Daily Papers

We explore Cross-lingual Backdoor ATtacks (X-BAT) in multilingual Large Language Models (mLLMs), revealing how backdoors inserted in one language can automatically transfer to others through shared embedding spaces. Using toxicity classification as a case study, we demonstrate that attackers can compromise multilingual systems by poisoning data in a single language, with rare tokens serving as specific effective triggers. Our findings expose a critical vulnerability in the fundamental architecture that enables cross-lingual transfer in these models. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/himanshubeniwal/X-BAT.

The task of toxicity detection is still a relevant task, especially in the context of safe and fair LMs development. Nevertheless, labeled binary toxicity classification corpora are not available for all languages, which is understandable given the resource-intensive nature of the annotation process. Ukrainian, in particular, is among the languages lacking such resources. To our knowledge, there has been no existing toxicity classification corpus in Ukrainian. In this study, we aim to fill this gap by investigating cross-lingual knowledge transfer techniques and creating labeled corpora by: (i)~translating from an English corpus, (ii)~filtering toxic samples using keywords, and (iii)~annotating with crowdsourcing. We compare LLMs prompting and other cross-lingual transfer approaches with and without fine-tuning offering insights into the most robust and efficient baselines.

With the development of natural language processing (NLP), large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly popular. LLMs are integrating more into everyday life, raising public concerns about their security vulnerabilities. Consequently, the security of large language models is becoming critically important. Currently, the techniques for attacking and defending against LLMs are continuously evolving. One significant method type of attack is the jailbreak attack, which designed to evade model safety mechanisms and induce the generation of inappropriate content. Existing jailbreak attacks primarily rely on crafting inducement prompts for direct jailbreaks, which are less effective against large models with robust filtering and high comprehension abilities. Given the increasing demand for real-time capabilities in large language models, real-time updates and iterations of new knowledge have become essential. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), an advanced technique to compensate for the model's lack of new knowledge, is gradually becoming mainstream. As RAG enables the model to utilize external knowledge bases, it provides a new avenue for jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we conduct the first work to propose the concept of indirect jailbreak and achieve Retrieval-Augmented Generation via LangChain. Building on this, we further design a novel method of indirect jailbreak attack, termed Poisoned-LangChain (PLC), which leverages a poisoned external knowledge base to interact with large language models, thereby causing the large models to generate malicious non-compliant dialogues.We tested this method on six different large language models across three major categories of jailbreak issues. The experiments demonstrate that PLC successfully implemented indirect jailbreak attacks under three different scenarios, achieving success rates of 88.56%, 79.04%, and 82.69% respectively.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to their extensive global deployment, and ensuring their safety calls for comprehensive and multilingual toxicity evaluations. However, existing toxicity benchmarks are overwhelmingly focused on English, posing serious risks to deploying LLMs in other languages. We address this by introducing PolygloToxicityPrompts (PTP), the first large-scale multilingual toxicity evaluation benchmark of 425K naturally occurring prompts spanning 17 languages. We overcome the scarcity of naturally occurring toxicity in web-text and ensure coverage across languages with varying resources by automatically scraping over 100M web-text documents. Using PTP, we investigate research questions to study the impact of model size, prompt language, and instruction and preference-tuning methods on toxicity by benchmarking over 60 LLMs. Notably, we find that toxicity increases as language resources decrease or model size increases. Although instruction- and preference-tuning reduce toxicity, the choice of preference-tuning method does not have any significant impact. Our findings shed light on crucial shortcomings of LLM safeguarding and highlight areas for future research.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) and small language models (SLMs) are being adopted at remarkable speed, although their safety still remains a serious concern. With the advent of multilingual S/LLMs, the question now becomes a matter of scale: can we expand multilingual safety evaluations of these models with the same velocity at which they are deployed? To this end we introduce RTP-LX, a human-transcreated and human-annotated corpus of toxic prompts and outputs in 28 languages. RTP-LX follows participatory design practices, and a portion of the corpus is especially designed to detect culturally-specific toxic language. We evaluate seven S/LLMs on their ability to detect toxic content in a culturally-sensitive, multilingual scenario. We find that, although they typically score acceptably in terms of accuracy, they have low agreement with human judges when judging holistically the toxicity of a prompt, and have difficulty discerning harm in context-dependent scenarios, particularly with subtle-yet-harmful content (e.g. microagressions, bias). We release of this dataset to contribute to further reduce harmful uses of these models and improve their safe deployment.

To date, toxicity mitigation in language models has almost entirely been focused on single-language settings. As language models embrace multilingual capabilities, it's crucial our safety measures keep pace. Recognizing this research gap, our approach expands the scope of conventional toxicity mitigation to address the complexities presented by multiple languages. In the absence of sufficient annotated datasets across languages, we employ translated data to evaluate and enhance our mitigation techniques. We also compare finetuning mitigation approaches against retrieval-augmented techniques under both static and continual toxicity mitigation scenarios. This allows us to examine the effects of translation quality and the cross-lingual transfer on toxicity mitigation. We also explore how model size and data quantity affect the success of these mitigation efforts. Covering nine languages, our study represents a broad array of linguistic families and levels of resource availability, ranging from high to mid-resource languages. Through comprehensive experiments, we provide insights into the complexities of multilingual toxicity mitigation, offering valuable insights and paving the way for future research in this increasingly important field. Code and data are available at https://github.com/for-ai/goodtriever.

Given the dynamic nature of toxic language use, automated methods for detecting toxic spans are likely to encounter distributional shift. To explore this phenomenon, we evaluate three approaches for detecting toxic spans under cross-domain conditions: lexicon-based, rationale extraction, and fine-tuned language models. Our findings indicate that a simple method using off-the-shelf lexicons performs best in the cross-domain setup. The cross-domain error analysis suggests that (1) rationale extraction methods are prone to false negatives, while (2) language models, despite performing best for the in-domain case, recall fewer explicitly toxic words than lexicons and are prone to certain types of false positives. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/toxic-cross-domain.

Detoxification is a task of generating text in polite style while preserving meaning and fluency of the original toxic text. Existing detoxification methods are designed to work in one exact language. This work investigates multilingual and cross-lingual detoxification and the behavior of large multilingual models like in this setting. Unlike previous works we aim to make large language models able to perform detoxification without direct fine-tuning in given language. Experiments show that multilingual models are capable of performing multilingual style transfer. However, models are not able to perform cross-lingual detoxification and direct fine-tuning on exact language is inevitable.

Even with various regulations in place across countries and social media platforms (Government of India, 2021; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2022, digital abusive speech remains a significant issue. One potential approach to address this challenge is automatic text detoxification, a text style transfer (TST) approach that transforms toxic language into a more neutral or non-toxic form. To date, the availability of parallel corpora for the text detoxification task (Logachevavet al., 2022; Atwell et al., 2022; Dementievavet al., 2024a) has proven to be crucial for state-of-the-art approaches. With this work, we extend parallel text detoxification corpus to new languages -- German, Chinese, Arabic, Hindi, and Amharic -- testing in the extensive multilingual setup TST baselines. Next, we conduct the first of its kind an automated, explainable analysis of the descriptive features of both toxic and non-toxic sentences, diving deeply into the nuances, similarities, and differences of toxicity and detoxification across 9 languages. Finally, based on the obtained insights, we experiment with a novel text detoxification method inspired by the Chain-of-Thoughts reasoning approach, enhancing the prompting process through clustering on relevant descriptive attributes.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Gemini have significantly advanced natural language processing, enabling various applications such as chatbots and automated content generation. However, these models can be exploited by malicious individuals who craft toxic prompts to elicit harmful or unethical responses. These individuals often employ jailbreaking techniques to bypass safety mechanisms, highlighting the need for robust toxic prompt detection methods. Existing detection techniques, both blackbox and whitebox, face challenges related to the diversity of toxic prompts, scalability, and computational efficiency. In response, we propose ToxicDetector, a lightweight greybox method designed to efficiently detect toxic prompts in LLMs. ToxicDetector leverages LLMs to create toxic concept prompts, uses embedding vectors to form feature vectors, and employs a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier for prompt classification. Our evaluation on various versions of the LLama models, Gemma-2, and multiple datasets demonstrates that ToxicDetector achieves a high accuracy of 96.39\% and a low false positive rate of 2.00\%, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, ToxicDetector's processing time of 0.0780 seconds per prompt makes it highly suitable for real-time applications. ToxicDetector achieves high accuracy, efficiency, and scalability, making it a practical method for toxic prompt detection in LLMs.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

