi occupied a 'larger area' governing the right to approach the <ORG> under Art. 226 , every such person could not claim a legal right to be heard before the <ORG> under S. 20(1) of the said Act. For the purposes of application of principles of natural justice, the question according to the learned Judges was merely whether 'any legal power has been exercised over a person affecting his legal rights and not whether he has some legal right to move the <ORG>s. For that purpose, the <ORG> relied upon the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> AIR 1976 SC 578.

22. It was then argued for the respondents by Sri M. V, <NAME> that the <ORG>, was a quasi-judicial tribunal and that it was a body exercising powers in 'public interest' and therefore it ought to receive representations from existing operators and give them a right of hearing. In our view, the provisions of S. 71 and S. 80 in the new Act as compared with Ss. 47 and 57 of the old Act clearly define the limits of the restrictions to be imposed in 'public interest' under Art. 19(6) and therefore, the <ORG>. while exercising powers under the new Act has necessarily to bear in mind those restrictions and cannot impose any other restrictions in the context of Art. 19(6 ), that were statutorily imposed earlier by Ss. 47 and 57 of the old Act.

23. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that when the <ORG> is dealing with new applications for grant of stage carriage permits, existing operators cannot claim any legal right to file representations or a right for being heard.

24. We shall next refer to the right of the existing operators to obtain copies of the applications filed by new applicants under Rule 166 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 166 reads thus:

"166. Levy of fees for supply of copies of documents:-- The Secretary, <ORG>, and Secretary, <ORG>, <ORG> or any authority specified by the said Tribunal may in its discretion give any person interested in an appeal or revision a certified copy of the decision or an order or of any other relevant documents on payment of a fee of Rupees two, such payment being made by means of <ORG> fee stamps affixed to the application for each such copy of the decision, orders, petition or documents."

It will be noticed that, under the said Rule, the <ORG> may, in its discretion, give any person interested in an appeal or revision, a certified copy of the decision or an order or of any other relevant documents on payment of the fee. In the present case, the applications filed by the writ petitioners before the <ORG> do not anywhere say that the applicants are interested in filing an appeal or revision. On the other hand, they merely say that they, as existing operators, require the certified copies of the applications filed by other applicants with a view to file 'representations' and that unless such certified copies are granted, they will not be in a position to file effective representations. Hence the applications of the writ petitioners do not, in our view, satisfy the requirements of R. 166. Further, we are of the view that the question of filing any application for a certified copies of the orders, decisions, petition or documents referred to in R. 166 arises only after the <ORG> disposes of the application for grant of stage carriage permit and not before that stage.

25. So far as W.A, No. 796/90 (arising out of W.P. No. 14969/89) is concerned, where copies are asked also for purpose of submission of representation to higher authorities, we may state that R. 166 does not cover such a situation.

26. We may point out that even after the grant of such permits, the existing operators, have, as conceded before us, no right of appeal under S. 89 of the Act. There is no provision for appeal by existing operators.

27. It is no doubt argued by Sri <NAME> and Sri. M, V. Ramana Reddi that the existing operators are, however, entitled to file revisions under Sec. 90 as 'persons aggrieved'. Reliance for that purpose is placed upon the decision of <ORG> in <CITATION> . wherein it was held, with reference to S. 64-A of the old Act, that though the existing operators had no right to represent at the stage of Sec. 47(3) when the public need is gone into and the <ORG> decides to open a new route, the existing operators could file a revision under Sec. 64-A. It is argued, on the said anology, that even if existing operators have no right to represent or right to be heard at the stage of Ss. 71 and 80, they could still file revisions under S. 90 . We do not think it necessary for the purpose of the cases before us to decide the question whether existing operators could file revisions under S.90 against orders granting stage carriage permit to applicants inasmuch as the matter in these writ petitions is still at the stage of grant of permits by the <ORG> and also because the question whether they had a right of revision will depend upon the scheme of the Act.

28. There was also some argument before us as to whether under S. 89(2) of the new Act permits for stage carriage ought to be ordinarily granted as a matter of course in cases not covered by S. 71(3) . While for the appellants and for some of the new applicants it was argued that was the positional was argued for the writ petitioners (respondents) and for some of the other new-applicants, that even in cases not covered by S. 71 (3) of the new Act, it is incumbent on the <ORG> to bear in mind the guidelines referred to in R. 179 of the new A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (corresponding to Rule 212 of the old Rules). We do not think it necessary to decide this question either.

