json/Mishnah/Seder Nezikin/Mishnah Sanhedrin/English/merged.json

{
    "title": "Mishnah Sanhedrin",
    "language": "en",
    "versionTitle": "merged",
    "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Sanhedrin",
    "text": [
        [
            "Cases concerning <b>monetary law</b> are adjudicated <b>by three</b> judges. Cases concerning <b>robbery and</b> personal <b>injury</b> are adjudicated <b>by three</b> judges. Cases concerning <b>damage</b> that one is responsible for because he or his property caused the damage are adjudicated by three judges as well. Likewise, cases concerning payment for <b>half the damage,</b> which is paid in the event that an ox whose owner has not been warned that it gored more than two times gores another animal (see Exodus 21:35); cases concerning <b>payment of double</b> the principal by a thief who was caught stealing (see Exodus 22:3); <b>and</b> cases concerning <b>payment of four or five</b> times the principal by a thief who slaughtered or sold a stolen ox or a lamb (see Exodus 21:37) are all adjudicated <b>by three</b> judges. Cases concerning <b>one who rapes or one who seduces</b> a virgin girl, and must therefore pay the girl’s father fifty silver shekels (see Deuteronomy 22:29, Exodus 22:15); <b>and</b> cases concerning <b>a defamer</b> who falsely asserts that his wife was not a virgin when she married him, and brings false witnesses who testify that she committed adultery while betrothed to him and who must therefore pay the girl’s father one hundred silver shekels as well as receive lashes (see Deuteronomy 22:13–19): All of these are adjudicated <b>by three</b> judges; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> Cases concerning <b>a defamer</b> are adjudicated <b>by</b> a court of <b>twenty-three</b> judges, which is the type of court authorized to judge cases of capital law, <b>because</b> this case <b>includes</b> the possibility of becoming a case of <b>capital law.</b> The husband brings witnesses that his wife committed adultery. If she is found guilty, she is liable to receive the death penalty. This punishment applies to the witnesses if they are exposed as conspiring witnesses.",
            "Cases concerning the violation of prohibitions that render one liable to receive <b>lashes</b> are adjudicated <b>by three</b> judges. The Sages <b>stated in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:</b> Cases concerning lashes are adjudicated <b>by twenty-three</b> judges. The <b>intercalation of the month</b> is performed <b>by</b> a panel of <b>three</b> judges. The <b>intercalation of the year,</b> meaning the decision to add an extra month to the year when necessary, is also decided <b>by</b> a panel of <b>three</b> judges; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> The deliberations <b>begin with three</b> judges, <b>and they debate</b> the matter <b>with five</b> judges, <b>and they conclude</b> the matter <b>with seven</b> judges, due to the significance of the decision. <b>And</b> Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concedes that <b>if they concluded</b> the matter <b>with</b> only <b>three</b> judges, the intercalation is valid and it is <b>a leap</b> year.",
            "Both the <b>laying of hands by the Sages and the breaking of the heifer’s neck</b> in a case where a person was found murdered and it is not known who killed him (see Deuteronomy 21:1–9) are performed in front of a panel <b>of three</b> judges; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> These rituals are performed in front <b>of five</b> judges. Both <b><i>ḥalitza</i>,</b> the ritual through which the <i>yavam</i>, a surviving brother of a married man who died without sons, frees the <i>yevama</i>, the widow, of her levirate bond in a case where the <i>yavam</i> does not wish to marry the <i>yevama</i> (see Deuteronomy 25:5–10), <b>and the refusal</b> of a girl before reaching majority to remain married to the man to whom her mother or brother married her off, are performed before a court <b>of three</b> judges. The <i>halakha</i> concerning fruit of a fourth-year sapling and second-tithe produce is that they are to be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there. If this is impractical, the produce can be redeemed and the redemption money brought to Jerusalem, where it is used to purchase food and drink. Valuation of fruit of <b>a fourth-year sapling or second-tithe</b> produce in cases <b>where their value is not known</b> is performed <b>by three</b> judges. The valuation of <b>consecrated</b> property for purposes of redemption is performed <b>by three</b> judges, and <b>the valuations that are movable property</b> (see Leviticus 27:1–8) are performed <b>by three</b> judges. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: One of</b> the three judges must be <b>a priest.</b> <b>And the</b> valuation of consecrated <b>land</b> is performed by <b>nine</b> judges <b>and,</b> in addition, one <b>priest. And</b> the valuation of <b>a person</b> for the purpose of a vow is performed in <b>a similar manner to</b> that of land.",
            "Cases of <b>capital law</b> are judged <b>by twenty-three</b> judges. <b>An animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality</b> are judged <b>by twenty-three</b> judges, <b>as it is stated:</b> “And if a woman approaches any animal to lie with it, <b>you shall kill the woman and the animal”</b> (Leviticus 20:16), <b>and it states:</b> “And if a man lies with an animal, he shall be put to death <b>and you shall kill the animal”</b> (Leviticus 20:15). In cases of bestiality, the verse juxtaposes the execution of the animal to the execution of the person, and therefore the case of the animal is adjudicated in the same way as cases of capital law. Similarly, <b>an ox that is</b> to be <b>stoned</b> because it killed a person is judged <b>by twenty-three</b> judges, <b>as it is stated:</b> “But if the ox was wont to gore in time past, and warning has been given to its owner, but he did not guard it and it kills a man or a woman <b>the ox shall be stoned and also its owner shall be put to death”</b> (Exodus 21:29). From this verse it is derived that <b>just as</b> the manner of <b>the death of the owner, so is</b> the manner of <b>the death of the ox.</b> The same <i>halakha</i> applies in the case of <b>a wolf or a lion, a bear or a leopard, or a cheetah, or a snake</b> that killed a person: <b>Their death</b> is decreed <b>by twenty-three</b> judges. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says</b> these dangerous animals do not need to be brought to court; rather, <b>anyone who kills them first merits</b> the performance of a mitzva. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: Their death</b> is decreed <b>by twenty-three</b> judges.",
            "The court <b>judges</b> cases involving an entire <b>tribe</b> that sinned, <b>or a false prophet</b> (see Deuteronomy 18:20–22), <b>or a High Priest</b> who transgressed a prohibition that carries a possible death sentence, <b>only on the basis of a court of seventy-one</b> judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. <b>And</b> the king may <b>bring</b> the nation <b>out to an optional war,</b> i.e., a war that was not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, <b>only on the basis of a court of seventy-one</b> judges. <b>They may extend the city</b> of Jerusalem <b>or the courtyards</b> of the Temple <b>only on the basis of a court of seventy-one</b> judges. <b>And</b> they may <b>appoint</b> a lesser <b>Sanhedrin</b> of twenty-three judges <b>for the tribes only on the basis of a court of seventy-one</b> judges. A city <b>may be designated</b> as <b>an idolatrous city,</b> i.e., a city whose residents all practice idolatry, and therefore according to Torah law all the residents must be killed and the city must be destroyed (see Deuteronomy 13:13–19), <b>only in accordance with</b> the ruling of <b>a court of seventy-one</b> judges. Additionally, the court <b>may not designate</b> a city as <b>an idolatrous city</b> if it is <b>on the frontier,</b> close to the borders of Eretz Yisrael, <b>and three</b> adjoining cities may <b>not</b> be designated as idolatrous cities. <b>But</b> the court <b>may designate one</b> city, <b>or two</b> adjoining cities, as idolatrous cities.",
            "With regard to the number of judges in the different courts the mishna presents a halakhic midrash: The <b>Great Sanhedrin was</b> composed <b>of seventy-one</b> judges, <b>and a lesser</b> Sanhedrin was composed <b>of twenty-three. From where</b> is it derived <b>that the Great</b> Sanhedrin <b>was</b> composed <b>of seventy-one</b> judges? <b>As it is stated: “Gather Me seventy men of the Elders of Israel,</b> whom you know to be the Elders of the people and officers over them, and bring them into the Tent of Meeting, and they shall stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16), <b>and</b> together with <b>Moses at the head of</b> this body, there are a total of seventy-one. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Moses was indeed at the head of the body, but he is not counted as part of the group. Consequently, a future Great Sanhedrin modeled after these Elders is to be composed of <b>seventy</b> judges. <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>that a lesser</b> Sanhedrin <b>is</b> composed <b>of twenty-three</b> judges? <b>As it is stated: “And the congregation shall judge</b> between the assailant and the avenger…<b>and the congregation shall save</b> the manslayer from the hands of the avenger” (Numbers 35:24–25). Therefore, there must be <b>a congregation,</b> which consists of at least ten judges, that <b>judges</b> the accused and attempts to convict him, <b>and</b> there must be <b>a congregation,</b> also consisting of at least ten judges, which attempts to <b>save</b> the accused by finding him innocent. Together, <b>there are twenty</b> judges <b>here.</b> Before proceeding to derive the requirement for the final three judges, the mishna clarifies: <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>that a congregation</b> consists <b>of</b> at least <b>ten</b> men? <b>As it is stated</b> concerning the spies: <b>“How long shall I bear with this evil congregation</b> that keep complaining about me?” (Numbers 14:27) There were twelve spies; <b>excluding Joshua and Caleb,</b> who did not complain, there would be ten men who are called: A congregation. Accordingly, the verses describing a congregation that attempts to convict the accused and a congregation that attempts to acquit him together add up to twenty judges. <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>to bring three more</b> judges to the court? <b>From the implication of that</b> which <b>is stated: “You shall not follow a multitude to convict”</b> (Exodus 23:2), <b>I</b> would <b>derive that</b> I may not convict a person on the basis of a majority but <b>I should follow</b> the majority <b>to exonerate. If so, why is it stated</b> in the same verse: <b>“To incline after a multitude,”</b> from which it can be understood that the majority is followed in all cases? In order to resolve the apparent contradiction it must be explained: <b>Your inclination</b> after the majority <b>to exonerate is not like your inclination</b> after the majority <b>to convict. Your inclination</b> after the majority <b>to exonerate</b> can result in a verdict <b>by</b> a majority of <b>one</b> judge. But <b>your inclination</b> after the majority <b>to convict</b> a transgressor must be <b>by</b> a more decisive majority of at least <b>two.</b> Therefore, the court must have at least twenty-two judges. <b>And</b> since there is a principle that <b>a court may not</b> be composed of <b>an even</b> number of judges, as such a court may be unable to reach a decision, therefore <b>they add another one to them,</b> and <b>there are twenty-three</b> judges <b>here.</b> <b>And how many</b> men must <b>be in the city for</b> it <b>to be eligible for</b> a lesser <b>Sanhedrin? One hundred and twenty. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Two hundred and thirty, corresponding to the ministers of tens,</b> as outlined by Moses and Yitro in the wilderness (Exodus, chapter 18). That is to say, each member of the Sanhedrin can be viewed as a judge with responsibility for ten residents. If there are not enough men in the city to enable this calculation, it would not be honorable to appoint a Sanhedrin, as their members will each preside over less than the minimum of ten residents."
