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---
base_model: BAAI/bge-m3
datasets: []
language: []
library_name: sentence-transformers
metrics:
- cosine_accuracy
- dot_accuracy
- manhattan_accuracy
- euclidean_accuracy
- max_accuracy
pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
tags:
- sentence-transformers
- sentence-similarity
- feature-extraction
- generated_from_trainer
- dataset_size:5000
- loss:TripletLoss
widget:
- source_sentence: philosophical. It is a schematic, bare-bones biography devoting
    only minimal attention to the significance of Marx's thought. It makes no attempt
    at textual exegesis beyond citations of a few " classic" passages, let alone at
    critical evaluation or interpretation of Marx's ideas. Yet its extremely readable
    style, richness of detail and highly useful manner of viewing Marx's life against
    the political history of his era, makes this book a service to the general public
    if not to the philosopher or Marxologist. (It should hardly need saying that Rubel
    is himself one of the world's eminent practicioners of the latter art.) Each chapter
    is devoted to six or seven years of Marx's life. Preceding each, the authors have
    included very valuable chronological tables listing major political events in
    Europe, the Americas and Asia, scientific and technological advances, and important
    works published (including notation as to whether Marx is known to have read them).
    The short biographies of various persons important to the life story of Marx and
    bibliographies of Marx's works and of works on Marx are also helpful. Rubel and
    Manale's understanding of Marx's intellectual development, as a unity originating
    in the mid1840s carried through consistently for the remainder of his life, is
    well documented, with due emphasis given the manuscripts of 1857-58 (the "Grundrisse")
    documenting the link between the Paris manuscripts of 1844 and Capital so often
    disputed by Marxist-Leninist apologists. Because of its greater interest to philosophers,
    I shall devote the rest of this review to Axelos'
  sentences:
  - equations" relative to ECF+, provable in H. Similarly, we obtain from MUC and
    the recursive density theorem for ECF the corresponding results for ECF+; the
    proof of QF-AC from the recursive density theorem also holds good for ECF+ [T1,
    2.6.20]. So far, we have shown these basic facts about ECF+ to be provable in
    H, i.e. in EL + AC-NF; but we have to show that they can be established in EL
    + QF-AC. To complete the proof, we note that (10) EL + AC-NF is conservative over
    EL + QF-AC for formulae of Fo [T1, 3.6.18(i)] where Fo is defined as in [T1, 3.6.3].
    (20) Almost negative predicates are transformed by the elimination translation
    r into almost negative predicates (by an induction on logical complexity), and
    therefore W+, I' are almost negative predicates; using this fact one then verifies
    that all basic properties of ECF+ needed can be expressed by means of formulae
    of F0. 2.2. REMARK. The method for constructing ECF+ as described here can also
    be used to construct a model ECFK of HA' + AC-NF in which the tape-2 objects are
    exactly the elements of K, and such that all the relevant closure conditions can
    be established in IDB,. ?3. The models for E-HA' + MUC. 3.1. Preliminaries. In
    discussing the term models for E-HA' + MUC, we find it actually more convenient
    to take as our starting point E-HA' + MUC*, where MUC* is the strengthening of
    MUC which states in addition to MUC
  - 's work. As Bruzina points out in his Introduction (xxvi), Axelos'' s work on
    Marx is part of a trilogy entitled Le deploiement de I''errance, which attempts
    to investigate the three alleged critical stages of Western thought: its beginnings,
    in Heraclite et la philosophie: La premiire saisie de Vetre en devenir de la totality;
    its culmination, in the present book, the original title of which is Marx, penseur
    de la technique: De I''alienation de Vhomme a la conquete du monde; and the transcending
    passage to a new way of thought, Vers la pensee planetaire: Le devenir-pensee
    du monde et le devenir-monde de la pensee. We are thus thrown into a study situating
    Marx as the culmination of Western, and particularly modern Western, thought.
    The interpretation of the tradition, and of Marx''s place in it, is essentially
    Heideggerian; after Heraclitus''s and Parmenides''s attempts to think Being as
    logos and physis, Western thought began its fall into the confusion of Being with
    particular types of entities (Plato: idea; Aristotle: entelechyenergeia; Christianity:
    Being as God or ens increatum, ens perfectissimum; Descartes: man''s mind as subject,
    all other entities as objects; and post-Cartesian thought, culminating in Hegel,
    Marx, and Nietzsche: human subjectivity as will which subdues and desolates the
    earth). Thus it can be seen at a glance that Axelos'' s Marx is going to be neither
    the Marx of Marxism-Leninism (Heaven forbid!) nor of contemporary Marxology, i.e.,
    the Marx of the Int J Phil Rel 12:59-64 (1981) 0020-7047/81/0121-0059 $00.90.
    ©1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The'
  - 'is accordingly neither confined to, nor ought it to be judged merely by its relative
    success on, the historical plane. There is, further, a particular methodological
    angle which deserves our attention. In this post-Freudian age, psychobiography
    has come to the fore. Seigel is profoundly interested in Eric Erickson''s psychohistorical
    approach, in terms of which he believes it possible to construct a dialectical
    analysis. It is well known that Marx''s thought was deeply influenced by Hegel''s.
    In this regard, following his psychohistorical inclination, Seigel makes the unusual
    suggestion that the little known Hegelian concept of inversion can function as
    a central thread with which to elucidate three specific incidents, so far unexplained
    in Marx''s biography: Marx''s passage to Hegelianism; as a guiding thread in his
    interpretation of Greek philosophy in his dissertation; and as a central element
    in Capital, whose unfinished status remained the great tragedy of Marx''s life.
    On the abstract level, this strategy has considerable intrinsic interest. Transcending
    any mere assemblage of the documented or documentable facts about Marx''s life,
    the interest here is clearly to tie together little understood events early and
    late in terms of a single explanatory principle which is intended to shed light
    on supposedly dark corners of Marx''s life and thought. Rather than appealing
    to such frequently employed techniques as the patient collection of data, or the
    careful reassessment of the known events of Marx''s life, or even the critical
    reinterpretation of his writings, a'
- source_sentence: really know what I have to face? Has she felt anything like this