29. The only and limited question therefore decided by us is that whenever fresh applications are filed under S.72 read with Ss. 70, 71 and 80 of the new Motor Vehicles Act , 1988, existing operators have no legal right !o file representations before the <ORG> Nor can they claim any right to be heard by the <ORG> It may however be open to them to send whatever representations they may like to send, as a matter of information, to the <ORG> but this they cannot claim as of right. If any representations are so sent, it is open to the <ORG> to consider them if there is anything relevant in the said representations. But the <ORG> may or may not consider every such representation sent by the existing operators. Nor can the existing operators claim any legal right to be heard before the <ORG> under any circumstances. They cannot also claim a right to be given certified copies under R. 166 of the A. P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, of any applications filed by fresh applicants (who are seeking stage carriage permits) on the ground that such copies are necessary 'for filing effective representations' before the <ORG> We do not decide any other question or questions which may have been incidentally referred to during the arguments, as it is not relevant for the question being decided by us.

30. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeals are allowed, the orders of the learned single Judge are set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 330/- in each case.

31. Appeals allowed.


PETITIONER: M/S. MATHRA PRASHAD AND SONS. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1961 BENCH: <NAME>, M. BENCH: <NAME>, M. <NAME>, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) <NAME>, J.L. SHAH, J.C. MUDHOLKAR, J.R. CITATION: 1962 AIR 745 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 913 ACT: Sales Tax-Exemptions-Notification issued after commencement of financial year-Whether effective from date of notification or from commencement of financial year-East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 (E. P. of 1948). ss. 4,5,6,10,11-Notification dated September 27, 1954. HEADNOTE: Section 6(1) of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, provided that no tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified in the Schedule to the Act and that no dealer shall charge sales tax on the sale of goods which were "declared tax-free from time to time". Sub-section (2) of s. 6 empowered <ORG> by notification to add or to delete from the Schedule. On September 27, 1954, <ORG> issued a notification under s. 6 (2) 914 adding item 51 relating to manufactured tobacco to the Schedule. The appellant contended that sales tax was a yearly tax and hence the exemption, whenever given during the financial year, became operative as from the beginning thereof. ^ Held, (per <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, <NAME>, J., dissenting) that the exemption operated for the entire financial year. The tax was a yearly tax levied on the taxable turnover of a dealer every year though it was collected in some cases at the end of the year, in some cases quarterly and in other cases monthly. If the exemption operated for the period for which the tax was payable according as it was annually, quarterly or monthly the tax would be different for different persons; those paying annually would get exemption for the whole year but those paying quarterly or monthly would get the benefit in the quarter or month of the notification and not for earlier quarters or months. This could not have been intended. The exemption whenever it came in, in the year for which the tax was payable, exempted sales throughout the year, unless the notification fixed the date for the commencement of the exemption. <CITATION> .,  2 S.C.R. 189, referred to. Per <NAME>, J.-The exemption became operative only from the date of the notification. The tax was not a yearly tax. The use of the words "tax- free from time to time" in s. 6 (1) showed that the exemption could be given at any time during the year and that it would operate from the date of the notification and not from the beginning of the financial year. Otherwise, an exemption given or an imposition made near the end of the year will both operate from the beginning of the year. This was never intended JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9 of 61.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1959, of <ORG> in L.P.A. No. 86 of 1956.

<NAME>, Attorney-General of India, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the appellants.

<NAME>, Advocate-General, Punjab, <NAME> and <NAME>, for the respondents.

1961. December, 5. The Judgment of <NAME> <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>, was delivered by <NAME>, <NAME>, J., delivered a separate judgment.

