Daily Papers

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become more prevalent, concerns about their safety, ethics, and potential biases have risen. Systematically evaluating LLMs' risk decision-making tendencies and attitudes, particularly in the ethical domain, has become crucial. This study innovatively applies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale from cognitive science to LLMs and proposes a novel Ethical Decision-Making Risk Attitude Scale (EDRAS) to assess LLMs' ethical risk attitudes in depth. We further propose a novel approach integrating risk scales and role-playing to quantitatively evaluate systematic biases in LLMs. Through systematic evaluation and analysis of multiple mainstream LLMs, we assessed the "risk personalities" of LLMs across multiple domains, with a particular focus on the ethical domain, and revealed and quantified LLMs' systematic biases towards different groups. This research helps understand LLMs' risk decision-making and ensure their safe and reliable application. Our approach provides a tool for identifying and mitigating biases, contributing to fairer and more trustworthy AI systems. The code and data are available.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular tool to control the risk of uncertain outcomes and ensure reliable performance in various sequential decision-making problems. While policy gradient methods have been developed for risk-sensitive RL, it remains unclear if these methods enjoy the same global convergence guarantees as in the risk-neutral case. In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic time-consistent risk measures, called Expected Conditional Risk Measures (ECRMs), and derive policy gradient updates for ECRM-based objective functions. Under both constrained direct parameterization and unconstrained softmax parameterization, we provide global convergence and iteration complexities of the corresponding risk-averse policy gradient algorithms. We further test risk-averse variants of REINFORCE and actor-critic algorithms to demonstrate the efficacy of our method and the importance of risk control.

Risk-sensitive reinforcement learning (RL) aims to optimize policies that balance the expected reward and risk. In this paper, we present a novel risk-sensitive RL framework that employs an Iterated Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) objective under both linear and general function approximations, enriched by human feedback. These new formulations provide a principled way to guarantee safety in each decision making step throughout the control process. Moreover, integrating human feedback into risk-sensitive RL framework bridges the gap between algorithmic decision-making and human participation, allowing us to also guarantee safety for human-in-the-loop systems. We propose provably sample-efficient algorithms for this Iterated CVaR RL and provide rigorous theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we establish a matching lower bound to corroborate the optimality of our algorithms in a linear context.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

The robustness of legged locomotion is crucial for quadrupedal robots in challenging terrains. Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has shown promising results in legged locomotion and various methods try to integrate privileged distillation, scene modeling, and external sensors to improve the generalization and robustness of locomotion policies. However, these methods are hard to handle uncertain scenarios such as abrupt terrain changes or unexpected external forces. In this paper, we consider a novel risk-sensitive perspective to enhance the robustness of legged locomotion. Specifically, we employ a distributional value function learned by quantile regression to model the aleatoric uncertainty of environments, and perform risk-averse policy learning by optimizing the worst-case scenarios via a risk distortion measure. Extensive experiments in both simulation environments and a real Aliengo robot demonstrate that our method is efficient in handling various external disturbances, and the resulting policy exhibits improved robustness in harsh and uncertain situations in legged locomotion. Videos are available at https://risk-averse-locomotion.github.io/.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

Growth in the penetration of renewable energy sources makes supply more uncertain and leads to an increase in the system imbalance. This trend, together with the single imbalance pricing, opens an opportunity for balance responsible parties (BRPs) to perform energy arbitrage in the imbalance settlement mechanism. To this end, we propose a battery control framework based on distributional reinforcement learning (DRL). Our proposed control framework takes a risk-sensitive perspective, allowing BRPs to adjust their risk preferences: we aim to optimize a weighted sum of the arbitrage profit and a risk measure while constraining the daily number of cycles for the battery. We assess the performance of our proposed control framework using the Belgian imbalance prices of 2022 and compare two state-of-the-art RL methods, deep Q learning and soft actor-critic. Results reveal that the distributional soft actor-critic method can outperform other methods. Moreover, we note that our fully risk-averse agent appropriately learns to hedge against the risk related to the unknown imbalance price by (dis)charging the battery only when the agent is more certain about the price.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

In this paper, we study risk-sensitive Reinforcement Learning (RL), focusing on the objective of Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) with risk tolerance tau. Starting with multi-arm bandits (MABs), we show the minimax CVaR regret rate is Omega(tau^{-1AK}), where A is the number of actions and K is the number of episodes, and that it is achieved by an Upper Confidence Bound algorithm with a novel Bernstein bonus. For online RL in tabular Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), we show a minimax regret lower bound of Omega(tau^{-1SAK}) (with normalized cumulative rewards), where S is the number of states, and we propose a novel bonus-driven Value Iteration procedure. We show that our algorithm achieves the optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1SAK}) under a continuity assumption and in general attains a near-optimal regret of widetilde O(tau^{-1}SAK), which is minimax-optimal for constant tau. This improves on the best available bounds. By discretizing rewards appropriately, our algorithms are computationally efficient.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

Excellent tail performance is crucial for modern machine learning tasks, such as algorithmic fairness, class imbalance, and risk-sensitive decision making, as it ensures the effective handling of challenging samples within a dataset. Tail performance is also a vital determinant of success for personalized recommender systems to reduce the risk of losing users with low satisfaction. This study introduces a "safe" collaborative filtering method that prioritizes recommendation quality for less-satisfied users rather than focusing on the average performance. Our approach minimizes the conditional value at risk (CVaR), which represents the average risk over the tails of users' loss. To overcome computational challenges for web-scale recommender systems, we develop a robust yet practical algorithm that extends the most scalable method, implicit alternating least squares (iALS). Empirical evaluation on real-world datasets demonstrates the excellent tail performance of our approach while maintaining competitive computational efficiency.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