    set of forces on her road to holiness? More to our point here, what does this
    saint, Vincent de Paul, know of business of the push and pull and particular grind
    of this world? Granting the depth and richness of his spiritual experience, was
    it shaped, at least analogously, by the kinds of pressures which the business
    person has to withstand? Does his path to holiness go through anything like the
    terrain of the modern business climate? If not, this saint's story, too, lifts
    off from this world and flies into its own orbit, perhaps admired but from too
    remote a distance to have influence. In short, what are the possi bilities of
    getting the two worlds together? The second issue concerns the manner in which
    lives of exemplars have been brought to bear upon moral thinking. One method might
    be termed prescriptive. It asks what directives for living can be drawn from the
    actions and atti tudes this person showed? There are principles and behavior patterns
    embedded in this saint's life which can serve as guides for present action. Francis
    of Assisi, for instance, out of a profound desire live out his sense of total
    dependence on God, made his way by begging. Therefore, there should be some embracing
    of radical unpre dictability and a large dose of reliance on others in our affairs
    also. The example is awkward perhaps, but it points up the method of drawing relatively
    clear moral lessons from
  sentences:
  - the holy one's life. While this approach affords a kind of clarity, it stands
    on shaky ground because of the often times wide gap between the saint's era and
    the present. The historically consciousness reader is wary of clear and simple
    crossovers. Too many changed circumstances and new assumptions lie in the valley
    between the distant past and now. If the moral directives have not been carefully
    passed through the screen of shifting horizons, they appear stretched and even
    fanciful. Applica tions to current situations are suspected of being as much a
    projection of the interpreter's agenda as it is a transmission of the saint's
    morality. An alternate way of bringing saints to bear on moral thinking is through
    the imagination. Most readers are familiar with recent attention to the role affect
    plays in following the good. Logic may package norms clearly and distinctly, but
    of itself does not bring about adherence. The deeper emotions must come into play
    as the engines which drive toward the good. Ethical reckoning happens primordially
    in the imagination where the attraction or repulsion of a given value registers.
    On a foundation level, moral education aims for the affect. It works to shape
    the image field in which the good is pictured. The rightly-told story of a saint
    appeals directly to the imagination. The narrative of his or her life presents
    a drama which invites in the listener much more as participant than spectator.
    Such a biography lays
  - 'principle whence all else follows. It knows that that principle is the divine
    essence and that, in this life, we cannot properly know it. On the other hand,
    it does not renounce all thought of synthesis to settle down to teaching catechism
    ; for it knows that there is such a thing as imperfect understanding. Systematically,
    it proceeds to that limited goal.1 (4) Matters of faith are not fit objects for
    science. Some clarification is in order here. For Aquinas, Christian beliefs fall
    into two categories : those that can be known by science and those that cannot.
    The ones that can be known by science are yet often known by faith. Further, this
    is a good thing : some people are too stupid to know by science what they believe
    by faith. And even people able to know by science what they believe by faith,
    may take longer to arrive at the belief by science. Moreover, beliefs acquired
    by faith may be more stable, more ''free of doubt and uncertainty, '' than the
    more abstruse deliverances of science (ST 11,11,2.4). The belief that there is
    an unmoved mover falls within the province of science though that belief is often
    held through faith. The belief that there is a Trinity is strictly outside the
    province of science. (5) Our assent to Christian doctrines has no natural explanation.
    The natural light of reason, even if it enjoins us to assent that there is a God,
    does not afford us any further information'
  - crushing to our smaller vanities, that there is no break in the seamless robe
    wherewith the universe is dressed. The facile distinction between moral education
    on the one hand and religious education on the other is drawn readily enough,
    and has its conveniences; but to conceive that at such and such a point the one
    ends and at such and such a point the other begins is to disrupt the universe.
    Moral education without vista is no education at all; it is truncated pedantry.
    Moral education only then begins to exercise its more potent ministry when it
    confronts and astounds and overwhelms us with categorical imperatives whose origins
    are wrapped in mystery but whose obligatoriness upon us for this very reason is
    immediate and certain and bows us in submission and awe. Some Essentials of Moral
    Education. 477 The moral education then of which we speak, and the "character"
    in which it culminates, must be conceived as embracing in their content an element,
    which, for want of more adequate words to express it, we call wonder, reverence,
    awe; an attitude of the soul which proves to be the Bridge of the Gods to the
    highest Realities. One more element we presuppose as inherent in the "character"
    in which moral education finds its culmination, namely, that passion for human
    service which spends itself and is spent for others without miserly calculation
    or circumstantial prudence; which with a pure disinterestedness repays the debt
    it owes to humanity and is ready at any
- source_sentence: between stuffs and things is complex and highly controversial,
    but it can be roughly understood as the distinction prevailing between objects
    and their constituting matter. Statues, tables, and trees are paradigmatic examples
    of objects, whereas copper, water, and wood are paradigmatic examples of stuffs.
    Objects and stuffs differ in many respects. For example, unlike individual things,
    stuffs persist despite division and transformation. If a statue made of bronze
    is melted to obtain two bronze cups, the statue disappears whereas the bronze
    persists. I will argue that olfactory perception involves being acquainted with
    stuffs rather than particular objects and that the notion of stuff is essential
    for understanding the idiosyncratic characteristics of olfaction. The argument
    will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will give a short inventory of olfactory
    experiences. In the second part, I will show how most philosophical accounts fail
