HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD RESERVED A.F.R. Court No. - 1 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 737 of 2020 Applicant :- Chitra @ Bebi Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Atul Kumar,Deepak Dubey,M J Akhtar Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Amit Daga Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J. 1. It is idiomatically said that 'Dead men tell no tales'. But, sometimes, before a man crosses over to the netherworld, he may speak his mind or tell the circumstances that led to his death - homicidal or suicidal. In cases of suicide, an authentic and dependable suicide note is the most sterling evidence about what drove the man to take his own life. 2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 seeks to challenge the impugned charge-sheet bearing number 219A of 2019 dated November the 15th, 2019 submitted in Case Crime No. 223 of 2019, under Sections 306, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602, Police Station - Meerapur, District - Muzaffarnagar and the entire proceedings in Case No. 1984/9 of 2019, pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 3, Muzaffarnagar, as against the applicant. This application calls in question the aforesaid charge-sheet, primarily on the ground that no prima facie case against the applicant is disclosed on the basis of material carried in the impugned charge sheet, about her involvement in abetting the suicide committed by her brother-in-law (her sister's deceased husband), the Late Mohan Kumar. 3. This prosecution commenced on a First Information Report3 lodged by the deceased's brother, Rahul Kumar Sharma, on 28.07.2019, about the suicidal death of his brother on 25th of July, 2019. The FIR nominates the deceased's in laws, numbering seven, including his wife Smt. Menka alias Monty, his mother-in-law Smt. Kusum Lata, his three sisters-in-law, to wit, Indu Sharma, Chhaya Sharma and Romika Sharma, besides his brother-in-law Rajat Sharma. Another person nominated is one Rajendra Chaudhary, said to be an uncle of sorts to the deceased's in-laws. The applicant is not named in the FIR. The substance of the information, addressed to the police, says that the named in-laws of the deceased were frequently troubling him and he was in distress. Rajendra Chaudhary had repeatedly threatened the deceased to death and demanded money of him. The deceased had shared the last mentioned fact with the informant, but his in-laws would not give up on their wayward conduct and Rajendra Chaudhary and the other in-laws would repeatedly demand money of the deceased. It is reported that distressed over this issue, on 25.07.2019, at 12 O' Clock, the deceased jumped off the bridge built over the Ganga barrage, and into the river, committing suicide. It is also said that he had left home, riding the informant's motorcycle, which was later later on found. A suicide note in the deceased's handwriting was found at the informant's Dharm Kanta, wherein the deceased had blamed harassment by his wife and in-laws as the cause driving him to commit suicide. It is said in the closing lines of the FIR that the deceased did commit suicide because of the harassment that his wife and in-laws inflicted on him. 4. Heard Mr. V.M. Zaidi, leanred Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Imran Khan, learned Counsel for the applicant, Mr. Amit Daga, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no. 2, and Mr. Deepak Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State. 5. Mr. V.M. Zaidi, learned Senior Advocate, has primarily submitted that no prima facie case is made out against the applicant, as the allegations and the material collected during investigation do not show that there was any act done by the applicant vis-à-vis the deceased, that may be said to constitute either ''instigation' or a ''conspiracy' with the other co-accused, or ''aid' within the meaning of Section 107 IPC that led the deceased to commit suicide. He submits that in the absence of any material about an act or omission constituting instigation, conspiracy or aid on the applicant's part, that led the deceased to commit suicide, no case worth trial against the applicant is prima facie made out. He submits that on this ground, the impugned charge-sheet, as against the applicant, deserves to be quashed, which, if not done, would be an abuse of process of Court and lead to ends of justice being defeated. It is on the aforesaid case that Mr. Zaidi has advanced his submissions before this Court. 6. The learned Senior Advocate has proceeded to point out that the applicant, much unlike the other in-laws, has not been nominated in the FIR. Her name has been introduced on the basis of a second thought by the informant and the other family members of the deceased, who, according to the learned Senior Advocate, in any case, have launched a malicious and vindictive prosecution against the deceased's wife and in-laws for an oblique motive. That oblique motive, according to the learned Senior Advocate, is that the informant wants to deprive the deceased's wife of her inheritance in her husband's property, both movable and immovable. He has pointed out that the entire prosecution is mala fide and designed to achieve the last mentioned purpose. He has been at pains to point out that the informant has launched another mala fide prosecution against deceased's in-laws, reporting them for an offence involving a murderous assault on the informant and his family, besides loot of ornaments that belonged to the deceased's wife. By a reference to the other prosecution arising from an FIR registered as Case Crime No. 224 of 2019, under Sections 395, 323, 307, 364, 506, 145 IPC, Police Station - Meerapur, District - Muzaffarnagar, learned Senior Advocate urges that it shows the underlying mala fides that animate the impugned prosecution and its oblique purpose. Mr. V.M. Zaidi, further elaborating on his submissions, says that the applicant was not named in the FIR, and also in the earlier statement of the first informant recorded on 28.07.2019, under Section 161 of the Code or the statements of the other witnesses also recorded under Section 161. It is pointed out that the applicant's name was introduced for the first time in the statement of one Sushil Kumar, about a month after the incident, as a result of the continuing efforts, to bring oblique pressure upon the wife's family in order to coerce the wife into giving up her share in the deceased's property. The learned Senior Advocate has also pointed out to the various steps taken by the informant to get his name mutated over the deceased's share in the family's agricultural land and transfer of funds done from the deceased's bank account to his own. 7. Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the Court's attention to a copy of the mutation application dated 30.08.2019 moved by the informant before the Consolidation Officer-II, Sadar, Muzaffarnagar and registered as Case no.520. This document is annexed to the supplementary affidavit dated 10.09.2020, as Annexure no. SA-4. Learned Senior Counsel has also drawn the Court's attention to a photostat copy of the deceased's bank account statement, bearing Account ID no. 1609010100512190, where transfer of funds to the informant's Account have been shown. A copy of the said statement is annexed as part of Annexure no. SA-5 to the supplementary affidavit, last mentioned. 8. Mr. V.M. Zaidi, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his submissions noticed in the opening part of this judgment about the absence of necessary ingredients to make out a prima facie case of abetment to commit suicide, has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vs. State of Maharashtra and others4 and further on a decision of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab5. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in Sudhakar Pathak vs. State of U.P.6. All these authorities have been pressed in aid of the essential submission that the three necessary ingredients to attract an offence of abetment to suicide, that is to say, instigation, aid or conspiracy are at all not discernible from the material collected during investigation. 9. It must be remarked here that in aid of the Application, the applicant has filed three supplementary affidavits, to wit, the one dated 09.10.2020, another dated 16.01.2020 and still another dated 17.02.2020. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the complainant/ opposite party, to which the applicant has filed a rejoinder. The State have not come up with any return, but at the hearing, supported the impugned proceedings through Mr. Deepak Mishra, learned A.G.A. The learned A.G.A. says that the facts here show it to be a triable case, which ought not to be quashed. 10. Mr. Amit Daga, learned Counsel appearing for the second opposite party/ informant submits that though the applicant is not named in the FIR, but during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer found material showing her involvement in the crime. In this regard, he has, particularly, referred to the text messages sent by the deceased through his mobile phone to the mobile phone of his relatives, while alive. These messages have also been treated as a part of the suicide note and made part of the police papers. These messages specifically carry the name of the applicant as one of the persons responsible for driving the deceased to commit suicide. Learned Counsel for the second opposite party, therefore, says that it cannot be said that there is no material against the applicant connecting her to the crime. It is emphasized that the material collected during investigation shows that the applicant along with the other co-accused - all in-laws of the deceased created such inexorable pressure, where the deceased had no option except to put an end to his life. It is pointed out with reference to the averments in paragraph no. 9 of the counter affidavit and the suicide note annexed as Annexure no. CA-1 to the said affidavit that what the applicant has annexed for the deceased's suicide note, is not the complete document. It is pointed out that the suicide note is a part of the case diary, annexed to the second parcha dated 29.07.2019. 