        ],
        [
            "The <b>High Priest judges</b> others if he is sufficiently wise, <b>and</b> others <b>judge him</b> when he transgresses. He <b>testifies</b> before the court <b>and</b> others <b>testify concerning him. He performs <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his brother’s widow <b>and</b> his brother <b>performs <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife; and</b> his brother <b>consummates levirate marriage with his wife. But he does not consummate levirate marriage</b> with his brother’s widow, <b>because it is prohibited for him to</b> marry <b>a widow</b> (see Leviticus 21:14), and can therefore never fulfill the mitzva of levirate marriage, as a <i>yevama</i> is by definition a widow. If a relative <b>of</b> the High Priest <b>dies, he does not follow the bier</b> carrying the corpse, since it is prohibited for the High Priest to become ritually impure even for immediate relatives (see Leviticus 21:11). <b>Rather,</b> once the members of the funeral procession <b>are concealed</b> from sight by turning onto another street, <b>he is revealed</b> on the street they departed, and when <b>they are revealed,</b> then <b>he is concealed, and</b> in this way, <b>he goes out with them until the entrance of the gate of the city,</b> from where they would take out the corpse, since the dead were not buried in Jerusalem. This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not emerge from the Temple</b> at all for the burial of his relatives, <b>as it is stated: “And from the Temple he shall not emerge</b> and will not desecrate the Temple of his God; for the separateness of the oil of the anointment of his God is on him” (Leviticus 21:12). The mishna continues: <b>And when he consoles others</b> in their mourning when they return from burial, the <b>way of all the people</b> is that <b>they pass by one after another</b> and the mourners stand in a line and are consoled, <b>and the appointed</b> person <b>stands in the middle, between</b> the High Priest <b>and the people. And when he is consoled by others</b> in his mourning, <b>all the people say to him: We are your atonement. And he says to them: May you be blessed from Heaven. And when they comfort him with the</b> first <b>meal</b> after the burial of one of his relatives, <b>all the people recline on the ground</b> as if they are taking his mourning on themselves, <b>and he reclines on the bench</b> out of respect for his status as High Priest.",
            "The mishna continues, enumerating the <i>halakhot</i> pertaining to the king in similar matters: <b>The king does not judge</b> others as a member of a court <b>and</b> others <b>do not judge him, he does not testify and</b> others <b>do not testify concerning him, he does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i></b> with his brother’s widow <b>and</b> his brother <b>does not perform <i>ḥalitza</i> with his wife,</b> and <b>he does not consummate levirate marriage</b> with his brother’s widow <b>and</b> his brother <b>does not consummate levirate marriage with his wife,</b> as all these actions are not fitting to the honor of his office. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> These are not restrictions, but his prerogative: <b>If he desired to perform <i>ḥalitza</i> or to consummate levirate marriage,</b> he is <b>remembered for good,</b> as this is to the benefit of his brother’s widow. The Sages <b>said to him: They do not listen to him</b> if he desires to do so, as this affects not only his own honor but that of the kingdom. <b>And no one may marry</b> a king’s <b>widow,</b> due to his honor. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Another <b>king may marry the widow of a king, as we found that</b> King <b>David married the widow of</b> King <b>Saul, as it is stated: “And I have given you the house of your master and the wives of your master in your bosom”</b> (II Samuel 12:8).",
            "If a relative <b>of</b> the king <b>dies, he does not emerge from the entrance of his palace [<i>palterin</i>],</b> as it does not befit one of his stature to accompany the deceased. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If he wishes to follow the bier, he follows</b> it, <b>as that is what we found</b> with regard <b>to</b> King <b>David, who followed the bier of Abner. As it is stated: “And King David followed the bier”</b> (II Samuel 3:31). The Sages <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yehuda: <b>The matter was only to appease the people,</b> so that they should not suspect David of ordering Abner’s death. <b>And when</b> the people <b>comfort</b> the king with the meal of comfort, <b>all the people recline on the ground, and he reclines on the <i>dargash</i>.</b>",
            "<b>And</b> the king <b>brings out</b> people <b>for</b> conscription in <b>an optional war,</b> i.e., a war that is not mandated by the Torah and is not a war of defense, <b>on the basis of a court of seventy-one, and breaches</b> fences of anyone in his way <b>to create a pathway for himself</b>  for his various needs, <b>and no one can protest his power. The pathway of the king has no measure,</b> neither lengthwise nor widthwise, and one cannot protest that this pathway is wider than necessary. <b>And all the people take spoils</b> in war <b>and give</b> them <b>to him, and he takes the first portion</b> of the spoils. mishna The king <b>“shall not add many wives for himself”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:17), <b>but</b> only <b>eighteen. Rabbi Yehuda says: He</b> may <b>add many</b> wives <b>for himself, provided that they are not</b> like those who <b>turn his heart</b> away from reverence for God. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: Even</b> if he wants to marry only <b>one</b> wife, if <b>she turns his heart away, he should not marry her. If so, why is it stated: “He shall not add many wives for himself”?</b> This teaches <b>that even</b> if his wives are <b>like Abigail,</b> who was righteous and prevented David from sin (see I Samuel, chapter 25), it is prohibited for him to have many wives. The king <b>“shall not accumulate many horses for himself”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:16), but <b>only</b> enough <b>for his chariot</b> in war and in peace. <b>“Neither shall he greatly accumulate silver and gold for himself”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:17), but <b>only enough to provide</b> his <b>soldiers’ sustenance [<i>aspanya</i>]. And</b> the king <b>writes himself a Torah scroll for his sake,</b> as stipulated in Deuteronomy 17:18. When <b>he goes out to war, he brings it out with him.</b> When <b>he comes in</b> from war, <b>he brings it in with him.</b> When <b>he sits in judgment, it is with him.</b> When <b>he reclines</b> to eat, <b>it is opposite him, as it is stated: “And it shall be with him and he shall read it all the days of his life”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:19).",
            "<b>One may not ride on</b> the king’s <b>horse, and one may not sit on his throne, and one may not use his scepter, and one may not see him when he is having his hair cut, nor when he is naked, nor when he is in the bathhouse, as it is stated: “You shall set a king over you”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:15), meaning, ensure <b>that his fear should be upon you.</b> All of these actions would lessen one’s fear of and reverence for the king."
        ],
        [
            "Cases of <b>monetary law</b> are adjudicated <b>by three.</b> They are chosen in the following manner: <b>This</b> litigant <b>chooses one for himself and that</b> litigant <b>chooses one for himself, and the two of them choose one more for themselves;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say:</b> The <b>two judges</b> that were chosen <b>choose one more</b> judge <b>for themselves.</b> <b>This</b> litigant can <b>disqualify the judge</b> chosen <b>by that</b> litigant <b>and that</b> litigant can <b>disqualify the judge</b> chosen <b>by this</b> litigant; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When</b> can one of the litigants disqualify the judges? Only <b>when he brings evidence about them that they are related</b> to one of the litigants or to each other, <b>or</b> that they are <b>disqualified</b> from serving as judges for another reason. <b>But if they are fit</b> to serve as judges <b>or are experts</b> ordained <b>by the court, he cannot disqualify them.</b> <b>This</b> litigant can <b>disqualify the witnesses of that</b> litigant <b>and that</b> litigant can <b>disqualify the witnesses of this</b> litigant; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: When</b> can one litigant disqualify the other’s witnesses? Only <b>when he brings evidence about them that they are related</b> to one of the litigants or to each other, <b>or</b> that they are <b>disqualified</b> from bearing witness for another reason. <b>But if they are fit</b> to serve as witnesses, <b>he cannot disqualify them.</b>",
            "If one litigant <b>says to</b> the other: <b>My father is trusted</b> to adjudicate <b>for me,</b> or: <b>Your father is trusted</b> to adjudicate <b>for me,</b> or: <b>Three cattle herders,</b> who are not proficient in <i>halakha</i>, <b>are trusted</b> to adjudicate <b>for me,</b> all of whom are disqualified from serving as judges, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The one who made the offer <b>can retract it, and the Rabbis say: He cannot retract it,</b> but must accept their verdict. Similarly, one who <b>was obligated</b> by Torah law to take <b>an oath to another,</b> which is done while grasping a sacred object, <b>and</b> the latter <b>said to him:</b> Instead of taking an oath, merely <b>vow to me by the life of your head</b> that what you claim is true, <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The one who made the offer <b>can retract it,</b> and demand that the other litigant take an oath, as he is obligated to do by Torah law. <b>And the Rabbis say: He cannot retract</b> his offer. Once he has agreed to accept a vow, which is of less severity than an oath, he cannot retract his agreement.",
            "<b>And these</b> on the following list <b>are the ones</b> who are <b>disqualified</b> by the Sages from bearing witness due to their unseemly behavior, as they are considered wicked individuals guilty of monetary transgressions: <b>One who plays with dice [<i>bekubbiyya</i>]</b> for money, <b>and one who lends</b> money <b>with interest, and those who fly pigeons, and merchants</b> who trade in the produce <b>of the Sabbatical</b> Year, which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce. <b>Rabbi Shimon said: Initially,</b> people <b>would call them: Gatherers</b> of the produce <b>of the Sabbatical</b> Year. <b>Once the tax collectors grew abundant they would then call them: Merchants</b> who trade in the produce <b>of the Sabbatical</b> Year, as the Gemara will explain. <b>Rabbi Yehuda said: When</b> are the people listed above disqualified from bearing witness? It is <b>when they have no occupation but this one. But</b> if <b>they have an occupation other than this one,</b> although they also make money by these inappropriate means, <b>they are fit</b> to bear witness.",
            "<b>And these are</b> the ones disqualified from bearing witness or from serving as judges due to their status as <b>relatives</b> of one of the litigants or of each other: One’s <b>brother, and his paternal uncle, and his maternal uncle, and his sister’s husband, and the husband of his paternal aunt, and the husband of his maternal aunt, and his mother’s husband, and his father-in-law, and his brother-in-law,</b> i.e., the husband of his wife’s sister. <b>They</b> themselves, all of these people, <b>and</b> also <b>their sons, and their sons-in-law</b> are considered relatives. <b>And his stepson alone</b> is disqualified, but not his stepson’s sons or sons-in-law. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: This</b> aforementioned <i>halakha</i> <b>is Rabbi Akiva’s</b> version of the <b>mishna. But the initial</b> version of the <b>mishna</b> reads as follows: <b>His uncle and the son of his uncle, and anyone who is fit to inherit</b> from <b>him.</b> Only paternal relatives, who are fit to inherit from him, are disqualified; maternal relatives, who do not inherit from him, are not disqualified from bearing witness about him or from adjudicating his case. <b>And</b> the <i>halakha</i> disqualifying a relative from bearing witness or serving as a judge is referring to <b>anyone who is related to him at the time</b> of the trial. If one <b>was</b> once <b>a relative and became unrelated</b> by the time of the trial, e.g., he married the daughter of one of the litigants, but she died or they were divorced, in this case <b>he is fit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even if his daughter died but</b> her husband, the former son-in-law, <b>has children from her, he is</b> still considered <b>a relative;</b> the children cause them to remain related.",
            "<b>One who loves or one who hates</b> one of the litigants is also disqualified. With regard to one who <b>loves</b> one of the litigants, <b>this</b> is referring to <b>his groomsman.</b> One who <b>hates</b> is referring to <b>anyone who, out of enmity, did not speak with</b> the litigant for <b>three days.</b> The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yehuda: <b>The Jewish people are not suspected of</b> bearing false witness due to love or hate.",
            "<b>How do</b> the judges <b>examine the witnesses? They bring them into a room</b> in the courthouse <b>and intimidate them</b> so that they will speak only the truth. <b>And they take all the people,</b> other than the judges, <b>outside</b> so that they should not tell the other witnesses the questions the judges ask and the answers the first witness gives, <b>and they leave</b> only <b>the eldest of</b> the witnesses to testify first. <b>And they say to him: Say how</b> exactly <b>you know that this</b> litigant <b>owes money to that</b> litigant, as the plaintiff claims. <b>If he said:</b> The defendant <b>said to me:</b> It is true <b>that I owe</b> the plaintiff, or if he says: <b>So-and-so said to me that</b> the defendant <b>owes</b> the plaintiff, the witness <b>has said nothing</b> and his testimony is disregarded. It is not valid testimony <b>unless he says:</b> The defendant <b>admitted in our presence to</b> the plaintiff <b>that he owes him,</b> e.g., <b>two hundred dinars.</b> By admitting to the debt in the presence of witnesses he renders himself liable to pay the amount that he mentioned. <b>And afterward they bring in the second</b> witness <b>and examine him</b> in the same manner. <b>If their statements are found to be congruent</b> the judges then <b>discuss the matter.</b> If the opinions of the judges are divided, as <b>two</b> judges <b>say</b> that the defendant is <b>exempt</b> from payment <b>and one says</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay, he is <b>exempt.</b> If <b>two say</b> he is <b>liable and one says</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> If <b>one says</b> he is <b>liable and one says</b> he is <b>exempt,</b> or <b>even</b> if <b>two</b> of the judges <b>deem</b> him <b>exempt or two</b> of them <b>deem</b> him <b>liable, and</b> the other <b>one says: I do not know,</b> the court <b>must add</b> more <b>judges</b> and then rule in accordance with the majority opinion. This is because the one who abstains is considered as though he is not a member of the court.",
            "After the judges <b>finish the matter</b> and reach a decision, <b>they bring in</b> the litigants. <b>The greatest of the judges says: So-and-so, you are exempt</b> from paying; or: <b>So-and-so, you are liable</b> to pay. <b>And from where</b> is it derived that <b>when</b> the judge <b>leaves</b> the courtroom <b>he may not say: I deemed</b> you <b>exempt and my colleagues deemed</b> you <b>liable, but what can I do, as my colleagues outnumbered me</b> and consequently you were deemed liable? <b>About this it is stated: “You shall not go as a talebearer among your people”</b> (Leviticus 19:16), <b>and it says: “One who goes about as a talebearer reveals secrets,</b> but one who is of a faithful spirit conceals a matter” (Proverbs 11:13).",
            "<b>Any time</b> one of the litigants <b>brings</b> additional <b>proof, he can overturn the verdict</b> that was decided according to previous proofs. If one litigant <b>said to</b> the other: <b>Bring all the proofs that you have from now until thirty days</b> from now, if <b>he found</b> additional proof <b>within thirty days, he can overturn</b> the verdict. If he found it <b>after thirty days, he cannot overturn</b> the verdict anymore. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said:</b> He can still overturn the verdict, as <b>what should this</b> litigant, <b>who</b> sought and <b>did not find</b> additional proof <b>within thirty</b> days <b>but found</b> it <b>after thirty</b> days, <b>have done?</b> In a case where one litigant <b>said to</b> the other: <b>Bring witnesses, and</b> the latter <b>said: I have no witnesses,</b> and the former <b>said</b> to him: <b>Bring a proof, and he said: I have no proof, and he later brought a proof or found witnesses,</b> in this case, <b>this</b> proof or these witnesses are worth <b>nothing.</b> It is apparently a false proof or false testimony. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: What should this</b> litigant, <b>who did not know that he has witnesses and</b> ultimately <b>found witnesses,</b> or who <b>did not know that he has a proof and</b> ultimately <b>found proof, have done?</b> Therefore, he can still overturn the verdict. If at the beginning of the discussion in the court one did not bring witnesses or other evidence for his claims, but then <b>he saw that he</b> was about to be <b>deemed liable</b> to pay <b>in the judgment, and said: Bring so-and-so and so-and-so, and they will testify on my behalf, or he pulled out a proof from under his belt [<i>pundato</i>],</b> even Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds <b>that this is</b> worth <b>nothing.</b> If there was truth in the testimony of these witnesses or in this proof, he would not have hidden it until now."