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellants are a firm of general merchants which sells, among other goods manufactured tobacco as defined in the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act, 1954 (12 of 1954), which came into force in the State of Punjab from April 1, 1954. The firm is also a registered dealer under s. 7 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 and till the end of March, 1954, was paying sales tax on manufactured tobacco also. Indeed, the firm paid sales tax on manufactured tobacco, also for the next quarter ending on June 30, 1954, but did not pay in the succeeding quarter in view of certain events, to which a detailed reference will be made presently. On September 27, 1954, <ORG> issued a Notification (No. 4556-E & T (Ch)-54/957) by which the schedule of exemptions under s. 6 of the Sales Tax Act was amended by the inclusion of item 51, which reads as follows:

"51. Manufactured tobacco as defined in the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act, 1954." This Notification was preceded by a Notification of May 7, 1954 (No. 427-E & T (Ch)-54/369), by which <ORG> had given notice, as required by law, of its intention to add the said item in the schedule of exemptions. In June, 1954, <ORG> issued a Press Note by which it was intended to convey to the dealers that though the Tobacco Vend Fees Act had come into force from April 1, 1954, it was not intended to levy both the sales tax as well as the fee for any period. The Press Note reads as follows:

"There is some misapprehension in the minds of dealers in manufactured tobacco as to whether sales tax is also chargeable in respect of manufactured tobacco after the 1st April, 1954, in addition to the license fees under the Tobacco Vend Fees Act. Government would like to make it clear that although the Tobacco Vend Fees Act has come into force with effect from 1st April, 1954, no license fees for dealers have yet been prescribed under the Act. Therefore, the levy of sales tax continues till the Vend Fee licences come into operation. It is to be clearly understood that the Vend Fee will be proportionately reduced for the current financial year to adjust the period for which sales tax will have been charged. Manufactured tobacco will be exempted from sales tax simultaneously with the enforcement of the Vend Fees."

On August 2, 1954, <ORG> issued another Press Note, in which the decision was altered. The Press Note said:

"Government recently announced through a press note that the levy of Sales Tax on manufactured tobacco would be continued till the Vend Fee Licences came into operation and that the Vend Fee would be proportionately reduced for the current financial year in respect of the period for which Sales Tax would have been charged. In order to avoid double taxation, Government have since reconsidered the matter and have, in supersession of the previous decision, decided that the Sales Tax, if any, recovered from the dealers would be refunded and that no Sales Tax would be charged during the current financial year in respect of sales of tobacco which fall under the Tobacco Vend Fees Act. Tobacco Vend Fees will be recovered at full rates for the whole year as and when rules under the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act are finalised."

It appears that the Rules under the Tobacco Vend Fees Act were not promulgated; nor were the forms and licences prescribed during the financial year ending on March 31, 1955. In the meantime, the appellants, as already stated, paid sales tax on sales of manufactured tobacco for the first quarter ending June 30, 1954, and the Notification exempting manufactured tobacco from sales tax was issued on September 27, 1954. The appellants had made enquiries from <ORG>, Punjab, about the Press Note of August 2, 1954, and had been assured that the Notification as printed in the Newspapers was accurate, and that Government intended implementing the Press Note.

On January 23, 1956, the appellants received a notice from <ORG>, Rohtak, calling upon them to produce their account books. The appellants as well as other dealers of manufactured tobacco similarly affected, made representations on the basis of the Press Note of August 2, 1954, but without success. The appellants then filed on February 8, 1956 a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for substantially three reliefs. They were: (a) a declaration that the levy of sales tax on manufactured tobacco upto September 26, 1954 was illegal; (b) refund of the sales tax paid by it for the quarter ending June 30, 1954; and (c) an order in the nature of a writ of <ORG> against the proposed levy of sales tax till September 26, 1954. It remains to mention that the sales tax authorities were acting in conformity with a Press Note issued in August, 1955, by which the State Government went back upon the policy declared in August, 1954 and reaffirmed the policy stated in the Press Note of June, 1954. The following extract from the Press Note of August, 1955 may be read here:

"2. In conformity with the press note issued in June, 1954, and in view of the facts explained above, Government have now decided that sales tax on tobacco shall be levied for the year 1954-55 before the 27th September,  only, the date on which tobacco was included in the schedule of exemptions appended to the General Sales Tax Act . This amounts to a handsome concession to the dealers and Government except that, in return, every cooperation shall be shown by the dealers of the assessing authorities in the matter of the assessment of the tax."

