REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.9684 OF 2011 BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHORITY ….Appellant VERSUS BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL (NOW A UNIT OF ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD.) AND ORS. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R. BANUMATHI, J. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 21.10.2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No.3688 of 2002 in and by which the High Court has set aside the order passed by the Single Judge thereby setting aside the betterment fee levied by the KTCP by holding that the very acquisition under the Industrial Area Development Act involve change of land use and development by KIADB and while so, Signature Not Verified further levy of betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP is not Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date: 2018.11.27 16:57:16 IST Reason: sustainable. 2. Brief facts of the case which led to filing of this appeal are that the provisions of Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961 to provide for regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. The State Government, by virtue of powers conferred under Section 4-A of the KTCP Act, issued Notification No.HUD142 MNX 95 dated 12.01.1996 declaring the area shown in the Schedule to the said notification as ‘Bangalore International Airport Planning Area’ w.e.f. 12.01.1996. On the same day, the State Government issued another Notification No.HUD 142 MSX 95 constituting the appellant as the Planning Authority for the said local planning area. The State Government by Notification dated 14.05.1997 added some other villages including the villages in question in Doddaballapur Taluk in the planning area of the appellant. 3. Respondent No.1 approached the State Government to approve a project to establish the Cement Terminal near Bangalore which was approved by the Single Window Agency by its clearance order dated 29.11.1996. By exercising powers under Sections 3(1) and 1(3) of KIAD Act, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB), issued a Notification on 03.07.1997 declaring some areas as industrial areas. Respondent No.1 was allotted lands by KIADB in Thippapura, Veerapura, Bashettinalli of Doddaballapur Taluk vide allotment letter dated 12/13.01.1998. Subsequently, respondent No.1 was asked to take possession of the said lands vide letter dated 29.05.1998 by KIADB and accordingly, possession certificate was issued on 16.07.1998 and respondent No.1 took possession on 16.7.1998. 4. On 8.6.1998, Respondent No.1 applied to Appellant authority seeking permission for construction of Bulk Cement Terminal. The Appellant inspected the spot along with KIADB Special Land Acquisition Officer, Urban Planning Director and Deputy Metropolitan Commissioner. By letter dated 17.9.1998, R-1 was informed by the Appellant that on inspecting the land once again and being satisfied that there is an approach road measuring 15 feet to the proposed land, it was decided to approve the development plan as per Rules. The Appellant also informed Respondent No.1 to pay betterment charges @ Rs. 75 per sq. mtr., inspection charges @ Rs. 150 per hectare, building construction charges, penalty @ Rs. 150 per hectare and road charges @ Rs. 1 lakh per acre totalling Rs.1,48,29,173/- pertaining to the sanctioning of the Development Plan consisting of the plans of storage, packing and administrative-office buildings. 5. Respondent No.1 objected to the demand by a letter dated 16.10.1998 stating that it had already made payment to KIADB towards allotment of lands, and therefore, development fee for constructing the commercial establishment is not necessary. Appellant issued notice dated 08.12.1998 under section 15 (4) of KTCP Act stating that as per Section 15 (1) of the KTCP Act, every development has to be proceeded only after getting necessary Commencement Certificate from the Appellant. It was stated in the notice that records reveal that no permission has been obtained as required under the provisions of KTCP Act. KTCP asked respondent No. 1 to stop work and discontinue use of the property and to show cause as to why action should not be taken to remove or pull down the work and to restore the land to its original condition. 6. Respondents No. 1 and 2 filed Writ Petitions No. 37717- 719/1998 dated 14.12.1998 before the High Court challenging the said notice dated 17.9.1998 and notice dated 8.12.1998. Respondent No.1 contended that the appellant has no authority to demand any development charges since the lands in the question were allotted in favour of Respondent No.1 by the KIADB, under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that in view of the declarations issued under section 4-A of the KTCP Act, the lands in question continue to be within the planning area. The Single Judge further held that when respondent No. 1 itself has submitted to the jurisdiction of the appellant by making an application for sanction of plan and for permission and while so, it is not open for them to say that the appellant has no jurisdiction or authority to demand development charges. The learned Single Judge held that by virtue of the power conferred on the appellant under Section 18, the appellant has rightly demanded the development charges having permitted Respondent No. 1 to use the land for establishment of an industry. 7. In the appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, the Division Bench held that KIAD Act is a special Act enacted for securing the establishment of industries in the State of Karnataka and the industrial area is governed by the provisions of the Act. The High Court further held that for the industrial plots allotted by KIADB, the change of land use and the development thereof comes under the purview of the special enactment KIAD Act and not under the general law of KTPC Act and the provisions of special Law will prevail over the provisions of the general Law. The High Court held that the only requirement for respondent No.1 is to obtain clearance from the appellant to show that the construction of the industrial unit is in conformity with the zonal regulations, etc. and this requirement does not in any way attract the provisions of Section 18 of the KTCP Act so as to empower the appellant to levy conversion fee/betterment fees. 8. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court erroneously held that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act are not applicable to the lands acquired under the KIAD Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that the provisions of KIAD Act mainly deals with the declaration of an area as an industrial area and the acquisition of the lands for the purpose of industrial development and allotment of the said land and there are no provisions in the KIAD Act with regard to the construction thereon or the developmental activities to be carried out in the industrial sites and one has to fall back upon the provisions of the KTCP Act for carrying on any development activities over the said land which brings into action Sections 14 and 15 of the KTCP Act for seeking permission and the power of the Planning Authority to levy the betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP Act. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the provisions of KTCP Act govern the entire planning and development of the buildings within the State of Karnataka including the industrial area falling within the planning area of the appellant authority and Section 18 of the KTCP Act automatically comes into play empowering the appellant to charge the betterment fees. It was submitted that the areas of operation of KTCP Act and KIAD Act are entirely different with different aims and objectives and therefore, the principle of interpretation of “special Act prevails over general Act” (Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant) would have no application and the same has been wrongly applied by the High Court and the Division Bench erred in reversing the judgment of the Single Judge. 9. Per contra, Mr. Bharat Sangal, learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that once the area is allotted to KIAD Board, the acquisition and the allotment being for industrial purpose which involves the change of land use and its development is controlled by the KIAD Board and the provisions of KIAD Act and it falls outside the purview of KTCP Act. The learned counsel for the first respondent further submitted that KIAD being a Special law, it will override the provisions of Sections 14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act and a general law like KTCP Act cannot defeat the provisions of the special Law to the extent to which they are in conflict. The learned counsel further submitted that the moment the land was acquired for industrial purpose, it assumes the character of industrial area and no further conversion and development is required and hence, there is no question of conversion fee/betterment fee be paid to KTCP and the entire field is covered by KIAD Act and KIADB Regulations which exclude the application and operation of KTCP Act, 1966. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent-KIADB submitted that once an area or land is acquired and declared as an industrial area under Section 3(1) of KIAD Act, the said area gets demarcated for industrial use and the KIADB is duty bound to develop the area for industrial activities and the ancillary area by virtue of the powers and functions under Section 14(C) of KIAD Act. There is no further requirement to apply for change of land use under the KTCP Act. It was further submitted that when any industrial area is set up by KIADB, all infrastructure facilities are also installed and the cost and the expenditure incurred by the KIADB is passed on to the entrepreneurs or allottees who intend to set up facilities for industrial activity in the State of Karnataka and there is no question of payment of conversion charges/betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP Act. 11. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the impugned judgment and materials placed on record. Upon consideration of the materials placed on record, the following points arise for determination in this appeal:- (i) Whether the High Court was right in holding that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act are not applicable when the lands are declared as industrial areas under Section 3 of KIAD Act and the payment of betterment fees for the purported development works under the provisions of the KTCP Act does not arise? (ii) When the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different with different aims and objectives, whether the High Court was right in saying that the principle of interpretation of Special Act prevails over the General Law is applicable? 12. Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (KTCP Act) has been enacted for regulation of planning, coordination and supervision of the orderly development of the areas within the State of Karnataka. KTCP Act is for the regulation of the planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State. 13. A combined reading of Section 14 with Section 18 of the KTCP Act leads to the conclusion that the Planning Authority under KTCP Act is entrusted with the function of granting licence to put up construction on the land including the land allotted by the KIAD Board to the allottees under the KIAD Act. This is clear from the non-obstante clause in KTCP Act i.e. Section 76-M which declares that the provisions of Section 76-M of KTCP Act along with rules and regulations and bye-laws made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. 