With the rise of large language models (LLMs), ensuring they embody the principles of being helpful, honest, and harmless (3H), known as Human Alignment, becomes crucial. While existing alignment methods like RLHF, DPO, etc., effectively fine-tune LLMs to match preferences in the preference dataset, they often lead LLMs to highly receptive human input and external evidence, even when this information is poisoned. This leads to a tendency for LLMs to be Adaptive Chameleons when external evidence conflicts with their parametric memory. This exacerbates the risk of LLM being attacked by external poisoned data, which poses a significant security risk to LLM system applications such as Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To address the challenge, we propose a novel framework: Dialectical Alignment (DA), which (1) utilizes AI feedback to identify optimal strategies for LLMs to navigate inter-context conflicts and context-memory conflicts with different external evidence in context window (i.e., different ratios of poisoned factual contexts); (2) constructs the SFT dataset as well as the preference dataset based on the AI feedback and strategies above; (3) uses the above datasets for LLM alignment to defense poisoned context attack while preserving the effectiveness of in-context knowledge editing. Our experiments show that the dialectical alignment model improves poisoned data attack defense by 20 and does not require any additional prompt engineering or prior declaration of ``you may be attacked`` to the LLMs' context window.

On the world wide web, toxic content detectors are a crucial line of defense against potentially hateful and offensive messages. As such, building highly effective classifiers that enable a safer internet is an important research area. Moreover, the web is a highly multilingual, cross-cultural community that develops its own lingo over time. As such, it is crucial to develop models that are effective across a diverse range of languages, usages, and styles. In this paper, we present the fundamentals behind the next version of the Perspective API from Google Jigsaw. At the heart of the approach is a single multilingual token-free Charformer model that is applicable across a range of languages, domains, and tasks. We demonstrate that by forgoing static vocabularies, we gain flexibility across a variety of settings. We additionally outline the techniques employed to make such a byte-level model efficient and feasible for productionization. Through extensive experiments on multilingual toxic comment classification benchmarks derived from real API traffic and evaluation on an array of code-switching, covert toxicity, emoji-based hate, human-readable obfuscation, distribution shift, and bias evaluation settings, we show that our proposed approach outperforms strong baselines. Finally, we present our findings from deploying this system in production.

This paper investigates using knowledge editing techniques to detoxify Large Language Models (LLMs). We construct a benchmark, SafeEdit, which covers nine unsafe categories with various powerful attack prompts and equips comprehensive metrics for systematic evaluation. We conduct experiments to compare knowledge editing approaches with previous baselines, indicating that knowledge editing has the potential to efficiently detoxify LLMs with limited impact on general performance. Then, we propose a simple yet effective baseline, dubbed Detoxifying with Intraoperative Neural Monitoring (DINM), to diminish the toxicity of LLMs within a few tuning steps via only one instance. We further provide an in-depth analysis of the internal mechanism for various detoxify approaches, demonstrating that previous methods like SFT and DPO may merely suppress the activations of toxic parameters, while DINM mitigates the toxicity of the toxic parameters to a certain extent, making permanent adjustments. We hope that these insights could shed light on future work of developing detoxifying approaches and the underlying knowledge mechanisms of LLMs. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, they pose potential safety concerns, such as the ``jailbreak'' problem, wherein malicious instructions can manipulate LLMs to exhibit undesirable behavior. Although several preventive measures have been developed to mitigate the potential risks associated with LLMs, they have primarily focused on English data. In this study, we reveal the presence of multilingual jailbreak challenges within LLMs and consider two potential risk scenarios: unintentional and intentional. The unintentional scenario involves users querying LLMs using non-English prompts and inadvertently bypassing the safety mechanisms, while the intentional scenario concerns malicious users combining malicious instructions with multilingual prompts to deliberately attack LLMs. The experimental results reveal that in the unintentional scenario, the rate of unsafe content increases as the availability of languages decreases. Specifically, low-resource languages exhibit three times the likelihood of encountering harmful content compared to high-resource languages, with both ChatGPT and GPT-4. In the intentional scenario, multilingual prompts can exacerbate the negative impact of malicious instructions, with astonishingly high rates of unsafe output: 80.92\% for ChatGPT and 40.71\% for GPT-4. To handle such a challenge in the multilingual context, we propose a novel Self-Defense framework that automatically generates multilingual training data for safety fine-tuning. Experimental results show that ChatGPT fine-tuned with such data can achieve a substantial reduction in unsafe content generation. Data is available at https://github.com/DAMO-NLP-SG/multilingual-safety-for-LLMs. Warning: This paper contains examples with potentially harmful content.

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a popular method for aligning Language Models (LM) with human values and preferences. RLHF requires a large number of preference pairs as training data, which are often used in both the Supervised Fine-Tuning and Reward Model training and therefore publicly available datasets are commonly used. In this work, we study to what extent a malicious actor can manipulate the LMs generations by poisoning the preferences, i.e., injecting poisonous preference pairs into these datasets and the RLHF training process. We propose strategies to build poisonous preference pairs and test their performance by poisoning two widely used preference datasets. Our results show that preference poisoning is highly effective: injecting a small amount of poisonous data (1-5\% of the original dataset), we can effectively manipulate the LM to generate a target entity in a target sentiment (positive or negative). The findings from our experiments also shed light on strategies to defend against the preference poisoning attack.

The open-endedness of large language models (LLMs) combined with their impressive capabilities may lead to new safety issues when being exploited for malicious use. While recent studies primarily focus on probing toxic outputs that can be easily detected with existing toxicity classifiers, we show that LLMs can generate diverse implicit toxic outputs that are exceptionally difficult to detect via simply zero-shot prompting. Moreover, we propose a reinforcement learning (RL) based attacking method to further induce the implicit toxicity in LLMs. Specifically, we optimize the language model with a reward that prefers implicit toxic outputs to explicit toxic and non-toxic ones. Experiments on five widely-adopted toxicity classifiers demonstrate that the attack success rate can be significantly improved through RL fine-tuning. For instance, the RL-finetuned LLaMA-13B model achieves an attack success rate of 90.04% on BAD and 62.85% on Davinci003. Our findings suggest that LLMs pose a significant threat in generating undetectable implicit toxic outputs. We further show that fine-tuning toxicity classifiers on the annotated examples from our attacking method can effectively enhance their ability to detect LLM-generated implicit toxic language. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Implicit-Toxicity.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Building safe Large Language Models (LLMs) across multiple languages is essential in ensuring both safe access and linguistic diversity. To this end, we introduce M-ALERT, a multilingual benchmark that evaluates the safety of LLMs in five languages: English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish. M-ALERT includes 15k high-quality prompts per language, totaling 75k, following the detailed ALERT taxonomy. Our extensive experiments on 10 state-of-the-art LLMs highlight the importance of language-specific safety analysis, revealing that models often exhibit significant inconsistencies in safety across languages and categories. For instance, Llama3.2 shows high unsafety in the category crime_tax for Italian but remains safe in other languages. Similar differences can be observed across all models. In contrast, certain categories, such as substance_cannabis and crime_propaganda, consistently trigger unsafe responses across models and languages. These findings underscore the need for robust multilingual safety practices in LLMs to ensure safe and responsible usage across diverse user communities.