The petition under Art. 226 was heard by a learned Single Judge of <ORG>, who held that the orders of Government were entirely in accordance with law, that the East Punjab Sales Tax Act, in so far as it related to the sale of manufactured tobacco was not repealed by the Tobacco Vend Fees Act, and that sales tax on manufactured tobacco was payable from April 1, 1954 to September 26, 1954, in view of the fact that the exemption was made on September 27, 1954, and would operate from the latter date. Against the decision of the learned Judge dismissing the writ petition, an appeal under Letters Patent was filed. <ORG>, which heard the appeal, agreed with the judgment appealed from, and dismissed the appeal. A certificate was, however, granted to the appellants and the present appeal has been filed.

Two contentions were raised in the forefront before <ORG>, by the appellants. The first was that the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act had pro tanto repealed the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, and that sales tax on manufactured tobacco could not be levied after April 1, 1954. The second was that <ORG> by its assurance in the Press Note of August, 1954, had estopped itself from reversing its policy and claming the sales tax up to the date of the Notification. These points were not seriously pressed upon us, because there can be two taxes on the same commodity or goods without the one law repealing the other. No repeal can be implied, unless there is an express repeal of an earlier Act by the later Act, or unless the two Acts cannot stand together. The first argument was, therefore, rightly rejected in <ORG>. The second argument is also without force. There can be no estoppel against a statute. If the law requires that a certain tax be collected, it cannot be given up, and any assurance that it would not be collected, would not bind <ORG>, whenever it choose to collect it.

The question which is now raised, and of which there is but a trace in <ORG> is the real one to decide, and it may be formulated thus; Did the exemption in the Notification issued on September 27, 1954 have effect from that date, or from the beginning of the financial year ? We are not concerned with the question whether, in the absence of rules and forms, the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act, 1954 could operate from April 1, 1954. Whether it did or did not, can make no difference to the sale tax, because the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act, 1954 did not abrogate the Sales Tax Act . If sales Tax was not payable, it would be because of the exemption, and the only question thus is when the exemption began to operate. The Notification does not say from what date the exemption operates. Taking the Notification by itself, it cannot be said that it comes into force from an earlier date. Both sides have thus called in aid provisions of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act and the Rules to determine the date from which the exemption can be said to operate. Reference was made by the appellants to a decision of this Court in <CITATION> .(1), where a notification increasing sales tax on edible oils issued in the middle of the year 1948 was held not to apply to the assessee in that year, inasmuch as its liability to tax had become fixed on April 1, earlier, as it had elected to pay tax on the turnover of the previous year. The scheme of taxation under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (15 of 1948) and the Rules under that Act is so vastly different from the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act and the Rules under it, that a detailed reference to that case may not be necessary.

The question thus must be viewed in the setting of the East Punjab Sales Tax Act and the Rules under it. We shall refer to them shortly as the Act and the Rules in the rest of this judgment. The Act was passed in 1948, and came into force on November 15, 1948. Previous to this, sometimes licence fee under an earlier Tobacco Vend Fees Act and sometimes sales tax also under an earlier Sales Tax Act had been levied but not side by side in the Province. The history of these earlier Acts was brought to our notice during the course of the argument, but nothing turns upon it.

The sales tax under the Act continued to be levied up to April 1, 1954, and none has disputed that it could be levied. On that date, the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act came into force. We have already said that the latter Act did not repeal pro tanto the earlier. The liability for sales tax in this appeal is for two quarters ending June 30, 1954, and September 30, 1954. There is no dispute that after September 27, 1954 sales tax could not be levied, in view of the inclusion of item 51 in the schedule exempting manufactured tobacco from the operation of the Act. We must now examine those provisions of the Act which are claimed by the rival parties to indicate the moment of time from which the exemption granted by the Notification began to operate. "Turnover" has been defined in the Act to include the aggregate of the amounts of sales and parts of sales actually made by any dealer during the given period, less certain allowances, and "year" means the financial year. Sections 4 and 5 read together are the charging sections, the first dealing with the incidence of the tax, and the second, with its rate. Section 6 (1) provides for exemptions on the sale of goods which are specified in schedule to the Act. Under s. 6 (2), <ORG> has been given the power to add to or delete from that schedule. Section 10 deals with the making of returns and payment of the tax. Section 27 empowers <ORG> to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. This is the general scheme of the Act, in so far as we are concerned; but a somewhat detailed examination of these sections is necessary to understand the rival contentions.