14. For proper appreciation of the contentions urged, we may usefully refer to the relevant provisions of both KTCP Act and KIAD Act. The Preamble of the KTCP Act reads as under:- “An Act to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. Whereas it is necessary and expedient,— (i) to create conditions favourable for planning and replanning of the urban and rural areas in the State of Karnataka, with a view to providing full civic and social amenities for the people in the State, (ii) to stop uncontrolled development of land due to land speculation and profiteering in land, (iii) to preserve and improve existing recreational facilities and other amenities contributing towards balanced use of land; and (iv) to direct the future growth of populated areas in the State, with a view to ensuring desirable standards of environmental health and hygiene, and creating facilities for the orderly growth of industry and commerce, thereby promoting general standards of living in the State; And whereas, in order to ensure that town planning schemes are made in a proper manner and their execution is made effective, it is necessary to provide that a local authority shall prepare a development plan for the entire area within its jurisdiction;” 15. “Development” and “Local Authority” are defined in Section 2 of the KTCP Act as under:- “Section 2. Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. – …… (1-c) “Development” with its grammatical variations, means the carrying out of building, engineering, mining, or other operations in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in any building or land, or in the use of any building or land and includes sub-division of any land; …… [(3-a) “Local authority” means a municipal corporation, municipal council, Town Panchayat or Grama Panchayat and a Local Authority is a ‘local authority concerned if any land within its local limits falls in the area of a plan prepared or to be prepared under this Act; Admittedly, appellant herein is the planning authority within the meaning of Section 2(7) of the Act. 16. Section 14 of the KTCP Act deals with enforcement of Outline Development Plan (ODP) and Regulations and it prescribes that on or from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare ODP is published under Section 10(1), every land use, every change in the land use and every development in the area covered by the plan shall conform to the KTCP Act, the ODP and the Regulations as approved by State Government under Section 13(3). Section 14(1) stipulates that every land use, every change in land use and every development in the areas covered by the plan shall conform to the provisions of the Act, the Outline Development Plan and the regulations, as finally approved by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 13. Section 14(2)(a) of the Act defines the expression ‘development’ which means the carrying out of building or other operation in or over or under any land or the making of any material change in the use of any building or other land. 17. Section 15 authorizes the Planning Authority to grant permission for development of building or land. Section 18 confers the power to collect betterment fee and it says where the permission for the change in the use or development of any land or building is granted under Section 15 or Section 16, and such change or development is capable of yielding betterment income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a prescribed fees not exceeding one third of the increase in the value of the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such use or development. In exercise of its powers under Section 10, the Planning Authority declared its intention of making ODP by a notification dated 29.03.1996 which was made public. The authority resolved to adopt the relevant government orders with regard to charge of betterment fees dated 05.08.1996. 18. Section 18 of the KTCP Act confers the power upon the Planning Authority to collect betterment fee where permission for a change in the use or development of the land or building is granted under Section 15 or Section 16 and such change or development is capable of yielding a better income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a prescribed fee not exceeding one-third of the estimated increase in the value of the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such change in use or development. Section 18 of the KTCP Act reads as under:- Section 18. Recovery of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of land or building.- [(1) Where permission for change of land use or development of land or building is granted under section 14-A or section 14-B or Section 15 or Section 17 and such change or development is capable of yielding a better income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a prescribed fee not exceeding one-third of the estimated increase in the value of the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such change of land use or development of land or building.] …… [(3) The State Government may exempt any Board, Authority or body constituted by or under any law owned or controlled by the State Government or Central Government or an infrastructure Project promoted or implemented by any Company or person and approved by the State Government or Central Government from the payment of fee specified under sub-section (1). 19. The non-obstante clause in Section 76-M of the KTCP Act reads as under:- “Section 76-M. Effect of other Laws.—(1) Save as provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations and bye-laws made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any such other law,- (a) when permission for development in respect of any land has been obtained under this Act, such development shall not be deemed to be unlawfully undertaken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under such other law for such development has not been obtained; (b) when permission for such development has not been obtained under this Act, such development shall not be deemed to be lawfully undertaken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under such other law for such development has been obtained.” 20. The purpose of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, as seen from the Preamble of the Act, is to make special provisions for securing the establishment or industrial areas in the State and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries therein and for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development Board. The Preamble of the KIAD Act reads as under:- “An Act to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. Whereas it is expedient to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and the orderly development of industries in such industrial areas, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.” 21. As per Section 27 of the KIAD Act, the provisions of the Act shall apply to such areas from such date as have been notified by the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 1. Section 47 is the non-obstante clause of KIAD Act which reads as under:- “Section 47 – Effect of provisions inconsistent with other laws – The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.” 22. By careful reading of the provisions of both the Acts, it is seen that the object of KIAD Act is to make special provisions for securing the establishments of industrial areas in the State and to generally promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries. On the other hand, KTCP Act is for regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State. Both the Acts i.e. KIAD Act and KTCP Act operate in different fields. Considering the objects of both the enactments, we find that there is no merit in the plea of the fifth respondent that once a land is acquired for the purpose of industries under the KIAD Act and made over to the Board, the use of the land becomes ‘use for industrial purpose’ and no further permission for change of use of land by KTCP or any other authority is required. 23. Though heading of Section 18 of the KTCP Act is “Recovery of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of land or building”, the levy of prescribed fee is not only for permission for change of land use but also for development of land or building as contemplated under Section 14A or Section 14B or Section 15 or Section 17 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, “development” is defined in Section 2(1-c) of KTCP Act which inter alia provides for “in the use of any building or land and includes sub-division of any land”. From a combined reading of Section 18 with Section 2(1-c) of KTCP Act, it is clear that the levy of prescribed fee under Section 18 of the Act is not merely for change of land use but also for development of land or building. The language of expression used in Section 18 that “permission for change of land used…..” and “development of land or building….” is to be interpreted in the light of the object of KTCP Act as enunciated in the Preamble of the Act. 24. Power to Exempt:- Prior to Amendment Act 11 of 1997 (with effect from 19.02.1997), Section 16 of KIAD Act provided for exclusion of operation of other laws in respect of industrial areas. Section 16(C) provided that the State Government may by notification provide that the provisions of any other law relating to local authority which is in force in that area shall cease to apply and thereupon such provision was ceased to apply thereto. In exercise of such powers, the State Government issued the Circular dated 31.12.1990 directing Urban Development Authorities, City Improvement Trust Boards, Planning Authorities not to collect the betterment charges from the statutory bodies like Karnataka Housing Board and KIADB. Section 16 of the KIAD Act was omitted by Act 11 of 1997 (with effect from 19.02.1997). Subsequently by the government order dated 17.07.1997, the above Circular dated 31.12.1990 was revoked and the authorities above named have been directed to collect the betterment charges as per law. 25. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the Minutes of the Meeting held on 04.12.1999 where the question of levy of fees by KTCP in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region came up for discussion. The said meeting was attended by various authorities including the Finance Department, Commissioner of KIADB, Director of Town Planning etc. After detailed discussion, the following decisions were taken:- “After detailed discussions, the following decisions were taken: 1. The Principal Secretaries to Government UDD & RDPR, in consultation with the Principal Secretary to Government Commerce & Industries Department and Secretary, Law Department would examine all aspects pertaining to constitution of Industrial Townships in identified industrial areas and come up with firm proposals by end of December, 1999. 