    to do justice to the phenomenology of olfactory experiences. In the last part,
    I will argue that olfactory experiences present compelling evidence that odors
    are properties of stuffs. 2 A world of odors Unlike colors, and to a lesser extent
    sounds, odors and olfaction have received little attention from philosophers.
    In philosophy, odors are sometimes mentioned to illustrate the distinction between
    primary and secondary qualities (Locke 1690) or to exemplify the category of "sense-data"
    (Russell 1912) or "qualia" (Campbell 2004; Jackson 1982), but they are rarely
    considered for their own
  sentences:
  - 'same olfactory level throughout an exhibition. Important as these practical issues
    are, the focus of the remainder of our article is on two theoretical questions:
    In what ways are smells suitable objects of aesthetic attention, and given that
    olfactory works are now an accepted part of the artworld, what are their special
    characteristics and limitations as serious art? This second question will lead
    to a final one concerning the art status of the most ancient of olfactory arts,
    perfume. II. THE PREJUDICE AGAINST SMELL As a first step in exploring these issues,
    we need to consider a longstanding philosophical prejudice against the so-called
    lower senses of smell, taste, and touch that has often led to the denial of their
    suitability for aesthetic reflection. From the ancient world into the twentieth
    century, majority opinion among philosophers has been that these senses are far
    beneath vision and hearing in dignity, intellectual power, and refinement.''1
    The classic philosophical application of this view to the aesthetic realm is Plato''s
    claim in Hippias Major that "beauty is the pleasant which comes through the senses
    of hearing and sight," whereas the pleasures of the other senses should not be
    called beautiful." Aristotle agreed on the superiority of sight and hearing, but
    also offered a more extensive and nuanced account of the senses.12 Although human
    taste, touch, and smell are sources of pleasure, not just of utility, the objects
    of the lower senses, for Aristotle, have no connection to moral qualities as do
    the pleasures of vision and hearing that are involved'
  - 'interest. Thomas Reid''s work is a notable exception; an entire chapter of his
    Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense ([1764] 2000) is
    dedicated to smell. It is remarkable that Reid''s discussion of the external senses
    starts with a long chapter devoted to olfaction. Reid''s justification for this
    choice is that an inquiry into human understanding must proceed from the simplest
    to the more complex and that the same principle should be applied to the philosophical
    examination of the senses. Therefore. Reid starts his discussion of the senses
    with olfaction not because it is "the noblest, or the most useful"4 sense, but
    because it is, according to him. the simplest. Reid''s view regarding the simplicity
    of smell appears to have roots in antiquity. Aristotle, for example, considers
    smell to be both poor and inaccurate: Smell and its object are much less easy
    to determine than what we have hitherto discussed; the distinguishing characteristic
    of the object of smell is less obvious than those of sound or colour. The ground
    of this is that our power of smell is less discriminating and in general inferior
    to that of many species of animals; men have a poor sense of smell and our apprehension
    of its 3 See Casati and Dokic (2005). 4 chap. II, section II. <£) Springer 236
    V. Mizrahi proper objects is inseparably bound up with and so confused by pleasure
    and pain, which shows that in us the organ is inaccurate.5 The goal of this section
    is to rehabilitate the sense of olfaction in view of such allegations by showing
    with a'
  - 'question, how to think the fundamental unity of thought and Being before this
    unity is broken by the insertion of a subject doing the thinking. This article
    is only one instance in a long series of relections, ranging from the Phe''nome''nologie
    de l''experience esthe''tique to Le Poetique, on Nature and its relation to humanity
    and art. There is "nature," the ensemble of all phenomena, and there is "Nature,"
    which is an "anonymous, blind force" (Phe''nome''nologie 1: 134) which is the
    source of nature, humanity, and art. Nature, on the other hand, needs art to be
    articulated and glorified. The following essay is "The A Priori of Imagination"
    (1965), and in it Dufreene argues against Kant that the a priori is not just a
    subjective condition of objectivity, but rather is in the object as well. The
    imagination''s function is to reveal this objective meaning to us. The next essay,
    "The Imaginary" (1976), deals first with images, the imagination, the imaginary,
    and the real and the unreal, all played off against Jean-Paul Sartre''s descriptions
    of the imagination. The second, and much shorter part of the article, considers,
    successively, desire and world, desire and language, language and world, language
    and desire, image and world, and finally image and language. Following "The Imaginary"
    is a very short piece, "Eye and Mind" (no entry in the Bibliography, thus no date
    available). This is a very clear and helpful, albeit too brief, commentary on
    Maurice Merleau-Ponty''s Eye and Mind and through it, the latter''s final philosophical
    project'
- source_sentence: construed as the personal/subjective degrees of belief of Bayesian
    agents is an old one. In recent years the idea has been vigorously pursued by
    a group of physicists who fly the banner of quantum
  sentences:
  - Bayesianism (QBism). The present paper aims to identify the prospects and problems
    of implementing QBism, and it critically assesses the claim that QBism provides
    a resolution (or dissolution)
  - divorcing moral responsibility from free will setting aside the threat of Frankfurt-style
    cases.6 There are two reasons for this restriction of focus. First, Wallace's
    strategy is offered as a logically independent strategy to Fischer's. Hence, it
    is important to evaluate it on its own merits. Second, I believe that the success
    of Frankfurt-style cases depends on the plausibility of the belief that moral
    responsibility requires free will. Defenders of Frankfurt-style cases have been
    hard-pressed to furnish a case in which an agent is clearly morally responsible
    and clearly lacks access to alternative possibilities. This has led many defenders
    of Frankfurt-style cases to contend that the true of aim of Frankfurt-style cases
    is to show that access to alternative possibilities is not explanatorily relevant,
    even if it is necessary (cf. Hunt 2005; Leon and Tognazzini 2010; Pereboom 200
    1).7 An adequate response to the neo-Frankfurtian attack requires a direct defense