Pretrained neural language models (LMs) are prone to generating racist, sexist, or otherwise toxic language which hinders their safe deployment. We investigate the extent to which pretrained LMs can be prompted to generate toxic language, and the effectiveness of controllable text generation algorithms at preventing such toxic degeneration. We create and release RealToxicityPrompts, a dataset of 100K naturally occurring, sentence-level prompts derived from a large corpus of English web text, paired with toxicity scores from a widely-used toxicity classifier. Using RealToxicityPrompts, we find that pretrained LMs can degenerate into toxic text even from seemingly innocuous prompts. We empirically assess several controllable generation methods, and find that while data- or compute-intensive methods (e.g., adaptive pretraining on non-toxic data) are more effective at steering away from toxicity than simpler solutions (e.g., banning "bad" words), no current method is failsafe against neural toxic degeneration. To pinpoint the potential cause of such persistent toxic degeneration, we analyze two web text corpora used to pretrain several LMs (including GPT-2; Radford et. al, 2019), and find a significant amount of offensive, factually unreliable, and otherwise toxic content. Our work provides a test bed for evaluating toxic generations by LMs and stresses the need for better data selection processes for pretraining.

With the rapid development of Large language models (LLMs), understanding the capabilities of LLMs in identifying unsafe content has become increasingly important. While previous works have introduced several benchmarks to evaluate the safety risk of LLMs, the community still has a limited understanding of current LLMs' capability to recognize illegal and unsafe content in Chinese contexts. In this work, we present a Chinese safety benchmark (ChineseSafe) to facilitate research on the content safety of large language models. To align with the regulations for Chinese Internet content moderation, our ChineseSafe contains 205,034 examples across 4 classes and 10 sub-classes of safety issues. For Chinese contexts, we add several special types of illegal content: political sensitivity, pornography, and variant/homophonic words. Moreover, we employ two methods to evaluate the legal risks of popular LLMs, including open-sourced models and APIs. The results reveal that many LLMs exhibit vulnerability to certain types of safety issues, leading to legal risks in China. Our work provides a guideline for developers and researchers to facilitate the safety of LLMs. Our results are also available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/SUSTech/ChineseSafe-Benchmark.

Existing approaches to multilingual text detoxification are hampered by the scarcity of parallel multilingual datasets. In this work, we introduce a pipeline for the generation of multilingual parallel detoxification data. We also introduce SynthDetoxM, a manually collected and synthetically generated multilingual parallel text detoxification dataset comprising 16,000 high-quality detoxification sentence pairs across German, French, Spanish and Russian. The data was sourced from different toxicity evaluation datasets and then rewritten with nine modern open-source LLMs in few-shot setting. Our experiments demonstrate that models trained on the produced synthetic datasets have superior performance to those trained on the human-annotated MultiParaDetox dataset even in data limited setting. Models trained on SynthDetoxM outperform all evaluated LLMs in few-shot setting. We release our dataset and code to help further research in multilingual text detoxification.

Large language models (LLMs) are known to have the potential to generate harmful content, posing risks to users. While significant progress has been made in developing taxonomies for LLM risks and safety evaluation prompts, most studies have focused on monolingual contexts, primarily in English. However, language- and region-specific risks in bilingual contexts are often overlooked, and core findings can diverge from those in monolingual settings. In this paper, we introduce Qorgau, a novel dataset specifically designed for safety evaluation in Kazakh and Russian, reflecting the unique bilingual context in Kazakhstan, where both Kazakh (a low-resource language) and Russian (a high-resource language) are spoken. Experiments with both multilingual and language-specific LLMs reveal notable differences in safety performance, emphasizing the need for tailored, region-specific datasets to ensure the responsible and safe deployment of LLMs in countries like Kazakhstan. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, or biased.

Text detoxification is the task of transferring the style of text from toxic to neutral. While here are approaches yielding promising results in monolingual setup, e.g., (Dale et al., 2021; Hallinan et al., 2022), cross-lingual transfer for this task remains a challenging open problem (Moskovskiy et al., 2022). In this work, we present a large-scale study of strategies for cross-lingual text detoxification -- given a parallel detoxification corpus for one language; the goal is to transfer detoxification ability to another language for which we do not have such a corpus. Moreover, we are the first to explore a new task where text translation and detoxification are performed simultaneously, providing several strong baselines for this task. Finally, we introduce new automatic detoxification evaluation metrics with higher correlations with human judgments than previous benchmarks. We assess the most promising approaches also with manual markup, determining the answer for the best strategy to transfer the knowledge of text detoxification between languages.

Recently, the newly emerged multimodal models, which leverage both visual and linguistic modalities to train powerful encoders, have gained increasing attention. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training data to trigger malicious behaviors in it. In contrast to previous work, only poisoning visual modality, in this work, we take the first step to studying poisoning attacks against multimodal models in both visual and linguistic modalities. Specially, we focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we propose three types of poisoning attacks against multimodal models. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can achieve significant attack performance while maintaining model utility in both visual and linguistic modalities. Furthermore, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.

Prior works on detoxification are scattered in the sense that they do not cover all aspects of detoxification needed in a real-world scenario. Notably, prior works restrict the task of developing detoxification models to only a seen subset of platforms, leaving the question of how the models would perform on unseen platforms unexplored. Additionally, these works do not address non-detoxifiability, a phenomenon whereby the toxic text cannot be detoxified without altering the meaning. We propose GreenLLaMA, the first comprehensive end-to-end detoxification framework, which attempts to alleviate the aforementioned limitations. We first introduce a cross-platform pseudo-parallel corpus applying multi-step data processing and generation strategies leveraging ChatGPT. We then train a suite of detoxification models with our cross-platform corpus. We show that our detoxification models outperform the SoTA model trained with human-annotated parallel corpus. We further introduce explanation to promote transparency and trustworthiness. GreenLLaMA additionally offers a unique paraphrase detector especially dedicated for the detoxification task to tackle the non-detoxifiable cases. Through experimental analysis, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our cross-platform corpus and the robustness of GreenLLaMA against adversarial toxicity.

Recent researches have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to a security threat known as Backdoor Attack. The backdoored model will behave well in normal cases but exhibit malicious behaviours on inputs inserted with a specific backdoor trigger. Current backdoor studies on LLMs predominantly focus on instruction-tuned LLMs, while neglecting another realistic scenario where LLMs are fine-tuned on multi-turn conversational data to be chat models. Chat models are extensively adopted across various real-world scenarios, thus the security of chat models deserves increasing attention. Unfortunately, we point out that the flexible multi-turn interaction format instead increases the flexibility of trigger designs and amplifies the vulnerability of chat models to backdoor attacks. In this work, we reveal and achieve a novel backdoor attacking method on chat models by distributing multiple trigger scenarios across user inputs in different rounds, and making the backdoor be triggered only when all trigger scenarios have appeared in the historical conversations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method can achieve high attack success rates (e.g., over 90% ASR on Vicuna-7B) while successfully maintaining the normal capabilities of chat models on providing helpful responses to benign user requests. Also, the backdoor can not be easily removed by the downstream re-alignment, highlighting the importance of continued research and attention to the security concerns of chat models. Warning: This paper may contain toxic content.

Added toxicity in the context of translation refers to the fact of producing a translation output with more toxicity than there exists in the input. In this paper, we present MinTox which is a novel pipeline to identify added toxicity and mitigate this issue which works at inference time. MinTox uses a toxicity detection classifier which is multimodal (speech and text) and works in languages at scale. The mitigation method is applied to languages at scale and directly in text outputs. MinTox is applied to SEAMLESSM4T, which is the latest multimodal and massively multilingual machine translation system. For this system, MinTox achieves significant added toxicity mitigation across domains, modalities and language directions. MinTox manages to approximately filter out from 25% to 95% of added toxicity (depending on the modality and domain) while keeping translation quality.