11. Learned Counsel for the second opposite party submits that though the suicide note, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure no. CA-1, does not specifically carry the applicant's name, but read as a whole, squarely blames all of the deceased's in-laws about that extreme position, where he was impelled to end his life. He submits that it is quite another matter that the deceased has, particularly, emphasized the malevolent role of his brother-in-law, Rajat and sister-in-law, Indu, but that, according to Mr. Daga, learned Counsel for the second opposite party, does not show that the applicant was no part of the conspiracy or instigation, that drove him to commit suicide. It is also submitted by the learned Counsel for the second opposite party, relying on averments made in paragraph no.10 of the counter affidavit that prior to scripting the suicide note, the deceased sent WhatsApp messages, carrying his photograph as well as a video from his mobile no. 9997589058 to the mobile number of the informant's elder brother, Sushil Kumar Sharma, where he specifically blamed the applicant alongwith the other co-accused as persons, who had tortured and harassed him to an extent that he had no option except to commit suicide. Copies of those WhatsApp messages are included in the case diary. 12. It is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the second opposite party that since the WhatsApp messages were sent on the WhatsApp messenger of his elder brother, Sushil Kumar Sharma, he was unaware about these messages when he lodged the FIR, or made his earlier statement to the police. It was during the course of investigation that Sushil discovered these WhatsApp messages on his phone and disclosed them to the police, who made them part of the case diary. It is these messages, which have shown the complicity of the applicant and certainly constitute material, on the basis whereof cognizance ought to be taken. It is urged with much emphasis on behalf of the second opposite party that the continued misbehaviour, torture, ill-treatment and harassment by the deceased's wife and in-laws, including the applicant, drove him to commit suicide and those acts do constitute intentional aid within the meaning of Section 107 IPC, besides conspiracy involving all the accused, so as to attract the provisions of Section 306 IPC. 13. This Court has keenly considered the submissions advanced on both sides and perused the record. It would be of seminal importance to extract the suicide note. The suicide note is part of CD no.2 dated 29.07.2019 and reads (in Hindi vernacular): "मै मोहित शर्मा आज दुखी होकर आत्महत्या करने जा रहा हूँ, मेरी मौत की सारी जिम्मेदारी मेरी ससुराल वालो की है, मेरी सबसे बड़ी साली इन्दु शर्मा, छाया, रजत शर्मा, रोमिता और सबसे खास राजेन्द्र चौधरी उर्फ चाचा और मेरी सास कुसुमलता की है। ये सब मुझ पर नाजायज दबाव बनाते है। मुझे दिन रात धमकी देते रहते है। मुझे बहुत परेशान कर रखा है। मेरी पत्नी का मुज0नगर में नाजायज रिश्ता है। वो मुझ पर ससुराल के पास घर लेकर रहने का दबाव बनाती है। मुझे गाली देती है। खाना तक छीन लेती है। मेरी आप सबसे बिनती है कि मेरे साले रजत को फॉसी और इन्दु को सजाये मौत जरूर देना और मेरा कोई पुत्र नहीं है। मेरी सारी सम्पत्ति मेरे प्रिय भाई राहुल कुमार को दे दी जाये और गै आज दुखी होकर जिसका कारण मेरी ससुराल के समस्त व्यक्तिगण है मैं आत्म हत्या करने जा रहा हूँ।" 14. Quite apart from it, are the contents of some WhatsApp messages, still photograph and videos, sent by the deceased to his elder brother, Sushil on 25.07.2019 at 11:26 a.m. in Hindi, but written in Roman script, which read thus: "Meri mout ki sari jimmedari meri sasural wali ki meri sali Indu, Chhaya Rajat, Chitra, romita, Rajendra Choudhary (ChaCha). Ye sab mujh par najayaj dabav banate rahten hai or Jaan se Marni ki damki deten rahten hai" 15. This message shows that the deceased was last seen on Thursday at 11:56 a.m. 16. There is yet another WhatsApp message, which carries the same suicide note, that was recovered from the informant's Dharm Kanta and made part of the case diary. There is one oddity, or at least a feature about the prosecution case, which shows that opportunity came knocking to save the deceased, but the one who could did not act. There is a statement attributed to one Faeemuddin, son of late Badaruddin recorded under Section 161 of the Code, where he says that the deceased scripted the suicide note in his presence and said that he was going to commit suicide, driven to it by his wife, Menaka and the in-laws. It is rather baffling that if the witness saw the deceased writing a suicide note, why he did not prevent him from moving away to accomplish his fatal intentions; but that is all about it. This statement under Section 161 may be true or not, but it does not, of its own, render the prosecution case incredible. 17. The material collected during investigation by the police shows that there are statements of the informant Sushil Sharma, the deceased's sister-in-law Smt. Nirupama Sharma wife of Sushil Sharma, Smt. Priyanka Sharma, another sister-in-law of the deceased, Sonu Dhimaan, an unrelated witness, who happened to pass by the deceased's residence on 25.07.2019, and another unrelated witness Akash Rastogi, who also passed by the deceased's house on 25.07.2019; and all of them saw the deceased's wife misbehave with him. The statements of the informant and the two sisters-in-law of the deceased show, amongst other things, that the deceased's wife would often stay at her parents' place, rather than her matrimonial home. She would repeatedly ask for money, apparently to meet her expenses and enforce her demand by show of anger and misbehaviour towards her husband. The deceased's wife wanted him to sell his property at Town Meerapur, District Muzaffarnagar and move over to her place at Patel Nagar, Muzaffarnagar. She was persuaded by the deceased's family not to indulge in that kind of behaviour, but she was aided in her pernicious conduct by her sisters, Chhaya, Romita, Indu, Chitra (applicant), her mother Kusum Lata and uncle Rajendra. All of them would coerce the deceased to part with money, and upon refusal, would threaten him with death. 18. There is a particular instance that appears in the statements of Smt. Nirupama Sharma, Smt. Priyanka Sharma and the two passersby, Sonu Dhimaan and Akash Rastogi, which indicate that the deceased Mohit Sharma and his wife were seen outside their house and the deceased's wife was misbehaving with him. The two sisters-in-law have said that the deceased's wife, Menaka beat him up publicly, a fact which many saw. The two public witnesses, who claimed to have witnessed the occurrence on 25.07.2019, have said that they saw the deceased, Mohit Sharma's wife misbehaving with him while they were passing by. She is alleged to have asked the deceased go somewhere and die. These witnesses also said that the deceased's wife said that when she demands money of him, he does not pay nor does he go over to Muzaffarnagar. It is said that thereafter Menaka beat him up. To the same effect is the statement of Akash Rastogi. All these statements have been recorded under Section 161 of the Code. The moot question is that, do all these statements taken together as material collected during investigation and the suicide note, besides the WhatsApp messages disclose a triable case of abetment to suicide against the applicant? 19. Gurcharan Singh vs. State of Punjab7 relied upon much by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the applicant was a case that came up before the Supreme Court in appeal from an order of conviction for an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. The deceased was the wife of one Dr. Jaspal Singh, whereas the appellant Gurcharan Singh was Dr. Jaspal Singh's brother. The victims were three in number, that is to say, Surjit Kaur, wife of Dr. Jaspal Singh and their two daughters, Geet Pahul and Preet Pahul. Apparently, four persons were charge sheeted after investigation, to wit, Satnam Kaur, who died pending committal proceedings, Gurcharan Singh, Ajit Kaur and Sukhvinder Singh alias Goldy. All of them were in-laws of the deceased, Surjit Kaur. At the conclusion of trial, Ajit Kaur was acquitted, whereas Gurcharan Singh and Sukhvinder Singh were convicted of the charge punishable under Section 306 IPC. The Trial Court awarded each of the accused a term of six years rigorous imprisonment. On appeal to the High Court, the conviction was upheld, but the sentences were reduced to five years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court by Special Leave preferred by Gurcharan Singh, the conviction was overturned and the appellant acquitted. The facts giving rise to the prosecution can no better be described than in their Lordships' words, where these are recorded thus: "3. The fascicule of facts, indispensable to comprehend the backdrop of the prosecution, has its origin in the inexplicable abandonment of the deceased Surjit Kaur and her two daughters, namely; Geet Pahul and Preet Pahul by Dr Jaspal Singh, their husband and father respectively, about two years prior to the tragic end of his three family members as above. The prosecution version is that Dr Jaspal Singh, who was initially in the government service, had relinquished the same and started a coal factory at Muktsar. He suffered loss in the business and consequently failed to repay the loan availed by him in this regard from the bank. As he and his brother Gurcharan Singh (appellant herein) and others succeeded to the property left by their predecessors, he started medical practice in private. 4. Be that as it may, before leaving his family, he addressed a communication to the bank concerned expressing his inability to repay the loan in spite of his best efforts as he was not possessed of any property in his name. Dr Jaspal Singh was thereafter not to be traced. Following this turn of events, according to the prosecution, his wife Surjit Kaur and his daughters shifted from Jalalabad where they used to stay to Abohar and started residing in a rented house of one Hansraj (PW 3). According to them, they had no source of income and further, they were also deprived of their share in the property and other entitlements, otherwise supposed to devolve on Dr Jaspal Singh. They were also not provided with any maintenance by the family members of her husband -- Jaspal Singh and instead were ill-treated, harassed and intimidated. 5. While the matter rested at that, on 3-10-2000 at about 10.30 p.m., Hansraj, the landlord of the deceased Surjit Kaur, being suspicious about prolonged and unusual lack of response by his tenants, though the television in their room was on, informed the brother of the deceased Surjit Kaur. Thereafter they broke open the door of the room and found all three lying dead. The police was informed and FIR was lodged. 6. In course of the inquisition, the investigating officer collected a suicide note in the handwriting of Surjit Kaur and also subscribed to by her daughter Preet Bahul. The suicide note implicated the appellant, his wife Ajit Kaur and the convicted co-accused Sukhvinder Singh alias Goldy as being responsible for their wretched condition, driving them in the ultimate to take the extreme step. A notebook containing some letters, written by deceased Geet Pahul was also recovered. On the completion of the investigation, which included, amongst others the collection of the post-mortem report which confirmed death due to consumption of aluminium phosphide, a pesticide, charge-sheet was submitted against the three persons named hereinabove along with Satnam Kaur under Sections 306/34 IPC." 20. It must be remarked here for the purpose of emphasis, though already apparent, that the decision in Gurcharan Singh came on appeal before their Lordships, where there was the advantage of all evidence recorded during trial being available and analyzed by the Courts below threadbare. The case did not arise on a petition to quash proceedings at the threshold. It was after a consideration of the evidence on record that it was held in Gurcharan Singh : "21. It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance or absence of any of these constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness of the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualise the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC. Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide. 22. Section 107 IPC defines "abetment" and is extracted hereunder: "107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of a thing, who-- First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.--A person, who by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that doing. Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." Not only the acts and omissions defining the offence of abetment singularly or in combination are enumerated therein, the explanations adequately encompass all conceivable facets of the culpable conduct of the offender relatable thereto. 27. The pith and purport of Section 306 IPC has since been enunciated by this Court in Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab [Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 56] , and the relevant excerpts therefrom are set out hereunder: (SCC p. 134, paras 12-13) "12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section 306 IPC. 13. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] , this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty." (emphasis supplied) 28. Significantly, this Court underlined by referring to its earlier pronouncement in Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] that courts have to be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case to ascertain as to whether cruelty had been meted out to the victim and that the same had induced the person to end his/her life by committing suicide, with the caveat that if the victim committing suicide appears to be hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life, quite common to the society to which he or she belonged and such factors were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to resort to such step, the accused charged with abetment could not be held guilty. The above view was reiterated in Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. [Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B., (2010) 1 SCC 707 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 896]. 29. That the intention of the legislature is that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit an offence and that there ought to be an active or direct act leading the deceased to commit suicide, being left with no option, had been propounded by this Court in S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465]. 30. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat [Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 10 SCC 48 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 616 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] , this Court, with reference to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872, while observing that the criminal law amendment bringing forth this provision was necessitated to meet the social challenge of saving the married woman from being ill-treated or forced to commit suicide by the husband or his relatives demanding dowry, it was underlined that the burden of proving the preconditions permitting the presumption as ingrained therein, squarely and singularly lay on the prosecution. That the prosecution as well has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had committed suicide on being abetted by the person charged under Section 306 IPC, was emphasised. 31. The assessment of the evidence on record as above, in our considered opinion, does not demonstrate with unqualified clarity and conviction, any role of the appellant or the other implicated in-laws of the deceased Surjit Kaur, as contemplated by the above provisions so as to return an unassailable finding of their culpability under Section 306 IPC. The materials on record, to reiterate, do not suggest even remotely any act of cruelty, oppression, harassment or inducement so as to persistently provoke or compel the deceased to resort to self-extinction being left with no other alternative. No such continuous and proximate conduct of the appellant or his family members with the required provocative culpability or lethal instigative content is discernible to even infer that the deceased Surjit Kaur and her daughters had been pushed to such a distressed state, physical or mental that they elected to liquidate themselves as if to seek a practical alleviation from their unbearable earthly miseries." (Emphasis by Court) 21. In Sudhakar Pathak and others vs. State of U.P. and others8 which is again a case that arose on appeal by a convicted husband before this Court - convicted for an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC for abetting suicide by his wife, this Court after a complete review of evidence on record and the law applicable held: "15. Though, Gurucharan (supra) was a case based on dowry harassment, the last four lines mentioned in bold letters are still relevant and they require specific incident, and not general allegations, having provocative capability to drive the deceased to such distressed state, mental and physical that she could elect to end her life. Routine behaviour, remark or quarrel by husband in matrimonial life in a drunken state cannot be taken to be sufficient to the extent to constitute abetment unless something extra-ordinary, more than normal wear and tear of married life, is shown on or just before the date of incident. In this instant case where admittedly the deceased was suffering from mental illness or disease, the burden of proving close link, in proximity of time between abetment and suicide, heavily lies on prosecution and the prosecution has utterly failed in discharging this burden. 16. This is no principle of law that wherever wife commits suicide, the husband will bear the responsibility and will be held liable. No doubt that in such cases, if the prosecution has discharged its initial burden of proof of guilt and has proved the relationship between abetment by husband and suicide by wife, the accused may be required in view of section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain the circumstances in which the wife committed suicide. But when mental illness of the wife is admitted much before in time from the date of death and the husband is habitual drunkard since marriage and in the habit of causing harassment in drunken state and both have passed more than 15 years of marriage as such giving birth to four children, general allegation of harassment cannot be sufficient to hold him guilty for the offence of abetment of suicide, particularly when the presence of husband in the house around the incident is not established." 22. This Court must still again remark that cases where the charge is about abetment to commit suicide, there are very subtle features of evidence that may show the necessary mens rea and the relevant persistent conduct of the accused in driving the deceased to commit suicide. There could be cases where on the material collected during investigation, there is hardly anything to show that the accused or one of them ex facie committed an act proximate in point of time that could drive the deceased to take his life. Again, there could be cases where the role of one of the accused is overt and proximate in point of time, by the standard of a man similarly circumstanced and a sensible man at that, that could lead him to commit suicide. The proximate and immediate conduct of one of the accused rendering the deceased option-less to commit suicide, may not be an impromptu action, provoked by the action of the accused on occasion. It could be the precipitating event behind which stand a long trail of instigation or aid, driven by persistent conduct of one or more of the accused acting together. This is in particular true of a matrimonial relationship, which comes as it does, with abiding social obligations and much legal consequences. A spouse at the receiving end of matrimonial cruelty - mental and physical or both, cannot be compared to a person placed in a different situation of harassment, like an employee perceiving or being actually harassed by his employer, or a student by his teacher. It is for this reason that special laws have been made for women where they commit suicide, within seven years of marriage in the matrimonial home. 23. No doubt, social realities have not yet arisen in the perception of law makers and others as well in similar terms for the other partner in marriage, but the reality remains that in the nature of relationship in matrimony, social and legal obligation arise, which when inter-laid with persistent cruel conduct by the wife, may lead a man to find himself optionless. Of course, it depends on the circumstances of a man, his financial and social status and his general outlook towards life. But, what cannot be ignored is the fact that in the matrimonial relationship both spouses, in sometime, become aware of the others general outlook and the threshold of toleration beyond which the other may not be driven, and if persistently harassed, may adopt fatal options. 