Section 4 consists of five sub-sections. Sub Section (1), which is a subject to the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 , says that every dealer, except one dealing exclusively in goods declared tax-free under s. 6 , whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of the Act exceeded the taxable quantum, shall be liable to pay tax under the Act on all sales effected after the coming into force of this Act. A proviso is added, which is not relevant. Sub-section (2) says that every dealer who is liable to pay tax under the first sub-section shall be liable to pay it on the expiry of 30 days after the date on which his gross turnover first exceeds the taxable quantum. Sub-sections (3) and (4) deal with the continuance of the liability of the dealer under certain circumstances, and are not relevant here. Sub- section (5) then defines "taxable quantum" in relation to different kinds of dealers, and fixes a certain amount as the lowest limit. Since, in the present case, the taxable quantum is above the limit applicable to the appellants and they are also admittedly dealers, a detailed reference to the provisions of sub-s. (5) is unnecessary. Section 5 , which deals with the rate of tax, is made subject to the other provisions of the Act, and the first sub-section says that there shall be levied on the taxable turnover every year of a dealer a tax at such rates (not exceeding two pice in a rupee) as <ORG> may by notification direct. "Taxable turnover"

is then defined by the second sub-section to mean that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom, inter alia his turnover during that period of tax- free sales, sales to registered dealers, sales to any undertaking supplying electrical energy, sales to dealers outside Punjab and other sales, as may be prescribed. With none of these deductions we are concerned in this case.

Now, the appellants emphasise the words "gross turnover during the year" in s.4 (1) and the words "taxable turnover every year of a dealer" in s. 5 (1), and argue that the tax is computed year-wise, and the exemption must, therefore, operate for the whole of the year in which it is made, irrespective of the date on which the Notification is made. The respondents, on the other hand, emphasise the words "gross turnover during any period" and "his turnover during that period" occurring in s. 5 , and contend that the tax is not year-wise but accrues, so to speak, from day to day or at least from period to period within a year, and the exemption thus operates not from the whole of the year, but for the period within which it is granted, and refer in aid of this argument, to ss. 6 and 10 . Sections 4 (1) and 5 (1) are subject to s. 6 , s. 5 (1), to other sections of the Act and so, s. 10 , and we have to see what they provide. Section 6 (1) is brief, and may be quoted in extenso. It reads:

"6 (1). No tax shall be payable under this Act on the sale of goods specified in the first column of the Schedule, subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column there of and no dealer shall charge Sales Tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax-free from time to time under this section."

The respondents emphasise the words "from time to time" in the first sub-section, and say that they also show that exemptions may be given, withdrawn, or given again and again several times during the year in respect of the same goods, and the exemptions, therefore, begin to operate when they are given and cease, when they are withdrawn. But, the appellants contend that these words merely indicate that the power may be exercised as often as needed, and do not indicate the time from which the operation of the exemption commences and the period during which it lasts. Section 10 (1) provides that the tax payable under the Act shall be paid in the manner provided at such intervals, as may be prescribed. Two Rules framed under s. 27 provide for such intervals. Rule 20 reads:

"Every registered dealer other than those referred to in rules 17, 18 and 19, shall furnish returns in Form S.T.VIII or S.T. XXIII, if so permitted quarterly within thirty days from the expiry of each quarter." (words underlined were introduced on June 28, 1955).

Rule 23:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of rules 20 and 21, the appropriate <ORG> may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix monthly returns for a dealer, who would otherwise be required to furnish quarterly or annually under these rules."

Section 10 and Rules 20 and 23 clearly provide that returns may be made annually, quarterly or monthly. The forms, S. T. VIII and S.T. XXIII, also are forms of returns of sales tax payable for the year, quarterly or monthly. It is thus possible that some dealers pay tax annually some, quarterly, and some, monthly.