In this paper, we focus on the task of conditional image generation, where an image is synthesized according to user instructions. The critical challenge underpinning this task is ensuring both the fidelity of the generated images and their semantic alignment with the provided conditions. To tackle this issue, previous studies have employed supervised perceptual losses derived from pre-trained models, i.e., reward models, to enforce alignment between the condition and the generated result. However, we observe one inherent shortcoming: considering the diversity of synthesized images, the reward model usually provides inaccurate feedback when encountering newly generated data, which can undermine the training process. To address this limitation, we propose an uncertainty-aware reward modeling, called Ctrl-U, including uncertainty estimation and uncertainty-aware regularization, designed to reduce the adverse effects of imprecise feedback from the reward model. Given the inherent cognitive uncertainty within reward models, even images generated under identical conditions often result in a relatively large discrepancy in reward loss. Inspired by the observation, we explicitly leverage such prediction variance as an uncertainty indicator. Based on the uncertainty estimation, we regularize the model training by adaptively rectifying the reward. In particular, rewards with lower uncertainty receive higher loss weights, while those with higher uncertainty are given reduced weights to allow for larger variability. The proposed uncertainty regularization facilitates reward fine-tuning through consistency construction. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our methodology in improving the controllability and generation quality, as well as its scalability across diverse conditional scenarios. Code will soon be available at https://grenoble-zhang.github.io/Ctrl-U-Page/.

The optimized certainty equivalent (OCE) is a family of risk measures that cover important examples such as entropic risk, conditional value-at-risk and mean-variance models. In this paper, we propose a new episodic risk-sensitive reinforcement learning formulation based on tabular Markov decision processes with recursive OCEs. We design an efficient learning algorithm for this problem based on value iteration and upper confidence bound. We derive an upper bound on the regret of the proposed algorithm, and also establish a minimax lower bound. Our bounds show that the regret rate achieved by our proposed algorithm has optimal dependence on the number of episodes and the number of actions.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

Designing an optimum portfolio for allocating suitable weights to its constituent assets so that the return and risk associated with the portfolio are optimized is a computationally hard problem. The seminal work of Markowitz that attempted to solve the problem by estimating the future returns of the stocks is found to perform sub-optimally on real-world stock market data. This is because the estimation task becomes extremely challenging due to the stochastic and volatile nature of stock prices. This work illustrates three approaches to portfolio design minimizing the risk, optimizing the risk, and assigning equal weights to the stocks of a portfolio. Thirteen critical sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India are first chosen. Three portfolios are designed following the above approaches choosing the top ten stocks from each sector based on their free-float market capitalization. The portfolios are designed using the historical prices of the stocks from Jan 1, 2017, to Dec 31, 2022. The portfolios are evaluated on the stock price data from Jan 1, 2022, to Dec 31, 2022. The performances of the portfolios are compared, and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.

We consider the distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problem with spectral risk-based uncertainty set and f-divergence penalty. This formulation includes common risk-sensitive learning objectives such as regularized condition value-at-risk (CVaR) and average top-k loss. We present Prospect, a stochastic gradient-based algorithm that only requires tuning a single learning rate hyperparameter, and prove that it enjoys linear convergence for smooth regularized losses. This contrasts with previous algorithms that either require tuning multiple hyperparameters or potentially fail to converge due to biased gradient estimates or inadequate regularization. Empirically, we show that Prospect can converge 2-3times faster than baselines such as stochastic gradient and stochastic saddle-point methods on distribution shift and fairness benchmarks spanning tabular, vision, and language domains.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

In this work, we explore the possibility of utilizing transfer learning techniques to address the financial portfolio optimization problem. We introduce a novel concept called "transfer risk", within the optimization framework of transfer learning. A series of numerical experiments are conducted from three categories: cross-continent transfer, cross-sector transfer, and cross-frequency transfer. In particular, 1. a strong correlation between the transfer risk and the overall performance of transfer learning methods is established, underscoring the significance of transfer risk as a viable indicator of "transferability"; 2. transfer risk is shown to provide a computationally efficient way to identify appropriate source tasks in transfer learning, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer learning approach; 3. additionally, the numerical experiments offer valuable new insights for portfolio management across these different settings.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

Dueling bandits is a prominent framework for decision-making involving preferential feedback, a valuable feature that fits various applications involving human interaction, such as ranking, information retrieval, and recommendation systems. While substantial efforts have been made to minimize the cumulative regret in dueling bandits, a notable gap in the current research is the absence of regret bounds that account for the inherent uncertainty in pairwise comparisons between the dueling arms. Intuitively, greater uncertainty suggests a higher level of difficulty in the problem. To bridge this gap, this paper studies the problem of contextual dueling bandits, where the binary comparison of dueling arms is generated from a generalized linear model (GLM). We propose a new SupLinUCB-type algorithm that enjoys computational efficiency and a variance-aware regret bound tilde Obig(dsum_{t=1^Tsigma_t^2} + dbig), where sigma_t is the variance of the pairwise comparison in round t, d is the dimension of the context vectors, and T is the time horizon. Our regret bound naturally aligns with the intuitive expectation in scenarios where the comparison is deterministic, the algorithm only suffers from an tilde O(d) regret. We perform empirical experiments on synthetic data to confirm the advantage of our method over previous variance-agnostic algorithms.