    of the thesis that moral responsibility requires free will. By offering a theory
    of pleas that is simple, unified, plausible, and has just this consequence, my
    theory serves as a partial response to proponents of Frankfurtstyle cases. Therefore,
    my defense of my proffered theory of pleas and the thesis that moral responsibility
    requires free will are conditional up on the failure of these cases.8 I begin
    by laying out R. Jay Wallace's (1994) theory of the normative force of excuses
    and exemptions. I believe that Wallace's theory of exemptions is sound, but that
    his account of
  - allows, on the one hand, for learning from experience and, on the other hand,
    avoids admitting observation reports into evidence (R. C. Jeffrey (5), ch. 11).
    I find Jeffrey's brave efforts inadequate to the job and have said so elsewhere
    (I. Levi (11) and (12)). Whatever the merits of Jeffrey's proposals, they constitute
    a rejection of conditionalization as the sole principle of rational probability
    revision. Other pressures have induced authors who tend to identify themselves
    as Bayesians to strip exclusive status away from the principle of conditionalization.
    P. Suppes acknowledges that conceptual innovation involves shifts in probability
    judgement which conditionalization cannot accommodate. If such shifts are to be
    brought under rational control, conditionalization will have to be supplemented
    by other principles (P. Suppes (18), p. 64). Thus, even within the Bayesian camp,
    serious doubts have been raised concerning the exclusive rights of conditionalization
    as a principle of rational probability revision. As a consequence, the force of
    the argument purporting to show that evidential assumptions accorded probability
    1 must be immune to correction has been substantially undermined. With the demise
    of this argument, much of the case against allowing fallible assumptions maximum
    probability withers away. Not only have Bayesians failed to muster decisive arguments
    against according probability 1 to fallible assumptions, a good case can be made
    in support of the view that a viable Bayesian (or quasi Bayesian) approach to
    inference requires granting evidential status to fallible assumptions. 302 NOOS
    According to Leonard Savage, Bayesians who endorse a subjectivist or personalist
    interpretation of
- source_sentence: 'structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing
    and the question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester''s chapter ''Inventing
    Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes'' as my starting point, I ask how the case
    of'
  sentences:
  - 'justified (D-justified) at t if it doesn''t fit S''s O-evidence at t, but S would
    have O-evidence of the appropriate kind (this derivative evidence amounting to
    D-evidence) were she to think of p (see Feldman 1988, pp. 98-99). In the example
    above, I was too busy with the paper to entertain any evidence that could support
    the belief that the PIN code is ####. So my O-evidence didn''t encompass anything
    supporting such belief. However, I had the disposition, upon considering my PIN
    code, to generate O-evidence of the appropriate kind: in the sense just presented,
    I had D-evidence. Since the quotation also seems to suggest that a true (stored)
    belief, if D-justified, may count as D-knowledge, it shows that the evidentialist
    is not banned from acknowledging that I did know my PIN code, even if this knowledge
    has a somehow derivative status, that of D-knowledge. This interpretation of Feldman''s
    reply raises two important concerns, respec tively related to the notion of dispositional
    justification and the notion of dispositional knowledge. Let us begin by taking
    into account Goldman''s worry, according to which no clear sense can be attached
    to the suggestion that a belief may be D-justified in the sense just adumbrated.
    The discussion of what must be added to D-justification in order to turn a true
    belief into D-knowledge shall not occupy us until the final part of the paper.
    A. Goldman has called into question Feldman''s answer (Goldman 1999, pp. 278 279,
    2002, p. 9). He has written: "if having a disposition to generate conscious evidential
    states'
  - consideration, Oliver unravels the consequences of this strange chiasmus-the resymbolization
    of the body and the embodiment of the Symbolic-for psychoanalysis, feminism, linguistics,
    ethics, and political theory. Although it draws on a variety of discourses ranging
    from philosophy to religion, from aesthetics to politics, Reading Kristeva privileges
    in a certain way the psychoanalytic framework as it focuses on Kristeva's most
    psychoanalytic texts from the 1980s and early 1990s. Accounting for Kristeva's
    interventions and revisions of psychoanalytic theory, Reading Kristeva points
    to the crucial differences not only between Kristeva and Jacques Lacan, but also
    between Kristeva and other French feminists, especially Luce Irigaray and Helene
    Cixous. The main challenge to the psychoanalytic theory, Oliver argues, lies in
    Kristeva's claim that the maternal function prefigures the oedipal structure and
    at the same time prevents its closure. The nodal points of these pre-oedipal relations
    are constituted by the narcissistic subject, the abject maternal body (constituting
    the pattern of rejection and negation), and the imaginary father (setting up the
    pattern of reduplication and identification). Reading Kristeva offers us many
    engaging and original readings of the difficult moments in Kristeva's work. One
    can mention, for instance, an excellent account of the structure of the primary
    narcissism, which, as the original displacement to the place of the Other, sets
    up the logic of reduplication and "the possibility of metaphorical shifting" (74).
    Yet probably the most original contribution of Oliver's book to feminist psychoanalytic
    theory lies in its re-interpretation of the imaginary father, one of
  - '''Agnes'' continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary approaches
    (sociological and psychoanalytic) to theorizing gender. I establish a conversation
    between distinct, psychoanalytically informed feminisms (Simone'
model-index:
- name: SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3
  results:
  - task:
      type: triplet
      name: Triplet
    dataset:
      name: all nli test
      type: all-nli-test
    metrics:
    - type: cosine_accuracy
      value: 0.8085
      name: Cosine Accuracy
    - type: dot_accuracy
      value: 0.1915
      name: Dot Accuracy
    - type: manhattan_accuracy
      value: 0.8085
      name: Manhattan Accuracy
    - type: euclidean_accuracy
      value: 0.8085
      name: Euclidean Accuracy
    - type: max_accuracy
      value: 0.8085
      name: Max Accuracy
---