The contention of the appellants is that s.10 read with Rules 20 and 23 merely provides for making of returns at prescribed intervals and the collection of tax is for a period falling between those intervals, but the tax is the tax appropriate to the whole year's result. The respondents contend that the effect of the section and the two Rules is that the tax due for the period of the return is separate from any other tax for any other period. Each period, according to them, must be viewed separately and not as part of a year. Thus, if exemption is granted during the second quarter, according to the respondents it affects that quarter and subsequent quarters but not the first quarter, because tax is payable on the turnover of a period and at such intervals, as may be applicable to an assessee.

We cannot help saying that the Act and the Notification could have been framed to obviate such unnecessary questions by providing clearly in them the time from which such exemptions would begin to operate. Similarly, if the rules under the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act had been framed in time and the Tobacco Vend Fees Act together with the Rules under it and the exemptions under the Sales Tax Act were brought into force together, a considerable amount of time to the <ORG> and the <ORG> would have been saved, as also trouble to the tax-payer. The Rules under the Punjab Tobacco Vend Fees Act were not framed during the whole of the financial year, 1954-55. Contradictory Press Notes were issued, which showed that the State Government itself was not sure of the true legal position, thus causing great confusion and distrust in the minds of the tax-payers.

There is no doubt that the tax is a yearly tax. It was payable, in the first instance, by a dealer whose gross turnover during the financial year immediately preceding May 1, 1949, was above the taxable quantum. The tax is to be levied on the taxable turnover of a dealer every year. The difference between gross turnover and taxable turnover is this, that to arrive at the taxable turnover of any period some deductions have to be made for the same period. This clearly shows that the tax is for a year. The method of collection allows collection of tax at intervals; in some cases, the tax is collected at the end of the year; in some others, the tax is collected quarterly and in still other cases, even monthly. If the exemption can be said to operate for that period for which the tax is payable according as it is annually, quarterly or monthly, the tax would be different for different persons. Those who are paying the tax annually would get exemption for the whole year; but those who are paying it quarterly or monthly would get benefit in the quarter or the month of the Notification but not for earlier quarters or months. It could not have been intended that the exemption was to operate differently in the case of dealers with different intervals of assessment.

The exemption thus must operate either from the date of the Notification or from the commencement of the financial year. Here, the nature of the tax, as disclosed in ss. 4 and 5 , is decisive. In s. (5), the tax is made leviable "on the taxable turnover every year of a dealer". The divisions of the year and the taxable turnover into different parts are to make easy the collection of tax, and form part of the machinery sections. If the tax is yearly and is to be paid on the taxable turnover of a dealer, then the exemption, whenever it comes in, in the year for which the tax is payable, would exempt sales of those goods throughout the year, unless the Act said that the Notification was not to have this effect, or the Notification fixed the date for the commencement of the exemption. In the present case, the Notification did not fix the date from which the exemption was to operate, probably because the Act omitted to make such provision, enabling the <ORG> to do so, and the exemption must, therefore, operate for the whole year, during which it was granted.

The case of this Court, to which we have referred earlier, dealt with an Act under which the taxpayer could elect to pay the tax on the turnover of either the previous year or the year of assessment. A notification in the middle of the assessment year was considered, and was held inapplicable in those cases where a dealer had elected to pay tax on the turnover of his previous year. The majority view on that occasion pointed out that it was not possible to divide the assessment year in two portions, in which the tax was levied at one rate in one part and another rate in another part. The case was confined to a dealer who had elected to pay the tax for a year different from that in which the exemption was granted. Those facts do not exist here; but if the case is considered at all relevant, it supports the appellants rather than the respondents.

In the result, the appeal succeeds, and is allowed with costs.

KAPUR, J.-The facts of this case have been set out in the judgment of my learned brother <NAME>, which I have had the advantage of reading and as I am unable to agree with the conclusion that the effect of the exemption given by Notification No. 34556-E & T. (CH)54/957 dated September 27, 1954, issued under s.6(2) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act (Act 16 of 1948), hereinafter called the "Act", on unmanufactured tobacco becomes effective as from the beginning of the financial year, I proceed to give my reasons for the same.

The period in regard to which the disputed amount of sales tax is sought to be levied was from April. 1, 1954 to September 27, 1954. Previous to the issuing of the notification of September 27, 1954, <ORG> issued a notification required under s.6(2) of the Act for the purpose of information of persons likely to be affected thereby and to give them an opportunity to file any objections or suggestions in regard to the same. A press note was issued on August 4, 1954 stating that no sales tax will be leviable on manufactured tobacco for the financial year 1954-55.