Conventional wisdom suggests that neural network predictions tend to be unpredictable and overconfident when faced with out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs. Our work reassesses this assumption for neural networks with high-dimensional inputs. Rather than extrapolating in arbitrary ways, we observe that neural network predictions often tend towards a constant value as input data becomes increasingly OOD. Moreover, we find that this value often closely approximates the optimal constant solution (OCS), i.e., the prediction that minimizes the average loss over the training data without observing the input. We present results showing this phenomenon across 8 datasets with different distributional shifts (including CIFAR10-C and ImageNet-R, S), different loss functions (cross entropy, MSE, and Gaussian NLL), and different architectures (CNNs and transformers). Furthermore, we present an explanation for this behavior, which we first validate empirically and then study theoretically in a simplified setting involving deep homogeneous networks with ReLU activations. Finally, we show how one can leverage our insights in practice to enable risk-sensitive decision-making in the presence of OOD inputs.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants have become increasingly popular for aligning language models with human preferences. These methods aim to teach models to better distinguish between chosen (or preferred) and rejected (or dispreferred) responses. However, prior research has identified that the probability of chosen responses often decreases during training, and this phenomenon is known as likelihood displacement. To tackle this challenge, in this work we introduce \method to controllably shift the distribution of the chosen probability. Then, we show that \method exhibits a fundamental trade-off between improving the chosen probability and sacrificing the reward margin, as supported by both theoretical analysis and experimental validation. Furthermore, we demonstrate the superiority of \method over DPO on downstream tasks such as MT-Bench and a designed win rate experiment. We believe this study shows that the likelihood displacement issue of DPO can be effectively mitigated with a simple, theoretically grounded solution. Our code is available at https://github.com/Meaquadddd/DPO-Shift.

We study risk-sensitive Reinforcement Learning (RL), where we aim to maximize the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) with a fixed risk tolerance tau. Prior theoretical work studying risk-sensitive RL focuses on the tabular Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) setting. To extend CVaR RL to settings where state space is large, function approximation must be deployed. We study CVaR RL in low-rank MDPs with nonlinear function approximation. Low-rank MDPs assume the underlying transition kernel admits a low-rank decomposition, but unlike prior linear models, low-rank MDPs do not assume the feature or state-action representation is known. We propose a novel Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) bonus-driven algorithm to carefully balance the interplay between exploration, exploitation, and representation learning in CVaR RL. We prove that our algorithm achieves a sample complexity of Oleft(H^7 A^2 d^4{tau^2 epsilon^2}right) to yield an epsilon-optimal CVaR, where H is the length of each episode, A is the capacity of action space, and d is the dimension of representations. Computational-wise, we design a novel discretized Least-Squares Value Iteration (LSVI) algorithm for the CVaR objective as the planning oracle and show that we can find the near-optimal policy in a polynomial running time with a Maximum Likelihood Estimation oracle. To our knowledge, this is the first provably efficient CVaR RL algorithm in low-rank MDPs.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Robust Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and risk-sensitive MDPs are both powerful tools for making decisions in the presence of uncertainties. Previous efforts have aimed to establish their connections, revealing equivalences in specific formulations. This paper introduces a new formulation for risk-sensitive MDPs, which assesses risk in a slightly different manner compared to the classical Markov risk measure (Ruszczy\'nski 2010), and establishes its equivalence with a class of regularized robust MDP (RMDP) problems, including the standard RMDP as a special case. Leveraging this equivalence, we further derive the policy gradient theorem for both problems, proving gradient domination and global convergence of the exact policy gradient method under the tabular setting with direct parameterization. This forms a sharp contrast to the Markov risk measure, known to be potentially non-gradient-dominant (Huang et al. 2021). We also propose a sample-based offline learning algorithm, namely the robust fitted-Z iteration (RFZI), for a specific regularized RMDP problem with a KL-divergence regularization term (or equivalently the risk-sensitive MDP with an entropy risk measure). We showcase its streamlined design and less stringent assumptions due to the equivalence and analyze its sample complexity.

This paper argues that fully autonomous AI agents should not be developed. In support of this position, we build from prior scientific literature and current product marketing to delineate different AI agent levels and detail the ethical values at play in each, documenting trade-offs in potential benefits and risks. Our analysis reveals that risks to people increase with the autonomy of a system: The more control a user cedes to an AI agent, the more risks to people arise. Particularly concerning are safety risks, which affect human life and impact further values.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Portfolio optimization has been a broad and intense area of interest for quantitative and statistical finance researchers and financial analysts. It is a challenging task to design a portfolio of stocks to arrive at the optimized values of the return and risk. This paper presents an algorithmic approach for designing optimum risk and eigen portfolios for five thematic sectors of the NSE of India. The prices of the stocks are extracted from the web from Jan 1, 2016, to Dec 31, 2020. Optimum risk and eigen portfolios for each sector are designed based on ten critical stocks from the sector. An LSTM model is designed for predicting future stock prices. Seven months after the portfolios were formed, on Aug 3, 2021, the actual returns of the portfolios are compared with the LSTM-predicted returns. The predicted and the actual returns indicate a very high-level accuracy of the LSTM model.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