        ],
        [
            "<b>Both</b> cases of <b>monetary law and</b> cases of <b>capital law are equal with regard to</b> the requirement for <b>inquiry and interrogation</b> of the witnesses, <b>as it is stated: “You shall have one manner of law”</b> (Leviticus 24:22), meaning that all legal procedures must be uniform. Having stated the essential similarity between the two, the mishna enumerates the differences between them. <b>What</b> are the differences <b>between</b> cases of <b>monetary law and</b> cases of <b>capital law?</b> Cases of <b>monetary law</b> are judged <b>by</b> a court of <b>three</b> judges, <b>and</b> cases of <b>capital law</b> are judged <b>by</b> a court of <b>twenty-three</b> judges. In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> the court <b>opens</b> the deliberations <b>either</b> with a claim <b>to exempt</b> the accused, <b>or</b> with a claim <b>to find</b> him <b>liable. And</b> in cases of <b>capital law,</b> the court <b>opens</b> the deliberations with a claim <b>to acquit</b> the accused, <b>but</b> it <b>does not open</b> the deliberations with a claim <b>to find</b> him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> the court <b>directs,</b> i.e., issues, the ruling <b>based on</b> a majority of <b>one</b> judge, <b>either to exempt, or to find liable. But</b> in cases of <b>capital law,</b> the court <b>directs</b> the judgment <b>based on</b> a majority of <b>one</b> judge <b>to acquit and based on</b> a majority of <b>two</b> judges <b>to find liable.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> the court <b>brings</b> the accused <b>back</b> to be judged again if new evidence arises, <b>either</b> with a claim <b>to exempt</b> the accused, <b>or</b> with a claim <b>to find</b> him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>capital law,</b> the court <b>brings</b> the accused <b>back</b> to be judged again with a claim <b>to acquit</b> him, <b>but</b> the court <b>does not bring</b> him back to be judged with a claim <b>to find</b> him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law, all</b> those present at the trial <b>may teach</b> a reason to <b>exempt</b> a litigant <b>or</b> to find him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>capital law, all</b> those present at the trial <b>may teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit</b> the accused, <b>but not all</b> present <b>may teach</b> a reason to find him <b>liable.</b> Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of <b>monetary law, one who</b> initially <b>teaches</b> a reason to find the accused <b>liable may</b> then <b>teach</b> a reason to <b>exempt</b> him, <b>and one who</b> initially <b>teaches</b> a reason to <b>exempt</b> him <b>may</b> then <b>teach</b> a reason to find him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>capital law, one who</b> initially <b>teaches</b> a reason to find him <b>liable may</b> then <b>teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit, but one who</b> initially <b>teaches</b> a reason to <b>acquit may not return and teach</b> a reason to find him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> the court <b>judges during the daytime, and may conclude</b> the deliberations and issue the ruling even <b>at night.</b> In cases of <b>capital law,</b> the court <b>judges during the daytime, and concludes</b> the deliberations and issues the ruling only <b>in the daytime.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> the court may <b>conclude</b> the deliberations and issue the ruling even <b>on that same day, whether to exempt</b> the accused <b>or to find</b> him <b>liable.</b> In cases of <b>capital law,</b> the court may <b>conclude</b> the deliberations and issue the ruling even <b>on that same day to acquit</b> the accused, but must wait until <b>the following day to</b> find him <b>liable. Therefore,</b> since capital cases might continue for two days, the court <b>does not judge</b> cases of capital law on certain days, <b>neither on the eve of Shabbat nor the eve of a Festival.</b>",
            "In cases of <b>monetary law,</b> and likewise in <b>the</b> cases of <b>ritual impurity and purity,</b> the judges <b>commence</b> expressing their opinions <b>from the greatest</b> of the judges. In cases of <b>capital law,</b> the judges <b>commence</b> issuing their opinions <b>from the side,</b> where the least significant judges sit. <b>All are fit to judge</b> cases of <b>monetary law. But not all are fit to judge</b> cases of <b>capital law; only priests, Levites, and Israelites who</b> are of sufficiently fit lineage to <b>marry</b> their daughters <b>to</b> members of <b>the priesthood</b> are fit to judge cases of capital law.",
            "<b>A Sanhedrin</b> of twenty-three <b>was</b> arranged in the same layout <b>as half of a circular threshing floor, in order that</b> all the judges <b>will see one another</b> and the witnesses. <b>And two judges’ scribes stand before</b> the court, <b>one on the right and one on the left, and they write the statements of those who find</b> the accused <b>liable and the statements of those who acquit</b> the accused. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> There were <b>three</b> scribes. <b>One writes</b> only <b>the statements of those who acquit</b> the accused, <b>one writes</b> only <b>the statements of those who find</b> him <b>liable, and the third writes</b> both <b>the statements of those who acquit</b> the accused <b>and the statements of those who find</b> him <b>liable,</b> so that if there is uncertainty concerning the precise wording that one of the scribes writes, it can be compared to the words of the third scribe.",
            "<b>And three rows of Torah scholars sit before</b> the judges, and <b>each and every one</b> among those sitting <b>recognizes his place,</b> i.e., they are seated in accordance with their stature. When the court <b>must ordain</b> an additional judge, e.g., if a judge dies during the proceedings or in the case of a court without a decisive majority (see 40a), the court <b>ordains</b> the greatest Torah scholar <b>from the first</b> row. As a seat in the first row is now vacant, <b>one</b> Torah scholar <b>from the second</b> row <b>comes to the first</b> row, and <b>one</b> Torah scholar <b>from the third</b> row <b>comes to the second</b> row, and the court <b>selects another</b> Torah scholar <b>from among the assembled and they seat him in the third</b> row. <b>And</b> this Torah scholar who moves from the second row to the first row <b>would not sit in the place of the first</b> Torah scholar, who joined the court, <b>rather, he</b> would <b>sit in the place appropriate for him,</b> i.e., at the end of that row, in accordance with his stature.",
            "<b>How does</b> the court <b>intimidate the witnesses in</b> giving <b>testimony for</b> cases of <b>capital law? They would bring</b> the witnesses <b>in and intimidate them</b> by saying to them: <b>Perhaps</b> what <b>you say</b> in your testimony is <b>based on conjecture, or</b> perhaps it is <b>based on a rumor,</b> perhaps it is <b>testimony</b> based on <b>hearsay,</b> e.g., you heard a witness testify to this in a different court, <b>or</b> perhaps it is <b>based on the statement of a trusted person. Perhaps you do not know that ultimately we examine you with inquiry and interrogation,</b> and if you are lying, your lie will be discovered. The court tells them: <b>You should know that</b> cases of <b>capital law</b> are <b>not like</b> cases of <b>monetary law.</b> In cases of <b>monetary law, a person</b> who testifies falsely, causing money to be given to the wrong party, can <b>give</b> the <b>money</b> to the proper owner <b>and his</b> sin <b>is atoned</b> for. In cases of <b>capital law,</b> if one testifies falsely, <b>the blood of</b> the accused <b>and the blood of his offspring</b> that he did not merit to produce <b>are ascribed to</b> the witness’s testimony <b>until eternity.</b> The proof for this is <b>as we found with Cain, who killed his brother, as it is stated</b> concerning him: “The voice of <b>your brother’s blood [<i>demei</i>] cries</b> out to Me from the ground” (Genesis 4:10). The verse <b>does not state: Your brother’s blood [<i>dam</i>],</b> in the singular, <b>but</b> rather: <b>“Your brother’s blood [<i>demei</i>],”</b> in the plural. This serves to teach that the loss of both <b>his</b> brother’s <b>blood and the blood of his</b> brother’s <b>offspring</b> are ascribed to Cain. The mishna notes: <b>Alternatively,</b> the phrase <b>“your brother’s blood [<i>demei</i>],”</b> written in the plural, teaches that <b>that his blood</b> was not gathered in one place but was <b>splattered on the trees and on the stones.</b> The court tells the witnesses: <b>Therefore, Adam</b> the first man <b>was created alone, to teach you that</b> with regard to <b>anyone who destroys one soul from the Jewish people,</b> i.e., kills one Jew, <b>the verse ascribes him</b> blame <b>as if he destroyed an entire world,</b> as Adam was one person, from whom the population of an entire world came forth. <b>And</b> conversely, <b>anyone who sustains one soul from the Jewish people, the verse ascribes him</b> credit <b>as if he sustained an entire world.</b> The mishna cites another reason Adam the first man was created alone: <b>And</b> this was done <b>due to</b> the importance of maintaining <b>peace among people, so</b> that one <b>person will not say to another: My father,</b> i.e., progenitor, <b>is greater than your father. And</b> it was also <b>so that the heretics</b> who believe in multiple gods <b>will not say: There are many authorities in Heaven,</b> and each created a different person. <b>And</b> this serves <b>to tell of the greatness of the Holy One, Blessed be He, as</b> when <b>a person stamps several coins with one seal, they are all similar to each other. But the supreme King of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He, stamped all people with the seal of Adam the first</b> man, as all of them are his offspring, <b>and not one of them is similar to another. Therefore,</b> since all humanity descends from one person, <b>each and every person is obligated to say: The world was created for me,</b> as one person can be the source of all humanity, and recognize the significance of his actions. The court says to the witnesses: <b>And perhaps you will say:</b> <b>Why would we</b> want <b>this trouble?</b> Perhaps it would be better not to testify at all. <b>But</b> be aware, as <b>is it not already stated: “And he being a witness, whether he has seen or known, if he does not utter it,</b> then he shall bear his iniquity” (Leviticus 5:1)? It is a transgression not to testify when one can do so. <b>And perhaps you will say: Why would we</b> want <b>to be responsible for the blood of this</b> person? <b>But</b> be aware, as <b>is it not already stated: “When the wicked perish, there is song”</b> (Proverbs 11:10)?"