24. There is yet another angle to the matter, which holds stronger in case of a matrimonial alliance. The person actually involved in doing an act proximate in point of time to the deceased taking his life, may have others participating with him/her leading to the 'build-up', where the fatal event occurs. These could be those persons who have conspired with the instigator or the one who actively aids the deceased through a proximate act. The role of such persons in the shadows who have conspired would in no measure be less culpable and certainly relevant under Section 107 IPC. No doubt, the evidence about their role would have to be more carefully sifted at the trial, than the person who has acted as the agent provocateur, proximate in point of time. 25. In the present case, this Court finds that whatever evidence has been collected is not one simply about a hair trigger fatal response from an over sensitive man. The parties were together for some four years and had a son. The suicide note, which comprises two parts, the one physically scripted and the other sent by WhatsApp messages, shows definitive allegations against wife and the in-laws. The scripted suicide note shows that the wife, who was staying back at her parents' place at Muzaffarnagar, was carrying on there and forcing the deceased to stay in a house close to her place. The note also says that the wife abuses him and snatches away food from him (मुझे गाली देती है, खाना तक छीन लेती है). He has blamed his wife and named the other in-laws, who along with her threatened and harassed him. The scripted suicide note goes to the extent of showing that the son is not begotten of him. 26. It must be remarked that though a child born during the subsistence of a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate and begotten of the husband, subject to fulfillment of the conditions specified under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872 disowning a child born during marriage is frowned upon by the law, but the words carried in the suicide note are those of a man who was on the brink of ending his own life. These are entitled justly to be differently received and assessed. No doubt, in the scripted suicide note, there is conspicuous absence of the applicant's name though all other in-laws have been specifically nominated as part of concerted design and effort to harass the deceased driving him over the brink, but the WhatsApp message, a copy of which is annexed at page 17 to the counter affidavit and is part of the case diary, clearly nominates the applicant also with imputations that have been extracted hereinbefore. 27. The statements of the informant and the two sisters-in-law of the deceased show that the family made efforts to persuade the deceased's wife away from the course of harassment and oppression, but to no avail. The deceased's wife, and if the material collected during investigation, were to withstand scrutiny at the trial, shows that the in-laws of the deceased, including the applicant, sometimes directly and at others through the deceased's wife put the deceased to extreme oppression and threat. The deceased was exposed to insult and humiliation. The material gathered during investigation shows that the immediate and proximate cause for the deceased to take the extreme step was a public humiliation by his wife, co-accused Menaka, who outside the matrimonial home and in full public view, misbehaved with him and on his protest beat him up. Public humiliation of a spouse, particularly, an act of assault by the husband or the wife, may, in the circumstances of long and persistent misbehaviour and harassment, drive a person to take the extreme step of taking his/ her life. 28. In the entirety of the circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, suicide committed by the deceased cannot be regarded as an oversensitive or freak reaction of a person, who circumstanced like the deceased, would not ordinarily be expected to exhibit. Much reliance was placed during the hearing by Mr. Zaidi, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant on a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami (supra) on the question what would constitute an offence of abetment to suicide, punishable under Section 306 IPC. It reads, thus: "49. Before we evaluate the contents of the FIR, a reference to Section 306 IPC is necessary. Section 306 stipulates that if a person commits suicide "whoever abets the commission of such suicide" shall be punished with imprisonment extending up to 10 years [ "306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."] . Section 107 is comprised within Chapter V IPC, which is titled "Of Abetment". Section 107 provides: (Quoted portion omitted) 50. The first segment of Section 107 defines abetment as the instigation of a person to do a particular thing. The second segment defines it with reference to engaging in a conspiracy with one or more other persons for the doing of a thing, and an act or illegal omission in pursuance of the conspiracy. Under the third segment, abetment is founded on intentionally aiding the doing of a thing either by an act or omission. These provisions have been construed specifically in the context of Section 306 to which a reference is necessary in order to furnish the legal foundation for assessing the contents of the FIR. These provisions have been construed in the earlier judgments of this Court in State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, (1994) 1 SCC 73 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 107] , Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab [Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 129 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 56] , Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 701] ("Kishori Lal") and Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat [Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 4 SCC 52 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 62] . In Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B. [Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B., (2010) 1 SCC 707 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 896] , Mukundakam Sharma, J., speaking for a two-Judge Bench of this Court and having adverted to the earlier decisions, observed : (SCC p. 712, para 12) "12. ... It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable." 51. The Court noted that before a person may be said to have abetted the commission of suicide, they "must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide". Instigation, as this Court held in Kishori Lal [Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 701] , "literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do anything". In S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Dalveer Bhandari, J., observed : (SCC p. 197, para 25) "25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide." 52.Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1048 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 682] was specifically a case which arose in the context of a petition under Section 482 CrPC where the High Court had dismissed [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 568] the petition for quashing an FIR registered for offences under Sections 306 and 294(b) IPC. In that case, the FIR was registered on a complaint of the spouse of the deceased who was working as a driver with the accused. The driver had been rebuked by the employer and was later found to be dead on having committed suicide. A suicide note was relied upon in the FIR, the contents of which indicated that the driver had not been given a fixed vehicle unlike other drivers besides which he had other complaints including the deduction of 15 days' wages from his salary. The suicide note named the appellant-accused. In the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court, delivered by V.S. Sirpurkar, J., the test laid down in Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] was applied and the Court held : (Madan Mohan Singh case [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1048 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 682] , SCC p. 631, paras 10-11) "10. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306 IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. 11. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the so-called suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this." 53. Dealing with the provisions of Section 306 IPC and the meaning of abetment within the meaning of Section 107, the Court observed : (Madan Mohan Singh case [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 8 SCC 628 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1048 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 682] , SCC pp. 631-32, para 12) "12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note." The Court noted that the suicide note expressed a state of anguish of the deceased and "cannot be depicted as expressing anything intentional on the part of the accused that the deceased might commit suicide". Reversing the judgment [Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat, 2008 SCC OnLine Guj 568] of the High Court, the petition under Section 482 was allowed and the FIR was quashed. 54. In a concurring judgment delivered by one of us (Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.) in the decision of the Constitution Bench in Common Cause [Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1] , the provisions of Section 107 were explained with the following observations : (SCC p. 244, para 458) "458. For abetting an offence, the person abetting must have intentionally aided the commission of the crime. Abetment requires an instigation to commit or intentionally aiding the commission of a crime. It presupposes a course of conduct or action which (in the context of the present discussion) facilitates another to end life. Hence abetment of suicide is an offence expressly punishable under Sections 305 and 306 IPC." 55. More recently in M. Arjunan v. State [M. Arjunan v. State, (2019) 3 SCC 315 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 219] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through R. Banumathi, J., elucidated the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC in the following observations : (SCC p. 317, para 7) "7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are : (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC." 56. Similarly, in another recent judgment of this Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301 : (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 306] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Dinesh Maheshwari, J., expounded on the ingredients of Section 306 IPC, and the factors to be considered in determining whether a case falls within the ken of the aforesaid provision, in the following terms : (SCC pp. 321-22, para 16) "16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions abovereferred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased." 57. Similarly, in Rajesh v. State of Haryana [Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2020) 15 SCC 359] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through L. Nageswara Rao, J., held as follows : (SCC para 9) "9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC." 58. In a recent decision of this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Hrishikesh Roy, J., held thus : (SCC pp. 206-07, para 15) "15. As in all crimes, mens rea has to be established. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible, to determine the culpability. In order to prove mens rea, there has to be something on record to establish or show that the appellant herein had a guilty mind and in furtherance of that state of mind, abetted the suicide of the deceased." 