Preference based Reinforcement Learning (PbRL) removes the need to hand specify a reward function by learning a reward from preference feedback over policy behaviors. Current approaches to PbRL do not address the credit assignment problem inherent in determining which parts of a behavior most contributed to a preference, which result in data intensive approaches and subpar reward functions. We address such limitations by introducing a credit assignment strategy (Hindsight PRIOR) that uses a world model to approximate state importance within a trajectory and then guides rewards to be proportional to state importance through an auxiliary predicted return redistribution objective. Incorporating state importance into reward learning improves the speed of policy learning, overall policy performance, and reward recovery on both locomotion and manipulation tasks. For example, Hindsight PRIOR recovers on average significantly (p<0.05) more reward on MetaWorld (20%) and DMC (15%). The performance gains and our ablations demonstrate the benefits even a simple credit assignment strategy can have on reward learning and that state importance in forward dynamics prediction is a strong proxy for a state's contribution to a preference decision. Code repository can be found at https://github.com/apple/ml-rlhf-hindsight-prior.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Most bandit algorithms assume that the reward variances or their upper bounds are known, and that they are the same for all arms. This naturally leads to suboptimal performance and higher regret due to variance overestimation. On the other hand, underestimated reward variances may lead to linear regret due to committing early to a suboptimal arm. This motivated prior works on variance-adaptive frequentist algorithms, which have strong instance-dependent regret bounds but cannot incorporate prior knowledge on reward variances. We lay foundations for the Bayesian setting, which incorporates prior knowledge. This results in lower regret in practice, due to using the prior in the algorithm design, and also improved regret guarantees. Specifically, we study Gaussian bandits with {unknown heterogeneous reward variances}, and develop a Thompson sampling algorithm with prior-dependent Bayes regret bounds. We achieve lower regret with lower reward variances and more informative priors on them, which is precisely why we pay only for what is uncertain. This is the first result of its kind. Finally, we corroborate our theory with extensive experiments, which show the superiority of our variance-adaptive Bayesian algorithm over prior frequentist approaches. We also show that our approach is robust to model misspecification and can be applied with estimated priors.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated great promise in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preference. Depending on the availability of preference data, both online and offline RLHF are active areas of investigation. A key bottleneck is understanding how to incorporate uncertainty estimation in the reward function learned from the preference data for RLHF, regardless of how the preference data is collected. While the principles of optimism or pessimism under uncertainty are well-established in standard reinforcement learning (RL), a practically-implementable and theoretically-grounded form amenable to large language models is not yet available, as standard techniques for constructing confidence intervals become intractable under arbitrary policy parameterizations. In this paper, we introduce a unified approach to online and offline RLHF -- value-incentivized preference optimization (VPO) -- which regularizes the maximum-likelihood estimate of the reward function with the corresponding value function, modulated by a sign to indicate whether the optimism or pessimism is chosen. VPO also directly optimizes the policy with implicit reward modeling, and therefore shares a simpler RLHF pipeline similar to direct preference optimization. Theoretical guarantees of VPO are provided for both online and offline settings, matching the rates of their standard RL counterparts. Moreover, experiments on text summarization and dialog verify the practicality and effectiveness of VPO.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Counterfactual Risk Minimization (CRM) is a framework for dealing with the logged bandit feedback problem, where the goal is to improve a logging policy using offline data. In this paper, we explore the case where it is possible to deploy learned policies multiple times and acquire new data. We extend the CRM principle and its theory to this scenario, which we call "Sequential Counterfactual Risk Minimization (SCRM)." We introduce a novel counterfactual estimator and identify conditions that can improve the performance of CRM in terms of excess risk and regret rates, by using an analysis similar to restart strategies in accelerated optimization methods. We also provide an empirical evaluation of our method in both discrete and continuous action settings, and demonstrate the benefits of multiple deployments of CRM.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

This paper introduces a novel approach to financial risk analysis that does not rely on traditional price and market data, instead using market news to model assets as distributions over a metric space of risk factors. By representing asset returns as integrals over the scalar field of these risk factors, we derive the covariance structure between asset returns. Utilizing encoder-only language models to embed this news data, we explore the relationships between asset return distributions through the concept of Energy Distance, establishing connections between distributional differences and excess returns co-movements. This data-agnostic approach provides new insights into portfolio diversification, risk management, and the construction of hedging strategies. Our findings have significant implications for both theoretical finance and practical risk management, offering a more robust framework for modelling complex financial systems without depending on conventional market data.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

We develop a variant of the stochastic prox-linear method for minimizing the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) objective. CVaR is a risk measure focused on minimizing worst-case performance, defined as the average of the top quantile of the losses. In machine learning, such a risk measure is useful to train more robust models. Although the stochastic subgradient method (SGM) is a natural choice for minimizing the CVaR objective, we show that our stochastic prox-linear (SPL+) algorithm can better exploit the structure of the objective, while still providing a convenient closed form update. Our SPL+ method also adapts to the scaling of the loss function, which allows for easier tuning. We then specialize a general convergence theorem for SPL+ to our setting, and show that it allows for a wider selection of step sizes compared to SGM. We support this theoretical finding experimentally.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

We study Pareto optimality in multi-objective multi-armed bandit by providing a formulation of adversarial multi-objective multi-armed bandit and defining its Pareto regrets that can be applied to both stochastic and adversarial settings. The regrets do not rely on any scalarization functions and reflect Pareto optimality compared to scalarized regrets. We also present new algorithms assuming both with and without prior information of the multi-objective multi-armed bandit setting. The algorithms are shown optimal in adversarial settings and nearly optimal up to a logarithmic factor in stochastic settings simultaneously by our established upper bounds and lower bounds on Pareto regrets. Moreover, the lower bound analyses show that the new regrets are consistent with the existing Pareto regret for stochastic settings and extend an adversarial attack mechanism from bandit to the multi-objective one.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Portfolio management is an essential component of investment strategy that aims to maximize returns while minimizing risk. This paper explores several portfolio management strategies, including asset allocation, diversification, active management, and risk management, and their importance in optimizing portfolio performance. These strategies are examined individually and in combination to demonstrate how they can help investors maximize alpha and minimize beta. Asset allocation is the process of dividing a portfolio among different asset classes to achieve the desired level of risk and return. Diversification involves spreading investments across different securities and sectors to minimize the impact of individual security or sector-specific risks. Active management involves security selection and risk management techniques to generate excess returns while minimizing losses. Risk management strategies, such as stop-loss orders and options strategies, aim to minimize losses in adverse market conditions. The importance of combining these strategies for optimizing portfolio performance is emphasized in this paper. The proper implementation of these strategies can help investors achieve their investment goals over the long-term, while minimizing exposure to risks. A call to action for investors to utilize portfolio management strategies to maximize alpha and minimize beta is also provided.