Hate speech and toxic comments are a common concern of social media platform users. Although these comments are, fortunately, the minority in these platforms, they are still capable of causing harm. Therefore, identifying these comments is an important task for studying and preventing the proliferation of toxicity in social media. Previous work in automatically detecting toxic comments focus mainly in English, with very few work in languages like Brazilian Portuguese. In this paper, we propose a new large-scale dataset for Brazilian Portuguese with tweets annotated as either toxic or non-toxic or in different types of toxicity. We present our dataset collection and annotation process, where we aimed to select candidates covering multiple demographic groups. State-of-the-art BERT models were able to achieve 76% macro-F1 score using monolingual data in the binary case. We also show that large-scale monolingual data is still needed to create more accurate models, despite recent advances in multilingual approaches. An error analysis and experiments with multi-label classification show the difficulty of classifying certain types of toxic comments that appear less frequently in our data and highlights the need to develop models that are aware of different categories of toxicity.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise the entire system, including coercing the model to spread confidential data to untrusted components. One promising approach is to tackle this problem at the system level via dynamic information flow (aka taint) tracking. Unfortunately, the traditional approach of propagating the most restrictive input label to the output is too conservative for applications where LLMs operate on inputs retrieved from diverse sources. In this paper, we propose a novel, more permissive approach to propagate information flow labels through LLM queries. The key idea behind our approach is to propagate only the labels of the samples that were influential in generating the model output and to eliminate the labels of unnecessary input. We implement and investigate the effectiveness of two variations of this approach, based on (i) prompt-based retrieval augmentation, and (ii) a k-nearest-neighbors language model. We compare these with the baseline of an introspection-based influence estimator that directly asks the language model to predict the output label. The results obtained highlight the superiority of our prompt-based label propagator, which improves the label in more than 85% of the cases in an LLM agent setting. These findings underscore the practicality of permissive label propagation for retrieval augmentation.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Toxic language detection systems often falsely flag text that contains minority group mentions as toxic, as those groups are often the targets of online hate. Such over-reliance on spurious correlations also causes systems to struggle with detecting implicitly toxic language. To help mitigate these issues, we create ToxiGen, a new large-scale and machine-generated dataset of 274k toxic and benign statements about 13 minority groups. We develop a demonstration-based prompting framework and an adversarial classifier-in-the-loop decoding method to generate subtly toxic and benign text with a massive pretrained language model. Controlling machine generation in this way allows ToxiGen to cover implicitly toxic text at a larger scale, and about more demographic groups, than previous resources of human-written text. We conduct a human evaluation on a challenging subset of ToxiGen and find that annotators struggle to distinguish machine-generated text from human-written language. We also find that 94.5% of toxic examples are labeled as hate speech by human annotators. Using three publicly-available datasets, we show that finetuning a toxicity classifier on our data improves its performance on human-written data substantially. We also demonstrate that ToxiGen can be used to fight machine-generated toxicity as finetuning improves the classifier significantly on our evaluation subset. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/ToxiGen.

Despite the considerable advancements in English LLMs, the progress in building comparable models for other languages has been hindered due to the scarcity of tailored resources. Our work aims to bridge this divide by introducing an expansive suite of resources specifically designed for the development of Indic LLMs, covering 22 languages, containing a total of 251B tokens and 74.8M instruction-response pairs. Recognizing the importance of both data quality and quantity, our approach combines highly curated manually verified data, unverified yet valuable data, and synthetic data. We build a clean, open-source pipeline for curating pre-training data from diverse sources, including websites, PDFs, and videos, incorporating best practices for crawling, cleaning, flagging, and deduplication. For instruction-fine tuning, we amalgamate existing Indic datasets, translate/transliterate English datasets into Indian languages, and utilize LLaMa2 and Mixtral models to create conversations grounded in articles from Indian Wikipedia and Wikihow. Additionally, we address toxicity alignment by generating toxic prompts for multiple scenarios and then generate non-toxic responses by feeding these toxic prompts to an aligned LLaMa2 model. We hope that the datasets, tools, and resources released as a part of this work will not only propel the research and development of Indic LLMs but also establish an open-source blueprint for extending such efforts to other languages. The data and other artifacts created as part of this work are released with permissive licenses.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

With adversarial or otherwise normal prompts, existing large language models (LLM) can be pushed to generate toxic discourses. One way to reduce the risk of LLMs generating undesired discourses is to alter the training of the LLM. This can be very restrictive due to demanding computation requirements. Other methods rely on rule-based or prompt-based token elimination, which are limited as they dismiss future tokens and the overall meaning of the complete discourse. Here, we center detoxification on the probability that the finished discourse is ultimately considered toxic. That is, at each point, we advise against token selections proportional to how likely a finished text from this point will be toxic. To this end, we formally extend the dead-end theory from the recent reinforcement learning (RL) literature to also cover uncertain outcomes. Our approach, called rectification, utilizes a separate but significantly smaller model for detoxification, which can be applied to diverse LLMs as long as they share the same vocabulary. Importantly, our method does not require access to the internal representations of the LLM, but only the token probability distribution at each decoding step. This is crucial as many LLMs today are hosted in servers and only accessible through APIs. When applied to various LLMs, including GPT-3, our approach significantly improves the generated discourse compared to the base LLMs and other techniques in terms of both the overall language and detoxification performance.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Text detoxification has the potential to mitigate the harms of toxicity by rephrasing text to remove offensive meaning, but subtle toxicity remains challenging to tackle. We introduce MaRCo, a detoxification algorithm that combines controllable generation and text rewriting methods using a Product of Experts with autoencoder language models (LMs). MaRCo uses likelihoods under a non-toxic LM (expert) and a toxic LM (anti-expert) to find candidate words to mask and potentially replace. We evaluate our method on several subtle toxicity and microaggressions datasets, and show that it not only outperforms baselines on automatic metrics, but MaRCo's rewrites are preferred 2.1 times more in human evaluation. Its applicability to instances of subtle toxicity is especially promising, demonstrating a path forward for addressing increasingly elusive online hate.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

Detoxifying multilingual Large Language Models (LLMs) has become crucial due to their increasing global use. In this work, we explore zero-shot cross-lingual generalization of preference tuning in detoxifying LLMs. Unlike previous studies that show limited cross-lingual generalization for other safety tasks, we demonstrate that Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) training with only English data can significantly reduce toxicity in multilingual open-ended generations. For example, the probability of mGPT-1.3B generating toxic continuations drops from 46.8% to 3.9% across 17 different languages after training. Our results also extend to other multilingual LLMs, such as BLOOM, Llama3, and Aya-23. Using mechanistic interpretability tools like causal intervention and activation analysis, we identified the dual multilinguality property of MLP layers in LLMs, which explains the cross-lingual generalization of DPO. Finally, we show that bilingual sentence retrieval can predict the cross-lingual transferability of DPO preference tuning.

This paper has been accepted in the NeurIPS 2024 D & B Track. Harmful memes have proliferated on the Chinese Internet, while research on detecting Chinese harmful memes significantly lags behind due to the absence of reliable datasets and effective detectors. To this end, we focus on the comprehensive detection of Chinese harmful memes. We construct ToxiCN MM, the first Chinese harmful meme dataset, which consists of 12,000 samples with fine-grained annotations for various meme types. Additionally, we propose a baseline detector, Multimodal Knowledge Enhancement (MKE), incorporating contextual information of meme content generated by the LLM to enhance the understanding of Chinese memes. During the evaluation phase, we conduct extensive quantitative experiments and qualitative analyses on multiple baselines, including LLMs and our MKE. The experimental results indicate that detecting Chinese harmful memes is challenging for existing models while demonstrating the effectiveness of MKE. The resources for this paper are available at https://github.com/DUT-lujunyu/ToxiCN_MM.