59. In Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke v. State of Maharashtra [Vaijnath Kondiba Khandke v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 7 SCC 781 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 362] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through U.U. Lalit, J., dealt with an appeal against the rejection of an application under Section 482 CrPC, for quashing an FIR registered under Sections 306 and 506 read with Section 34 IPC. A person serving in the office of the Deputy Director of Education, Aurangabad had committed suicide on 8-8-2017. His wife made a complaint to the police that her husband was suffering from mental torture as his superiors were getting heavy work done from her husband. This resulted in him having to work from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. and even at odd hours and on holidays. The specific allegation against the appellant was that he had stopped the deceased's salary for one month and was threatening the deceased that his increment would be stopped. This Court noted that there was no suicide note, and the only material on record was in the form of assertions made by the deceased's wife in her report to the police. The Court went on to hold that the facts on record were inadequate and insufficient to bring home the charge of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. The mere factum of work being assigned by the appellant to the deceased, or the stoppage of salary for a month, was not enough to prove criminal intent or guilty mind. Consequently, proceedings against the appellant were quashed. 60. On the other hand, we must also notice the decision in Praveen Pradhan [Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 9 SCC 734 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 146] where a two-Judge Bench of this Court, speaking through B.S. Chauhan, J., dismissed an appeal against the rejection [Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal, 2012 SCC OnLine Utt 51] of an application under Section 482 CrPC by the High Court for quashing a criminal proceeding, implicating an offence under Section 306 IPC. The suicide note which was left behind by the deceased showed, as this Court observed, that "the appellant perpetually humiliated, exploited and demoralised the deceased, who was compelled to indulge in wrongful practices at the workplace, which hurt his self-respect tremendously." The Court noted that the appellant always scolded the deceased and tried to always force the deceased to resign. Resultantly, the Court observed : (SCC p. 741, para 19) "19. Thus, the case is required to be considered in the light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions. In the instant case, alleged harassment had not been a casual feature, rather remained a matter of persistent harassment. It is not a case of a driver; or a man having an illicit relationship with a married woman, knowing that she also had another paramour; and therefore, cannot be compared to the situation of the deceased in the instant case, who was a qualified graduate engineer and still suffered persistent harassment and humiliation and additionally, also had to endure continuous illegal demands made by the appellant, upon nonfulfilment of which, he would be mercilessly harassed by the appellant for a prolonged period of time. He had also been forced to work continuously for long durations in the factory, vis-à-vis other employees which often even entered to 16-17 hours at a stretch. Such harassment, coupled with the utterance of words to the effect, that, "had there been any other person in his place, he would have certainly committed suicide" is what makes the present case distinct from the aforementioned cases. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not think it is a case which requires any interference by this Court as regards the impugned judgment and order [Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttaranchal, 2012 SCC OnLine Utt 51] of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed accordingly." The contents of the FIR, therefore, indicated that the deceased had been subjected to harassment persistently and continuously and this was coupled by words used by the accused which led to the commission of suicide. 61. In Narayan Malhari Thorat v. Vinayak Deorao Bhagat [Narayan Malhari Thorat v. Vinayak Deorao Bhagat, (2019) 13 SCC 598 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 636] , this Court, speaking through U.U. Lalit, J., reversed the judgment [Vinayak Deorao Bhagat v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 15933] of a Division Bench of the High Court which had quashed criminal proceedings in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482. This was a case where the FIR was registered pursuant to the information received from the appellant. The FIR stated that the son and daughter-in-law of the appellant were teachers in Zila Parishad School. The respondent used to call the daughter-in-law of the appellant on the phone and used to harass her. Moreover, despite the efforts of the son of the appellant, the respondent did not desist from doing so. This Court noted : (SCC p. 603, para 12) "12. We now consider the facts of the present case. There are definite allegations that the first respondent would keep on calling the wife of the victim on her mobile and keep harassing her which allegations are supported by the statements of the mother and the wife of the victim recorded during investigation. The record shows that 3-4 days prior to the suicide there was an altercation between the victim and the first respondent. In the light of these facts, coupled with the fact that the suicide note made definite allegation against first respondent, the High Court was not justified in entering into question whether the first respondent had the requisite intention to aid or instigate or abet the commission of suicide. At this juncture when the investigation was yet to be completed and charge-sheet, if any, was yet to be filed, the High Court ought not to have gone into the aspect whether there was requisite mental element or intention on part of the respondent." The above observations of the Court clearly indicated that there was a specific allegation in the FIR bearing on the imputation that the respondent had actively facilitated the commission of suicide by continuously harassing the spouse of the victim and in failing to rectify his conduct despite the efforts of the victim." 29. The authorities of the Supreme Court referred to in Goswami (supra), it is true, lay down that mere harassment of an individual by another or oppressive behaviour cannot be held to be in itself constitutive of the offence of abetment to commit suicide, but persistent acts of harassment by the accused or a continuous course of conduct, that creates a situation, "which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide" to borrow the words of their Lordships in Ude Singh vs. State of Haryana9 has been regarded sufficient to qualify for the requirement envisaged under Section 306 IPC. Likewise, in Ude Singh it has been recognized that where the accused played an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, that eventually draws him to commit suicide, may be regarded as abetment. Here, as said in some detail in the earlier part of this judgment, the wife allegedly brought matters to the precipitating event by humiliating the husband in public outside their matrimonial home, where she is said to have assaulted him; and again, if this were an isolated action, it might have been discounted for a hypersensitive reaction of a person, where a person similarly circumstanced would not have acted to take his own life. But, as the materials collected during investigation suggest, the fateful event came at the end of a 'build-up', where the wife and in-laws had subjected the deceased to persistent harassment and humiliation. And if the departed soul were to be believed for his word in the scripted suicide note, he was subjected to the humiliation of the wife carrying on with another man and bearing the other's child. In this entire long course of the claimed harassment that the deceased suffered, the in-laws, including the applicant, are alleged to have been active participants. They are said to have connived with the wife and acted alongside her in harassing the deceased. 30. One may legitimately think as to what would possibly be the shade of the mens rea that the victim's wife or his in-laws would harbour to covet death for him. In the opinion of this Court, if a person, particularly one in a relationship of great trust like man and wife, were to betray that trust persistently and indulge in harassment of the other in a manner that the victim-spouse, could reasonably be expected in the circumstances to be driven to take the extreme step, the precise kind of mens rea that would be involved, may not be very relevant. The necessary mens rea of whatever shade and fuelled by whatever motivation, would be inferable from the persistent conduct of the accused. 31. This Court, however, may clarify that whatever is said in this judgment is purely tentative and limited to the purpose of judging the worth of the prayer to quash proceedings. It is and ought not be regarded by the Trial Court as any kind of a comment or evaluation about evidence, which is yet to surface during trial. The truth of the prosecution case has to be established beyond doubt at the trial in accordance with law. However, this Court is of opinion that this is not a case, where the prosecution ought to be scuttled at the threshold in the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code. 32. In the result, this Application fails and is dismissed. Order Date :- July the 16th, 2021 Anoop / I. Batabyal