# SentenceTransformer based on BAAI/bge-m3

This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [BAAI/bge-m3](https://huggingface.co/BAAI/bge-m3). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 1024-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.

## Model Details

### Model Description
- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
- **Base model:** [BAAI/bge-m3](https://huggingface.co/BAAI/bge-m3) <!-- at revision 5617a9f61b028005a4858fdac845db406aefb181 -->
- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 8192 tokens
- **Output Dimensionality:** 1024 tokens
- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
<!-- - **Training Dataset:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **Language:** Unknown -->
<!-- - **License:** Unknown -->

### Model Sources

- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)

### Full Model Architecture

```
SentenceTransformer(
  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: XLMRobertaModel 
  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 1024, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': True, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
  (2): Normalize()
)
```

## Usage

### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

```bash
pip install -U sentence-transformers
```

Then you can load this model and run inference.
```python
from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/bge-m3-philosophy-triplets_v1")
# Run inference
sentences = [
    "structural affinity between the case study as a genre of writing and the question of gendered subjectivity. With John Forrester's chapter 'Inventing Gender Identity: The Case of Agnes' as my starting point, I ask how the case of",
    "'Agnes' continues to inform our understanding of different disciplinary approaches (sociological and psychoanalytic) to theorizing gender. I establish a conversation between distinct, psychoanalytically informed feminisms (Simone",
    'consideration, Oliver unravels the consequences of this strange chiasmus-the resymbolization of the body and the embodiment of the Symbolic-for psychoanalysis, feminism, linguistics, ethics, and political theory. Although it draws on a variety of discourses ranging from philosophy to religion, from aesthetics to politics, Reading Kristeva privileges in a certain way the psychoanalytic framework as it focuses on Kristeva\'s most psychoanalytic texts from the 1980s and early 1990s. Accounting for Kristeva\'s interventions and revisions of psychoanalytic theory, Reading Kristeva points to the crucial differences not only between Kristeva and Jacques Lacan, but also between Kristeva and other French feminists, especially Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous. The main challenge to the psychoanalytic theory, Oliver argues, lies in Kristeva\'s claim that the maternal function prefigures the oedipal structure and at the same time prevents its closure. The nodal points of these pre-oedipal relations are constituted by the narcissistic subject, the abject maternal body (constituting the pattern of rejection and negation), and the imaginary father (setting up the pattern of reduplication and identification). Reading Kristeva offers us many engaging and original readings of the difficult moments in Kristeva\'s work. One can mention, for instance, an excellent account of the structure of the primary narcissism, which, as the original displacement to the place of the Other, sets up the logic of reduplication and "the possibility of metaphorical shifting" (74). Yet probably the most original contribution of Oliver\'s book to feminist psychoanalytic theory lies in its re-interpretation of the imaginary father, one of',
]
embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
print(embeddings.shape)
# [3, 1024]

# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
print(similarities.shape)
# [3, 3]
```

<!--
### Direct Usage (Transformers)

<details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary>

</details>
-->

<!--
### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)

You can finetune this model on your own dataset.

<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

</details>
-->

<!--
### Out-of-Scope Use

*List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.*
-->

## Evaluation

### Metrics

#### Triplet
* Dataset: `all-nli-test`
* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)

| Metric             | Value      |
|:-------------------|:-----------|
| cosine_accuracy    | 0.8085     |
| dot_accuracy       | 0.1915     |
| manhattan_accuracy | 0.8085     |
| euclidean_accuracy | 0.8085     |
| **max_accuracy**   | **0.8085** |

