REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 707 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 3585 OF 2020) HITESH VERMA .....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. .....RESPONDENT(S) JUDGMENT HEMANT GUPTA, J. 1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital on 20.7.2020 whereby the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 for quashing the charge-sheet as well as the summoning order dated 25.6.2020 was dismissed. 2. The FIR No. 173 in question was lodged by the respondent No. 2 on 11.12.2019 at 23:24 hours in respect of an incident alleged to have Signature Not Verified occurred on 10.12.2019 at 10:00 hours against the appellants and Digitally signed by Vishal Anand Date: 2020.11.05 others. The FIR was lodged for the offences under Sections 452, 16:30:41 IST Reason: 1 For short, the ‘Code’ 504, 506 and Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(e) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 2. The said FIR, when translated, reads as under: “Respected SHO with respect of registering of FIR, the complainant is presently resident of Gram New Bajeti Patti Chandak Tehsil & District Pithoragarh. I am constructing my house on my Khet No. 6195, 6196 & 6199 but Banshilal, Pyarelal S/o Late Har Lal, Hitesh Verma S/o Sh. Pyarelal, Pawan Verma S/o Banshilal, Uma Verma w/o Pyarelal and their Nepali Domestic help Raju from past 6 months are not allowing the applicant to work on her fields. All the above persons used to abuse the applicant her husband and other family members and use to give death threats and use Caste coloured abuses. On 10.12.2019 at around 10 am, all these persons entered illegally in to four walls of her building and started hurling abuses on myself and my labourers and gave death threats and used castes’ remarks/abuses and took away the construction material such as Cement, Iron, Rod, Bricks. The Applicant is a Scheduled Caste and all of the above person uses castes’ remarks/abuses (used bad language) and said that you are persons of bad caste and that we will not let you live in this mohalla/vicinity. Respect Sir, the applicant and her family has threat to her life from such persons. Thus, it is requested that an FIR may be lodged against such persons and necessary action may be taken against them…..” 3. Pursuant to the FIR filed by Respondent No. 2, Police filed a report disclosing offences under Sections 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, cognizance for the same was taken by the Trial Court on 25.6.2020. It is the said order which was challenged along with the charge-sheet before the High Court, which was unsuccessful. 4. On the other hand, on the basis of the statement of Mr. Pawan Verma, an FIR No. 174 at about 23:47 hours was lodged on 2 For short, “the Act”. 11.12.2019 in respect of an occurrence which had taken place allegedly at 9:45 hours on 11.12.2019. A charge-sheet in the said matter has been submitted against respondent No. 2 and others. Thereafter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pithoragarh had taken cognizance for the offences under Sections 323 and 354 IPC against respondent No. 2 and others on 2.7.2020. 5. The Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of a petition under Section 482 of the Code to challenge the charge- sheet and the order taking cognizance. The Appellant relied upon Gerige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. 3 wherein the allegation was of abusing the complainant in the name of their caste and this Court quashed the complaint. The attention of the High Court was drawn to another judgment reported as Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 4 wherein this Court refused to quash the FIR on the ground that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the first information report. The High Court found that both the abovementioned cases dealt with the same issue with regard to applicability of the provisions of the Act. It was observed by the High Court that the appellant had categorically admitted that the informant belonged to Scheduled Caste and that she and her labourers were abused. Therefore, the provisions of the Act were found to be applicable and accordingly, after investigation, charge-sheet has been submitted. The High Court dismissed the petition with the aforesaid findings. 3 (2008) 12 SCC 531 4 (2009) 3 SCC 789 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the disputes relating to the property are pending before the Civil Court and that, the present FIR has been filed on patently false grounds by respondent No. 2 only to harass the appellant and to abuse of process of law. It is argued that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the subsequent report submitted by the Police after investigations does not disclose any offence under the Act. Furthermore, it is argued that the report neither discloses the caste of the informant nor the allegations are that they were made in public view. Also, the offending words are not purported to be made for the reason that the informant is a person belonging to Scheduled Caste. 7. The learned counsel for the State on the contrary, submitted that during investigations, certain persons have supported the version of the informant. It is argued on behalf of respondent No. 2 that in fact the appellant and his family are encroacher on the informant’s land. Therefore, the appellant was rightly not granted any indulgence by the High Court. 8. Against the backdrop of these facts, it is pertinent to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of enactment of the Act. It is provided as under: economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. 2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education, etc., they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and resist practices of untouchability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self- respect or honour of their women, they become irritants for the dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has bene an increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like making the Scheduled Caste persons eat inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the circumstances, the existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code have been found to be inadequate to check these crimes. A special Legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary.” 9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view”. 