        ],
        [
            "The court <b>would examine</b> the witnesses in capital cases <b>with seven interrogations,</b> i.e., interrogatory questions, and they are: <b>In which seven-year</b> period, that is, in which cycle of seven years within a jubilee did the event occur; <b>in which year</b> of the Sabbatical cycle did the event occur; <b>in which month</b> did the event occur; <b>on which</b> day <b>of the month</b> did the event occur; <b>on which day</b> of the week did the event occur; <b>at which hour</b> did the event occur; and <b>in what place</b> did the event occur. <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> The court would examine the witnesses with only three interrogations: <b>On which day</b> did the event occur, <b>at which hour,</b> and <b>in what place.</b> They would also ask: <b>Do you recognize him</b> as the man who committed the transgression? <b>Did you warn him?</b> They would then ask the witnesses about the particulars of the incident. For example, in the case of <b>one who</b> is an accused <b>idol worshipper,</b> they ask the witnesses: <b>Whom,</b> i.e., which idol, <b>did he worship, and in what manner did he worship</b> it, and so on.",
            "With regard to <b>all</b> judges <b>who increase</b> the number of <b>examinations,</b> i.e., who add questions about the details of the event, <b>this is praiseworthy,</b> as this may clarify that the witnesses are lying. <b>An incident</b> occurred <b>and ben Zakkai examined</b> the witnesses by questioning them <b>about</b> the color and shape of <b>the stems of figs</b> in order to unearth a contradiction between the witnesses. The mishna explains: <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between interrogations and examinations?</b> With regard to <b>interrogations,</b> if <b>one</b> of the witnesses <b>says: I do not know</b> the answer, <b>their testimony is void</b> immediately. With regard to <b>examinations,</b> if <b>one says: I do not know</b> the answer, <b>and even</b> if <b>two say: We do not know</b> the answer, <b>their testimony</b> still <b>stands. Both</b> with regard to <b>interrogations and examinations, at a time when</b> the witnesses <b>contradict one another, their testimony is void.</b>",
            "The mishna clarifies: If <b>one</b> witness <b>says</b> the event occurred <b>on the second of the month, and one</b> witness <b>says</b> that the event occurred <b>on the third of the month,</b> this is not regarded as a contradiction and <b>their testimony stands,</b> since it is possible to say <b>that this</b> witness <b>knows of</b> the <b>addition of</b> a day to the previous <b>month,</b> and according to his tally the event occurred on the second of the month, <b>and that</b> witness <b>does not know of</b> the <b>addition of</b> a day to the previous <b>month,</b> and according to his tally the event occurred on the third of the month. Their testimony is not considered incongruent. By contrast, if <b>this</b> witness <b>says</b> the event occurred <b>on the third</b> of the month <b>and one</b> witness <b>says</b> the event occurred <b>on the fifth</b> of the month, <b>their testimony is void,</b> as this disparity cannot be attributed to a mere error. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent. Similarly, if <b>one</b> witness <b>says</b> that the event occurred <b>at two hours,</b> i.e., the second hour of the day from sunrise, <b>and one</b> witness <b>says</b> that the event occurred <b>at three hours, their testimony stands,</b> as one could reasonably err this amount in estimating the hour of the day. By contrast, if <b>one says</b> that the event occurred <b>at three</b> hours, <b>and one says</b> that the event occurred <b>at five</b> hours, <b>their testimony is void.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Also in this case their testimony <b>stands,</b> as one could reasonably err concerning even this length of time. Rabbi Yehuda adds: But if <b>one says</b> that the event occurred <b>at five</b> hours, <b>and one says</b> that the event occurred <b>at seven</b> hours, <b>their testimony is void.</b> Here the difference is recognizable to all, <b>since at five</b> hours <b>the sun</b> is <b>in the east and at seven the sun</b> is <b>in the west,</b> and one could not err concerning this. Therefore, their testimony is not congruent.",
            "The mishna continues: <b>And afterward,</b> after the court examines the first witness, <b>they bring in the second</b> witness <b>and examine him. If the statements</b> of the witnesses <b>are found</b> to be <b>congruent,</b> the court begins to deliberate the matter. <b>They open</b> the deliberations <b>with</b> an appeal to anyone who can find a reason to <b>acquit</b> the accused. If <b>one of the witnesses said: I can teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit him, or</b> if <b>one of the students</b> sitting before the judges said: <b>I can teach</b> a reason to deem <b>him liable,</b> the judges <b>silence him,</b> i.e., both the witness and the student. The reason is that these people are not allowed to offer information such as this. But if <b>one of the students said: I can to teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit him, they raise him</b> to the seat of the court <b>and seat him among them, and he would not descend from there the entire day,</b> but would sit and participate in their deliberations. <b>If the statement of</b> that student <b>has substance,</b> the court <b>listens to him. And</b> if <b>even</b> the accused <b>says: I can teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit me,</b> the court <b>listens to him</b> and considers his statement, <b>provided that his statement has substance.</b>",
            "<b>And if</b> the court <b>found</b> it fit to <b>acquit him</b> during the deliberations, as all or a majority of the judges agreed to acquit him, <b>they excuse him. But if</b> a majority does <b>not</b> find it fit to acquit him, <b>they delay</b> his verdict <b>to</b> the <b>following day, and</b> they then <b>assign pairs</b> of judges to discuss the matter with each other. <b>They would minimize</b> their <b>food</b> intake <b>and they would not drink wine all day. And they</b> would <b>deliberate all night, and the following day they</b> would <b>arise early and come to court</b> and then vote again and tally the votes of the judges. <b>One who</b> yesterday was of the opinion to <b>acquit</b> the defendant <b>says: I</b> said to <b>acquit, and I acquit in my place,</b> i.e., I stand by my statement to acquit. <b>And one who</b> yesterday was of the opinion to <b>deem</b> him <b>liable says: I</b> said to <b>deem</b> him <b>liable, and I deem</b> him <b>liable in my place. One who</b> yesterday <b>taught</b> a reason to deem him <b>liable may</b> then <b>teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit, but one who</b> yesterday <b>taught</b> a reason to <b>acquit may not then teach</b> a reason to deem him <b>liable.</b> If <b>they erred in the matter,</b> as one of the judges forgot what he had said the previous day, <b>two judges’ scribes,</b> who recorded the statements of the judges, <b>remind him. If</b> the court then <b>found</b> it fit to <b>acquit him</b> unanimously, <b>they excuse him, and if not</b> all of the judges determine to acquit, <b>they stand to count</b> the vote. If <b>twelve</b> judges vote to <b>acquit</b> him <b>and eleven</b> judges <b>deem</b> him <b>liable,</b> he is <b>acquitted.</b> The mishna continues: In a case where <b>twelve</b> judges <b>deem</b> him <b>liable and eleven</b> judges <b>acquit; or even</b> if <b>eleven</b> judges <b>acquit and eleven deem</b> him <b>liable and one</b> judge <b>says: I do not know; or even</b> if <b>twenty-two</b> judges <b>acquit or deem</b> him <b>liable and one</b> judge <b>says: I do not know,</b> the judge who said he does not know is disregarded, and <b>the judges add</b> additional judges to the court until they reach a definitive ruling. <b>And how many</b> judges <b>do they add?</b> They add <b>pairs of two</b> judges each time they do not reach a ruling <b>until</b> there are <b>seventy-one</b> judges, but no more than that. At that point, if <b>thirty-six</b> judges <b>acquit and thirty-five</b> judges <b>deem</b> him <b>liable,</b> he is <b>acquitted.</b> If <b>thirty-six</b> judges <b>deem</b> him <b>liable and thirty-five</b> judges <b>acquit, they</b> continue to <b>deliberate</b> the matter, <b>these</b> judges <b>against those</b> judges, <b>until one of those who deems</b> him <b>liable sees</b> the validity of <b>the statements of those who acquit</b> and changes his position, as the court does not condemn a defendant to death by a majority of one judge."
        ],
        [
            "When <b>the trial has ended</b> in a guilty verdict and the condemned man has been sentenced to be stoned, <b>he is taken out to be stoned. The place of stoning was outside the court</b> and a little beyond it, <b>as it is stated</b> with regard to a blasphemer: <b>“Take out him who has cursed</b> to outside the camp, and let all that heard him lay their hands upon his head, and let all the congregation stone him” (Leviticus 24:14). <b>One</b> man <b>stands at the entrance to the court, with cloths [<i>vehasudarin</i>] in his hand, and</b> another man sits on <b>a horse at a distance from him</b> but <b>where he can</b> still <b>see him.</b> If <b>one</b> of the judges <b>says:</b> I <b>can teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit him, the other,</b> i.e., the man with the cloths, <b>waves the cloths</b> as a signal to the man on the horse, <b>and the horse races</b> off after the court agents who are leading the condemned man to his execution, <b>and</b> he <b>stops them,</b> and they wait until the court determines whether or not the argument has substance. <b>And even</b> if <b>he,</b> the condemned man himself, <b>says: I can teach</b> a reason to <b>acquit myself, he is returned</b> to the courthouse, <b>even four or five times, provided that there is substance to his words.</b> If, after the condemned man is returned to the courthouse, the judges <b>find</b> a reason to <b>acquit him, they</b> acquit him and <b>release him</b> immediately. <b>But if</b> they do <b>not</b> find a reason to acquit him, <b>he goes out to be stoned. And a crier goes out before him</b> and publicly proclaims: <b>So-and-so, son of so-and-so, is going out to be stoned because he committed such and such a transgression. And so-and-so and so-and-so are his witnesses. Anyone who knows</b> of a reason to <b>acquit him should come</b> forward <b>and teach</b> it <b>on his behalf.</b>",
            "<b>When</b> the condemned man <b>is at a distance of about ten cubits from the place of stoning, they say to him: Confess</b> your transgressions, <b>as the way of all who are being executed is to confess. As whoever confesses</b> and regrets his transgressions <b>has a portion in the World-to-Come. For so we find with regard to Achan, that Joshua said to him: “My son, please give glory to the Lord, God of Israel, and make confession to Him”</b> (Joshua 7:19). And the next verse states: <b>“And Achan answered Joshua, and said: Indeed I have sinned against the Lord, God of Israel, and like this and like that</b> have I done.” <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>that</b> Achan’s <b>confession achieved atonement for him?</b> It is derived from here, <b>as it is stated: “And Joshua said: Why have you brought trouble on us? The Lord shall trouble you this day”</b> (Joshua 7:25). Joshua said to Achan as follows: <b>On this day</b> of your judgment <b>you are troubled, but you will not be troubled in the World-to-Come.</b> <b>And if</b> the condemned man <b>does not know how to confess,</b> either from ignorance or out of confusion, <b>they say to him: Say</b> simply: <b>Let my death be an atonement for all my sins. Rabbi Yehuda says: If</b> the condemned man <b>knows that he was convicted by the testimony of conspiring witnesses,</b> but in fact he is innocent, <b>he says: Let my death be an atonement for all my sins except for this sin.</b> The Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Yehuda <b>said to him: If so, every person</b> who is being executed <b>will say that, to clear himself</b> in the eyes of the public. Therefore, if the condemned man does not make such a statement on his own, the court does not suggest it to him as an alternative.",
            "<b>When</b> the condemned man <b>is at a distance of four cubits from the place of stoning, they take off his clothes. They cover a man’s</b> genitals <b>in the front, and a woman</b> is covered both <b>in the front and in the back;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. But the Rabbis say: A man is stoned naked,</b> i.e., wearing only that cloth covering, <b>but a woman is not stoned naked,</b> but is stoned while clothed.",
            "<b>The place of stoning</b> from which the condemned man is pushed to his death <b>is</b> a platform <b>twice the height</b> of an ordinary person. He is made to stand at the edge of the platform, and then <b>one of the witnesses</b> who testified against him <b>pushes him</b> down <b>by the hips,</b> so that he falls face up onto the ground. If <b>he turned over onto his chest,</b> with his face downward, the witness <b>turns him</b> over <b>onto his hips. And if he dies through this</b> fall to the ground, the obligation to stone the transgressor is <b>fulfilled.</b> <b>And if</b> the condemned man does <b>not</b> die from his fall, <b>the second</b> witness <b>takes the stone</b> that has been prepared for this task <b>and places,</b> i.e., casts, <b>it on his chest.</b> And <b>if he dies with</b> the casting of <b>this</b> first stone, the obligation to stone the transgressor <b>is fulfilled. And if</b> he does <b>not</b> die with the casting of this stone, then <b>his stoning</b> is completed <b>by all of the Jewish people,</b> i.e., by all the people who assembled for the execution, <b>as it is stated: “The hand of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterward the hand of all the people”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:7). The corpses of all those <b>who are stoned are hung</b> after their death; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say: Only</b> the corpse of <b>the blasphemer,</b> who has cursed God, <b>and</b> the corpse of <b>the idol worshipper are hung.</b> The corpse of <b>a man is hung facing the people, but</b> the corpse of <b>a woman,</b> out of modesty, is hung with <b>facing the tree;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And the Rabbis say:</b> the corpse of <b>a man is hung, but</b> the corpse of <b>a woman is not hung. Rabbi Eliezer said to</b> the Rabbis: <b>Did Shimon ben Shataḥ not hang in Ashkelon women</b> who were found guilty of witchcraft, proving that the corpse of a woman who is executed is also hung? <b>They said to him:</b> No proof can be brought from here, as <b>he hanged eighty women</b> on that day, <b>and</b> the <i>halakha</i> is that the same court <b>may not judge</b> even <b>two</b> people charged with capital transgressions <b>on the same day.</b> It is therefore clear that he was not acting in accordance with Torah law, but rather his execution of the eighty women was an extraordinary punishment necessitated by unusually pressing circumstances. <b>How do they hang</b> the corpse of one who was put to death by stoning? <b>They sink a post into the earth</b> with a piece of <b>wood jutting out,</b> forming a T-shaped structure. <b>And</b> the court appointee then <b>places</b> the dead man’s <b>two hands one upon the other,</b> ties them, <b>and hangs him</b> by his hands. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: The post</b> is not sunk into the ground; rather, it <b>leans against a wall, and he hangs</b> the corpse on it <b>the way that butchers do</b> with meat. The dead man hangs there for only a very short time, <b>and</b> then <b>they immediately untie him. And if he was left</b> hanging <b>overnight, a prohibition is transgressed, as it is stated: “His body shall not remain all night upon the tree, but you shall bury him</b> that day, <b>for he that is hung is a curse of God”</b> (Deuteronomy 21:23). <b>That is to say:</b> Were the corpse left hanging on the tree overnight, people would ask: <b>For what</b> reason <b>was this one hung</b> after he was put to death? They would be answered: <b>Because he blessed God,</b> a euphemism for blasphemy. <b>And therefore the name of Heaven would be desecrated</b> were the dead man’s corpse to remain hanging, reminding everybody of his transgression.",