2. KIADB will obtain approval from the concerned Planning Authority before developing any new industrial area; 3. The matter regarding rationalization of various charges, fees and other levies under the KTCP Act and RDPR Act will be re-examined by the concerned departments, having regard to what is prevailing in neighboring States and firm proposals will be formulated within a period of one month; 4. The matter regarding delegation of powers to KIADB for granting approvals for building plans for industrial units to be established in approved industrial areas will be examined by the Urban Development Department and if necessary suitable amendments would be effected to the concerned Town Planning Act; and 5. Principal Secretary to Government Commerce & Industries Department will organize a meeting of major industries who had not yet paid certain charges and fee and try to sort out the matter in consultation with the Urban Development Department; Concluding the discussions, the Minister for Large & Medium Industries and Infrastructure Development informed that the main objective of constituting industrial townships was to simplify and streamline the procedures and ensure that approvals and also ensure that these industrial areas are maintained properly which at present are in a sorry state of affairs. He suggested that a proper revenue sharing mechanism between township authority and concerned local bodies should be worked out to ensure that the local bodies are also strengthened and take development works outside the industrial area. In view of the inordinate delay in fulfilling the commitments which had been made in the 1993 policy he requested that all concerned departments should take immediate action to formulate a proposal which is acceptable to all the departments.” [Underlining added] When the government of Karnataka, Finance Department and other departments and also the Commissioner for Industrial Development and other departments have participated in the abovesaid meeting and were all parties to the above decisions, it is not open to KIADB to resile from the minutes and put forth claim contrarily. Having been a party to the discussion in the meeting held on 04.12.1999, the State of Karnataka is also not justified in contending that the lands in question are included in the industrial area declared by the State Government and hence, not bound to pay the development fee under Section 18 of the Act. 26. It was stated by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the State of Karnataka has not filed its counter in the High Court. It is also to be pointed out that after dismissal of the writ petition by the Single Judge, a writ appeal was preferred only by the first respondent. The State of Karnataka has neither filed any appeal nor made its stand clear before the High Court. In the Supreme Court also, the State of Karnataka has not filed its counter affidavit. Only at the time of arguments, the State of Karnataka has filed written submissions stating that the provisions of the KTCP Act are not attracted to the industrial area covered under KIAD Act and that Section 18 of the Act will have no application and hence, no fee could be levied thereunder. In its written submissions, the stand taken by the State of Karnataka reads as under:- “……It is stated that in the present case, the lands in question are included in the industrial area declared by the State Government and the change in the land use and development thereof are governed by the provisions contained under Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 Sections 14 and 15 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 are not at all attracted and consequently Section 18 thereof will have no application to such lands and hence no fee could be levied there under by respondent No.4 and the petitioner…..” Since the State of Karnataka has not made its stand clear before the High Court nor any counter affidavit sworn in by any responsible officer of the State of Karnataka has been filed, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the stand taken by State of Karnataka in its written submissions. More so, when the State is a party to the meeting held on 04.12.1999 and concern expressed in the meeting as to the non-payment of development charges and the decisions taken thereon. The State appears to have been sitting over the fence and watching its two key authorities under KTCP Act and KIAD Act litigating. 27. Section 14 read with Section 18 of the KTCP Act clearly connotes that the Planning Authority is entrusted with the function of granting licence to put up construction on the land including the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. This is also clear from the provisions contained in the non-obstante clause in Section 74-M of the KTCP Act which declares that the provisions of the said Act and the Rules, Regulations and Bye-Laws made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. There is nothing in the provisions of this Act to exclude or exempt the lands which are covered by the KIAD Act. 28. In its lengthy judgment, the High Court inter alia observed that the very acquisition for the industrial areas and the development by KIADB by itself involve the change of land use and the development by the KIADB and while so, seeking permission for change of land use and its development under the KTCP Act will be superfluous. The relevant findings of the High Court in the impugned judgment are as under:-  So far as the land acquired under KIAD Act and utilised for industrial purpose and development thereof will have to be made by the Board in the area declared under the Act as an industrial area. The industrial activities in the industrial area are developed and controlled by the KIADB in accordance with the provisions of KIAD Act and it is a part of functions of KIADB;  The non-obstante clause-Section 47 of KIAD Act excludes the application of the provisions of any other Act;  The industrial activities in the industrial area, however, shall not contravene other laws and it shall be in conformity with Zoning Regulations and the Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act. The submission of plan to the appellant- Authority is only to ensure that the establishment of the industrial unit by the allottee in the industrial area is in conformity with the Zonal Regulations. Only for this limited purpose, the allottee of the industrial plot must submit its plan to the Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act for the purpose of obtaining NOC;  For granting approval and for issuance of NOC, the Planning Authority under KTCP Act cannot levy betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP Act because the allottee of an industrial plot does not seek for a change in the land use or development of the said land. There was already a change of land use and its development as an industrial unit which is the function of the Board constituted under the Special Act i.e. KIAD Act; and  When the entrepreneurs do not seek for change in land use and its development within the meaning of Sections 14 and 15 of the KTCP Act, the question for levying any fee for change of land use under Section 18 of the Act will not arise. 29. The High Court, on the one hand, took the view that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act are not applicable to the industrial area which is governed by KIAD Act. On the other hand, the High Court held that for compliance of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the KTCP Act for all the establishment of the industrial unit, the allottee has to seek approval of the Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act and KTCP is to scrutinise the plan and other documents so as to ensure that the establishment of the industrial unit by the allottee in the industrial area is in conformity with the Zonal Regulations etc; but KTCP is not to levy betterment fee. The findings of the High Court are self-contradictory to each other. 30. As discussed earlier, the Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act is entrusted with the functions of granting approval for any development on the land within its jurisdiction including the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. Per contra, the enactment of KIAD Act is to make special provision for securing the establishment of the industrial area in the State and for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development Board. The provisions of both the Acts make the intention of the legislature very clear. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that if there are two possible interpretations of an enactment, one should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by the court should be to secure that object. In so far as the “industrial area” allotted by KIADB, the interpretation given by the High Court to the provisions of KTCP Act would render the existence of the Planning Authority like the appellant to futility. While on the one hand, the High Court has directed the first respondent to obtain permission from the Planning Authority under KTCP Act and that the appellant- Authority to scrutinise those plans only to ensure that they are in conformity with the Regulations etc. At the same time, the High Court is saying that the appellant-Authority cannot collect the betterment fees. In our considered view, such findings are contradictory to each other and cannot be sustained. 31. The High Court held that KIAD Act being a Special Act, the same will prevail over KTCP Act which is a General Act. KTCP Act is applicable to all the developmental activities in respect of any land coming within the area of Outline Development Plan (ODP) and the lands in question even though situated in industrial area comes within the area of ODP of the Planning Authority. The developmental activities over the said land have to be carried on only with the permission of the Authority and both the enactments have to be harmoniously construed so as to give effect to each of the Acts enacted by the State Government. 32. The question to be considered in this regard is whether KIAD Act is a special enactment and KTCP Act a general Act and whether the maxim ‘Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant’ is applicable as held by the High Court. Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted, which can be seen from the preamble of an Act. As discussed earlier, as per the preamble of the KIAD Act, it is an Act to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein. KTCP Act on the other hand, as we have pointed out earlier, was enacted to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. Thus, considering the legislative intent of the two enactments, it is seen that there is nothing in the KIAD Act to destroy the authority of the Appellant which has its own assigned role to perform under the provisions of the KTCP Act. Considering the object and purpose for which both the Acts were enacted, there is no inconsistency or overlapping between the two enactments and the power of authorities constituted under the Acts. As the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different, there is no question of applicability of the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant. 33. Seeking grant of permission for construction of industrial buildings – Bulk Cement Terminal near Dodaballapur Railway Station, the first respondent submitted its application to the appellant-Authority on 08.06.1998. On that application for sanctioning the development plan consisting of the plan of storage, packing and administrative office buildings in the plot in question, the appellant-Authority vide order dated 17.09.1988 levied betterment charges, road charges etc. of Rs.1,48,29,173/- under various heads. In response to the same, the first respondent has sent its reply on 16.10.1998 inter alia stating that:- (i) since the first respondent has made payment to KIADB towards allotment of lands considering the first respondent as commercial establishment and levy of development at the rate of Rs.75/- per sq. mtr. may not be necessary; (ii) the construction put up by the first respondent are industrial buildings and not commercial establishments; and (iii) the first respondent is situated in Bengaluru Rural (North) District and it is not situated in Bengaluru Urban District attracting levy of such higher fee. 34. By careful perusal of the first respondent’s response dated 16.10.1998, it is seen that the first respondent has not challenged the jurisdiction of appellant-Authority to levy betterment charges and that the objections that the first respondent has raised were regarding the rate of betterment fee treating the first respondent as commercial establishment and the fact that they are situated in Bengaluru Rural (North) District and not in Bengaluru Urban District. When the first respondent has not raised the objection regarding the jurisdiction/competence of the appellant-Authority to levy betterment fee, the first respondent was not justified in turning around and challenging the powers of the appellant-Planning Authority to levy betterment charges. The High Court, in our view, did not properly consider the response of the first respondent and the High Court erred in saying that the role of KTCP is only to scrutinise the application to ensure that the plan is in conformity with the provisions of the KTCP Act and that it cannot levy the fee. 35. It is also pertinent to note that for obtaining sanction of their plan, the other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid the betterment charges and also the road cess as demanded by the appellant-Authority. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the communication from ITC Limited including the Pay Order dated 01.08.1997 for payment of betterment charges of Rs.3,01,71,600/-. When other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid betterment charges and road cess for obtaining sanction of the plan, the first respondent cannot challenge the levy and contend that they are not liable to pay the betterment charges. 36. The High Court, in our view, ignored the important provisions of KTCP i.e. Sections 14 and 15 regarding the development act and the development activities including the industrial areas fall within the scope of the appellant-Authority and that the first respondent while obtaining the approval from the appellant-Authority for its plan is bound to pay the betterment charges, road cess and other charges as per the laws. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the first respondent and the Division Bench erred in reversing the same and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 37. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The first respondent is directed to pay Rs.1,48,29,173/- to appellant-Authority with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the demand (17.09.1998) within a period of two months from this date, failing which the respondent is liable to pay the interest at the rate of 12% thereafter on the accrued amount. …………….……………J. [R. BANUMATHI] …………….……………J. [INDIRA BANERJEE] New Delhi; November 27, 2018


1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3195-3196 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C)Nos.10972-10973 OF 2020) TRUSTEES OF H.C. DHANDA TRUST ...APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant by these appeals challenges the judgment of learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore in Writ Petition No.8888 of 2011 dated 30.03.2017 dismissing the Writ Petition of the appellant as well as the judgment dated Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by 04.09.2017 of the Division Bench dismissing the Writ MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date: 2020.09.17 15:31:32 IST Reason: Appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench has dismissed the writ appeal vide its judgment dated 04.09.2017 holding it as not maintainable. 3. Brief facts of the case giving rise to these appeals are: Late Shri Harish Chand Dhanda, a Minister in erstwhile Government of Maharaja Holkar of Indore received the free gift of land measuring 108,900 sq.ft. (one lac eight thousand nine hundred) situate at Yeshwant Niwas Road, Indore by Order No.58 of 22.04.1946. Late Shri H.C. Dhanda got constructed in the above piece of land, a building known as ‘Hotel Lantern’. Another piece of land situate at 5, Ravindra Nath Tagore Marg, Indore was gifted to Late Shri H.C. Dhanda by his father-in-law late Col. V.B. Jadhav on 05.10.1948. Late Shri H.C. Dhanda possessed various other movable and immovable properties in the city of Indore with which we are not concerned in the present appeals. Late Shri H.C. Dhanda executed his last Will dated 26.10.2002. In his Will he mentioned his movable and immovable properties apart from the above two immovable properties and by his Will he created a Trust in which he appointed his son, Yogesh Dhanda as Chairman of Trust, Shri B.J. Dave, Chartered Accountant, Indore and one Shri Chhaganlal Nagar as member. The above two immovable properties apart from other properties were put in Trust under the aforesaid Will. All Trustees under the Will were the executors of the Will. Shri H.C. Dhanda died on 05.07.2003. 4. A meeting of Board of Trustees was held on 06.04.2005. A resolution was passed by Executors/Trustees to transfer and vest area by executing a Deed of Transfer with a site plan from the trustees to beneficiaries by registering the same. On 21.04.2005 a Deed of Assent was executed between M/s H.C. Dhanda Trust, a private trust as one part and Jogesh Dhanda and others as other part. By Deed of Assent the Trustees/Executors gave assent to complete the title of the Legatees and vest absolutely and forever in their favour both Lantern Hotel and Jahaj Mahal property. A notice was issued by the Collector of Stamps, District Indore stating that in Deed of Assent dated 21.04.2005 proper stamp duty has not been paid, 22.03.2007 was fixed for appearance. The notice further stated that why deficit stamp duty of Rs. 1,62,82,150/- on the document dated 21.04.2005, and ten times penalty should not be imposed. The Trust appeared before the Collector of Stamps and filed its objection. The Collector of Stamps passed an order dated 22.09.2008 holding the Deed of Assent dated 21.04.2005 as a gift deed. The Collector held that under Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the stamp duty payable on a gift deed would be 8% of the market value, Municipal duty 1% and Janpad duty 1%. The Collector found deficit duty to the extent of Rs.1,28,09,700/- and also imposed ten times penalty i.e. Rs.12,80,97,000/-. The order called upon the Trust to deposit amount of Rs.14,09,06,700/- within thirty days. Aggrieved against the order of Collector, Reference Application was filed by the appellant before the Board of Revenue, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior. Board of Revenue vide its order dated 25.10.2011 upheld deficiency of stamp duty of Rs.1,28,09,700/- and ten times penalty of Rs.12,80,97,000/-. The order called upon the Trust to deposit amount of Rs.14,09,06,700/- within thirty days. Board of Revenue vide its order dated 25.10.2011 upheld the order of the Collector dated 22.09.2008 and dismissed the Reference Application. Challenging the order of the Board of Revenue as well as the Collector of Stamps a Writ Petition No.8888 of 2011 was filed by the appellant in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Learned Single Judge of the High Court vide its judgment dated 30.03.2017 dismissed the writ petition. Learned Single Judge upheld the order of the Collector by which deficiency in the stamp duty and ten times penalty was imposed. 5. An SLP was filed in this Court challenging the order of the learned Single Judge by the appellant which was withdrawn by the appellant on 4.5.2017 seeking liberty to file writ appeal in the High Court. The writ appeal was filed by the appellant being Writ Appeal No.255 of 2017 which has been dismissed by the Division Bench on 4.9.2017 holding the writ appeal as not maintainable. Aggrieved against the aforesaid two orders these appeals have been filed by the appellant. 6. This Court by its order dated 10.11.2017 issued limited notice to the following effect: “Issue notice, returnable in six weeks, limited to the quantum of penalty that has been imposed by the Collector (Stamps). Subject to the condition that stamp duty is paid within a period of one month, there shall be stay of the order qua the penalty.” 7. In response to the above notice the respondents have appeared. 8. We have heard Shri A.K. Chitale, learned senior counsel, for the appellant and Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, for the State. 9. Shri A.K. Chitale, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the Deed of Assent executed on 21.04.2005 is referable to Section 331 and 332 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. Shri Chitale submitted that document in question is not a Gift Deed. Shri Chitale submits that the penalty imposed by the Collector of Stamps was wholly illegal. There was no dishonest conduct on the part of the appellant, Deed of Assent was executed bona fide on which there was no deficiency in the stamp duty. Shri Chitale submits that no reason has been given by the Collector of Stamps as to why maximum penalty of ten times was imposed on the appellant while determining the stamp duty. Shri Chitale submits that the Collector of Stamps has not exercised his jurisdiction in reasonable and fair manner and imposition of ten times penalty on the appellant deserves to be set aside. 10. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General refuting the submission of counsel for the appellant contends that nature of document having been found to be gift the Collector has rightly determined the deficiency in the stamp duty and imposed ten times penalty. Shri Mehta submits that there was clear intention of the appellant to evade the payment of stamp duty which clearly called for imposition of ten times penalty. Shri Mehta referred to the order of Board of Revenue and submits that Board of Revenue has also upheld imposition of ten times penalty by holding that the applicant has executed Deed of Assent suppressing the facts intentionally due to which there has been loss of stamp duty. This can neither be termed as wrong nor illegal. 11. We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the records. 12. Only question to be determined in these appeals is as to whether the imposition of ten times penalty by the Collector of Stamps under Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 was validly imposed or not. 13. The Collector of Stamps vide its order dated 22.09.2008 determined the nature of document dated 21.04.2005 as Gift Deed. The Collector of Stamps in his order also proceeded to determine the market value of property, Lantern Hotel situate at Yashwant Niwas Road and Jahaj Mahal situate in Ravindra Nath Tagore Marg, on the market value of both afove properties stamp duty payable was determined as Rs.1,28,09,900/-, stamp duty of Rs.200/- only having been paid on the document deficit duty was determined as Rs.1,28,09,700/-. The Collector of Stamps by the same order also imposed ten times penalty of Rs.12,80,97,000/-. 