<!--
## Bias, Risks and Limitations

*What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.*
-->

<!--
### Recommendations

*What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.*
-->

## Training Details

### Training Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 5,000 training samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                            | negative                                                                             |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                              | string                                                                               |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 16 tokens</li><li>mean: 276.83 tokens</li><li>max: 597 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 12 tokens</li><li>mean: 276.4 tokens</li><li>max: 571 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 25 tokens</li><li>mean: 295.99 tokens</li><li>max: 607 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
  |:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | <code>have argued from broadly conciliationist premises that we should not. If they are right, we philosophers face a dilemma: if we believe our views, we are irrational; if we do not, we are not sincere in</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <code>holding them. This paper offers a way out, proposing an attitude we can rationally take toward our views that can support sincerity of the appropriate sort. We should arrive at our views via a certain sort of</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | <code>the subtle weighing of various factors involved in being responsive to ail aspects of a complex issue. He is likely to attach too much or too little weight to a single principle or a single distinction. And in matters of public dispute, it is the sensibility of the average person rather than the trained philosopher that seems most relevant. In this paper I will explore the possibility that the relevant criterion of "rational" or "reasonable" belief can be derived not from social science, clinical psychology, or philosophical dialectics, but from the rhetorical tradition stemming from Aristotle. Actually, Clifford seems to point in this direction when he writes, No one man's belief is . . . a private matter which concerns himself alone. Our lives are guided by that generai conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes.11 I will assume that actions that tend to harm the interests of others are prima fade immoral, and should prima fade be restricted by society, without trying to defìne "harm," "interest," or "immoral."12 (I will also leave aside the difficult issue of actions causing harm only to oneself.) I will assume that belief s about justice and social groups are sufficiently voluntary that we can rightly be held responsible for them. This seems reasonable, since such belief s rest on évidence toward which each person must take up an attitude of acceptance, rejection, or something in between. I will not be concerned with whether the belief s are true or false, but with whether the act of</code> |
  | <code>nature, and its effort to search for the truth is obscured by the passions. The inherent capacity of the soul for self-realization is also obstructed by the veil of karma.4 It is subjected to the forces of karma, which express themselves, first, through the feelings and emotions and, secondly, in the chains of very subtle kinds of matter invisible to the eye and all ordinary instruments of knowledge. It is then embodied and is affected by the environment-physical, social, and spiritual. Thus, various typeg of soul existence come into being. Karma, according to the Jainas, is material in nature. It is matter in a subtle form and is a substantive force. It is constituted of finer particles of matter. The kind of matter fit to manifest karma is everywhere in the universe. It has the special property of developing the effects of merit and demerit. By its activity due to contact with the physical world, the soul becomes penetrated 2 Ibid., p. 15. 3 Dravya-sthagraha, II. 4 Umisaviti, Tattvarthadhigama-siftra, J. L. Jaini, trans. (Arrah: The Central Jaina Publishing House, 1920). KARMA IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY 231 with particles of karmic body (karma-sartra), which are constantly attached to the soul until the soul succeeds in freeing itself from the body. "Nowhere has the physical nature of karma been asserted with more stress than in Jainism."5 A moral fact produces a psychophysical quality, a real and not merely a symbolic mark, affecting the soul in its physical nature. This point of view has been worked out in detail in the form of mathematical calculation in the</code> | <code>Karma-grantha. The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects: (1) the physical aspect (dravya-karma) and (2) the psychic aspect (bhavakarma). The physical aspect comprises the particles of karma accruing to the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily the mental states and events arising out of the activity of mind, body, and speech--they are like the mental traces of the actions, since we experience the mnemic traces long after the experienced conscious states vanish. Physical karma and psychic karma are mutually related as cause and effect." The distinction between the physical and the psychic aspects of karma is psychologically significant, since it presents the interaction of the bodily and the mental due to the incessant activity of the soul. This bondage of the soul to karma is of four types, according to its nature (prakrti), duration (sthiti), intensity (anubhaga, rasa), and quantity (pradeda) . Karma can be distinguished into eight types: (1) finanavaran~iya, that which obscures right knowledge; (2) darianavaraniya, that which obscures right intuition; (3) vedaniya, that which arouses affective states such as feelings and emotions ; (4) mohaniya, that which deludes right faith; (5) dyu-karma, that which determines the age of the individual; (6) nama-karma, that which produces various circumstances collectively making up an individual existence, such as the body and other special qualities of individuality; (7) gotra-karma, that which determines the family, social standing, etc., of the individual; (8) antardya-karma, that which obstructs the</code> | <code>was that even the gods were subject to the inexorable law of Karma. Of the schools based on the Veda, the Nyaya-Vai§esika system, which is mainly concerned with logic and dialectics, may be described as realistic. It has an interesting atomic theory, and regards the physical universe as ultimately consisting of an indefinite number of atoms of four types, plus three infinite and pervasive entities-ether (dkAsa, regarded as the substratum of sound), time, and space. This system regards the whole and its parts as quite distinct and postulates a special relation (samavaya, "inherence") between them, which is described by Mr. Hiriyanna as "a metaphysical fiction." The same relationship is supposed to obtain between a universal and the particulars which it characterizes. Universals in this doctrine are regarded as eternal and independently real, not as transient configurations of particular objects (Jain view) or as purely conceptual (Buddhist view). 267 PHILOSOPHY The Sankhya and Yoga schools form another composite system, which regards both matter and spirit as ultimately real and admits a plurality of selves. It differs from the Nyaya-VaiSesika in tracing the whole of the physical universe to a single source called Prakrti. Purusa and Prakrti, or spirit and nature, are the two basic conceptions of the doctrine (p. 107). Spirit without nature (or "matter") is inoperative and nature without spirit is blind. The knowledge of the ultimate separateness of these two principles is stated to be the means to release. The philosophical</code>          |
  | <code>the hundredth anniversary of the publication of Nishida Kitaro's An Inquiry into the Good. The following is an English version of a talk delivered on that occasion. In it I have</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <code>tried to argue against the widely held view that this maiden work contains the germ of Nishida's mature philosophy, and at the same time to suggest that an early strain of ambiguity</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <code>the origins of this important work, a text often seen as marking the beginning of Modern Japanese philosophy. I will show that while Buddhism is an important part of Nishida's early intellectual development, there is ample biographical and textual evidence to suggest that zen no kenkyu is at its core a text which attempts to solve key ethical problems via a modern interpretation of concepts</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.EUCLIDEAN",