13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen 5 (2008) 8 SCC 435 by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh6, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: 6 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104 “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out. 19. This Court in a judgment reported as Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 7 issued certain directions in respect of investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.8 reviewed the directions issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, 7 (2018) 6 SCC 454 8 (2020) 4 SCC 761 the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as under: “52. There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC.” 20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the Amending Act (Central Act No. 27 of 2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India & Ors.9 held that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under: “12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and no argument to the contrary has been raised.” 21. In Gerige Pentaiah, one of the arguments raised was non- disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost 9 (2020) 4 SCC 727 similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment. 22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law. 23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.10 held that there is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under: “9. Having regard to the settled legal position on external interference in investigation and the specific facts of this case, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person may be accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a particular charge or charges, on any ground available to him in law. Under Section 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the Criminal Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount to abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse. There is no requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The supplementary report filed by the police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.” 24. In view of the above facts, we find that the charges against the appellant under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out. Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. The 10 (2018) 13 SCC 612 appeal is disposed of in the above terms. 25. The FIR in respect of other offences will be tried by the competent Court in accordance with law along with the criminal case 11, though separately initiated, for the reason that it relates to interparty dispute and is in respect of same subject matter of property, despite of the fact that two different dates of the incident have been provided by the parties. .............................................J. (L. NAGESWARA RAO) .............................................J. (HEMANT GUPTA) .............................................J. (AJAY RASTOGI) NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 5, 2020.


Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 923 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No 28615 of 2016) Vodafone Idea Cellular Ltd. …Appellant Versus Ajay Kumar Agarwal …Respondent WITH Civil Appeal No 1389 of 2022 & Civil Appeal No 4274 of 2016 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Chetan Kumar Date: 2022.02.25 16:45:40 IST Reason: JUDGMENT Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1. This civil appeal 1 arises from a judgment and order dated 26 May 2016 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 2 which was rendered in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The issue is whether Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 ousts the jurisdiction of the consumer forum in deciding a dispute between a telecom company and a consumer. 2. On 25 May 2014, the respondent instituted a consumer complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum 3, Ahmedabad alleging a deficiency of service on the part of the appellant. The complaint states that the respondent had a post-paid mobile connection and was paying an amount of Rs 249 as the monthly basic rent. The appellant was providing mobile telecom services to the complainant on the basis of which it was asserted that there exists a relationship of consumer and service provider. The complainant subscribed to an ‘auto pay’ system through a credit card issued by his bankers in terms of which, the appellant would receive the payment before the due date to facilitate the timely payment of bills. According to the complainant, the average monthly bill was in the vicinity of Rs 555. Copies of the previous bills for five months, until 8 November 2013 were annexed. For the period between 8 November 2013 and 7 December 2013, the respondent was billed in the amount of Rs 24,609.51. Civil Appeal No 923 of 2017 “NCDRC” “District Forum” According to the respondent, this is an over-charge. The credit limit for the post- paid mobile connection was Rs 2,300 until the bill dated 8 November 2013, after which the credit limit was increased to Rs 2,800 for the bill which was generated on 8 December 2013. The respondent has denied undertaking excessive use of the connection, including towards internet facilities. It was alleged that as a prevalent practice, the mobile service provider must intimate the customer when the bill reaches 80 percent of the credit limit. The complaint contains a recital of the steps which were taken by the respondent by contacting the representatives of the appellant following which he registered a complaint on 22 December 2013. The respondent instituted the consumer complaint on 25 May 2014 seeking compensation in the amount of Rs 22,000 together with interest, besides consequential reliefs. 