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Mar 11

HiRED: Attention-Guided Token Dropping for Efficient Inference of High-Resolution Vision-Language Models in Resource-Constrained Environments

High-resolution Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have been widely used in multimodal tasks to enhance accuracy by preserving detailed image information. However, these models often generate excessive visual tokens due to encoding multiple partitions of the input image. Processing these excessive visual tokens is computationally challenging, especially in resource-constrained environments with commodity GPUs. To support high-resolution images while meeting resource constraints, we propose High-Resolution Early Dropping (HiRED), a token-dropping scheme that operates within a fixed token budget before the Large Language Model (LLM) stage. HiRED can be integrated with existing high-resolution VLMs in a plug-and-play manner, as it requires no additional training while still maintaining superior accuracy. We strategically use the vision encoder's attention in the initial layers to assess the visual content of each image partition and allocate the token budget accordingly. Then, using the attention in the final layer, we select the most important visual tokens from each partition within the allocated budget, dropping the rest. Empirically, when applied to LLaVA-Next-7B on NVIDIA TESLA P40 GPU, HiRED with a 20% token budget increases token generation throughput by 4.7, reduces first-token generation latency by 15 seconds, and saves 2.3 GB of GPU memory for a single inference.

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.