Daily Papers

We study neural network loss landscapes through the lens of mode connectivity, the observation that minimizers of neural networks retrieved via training on a dataset are connected via simple paths of low loss. Specifically, we ask the following question: are minimizers that rely on different mechanisms for making their predictions connected via simple paths of low loss? We provide a definition of mechanistic similarity as shared invariances to input transformations and demonstrate that lack of linear connectivity between two models implies they use dissimilar mechanisms for making their predictions. Relevant to practice, this result helps us demonstrate that naive fine-tuning on a downstream dataset can fail to alter a model's mechanisms, e.g., fine-tuning can fail to eliminate a model's reliance on spurious attributes. Our analysis also motivates a method for targeted alteration of a model's mechanisms, named connectivity-based fine-tuning (CBFT), which we analyze using several synthetic datasets for the task of reducing a model's reliance on spurious attributes.

Denoising diffusion models have recently gained prominence as powerful tools for a variety of image generation and manipulation tasks. Building on this, we propose a novel tool for real-time editing of images that provides users with fine-grained region-targeted supervision in addition to existing prompt-based controls. Our novel editing technique, termed Layered Diffusion Brushes, leverages prompt-guided and region-targeted alteration of intermediate denoising steps, enabling precise modifications while maintaining the integrity and context of the input image. We provide an editor based on Layered Diffusion Brushes modifications, which incorporates well-known image editing concepts such as layer masks, visibility toggles, and independent manipulation of layers; regardless of their order. Our system renders a single edit on a 512x512 image within 140 ms using a high-end consumer GPU, enabling real-time feedback and rapid exploration of candidate edits. We validated our method and editing system through a user study involving both natural images (using inversion) and generated images, showcasing its usability and effectiveness compared to existing techniques such as InstructPix2Pix and Stable Diffusion Inpainting for refining images. Our approach demonstrates efficacy across a range of tasks, including object attribute adjustments, error correction, and sequential prompt-based object placement and manipulation, demonstrating its versatility and potential for enhancing creative workflows.

The prevalent use of commercial and open-source diffusion models (DMs) for text-to-image generation prompts risk mitigation to prevent undesired behaviors. Existing concept erasing methods in academia are all based on full parameter or specification-based fine-tuning, from which we observe the following issues: 1) Generation alternation towards erosion: Parameter drift during target elimination causes alternations and potential deformations across all generations, even eroding other concepts at varying degrees, which is more evident with multi-concept erased; 2) Transfer inability & deployment inefficiency: Previous model-specific erasure impedes the flexible combination of concepts and the training-free transfer towards other models, resulting in linear cost growth as the deployment scenarios increase. To achieve non-invasive, precise, customizable, and transferable elimination, we ground our erasing framework on one-dimensional adapters to erase multiple concepts from most DMs at once across versatile erasing applications. The concept-SemiPermeable structure is injected as a Membrane (SPM) into any DM to learn targeted erasing, and meantime the alteration and erosion phenomenon is effectively mitigated via a novel Latent Anchoring fine-tuning strategy. Once obtained, SPMs can be flexibly combined and plug-and-play for other DMs without specific re-tuning, enabling timely and efficient adaptation to diverse scenarios. During generation, our Facilitated Transport mechanism dynamically regulates the permeability of each SPM to respond to different input prompts, further minimizing the impact on other concepts. Quantitative and qualitative results across ~40 concepts, 7 DMs and 4 erasing applications have demonstrated the superior erasing of SPM. Our code and pre-tuned SPMs will be available on the project page https://lyumengyao.github.io/projects/spm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed numerous fields by enabling advanced natural language interactions but remain susceptible to critical vulnerabilities, particularly jailbreak attacks. Current jailbreak techniques, while effective, often depend on input modifications, making them detectable and limiting their stealth and scalability. This paper presents Targeted Model Editing (TME), a novel white-box approach that bypasses safety filters by minimally altering internal model structures while preserving the model's intended functionalities. TME identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) embedded in model matrices, enabling malicious queries to bypass restrictions without input modifications. By analyzing distinct activation patterns between safe and unsafe queries, TME isolates and approximates SCTs through an optimization process. Implemented in the D-LLM framework, our method achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 84.86% on four mainstream open-source LLMs, maintaining high performance. Unlike existing methods, D-LLM eliminates the need for specific triggers or harmful response collections, offering a stealthier and more effective jailbreak strategy. This work reveals a covert and robust threat vector in LLM security and emphasizes the need for stronger safeguards in model safety alignment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) possess the potential to exert substantial influence on public perceptions and interactions with information. This raises concerns about the societal impact that could arise if the ideologies within these models can be easily manipulated. In this work, we investigate how effectively LLMs can learn and generalize ideological biases from their instruction-tuning data. Our findings reveal a concerning vulnerability: exposure to only a small amount of ideologically driven samples significantly alters the ideology of LLMs. Notably, LLMs demonstrate a startling ability to absorb ideology from one topic and generalize it to even unrelated ones. The ease with which LLMs' ideologies can be skewed underscores the risks associated with intentionally poisoned training data by malicious actors or inadvertently introduced biases by data annotators. It also emphasizes the imperative for robust safeguards to mitigate the influence of ideological manipulations on LLMs.

Prior work in parameter-modifying knowledge editing has shown that large-scale sequential editing leads to significant model degradation. In this paper, we study the reasons behind this and scale sequential knowledge editing to 10,000 sequential edits, while maintaining the downstream performance of the original model. We first show that locate-then-edit knowledge editing methods lead to overfitting on the edited facts. We also show that continuous knowledge editing using these methods leads to disproportionate growth in the norm of the edited matrix. We then provide a crucial insight into the inner workings of locate-then-edit methods. We show that norm-growth is a hidden trick employed by these methods that gives larger importance to the output activations produced from the edited layers. With this "importance hacking", the edited layers provide a much larger contributions to the model's output. To mitigate these issues, we present ENCORE - Early stopping and Norm-Constrained Robust knowledge Editing. ENCORE controls for overfitting and the disproportionate norm-growth to enable long-term sequential editing, where we are able to perform up to 10,000 sequential edits without loss of downstream performance. ENCORE is also 61% faster than MEMIT and 64% faster than AlphaEdit on Llama3-8B.

We present an approach to mitigating the risks of malicious image editing posed by large diffusion models. The key idea is to immunize images so as to make them resistant to manipulation by these models. This immunization relies on injection of imperceptible adversarial perturbations designed to disrupt the operation of the targeted diffusion models, forcing them to generate unrealistic images. We provide two methods for crafting such perturbations, and then demonstrate their efficacy. Finally, we discuss a policy component necessary to make our approach fully effective and practical -- one that involves the organizations developing diffusion models, rather than individual users, to implement (and support) the immunization process.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.