            "<b>Rabbi Meir said:</b> The phrase “for he that is hung is a curse [<i>kilelat</i>] of God” should be understood as follows: <b>When a man suffers</b> in the wake of his sin, <b>what expression does the Divine Presence use? I am distressed [<i>kallani</i>] about My head, I am distressed about My arm,</b> meaning, I, too, suffer when the wicked are punished. From here it is derived: <b>If God suffers</b> such distress <b>over the blood of the wicked that is spilled,</b> even though they justly deserved their punishment, it can be inferred <b><i>a fortiori</i></b> that He suffers distress <b>over the blood of the righteous.</b> <b>And</b> the Sages <b>said not only this,</b> that an executed transgressor must be buried on the same day that he is killed, <b>but</b> they said that <b>anyone who leaves his deceased</b> relative <b>overnight</b> with-out burying him <b>transgresses a prohibition.</b> But if <b>he left</b> the deceased <b>overnight for the sake of</b> the deceased’s <b>honor,</b> e.g., <b>to bring a coffin or shrouds</b> for his burial, <b>he does not transgress</b> the prohibition against leaving him unburied overnight. After the executed transgressor is taken down he is buried, <b>and they would not bury him in his ancestral</b> burial <b>plot. Rather, two graveyards were established for</b> the burial of those executed by <b>the court: One for those who were killed</b> by decapitation <b>or strangled, and one for those who were stoned or burned.</b> ",
            "Once <b>the flesh</b> of the deceased <b>had decomposed, they would gather his bones and bury them in their</b> proper <b>place</b> in his ancestral burial plot. <b>And</b> soon after the execution, <b>the relatives</b> of the executed transgressor <b>would come and inquire about the welfare of the judges and about the welfare of the witnesses, as if to say: We hold no</b> grudges <b>against you, as you judged a true judgment.</b> <b>And</b> the relatives of the executed man <b>would not mourn</b> him with the observance of the usual mourning rites, so that his unmourned death would atone for his transgression; <b>but they would grieve</b> over his passing, <b>since grief is</b> felt <b>only in the heart.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>Four types of</b> the <b>death</b> penalty <b>were given over to</b> the <b>court,</b> with which those who committed certain transgressions are executed. They are, in descending order of severity: <b>Stoning, burning, killing</b> by decapitation, <b>and strangulation. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> They are, in descending order of severity: <b>Burning, stoning, strangulation, and killing. This</b> execution, described in the previous chapter, is referring to <b>the mitzva of those who are stoned,</b> i.e., to the process of execution by stoning.",
            "<b>The mitzva of those who are burned,</b> i.e., the process of execution by burning, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners <b>submerge</b> the condemned one <b>in dung up to his knees</b> so he cannot move, <b>and they place a rough scarf within a soft one,</b> so his throat will not be wounded, <b>and wrap</b> these scarves <b>around his neck. This</b> one, i.e., one of the witnesses, <b>pulls</b> the scarf <b>toward himself, and that</b> one, the other witness, <b>pulls</b> it <b>toward himself, until</b> the condemned one is forced to <b>open his mouth,</b> as he is choking. <b>And</b> another person then <b>lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines</b> and he dies. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: But if this</b> one who is condemned to death by burning accidentally <b>died at their hands</b> by strangulation, <b>they have not fulfilled the mitzva of</b> execution by <b>burning for</b> this person. <b>Rather,</b> the process is carried out in the following manner: One <b>opens the mouth of</b> the condemned person <b>with prongs, against his will, and</b> one <b>lights the wick and throws it into his mouth, and it goes down into his intestines and burns his intestines</b> and he dies. <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Tzadok said: An incident</b> occurred <b>with regard to a certain priest’s daughter who committed adultery, and they wrapped her in bundles of branches and burned her,</b> contrary to the process described in the mishna. The Sages <b>said to him:</b> That court did not act properly; they did so <b>because the court at that time was not proficient</b> in <i>halakha</i>.",
            "<b>The mitzva of those who are killed,</b> i.e., the process of execution by decapitation, is carried out in the following manner: The executioners <b>cut off his head with a sword, the way that the monarchy does</b> when a king sentences a person to death. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> This manner of execution is improper, as <b>it degrades him. Rather, they place the head of</b> the condemned <b>on the block, and chop</b> it off <b>with a cleaver [<i>bekofitz</i>].</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> If you are concerned about his degradation, <b>there is no death</b> penalty more <b>degrading than that.</b> It is better for him to be executed in the manner described first. <b>The mitzva of those who are strangled</b> is carried out in the following manner: The agents of the court <b>submerge</b> the condemned one <b>in dung up to his knees</b> so he cannot move, <b>and</b> one of them <b>places a rough scarf within a soft one, and wraps</b> it <b>around his neck. This</b> one, i.e., one of the witnesses, <b>pulls</b> the scarf <b>toward him, and that</b> one, the other witness, <b>pulls</b> it <b>toward him, until the soul of</b> the condemned one <b>departs.</b>",
            "<b>These</b> transgressors <b>are those who are stoned</b> to death: <b>One who engages in intercourse with</b> his <b>mother; or with</b> his <b>father’s wife,</b> even if she is not his mother; <b>or with</b> his <b>daughter-in-law; or with a male; or with an animal; and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal. And one who blasphemes, and one who engages in idol worship. And one who gives of his offspring to Molekh, and a necromancer, and a sorcerer. And one who desecrates Shabbat, and one who curses his father or his mother, and one who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman, and an inciter</b> who incites individuals to idol worship, <b>and a subverter</b> who incites an entire city to idol worship, <b>and a warlock, and a stubborn and rebellious son.</b> The mishna elaborates: <b>One who</b> unwittingly <b>engages in intercourse with</b> his <b>mother</b> who is also his father’s wife is <b>liable</b> to bring two sin-offerings <b>for</b> his intercourse with <b>her:</b> One <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s <b>mother and</b> one <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s <b>father’s wife. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is liable</b> to bring <b>only</b> one sin-offering, <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s <b>mother.</b> <b>One who</b> unwittingly <b>engages in intercourse with</b> his <b>father’s wife</b> while his father is married to her is <b>liable</b> to bring two sin-offerings: One <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s <b>father’s wife and</b> one <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with <b>a married woman.</b> He is liable due to the former prohibition <b>both during his father’s lifetime and after his father’s death,</b> and <b>whether</b> the relationship between the woman and his father is one <b>of betrothal or</b> one <b>of marriage.</b> Likewise, <b>one who</b> unwittingly <b>engages in intercourse with his daughter-in-law</b> during his son’s lifetime is <b>liable</b> to bring two sin-offerings <b>for</b> his intercourse with <b>her:</b> One <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s <b>daughter-in-law, and</b> one <b>due to</b> the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with <b>a married woman.</b> The former liability applies <b>both during his son’s lifetime</b> and <b>after his son’s death,</b> and <b>whether</b> the relationship between the woman and his son is one <b>of betrothal or</b> one <b>of marriage.</b> A man <b>who engages in intercourse with a male or with an animal, and a woman who engages in intercourse with an animal,</b> are executed <b>by stoning.</b> The animal is likewise stoned to death. The mishna asks: <b>If</b> the <b>person sinned</b> by doing this, <b>how did the animal sin? Rather, because a calamity was caused to a person by it, therefore the verse states</b> that <b>it should be stoned,</b> so that it does not cause another to sin. <b>Alternatively,</b> it is <b>so that</b> this <b>animal will not pass through the marketplace, and</b> those who see it <b>will say: This is</b> the animal <b>because of which so-and-so was stoned,</b> and its existence would shame his memory.",
            "<b>One who blasphemes,</b> i.e., one who curses God, <b>is not liable unless he utters the name</b> of God and curses it. <b>Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said:</b> <b>On every day</b> of a blasphemer’s trial, when the judges <b>judge the witnesses,</b> i.e., interrogate the witnesses, they ask the witnesses to use <b>an appellation</b> for the name of God, so that they do not utter a curse of God’s name. Specifically, the witnesses would say: <b>Let Yosei smite Yosei,</b> as the name Yosei has four letters in Hebrew, as does the Tetragrammaton. When <b>the judgment is over,</b> and the court votes to deem the defendant guilty, <b>they do not sentence</b> him <b>to death based on</b> the testimony of the witnesses in which they used <b>an appellation</b> for the name of God, without having ever heard the exact wording of the curse. <b>Rather, they remove all</b> the <b>people</b> who are not required to be there from the court, so that the curse is not heard publicly, and the judges <b>interrogate the eldest of</b> the witnesses, <b>and say to him: Say what you heard explicitly. And he says</b> exactly what he heard. <b>And the judges stand on their feet and make a tear</b> in their garments, as an act of mourning for the desecration of the honor of God. <b>And they do not</b> ever fully <b>stitch</b> it back together again. <b>And the second</b> witness <b>says: I too</b> heard <b>as he</b> did, but he does not repeat the curse explicitly. <b>And the third</b> witness, in the event that there is one, <b>says: I too</b> heard <b>as he</b> did. In this manner, the repetition of the invective sentence is limited to what is absolutely necessary.",
            "<b>One who worships idols</b> is executed by stoning. This includes <b>one who worships</b> an idol, <b>and one who slaughters</b> an animal as an idolatrous offering, <b>and one who burns</b> incense as an idolatrous offering, <b>and one who pours a libation</b> in idol worship, <b>and one who bows</b> to an idol, <b>and one who</b> declares that he <b>accepts</b> an idol <b>upon himself as a god, and one who says to</b> an idol: <b>You are my god.</b> <b>But</b> with regard to <b>one who hugs</b> an idol, <b>or one who kisses</b> it, <b>or one who cleans</b> it, <b>or one who sprays</b> water before it, <b>or one who washes</b> it, <b>or one who rubs</b> it with oil, <b>or one who dresses</b> it, <b>or one who puts its shoes on</b> it, he <b>transgresses a prohibition</b> but is not liable to receive capital punishment. With regard to <b>one who vows in</b> an idol’s <b>name and one who affirms</b> his statement by an oath <b>in its name,</b> he <b>transgresses a prohibition.</b> <b>One who defecates before</b> the idol known as <b>Ba’al-Peor</b> is liable to receive capital punishment, even though defecating is a degrading act, as <b>that is its</b> form of <b>worship.</b> Likewise, <b>one who throws a stone at Mercury</b> is liable to receive capital punishment, as <b>that is its</b> form of <b>worship.</b>",
            "<b>One who gives of his offspring to Molekh,</b> for which one is executed by stoning, <b>is not liable unless he hands over</b> his child <b>to the</b> priests of <b>Molekh and passes</b> the child <b>through the fire.</b> If <b>he handed over</b> the child <b>to the</b> priests of <b>Molekh but did not pass</b> him <b>through the fire,</b> or if <b>he passed</b> him <b>through the fire but did not hand</b> him <b>over to the</b> priests of <b>Molekh, he is not liable, unless he hands</b> the child <b>over to the</b> priests of <b>Molekh and passes</b> him <b>through the fire.</b> The list of those liable to be executed by stoning includes those who practice various types of sorcery. The mishna describes them: <b>A necromancer is a <i>pitom</i> from whose armpit</b> the voice of the dead appears to <b>speak. And a sorcerer is</b> one <b>from whose mouth</b> the dead appears to <b>speak. These,</b> the necromancer and the sorcerer, <b>are</b> executed <b>by stoning, and one who inquires</b> about the future <b>through them is in</b> violation of <b>a prohibition.</b>",