There has been a recent surge in interest in the application of artificial intelligence to automated trading. Reinforcement learning has been applied to single- and multi-instrument use cases, such as market making or portfolio management. This paper proposes a new approach to framing cryptocurrency market making as a reinforcement learning challenge by introducing an event-based environment wherein an event is defined as a change in price greater or less than a given threshold, as opposed to by tick or time-based events (e.g., every minute, hour, day, etc.). Two policy-based agents are trained to learn a market making trading strategy using eight days of training data and evaluate their performance using 30 days of testing data. Limit order book data recorded from Bitmex exchange is used to validate this approach, which demonstrates improved profit and stability compared to a time-based approach for both agents when using a simple multi-layer perceptron neural network for function approximation and seven different reward functions.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Machine learning models are often trained to predict the outcome resulting from a human decision. For example, if a doctor decides to test a patient for disease, will the patient test positive? A challenge is that historical decision-making determines whether the outcome is observed: we only observe test outcomes for patients doctors historically tested. Untested patients, for whom outcomes are unobserved, may differ from tested patients along observed and unobserved dimensions. We propose a Bayesian model class which captures this setting. The purpose of the model is to accurately estimate risk for both tested and untested patients. Estimating this model is challenging due to the wide range of possibilities for untested patients. To address this, we propose two domain constraints which are plausible in health settings: a prevalence constraint, where the overall disease prevalence is known, and an expertise constraint, where the human decision-maker deviates from purely risk-based decision-making only along a constrained feature set. We show theoretically and on synthetic data that domain constraints improve parameter inference. We apply our model to a case study of cancer risk prediction, showing that the model's inferred risk predicts cancer diagnoses, its inferred testing policy captures known public health policies, and it can identify suboptimalities in test allocation. Though our case study is in healthcare, our analysis reveals a general class of domain constraints which can improve model estimation in many settings.

In many applications of Reinforcement Learning (RL), it is critically important that the algorithm performs safely, such that instantaneous hard constraints are satisfied at each step, and unsafe states and actions are avoided. However, existing algorithms for ''safe'' RL are often designed under constraints that either require expected cumulative costs to be bounded or assume all states are safe. Thus, such algorithms could violate instantaneous hard constraints and traverse unsafe states (and actions) in practice. Therefore, in this paper, we develop the first near-optimal safe RL algorithm for episodic Markov Decision Processes with unsafe states and actions under instantaneous hard constraints and the linear mixture model. It not only achieves a regret O(d H^3 sqrt{dK}{Delta_c}) that tightly matches the state-of-the-art regret in the setting with only unsafe actions and nearly matches that in the unconstrained setting, but is also safe at each step, where d is the feature-mapping dimension, K is the number of episodes, H is the number of steps in each episode, and Delta_c is a safety-related parameter. We also provide a lower bound Omega(max{dH K, H{Delta_c^2}}), which indicates that the dependency on Delta_c is necessary. Further, both our algorithm design and regret analysis involve several novel ideas, which may be of independent interest.

When facing data with imbalanced classes or groups, practitioners follow an intriguing strategy to achieve best results. They throw away examples until the classes or groups are balanced in size, and then perform empirical risk minimization on the reduced training set. This opposes common wisdom in learning theory, where the expected error is supposed to decrease as the dataset grows in size. In this work, we leverage extreme value theory to address this apparent contradiction. Our results show that the tails of the data distribution play an important role in determining the worst-group-accuracy of linear classifiers. When learning on data with heavy tails, throwing away data restores the geometric symmetry of the resulting classifier, and therefore improves its worst-group generalization.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Iterative preference learning, though yielding superior performances, requires online annotated preference labels. In this work, we study strategies to select worth-annotating response pairs for cost-efficient annotation while achieving competitive or even better performances compared with the random selection baseline for iterative preference learning. Built on assumptions regarding uncertainty and distribution shifts, we propose a comparative view to rank the implicit reward margins as predicted by DPO to select the response pairs that yield more benefits. Through extensive experiments, we show that annotating those response pairs with small margins is generally better than large or random, under both single- and multi-iteration scenarios. Besides, our empirical results suggest allocating more annotation budgets in the earlier iterations rather than later across multiple iterations.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

We introduce distributional dynamic programming (DP) methods for optimizing statistical functionals of the return distribution, with standard reinforcement learning as a special case. Previous distributional DP methods could optimize the same class of expected utilities as classic DP. To go beyond expected utilities, we combine distributional DP with stock augmentation, a technique previously introduced for classic DP in the context of risk-sensitive RL, where the MDP state is augmented with a statistic of the rewards obtained so far (since the first time step). We find that a number of recently studied problems can be formulated as stock-augmented return distribution optimization, and we show that we can use distributional DP to solve them. We analyze distributional value and policy iteration, with bounds and a study of what objectives these distributional DP methods can or cannot optimize. We describe a number of applications outlining how to use distributional DP to solve different stock-augmented return distribution optimization problems, for example maximizing conditional value-at-risk, and homeostatic regulation. To highlight the practical potential of stock-augmented return distribution optimization and distributional DP, we combine the core ideas of distributional value iteration with the deep RL agent DQN, and empirically evaluate it for solving instances of the applications discussed.