PETITIONER: REV. FR. K. C. ALEXANDER Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA DATE OF JUDGMENT16/08/1973 BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BENCH: REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN DWIVEDI, S.N. CITATION: 1973 AIR 2498 1974 SCR (1) 399 1973 SCC (2) 737 ACT: Travancore Land Conservancy Act (4 of 1916), s. 9-'Other product raised on land' if includes trees. Trespasser-Right to compensation for trees Planted on another's land. HEADNOTE: There was a dispute regarding the ownership of certain land between a Jenmi family and the State Government, and the Jenmi family filed a suit for declaration of its title. While the dispute was pending, the appellant applied to the Conservator of Forests for registration of the lands in his name under the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1916, but the application was rejected. After the suit filed by the Jenmi family was dismissed, the appellant who was in possession of the land, was dispossessed. The appellant, thereafter. filed a suit for the value of improvements affected by him on the land by planting trees and constructing a building. The trial Court decreed the suit for the value of the building but rejected the rest of claim. The High Court dismissed his appeal. In appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (1) there was no order of forfeiture of improvements as required under s. 9 of the Act; (2) the appellant was entitled to compensation under general, law; and (3) the appellant was not served with a notice to quit as required by s. 9 of the Act to enable him to cut and remove the trees. Dismissing the appeal, HELD: (1) Section 9 provides for two notices to be given : (a) one notice to be given to the person in unauthorised occupation of government land to vacate within a reasonable time, and (b) another for forfeiture of any crop or other product raised on the land or to remove any building or other structure within a reasonable time. The words 'raised on the land' qualify both the 'crop' and 'other product', and so, the words 'other product' have to be read in the context of the word 'crop'. So read, trees would not be in- cluded within the meaning of 'other product raised on the land in s. 9 of the Act, and therefore. there is no obligation on the respondent to give notice of forfeiture. [405D-H; 406E] Clark and Another v. Gaskarth, 8 Taunt 431, applied. (2) (a) The trial court and High-Court found on the evidence that the appellant's possession commenced only after his application for registration was rejected, and that. the improvements, if any, were effected by him only thereafter, with full knowledge that the title to the lands was in dispute. Therefore, he could not be said to be a bona fide trespasser. It could not also be contended that nevertheless he was a bona fide trespasser entitled to com- pensation on the basis that he entered upon the land with a bona fide intention of improving the land. Such a contention would give validity to a dangerous principle which will condone all acts of deliberate and wrongful trespass, be-cause, any person desperate enough to trespass on other man's land without any claim of title can always plead that he had a bona fide intention of improving the land whether or not the owner of the land wanted the improvement. The maxim of English law quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit (whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil) is not applicable to India. but that is not to say that wrongful trespasser can plant trees on someone else's land and claim a right to those trees after he is evicted. [406E-H; 407A] Vallabdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra, A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 163, applied. 400 (b) in any case, the position of a trespasser cannot be better than that of a lawful tenant, who, having lost his possession cannot claim compensation or damages for anything erected on the land or any improvements made therein. [407H] (3) There are no clear allegations in the plaint that the appellant was evicted without notice. No issue had been framed regarding the notice of eviction not being given and no application for framing such an issue was filed in the trial court, or the High Court or this Court. Therefore, the appellant, who was not a mere trespasser but one who had deliberately entered upon the land knowing fully well that he had no right, claim or title to the land, or any manner of right to enter the land, and who had been rightly evicted as a trespasser, should not be permitted to raise such a contention in this Court. [408H-409B] JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 744 of 1967. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the 2nd March 1965, of the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam, in A. S. No. 216 of 1961. J. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, Annamma Allexander, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, Qamaruddin and Vinod Dhawan, for the appellant. A. R. Somnath Iyer and M. R. K. Pillai, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.-This appeal is by special leave against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Kerala which dismissed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court of Havelikkara. The appellant had filed a suit on October 24, 1942, for the recovery of Rs. 2 lakhs and interest thereon from the date of suit and for costs originally against the State of Travancore now the State of Kerala-the respondent-and three others who however were not made parties in the appeal before the High Court. It has alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff (appellant) was wrongfully dispossessed from 160 acres of land along with the improvements which had been effected by him and as the State had appropriated those improvements without any right or title thereto he claimed the value of those improvements. It was the appellant's case that he had been in occupation of the said 160 acres of Cherikkal land (unregistered dry lands in hilly tracts) about which and the adjoining lands there was a dispute as to whether the same belonged to a jenmi family known as Koodalvalli Illom--hereinafter called 'the Illom--or to the Government of the erstwhile Travancore State. The appellant's father and the appellant had occupied these lands, made improvement thereon by planting coconut trees, arecanut palms, peppervines, rubber-trees, jack trees, other trees, and by constructing bungalow, huts, wells etc. in the bona fide belief that the lands belonged to the Illom. It was stated that according to the practice prevailing in the erstwhile State of Travancore the cultivators could enter into unoccupied waste lands belonging to the janmies with the object of cultivating and improving them, and as they held the lands under them by paying rent, the consent of the Jemies to such occupation was implied. This practice it seems, was also current in respect of lands belonging to the, Government be-fore the Travancore Land Conservancy Act 4 of 1091 (24-7-1916) (hereinafter called 'the Act'). It is the case of the appellant that even, after the Act was passed, unauthorised occupants of land belonging to the Government who had made improvements therein had, under the rules made both under the Act and the Land Assignment Act a pre- ferential claim over others for getting kuthakapattom or assignment of the property in their possession. It may be mentioned that in respect of the 160 acres of land of' the Illom which were occupied by the appellant's father and the appellant, there was a dispute between the Illom and the Travancore State from about 1848. While this dispute was pending it appears the appellant applied to the Conservator of Forests for registration of the lands in his name, but the application was rejected on June 14, 1919 stating that the land applied for cannot be registered (Ext. A). While the application for registration was pending, the dispute between the Illom and the State of Travancore had reached a stage when the Illom had to institute a suit O. S. No. No. 126 of 1096 (January 1918) in the District Court at Quilon for a declaration of its title to those properties. In that suit the appellant, after his application for registration was rejected, sought to get himself impleaded, but that application also was rejected. Thereafter the suit filed by the Illom was dismissed on 28-6-1109 (February 10, 1934). An appeal against it was dismissed on September 27, 1943. It may here be mentioned that while the suit of the Illom i.e. O.S. No. 126 of 1096 M.E. was pending in the District Court, Quilon, the Government of Travancore had initiated proceedings in ejectment against the appellant by L. C. Case No. 112 of 1100; (1925 A.D.). As the suit of the illom had been finally disposed of and the title of' the Illom to the lands was not established, the appellant apprehending that he might be ejected in the above L.C. Case filed a suit No. O.S. 156 of 1103 M.E. (1927-28 A.D.) in the District Court at Quilon against the respondent to establish his right and title to the said 160 acres and in the adjoining Cherikkal lands in his possession. In that suit an injunction was prayed for in respect of 100 acres of the property involved in the suit, but the prayer was rejected. Against that order a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 206 of 1110 M.E. (1934-35 A.D.) was filed in the High Court of Travancore. The High Court issued a commission for inspecting the properties and the Commissioner in his report part 13 of Ext. CC set out the improvements made by the appellant on the lands which comprised of a bungalow in which the appellant was residing, a number of small houses. a rubbers state, and a large number of other valuable trees like jack trees, mango trees, coconut trees etc. It appears that as there was no injunction restraining his dispossession in L.C. Case No. 112 of 11,00 M.E. an order was passed for dispossessing the appellant on July 24. 1939, Ext. VI. The appellant, pursuant to this order, was dispossessed from the lands and possession of these lands was given to the second defendant Nair Service Society Ltd. in August 1939. Thereafter the suit out of which this appeal arises was filed against the Government on October 24, 1942. The respondent-State contended that the appellant encroached on the suit lands, that proceedings were taken against him in L.C. Case No. 112 of 11 00 M. E. and he was evicted in due course, that the trespass by the appellant was of recent origin, that the allegation that the entry was made in the belief that the land belonged to the Illom was false, that the Revenue and Forest Departments did not harass the appellant but they took steps for dispossessing him only in accordance with the law, that the Commissioner's report was not correct in that all the improvements noted by the Commissioner were not made by the appellant but by other independent squatters, that after due notice an order of forfeiture had been passed in L.C. Case No. 112 of 1100 M.E. and the appellant was therefore not entitled to claim any value for improvements as it was his duty to remove any building before he was evicted. The respondent also averred that it had not taken possession of any crops or movables as stated in the ,plaint and that the movables found in the building were attached for the realisation of arrears of fine etc. There were other allegations also but it is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal to refer to them. Several issues were framed, but it is not necessary to refer to :them except to say that the suit was decreed only for Rs. 3000/being the value of the appellant's bungalow taken possession of by the respondent. The rest of the claim was dismissed. it was observed by the Trial Court that though there is no specific evidence to show when exactly the possession of the appellant had commenced, the evidence however indicated that it must have started close to the year I 100 M. E. and that in any case the claim of the appellant that possession was from 1030 M.E. was not true inasmuch as from the year 1067 M.E. when the Act was passed possession without permission was penal and it could not be imagined that the appellant was left in peace for all these long years. The Trial Court