14. Before we proceed to consider the respective submissions, it is useful to extract the order of the Collector of Stamps which contains the discussion regarding imposition of penalty, which is as follows: “……In the above background, the deed in question is classified in the category of a gift deed. The total market value of the property in question in the position of year 2005-06 under the document is fixed at market value Rs.12,80,99,000/-, on which total stamp duty of Rs.1,28,09,900/- is payable. Only Rs.200/- stamp duty has been paid on the document. Thus, remaining stamp duty Rs.1,28,09,700/- and, since the party has not mentioned the actual nature of the document with an intention to escape the duty, therefore, under Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, ten times penalty Rs.12,80,97,000/- is imposed. Thus, total Rs.14,09,06,700/- shall be deposited in the treasure within 30 days.” 15. Section 40 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 provides for Collectors power to stamp instruments impounded. Section 40(1) which is relevant for the present case which is as follows: “40. Collectors power to stamp instruments impounded. — (1) When the Collector impounds any instrument under section 33, or receives any instrument sent to him under section 38, sub-section (2), not being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten naye paise only or a bill of exchange or promissory note, he shall adopt the following procedure: — (a) if he is of opinion that such instrument is duly stampeded or is not chargeable with duty, he shall certify by endorsement thereon that it is duly stamped, or that it is not so chargeable, as the case may be; b) if he is of opinion that such instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of the proper duty or the amount required to make up the same, together with a penalty of five rupees; or, if he thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof, whether such amount exceeds or falls short of five rupees: Provided that, when such instrument has been impounded only because it has been written in contravention of section 11 13 or section 14, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, remit the whole penalty prescribed by this section.” 16. According to Section 40(1)(b) if the Collector is of opinion that such instrument is chargeable with duty and is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of the of the proper duty or the amount required to make up the same, together with a penalty of the five rupees; or, if he thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or of the deficient portion thereof. The statutory scheme of Section 40(1)(b) as noticed above indicates that when the Collector is satisfied that instrument is not duly stamped, he shall require the payment of proper duty together with a penalty of the five rupees. The relevant part of Section 40(1)(b) which falls for consideration in these appeals is: “or, if he thinks fit, an amount not exceeding ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof.” 17. The amount of penalty thus can be an amount not exceeding ten times. The expression “an amount not exceeding ten times” is preceded by expression “if he thinks fit”. The statutory scheme, thus, vest the discretion to the Collector to impose the penalty amount not exceeding ten times. Whenever statute transfers discretion to an authority the discretion is to be exercised in furtherance of objects of the enactment. The discretion is to be exercised not on whims or fancies rather the discretion is to be exercised on rational basis in a fair manner. The amount of penalty not exceeding ten times is not an amount to be imposed as a matter of force. Neither imposition of penalty of ten times under Section 40(1) (b) is automatic nor can be mechanically imposed. The concept of imposition of penalty of ten times of a sum equal to ten times of the proper duty or deficiency thereof has occurred in other provisions of the Act as well. We may refer to Section 35(a) in this context is as follows: “35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. — No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped : Provided that— (a)any such instrument shall be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of any instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion; (b)… … … …” 18. It is relevant to notice that Section 35 contemplates that when ten times the amount of the proper duty of or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion is required to be deposited. Under Section 39 Collector is empowered to refund penalty. As noticed above under Section 35(a) there is no option except to pay sum equal to ten times of such duty or deficient portion but Section 39 empowers the Collector to refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees which is expressed in following words: “if he thinks fit refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees which has been paid in respect of such instrument.” 19. The legislative intent which is clear from reading of Sections 33,35,38 and 39 indicates that with respect to the instrument not duly stamped, ten times penalty is not always retained and power can be exercised under Section 39 to reduce penalty in regard to that there is a statutory discretion in Collector to refund penalty. 20. Section 39(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 came for consideration before this Court in Gangtappa and another vs. Fakkirappa, 2019(3) SCC 788 (of which one of us Ashok Bhushan, J. was a member). This Court noticed the legislative scheme and held that the legislature has never contemplated that in all cases penalty to the extent of ten times should be ultimately realized. In paragraph 16 following has been laid down by this Court: “16. Deputy Commissioner under Section 38 is empowered to refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees which has been paid in respect of such instrument. Section 38 Sub-section (1) again uses the expression "if he thinks fit". Thus, in cases where penalty of 10 times has been imposed, Deputy Commissioner has discretion to direct the refund of the penalty in facts of a particular case. The power to refund the penalty Under Section 38 clearly indicates that legislature have never contemplated that in all cases penalty to the extent of 10 times should be ultimately realised. Although the procedural part which provides for impounding and realisation of duty and penalty does not give any discretion Under Section 33 for imposing any lesser penalty than 10 times, however, when provision of Section 38 is read, the discretion given to Deputy Commissioner to refund the penalty is akin to exercise of the jurisdiction Under Section 39 where while determining the penalty he can impose the penalty lesser than 10 times.” 20. The expression “if he thinks fit” also occurs in Section 40 sub-clause (b). The same legislative scheme as occurring in Section 39 is also discernible in Section 40(b), there is no legislative intentment that in all cases penalty to the extent of ten times the amount of proper stamp duty or deficient portion should be realised. The discretion given to Collector by use of expression “if he thinks fit” gives ample latitude to Collector to apply his mind on the relevant factors to determine the extent of penalty to be imposed for a case where instrument is not duly stamped. Unavoidable circumstances including the conduct of the party, his intent are the relevant factors to come to a decision. 21. The purpose of penalty generally is a deterrence and not retribution. When a discretion is given to a public authority, such public authority should exercise such discretion reasonably and not in oppressive manner. The responsibility to exercise the discretion in reasonable manner lies more in cases where discretion vested by the statute is unfettered. Imposition of the extreme penalty i.e. ten times of the duty or deficient portion thereof cannot be based on the mere factum of evasion of duty. The reason such as fraud or deceit in order to deprive the Revenue or undue enrichment are relevant factors to arrive at a decision as to what should be the extent of penalty under Section 40(1)(b). 22. We may refer to judgment of this Court in Peteti Subba Rao vs. Anumala S. Narendra, 2002 (10) SCC 427. This Court had occasion to consider in the above case provisions of Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Referring to Section 40 this Court made following observation in paragraph 6: “6………The Collector has the power to require the person concerned to pay the proper duty together with a penalty amount which the Collector has to fix in consideration of all aspects involved. The restriction imposed on the Collector in imposing the penalty amount is that under no circumstances the penalty amount shall go beyond ten times the duty or the deficient portion thereof. That is the farthest limit which meant only in very extreme situations the penalty need be imposed up to that limit. It is unnecessary for us to say that the Collector is not required by law to impose the maximum rate of penalty as a matter of course whenever an impounded document is sent to him. He has to take into account various aspects including the financial position of the person concerned.” 23. This Court in the above case categorically held that it is only in the very extreme situation that penalty needs to be imposed to the extent of ten times. 24. The Collector by imposing ten times penalty in his order has given the reason for imposition as “the party has not mentioned the actual nature of the document with the intention to escape the duty”. When the Collector found intention to escape the duty, it was the case of imposition of penalty but whether the reason given by the Collector is sufficient for imposition of extreme penalty of ten times is the question which needs to be further considered. The High Court while considering the question of imposition of penalty of ten times has also given almost same reason in following words: “………But in the present case the complete title has been transferred by Trust to Jogesh Dhanda and Ishan Dhanda in the name of Deed of Assent. Therefore, there was intention to evade the heavy stamp duty on such transaction. Therefore, the Collector of Stamp has rightly imposed 10 times penalty which is maximum under the Act. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this writ petition. The same is hereby dismissed.” 25. No other reasons have been given either by the Collector or by the High Court justifying the imposition of maximum penalty of ten times. It is not the case of Collector that the conduct of the appellant was dishonest or contumacious. The High Court in its judgment has noticed that although the resolution was passed on 06.04.2005 to execute the Deed of Transfer by Trustees in favour of Jogesh Dhanda and Ishan Dhanda, but later on they deliberately executed the deed in the name of Deed of Assent on a stamp paper of Rs.200/-. For the reason given by the Collector as well as by the High Court that there was intention to evade the stamp duty in describing the document as Deed of Assent the imposition of the penalty was called for but in the facts and circumstances and the reasons which have been given by the Collector of Stamps as noticed above we are satisfied that this was not a case of imposition of extreme penalty of ten times of deficiency of stamp duty. Taking into consideration all facts and circumstances of the case, we are of view that ends of justice will be served in reducing the penalty imposed to the extent of the half i.e. five times of deficiency in the stamp duty. 26. In result the appeals are allowed the order of the Collector of Stamps dated 22.09.2008 is modified to the extent that penalty imposed of ten times of Rs.12,80,97,000/- is modified into five times penalty i.e. Rs.6,40,48,500/-. The appeals are partly allowed to the above extent. .....................J. ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) ......................J. ( R. SUBHASH REDDY ) ......................J. ( M.R. SHAH ) NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 17, 2020.


CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (civil) 6779 of 2000 PETITIONER: VICCO LABORATORIES & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: ART COMMERCIA ADVERTISING PVT.LTD. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/08/2001 BENCH: S.R.Babu, Y.K.Sabharwal JUDGMENT: RAJENDRA BABU, J. : A suit was filed in S.C.Suit No.493 of 1986 in the Bombay City Civil Court, Bombay by Vicco Laboratories, appellant herein, manufacturers of ayurvedic pharmaceutical products against defendant Nos. 1 to 4, respondents herein, for a declaration that the title and format of the suit serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" exclusively belonged to them and respondents Nos. 1 to 4 have no right thereto and for permanent injunction restraining the said respondents from making use of the title or episodes belonging to the petitioners or any episodes hereafter made. A number of averments germane to this case as set out in the plaint are set out hereunder: The petitioners carried on business as manufacturers of ayurvedic pharmaceuticals products, which were sold under the brand name of "Vicco" and have acquired substantial reputation in the market. The 1st respondent are an advertising agency and have been the advertising agents in respect of the products manufactured by the petitioners as aforesaid for number of years. The 2nd respondent is a Director and/or partner of the 1st respondent and has mainly dealt with the petitioners on behalf of the 1st respondent. Respondents Nos. 3 & 4 are proprietary concerns of respondent No.2. The 5th respondent is the Union of India and has been joined as the authority concerning Television in India in the name and style of Doordarshan, which is a television media. The petitioners had employed the respondent Nos.1 to 4 as their advertising agents through the petitioners' sister concern "M/s Modern Advertising Agency" and "Uta Advertising Agency" and were dealing with the respondent No.1 mainly through the petitioners Managing Director, G.K.Pendharkar. In 1984, Doordarshan in order to popularize sponsored serial, undertook the production of a serial by the name "HUMLOG". The petitioners are also pioneers in making use of Doordarshan for advertising their products through the agency of the 1st respondent, approached the 1st respondent to act as their agents for the purpose of producing a serial which would be shown as petitioners' sponsored programme. The petitioners agreed to pay the entire costs of the said production to the said advertising agency and requested it to look into the matter, employed various persons on behalf of the petitioners and prepare a suitable serial for them. Pursuant to the said arrangement, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 as the agents of the petitioners prepared at the costs and expenses of the petitioners, a serial entitled "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi". The petitioners claimed that as a result of the employment of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and the finances paid by them the petitioners are the owners of the said serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" and the title thereof. The first and second respondents under the arrangement produced about 60 episodes and the petitioners have spent a crore of rupees for the products and telecast of the said episodes and have also spent large sums of money on advertising to popularize the said programme. "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" had gained popularity and had become one of the most exclusive and popular serial. The petitioners claimed that the exclusive right to use the title thereof belonged to them and the 2nd episode of "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" was telecast without the name of the petitioners being mentioned as sponsors nor was their advertisement shown. This was due to the negligence of the respondent Nos.1 to 4. But the respondents recovered the cost of production from the petitioners. Further the said respondents had been recovering the cost of production well in advance of the serial episodes being actually produced. The petitioners claimed that they were the real producers and owners of the said serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" and the petitioners to the knowledge of the respondents have entered into an agreement assigning the video rights in the said serial to one M/s Esquire Distributing and Servicing Pvt. Ltd. on 1.1.1985. The petitioners though not required to do so, made an ex gratia payment to respondent Nos. 1 to 4 of a portion of the royalty received by them from the said M/s Esquire Distributing and Servicing Pvt. Ltd.. 1st and 2nd respondents had by their letter dated 14.12.1984 confirmed that the petitioners have all T.V. and video rights of the sponsored programme in Hindi "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" and vest with the petitioners. Though original agreement was to have 27 episodes but having regard to the popularity of the programme the petitioners decided to increase the said serial to 52 episodes and by a letter dated 22.4.1985 the petitioners informed respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that in the title of the 27th and 28th episodes it has been stated that it is presented by "Oberoi Films". Some time in May 1985, the 1st respondent proposed to the petitioners that some other products should be tied up with the serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi". However, the petitioners were not interested in the same as they wanted the serial to project their products only exclusively and did not agree to any other products being tied up with the said serial. The respondents on 27.12.1985 alleged that they were losing Rs.50,000/- to Rs.75,000/- per episode and indicated that they wanted to get a new sponsor. By their letter dated 2.1.1986 the petitioners informed the 1st and 2nd respondents that it was not possible to increase the costs of production for the episodes and that in the circumstances, the production of the serial may stop. It was also pointed out that the name "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" is associated with the "Vicco Laboratories" and that if they wanted to obtain another sponsor they could produce a new serial under a different name. The petitioners apprehended that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 intended to produce further episodes under the title "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" making use of the same format as the earlier serial for and on behalf of the third party. The petitioners reserved their right to sue for damages in terms of Order II, Rule 2 CPC. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in their written statement contested the suit. Apart from raising the question of valuation of the suit and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court to try the same they also raised question that the petitioners are not the owners of the copyright in the said serial within the meaning of Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and the copyright in respect of the said serial belongs and vests with the respondent Nos. 1 to 4. Therefore, it was submitted that the suit lacked cause of action. While traversing the case on merit they contended that it was all along agreed between the petitioners and respondents that the copyright in the said serial would rest exclusively in the respondents and not in the petitioners. Thus the respondents' name was shown in the title of the said serial as the producer thereof right from the beginning of the said serial but the petitioners did not protest against the same. Consistently with the said intention further, the master cassette of the said serial at all relevant times remained exclusively with the respondents and not with the petitioners and the petitioners paid to the respondents 50% of the royalty received from M/s Esquire Distributing and Servicing Pvt. Ltd. under the agreement dated 1.1.1985, 4.3.1985 and 16.9.1985. The advertisements issued by the petitioners themselves in various newspapers to give wide publicity to the said serial would indicate that the serial mentioned these respondents' are the owners of the copyright in respect of the said serial and the petitioners claim in that behalf is devoid of any substance. The respondents also contended that even assuming but without admitting that even if the petitioners are the owners of the copyright in respect of the said serial as on the date of the suit they ceased to be such owners in view of the fact that these rights vested in them before the institution of the suit and they have acquiesced in the exercise of the said right by these respondents by their conduct as referred to earlier. It was also contended that the 2nd respondent is an artist and a film maker and has been in the field of film making for the past 20 years. In the course of his business the 2nd respondent has developed contacts and connections with important and renowned personalities, artists, technicians etc. in the film industry. In the year 1967, the 2nd respondent's wife Mrs. Sunanda S. Oberoi started the proprietary business of advertising agency in the name and style of Art Commercial and the 2nd respondent used to work in various capacities for the said firm. In the year 1983, the said proprietary firm was converted into a private limited company which is the 1st respondent in the present suit and the 2nd respondent constituted respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as his proprietary firm. About 18 years ago before filing of the suit, the respondents came into contact with the petitioners initially as clients in connection with the job of advertisement of their products on All India Radio, theatre and films and later, on television. These ad-films and jingles fetched handsome returns for the petitioners and boosted their sales beyond their own expectations. In course of time, the 2nd respondent and partners of the petitioners especially G.K.Pendharkar came very close to each other and developed very intimate relations. Either at the end of 1983 or early part of 1984, the 5th respondent through the said Doorsarshan decided to introduce the production of films or serials especially for exhibitions on TV instead of exhibiting/telecasting films produced by the professional film producers on payment of exorbitant royalty to them, partly as an economy measure and partly to provide avenues to and exposure new talents. The 5th respondent thereafter decided to entertain/welcome and/or encourage the proposals from the private producers to produce such serials or films at their own cost and responsibility and under the said scheme the advertisers desirous of linking up their advertisements with such films or serials were required to negotiate and settle directly with the producers of such films and/or serials, the royalty or consideration payable to such producers for linking up their advertisements and commercials with their film/serial and under the said scheme further, such advertisements were offered handsome concessions in the rates of advertisements for display of their ads on TV. As against the regular rates/charge of Rs.3,24,000/- for display of advertisements on TV of such advertisers for 120 seconds per telecast, the relevant time, at the rate of Rs.35,000/- only for 120 seconds in addition to the royalty or consideration payable to the producers of such films or serials which invariably was far less than the difference between the usual rates and concession rates of advertisements. The 2nd respondent undertook the preliminary project work on his own without loss of any time. The 2nd respondent made extensive study and research and prepared a format of the proposed serial. The said team of the 2nd respondent responded to his appeal