In order to solve a task using reinforcement learning, it is necessary to first formalise the goal of that task as a reward function. However, for many real-world tasks, it is very difficult to manually specify a reward function that never incentivises undesirable behaviour. As a result, it is increasingly popular to use reward learning algorithms, which attempt to learn a reward function from data. However, the theoretical foundations of reward learning are not yet well-developed. In particular, it is typically not known when a given reward learning algorithm with high probability will learn a reward function that is safe to optimise. This means that reward learning algorithms generally must be evaluated empirically, which is expensive, and that their failure modes are difficult to anticipate in advance. One of the roadblocks to deriving better theoretical guarantees is the lack of good methods for quantifying the difference between reward functions. In this paper we provide a solution to this problem, in the form of a class of pseudometrics on the space of all reward functions that we call STARC (STAndardised Reward Comparison) metrics. We show that STARC metrics induce both an upper and a lower bound on worst-case regret, which implies that our metrics are tight, and that any metric with the same properties must be bilipschitz equivalent to ours. Moreover, we also identify a number of issues with reward metrics proposed by earlier works. Finally, we evaluate our metrics empirically, to demonstrate their practical efficacy. STARC metrics can be used to make both theoretical and empirical analysis of reward learning algorithms both easier and more principled.

We consider two data driven approaches, Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Deep Trajectory-based Stochastic Optimal Control (DTSOC) for hedging a European call option without and with transaction cost according to a quadratic hedging P&L objective at maturity ("variance-optimal hedging" or "final quadratic hedging"). We study the performance of the two approaches under various market environments (modeled via the Black-Scholes and/or the log-normal SABR model) to understand their advantages and limitations. Without transaction costs and in the Black-Scholes model, both approaches match the performance of the variance-optimal Delta hedge. In the log-normal SABR model without transaction costs, they match the performance of the variance-optimal Barlett's Delta hedge. Agents trained on Black-Scholes trajectories with matching initial volatility but used on SABR trajectories match the performance of Bartlett's Delta hedge in average cost, but show substantially wider variance. To apply RL approaches to these problems, P&L at maturity is written as sum of step-wise contributions and variants of RL algorithms are implemented and used that minimize expectation of second moments of such sums.

Accurate prediction of future prices of stocks is a difficult task to perform. Even more challenging is to design an optimized portfolio with weights allocated to the stocks in a way that optimizes its return and the risk. This paper presents a systematic approach towards building two types of portfolios, optimum risk, and eigen, for four critical economic sectors of India. The prices of the stocks are extracted from the web from Jan 1, 2016, to Dec 31, 2020. Sector-wise portfolios are built based on their ten most significant stocks. An LSTM model is also designed for predicting future stock prices. Six months after the construction of the portfolios, i.e., on Jul 1, 2021, the actual returns and the LSTM-predicted returns for the portfolios are computed. A comparison of the predicted and the actual returns indicate a high accuracy level of the LSTM model.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become a key method for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences through the use of reward models. However, traditional reward models typically generate point estimates, which oversimplify the diversity and complexity of human values and preferences. In this paper, we introduce Quantile Reward Models (QRMs), a novel approach to reward modeling that learns a distribution over rewards instead of a single scalar value. Our method uses quantile regression to estimate a full, potentially multimodal distribution over preferences, providing a more powerful and nuanced representation of preferences. This distributional approach can better capture the diversity of human values, addresses label noise, and accommodates conflicting preferences by modeling them as distinct modes in the distribution. Our experimental results show that QRM outperforms comparable traditional point-estimate models on RewardBench. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the additional information provided by the distributional estimates can be utilized in downstream applications, such as risk-aware reinforcement learning, resulting in LLM policies that generate fewer extremely negative responses. Our code and model are released at https://github.com/Nicolinho/QRM.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a popular paradigm for aligning models with human intent. Typically RLHF algorithms operate in two phases: first, use human preferences to learn a reward function and second, align the model by optimizing the learned reward via reinforcement learning (RL). This paradigm assumes that human preferences are distributed according to reward, but recent work suggests that they instead follow the regret under the user's optimal policy. Thus, learning a reward function from feedback is not only based on a flawed assumption of human preference, but also leads to unwieldy optimization challenges that stem from policy gradients or bootstrapping in the RL phase. Because of these optimization challenges, contemporary RLHF methods restrict themselves to contextual bandit settings (e.g., as in large language models) or limit observation dimensionality (e.g., state-based robotics). We overcome these limitations by introducing a new family of algorithms for optimizing behavior from human feedback using the regret-based model of human preferences. Using the principle of maximum entropy, we derive Contrastive Preference Learning (CPL), an algorithm for learning optimal policies from preferences without learning reward functions, circumventing the need for RL. CPL is fully off-policy, uses only a simple contrastive objective, and can be applied to arbitrary MDPs. This enables CPL to elegantly scale to high-dimensional and sequential RLHF problems while being simpler than prior methods.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

Cryptocurrencies have evolved into an important asset class, providing a variety of benefits. However, they also present significant risks, such as market volatility and the potential for misuse in illegal activities. These risks underline the urgent need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure consumer protection, market integrity, and financial stability. Yet, the global landscape of cryptocurrency regulation remains complex, marked by substantial variations in regulatory frameworks among different countries. This paper aims to study these differences by investigating the regulatory landscapes across various jurisdictions. We first discuss regulatory challenges and considerations, and then conduct a comparative analysis of international regulatory stances, approaches, and measures. We hope our study offers practical insights to enhance the understanding of global trends in cryptocurrency regulation.

