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byAK and the research community

Mar 12

The political ideology of conversational AI: Converging evidence on ChatGPT's pro-environmental, left-libertarian orientation

Conversational artificial intelligence (AI) disrupts how humans interact with technology. Recently, OpenAI introduced ChatGPT, a state-of-the-art dialogue model that can converse with its human counterparts with unprecedented capabilities. ChatGPT has witnessed tremendous attention from the media, academia, industry, and the general public, attracting more than a million users within days of its release. However, its explosive adoption for information search and as an automated decision aid underscores the importance to understand its limitations and biases. This paper focuses on one of democratic society's most important decision-making processes: political elections. Prompting ChatGPT with 630 political statements from two leading voting advice applications and the nation-agnostic political compass test in three pre-registered experiments, we uncover ChatGPT's pro-environmental, left-libertarian ideology. For example, ChatGPT would impose taxes on flights, restrict rent increases, and legalize abortion. In the 2021 elections, it would have voted most likely for the Greens both in Germany (B\"undnis 90/Die Gr\"unen) and in the Netherlands (GroenLinks). Our findings are robust when negating the prompts, reversing the order of the statements, varying prompt formality, and across languages (English, German, Dutch, and Spanish). We conclude by discussing the implications of politically biased conversational AI on society.

Large language models can consistently generate high-quality content for election disinformation operations

Advances in large language models have raised concerns about their potential use in generating compelling election disinformation at scale. This study presents a two-part investigation into the capabilities of LLMs to automate stages of an election disinformation operation. First, we introduce DisElect, a novel evaluation dataset designed to measure LLM compliance with instructions to generate content for an election disinformation operation in localised UK context, containing 2,200 malicious prompts and 50 benign prompts. Using DisElect, we test 13 LLMs and find that most models broadly comply with these requests; we also find that the few models which refuse malicious prompts also refuse benign election-related prompts, and are more likely to refuse to generate content from a right-wing perspective. Secondly, we conduct a series of experiments (N=2,340) to assess the "humanness" of LLMs: the extent to which disinformation operation content generated by an LLM is able to pass as human-written. Our experiments suggest that almost all LLMs tested released since 2022 produce election disinformation operation content indiscernible by human evaluators over 50% of the time. Notably, we observe that multiple models achieve above-human levels of humanness. Taken together, these findings suggest that current LLMs can be used to generate high-quality content for election disinformation operations, even in hyperlocalised scenarios, at far lower costs than traditional methods, and offer researchers and policymakers an empirical benchmark for the measurement and evaluation of these capabilities in current and future models.