| { | |
| "title": "Mishnah Bava Kamma", | |
| "language": "en", | |
| "versionTitle": "merged", | |
| "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Bava_Kamma", | |
| "text": [ | |
| [ | |
| "There are <b>four primary categories of damage: The</b> category of <b>Ox; and the</b> category of <b>Pit; and the</b> category of <b><i>Maveh</i>,</b> which, based on a discussion in the Gemara refers either to the tooth of an animal that causes damage or to a person who causes damage; <b>and the</b> category of <b>Fire.</b> Each of these categories is unique; therefore, the <i>halakhot</i> of one cannot be derived from another. The defining characteristic of <b>the</b> primary category of <b>Ox is not similar to</b> the defining characteristic of <b>the</b> primary category of <b><i>Maveh</i>, and</b> the defining characteristic of <b>the</b> primary category of <b><i>Maveh</i> is not similar to</b> the defining characteristic of <b>the</b> primary category of <b>Ox. And</b> the defining characteristics of <b>this</b> category of Ox <b>and that</b> category of <i>Maveh</i>, <b>in which there is a living spirit</b> that causes damage, <b>are not similar to</b> the defining characteristic of <b>the</b> category of <b>Fire, in which there is no living spirit.</b> The mishna continues: <b>And</b> the defining characteristics of <b>this</b> primary category of Ox and <i>Maveh</i> <b>and that</b> primary category of Fire, <b>in which</b> the <b>typical manner</b> of their components is <b>to proceed</b> from one place to another <b>and</b> cause <b>damage, are not similar to</b> the defining characteristic of <b>the</b> primary category of <b>Pit, in which</b> the <b>typical manner</b> of its components is <b>not to proceed</b> from one place to another <b>and</b> cause <b>damage;</b> rather, it remains in place and the damage is caused by the injured party proceeding and encountering the obstacle. <b>The common denominator of</b> the components in all of <b>these</b> primary categories is <b>that</b> it is <b>their typical manner to cause damage, and</b> the responsibility for <b>their safeguarding</b> to prevent them from causing damage is incumbent <b>upon you,</b> the owner of the animal or generator of the fire or the pit. <b>And when</b> a component of any of these categories <b>causes damage, the</b> owner or generator of the component that <b>caused</b> the <b>damage is obligated to pay</b> restitution <b>for damage with best</b>-quality <b>land.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>anything</b> for <b>which I became responsible for safeguarding it</b> to prevent it from causing damage, if it in fact causes damage, it is considered as if <b>I</b> actively <b>facilitated that damage,</b> and accordingly I must pay for it. In any case in which <b>I facilitated part of the damage it</b> caused, <b>I am liable for payments</b> of restitution <b>for damage it</b> caused, <b>as</b> if I were the <b>one who facilitated the entire damage it</b> caused. One is liable only with regard to damage caused to <b>property</b> for <b>which,</b> were he to use it for a non-sacred purpose, he <b>would not be</b> liable <b>for</b> the <b>misuse</b> of consecrated property; with regard to damage caused to <b>property that belongs to members of the covenant,</b> i.e., Jews; and with regard to <b>assigned property,</b> the meaning of which the Gemara will explain. <b>And</b> one is liable for damage caused <b>in any place except for a domain designated</b> exclusively <b>for</b> the use of <b>the one responsible for the damage.</b> <b>And</b> one is liable for damage caused in <b>a domain</b> designated for the joint use <b>of the injured</b> party <b>and the one liable for the damage.</b> <b>When</b> an animal or item one is responsible to safeguard <b>causes damage, the one liable for the damage</b> caused by insufficiently safeguarding it <b>is obligated to pay payments</b> of restitution <b>for damage with</b> his best-quality <b>land.</b>", | |
| "The determination of payment of damages is made by <b>monetary appraisal.</b> One pays with items <b>worth money.</b> This <i>halakha</i> applies <b>before a court. And</b> it is <b>based upon</b> the testimony of <b>witnesses</b> who are <b>free men,</b> i.e., men who are not Canaanite slaves, and who are <b>members of the covenant,</b> i.e., Jews. <b>And women are included in the</b> <i>halakhot</i> of <b>damages</b> in the same way as men. <b>And</b> both <b>the injured</b> party <b>and the one liable for the damage</b> are involved <b>in</b> the <b>payment.</b> The Gemara will explicate each of these principles.", | |