Dynamic treatment regimes (DTRs) are personalized, adaptive, multi-stage treatment plans that adapt treatment decisions both to an individual's initial features and to intermediate outcomes and features at each subsequent stage, which are affected by decisions in prior stages. Examples include personalized first- and second-line treatments of chronic conditions like diabetes, cancer, and depression, which adapt to patient response to first-line treatment, disease progression, and individual characteristics. While existing literature mostly focuses on estimating the optimal DTR from offline data such as from sequentially randomized trials, we study the problem of developing the optimal DTR in an online manner, where the interaction with each individual affect both our cumulative reward and our data collection for future learning. We term this the DTR bandit problem. We propose a novel algorithm that, by carefully balancing exploration and exploitation, is guaranteed to achieve rate-optimal regret when the transition and reward models are linear. We demonstrate our algorithm and its benefits both in synthetic experiments and in a case study of adaptive treatment of major depressive disorder using real-world data.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

We consider a combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem for maximum value reward function under maximum value and index feedback. This is a new feedback structure that lies in between commonly studied semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback structures. We propose an algorithm and provide a regret bound for problem instances with stochastic arm outcomes according to arbitrary distributions with finite supports. The regret analysis rests on considering an extended set of arms, associated with values and probabilities of arm outcomes, and applying a smoothness condition. Our algorithm achieves a O((k/Delta)log(T)) distribution-dependent and a O(T) distribution-independent regret where k is the number of arms selected in each round, Delta is a distribution-dependent reward gap and T is the horizon time. Perhaps surprisingly, the regret bound is comparable to previously-known bound under more informative semi-bandit feedback. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm through experimental results.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

We consider a resource-aware variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem: In each round, the learner selects an arm and determines a resource limit. It then observes a corresponding (random) reward, provided the (random) amount of consumed resources remains below the limit. Otherwise, the observation is censored, i.e., no reward is obtained. For this problem setting, we introduce a measure of regret, which incorporates the actual amount of allocated resources of each learning round as well as the optimality of realizable rewards. Thus, to minimize regret, the learner needs to set a resource limit and choose an arm in such a way that the chance to realize a high reward within the predefined resource limit is high, while the resource limit itself should be kept as low as possible. We propose a UCB-inspired online learning algorithm, which we analyze theoretically in terms of its regret upper bound. In a simulation study, we show that our learning algorithm outperforms straightforward extensions of standard multi-armed bandit algorithms.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

In this report, we survey Bayesian Optimization methods focussed on the Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. We take the help of the paper "Portfolio Allocation for Bayesian Optimization". We report a small literature survey on the acquisition functions and the types of portfolio strategies used in papers discussing Bayesian Optimization. We also replicate the experiments and report our findings and compare them to the results in the paper. Code link: https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1GZ14klEDoe3dcBeZKo5l8qqrKf_GmBDn?usp=sharing#scrollTo=XgIBau3O45_V.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a branch of machine learning that has been used in a variety of applications such as robotics, game playing, and autonomous systems. In recent years, there has been growing interest in applying RL to quantitative trading, where the goal is to make profitable trades in financial markets. This paper explores the use of RL in quantitative trading and presents a case study of a RL-based trading algorithm. The results show that RL can be a powerful tool for quantitative trading, and that it has the potential to outperform traditional trading algorithms. The use of reinforcement learning in quantitative trading represents a promising area of research that can potentially lead to the development of more sophisticated and effective trading systems. Future work could explore the use of alternative reinforcement learning algorithms, incorporate additional data sources, and test the system on different asset classes. Overall, our research demonstrates the potential of using reinforcement learning in quantitative trading and highlights the importance of continued research and development in this area. By developing more sophisticated and effective trading systems, we can potentially improve the efficiency of financial markets and generate greater returns for investors.

Security is an essential cornerstone of functioning digital marketplaces and communities. If users doubt that data shared online will remain secure, they will withdraw from platforms. Even when firms take these risks seriously, security expertise is expensive and vulnerabilities are diverse in nature. Increasingly, firms and governments are turning to bug bounty programs (BBPs) to crowdsource their cybersecurity, in which they pay individuals for reporting vulnerabilities in their systems. And while the use of BBPs has grown significantly in recent years, research on the actors in this market and their incentives remains limited. Using the lens of transaction cost economics, this paper examines the incentives of firms and researchers (sometimes called hackers) participating in BBPs. We study the crucial role that centralized platforms that organize BBPs play in this emerging market. We carry out an analysis of the HackerOne BBP platform, using a novel dataset on over 14,000 researchers reporting over 125,000 public vulnerabilities to over 500 firms from 2014 to the end of 2021. We outline how platforms like HackerOne make a market for information security vulnerabilities by reducing information asymmetries and their associated transaction costs.

In dynamic programming (DP) and reinforcement learning (RL), an agent learns to act optimally in terms of expected long-term return by sequentially interacting with its environment modeled by a Markov decision process (MDP). More generally in distributional reinforcement learning (DRL), the focus is on the whole distribution of the return, not just its expectation. Although DRL-based methods produced state-of-the-art performance in RL with function approximation, they involve additional quantities (compared to the non-distributional setting) that are still not well understood. As a first contribution, we introduce a new class of distributional operators, together with a practical DP algorithm for policy evaluation, that come with a robust MDP interpretation. Indeed, our approach reformulates through an augmented state space where each state is split into a worst-case substate and a best-case substate, whose values are maximized by safe and risky policies respectively. Finally, we derive distributional operators and DP algorithms solving a new control task: How to distinguish safe from risky optimal actions in order to break ties in the space of optimal policies?