also held that all through these long years there had been a dispute as to the title between the Illom and the State and after the suit of the Illom was dismissed and the Illom's title was not sustained, the allegation that the improvements were effected cannot be stated to be bona fide. It pointed out that the plaintiff (appellant) had applied to get himself impleaded on 0.S. No. 126 of _ 109,6 M. E. but his application was rejected, and after that suit was dismissed the appellant again applied for registry, but that was also rejected. All this, according to the Trial Court, would show that the appellant was aware that he was remaining on Government lands without title. It was further held that the greater part of the improvements were effected by the appellant after the proceedings in the L.C. Case No. 112 of 1100 M.E. were stayed, as such it cannot be said that these improvements could have been effected in good faith. With respect to the allegation that an order of forfeiture was not served on the appellant under s. 9 of the .Act, the Court observed that though the State had in its written statement contended that such an order had been passed, no order was produced in evidence and consequently it was conceded by the Government Pleader that no such order was passed. In the circumstances the question that had to be considered was whether without an order of forfeiture being passed, the respondent could forfeit the improve- ments. On this issue it was held that no notice, of forfeiture of trees. need be given under s. 9 of the Act and, therefore no compensation or damages were payable in respect thereof. The High Court accepted the finding of the Trial Court on issue. It observed that the evidence in the case indicated that the possession of the father of the appellant must have commenced close to the year 1100 M.E. and consequently the claim of the appellant that lie was in possession from 1030 M.E. cannot be true. It then said : "If the possession commenced only about the year 1100, it certainly cannot be under any bona fide claim of title for even on. 12-6-1094, the petitioner knew that the land was Government land and had then applied for assignment of the land." Accordingly the High Court found that at no time the occupation of the land by the appellant was under a bona fide claim of title. The contention of the appellant that the trees which are the subject-matter of the appeal should have been forfeited by an order passed under s. 9 of the Act and in the absence of such. an order his right to the value of those trees had to be adjudged and paid. to him was also negatived, as the Court held that the words "any crop or other product raised on the land" occuring in s. 9 of the Act would not include trees. In its view these words take in what is familiarly known in law as 'emblements' which according to Black's. Law Dictionary mean "Such products of the soil as are annually planted, served and saved by manual labour, as cereals, vegetables, Grass maturing for harvest or harvested, etc., but not grass on lands used for pasturage." In this view it held that compensation for trees which are to be dealt with under the general law cannot be decreed in favour of a mere trespasser who had no rights therein. It was also of the view that the claim for compensation for trees which has to be dealt with under the general law under which a mere trespasser would have no rights to the payment of compensation nor could be. appellant be allowed to remove them after his dispossession. Another reason for disallowing the compensation for trees given by the High Court was that the position of a trespasser-whether he be a mere trespasser or a trespasser under a bona fide claim of title--cannot be better than that of a tenant, and that if this is correct, then the appeal has to be dismissed on the short ground that there is no principle of law or equity which requires the payment of compensation in respect of trees, the ownership of which was all along, or at any rate from the dale of the trespasser's dispossession, vested in the State. The learned advocate for the appellant has reiterated the submissions made before the Trial Court and the High Court and contends that there is no order forfeiting the improvements as required under s. 9 of the Act, and if s. 9 does not apply and there is no right of forfeiture as contemplated under s. 9, then the appellant is entitled to compensation under the general law. Apart from this contention, towards the end of his argument, the learned advocate for the appellant sought to make out a fresh case, namely, that as the appellant was not served with a notice to quit as required under s. 9 of the Act but was forcibly evicted without giving him an opportunity of cutting and taking away the trees etc. from the lands from which he was evicted, he would be entitled to claim compensation for the improvements made by him. It may be stated that the finding that the possession of the appellant ,commenced after his application for registration was rejected in 1919, and the improvements, if any must have been effected only thereafter with full knowledge that the title to the lands was in dispute between the Illom and the Government, is unassailable. We have earlier adverted to Ext. A and also to the fact that after the application for registration was ,rejected the appellant tried to get himself impleaded in the suit filed by the Illom against the State which application was also rejected and so the claim that his possession was bona fide or that he was a bona fide .trespasser has no validity. This finding is fortified by s. 5 of the Act which provides that from and after the commencement of the Act it shall not be lawful for any person to occupy land which is the property of the Government whether Poramboke or not without the permission from the Government or such officer of the Government as may be ,empowered in that behalf. In view of this specific provision the contravention of which is punishable under s. 6 thereof, his conduct in applying for registration and for getting himself impleaded in the suit of the Illom against the Government, would show that he knew that the land was Government land or land in which the Government had a claim. In these circumstances he cannot be said to be a bona fide trespasser particularly after he had applied to the Government for obtaining .a registration in his name on the basis that it was Government land. It is however urged before us that the High Court was in error in thinking that the appellant did not occupy the lands as a trespasser with a bona fide claim of title because it was his case that he trespassed upon the land with a bona fide intention to improve the land, and as such he can still be considered as a bona fide trespasser entitled to improvements under the general law. Before dealing with this aspect,, we will first consider the question whether trees are included within the meaning of s. 9, so as to entitle the appellant to a notice of forfeiture thereunder. Section 9 of the Act is in the following terms : "Any person unauthorisedly occupying any land for which he is liable to pay a fine under section 6 and an assessment or prohibitory assessment under section 7, may be summarily evicted by the Division Peishkar, and any crop or other product raised on the land shall be liable to forfeiture and any building or other structure erected or anything deposited thereon shall also, if not removed by him after such written notice as the Division Peishkar may deem reasonable, be liable to forfeiture. 'Forfeiture under this section shall be disposed of as the Division Peishkar may direct. An eviction under this section shall be made in the following manner, namely: By serving a notice on a person reported to be in occupation or his agent, requir ing him, within such time as the Division Peishkar may deem reasonable after receipt of the said notice to vacate the land, and if such notice is not obeyed, by removing or deputing a subordinate to remove any person who may refuse to vacate the same, and, if the officer removing any such person shall be resisted or obstructed by any person, the Division Peishkar shall hold a summary enquiry into the, facts of the case and, if satisfied that the resistance or obstruction still continues, may issue a warrant for the arrest of the said person, and on his appearance may send him with a warrant in the form of the Schedule for imprisonment in the Civil Jail of the District for such period not exceeding 30 days as may be necessary to prevent the continuance of such obstruction or resistance Provided that no person so committed or imprisoned under this section shall be liable to be prosecuted under sections 176, 179 and 181 of the Travancore Penal Code in respect of the same facts." This section provides for two notices to be given one notice is to be given to the person who is in unauthorised occupation of Government land to vacate the land within a reasonable time and the other notice is to forfeit any crop or other product raised on the land or to remove any building or other structure erected or anything deposited therein within a reasonable time as may be stated in the notice. It was conceded before the Trial Court and no attempt was made to establish anything to the contrary before the High Court that no notice of forfeiture as required under s. 9 was given to the appellant. In these circumstances, the question that would arise for determination is whether the trees come within the description of "other product raised on the land". It is stated before us that at the time when the appellant was evicted the Transfer of Property Act was not in force. But this is not relevant as what has to be considered is whether trees can be said to be "other product raised on the land". The words "raised on the land" qualify both the 'crop' and 'other product', so the words "other product" have to be read in the context of the word 'crop' which precedes it. It was pointed out by the learned advocate that the High Court was in error in equating other product raised on the land with emblements because the definition of crop in Black's Law Dictionary does include emblements, as such the words 'other product' cannot also be treated as emblements and must therefore be given a different meaning which according to him would include trees. No doubt one of the meanings given in the Black's Law Dictionary does say that in a more restricted sense the word is synonymous with 'fructus industrials'. But the meaning to be ascribed to that word is that it connotes in its larger signification, products of the soil that are grown and raised yearly and are gathered during a single season. In this sense the term includes "fructus industrials" and having regard to the etymology of the word it has been held to mean only products after they have been severed from the soil. The same dictionary gives the meaning of the word ,,product" as follows : "Product. With reference to property, proceeds.: yield; income; receipts; return . ............ The "products" of a farm may include, the increase of cattle on the premises................" Even under this definition "product" cannot mean anything which is attached to the land like trees. It may, however, include the fruit of the trees. This view of ours is supported by the case of Clark and Another v. Gaskarth(1). That was a case of a trespass for breaking and entering the closes of the plaintiffs and tearing up, digging up, cutting down, and carrying away the plaintiff's trees, plants, roots and seeds, growing on the closes. Notice of this trespass was given to the defendant. At the time of the distress the sum of pound 281.6 s. was due from the plaintiffs to the defendant for rent in respect of the nursery ground. The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to recover against the defendant damages caused to them by cutting down and carrying away the plaintiffs' trees. It was Contended-that the defendant's action was justified under the statute II G. 2, C. 19, s. 8, which after enumerating certain crops, empowered the landlord to seize as a distress any "other product whatsoever which shall be growing on any part of the estate demised" and, therefore, the trees and shrubs in question came within that description. The Court rejected the contention that the trees and shrubs could be distrained and held that the word product' in the eighth section of the statute did not extend to trees and shrubs growing in a nurseryman's ground, but that it was confined to products of a similar nature. with those specified in that section, to all of which the process of becoming ripe, and of being cut, gathered, made, and laid up when ripe, was incidental. In our view, therefore, trees are not included within the meaning of 'other products raised on the, land' in s. 9 of the Act and there is, therefore, no obligation on the Government to give notice of forfeiture under that section. It is then contended that even if trees are not included in s. 9 and no notice of forfeiture is necessary, under the general law even a trespasser on the land, whether bona fide or not, is entitled to compensation or damages for the improvements made by him on the land We have already agreed with the Trial Court and the High Court that the appellant was not a bona fide trespasser. But the learned advocate for the appellant submits that it was not his case nor is it under the general law necessary for a person who trespassed on the land to trespass with a claim of bona fide title. According to his submission a person is nevertheless a bona fide trespasser if he enters upon the land with a bona fide intention of improving the land. No authority has been cited for this novel proposition, and if accepted, it would give validity to a dangerous principle which will condone all acts of deliberate and wrongful trespass because any person desparate enough to trespass on other mans' land without any claim of title can always plead that he had a bona fide intention of improving the land whether the owner of that land wants that improvement or not. This vicarious and altruistic exhibition of good intention may even cause damage to the land of an owner who may not want improvements of such a kind as tree plantation. It is true that the maxim of the English law "quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit" i.e. whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil, is. not applicable in (1) 8 Taunt 431, India but that is not to say that a wrongful trespasser can plant trees on some one else's land and claim a right to those trees after he is evicted. The case of Vallabdas Narainji v. Development Officer, Bandra(1), which was cited by the learned counsel for the appellant does not assist him, for the Privy Council did not think it necessary to give a decision on what it termed to be a far-reaching contention. That was a case in which the Government had taken possession of the lands and had erected certain building on the land before a decision under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made as to the appellant's property arid it was contended that the appellant should be allowed the value of the land in the state in which it then was i.e. with buildings on it. It appears that the Government had resolved to acquire the land in question and other lands and by arrangement with certain of the sutidars it took possession of such land, including a portion which was in the occupation of the appellant. Upon such land, including a portion in the possession of the appellant they proceeded to erect buildings without the necessary notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which was not served until November 4, 1920. On these findings it was observed that the Government were in a position, by law at any rate, to regularize their possession by such a notification a fact which becomes material when it has to be considered what the nature of the trespass is. Both the Assistant Judge and the High Court negatived the claim of the appellant. Before the Privy Council it was contended on behalf of the appellant that in the various cases relied upon, there was at least some genuine claim or belief in the party erecting the buildings that he had a title to do so, even though he was eventually held to be a trespasser; and it was urged that no such claim or belief existed in that case, in which it was said the Government without any pretence of a right, tortuously invaded the appellant's property and proceeded to deal with it as their own. it is in this context that the respondent's contention that even if the appellants were considered to be mere trespassers they would still be entitled to the value of the improvements and contest the claim of the appellant was described, as already stated, as a far-reaching contention. The Board, however, agreed with what was apparently the view of both Courts in India that under the circumstances of this case, as already set forth, by the law of India, which they appear to have correctly interpreted, the Government officials were in possession "not as mere trespassers" but under such a colour of title that the buildings erected by them on the land ought not to be included in the valuation as having become the property of the landowner. This case does not support the contention that a mere trespasser who has deliberately and wrongfully contrary to the provisions of s. 5 of the Act, entered 'upon another's land which makes such an act even punishable under s. 6 thereof, is entitled to compensation for the trees planted by him on the land. In any case, as the High Court rightly observed, the position of a trespasser cannot be better than that of a lawful tenant who having lost his possession cannot claim compensation or damages for anything erected on the land or any improvements made therein. The appellant's claim after he was evicted cannot, on the same parity of reasoning, be held to be valid. Once the appellant's counsel was confronted I with this (1) A.I.R. 1929 P.C. 163. proposition, he tried to raise an entirely new point, namely, that no notice of eviction was given to the appellant, and if such a notice had been given to him under s. 9, he would have cut the trees and taken them away, within the time allowed for him to vacate the lands. In support of this contention he has referred us to the leadings contained in paragraph-3 of the plaint in which it is stated : "The improvements effected by the plaintiff have a value of Rs. 2 lakhs as per the accounts shown below. In his helplessness the plaintiff had even applied to Government to give him the land in which he had effected improvements, on kuthakapattom. But out of the said land 160 acres were taken out of my possession and given to the 2nd defendant even without giving me the opportunity to remove the movable improvements, such as cultivation, cattle, machines, utensils, houses, stocked crops, ripe crops etc., belonging to me." These averments in the above paragraph do not clearly allege that he was evicted without notice, nor has any allegation been made that he was forcibly evicted from the lands with the help of the police etc. as it has now been contended before us. On the other hand what the plaintiff (appellant) stated shows that no opportunity was given to him to remove the movable improvements, such as cultivation, cattle, machines, utensils, houses, stocked crops, ripe crops etc. which belonged to him. There is nothing stated by him that he had no opportunity to cut trees and take them away. Even in paragraph-4 of the plaint where he complains that no notice of forfeiture was given to him, he mentions only the items referred to in paragraph-3. It is in this connection, he says, that no legal procedure had been followed by Government for taking them into possession, which only implies that it is in respect of the items mentioned in paragraph-3. It is again stated in, paragraph-4 that "It was irregular on the part of Government to take possession of the above items". The respondent did not understand the averments in the plaint as alleging that no notice to quit was given to him is evident from the written statement of the respondent in paragraph, where it is stated thus : "This defendant submits that after due notice an order of forfeiture has been passed in Poramboke Case 112 of 11 00 and the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to claim any value of improvements or value of any building." The issues that had been famed by the Trial Court also do not refer to this aspect. No doubt in the evidence of the plaintiff P.W. 1 states that he was evicted from the lands without giving him an opportunity to remove the improvements, and in cross-examination he was asked whether he was not given any notice prior to the dispossession and he said that certainly no notice was, received. P.W. 4 the Manager was asked in cross-examination whether he had been given any prior- information or notice about eviction and this witness also said that there was no prior information or notice. While these passages might show that no notice of eviction was given, even at that stage there was no application for an issue being framed, nor has such an application been made in the appeal before the High Court, nor even before this Court. en it has been held that the appellant was not a mere trespasser and had deliberately entered upon the lands knowing fully well that he had no right, claim or title to the lands or had in any manner a right to enter the land and has been rightly evicted as a trespasser, he cannot now be permitted to raise this contention before us. In the view we have taken, the appeal has no substance and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs, but the court fee will be recovered from the appellant. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.