Text detoxification is a textual style transfer (TST) task where a text is paraphrased from a toxic surface form, e.g. featuring rude words, to the neutral register. Recently, text detoxification methods found their applications in various task such as detoxification of Large Language Models (LLMs) (Leong et al., 2023; He et al., 2024; Tang et al., 2023) and toxic speech combating in social networks (Deng et al., 2023; Mun et al., 2023; Agarwal et al., 2023). All these applications are extremely important to ensure safe communication in modern digital worlds. However, the previous approaches for parallel text detoxification corpora collection -- ParaDetox (Logacheva et al., 2022) and APPADIA (Atwell et al., 2022) -- were explored only in monolingual setup. In this work, we aim to extend ParaDetox pipeline to multiple languages presenting MultiParaDetox to automate parallel detoxification corpus collection for potentially any language. Then, we experiment with different text detoxification models -- from unsupervised baselines to LLMs and fine-tuned models on the presented parallel corpora -- showing the great benefit of parallel corpus presence to obtain state-of-the-art text detoxification models for any language.

The proliferation of online toxic speech is a pertinent problem posing threats to demographic groups. While explicit toxic speech contains offensive lexical signals, implicit one consists of coded or indirect language. Therefore, it is crucial for models not only to detect implicit toxic speech but also to explain its toxicity. This draws a unique need for unified frameworks that can effectively detect and explain implicit toxic speech. Prior works mainly formulated the task of toxic speech detection and explanation as a text generation problem. Nonetheless, models trained using this strategy can be prone to suffer from the consequent error propagation problem. Moreover, our experiments reveal that the detection results of such models are much lower than those that focus only on the detection task. To bridge these gaps, we introduce ToXCL, a unified framework for the detection and explanation of implicit toxic speech. Our model consists of three modules: a (i) Target Group Generator to generate the targeted demographic group(s) of a given post; an (ii) Encoder-Decoder Model in which the encoder focuses on detecting implicit toxic speech and is boosted by a (iii) Teacher Classifier via knowledge distillation, and the decoder generates the necessary explanation. ToXCL achieves new state-of-the-art effectiveness, and outperforms baselines significantly.

Despite remarkable advances that large language models have achieved in chatbots, maintaining a non-toxic user-AI interactive environment has become increasingly critical nowadays. However, previous efforts in toxicity detection have been mostly based on benchmarks derived from social media content, leaving the unique challenges inherent to real-world user-AI interactions insufficiently explored. In this work, we introduce ToxicChat, a novel benchmark based on real user queries from an open-source chatbot. This benchmark contains the rich, nuanced phenomena that can be tricky for current toxicity detection models to identify, revealing a significant domain difference compared to social media content. Our systematic evaluation of models trained on existing toxicity datasets has shown their shortcomings when applied to this unique domain of ToxicChat. Our work illuminates the potentially overlooked challenges of toxicity detection in real-world user-AI conversations. In the future, ToxicChat can be a valuable resource to drive further advancements toward building a safe and healthy environment for user-AI interactions.

In recent years, the widespread use of social media has led to an increase in the generation of toxic and offensive content on online platforms. In response, social media platforms have worked on developing automatic detection methods and employing human moderators to cope with this deluge of offensive content. While various state-of-the-art statistical models have been applied to detect toxic posts, there are only a few studies that focus on detecting the words or expressions that make a post offensive. This motivates the organization of the SemEval-2021 Task 5: Toxic Spans Detection competition, which has provided participants with a dataset containing toxic spans annotation in English posts. In this paper, we present the WLV-RIT entry for the SemEval-2021 Task 5. Our best performing neural transformer model achieves an 0.68 F1-Score. Furthermore, we develop an open-source framework for multilingual detection of offensive spans, i.e., MUDES, based on neural transformers that detect toxic spans in texts.

During the development of large language models (LLMs), pre-training data play a critical role in shaping LLMs' capabilities. In recent years several large-scale and high-quality pre-training datasets have been released to accelerate the research of LLMs, including ChineseWebText1.0, C4, Pile, WanJuan, MAPCC and others. However, as LLMs continue to evolve, focus has increasingly shifted to domain-specific capabilities and safety concerns, making those previous coarse-grained texts insufficient for meeting training requirements. Furthermore, fine-grained information, such as quality, domain and toxicity, is becoming increasingly important in building powerful and reliable LLMs for various scenarios. To address these challenges, in this paper we propose a new tool-chain called MDFG-tool for constructing large-scale and high-quality Chinese datasets with multi-dimensional and fine-grained information. First, we employ manually crafted rules to discard explicit noisy texts from raw contents. Second, the quality evaluation model, domain classifier, and toxicity evaluation model are well-designed to assess the remaining cleaned data respectively. Finally, we integrate these three types of fine-grained information for each text. With this approach, we release the largest, high-quality and fine-grained Chinese text ChineseWebText2.0, which consists of 3.8TB and each text is associated with a quality score, domain labels, a toxicity label and a toxicity score, facilitating the LLM researchers to select data based on various types of fine-grained information. The data, codes and the tool-chain are available on this website https://github.com/CASIA-LM/ChineseWebText-2.0

To ensure safe usage, Large Language Models (LLMs) typically undergo alignment with human-defined values. However, this alignment often relies on primarily English data and is biased towards Western-centric values, limiting its effectiveness in low-resource language settings. In this paper, we describe our approach for aligning SEA-Lion-v2.1-Instruct (a Llama3-8B variant) to minimize toxicity in Singlish, an English creole specific to Singapore. We find that supervised fine-tuning and Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO) on paired and unpaired preferences is more sample efficient and yields significantly better results than Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Our analysis reveals that DPO implicitly enforces a weaker safety objective than KTO, and that SFT complements KTO by improving training stability. Finally, we introduce a simple but novel modification to KTO, KTO-S, which improves training stability through better gradient exploitation. Overall, we present a general approach for safety alignment conducive to low-resource English languages, successfully reducing toxicity by 99\% on our Singlish benchmark, with gains generalizing to the broader TOXIGEN dataset while maintaining strong performance across standard LLM benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to a variety of risks, from non-faithful output to biased and toxic generations. Due to several limiting factors surrounding LLMs (training cost, API access, data availability, etc.), it may not always be feasible to impose direct safety constraints on a deployed model. Therefore, an efficient and reliable alternative is required. To this end, we present our ongoing efforts to create and deploy a library of detectors: compact and easy-to-build classification models that provide labels for various harms. In addition to the detectors themselves, we discuss a wide range of uses for these detector models - from acting as guardrails to enabling effective AI governance. We also deep dive into inherent challenges in their development and discuss future work aimed at making the detectors more reliable and broadening their scope.

This paper investigates the propagation of harmful information in multilingual large language models (LLMs) and evaluates the efficacy of various unlearning methods. We demonstrate that fake information, regardless of the language it is in, once introduced into these models through training data, can spread across different languages, compromising the integrity and reliability of the generated content. Our findings reveal that standard unlearning techniques, which typically focus on English data, are insufficient in mitigating the spread of harmful content in multilingual contexts and could inadvertently reinforce harmful content across languages. We show that only by addressing harmful responses in both English and the original language of the harmful data can we effectively eliminate generations for all languages. This underscores the critical need for comprehensive unlearning strategies that consider the multilingual nature of modern LLMs to enhance their safety and reliability across diverse linguistic landscapes.

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

In this paper, we present JADE, a targeted linguistic fuzzing platform which strengthens the linguistic complexity of seed questions to simultaneously and consistently break a wide range of widely-used LLMs categorized in three groups: eight open-sourced Chinese, six commercial Chinese and four commercial English LLMs. JADE generates three safety benchmarks for the three groups of LLMs, which contain unsafe questions that are highly threatening: the questions simultaneously trigger harmful generation of multiple LLMs, with an average unsafe generation ratio of 70% (please see the table below), while are still natural questions, fluent and preserving the core unsafe semantics. We release the benchmark demos generated for commercial English LLMs and open-sourced English LLMs in the following link: https://github.com/whitzard-ai/jade-db. For readers who are interested in evaluating on more questions generated by JADE, please contact us. JADE is based on Noam Chomsky's seminal theory of transformational-generative grammar. Given a seed question with unsafe intention, JADE invokes a sequence of generative and transformational rules to increment the complexity of the syntactic structure of the original question, until the safety guardrail is broken. Our key insight is: Due to the complexity of human language, most of the current best LLMs can hardly recognize the invariant evil from the infinite number of different syntactic structures which form an unbound example space that can never be fully covered. Technically, the generative/transformative rules are constructed by native speakers of the languages, and, once developed, can be used to automatically grow and transform the parse tree of a given question, until the guardrail is broken. For more evaluation results and demo, please check our website: https://whitzard-ai.github.io/jade.html.