There has been considerable recent interest in scoring properties on the basis of eviction risk. The success of methods for eviction prediction is typically evaluated using different measures of predictive accuracy. However, the underlying goal of such prediction is to direct appropriate assistance to households that may be at greater risk so they remain stably housed. Thus, we must ask the question of how useful such predictions are in targeting outreach efforts - informing action. In this paper, we investigate this question using a novel dataset that matches information on properties, evictions, and owners. We perform an eviction prediction task to produce risk scores and then use these risk scores to plan targeted outreach policies. We show that the risk scores are, in fact, useful, enabling a theoretical team of caseworkers to reach more eviction-prone properties in the same amount of time, compared to outreach policies that are either neighborhood-based or focus on buildings with a recent history of evictions. We also discuss the importance of neighborhood and ownership features in both risk prediction and targeted outreach.

We consider learning in an adversarial Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the loss functions can change arbitrarily over K episodes and the state space can be arbitrarily large. We assume that the Q-function of any policy is linear in some known features, that is, a linear function approximation exists. The best existing regret upper bound for this setting (Luo et al., 2021) is of order mathcal O(K^{2/3}) (omitting all other dependencies), given access to a simulator. This paper provides two algorithms that improve the regret to mathcal O(sqrt K) in the same setting. Our first algorithm makes use of a refined analysis of the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm with the log-barrier regularizer. This analysis allows the loss estimators to be arbitrarily negative and might be of independent interest. Our second algorithm develops a magnitude-reduced loss estimator, further removing the polynomial dependency on the number of actions in the first algorithm and leading to the optimal regret bound (up to logarithmic terms and dependency on the horizon). Moreover, we also extend the first algorithm to simulator-free linear MDPs, which achieves mathcal O(K^{8/9}) regret and greatly improves over the best existing bound mathcal O(K^{14/15}). This algorithm relies on a better alternative to the Matrix Geometric Resampling procedure by Neu & Olkhovskaya (2020), which could again be of independent interest.

This research paper delves into the application of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) in asset-class agnostic portfolio optimization, integrating industry-grade methodologies with quantitative finance. At the heart of this integration is our robust framework that not only merges advanced DRL algorithms with modern computational techniques but also emphasizes stringent statistical analysis, software engineering and regulatory compliance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study integrating financial Reinforcement Learning with sim-to-real methodologies from robotics and mathematical physics, thus enriching our frameworks and arguments with this unique perspective. Our research culminates with the introduction of AlphaOptimizerNet, a proprietary Reinforcement Learning agent (and corresponding library). Developed from a synthesis of state-of-the-art (SOTA) literature and our unique interdisciplinary methodology, AlphaOptimizerNet demonstrates encouraging risk-return optimization across various asset classes with realistic constraints. These preliminary results underscore the practical efficacy of our frameworks. As the finance sector increasingly gravitates towards advanced algorithmic solutions, our study bridges theoretical advancements with real-world applicability, offering a template for ensuring safety and robust standards in this technologically driven future.

Simple regret is a natural and parameter-free performance criterion for pure exploration in multi-armed bandits yet is less popular than the probability of missing the best arm or an epsilon-good arm, perhaps due to lack of easy ways to characterize it. In this paper, we make significant progress on minimizing simple regret in both data-rich (Tge n) and data-poor regime (T le n) where n is the number of arms, and T is the number of samples. At its heart is our improved instance-dependent analysis of the well-known Sequential Halving (SH) algorithm, where we bound the probability of returning an arm whose mean reward is not within epsilon from the best (i.e., not epsilon-good) for any choice of epsilon>0, although epsilon is not an input to SH. Our bound not only leads to an optimal worst-case simple regret bound of n/T up to logarithmic factors but also essentially matches the instance-dependent lower bound for returning an epsilon-good arm reported by Katz-Samuels and Jamieson (2020). For the more challenging data-poor regime, we propose Bracketing SH (BSH) that enjoys the same improvement even without sampling each arm at least once. Our empirical study shows that BSH outperforms existing methods on real-world tasks.

Network systems form the foundation of modern society, playing a critical role in various applications. However, these systems are at significant risk of being adversely affected by unforeseen circumstances, such as disasters. Considering this, there is a pressing need for research to enhance the robustness of network systems. Recently, in reinforcement learning, the relationship between acquiring robustness and regularizing entropy has been identified. Additionally, imitation learning is used within this framework to reflect experts' behavior. However, there are no comprehensive studies on the use of a similar imitation framework for optimal transport on networks. Therefore, in this study, imitation-regularized optimal transport (I-OT) on networks was investigated. It encodes prior knowledge on the network by imitating a given prior distribution. The I-OT solution demonstrated robustness in terms of the cost defined on the network. Moreover, we applied the I-OT to a logistics planning problem using real data. We also examined the imitation and apriori risk information scenarios to demonstrate the usefulness and implications of the proposed method.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Deep Reinforcement Learning approaches to Online Portfolio Selection have grown in popularity in recent years. The sensitive nature of training Reinforcement Learning agents implies a need for extensive efforts in market representation, behavior objectives, and training processes, which have often been lacking in previous works. We propose a training and evaluation process to assess the performance of classical DRL algorithms for portfolio management. We found that most Deep Reinforcement Learning algorithms were not robust, with strategies generalizing poorly and degrading quickly during backtesting.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.