            "Also liable to be executed by stoning is <b>one who desecrates Shabbat by</b> performing <b>a matter that for its intentional</b> performance one is liable to receive <b><i>karet</i> and for its unwitting</b> performance one is obligated to bring <b>a sin-offering.</b> <b>One who curses his father or his mother is not liable</b> to be executed by stoning <b>unless he curses them with the name</b> of God. If <b>he cursed them with an appellation</b> of the name of God, <b>Rabbi Meir deems</b> him <b>liable, and the Rabbis deem</b> him <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>One who engages in intercourse with a betrothed young woman is not liable</b> to be executed by stoning <b>unless she is a young woman,</b> i.e., neither a minor nor an adult; <b>a virgin; betrothed</b> but not yet married; <b>and she</b> lives <b>in her father’s home,</b> having yet to move in with her husband. If <b>two</b> men <b>engaged in intercourse with her, the first</b> is liable to be executed <b>by stoning, and the second</b> is liable to be executed <b>by strangulation.</b> The second man is executed in this manner in accordance with the <i>halakha</i> of one who engages in intercourse with a married or non-virgin betrothed woman, as she was no longer a virgin when he engaged in intercourse with her.",
            "With regard to the case of <b>an inciter,</b> listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, <b>this is an ordinary person,</b> not a prophet. <b>And</b> it is referring to <b>one who incites an ordinary person</b> and not a multitude of people. What does the inciter do? <b>He says: There is an idol in such and such a place,</b> which <b>eats like this, drinks like this, does good</b> for its worshippers <b>like this,</b> and <b>harms</b> those who do not worship it <b>like this.</b> The mishna states a principle with regard to the <i>halakha</i> of an inciter: With regard to <b>all of those</b> mentioned <b>in the Torah</b> who <b>are liable to</b> receive <b>the death</b> penalty, if there are no witnesses to their transgressions, the court <b>does not hide</b> witnesses in order <b>to</b> ensnare and punish <b>them, except for this</b> case of an inciter. The mishna elaborates: If the inciter <b>said</b> his words of incitement <b>to two</b> men, <b>they are his witnesses, and</b> he does not need to be warned before the transgression; <b>they bring him to court and stone him.</b> If <b>he said</b> his words of incitement <b>to one</b> man alone, that man’s testimony would not be sufficient to have the inciter executed. Therefore <b>he says</b> to the inciter: <b>I have friends who are interested in this;</b> tell them too. This way there will be more witnesses. The mishna continues: <b>If</b> the inciter <b>is cunning, and</b> he knows that <b>he cannot speak in front of</b> two men, the court <b>hides witnesses for him behind the fence</b> so that he will not see them, <b>and</b> the man whom the inciter had previously tried to incite <b>says to him: Say what you said</b> to me when we were <b>in seclusion. And the other</b> person, the inciter, <b>says to him</b> again that he should worship the idol. <b>And he says to</b> the inciter: <b>How can we forsake our God in Heaven and go and worship wood and stones? If</b> the inciter <b>retracts</b> his suggestion, <b>that is good. But if he says: This</b> idol worship <b>is our duty; this</b> is what <b>suits us,</b> then <b>those standing behind the fence bring him to court and have him stoned.</b> The <i>halakha</i> of an inciter includes <b>one who says: I shall worship</b> idols, or one of the following statements: <b>I shall go and worship</b> idols, or: <b>let us go and worship</b> idols, or: <b>I shall sacrifice</b> an idolatrous offering, or: <b>I shall go and sacrifice</b> an idolatrous offering, or: <b>Let us go and sacrifice</b> an idolatrous offering, or: <b>I shall burn</b> incense as an idolatrous offering, or: <b>I shall go and burn</b> incense, or: <b>Let us go and burn</b> incense, or: <b>I shall pour</b> an idolatrous libation, or: <b>I shall go and pour</b> a libation, or: <b>Let us go and pour</b> a libation, or: <b>I shall bow</b> to an idol, or: <b>I shall go and bow,</b> or: <b>Let us go and bow.</b> With regard to the case of <b>the subverter</b> listed among those liable to be executed by stoning, <b>this is one who says</b> to a multitude of people: <b>Let us go and worship idols.</b>",
            "<b>The warlock</b> is also liable to be executed by stoning. <b>One who performs</b> a real <b>act</b> of sorcery <b>is liable, but not one who deceives the eyes,</b> making it appear as though he is performing sorcery, as that is not considered sorcery. <b>Rabbi Akiva says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua:</b> For example, <b>two</b> people can each <b>gather cucumbers</b> by sorcery. <b>One</b> of them <b>gathers</b> cucumbers and he is <b>exempt, and</b> the other <b>one gathers</b> cucumbers and he is <b>liable.</b> How so? <b>The one who performs</b> a real <b>act</b> of sorcery is <b>liable,</b> and <b>the one who deceives the eyes is exempt.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "The Torah describes the punishment given to a son who steals money from his parents to eat a gluttonous meal of meat and wine in the company of lowly men. If his parents bring him to court for this act, he is exhorted to desist and is punished with lashes. If he repeats the same misdeed and is again brought to court by his parents within the same three-month period, he is considered a stubborn and rebellious son [<i>ben sorer umoreh</i>]. He is liable to receive the death penalty, which in this case is execution by stoning. <b>From when does a stubborn and rebellious son become</b> liable to receive the death penalty imposed upon <b>a stubborn and rebellious son?</b> <b>From when he grows two</b> pubic <b>hairs,</b> which are a sign of puberty and from which time he is considered an adult, <b>until he has grown a beard around.</b> The reference here is to <b>the lower</b> beard surrounding his genitals, <b>and not the upper</b> beard, i.e., his facial hair, <b>but the Sages spoke in euphemistic terms. As it is stated: “If a man has</b> a stubborn and rebellious <b>son”</b> (Deuteronomy 21:18), which indicates that the penalty for rebelliousness is imposed upon <b>a son, but not</b> upon <b>a daughter;</b> and upon <b>a son, but not</b> upon a fully grown <b>man. A minor</b> under the age of thirteen is <b>exempt</b> from the penalty imposed upon a stubborn and rebellious son, <b>because he has not</b> yet <b>reached</b> the age of <b>inclusion in mitzvot.</b>",
            "<b>From when</b> is a stubborn and rebellious son <b>liable? From when he eats a <i>tarteimar</i> of meat and drinks a half-<i>log</i> of Italian wine. Rabbi Yosei says:</b> From when he eats <b>a <i>maneh</i> of meat and</b> drinks <b>a <i>log</i> of wine.</b> The mishna now lists a series of conditions concerning his eating and drinking. If <b>he ate</b> these items <b>with a group</b> assembled for the performance <b>of a mitzva,</b> or <b>he ate</b> them <b>at</b> a meal celebrating <b>the intercalation of a month,</b> or <b>he ate</b> the items when they had <b>second tithe</b> status, <b>in Jerusalem,</b> he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son because each of these circumstances involves some aspect of a mitzva. If <b>he ate</b> the meat of unslaughtered <b>animal carcasses or animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [<i>tereifot</i>]</b> or <b>repugnant creatures or creeping animals,</b> or <b>he ate untithed produce</b> from which tithes and <i>terumot</i> were not separated, <b>or first tithe from which its <i>teruma</i> was not separated, or second tithe</b> outside Jerusalem <b>or consecrated food that was not redeemed,</b> each of which involves a transgression, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son. The mishna summarizes: If <b>he ate an item that</b> involves performing <b>a mitzva or an item that</b> involves committing <b>a transgression,</b> or if <b>he ate any food</b> in the world <b>but did not eat meat,</b> or if he <b>drank any beverage but did not drink wine, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he</b> actually <b>eats meat and</b> actually <b>drinks wine, as it is stated:</b> “This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he does not listen to our voice; he…<b>is a glutton [<i>zolel</i>] and a drunkard [<i>vesovei</i>]”</b> (Deuteronomy 21:20). One is not called a glutton and a drunkard unless he eats meat and drinks wine. <b>And although there is no</b> explicit <b>proof to the matter</b> that the reference in the Torah is to meat and wine, <b>there is an allusion to the matter</b> in another verse, <b>as it is stated: “Be not among wine drinkers [<i>besovei</i>], among gluttonous eaters [<i>bezolelei</i>] of meat”</b> (Proverbs 23:20).",
            "If <b>he stole that</b> which belonged <b>to his father and ate on his father’s property,</b> or he stole that which belonged <b>to others and ate on the property of others,</b> or he stole that which belonged <b>to others and ate on his father’s property, he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless he steals</b> that which belonged <b>to his father and eats on the property of others. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says:</b> He does not become a stubborn and rebellious son <b>unless he steals</b> that which belonged <b>to his father and</b> that which belonged <b>to his mother.</b>",
            "If <b>his father wishes</b> to have him punished <b>but his mother does not wish</b> that, or if <b>his father does not wish</b> to have him punished <b>but his mother wishes</b> that, <b>he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, unless they both wish</b> that he be punished. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: If his mother was not suited for his father,</b> the two being an inappropriate match, as the Gemara will explain, <b>he does not become a stubborn and rebellious son.</b> <b>If one of</b> the parents <b>was without hands, or lame, or mute, or blind, or deaf,</b> their son <b>does not become a stubborn and rebellious son, as it is stated:</b> “Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him, and bring him out to the elders of his city and to the gate of his place. And they shall say to the elders of his city: This son of ours is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voices; he is a glutton and a drunkard” (Deuteronomy 21:19–20). The Sages derive: <b>“Then shall his father and his mother lay hold of him,” but not</b> people <b>without hands,</b> who cannot do this. <b>“And bring him out,” but not lame people,</b> who cannot walk. <b>“And they shall say,” but not mutes. “This son of ours,” but not blind people,</b> who cannot point to their son and say “this.” <b>“He will not obey our voices,” but not deaf people,</b> who cannot hear whether or not he declined to obey them. After he is brought before the elders of the city, <b>he is admonished before three</b> people <b>and</b> then <b>they flog him</b> for having stolen. If <b>he sins again, he is judged by</b> a court of <b>twenty-three</b> judges, <b>but he is not stoned unless the first three</b> judges before whom he had been flogged <b>are</b> present <b>there, as it is stated: “This son of ours,” this is</b> the son <b>who was</b> already <b>flogged before you.</b> If the rebellious son <b>ran away before he was sentenced, and afterward,</b> before he was caught, <b>his lower beard grew around,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from the death penalty. Once his lower beard grows around his genitals, he can no longer be judged as a stubborn and rebellious son. <b>But if he ran away</b> only <b>after he was sentenced, and afterward,</b> by the time he was caught, <b>his lower beard had</b> already <b>grown around,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to receive the death penalty. Once he is sentenced to death his sentence remains in force.",
            "<b>A stubborn and rebellious son is sentenced</b> to death not because of the severity of the transgression that he already committed but <b>on account of his ultimate end,</b> because a boy of his nature will grow up to lead an immoral life, and it is better that <b>he should die</b> while he is still <b>innocent,</b> before causing excessive harm, <b>and not die</b> after he becomes <b>guilty.</b> This is <b>because the death of the wicked is beneficial to them,</b> because they can no longer sin, <b>and</b> it is also <b>beneficial to the world,</b> which is now rid of those who do it harm. Conversely, the death <b>of the righteous is detrimental to them,</b> as they can no longer engage in the performance of mitzvot, <b>and</b> it is also <b>detrimental to the world,</b> as the righteous are now absent from it. By way of association, the mishna continues: The <b>wine and sleep of the wicked are beneficial to them and beneficial to the world,</b> as when they are sleeping or under the influence of wine, they do not cause harm to others. <b>And,</b> conversely, the wine and sleep <b>of the righteous are detrimental to them and detrimental to the world,</b> as wine and sleep prevent them from engaging in their good deeds. The <b>dispersal of the wicked,</b> so that they are not found in close proximity to each other, <b>is beneficial to them,</b> as they are less likely to provoke each other to sin, <b>and</b> it is <b>beneficial to the world.</b> The dispersal <b>of the righteous is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world.</b> The <b>assembly of the wicked</b> in one place <b>is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world,</b> while the assembly <b>of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.</b> The <b>tranquility of the wicked is detrimental to them and detrimental to the world,</b> while the tranquility <b>of the righteous is beneficial to them and beneficial to the world.</b>",
            "<b>A burglar</b> who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is <b>sentenced on account of his ultimate end,</b> as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar <b>was breaking into</b> a house, <b>and</b> in the course of doing so <b>he broke a barrel, if there is blood</b>-guiltiness <b>for</b> killing <b>him,</b> i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is <b>liable</b> to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. <b>If there is no blood</b>-guiltiness <b>for</b> killing <b>him,</b> i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is <b>exempt</b> from paying for the barrel.",
            "<b>And these are the ones who are saved</b> from transgressing even <b>at</b> the cost of <b>their lives;</b> that is to say, these people may be killed so that they do not perform a transgression: <b>One who pursues another to kill him, or</b> pursues <b>a male</b> to sodomize him, <b>or</b> pursues <b>a betrothed young woman</b> to rape her. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>one who pursues an animal</b> to sodomize it, <b>or one who</b> seeks to <b>desecrate Shabbat, or</b> one who is going to <b>engage in idol worship,</b> they <b>are not saved at</b> the cost of <b>their lives.</b> Rather, they are forewarned not to transgress, and if they proceed to transgress after having been forewarned, they are brought to trial, and if they are found guilty, they are executed."