and took great pains and put in hard work in the said project and presented to him an exclusive and ingenious format of the proposed serial. The 2nd respondent then approached the 5th respondent through Doordarshan with his proposal to produce the said serial then proposed to be entitled "Mussibat Hai". After a number of meetings between the 2nd respondent and the concerned officers and the authorities of the respondents at Delhi in connection with the said proposal approved a pilot [i.e. the first episode as sample] on 19.9.1984 to produce a TV serial comprising 52 episodes subject of course to the 5th respondent discretion to discontinue the same if the same proved a flop before the expiry of the stipulated period. The entire cost of the spade work and the cost of the title song was borne exclusively by the respondents and nothing was contributed by the petitioners in this regard. The 5th respondent registered the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as the producers of the said serial. After finalizing the proposal by the TV authorities, respondent No.2 asked the petitioners as to whether they were interested in the linking up their ads with the said serial. Petitioners agreed to link up their ads with 26 episodes of the said serial. The petitioners agreed to pay fixed amount to these respondents per episode for linking up their commercials with the said serial and not on the basis of the actual cost of production of each episode so that if the cost of production exceeded the said fixed amount the respondents had to bear the same. In these circumstances, the respondents contended that by entering into the said agreement of sponsorship, neither the petitioners nor the respondents created nor did they ever intend to create any relationship of employer and employee and/or master and servant or principal and agent between the petitioners on the one hand and the respondents No.1 to 4 on the other. Nor did the parties intend that the respondents should produce the said serial for the petitioners or at the instance of the petitioners and the respondents intended to embark on the production of the said serial on their own. The petitioners by their letter dated 2.1.1987 turned down the respondents' demand and informed the respondents that they had no objection if the respondents went ahead with the production of the said serial and merely requested the respondents that the title of the said serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" may not be used by the respondents. In the meanwhile, the respondents contended that M/s Brook Bond Ltd. who wanted to link up their commercial with 13 episodes and agreed to pay and paid the ruling market price. On these grounds, the respondents contended that the suit of the petitioners is misconceived, malicious and baseless and is liable to be dismissed. The respondents contended that on no occasion the petitioners acted as a producer and even the contract was signed by the petitioners as an Advertiser and by the respondent No. 1 as an approved agent. The respondents strongly contended that the serial "Hum Log" was produced by the petitioners in collaboration with M/s Concept Advertisers. The trial court raised as many as 12 issues and they are as follows :- 1. "Is it proved that this Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit? 2. Do the plaintiffs prove that the T.V.serial entitled "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" was produced by the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 as agents and (the said serial made by defendant Nos. 1 to 4) in the course of their employment with the plaintiffs as alleged? 3. Do the plaintiffs prove that the entire serial rights including the excluding the exclusive right to use the title thereof, belong to the plaintiffs as alleged? 4. Are defendant Nos. 1 to 4 entitled to deny the ownership of the plaintiffs of the Film "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" in view of Exhibits a, B and E (colly) to the plaint? 5. Do the defendants prove that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the copyright of the TV serial/film, viz., "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" , within the meaning of Section 17 of the Copyright Act? 6. Do the defendant Nos. 1 to 4 prove that it was intended between the parties that copyrights in respect of the said film should vest exclusively with the defendants or that the right of ownership was waived by the plaintiffs? 7. Does the suit suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties? 8. Is the suit not maintainable against defendant No. 5 for failure to give notice u/s 80 of CPC? 9. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the declaration sought? 10. Are the plaintiffs entitled to permanent injuction as prayed for? 11. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 12. What order?" The trial court found that the petitioners have not been able to prove that the TV serial "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" was produced by defendants Nos. 1 to 4 as agents in the course of their employment as the agent of the petitioners as contended in the suit. The petitioners were also not able to prove that the entire serial rights including the exclusive right to use the title thereof belonged to the petitioners as alleged. It was also held that the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 are entitled to deny the ownership of the petitioners of the film "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi in view of Exhibits A, B and E produced in the case. It was also held that the respondents proved that the petitioners are not the owners of the copy right of the TV serial/film viz., "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" within the meaning of Section 17 of the Copy Right Act and it was intended between the parties that copy rights in respect of the said film should vest exclusively with the respondents or that the rights of ownership was waived by the petitioners. After examining the oral and documentary evidence on record it is disclosed that prior to letter sent on 11.7.1984 the petitioners were acquainted even with the format of the suit serial, they did not have any connection with the suit serial till that date and relied upon the wording used therein to the effect that "you and Mr. G.K. Pendharkar are requested to join Mr. Oberoi and his creative team when the format of the proposed half and hour sponsored programme shall be presented to you." That was the first occasion when the format was presented to the petitioners. It was also on record that the Shri G.K. Pendharkar of the petitioners and respondent No. 2 had long standing relations with each other and they had already done a lot of advertising works for the petitioners before the production of the suit serial. Exhibit G-1 (which is Exhibit 27-A in the petitioners' compilation) is a letter written by Shri S.P. Agrawal, Controller of Programmes of Doordarshan to respondent No. 1, M/s Art Commercia with reference to the format for the proposed serial of half and hour duration tentatively titled "Musibat Hai" serial sent to them on 13.7.1984. Since the letter was addressed to M/s Art Commercia in which the proposal was accepted for production of the serial and the first episode was to be sent for preview and approval which would be given only after seeing the recording of the first episode. That letter had been addressed to respondent No. 1, M/s Art Commercia. The trial court felt that it was addressed not to the petitioners but to the respondents alone. The trial court also relied on Exhibit C-1 which indicated that the respondents were submitting a format for the serial which was to be registered on behalf of the client M/s Vicco Laboratories. The learned Judge of the trial court took the view that this letter nowhere mentioned that the respondents wanted to register their format on behalf of their producers which is consistent with the modern norms of advertising. The trial court ultimately came to the conclusion that the spade work on the production of the suit serial had already started before 11.7.1984 and on that day for the first time film was presented to the petitioners. It was, therefore, found that there was no copy right attached to any idea, but copy right is attached to the work and what is important is that not only the idea of producing the suit serial on TV came to the mind of respondent No. 2 but he had already started working on it in advance and forwarded it to Doordarshan for its approval. The trial court, after examining Exhibits C-1, E-1, F-1 P-1 found that the proposal was for 52 episodes and was accepted by the Doordarshan, while the case put forth on behalf of the appellants is that the original agreement was to have 27 episodes and having regard to the popularity of the programme the petitioners decided to increase the said serial to 52 episodes. The evidence was found to be inconsistent with the theory put forth by the petitioners that they are producers of the suit serial and, if it were to hold otherwise, the agreement or arrangement with the respondents was only for 26 episodes, whereas the sponsorship was for 52 episodes. The trial court examined in detail the letter dated 19.7.1984 (Exhibit F-1) written by Shri G.K. Pendharkar of the petitioners and concluded that averments made in the plaint stated that the original agreement was to have 27 episodes but having regard to the popularity of the serial programme the petitioners decided to increase the said serial to 52 episodes. In one of the contracts (Exhibit H-1) the wording used is as under :- "Sponsorship of programme of 25 mts duration produced by sponsor entitled "Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi" including 2 mts free commercial time". Relying upon this letter emphasis was laid on the words "produced by sponsors" . Whether two capacities "sponsor" and "producer" can co- exist in one and the same person or not has been examined and the trial court noted that the wording had been borrowed from the Tariff Card and Tariff Card also indicated what are the categories of the advertisers and rates thereof. It is held that words "produced by sponsors" would not mean that the sponsors themselves are the producers of the said programmes, as is clear from the Tariff Card. The trial court proceeded thereafter to examine the payments made in regard to production of the serial. Thus it was found that the first 26 episodes the amount per episode paid by the petitioners was Rs. 1,20,000/- and each bill contained the expression "service charges" which was stated by the appellants that the respondents acted as agents of the petitioners for production of suit serial. On proper construction of the bills the trial court rejected the contention that these bills and payments as showing that they had borne the costs of production of the suit serial and, therefore, they are the producers. Inasmuch as the respondents could not claim any amount at random, details regarding expenditure were included in the bills and therefore it is the sponsor's price for sponsoring the suit serial. Strong reliance was placed upon certain circumstances, namely, that the format had been approved by the petitioners only on 11.7.1984 and PW-1 admitted that in view of the bill the entry claiming deduction made by the petitioners in their accounts in the financial year ending on 30.3.1984; that the amount was not to be paid for all 26 episodes or even thereafter in lump sum and the bill for 26 episodes enabled petitioners to claim deduction for the entire amount without actual payment in financial year 1983-84; that the entry made for the financial year 1983-84 was beneficial to the petitioners that there was no ceiling on advertising expenditure and it was introduced from 1.4.1984 onwards, the plaintiff did not produce the account books to show if the deduction in respect of the entire amount was claimed or not though they were repeatedly called upon to produce them. The trial court was conscious enough not to enter into the controversy whether during the particular account year ending on 31.3.1984 the advertising expenditure was fully exempted from tax or that there was disallowance of 20 per cent on that point and the decision regarding income tax deductions is not necessary as there is enough other material to show that the said bill was ante-date. The change in the title from 55th episode "for Vicco Laboratories" was introduced. Their contention was that there was a protest from the petitioners and as a result thereof this change took place. The 55th episode was telecast sometime at the end of November or beginning of December 1985 and thus there was a time gap of 7/8 months between the protest and the telecast of the 55th episode. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any communication between the same. The trial court also noticed that in respect of both the advertisements and also in respect of suit serial the petitioners paid to the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 amount which was to be the maximum amount. Thus the profits or loss was of the respondents and there is element of liability to render account was missing and thus there was no question of respondents being the agents of the petitioners within the meaning of Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act. The suit serial was produced by the respondents as agents of the petitioners was false. The facts emerging in the case indicate that the petitioners had joined the production of the suit serial after some concrete beginning had been made like recording of the title song, the conceiving of the title and format of the suit serial, etc. The trial court summed up the position that the two capacities "sponsor" and "producer" cannot co-exist in one and the same person. If the documents are interpreted that the petitioners are the sponsors as well as the producers it would lead to absurd results. Thus the trial court proceeded to uphold the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents to dismiss the suit. On appeal, the High Court re-examined the matter and on examination of the pleadings, the contentions, put forth before the court, the evidence on record and the findings recorded by the trial court, concluded that the findings recorded by the trial court are proper. In doing so, the High Court noticed that the admitted position in the pleadings and the oral evidence is that the petitioners agreed to sponsor only 26 episodes whereas the respondents had agreed to produce 52 episodes and had made firm commitment to Doordarshan to that effect and this circumstance militates against the respondents having undertaken the production at the behest or at the request of the petitioners. The High Court observed that the petitioners had no knowledge of the Doordarshan scheme regarding the sponsored programme and linking of 2 minutes advertisement and agreed with the findings of the trial court that it is improbable for the respondents to have agreed to reduce its income in the form of commission and undertake the responsible job of production of the serial. It was stated that certain bills had been given to the petitioners to suit their convenience in tax matters and there was no such bill submitted to the petitioners by the respondents when the petitioner had agreed to extend the sponsorship from episodes Nos. 27 to 52 and noticed the nature of the system of accounting maintained by them and held that the petitioners had got deductions in respect of the entire amount of the bill in the year which ended on March 31, 1984. The High Court also noticed the circumstance of respondent No.2's name appearing as 'producer' in the titles of the suit serial and the petitioners did not do anything by way of protest or other objection or take steps to withhold payment of the respondents which in the normal course would have been done and, therefore, the explanation now sought to be offered by the petitioners in the form of a written protest was devoid of any substance. The explanation given by the petitioners that they were busy in the shootings did not carry much weight with the High Court. The High Court also examined the scope of Section 17 of the Copyright Act and the ingredients thereof not having been established the High Court held that no claim could be based on the same and thus agreed with the findings recorded by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. In this special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution, the contentions raised before the High Court are reiterated particularly as to the effect of Section 17 of the Copyright Act and whether the correspondence on record would not indicate that they were entitled to ownership and copyright in respect of the TV programme 'Yeh Jo Hai Zindagi'. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly relied upon the following documents: 1. The cost estimate. 2. The bills of cost of production. 3. Letters dated 14.12.1984 and 15.11.1985. 4. Contracts with Doordarshan. 5. Contractd with Esquire Distributing & Servicing Pvt. Ltd. We have carefully considered the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. We are not satisfied that the petitioners have made out a case for consideration by this Court. The matter rests purely upon the appreciation of evidence on record and does not give rise to any question of such importance as to be decided by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is clear from the findings recorded by the trial court and the appellate court: 1. that the respondents have not undertaken the production of the said serial at the instance of the petitioners. G.K.Pendharkar, the Managing Director of petitioner No.1 was asked to come to view the format of the programme and the petitioners were not even acquainted with the format of the serial while the respondents had taken concrete steps in this regard prior to the letter dated 11.7.1984. 2. That the petitioners had agreed to sponsor only 26 episodes whereas the respondents had agreed to produce 52 episodes and had given a firm commitment to that effect to Doordarshan as is clear from the letter dated 12.7.1984 sent by the respondents to Doordarshan. The trial court thus rightly noted that there was no agency between the parties. 3. That the titles of each episode indicated that respondent No.2 is the producer of the said serial and the petitioners are only the sponsors. As late as on 22.4.1985, the petitioners communicated their displeasure on this display in the episodes as to the titles. However, the titles continued to show Mr. S.S.Oberoi as the producer of the serial and the petitioners did not withhold payments. 4. That the courts below have refuted the claim of the petitioners that the bill dated 19.3.1984 establishes the fact that the production work had been started by the respondents at the behest of the petitioners. It has been proved that the said bill was ante-dated and raised by the respondents in July, 1984 ostensibly for the purpose of benefiting the petitioners for their obtaining tax concessions. 5. That the Doordarshan, which have been impleaded as a party, in their written statement stated that they recognize the respondents as producers of the said serial and recognize the petitioners as sponsors only. 6. That the evidence of Mr. S.S.Gill, who gave evidence on behalf of the Information & Broadcasting Ministry that he was not acquainted with Mr. Pendharkar and that Doordarshan had no direct connection with the petitioners but only with the respondents as producers or the Director stood un-impeached. In his further evidence, Mr. Gill stated that some time in the month of May/June, 1984 he had met Kundan Shah and requested to make a comedy serial for Doordarshan which clearly indicated that it is only the respondents who were dealing with Doordarshan. 7. That the video rights were assigned to Esquire Distributing & Servicing Pvt. Ltd. by the respondents pursuant to letters dated 14.12.1984 and 15.11.1985 and had received royalty for the video rights and the original U-matic cassettes were returned to them by Esquire Distributing & Servicing Pvt. Ltd. as their property. 8. That there was no transfer of rights in favour of the petitioners by the respondents in the aforesaid letters and no consideration whatsoever was paid to the respondents for issuing the said letters which have no legal consequences and it was after the petitioners received the letter dated 19.10.1985 from Esquire Distributing & Servicing Pvt. Ltd. that the respondents were asked by the petitioners to issue another letter in this regard. Thus the pleadings and the evidence on record clearly indicated that the respondents were not the agents of the petitioners for the purpose of producing the said serial. The aggregate amount of Rs.76.50 lakhs which was paid to the respondents for 60 episodes is not the amount for cost of production but the fixed price for sponsoring the said serial in order to link up their advertisement with the serial and avail substantial benefit of concessional rate under the scheme envisaged by Doordarshan. The respondents were not liable to render accounts to the petitioners who paid them a fixed sum for sponsoring the programme. If the expenses were less, the petitioners did not ask for a refund and the profit or loss was entirely of the respondents. It is clear that the bills that have been raised were only to accommodate the petitioners from the circumstances narrated above. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners made elaborate reference to the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the provisions whether such availment of benefit could be taken or not pursuant to the amendment effected to the provisions relating to computation of business income at different stages may not be very germane to the present case. It is probable that the respondents had obliged the petitioners by issuing these bills because the bills cannot be read in isolation but with reference to surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the view taken by the courts below in this regard appears to be correct. So far as the contentions raised on the basis of Section 17 of the Copyright Act is concerned, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to establish that the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 produced the said serial (1) as the agents of the petitioners; (2) in the course of their employment with the petitioners; (3) for valuable consideration paid by the petitioners to them; and (iv) at the instance of the petitioners. When these factors had not been established and the suit is itself not dependent on the interpretation of Section 17 of the Copyright Act, pleadings and issues raised did not attract the same. On appreciation of evidence, the courts below have come to the conclusion that the respondents did not make the said serial for valuable consideration at the instance of the petitioners and in view of the findings of fact, the claim of copyright or ownership in respect of the serial under Section 17(b) and (c) would not arise at all. Thus we find absolutely no merit in this petition. We decline to interfere with the order made by the High Court affirming the decree of the trial court. The petition, therefore, stands dismissed. No costs.