3. The appellant raised an objection to the maintainability of the complaint based on a judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in General Manager, Telecom v. M Krishnan and Another 4. The District Forum dismissed the application and directed that a written statement must be submitted by the appellant on all issues including on the issue of jurisdiction. It was observed that the appellant, a private service provider is not a ‘telegraph authority’ for the purposes of Section 7B of the Indian Telegraphic Act 1885 5; however, the issue of jurisdiction could not be determined without the filing of a written statement. In this context, it was observed: “17. […] In these circumstances also instead of taking decision on preliminary issue i.e jurisdiction, it is (2009) 8 SCC 481 “Act of 1885” reasonable and legal that whole complaint is heard on merits and decision regarding jurisdiction is also taken in it.” The order of the District Forum was questioned before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 6, Gujarat. The SCDRC held by an order dated 30 November 2015 that the issue of jurisdiction could be raised as a preliminary issue. On merits, the SCDRC relied on the letter of the Department of Telecommunication dated 24 January 2014 where it was stated that the judgment in M Krishnan (supra) on Section 7B of the Act of 1885 would not be applicable to a private service provider since it is not a ‘Telegraph Authority”. For this purpose, reliance was also placed on Bharthi Hexacom Ltd. v. Komal Prakash 7. The State Forum observed that: “ […] under the above mentioned circumstances for a dispute under Sect. 7(B) between Private Service Provider and Consumer the authority cannot take decision because, for Private Service provider any arrangement is not made in the above act regarding Telegraphic Authority are not given to the Service Provider, hence, the Learned Consumer Forum has the jurisdiction to hear, decide and dispose of the dispute between the Private service Provider and consumer.” The matter was thereafter carried in revision to the NCDRC. The NCDRC by its judgment dated 26 May 2016 affirmed the view of the SCDRC. 4. Mr Aditya Narain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that Section 7B of the Act of 1885 provides a statutory remedy of arbitration. Counsel submitted that in view of the statutory remedy, which is a remedy under a special statute, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum is ousted. In this context, besides relying on the provisions of Section 7B, counsel adverted “SCDRC” or “State Forum” Misc Application No. 204/2014 in Revision Petition Application No. 12 to the definitions of the expression ‘telecom officer’ in Section 3(2) and of ‘telegraph authority’ in Section 3(6). 5. The principal issue which arises for determination is whether the existence of a remedy under Section 7B of the Act of 1885 ousts the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Consumer Protection Act 1986 8. 6. Section 11 of the Act of 1986 specified the jurisdiction of the District Forum. Section 11(1) provided as follows: “11. Jurisdiction of the District Forum.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs.” 7. In terms of Section 11(1), the District Forum was conferred with the jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed did not exceed a stipulated amount. The amount was progressively revised from Rs 1 lakh to Rs 5 lakhs and eventually to Rs 20 lakhs. The expression ‘service’ is defined in Section 2(o) in the following terms: “2 (o) “service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service.” 8. The expression ‘deficiency’ is defined in Section 2(g): “2(g) “deficiency” means any fault, imperfection, “Act of 1986” shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service.” 9. The definition of the expression ‘service’ is couched in wide terms. The width of statutory language emerges from the manner in which the definition is cast. Parliament has used the expression “service of any description which is made available to potential users”. The definition employs the ‘means and includes formula’. The means part of the definition incorporates service of “any” description. The inclusive part incorporates services by way of illustration, such as facilities in connection with banking, finance, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board or lodging and housing construction. The inclusive part is prefaced by the clarification that the services which are specified are not exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression “but not limited to”. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion only to two specified categories. The initial part of the definition however makes it abundantly clear that the expression ‘service’ is defined to mean service of any description. In other words, a service of every description would fall within the ambit of the statutory provision. 10. The Act of 1986 was a milestone in legislative efforts designed to protect the welfare and interest of consumers. The long title to the Act specifies that it is an Act “to provide for better protection of the interest of consumers”. Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the introduction of the Bill in Parliament specifies the objects in the following terms: “2. It seeks, inter alia, to promote and protect the rights of consumers such as— (a) the right to be protected against marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property; (b) the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices; (c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to variety of goods at competitive prices; (d) the right to be heard and to be assured that consumers' interests will receive due consideration at appropriate forums; (e) the right to seek redressal against unfair trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers; and (f) right to consumer education.” 11. Section 4 of the Act of 1885 vests the Central government with the exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and working telegraphs. The expression ‘telegraph’ finds its definition in Section 3(1AA). Under the proviso to Section 4(1) the Central Government is empowered to grant a license to any person to establish, maintain or work a telegraph within any part of India. Section 7B contains a provision for the arbitration of disputes and is in the following terms: “7B. Arbitration of disputes.—(1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be determined by arbitration and shall, for the purposes of such determination, be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section. (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub- section (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any court.” 12. Under Section 7B, any dispute concerning a telegraph line, appliance or apparatus, between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is or has been provided has to be determined by arbitration. Such a dispute has to be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either especially for the determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of the disputes under the Section. The expression ‘telegraph authority’ is defined in Section 3(6) 9. 