Large language models (LLMs) have become integral to our professional workflows and daily lives. Nevertheless, these machine companions of ours have a critical flaw: the huge amount of data which endows them with vast and diverse knowledge, also exposes them to the inevitable toxicity and bias. While most LLMs incorporate defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of harmful content, these safeguards can be easily bypassed with minimal prompt engineering. In this paper, we introduce the new Thoroughly Engineered Toxicity (TET) dataset, comprising manually crafted prompts designed to nullify the protective layers of such models. Through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate the pivotal role of TET in providing a rigorous benchmark for evaluation of toxicity awareness in several popular LLMs: it highlights the toxicity in the LLMs that might remain hidden when using normal prompts, thus revealing subtler issues in their behavior.

Driven by the goal of eradicating language barriers on a global scale, machine translation has solidified itself as a key focus of artificial intelligence research today. However, such efforts have coalesced around a small subset of languages, leaving behind the vast majority of mostly low-resource languages. What does it take to break the 200 language barrier while ensuring safe, high quality results, all while keeping ethical considerations in mind? In No Language Left Behind, we took on this challenge by first contextualizing the need for low-resource language translation support through exploratory interviews with native speakers. Then, we created datasets and models aimed at narrowing the performance gap between low and high-resource languages. More specifically, we developed a conditional compute model based on Sparsely Gated Mixture of Experts that is trained on data obtained with novel and effective data mining techniques tailored for low-resource languages. We propose multiple architectural and training improvements to counteract overfitting while training on thousands of tasks. Critically, we evaluated the performance of over 40,000 different translation directions using a human-translated benchmark, Flores-200, and combined human evaluation with a novel toxicity benchmark covering all languages in Flores-200 to assess translation safety. Our model achieves an improvement of 44% BLEU relative to the previous state-of-the-art, laying important groundwork towards realizing a universal translation system. Finally, we open source all contributions described in this work, accessible at https://github.com/facebookresearch/fairseq/tree/nllb.

Traditional toxicity detection models have focused on the single utterance level without deeper understanding of context. We introduce CONDA, a new dataset for in-game toxic language detection enabling joint intent classification and slot filling analysis, which is the core task of Natural Language Understanding (NLU). The dataset consists of 45K utterances from 12K conversations from the chat logs of 1.9K completed Dota 2 matches. We propose a robust dual semantic-level toxicity framework, which handles utterance and token-level patterns, and rich contextual chatting history. Accompanying the dataset is a thorough in-game toxicity analysis, which provides comprehensive understanding of context at utterance, token, and dual levels. Inspired by NLU, we also apply its metrics to the toxicity detection tasks for assessing toxicity and game-specific aspects. We evaluate strong NLU models on CONDA, providing fine-grained results for different intent classes and slot classes. Furthermore, we examine the coverage of toxicity nature in our dataset by comparing it with other toxicity datasets.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

With the proliferation of red-teaming strategies for Large Language Models (LLMs), the deficiency in the literature about improving the safety and robustness of LLM defense strategies is becoming increasingly pronounced. This paper introduces the LLM-based sentinel model as a plug-and-play prefix module designed to reconstruct the input prompt with just a few (<30) additional tokens, effectively reducing toxicity in responses from target LLMs. The sentinel model naturally overcomes the parameter inefficiency and limited model accessibility for fine-tuning large target models. We employ an interleaved training regimen using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) to optimize both red team and sentinel models dynamically, incorporating a value head-sharing mechanism inspired by the multi-agent centralized critic to manage the complex interplay between agents. Our extensive experiments across text-to-text and text-to-image demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating toxic outputs, even when dealing with larger models like Llama-2, GPT-3.5 and Stable-Diffusion, highlighting the potential of our framework in enhancing safety and robustness in various applications.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

The opacity in developing large language models (LLMs) is raising growing concerns about the potential contamination of public benchmarks in the pre-training data. Existing contamination detection methods are typically based on the text overlap between training and evaluation data, which can be too superficial to reflect deeper forms of contamination. In this paper, we first present a cross-lingual form of contamination that inflates LLMs' performance while evading current detection methods, deliberately injected by overfitting LLMs on the translated versions of benchmark test sets. Then, we propose generalization-based approaches to unmask such deeply concealed contamination. Specifically, we examine the LLM's performance change after modifying the original benchmark by replacing the false answer choices with correct ones from other questions. Contaminated models can hardly generalize to such easier situations, where the false choices can be not even wrong, as all choices are correct in their memorization. Experimental results demonstrate that cross-lingual contamination can easily fool existing detection methods, but not ours. In addition, we discuss the potential utilization of cross-lingual contamination in interpreting LLMs' working mechanisms and in post-training LLMs for enhanced multilingual capabilities. The code and dataset we use can be obtained from https://github.com/ShangDataLab/Deep-Contam.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

This paper explores the application of large language models (LLMs) in nursing and elderly care, focusing on AI-driven patient monitoring and interaction. We introduce a novel Chinese nursing dataset and implement incremental pre-training (IPT) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT) techniques to enhance LLM performance in specialized tasks. Using LangChain, we develop a dynamic nursing assistant capable of real-time care and personalized interventions. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements, paving the way for AI-driven solutions to meet the growing demands of healthcare in aging populations.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked widespread concerns about their safety. Recent work demonstrates that safety alignment of LLMs can be easily removed by fine-tuning with a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples, i.e., fine-tuning attacks. We take a further step to understand fine-tuning attacks in multilingual LLMs. We first discover cross-lingual generalization of fine-tuning attacks: using a few adversarially chosen instruction-following examples in one language, multilingual LLMs can also be easily compromised (e.g., multilingual LLMs fail to refuse harmful prompts in other languages). Motivated by this finding, we hypothesize that safety-related information is language-agnostic and propose a new method termed Safety Information Localization (SIL) to identify the safety-related information in the model parameter space. Through SIL, we validate this hypothesis and find that only changing 20% of weight parameters in fine-tuning attacks can break safety alignment across all languages. Furthermore, we provide evidence to the alternative pathways hypothesis for why freezing safety-related parameters does not prevent fine-tuning attacks, and we demonstrate that our attack vector can still jailbreak LLMs adapted to new languages.