        ],
        [
            "<b>And these are</b> the transgressors <b>who are burned</b> in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: <b>One who engaged in intercourse with a woman and her daughter, and</b> one who is <b>the daughter of a priest</b> and <b>who committed adultery.</b> Included <b>in the category of</b> the prohibition of engaging in intercourse with <b>a woman and her daughter</b> and the resulting execution by burning, <b>there are: His daughter, and the daughter of his daughter, and the daughter of his son.</b> Likewise, the following are also included in this category: Intercourse with <b>the daughter of his wife,</b> even though she is not his daughter, <b>and the daughter of her daughter, and the daughter of her son,</b> as well as intercourse with <b>his mother-in-law, and the mother of his mother-in-law, and the mother of his father-in-law.</b> The prohibition and punishment apply both in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her daughter, and in cases where a man marries a woman and then engages in intercourse with her mother. <b>And these are</b> the transgressors <b>who are killed</b> by decapitation in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: <b>The murderer; and the residents of an idolatrous city,</b> all of whom engaged in idol worship. The mishna elaborates: In the case of <b>a murderer who struck another with a stone or with iron, or held him in the water or in the fire, and</b> the victim <b>could not extricate himself from there and he died,</b>the murderer is <b>liable</b> to be executed. If <b>one pushed</b> another <b>into the water or into the fire and</b> that person <b>could have extricated himself from there</b> but failed to do so, <b>and he died,</b> the one who pushed him is <b>exempt</b> from punishment by a court, as he caused the death but did not actually kill the victim. For the same reason, if <b>one set a dog against</b> another and the dog killed him, or if <b>one set a snake against</b> another and the snake killed him, the one who set the dog or the snake is <b>exempt</b> from punishment. If he imbedded the snake’s fangs into another and <b>caused the snake to bite him</b> and kill him, <b>Rabbi Yehuda deems</b> him <b>liable</b> to be executed, as he is a murderer, <b>and the Rabbis exempt</b> him, as they maintain that he indirectly caused the individual’s death. In the case of <b>one who strikes another, whether</b> he does so <b>with a stone or with</b> his <b>fist, and</b> the doctors <b>assessed</b> his condition, estimating that it would lead <b>to death, and</b> then his condition <b>eased from what it was,</b> and the doctors revised their prognosis and predicted that he would live, <b>and thereafter</b> his condition <b>worsened and he died,</b> the assailant is <b>liable</b> to be executed as a murderer. <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> He is <b>exempt, as there is a basis for the matter</b> of assuming that he is not liable. Since the victim’s condition eased in the interim, a cause other than the blow struck by the assailant ultimately caused his death. ",
            "If one <b>intended to kill an animal, and he killed a person</b> standing adjacent to it, or if he intended <b>to</b> kill <b>a gentile,</b> for whose murder he is not liable to be executed in court, <b>and he killed a Jew,</b> or if he intended <b>to</b> kill <b>non-viable newborns,</b> for whose murder one is not liable, <b>and he killed a viable person,</b> the assailant is <b>exempt</b> from execution, since his intent was to kill one for whose murder he is not liable. If one <b>intended to strike</b> another <b>on his loins, and</b> the blow <b>was not</b> powerful <b>enough to kill him</b> if it were to land <b>on his loins, but</b> instead the blow landed <b>on</b> his chest over the victim’s <b>heart, and it was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill him</b> when it landed <b>on</b> his chest over <b>his heart, and</b> the victim <b>died</b> as a result of the blow, the assailant is <b>exempt</b> from execution, as he did not intend to strike the victim a blow that would cause his death. If <b>he intended to strike him on</b> his chest over <b>his heart</b> <b>and</b> the blow <b>was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill him</b> were it to land <b>on</b> his chest over <b>his heart, and</b> instead the blow <b>landed on his loins, and it was not</b> powerful <b>enough to kill him</b> when it landed <b>on his loins, and</b> nevertheless the victim <b>died,</b> the assailant is <b>exempt.</b> Although the assailant intended to kill the victim, the blow was not powerful enough to kill. Ostensibly, his death was not a result of the blow. If <b>one intended to kill an adult and</b> the blow <b>was not</b> powerful <b>enough to kill the adult,</b> and instead the <b>blow landed on a minor, and</b> the blow <b>was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill the minor and</b> the minor <b>died,</b> the assailant is <b>exempt.</b> If <b>one intended to kill a minor and</b> the blow <b>was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill a minor, and</b> the blow <b>landed on an adult and</b> the blow <b>was not</b> powerful <b>enough to kill the adult, and</b> nevertheless, the adult <b>died,</b> the assailant is <b>exempt.</b> <b>But</b> if <b>one intended to strike</b> another <b>on his loins, and</b> the blow <b>was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill him</b> were it to land <b>on his loins, and</b> instead the blow <b>landed on</b> his chest over <b>his heart, and he died,</b> the assailant is <b>liable,</b> since in any event, his intent was to kill the victim and the blow was powerful enough to kill him wherever it struck him. If <b>one intended to strike an adult and</b> the blow <b>was</b> powerful <b>enough to kill the adult, and</b> the blow <b>landed on a minor and he died,</b> the assailant is <b>liable. Rabbi Shimon says: Even</b> if <b>one intended to kill this</b> one <b>and he killed that</b> one, although he would be liable for killing either, he is <b>exempt,</b> because one is executed only if his action completely corresponded with his intent.",
            "With regard to <b>a murderer who was intermingled with others</b> and it is not possible to identify the murderer, <b>all of them are exempt</b> from liability to be executed. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The court <b>gathers them into the vaulted chamber [<i>lakippa</i>]</b> where they will eventually die. With regard to <b>all</b> those <b>liable to</b> be executed with different court-imposed <b>death</b> penalties <b>who became intermingled with each other</b> and it cannot be determined which individual was sentenced to which death, <b>they are</b> all <b>sentenced to the</b> most <b>lenient</b> form of execution to which any of them was sentenced. In a case where those <b>who are</b> liable to be <b>stoned</b> were intermingled <b>with</b> those <b>who are</b> liable to be <b>burned, Rabbi Shimon says: They are</b> all <b>sentenced</b> to be executed <b>by stoning, as burning</b> is a more <b>severe</b> form of execution than stoning. <b>And the Rabbis say: They are</b> all <b>sentenced</b> to be executed <b>by burning, as stoning</b> is a more <b>severe</b> form of execution than burning. <b>Rabbi Shimon said to</b> the Rabbis: <b>If burning were not more severe</b> than stoning, <b>it would not have been administered to a priest’s daughter who committed adultery.</b> A betrothed daughter of an Israelite who committed adultery is executed by stoning. If burning were not a more severe form of execution than stoning, it would not have been administered to the daughter of a priest who committed adultery, who would presumably receive a more severe punishment. The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Shimon: <b>If stoning were not more severe</b> than burning <b>it would not have been</b> the death penalty <b>administered to a blasphemer and to an idol worshipper,</b> as their actions violate the very core of the Jewish faith. There is a parallel dispute: In a case where those <b>who are</b> liable to be <b>killed</b> by beheading were intermingled <b>with</b> those <b>who are</b> liable to be <b>strangled, Rabbi Shimon says: They are</b> all <b>sentenced</b> to be beheaded <b>with a sword,</b> as strangulation is a more severe form of execution than beheading. <b>And the Rabbis say: They are</b> all <b>sentenced</b> to be executed <b>by strangulation,</b> as beheading is a more severe form of execution than strangulation. ",
            "<b>One who is liable</b> to be executed <b>with two</b> different <b>court</b>-imposed <b>death</b> penalties, as he violated two different capital transgressions, <b>is sentenced to the</b> more <b>severe</b> form of execution. If one <b>violated</b> one <b>transgression</b> for <b>which he is liable</b> to receive <b>two death</b> penalties, e.g., if one engaged in intercourse with his mother-in-law, who is also a married woman, <b>he is sentenced to the</b> more <b>severe</b> form of execution. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: He is sentenced</b> to the form of execution that he is liable to receive due <b>to the first relationship that came upon him,</b> i.e., if she was his mother-in-law before she was married, he is executed by burning; if she was married before she was his mother-in-law, he is punished by strangulation. ",
            "<b>One who was flogged</b> for violating a prohibition <b>and</b> then <b>repeated</b> the violation and was flogged again assumes the status of a forewarned transgressor. The <b>court places him into the vaulted chamber [<i>lakippa</i>] and feeds him barley</b> bread <b>until his belly ruptures</b> due to the low-quality food, and he dies. With regard to <b>one who kills a person not in</b> the presence of <b>witnesses</b> and it is impossible to judge him in court, the court <b>places him into a vaulted chamber and feeds him sparing bread and scant water</b> (see Isaiah 30:20).",
            "With regard to <b>one who steals a <i>kasva</i>, and one who curses with a sorcerer, and one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots strike him</b> and kill him. Although the Torah does not say that one who performs one of these actions is liable to be executed, it is permitted for anyone who zealously takes the vengeance of the Lord to do so. In the case of <b>a priest who performed</b> the Temple <b>service in</b> a state of <b>ritual impurity, his priestly brethren do not bring him to court</b> for judgment; <b>rather, the young men of the priesthood remove him from the Temple courtyard and pierce his skull with pieces of wood.</b> In the case of <b>a non-priest who performed the service in the Temple, Rabbi Akiva says:</b> His execution is <b>by strangulation, and the Rabbis say:</b> He is not executed with a court-imposed death penalty; rather, he is liable to receive death <b>at the hand of Heaven.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>All of the Jewish people,</b> even sinners and those who are liable to be executed with a court-imposed death penalty, <b>have a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And your people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever; the branch of My planting, the work of My hands, for My name to be glorified”</b> (Isaiah 60:21). <b>And these</b> are the exceptions, the people <b>who have no share in the World-to-Come,</b> even when they fulfilled many mitzvot: <b>One who says: There is no resurrection of the dead</b> derived <b>from the Torah, and</b> one who says: The <b>Torah</b> did <b>not</b> originate <b>from Heaven, and an <i>epikoros</i>,</b> who treats Torah scholars and the Torah that they teach with contempt. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: Also</b> included in the exceptions are <b>one who reads external literature, and one who whispers</b> invocations <b>over a wound and says</b> as an invocation for healing: <b>“Every illness that I placed upon Egypt I will not place upon you, for I am the Lord, your Healer”</b> (Exodus 15:26). By doing so, he shows contempt for the sanctity of the name of God and therefore has no share in the World-to-Come. <b>Abba Shaul says: Also</b> included in the exceptions is <b>one who pronounces the</b> ineffable <b>name</b> of God as it is written, <b>with its letters.</b> ",
            "<b>Three</b> prominent <b>kings</b> mentioned in the Bible <b>and four</b> prominent <b>commoners</b> who are described in the Bible as men of great wisdom <b>have no share in the World-to-Come.</b> The <b>three kings</b> are: <b>Jeroboam,</b> son of Nebat, and <b>Ahab,</b> both of whom were kings of Israel, <b>and Manasseh,</b> king of Judea. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Manasseh has a share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated</b> concerning Manasseh: <b>“And he prayed to Him,</b> and He received his entreaty, <b>and heard his supplication and brought him back to Jerusalem unto his kingdom”</b> (II Chronicles 33:13), indicating that he repented wholeheartedly and effectively. The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Yehuda: He regretted his actions, and his repentance was effective to the extent that God <b>restored him to his kingdom, but</b> God <b>did not restore him to his</b> share in <b>life in the World-to-Come.</b> The <b>four commoners</b> are: <b>Balaam,</b> son of Beor; <b>Doeg</b> the Edomite; <b>Ahithophel; and Gehazi.</b>",
            "The members of <b>the generation of the flood have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment</b> at the end of days, <b>as it is stated: “My soul shall not abide [<i>yadon</i>] in man forever”</b> (Genesis 6:3); <b>neither</b> will they stand in <b>judgment [<i>din</i>] nor</b> shall their <b>souls</b> be restored to them. The members of <b>the generation of the dispersion have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the Lord scattered them from there upon the face of all the earth”</b> (Genesis 11:8), <b>and it is written: “And from there did the Lord scatter them</b> upon the face of all the earth” (Genesis 11:9). <b>“And the Lord scattered them”</b> indicates <b>in this world; “and from there did the Lord scatter them”</b> indicates <b>for the World-to-Come. The people of Sodom have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners before the Lord exceedingly”</b> (Genesis 13:13). <b>“Wicked”</b> indicates <b>in this world; “and sinners”</b> indicates <b>for the World-to-Come. But they will stand in judgment</b> and they will be sentenced to eternal contempt. <b>Rabbi Neḥemya says:</b> Both <b>these,</b> the people of Sodom, <b>and those,</b> the members of the generation of the flood, <b>will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “Therefore the wicked shall not stand</b> <b>in judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous”</b> (Psalms 1:5). <b>“Therefore the wicked shall not stand in judgment”; this</b> is referring to <b>the generation of the flood,</b> about whom it is written: “The wickedness of man was great upon the earth” (Genesis 6:5). <b>“Nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous”; these are the people of Sodom,</b> about whom it is written: “And the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners” (Genesis 13:13). The Sages <b>said to</b> Rabbi Neḥemya: <b>They will not stand</b> in judgment for resurrection <b>in the congregation of the righteous, but they will stand</b> in judgment <b>in the congregation of the wicked.</b> <b>The spies</b> who spread an evil report of their visit to Canaan <b>have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “And those men who spread the evil report about the land died by plague before the Lord”</b> (Numbers 14:37). <b>“And…died”</b> indicates <b>in this world; “by plague”</b> indicates <b>for the World-to-Come.</b> The members of <b>the generation of the wilderness have no share in the World-to-Come and will not stand in judgment, as it is stated: “In this wilderness they shall be consumed, and there they shall die”</b> (Numbers 14:35). “They shall be consumed” indicates in this world; “and there they shall die” indicates for the World-to-Come; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> The members of the generation of the wilderness were essentially righteous, and <b>about them</b> the verse <b>says: “Gather My pious together to Me, those that have entered into My covenant by offering”</b> (Psalms 50:5). It is they who entered into the covenant with God and they will certainly be rewarded in the future. <b>The assembly of Korah is not destined to arise</b> for resurrection, <b>as it is stated: “And the earth closed upon them”</b> (Numbers 16:33), meaning <b>in this world,</b> and also: <b>“And they perished from among the assembly”</b> (Numbers 16:33), meaning <b>in the World-to-Come;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: About them</b> the verse <b>says: “The Lord kills and makes alive; He lowers to the grave, and raises”</b> (I Samuel 2:6), indicating that the assembly of Korah has a share in the World-to-Come. <b>The ten tribes are not destined to return</b> to Eretz Yisrael, even during the messianic era, <b>as it is stated: “And He cast them into another land, as it is this day”</b> (Deuteronomy 29:27). <b>Just as the day passes never to return, so too,</b> the ten tribes <b>go</b> into exile <b>and do not return;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer says: “As it is this day,”</b> meaning <b>just as the day darkens and</b> then the sky <b>brightens</b> the next day, with regard to <b>the ten tribes as well,</b> although <b>it is dark for them</b> now, <b>so it is destined to brighten for them.</b>",