13. The submissions of the appellant proceed on the basis that as a private telecom service provider, any dispute of a subscriber with it is encompassed by the remedy of arbitration in terms of Section 7B of the Act of 1885. Even if that be so, the issue in the present case is whether this would oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. The definition of the expression ‘service’, as already noticed, is embodied in wide terms. The District Forum is entrusted with the jurisdiction to entertain all complaints where the value of goods or services and the compensation claimed do not exceed the stipulated threshold. Under Section 14, where the District Forum is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint about the services are proved, it is empowered to pass remedial orders in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1). While the Act of 1885 can be construed to be a special enactment for regulating telegraphs, the Act of 1986 is a special (and later) enactment intended to protect the interest and welfare of consumers. Section 3(6) of the Act of 1885 defines ‘telegraph authority’ thus: “telegraph authority” means the Director General of 1 [Posts and Telegraphs], and includes any officer empowered by him to perform all or any of the functions of the telegraph authority under this Act”; Though the present case relates to the period before the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 10, an important aspect of the matter is that the definition of the expression ‘service’ in Section 2(42) of the later Act specifically incorporates telecom services 11. 14. The submission which was urged on behalf of the appellant was that the specific incorporation of telegraph services in the Act of 2019 is an indicator that it was only as a result of the new legislation that telecom services were brought within the jurisdiction of the consumer fora. This submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the specification of services in Section 2(s) of the earlier Act of 1986 was illustrative. This is apparent from the use of the expression ‘includes but not limited to’. The specification of services in Section 2(s) of the erstwhile Act was therefore not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of the services which are comprehended within the definition. On the contrary, by adopting language which provides that the expression ‘service’ would mean service of any description which is made available to potential users, Parliament indicated in unambiguous terms that all services would fall within the ambit of the definition. The only exception was in the case of (i) services rendered free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. 15. In Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh 12, this Court has held that an arbitration agreement governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 will “Act of 2019” Section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is as follows: - "service" means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, telecom, boarding or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”; (2019) 12 SCC 751 not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum to entertain a complaint of deficiency of goods or services. The Court relied on Section 3 13 of the Act of 1986, which provides that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other enactment. The following observations of this Court are relevant: “19. Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act provided that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Noticing the object and purpose of the Act as well as Section 3, this Court in Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha [Thirumurugan Coop. Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha, (2004) 1 SCC 305] , laid down the following in paras 11 and 12 : (SCC p. 312) “11. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the scheme of the 1986 Act, it is apparent that the main objective of the Act is to provide for better protection of the interest of the consumer and for that purpose to provide for better redressal, mechanism through which cheaper, easier, expeditious and effective redressal is made available to consumers. To serve the purpose of the Act, various quasi-judicial forums are set up at the district, State and national level with wide range of powers vested in them. These quasi- judicial forums, observing the principles of natural justice, are empowered to give relief of a specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to the consumers and to impose penalties for non-compliance with their orders. 12. As per Section 3 of the Act, as already stated above, the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act and purpose sought to be achieved to protect the interest of the consumers better, the provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively and purposefully in the context of the present case to give meaning to additional/extended jurisdiction, particularly when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act in addition to other Section 3 – Act not in derogation of any other law- “The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.” remedies provided under other Acts unless there is a clear bar.” 16. The only distinction in the present case is that where Section 7B of the Act of 1885 applies, a statutory remedy of arbitration is provided. The fact that the remedy of an arbitration under the Act 1885 is of a statutory nature, would not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. The Act of 1986 and its successor, the Act of 2019 are subsequent enactments which have been enacted by Parliament to protect the interest of consumers. Hence, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be lightly assumed unless express words are used or such a consequence follows by necessary implication. 17. The judgment of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in M Krishnan (supra) arose from a decision of the Kerala High Court. The dispute, in that case, arose from the disconnection of a telephone connection for the non-payment of the bill. The District Forum allowed the complaint. The writ petition was dismissed. The proceedings resulted in a reference to a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, which dismissed the writ appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge. Before this Court, the jurisdiction of the consumer forum was in issue. In that context, a two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus: “5.In our opinion when there is a special remedy provided in Section 7-B of the Telegraph Act regarding disputes in respect of telephone bills, then the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act is by implication barred.” The Court also relied on Rule 413 of the Telegraph Rules in terms of which all services relating to telephones are subject to the Telegraph Rules. The Court held that the special law would override the general law and concluded that the High Court was not correct in upholding the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. 