With the rapid popularity of large language models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, a growing amount of attention is paid to their safety concerns. These models may generate insulting and discriminatory content, reflect incorrect social values, and may be used for malicious purposes such as fraud and dissemination of misleading information. Evaluating and enhancing their safety is particularly essential for the wide application of large language models (LLMs). To further promote the safe deployment of LLMs, we develop a Chinese LLM safety assessment benchmark. Our benchmark explores the comprehensive safety performance of LLMs from two perspectives: 8 kinds of typical safety scenarios and 6 types of more challenging instruction attacks. Our benchmark is based on a straightforward process in which it provides the test prompts and evaluates the safety of the generated responses from the evaluated model. In evaluation, we utilize the LLM's strong evaluation ability and develop it as a safety evaluator by prompting. On top of this benchmark, we conduct safety assessments and analyze 15 LLMs including the OpenAI GPT series and other well-known Chinese LLMs, where we observe some interesting findings. For example, we find that instruction attacks are more likely to expose safety issues of all LLMs. Moreover, to promote the development and deployment of safe, responsible, and ethical AI, we publicly release SafetyPrompts including 100k augmented prompts and responses by LLMs.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) are shown to easily generate toxic language. In this work, we systematically explore domain-adaptive training to reduce the toxicity of language models. We conduct this study on three dimensions: training corpus, model size, and parameter efficiency. For the training corpus, we propose to leverage the generative power of LMs and generate nontoxic datasets for domain-adaptive training, which mitigates the exposure bias and is shown to be more data-efficient than using a curated pre-training corpus. We demonstrate that the self-generation method consistently outperforms the existing baselines across various model sizes on both automatic and human evaluations, even when it uses a 1/3 smaller training corpus. We then comprehensively study detoxifying LMs with parameter sizes ranging from 126M up to 530B (3x larger than GPT-3), a scale that has never been studied before. We find that i) large LMs have similar toxicity levels as smaller ones given the same pre-training corpus, and ii) large LMs require more endeavor to detoxify. We also explore parameter-efficient training methods for detoxification. We demonstrate that adding and training adapter-only layers in LMs not only saves a lot of parameters but also achieves a better trade-off between toxicity and perplexity than whole model adaptation for the large-scale models.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, have gained significant attention due to their impressive natural language processing capabilities. It is crucial to prioritize human-centered principles when utilizing these models. Safeguarding the ethical and moral compliance of LLMs is of utmost importance. However, individual ethical issues have not been well studied on the latest LLMs. Therefore, this study aims to address these gaps by introducing a new benchmark -- TrustGPT. TrustGPT provides a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs in three crucial areas: toxicity, bias, and value-alignment. Initially, TrustGPT examines toxicity in language models by employing toxic prompt templates derived from social norms. It then quantifies the extent of bias in models by measuring quantifiable toxicity values across different groups. Lastly, TrustGPT assesses the value of conversation generation models from both active value-alignment and passive value-alignment tasks. Through the implementation of TrustGPT, this research aims to enhance our understanding of the performance of conversation generation models and promote the development of language models that are more ethical and socially responsible.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has not only provided numerous opportunities but also presented significant challenges. This becomes particularly evident when LLMs inadvertently generate harmful or toxic content, either unintentionally or because of intentional inducement. Existing alignment methods usually direct LLMs toward the favorable outcomes by utilizing human-annotated, flawless instruction-response pairs. Conversely, this study proposes a novel alignment technique based on mistake analysis, which deliberately exposes LLMs to erroneous content to learn the reasons for mistakes and how to avoid them. In this case, mistakes are repurposed into valuable data for alignment, effectively helping to avoid the production of erroneous responses. Without external models or human annotations, our method leverages a model's intrinsic ability to discern undesirable mistakes and improves the safety of its generated responses. Experimental results reveal that our method outperforms existing alignment approaches in enhancing model safety while maintaining the overall utility.

Disclaimer: Samples in this paper may be harmful and cause discomfort! Patronizing and condescending language (PCL) is a form of speech directed at vulnerable groups. As an essential branch of toxic language, this type of language exacerbates conflicts and confrontations among Internet communities and detrimentally impacts disadvantaged groups. Traditional pre-trained language models (PLMs) perform poorly in detecting PCL due to its implicit toxicity traits like hypocrisy and false sympathy. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), we can harness their rich emotional semantics to establish a paradigm for exploring implicit toxicity. In this paper, we introduce PclGPT, a comprehensive LLM benchmark designed specifically for PCL. We collect, annotate, and integrate the Pcl-PT/SFT dataset, and then develop a bilingual PclGPT-EN/CN model group through a comprehensive pre-training and supervised fine-tuning staircase process to facilitate implicit toxic detection. Group detection results and fine-grained detection from PclGPT and other models reveal significant variations in the degree of bias in PCL towards different vulnerable groups, necessitating increased societal attention to protect them.

Language model detoxification aims to minimize the risk of generating offensive or harmful content in pretrained language models (PLMs) for safer deployment. Existing methods can be roughly categorized as finetuning-based and decoding-based. However, the former is often resource-intensive, while the latter relies on additional components and potentially compromises the generation fluency. In this paper, we propose a more lightweight approach that enables the PLM itself to achieve "self-detoxification". Our method is built upon the observation that prepending a negative steering prompt can effectively induce PLMs to generate toxic content. At the same time, we are inspired by the recent research in the interpretability field, which formulates the evolving contextualized representations within the PLM as an information stream facilitated by the attention layers. Drawing on this idea, we devise a method to identify the toxification direction from the normal generation process to the one prompted with the negative prefix, and then steer the generation to the reversed direction by manipulating the information movement within the attention layers. Experimental results show that our approach, without any fine-tuning or extra components, can achieve comparable performance with state-of-the-art methods.

We introduce the first study of automatic detoxification of Russian texts to combat offensive language. Such a kind of textual style transfer can be used, for instance, for processing toxic content in social media. While much work has been done for the English language in this field, it has never been solved for the Russian language yet. We test two types of models - unsupervised approach based on BERT architecture that performs local corrections and supervised approach based on pretrained language GPT-2 model - and compare them with several baselines. In addition, we describe evaluation setup providing training datasets and metrics for automatic evaluation. The results show that the tested approaches can be successfully used for detoxification, although there is room for improvement.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) across various regions underscores the urgent need to evaluate their alignment with human values. Current benchmarks, however, fall short of effectively uncovering safety vulnerabilities in LLMs. Despite numerous models achieving high scores and 'topping the chart' in these evaluations, there is still a significant gap in LLMs' deeper alignment with human values and achieving genuine harmlessness. To this end, this paper proposes a value alignment benchmark named Flames, which encompasses both common harmlessness principles and a unique morality dimension that integrates specific Chinese values such as harmony. Accordingly, we carefully design adversarial prompts that incorporate complex scenarios and jailbreaking methods, mostly with implicit malice. By prompting 17 mainstream LLMs, we obtain model responses and rigorously annotate them for detailed evaluation. Our findings indicate that all the evaluated LLMs demonstrate relatively poor performance on Flames, particularly in the safety and fairness dimensions. We also develop a lightweight specified scorer capable of scoring LLMs across multiple dimensions to efficiently evaluate new models on the benchmark. The complexity of Flames has far exceeded existing benchmarks, setting a new challenge for contemporary LLMs and highlighting the need for further alignment of LLMs. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/AIFlames/Flames.

Large Language Models (LLMs) possess the potential to exert substantial influence on public perceptions and interactions with information. This raises concerns about the societal impact that could arise if the ideologies within these models can be easily manipulated. In this work, we investigate how effectively LLMs can learn and generalize ideological biases from their instruction-tuning data. Our findings reveal a concerning vulnerability: exposure to only a small amount of ideologically driven samples significantly alters the ideology of LLMs. Notably, LLMs demonstrate a startling ability to absorb ideology from one topic and generalize it to even unrelated ones. The ease with which LLMs' ideologies can be skewed underscores the risks associated with intentionally poisoned training data by malicious actors or inadvertently introduced biases by data annotators. It also emphasizes the imperative for robust safeguards to mitigate the influence of ideological manipulations on LLMs.

When building Large Language Models (LLMs), it is paramount to bear safety in mind and protect them with guardrails. Indeed, LLMs should never generate content promoting or normalizing harmful, illegal, or unethical behavior that may contribute to harm to individuals or society. This principle applies to both normal and adversarial use. In response, we introduce ALERT, a large-scale benchmark to assess safety based on a novel fine-grained risk taxonomy. It is designed to evaluate the safety of LLMs through red teaming methodologies and consists of more than 45k instructions categorized using our novel taxonomy. By subjecting LLMs to adversarial testing scenarios, ALERT aims to identify vulnerabilities, inform improvements, and enhance the overall safety of the language models. Furthermore, the fine-grained taxonomy enables researchers to perform an in-depth evaluation that also helps one to assess the alignment with various policies. In our experiments, we extensively evaluate 10 popular open- and closed-source LLMs and demonstrate that many of them still struggle to attain reasonable levels of safety.