In order to resolve the controversy as to whether the exemption is effective from the commencement of the financial year or from the date of the notification it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the Act and the rules made thereunder. The East Punjab General Sales Tax Act (Act 46 of 1948) as amended, made provision for the levy of general sales tax on the sale of goods in the Punjab and repealed the General Sales Tax Act of 1941. Section 2 of the Act gives definitions and cl.(d) defines a "dealer" as a person.. engaged in the business of selling or supplying goods. In cl.(i) "Turnover" was defined to include-

"the aggregate of the amount of a sale and parts of the sale actually made by any dealer during the given period less any sum allowed as cash discount according to ordinary trade practice...."

Sections 4 and 5 are the charging sections, the former makes the tax leviable prospectively and the latter prescribes the rate of tax. The relevant portions of these sections when quoted are as follows:

S.4(1) "Subject to the provisions of sections 5 and 6 , every dealer except one dealing exclusively in goods declared tax-free under section 6 whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act exceeded the taxable quantum shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on all sales effected after the coming into force of this Act.

(2) Every dealer to whom sub-section (1) does not apply or who does not deal exclusively in goods declared to be tax-free under section 6 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on the expiry of 30 days after the date which his gross turnover first exceeds the taxable quantum."

"Taxable quantum" mentioned in sub-section (2) is defined in sub-section (5) of s. 4 .

Thus a dealer is liable to sales tax if his sales in the year preceding the commencement of the Act are more than the taxable quantum (s.

4.(1) or subsequently becomes so during any year. S. 5.(1) "Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall be levied on the taxable turnover every year of a dealer a tax at such rates not exceeding two pice in a rupee as the State Government may by notification direct:

Provided that Government may by notification in the Official Gazette declare that in respect of any goods or class of goods the dealer may pay such lump-sum by way of composition of the tax payable under this Act as the Government may notify from time to time.

(2) In this Act the expression "taxable turnover" means that part of a dealer's gross turnover during any period which remains after deducting therefrom.

(a) his turnover during that period on

(i) the sale of goods declared tax-free under section 6 ;

(ii)............................... .

(iii).............................. "

Section 6 which makes provision for giving exemption is as follows:-

S.6(1) "No tax shall be payable under this act on the sale of goods specified in the first column of the Schedule subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof, and no dealer shall charge Sales Tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax- free from time to time under this section. (2) The State Government, after giving by notification not less than three months' notice of its intention so to do, may by like notification add to or delete from the Schedule and thereupon the Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly." Section 10 deals with payment of taxes of returns. Clause (1) of s. 10 provides:-

S.10 (1) "Tax payable under this Act shall be paid in the manner hereinafter provided at such intervals as may be prescribed."

Section 11 is the section dealing with assessments. It provides that if <ORG> is satisfied that the returns furnished are correct and complete he shall assess the amount of tax due and if he is not so satisfied he can require the production of evidence which may be necessary and provision is also made for default in carrying out the notice issued. Section 27 gives the <ORG> the power to make rules. The relevant portions of this section are clauses

(h) and (i) which were as follows:-

(h) "the return to be furnished under sub- section (3) of section 10 , and dates by which and the authority to which, such returns shall be furnished;

(i) the date by which returns for any period are to be furnished and the procedure to be followed for assessment under section

Under the rule making power rules have been framed by <ORG> and reference may be made to Rules 20 and 23. Under the former rule every registered dealer is required to furnish returns in Form ST-VIII or ST-XXIII if so permitted quarterly within thirty days from the expiry of each quarter. Under the latter <ORG> is given the power to tax the returns to be made monthly in the case of a dealer who would otherwise be required to furnish them quarterly or annually.

It was argued that the tax under s.5 was a yearly tax and therefore whenever the exemption may be given during a financial year the effect of the exemption will become operative as from the beginning of the financial year and emphasis was laid on the words "there shall be levied on the taxable turnover every year of a dealer a tax.." The argument was that it was a yearly tax on the turnover and not that every year a tax was to be levied on the taxable turnover i.e. aggregate of the sales made during a given period. It was also argued that if the exemption of the turnover was to operate for the quarter in which the exemption was notified, the consequence will be absurd as those who pay the tax on quarterly returns or monthly returns will not be able to get the advantage of the exemption whereas those who pay on yearly returns will be so entitled.