      "triplet_margin": 5
  }
  ```

### Evaluation Dataset

#### Unnamed Dataset


* Size: 1,000 evaluation samples
* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                             | negative                                                                             |
  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                               | string                                                                               |
  | details | <ul><li>min: 13 tokens</li><li>mean: 279.94 tokens</li><li>max: 554 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 15 tokens</li><li>mean: 279.37 tokens</li><li>max: 527 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 17 tokens</li><li>mean: 298.26 tokens</li><li>max: 506 tokens</li></ul> |
* Samples:
  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
  |:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
  | <code>Y involves not only fitting particular curves from some given hypothesis space to the data but also making ‘higher’ level decisions about which general family or functional form (linear, quadratic, etc.) is most appropriate. There may be a still higher level allowing choice between expansions in polynomials and expansions in Fourier series. At the lowest level of the hierarchical model representing curve fitting, theories T 0 specify specific curves, such as } $y=2x+3$ or } $y=x^{2}-4$ , that we fit to the data. At the next level of the hierarchy, theories T 1 are distinguished by the maximum degree of the polynomial they assign to curves in the low‐level hypothesis space. For instance, T 1 could be the theory Poly1, with maximum polynomial degree 1. An alternative T 1 is Poly2, with maximum polynomial degree 2, and so on. At a higher level, there are two possible theories that specify that T 1 theories are either polynomials or Fourier series, respectively. The model also specifies the conditional probabilities } $p( T_{0} T_{1}) $ and } $p( T_{1} T_{2}) $ . At each level of the HBM, the alternative theories are mutually exclusive. In this example, Poly1 and Poly2 are taken to be mutually exclusive alternatives. We will see soon how this should be understood.</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | <code>We now suggest that HBMs are particularly apt models in certain respects of scientific inference. They provide a natural way to represent a broadly Kuhnian picture of the structure and dynamics of scientific theories. Let us first highlight some of the key features of the structure and dynamics of scientific theories to which historians and philosophers with a historical orientation (Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1978; Laudan 1978) have been particularly attentive and for which HBMs provide a natural model. It has been common in philosophy of science, particularly in this tradition, to distinguish at least two levels of hierarchical structure: a higher level consisting of a paradigm, research program, or research tradition and a lower level of more specific theories or hypotheses. Paradigms, research programs, and research traditions have been invested with a number of different roles. Kuhn’s paradigms, for instance, may carry with them a commitment to specific forms of instrumentation and to general theoretical goals and methodologies, such as an emphasis on quantitative prediction or a distaste for unobservable entities. However, one of the primary functions of paradigms and their like is to contain what we will call ‘framework theories’, which comprise abstract</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <code>what they focus primarily on what Prof. Kuhn had said PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS 119 about the products of scientific communities scientific theories and the empirical claims associated with them. Other aspects of his theory dealing with the scientific communities are however peripherally touched. In particular, both Prof. Stegm?ller and I, in somewhat different ways, try to explain what it is for a person 'zu verf?gen ?ber' or 'to have' a theory. I have explained my conception of logical reconstruction of physical theories and the extent of its normative aspect. ([4], p. 4). I still believe this account of the matter to be correct and I now believe the account applies as well to logical reconstructions of theories in the science of science. I think the principal consideration is faithfulness to the 'existing exposition' of the theory. Within this, normative considerations of logical consistency, clarity and systematic elegance operate. Only at doubtful points where the existing exposition is ambiguous or unclear should normative consideration dominate the existing exposition. This means that in reconstructing a theory of science we are primarily concerned with exhibiting what the theory tells us about the way scientific communities work in particular, but not exclusively, what it tells us about how their products change over time. Whether the theory's account is true, whether it agrees with some preconceived account of 'scientific rationality', and whether it suggests some 'better' alternatives for meeting society's infor? mation needs are all different and distinct questions. The first and last, at least, are obviously interesting. 2. THE PRODUCTS</code> |
  | <code>obligation'O'-signify an all-things-considered obligation. This claim is harmless if it simply expresses our intention to call only all-things-considered moral requirements "duties" or "obligations" and to treat 'prima facie obligation' as a technical term. But I think that more than this is usually intended by those who deny that prima facie obligations are genuine obligations, and their denial rests on a misunderstanding of prima facie obligations that it is important to avoid. These writers sometimes say that prima facie obligations are merely apparent obligations such that they have no moral force if overridden.7 But this does not fit our understanding of prima facie obligations or Ross's. As Ross points out, we should not understand prima facie obligations as the epistemic claim that certain things appear to be obligatory that may not prove to be.8 This reading does not imply that there is any moral reason supporting x corresponding to the prima facie obligation to do x. Rather, prima facie obligations should be given a metaphysical reading that recognizes prima facie obligations as moral forces that are not canceled by the existence of other moral forces even if the latter override or defeat the former.9 Now Ross does say that prima facie duties are conditional duties 6Foot recognizes genuine obligations that may be overridden (type-i obligations) and distinguishes them from the obligation associated with what there is the most moral reason to do (type-2 obligations), and so recognizes something like the distinction that I intend between prima facie and all-things-considered obligations. But she</code> | <code>seems to treat prima facie obligations epistemically or statistically (see text below) and so does not want to equate the type-1/type-2 distinction with the prima facie/all-thingsconsidered distinction. See Philippa Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," reprinted in Moral Dilemmas, ed. C. Gowans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 256-57. Because I reject these readings of prima facie obligations, our distinctions are similar. 7See Bernard Williams, "Ethical Consistency," reprinted in Moral Dilemmas, ed. Gowans, 125, 126; Bas van Fraassen, "Values and the Heart's Command," ibid., 141, 142; Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," ibid., 191; Foot, "Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma," 257. 8The Right and the Good, 20. 90n the metaphysical reading, a prima facie obligation expresses a pro tanto moral obligation or moral reason. 218 MORAL CONFLICT AND ITS STRUCTURE and not duties proper.'0 This, I believe, reflects only his decision to reserve the terms 'duty' and 'obligation' for all-things-considered moral claims. If we concede this to him, then we can explain most of his claims about prima facie obligations on our model. Prima facie obligations are conditional (all-things-considered) duties in the sense that if all else is equal, then there is not only a prima facie obligation to do x but also a genuine or all-things-considered obligation. Sometimes Ross says that prima facie obligations refer to features of an act that tend to make acts of that type (all-things-considered) obligatory." This claim admits of a purely statistical reading: though there may be nothing about this token act</code> | <code>a situation, and it can still be right to break the promise. This is because two prima facie duties can come into conflict. We may, for example, have promised to meet a friend for lunch, but meet a stranger in dire need of help along the way. In such a case, there will be a conflict of prima facie duties: it would be prima facie right to keep the promise, but it is also prima facie right to help those in need when we are able. In such a case, the right thing to do may very well be to help the stranger, and thus break our promise to our friend. One prima facie duty, therefore, can be overridden by another. Even when a prima facie duty is overridden, however, it still retains its force. Our judgment that, overall, it is right to break our promise does not mean that promise-breaking, in this case, does give us some reason to think the action wrong. It simply doesn't give us enough of a reason. To borrow Robert Audi's phrase, Dancy interprets prima facie duties as "ineradicable but overridable." (Audi, 1997, p. 35) This, it turns out, is what makes Ross a generalist. As Dancy writes, It is clearly a generalist account, in that it maintains that what is a reason here must be the same reason everywhere. (Dancy, 1993, p. 96) 6 The most important source for Ross's theory is (Ross, 1930). For a later statement congruent with these central claims see: (Ross,</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