18. We are unable to subscribe to the view which has been adopted in the above decision in M Krishnan (supra). The decision is incorrect on two grounds. First, it failed to recognize that the Act of 1986 is not a general law but a special law that has been enacted by Parliament specifically to protect the interest of consumers. Second, even if it is assumed that the Act of 1986 is a general law, it is a settled position of law that if there is any inconsistency between two legislations, the later law, even if general in nature, would override an earlier special law. In Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India14, a three-judge Bench of this Court observed: “38…As mentioned hereinbefore if the Scheme was held to be valid, then the question what is the general law and what is the special law and which law in case of conflict would prevail would have arisen and that would have necessitated the application of the principle Generalia specialibus non derogant. The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between two statutes is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied: “(i) The two are inconsistent with each other. (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment.” If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law, even though general, would prevail. 39. From the text and the decisions, four tests are deducible and these are: (i) The legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered, abrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provisions, (iii) A later general law will override a prior special law if the two are so repugnant to each other that they cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in the general law, and (iv) It is only in the absence of a provision to the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special law will remain wholly unaffected by a later general law. See in this connection, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edn., pp. 196-198.” (1984) 3 SCC 127 19. In any event, the decision in M Krishnan (supra) also fails to note that the Act of 1986 is a special law providing protection to consumers. Crucially, M Krishnan (supra) fails to notice that Section 3 of the Act of 1986 clearly provides that the remedies available under the Act are in addition to the remedies available in other statutes and the availability of additional remedies would not bar a consumer from filing a complaint under the Act of 1986. Section 100 of the Act of 2019 corresponds to Section 3 of the Act of 1986. In Emaar MGF Land Ltd. (supra), this Court held that the complaint under the Act of 1986 is a special remedy provided to a consumer in addition to the remedies that can be availed of by them, including arbitration. In Imperia Structures Ltd. v Anil Patni 15, this Court held that the remedies available under the Act of 1986 are in addition to the remedies available under other statutes, including special statutes like the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016 16. This Court reiterated the settled position of law in the following terms: “23. It has consistently been held by this Court that the remedies available under the provisions of the CP Act are additional remedies over and above the other remedies including those made available under any special statutes; and that the availability of an alternate remedy is no bar in entertaining a complaint under the CP Act.” 20. The above position was reiterated in IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna 17 by a three-judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part. Justice Indu Malhotra, speaking for the Bench invoked the doctrine of election, which provides that when two remedies are available for the same relief, the party at whose disposal such remedies are (2020) 10 SCC 783 “RERA” 2021 SCC OnLine SC 277 available, can make the choice to elect either of the remedies as long as the ambit and scope of the two remedies is not essentially different. These observations were made in the context of an allottee of an apartment having the choice of initiating proceedings under the Act of 1986 or the RERA. In the present case, the existence of an arbitral remedy will not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. It would be open to a consumer to opt for the remedy of arbitration, but there is no compulsion in law to do so and it would be open to a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies which are provided under the Act of 1986, now replaced by the Act of 2019. The insertion of the expression ‘telecom services’ in the definition which is contained in Section 2(42) of the Act of 2019 cannot, for the reasons which we have indicated be construed to mean that telecom services were excluded from the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Act of 1986. On the contrary, the definition of the expression ‘service’ in Section 2(o) of the Act of 1986 was wide enough to comprehend services of every description including telecom services. 21. For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the NCDRC which came to the conclusion that the District Forum has the jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. 22. The appeal shall accordingly stand dismissed. 23. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. Civil Appeal No 1389 of 2022 [Arising out of SLP(C) No 9071/2016] & Civil Appeal No 4274 of 2016 1. Leave granted. 2. In view of the judgment delivered today in Idea Cellular Ltd vs Ajay Kumar Agarwal [Civil Appeal No 923 of 2017], the appeals shall stand allowed and the impugned judgments and orders of the NCDRC dated 30 April 2014 in Revision Petition No 531 of 2013 and 11 April 2013 in Revision Petition No 95 of 2013 shall stand set aside. Consumer Complaint No 238 of 2010 and Complaint No 1457 of 2007 shall stand restored to the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Kasargod and Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Delhi respectively. 3. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. ….....…...….......………………........J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] ..…....…........……………….…........J. [Surya Kant] ..…....…........……………….…........J. [Vikram Nath] New Delhi; February 16, 2022 CKB