I am unable to agree that the effect of the collection of the words in s. 5 and particularly of the words "shall be levied on the taxable turnover every year...... a tax" is what was argued by the appellants i.e. it was a yearly tax like the income tax. Section 6 which provides for exemption specifically envisages the declaration from time to time of exemption of goods which are to be tax-free. The use of the words "tax-free from time to time", in my opinion, means that the exemption may be given at any time during the year but it does not suggest that the exemption will operate from the beginning of the year and not from the time that the exemption is given. If this were not so the the imposition of sales tax by excluding an article exempt from tax from the schedule say about the end of the financial year would render the dealer liable to sales tax for the whole year even though he may not have collected any sales tax from his customers which under the law he would be entitled to do if the article is not in the schedule. It will be an imposition which is not envisaged by the general scheme of the Sales Tax Act because the tax is exigible on taxable turnover in every return made monthly or quarterly or yearly as the case may be. It appears that it is for that reason that in the definition of the word "turnover" the legislature has chosen the word "during the given period" i.e. the period for which the tax is leviable and is levied. Similarly in subsection (2) of s. 5 where sales tax is levied on the taxable turnover of a dealer the use of the word "during any period" is again repeated and in cl.(a) of that section reference is made to deduction from his turnover during that period of the sale of goods declared tax-free under s. 6 and that is for a good reason because s. 6 itself mentions the declaration of tax-free goods from time to time indicating that whenever during the year or at any time during the year when goods are notified to be tax-free.

That the intention of the legislature was to give exemption from the date of the notification or such date as is mentioned in the notification is further supported by the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the Act. Under s. 10 a dealer may be required to furnish his return at such intervals as may be prescribed and when he makes a return it must necessarily be of the goods on which during that period sales tax was exigible. Under sub- s.(4) of s.10 the dealer is required to pay into the <ORG> treasury the full amount of tax according to his return. Under s. 11 the assessment of the tax either on the acceptance of the return or after production of such evidence as may be required is to be made. From the provisions of a 11, it does not appear that returns are to be scrutinised at the end of the year like in income tax cases and assessment made on the income of the year preceding the assessment year. It is to be made in regard to each return whenever according to the rules the return has to be and is made. The tax is also paid for that period i.e. on the taxable turnover for the period for which the return is made and which becomes the subject matter of assessment. When the assessment has been made and the tax assessed is paid the assessment for that period is completed and all proceedings and liabilities and subjected to what is stated as to escaped periods.

This is further clear from the rules which have been made in regard to registration and furnishing of returns. In the registration certificate it has to be mentioned as to what goods are free of tax. Returns are required to be made in the Forms which are given i.e. Form VIII or Form XXIII. A return under Form VIII may be monthly, quarterly or yearly. A return to be made also provides for mentioning the turnover of tax- free goods and goods which are exempted from sales tax. If the contention of the appellants is correct, then after all the returns have been filed, the amount of sales tax according to the returns assessed and payments made, there will have to be proceedings for reassessment, remission or refund as the case may be in regard to those periods, if any goods are added to the schedule exempting them from sales tax after the assessment or any goods are deleted from the schedule thus making them liable for sales tax and that will be for the periods of which the assessment had already been completed and finished. That does not seem to be the scheme of the Act. It does not envisage reassessment for the purpose of refunding the tax assessed and paid on articles which were assessable at the time the assessment was made but became exempt later nor is it envisaged in the case of articles excluded from the schedule. Section 11(6) which deals with reassessments at the relevant time provided:

"If upon information which has come into his possession <ORG> is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of any period has failed to apply for registration, <ORG> shall.........assess to the best of his judgment the amount of tax.......due from the dealer."

The scheme of the Act and the rules made thereunder do not, in my opinion, show that the exemption becomes operative for the whole year whenever during the year the notification of exemption is issued even though it may be on the last day of the financial year.

I would therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

By <ORG>. In accordance with the judgment of the majority, the appeal stands allowed with costs.