  | <code>over another's duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <code>to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory's focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <code>monstrous to admit as a subjective determinant of the will any element which has not intelligible roots in the character of the agent. An act of will which does not spring from the self's character, it is said, is obviously not the self's act at all. It is of no more use to the wise Libertarian than to the Determinist. This may fairly be said to have established itself as a philosophical cliche. It is also, as I believe, and as I have argued more than once elsewhere, a devastating error which has played havoc withl the whole free will controversy. My purpose at the moment, however, is merely to point out that here, in the climate of philosophical opinion, there has been an additional encouragement to the psychologist to give a preference to one of the two rival hypotheses concerning the experience of will-effort. It is, I hope, not unfair to suggest that psychologists have often approached the analysis of the experience of will-effort with a rather definite expectation of finding that, even from the standpoint of psychology, there is nothing which lends countenance to the notion of a form of mental energy which, while not intelligibly rooted in character, can yet influence the act of choice. One further word before commencing consideration of the more important of the psychological analyses which proceed along what, for the sake of a convenient label, we may call " Determinist " lines. We ought to be clear at the outset about the fundamental requirement which any such analysis</code>                                                                                                                                                                             |
* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
  ```json
  {
      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.EUCLIDEAN",
      "triplet_margin": 5
  }
  ```

### Training Hyperparameters
#### Non-Default Hyperparameters

- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `num_train_epochs`: 5
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates

#### All Hyperparameters
<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
- `do_predict`: False
- `eval_strategy`: steps
- `prediction_loss_only`: True
- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
- `weight_decay`: 0.0
- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
- `num_train_epochs`: 5
- `max_steps`: -1
- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
- `warmup_steps`: 0
- `log_level`: passive
- `log_level_replica`: warning
- `log_on_each_node`: True
- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
- `save_safetensors`: True
- `save_on_each_node`: False
- `save_only_model`: False
- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
- `no_cuda`: False
- `use_cpu`: False
- `use_mps_device`: False
- `seed`: 42
- `data_seed`: None
- `jit_mode_eval`: False
- `use_ipex`: False
- `bf16`: False
- `fp16`: False
- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
- `half_precision_backend`: auto
- `bf16_full_eval`: False
- `fp16_full_eval`: False
- `tf32`: None
- `local_rank`: 0
- `ddp_backend`: None
- `tpu_num_cores`: None
- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
- `debug`: []
- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
- `past_index`: -1
- `disable_tqdm`: False
- `remove_unused_columns`: True
- `label_names`: None
- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
- `ignore_data_skip`: False
- `fsdp`: []
- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
- `deepspeed`: None
- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
- `optim`: adamw_torch
- `optim_args`: None
- `adafactor`: False
- `group_by_length`: False
- `length_column_name`: length
- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
- `push_to_hub`: False
- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
- `hub_model_id`: None
- `hub_strategy`: every_save
- `hub_private_repo`: False
- `hub_always_push`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
- `fp16_backend`: auto
- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
- `mp_parameters`: 
- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
- `full_determinism`: False
- `torchdynamo`: None
- `ray_scope`: last
- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
- `torch_compile`: False
- `torch_compile_backend`: None
- `torch_compile_mode`: None
- `dispatch_batches`: None
- `split_batches`: None
- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
- `optim_target_modules`: None
- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
- `eval_on_start`: False
- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional

</details>

### Training Logs
| Epoch  | Step | Training Loss | loss   | all-nli-test_max_accuracy |
|:------:|:----:|:-------------:|:------:|:-------------------------:|
| 0.08   | 100  | 4.8908        | 4.8563 | -                         |
| 0.16   | 200  | 4.8672        | 4.8117 | -                         |
| 0.24   | 300  | 4.8049        | 4.7065 | -                         |
| 0.32   | 400  | 4.7156        | 4.5210 | -                         |
| 0.4    | 500  | 4.5615        | 4.4572 | -                         |
| 0.48   | 600  | 4.5355        | 4.4548 | -                         |
| 0.56   | 700  | 4.589         | 4.4488 | -                         |
| 0.64   | 800  | 4.5506        | 4.4304 | -                         |
| 0.72   | 900  | 4.4665        | 4.4323 | -                         |
| 0.8    | 1000 | 4.5033        | 4.4068 | -                         |
| 0.88   | 1100 | 4.5526        | 4.4300 | -                         |
| 0.96   | 1200 | 4.5195        | 4.4004 | -                         |
| 1.04   | 1300 | 4.4698        | 4.3785 | -                         |
| 1.12   | 1400 | 4.4466        | 4.4032 | -                         |
| 1.2    | 1500 | 4.4429        | 4.3731 | -                         |
| 1.28   | 1600 | 4.4364        | 4.3455 | -                         |
| 1.3600 | 1700 | 4.4631        | 4.3660 | -                         |
| 1.44   | 1800 | 4.3781        | 4.3577 | -                         |
| 1.52   | 1900 | 4.442         | 4.3767 | -                         |
| 1.6    | 2000 | 4.4354        | 4.3541 | -                         |
| 1.6800 | 2100 | 4.3309        | 4.3393 | -                         |
| 1.76   | 2200 | 4.3784        | 4.3350 | -                         |
| 1.8400 | 2300 | 4.403         | 4.3271 | -                         |
| 1.92   | 2400 | 4.3733        | 4.3328 | -                         |
| 2.0    | 2500 | 4.3256        | 4.3385 | -                         |
| 2.08   | 2600 | 4.3109        | 4.3845 | -                         |
| 2.16   | 2700 | 4.3712        | 4.3043 | -                         |
| 2.2232 | 2779 | -             | -      | 0.8085                    |


### Framework Versions
- Python: 3.10.12
- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
- Transformers: 4.42.4
- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
- Accelerate: 0.32.1
- Datasets: 2.21.0
- Tokenizers: 0.19.1

## Citation

### BibTeX

#### Sentence Transformers
```bibtex
@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}
```

#### TripletLoss
```bibtex
@misc{hermans2017defense,
    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
    year={2017},
    eprint={1703.07737},
    archivePrefix={arXiv},
    primaryClass={cs.CV}
}
```

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