As the influence of large language models (LLMs) spans across global communities, their safety challenges in multilingual settings become paramount for alignment research. This paper examines the variations in safety challenges faced by LLMs across different languages and discusses approaches to alleviating such concerns. By comparing how state-of-the-art LLMs respond to the same set of malicious prompts written in higher- vs. lower-resource languages, we observe that (1) LLMs tend to generate unsafe responses much more often when a malicious prompt is written in a lower-resource language, and (2) LLMs tend to generate more irrelevant responses to malicious prompts in lower-resource languages. To understand where the discrepancy can be attributed, we study the effect of instruction tuning with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) or supervised finetuning (SFT) on the HH-RLHF dataset. Surprisingly, while training with high-resource languages improves model alignment, training in lower-resource languages yields minimal improvement. This suggests that the bottleneck of cross-lingual alignment is rooted in the pretraining stage. Our findings highlight the challenges in cross-lingual LLM safety, and we hope they inform future research in this direction.

Text detoxification aims to minimize the risk of language models producing toxic content. Existing detoxification methods of directly constraining the model output or further training the model on the non-toxic corpus fail to achieve a decent balance between detoxification effectiveness and generation quality. This issue stems from the neglect of constrain imposed by the context since language models are designed to generate output that closely matches the context while detoxification methods endeavor to ensure the safety of the output even if it semantically deviates from the context. In view of this, we introduce a Context-aware Model self-Detoxification~(CMD) framework that pays attention to both the context and the detoxification process, i.e., first detoxifying the context and then making the language model generate along the safe context. Specifically, CMD framework involves two phases: utilizing language models to synthesize data and applying these data for training. We also introduce a toxic contrastive loss that encourages the model generation away from the negative toxic samples. Experiments on various LLMs have verified the effectiveness of our MSD framework, which can yield the best performance compared to baselines.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

Recent developments in balancing the usefulness and safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raised a critical question: Are mainstream NLP tasks adequately aligned with safety consideration? Our study, focusing on safety-sensitive documents obtained through adversarial attacks, reveals significant disparities in the safety alignment of various NLP tasks. For instance, LLMs can effectively summarize malicious long documents but often refuse to translate them. This discrepancy highlights a previously unidentified vulnerability: attacks exploiting tasks with weaker safety alignment, like summarization, can potentially compromise the integraty of tasks traditionally deemed more robust, such as translation and question-answering (QA). Moreover, the concurrent use of multiple NLP tasks with lesser safety alignment increases the risk of LLMs inadvertently processing harmful content. We demonstrate these vulnerabilities in various safety-aligned LLMs, particularly Llama2 models and GPT-4, indicating an urgent need for strengthening safety alignments across a broad spectrum of NLP tasks.

We propose a method to control the attributes of Language Models (LMs) for the text generation task using Causal Average Treatment Effect (ATE) scores and counterfactual augmentation. We explore this method, in the context of LM detoxification, and propose the Causally Fair Language (CFL) architecture for detoxifying pre-trained LMs in a plug-and-play manner. Our architecture is based on a Structural Causal Model (SCM) that is mathematically transparent and computationally efficient as compared with many existing detoxification techniques. We also propose several new metrics that aim to better understand the behaviour of LMs in the context of toxic text generation. Further, we achieve state of the art performance for toxic degeneration, which are computed using \RTP (RTP) benchmark. Our experiments show that CFL achieves such a detoxification without much impact on the model perplexity. We also show that CFL mitigates the unintended bias problem through experiments on the BOLD dataset.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Large language models (LM) generate remarkably fluent text and can be efficiently adapted across NLP tasks. Measuring and guaranteeing the quality of generated text in terms of safety is imperative for deploying LMs in the real world; to this end, prior work often relies on automatic evaluation of LM toxicity. We critically discuss this approach, evaluate several toxicity mitigation strategies with respect to both automatic and human evaluation, and analyze consequences of toxicity mitigation in terms of model bias and LM quality. We demonstrate that while basic intervention strategies can effectively optimize previously established automatic metrics on the RealToxicityPrompts dataset, this comes at the cost of reduced LM coverage for both texts about, and dialects of, marginalized groups. Additionally, we find that human raters often disagree with high automatic toxicity scores after strong toxicity reduction interventions -- highlighting further the nuances involved in careful evaluation of LM toxicity.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Large language models (LLMs) are renowned for their exceptional capabilities, and applying to a wide range of applications. However, this widespread use brings significant vulnerabilities. Also, it is well observed that there are huge gap which lies in the need for effective detection and mitigation strategies against malicious prompt injection attacks in large language models, as current approaches may not adequately address the complexity and evolving nature of these vulnerabilities in real-world applications. Therefore, this work focuses the impact of malicious prompt injection attacks which is one of most dangerous vulnerability on real LLMs applications. It examines to apply various BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers) like multilingual BERT, DistilBert for classifying malicious prompts from legitimate prompts. Also, we observed how tokenizing the prompt texts and generating embeddings using multilingual BERT contributes to improve the performance of various machine learning methods: Gaussian Naive Bayes, Random Forest, Support Vector Machine, and Logistic Regression. The performance of each model is rigorously analyzed with various parameters to improve the binary classification to discover malicious prompts. Multilingual BERT approach to embed the prompts significantly improved and outperformed the existing works and achieves an outstanding accuracy of 96.55% by Logistic regression. Additionally, we investigated the incorrect predictions of the model to gain insights into its limitations. The findings can guide researchers in tuning various BERT for finding the most suitable model for diverse LLMs vulnerabilities.

Backdoor attacks, which maliciously control a well-trained model's outputs of the instances with specific triggers, are recently shown to be serious threats to the safety of reusing deep neural networks (DNNs). In this work, we propose an efficient online defense mechanism based on robustness-aware perturbations. Specifically, by analyzing the backdoor training process, we point out that there exists a big gap of robustness between poisoned and clean samples. Motivated by this observation, we construct a word-based robustness-aware perturbation to distinguish poisoned samples from clean samples to defend against the backdoor attacks on natural language processing (NLP) models. Moreover, we give a theoretical analysis about the feasibility of our robustness-aware perturbation-based defense method. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and toxic detection tasks show that our method achieves better defending performance and much lower computational costs than existing online defense methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/RAP.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

The risk of harmful content generated by large language models (LLMs) becomes a critical concern. This paper presents a systematic study on assessing and improving LLMs' capability to perform the task of course-correction, \ie, the model can steer away from generating harmful content autonomously. To start with, we introduce the C^2-Eval benchmark for quantitative assessment and analyze 10 popular LLMs, revealing varying proficiency of current safety-tuned LLMs in course-correction. To improve, we propose fine-tuning LLMs with preference learning, emphasizing the preference for timely course-correction. Using an automated pipeline, we create C^2-Syn, a synthetic dataset with 750K pairwise preferences, to teach models the concept of timely course-correction through data-driven preference learning. Experiments on 2 LLMs, Llama2-Chat 7B and Qwen2 7B, show that our method effectively enhances course-correction skills without affecting general performance. Additionally, it effectively improves LLMs' safety, particularly in resisting jailbreak attacks.

Recent advancements in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) have significantly impacted the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs). The sensitivity of reinforcement learning algorithms such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) has led to new line work on Direct Policy Optimization (DPO), which treats RLHF in a supervised learning framework. The increased practical use of these RLHF methods warrants an analysis of their vulnerabilities. In this work, we investigate the vulnerabilities of DPO to poisoning attacks under different scenarios and compare the effectiveness of preference poisoning, a first of its kind. We comprehensively analyze DPO's vulnerabilities under different types of attacks, i.e., backdoor and non-backdoor attacks, and different poisoning methods across a wide array of language models, i.e., LLama 7B, Mistral 7B, and Gemma 7B. We find that unlike PPO-based methods, which, when it comes to backdoor attacks, require at least 4\% of the data to be poisoned to elicit harmful behavior, we exploit the true vulnerabilities of DPO more simply so we can poison the model with only as much as 0.5\% of the data. We further investigate the potential reasons behind the vulnerability and how well this vulnerability translates into backdoor vs non-backdoor attacks.