            "<b>The residents of an idolatrous city have no share in the World-to-Come, as it is stated: “Certain men, wicked persons, are gone out from your midst, and have subverted the inhabitants of their city, saying:</b> Let us go and let us worship other gods” (Deuteronomy 13:14). <b>And</b> idol worshippers <b>are not executed</b> as residents of an idolatrous city <b>unless its subverters are from that city and from that tribe, and unless most of</b> the inhabitants of the city <b>are subverted, and unless men subvert</b> the inhabitants of the city. If it occurs that <b>women or children subvert</b> the inhabitants of the city, <b>or that a minority of</b> the inhabitants of the city <b>were subverted, or that its subverters were from outside</b> the city and were neither residents of that city nor members of that tribe, <b>these</b> idol worshippers <b>are</b> judged <b>as individuals. And</b> to judge the inhabitants of a city <b>one requires two witnesses and forewarning for each and every one</b> who engaged in idol worship. <b>This is a stringency with regard to individuals</b> who worship idols that is more stringent <b>than</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to multitudes</b> who worship idols: <b>As the individuals</b> who worship idols are executed <b>by stoning; therefore,</b> since there is a stringency with regard to their mode of execution, <b>their property is spared</b> and is inherited by their heirs. <b>And the multitudes</b> are executed <b>by the sword;</b> therefore, since there is a leniency with regard to their mode of execution, <b>their property is eliminated.</b> ",
            "From the verse: <b>“You shall smite the inhabitants of that city with the edge of the sword”</b> (Deuteronomy 13:16), it is derived that <b>the caravan of donkeys and the caravan of camels that move from place to place, these</b> donkey or camel drivers <b>save</b> the city. If they were residing in the city for a period, they could join the minority of permanent residents who were not subverted to idol worship in order to create a majority and prevent the destruction of the city and its contents. <b>It is stated: “Destroy it utterly, and all that is in it and its animals, with the edge of the sword”</b> (Deuteronomy 13:16). <b>From here,</b> the Sages <b>stated: The property of the righteous,</b> who did not engage in idol worship, <b>that is inside</b> the city <b>is destroyed</b> with the rest of the city and its contents; but the property of the righteous <b>that is outside</b> the city <b>is spared. And</b> the property <b>of the wicked, whether</b> it is <b>inside</b> the city <b>or whether it is outside</b> the city, <b>these</b> items <b>are destroyed.</b> ",
            "<b>“And you shall gather all of its spoils into the midst of its square”</b> (Deuteronomy 13:17). <b>If</b> the city <b>has no square, one creates a square for</b> the city in order to fulfill the mitzva as it is written. <b>If there was a square outside of</b> the city, <b>they bring it inside</b> the city by expanding the city wall to include the square. <b>It is stated</b> in the continuation of the verse: <b>“And you shall burn it with fire, both the city and all its spoils, entirely for the Lord your God.”</b> The mishna infers: <b>“Its spoils,” but not the spoils of Heaven. From here</b> the Sages <b>stated: The consecrated</b> property <b>in it,</b> which was no longer the property of its inhabitants, <b>must be redeemed, and <i>terumot</i></b> are neither eaten nor burned; rather <b>they must</b> be left to <b>decay.</b> And <b>second tithe and sacred scrolls</b> that were in the city <b>must be interred.</b> With regard to the phrase: <b>“Entirely [<i>kalil</i>] for the Lord your God,” Rabbi Shimon says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, says: If you implement judgment on an idolatrous city, I ascribe you</b> credit <b>as though you have sacrificed an entirely [<i>kalil</i>] burnt offering before Me.</b> It is written: <b>“And it shall be a heap forever”</b> (Deuteronomy 13:17), meaning: The idolatrous city <b>shall not be converted</b> even into <b>gardens and orchards;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> From the end of that verse: <b>“It shall not be built again,”</b> it is derived: To restore it <b>to the way it was</b> before destruction, <b>it</b> may <b>not</b> be <b>built; but it may be converted into gardens and orchards.</b> The next verse states: <b>“And there shall cleave nothing of that which was devoted to your hand”</b> (Deuteronomy 13:18). This teaches that <b>as long as the wicked</b> exist <b>in the world,</b> there is <b>wrath in the world;</b> once <b>the wicked are eliminated from the world, wrath leaves the world.</b>"
        ],
        [
            "<b>These are</b> the transgressors <b>who are strangled</b> in the implementation of the court-imposed death penalty: <b>One who strikes his father or his mother, and one who abducts a Jewish person, and a rebellious elder according to</b> the <b>court, and a false prophet, and one who prophesies in the name of idol worship, and one who engages in intercourse with a married woman, and conspiring</b> witnesses who testify that <b>the daughter of a priest</b> committed adultery, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. <b>And her paramour</b> is also executed via strangulation as in any case where a man engages in intercourse with a married woman. <b>One who strikes his father or his mother is not liable</b> to be executed <b>unless he wounds</b> one of <b>them. This is a stringency with regard to one who curses</b> his father that is more severe <b>than</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to one who strikes</b> his father, <b>as one who curses</b> his father or his mother <b>after</b> his or her <b>death is liable, but one who strikes</b> one of them <b>after</b> his or her <b>death is exempt,</b> as he did not cause a wound. gemara <b>The Sages taught</b> in a <i>baraita</i> that it is written: “For any man who curses his father and his mother shall be put to death, he has cursed his father and his mother; his blood shall be upon him who curses his father and his mother shall die; <b>he has cursed his father and his mother;</b> his blood shall be upon him” (Leviticus 20:9). This is referring to one who curses his parents even <b>after</b> their <b>death, as</b> one <b>might</b> have thought: <b>Since one is liable for striking and one is liable for cursing, just as one who strikes is liable only when</b> his father or mother are <b>alive, so too, one who curses is liable only when</b> they are <b>alive.</b> <b>One who abducts a Jewish person is not liable</b> to be executed <b>unless he brings</b> the abductee <b>into his domain. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> He is not liable <b>unless he brings him into his domain and exploits him, as it is stated:</b> “If a man shall be found abducting a person of his brethren from the children of Israel, <b>and he exploited him and sold him,</b> then that abductor shall die” (Deuteronomy 24:7). The phrase “exploited him” indicates using him for labor. With regard to <b>one who abducts his</b> own <b>son</b> and sells him, <b>Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, deems</b> him <b>liable, and the Rabbis deem</b> him <b>exempt.</b> If <b>one abducted one who is a half-slave half-freeman,</b> i.e., a Canaanite slave who belonged to two owners and was emancipated by one of them, <b>Rabbi Yehuda deems</b> him <b>liable, and the Rabbis deem</b> him <b>exempt.</b>",
            "<b>A rebellious elder according to</b> the <b>court,</b> who does not observe the ruling of the court, is executed by strangulation, <b>as it is stated: “If there shall be a matter too hard for you in judgment</b>…and you shall arise and ascend unto the place that the Lord your God shall choose…and you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you…and the man that shall do so intentionally, not to listen…and that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:8–12). <b>There were three courts there</b> in Jerusalem. <b>One convenes at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and one convenes at the entrance to the</b> Temple <b>courtyard, and one convenes in the Chamber of Hewn Stone.</b> An elder who issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of his colleagues and his colleagues <b>come to that</b> court <b>that is at the entrance to the Temple Mount, and</b> the elder <b>says: This</b> is what <b>I interpreted and that</b> is what <b>my colleagues interpreted; this</b> is what <b>I taught and that</b> is what <b>my colleagues taught. If</b> the members of the court <b>heard</b> a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court <b>says</b> it <b>to them.</b> <b>And if not, they come to those</b> judges <b>who</b> are convened <b>at the entrance to</b> the <b>Temple courtyard,</b> which is a more significant tribunal. <b>And</b> the elder <b>says: This</b> is what <b>I interpreted and that</b> is what <b>my colleagues interpreted; this</b> is what <b>I taught and that</b> is what <b>my colleagues taught. If</b> the members of the court <b>heard</b> a clear halakhic ruling in that case, the court <b>says</b> it <b>to them.</b> <b>And if not, these</b> judges <b>and those</b> judges <b>come to the High Court,</b> the Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges <b>that is in the Chamber of Hewn Stone, from which Torah emerges to the entire Jewish people, as it is stated:</b> “And you shall do according to the matter that they shall declare unto you <b>from that place that the Lord shall choose</b> and you shall observe to perform according to all that they shall teach you” (Deuteronomy 17:10). They are the ultimate arbiters who establish the <i>halakha</i> that is binding. If they ruled contrary to the ruling of the elder and the elder then <b>returned to his city,</b> and nevertheless, <b>he taught in the manner that he was teaching</b> previously, he is <b>exempt</b> from punishment. <b>But if he instructed</b> others <b>to act</b> on the basis of his ruling that stands contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is <b>liable</b> to be executed, <b>as it is stated: “And the man that shall do so intentionally</b> not to listen” (Deuteronomy 17:12), meaning that <b>one is not liable unless he instructs</b> others <b>to act.</b> <b>A student</b> who is not yet an elder, i.e., he has not been ordained, <b>who instructs</b> others <b>to act</b> contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, is <b>exempt,</b> as a ruling given prior to ordination is not a valid ruling. <b>It follows</b> that <b>his stringency is his leniency.</b> The stringency imposed upon the student that he is not sanctioned to issue rulings results in the leniency that if he instructs others to act on the basis of his ruling that is contrary to the ruling of the Sanhedrin, he is exempt.",
            "With regard to the rulings of the rebellious elder the mishna states: There is greater <b>stringency with regard to</b> traditional <b>rabbinic interpretations</b> of the Torah <b>than with regard to matters of Torah.</b> If <b>one states:</b> There is <b>no</b> mitzva to don <b>phylacteries,</b> and his intention is <b>in order to</b> have others <b>violate matters of Torah,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from punishment as a rebellious elder. One who disputes matters written explicitly in the Torah is not considered an elder and a Torah scholar, and therefore does not assume the status of a rebellious elder. If, however, he disputed a matter based on rabbinic tradition, e.g., he stated that there should be <b>five compartments</b> in the phylacteries of the head, in order <b>to add</b> an extra compartment <b>to</b> the four established according to traditional <b>rabbinic interpretations</b> of the Torah, he is <b>liable.</b>",
            "<b>One does not execute</b> the rebellious elder, <b>neither in the court that is in his city, nor in the court that is in Yavne,</b> although that was the seat of the Sanhedrin after the destruction of the Second Temple. <b>Rather, one takes him up to the High Court in Jerusalem. And they guard him</b> in incarceration <b>until the pilgrimage Festival, and</b> the court <b>executes him during the pilgrimage Festival, as it is stated: “And all the nation shall hear, and fear, and no longer sin intentionally”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:13); this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not delay</b> administering <b>justice</b> to <b>this</b> individual. <b>Rather,</b> the court <b>executes him immediately, and</b> the judges <b>write</b> reports <b>and dispatch agents to all the places,</b> informing them: <b>So-and-so is liable</b> to be punished with the <b>court</b>-imposed <b>death</b> penalty for disobeying the court.",
            "<b>The false prophet</b> mentioned in the Torah includes <b>one who prophesies that which he did not hear</b> from God <b>and</b> one who prophesies <b>that which was not said to him,</b> even if it was said to another prophet. In those cases, <b>his execution is at the hand of man,</b> through strangulation imposed by the court. <b>But</b> with regard to <b>one who suppresses his prophecy</b> because he does not want to share it with the public, <b>and one who</b> contemptuously <b>forgoes the statement of a prophet</b> and refuses to heed it, <b>and a prophet who violated his own statement</b> and failed to perform that which he was commanded to do, <b>his death is at the hand of Heaven, as it is stated:</b> “And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall not hearken unto My words that he shall speak in My name, <b>I will exact it of him”</b> (Deuteronomy 18:19).",
            "<b>One who prophesies in the name of idol worship and says: This</b> is what the <b>idol said, even</b> if <b>he approximated the</b> correct <b><i>halakha</i></b> in the name of the idol <b>to deem ritually impure that which is ritually impure and to deem ritually pure that which is ritually pure,</b> is executed by strangulation. In the case of <b>one who engages in intercourse with a married woman once she entered her husband’s domain for</b> the purposes of <b>marriage, even if</b> the marriage was not yet consummated, as <b>she did not</b> yet <b>engage in intercourse</b> with him, <b>one who engages in intercourse with her is</b> executed <b>by strangulation.</b> Before marriage, one who engages in intercourse with her is liable to be executed by stoning. <b>And conspiring</b> witnesses who testified that <b>the daughter of a priest</b> committed adultery are executed by strangulation, even though were she guilty, she would be executed by burning. <b>And her paramour</b> is also executed by strangulation, as in any case where one engages in intercourse with a married woman. <b>As all</b> those <b>who are rendered conspiring witnesses are led to</b> their deaths via <b>the same</b> mode of <b>execution</b> with which they conspired to have their victim executed, <b>except for conspiring</b> witnesses who testified that <b>the daughter of a priest and her paramour</b> committed adultery. In that case, although the priest’s daughter who commits adultery is executed by burning, the conspiring witnesses who sought to have her executed are executed by strangulation, as is the paramour whom they also conspired to have executed."
        ]
    ],
    "versions": [
        [
            "William Davidson Edition - English",
            "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1"
        ]
    ],
    "heTitle": "משנה סנהדרין",
    "categories": [
        "Mishnah",
        "Seder Nezikin"
    ],
    "sectionNames": [
        "Chapter",
        "Mishnah"
    ]
}