| "There are <b>five</b> damage-causing acts that an animal can perform twice and remain <b>innocuous</b> even when its owner was warned each time to prevent it from doing so. After the third time, the animal is rendered forewarned. In such cases, the owner is liable to pay only half of the damages. <b>And</b> there are <b>five</b> damage-causing acts for which an animal is considered <b>forewarned,</b> at times even if it had never caused damage in that manner. In such cases the owner is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. <b>An animal is not</b> considered <b>forewarned</b> with regard to Goring, i.e., <b>not for goring</b> with its horns, <b>nor for pushing</b> with its body, <b>nor for biting, nor for crouching</b> upon items in order to damage them, <b>nor for kicking.</b> In these cases the animal is considered to be innocuous and its owner is liable for only half of the damages. Concerning acts of damage performed with <b>the tooth,</b> the animal is considered <b>forewarned with regard to eating that which is fitting for it</b> to eat. Concerning acts of damage performed with <b>the foot,</b> the animal is considered <b>forewarned with regard to breaking</b> items <b>while walking. And</b> there is <b>a forewarned ox,</b> which gored three times and each time his owner was warned to safeguard his ox from doing so. <b>And</b> there is <b>an ox that causes damage</b> to the property of the injured party while <b>on the property of the injured</b> party. <b>And</b> there is <b>the person,</b> i.e., any damage done by a person. In all of these cases the one who caused the damage is considered to be forewarned, resulting in the obligation to pay the full cost of the damage. The mishna presents the <i>halakha</i> for wild animals: <b>The wolf; the lion; the bear; the leopard; the <i>bardelas</i>,</b> the meaning of which the Gemara will discuss; <b>and the snake. These are</b> considered <b>forewarned</b> even if they had never previously caused damage. <b>Rabbi Elazar says: When these</b> animals <b>are domesticated they are not</b> considered <b>forewarned. But the snake is always</b> considered <b>forewarned.</b> <b>What</b> is the difference <b>between</b> the liability incurred for damage caused by an ox that is considered <b>innocuous and</b> the liability incurred for damage caused by an ox that is <b>forewarned?</b> The <b>only</b> differences are <b>that</b> for damage caused by <b>an innocuous</b> ox, the owner <b>pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage</b> exclusively <b>from</b> proceeds of the sale <b>of the body</b> of the ox, <b>and</b> for <b>a forewarned</b> ox <b>he pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage from</b> his <b>higher</b> property." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "The mishna in the previous chapter (15b) teaches that the owner of an animal is always forewarned with regard to the category of Trampling. The mishna elaborates: For <b>what</b> damage caused with <b>the hoof</b> is the animal deemed <b>forewarned?</b> It is deemed forewarned with regard <b>to</b> trampling objects and <b>breaking</b> them <b>in the course of its walking. An animal is</b> deemed <b>forewarned with regard to walking in its</b> typical <b>manner and,</b> by doing so, <b>breaking</b> objects as it proceeds. By contrast, if the animal <b>was kicking</b> while it was walking, <b>or</b> it transpired <b>that pebbles were</b> inadvertently <b>propelled from under its feet and</b> those pebbles <b>broke vessels,</b> cases of that kind do not fit precisely into the primary category of Trampling. In both of these cases the owner of the animal <b>pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b> If an animal <b>trod upon a vessel and broke it and</b> then a shard of that vessel <b>fell upon</b> a second <b>vessel and broke it,</b> the owner <b>pays</b> the <b>full</b> cost of the <b>damage for the first</b> vessel, as its action is classified under the primary category of Trampling, <b>and he pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage for the latter</b> vessel, as the damage caused by the shard is tantamount to damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of an animal. <b>Chickens are</b> deemed <b>forewarned</b> with regard <b>to walking in their</b> typical <b>manner and breaking</b> objects, and therefore, the owner of a chicken pays the full restitution for the damage done to any objects broken by his chicken. If there <b>was a string [<i>delil</i>] tied to</b> a chicken’s <b>leg</b> as an indication of ownership and it wrapped around a vessel and broke it, <b>or</b> if the chicken <b>was hopping</b> in an atypical manner <b>and breaking vessels,</b> its owner <b>pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b>", | |
| "Within the context of the primary category of Eating, for <b>what</b> damage caused with <b>the tooth</b> is an animal deemed <b>forewarned?</b> It is deemed forewarned with regard <b>to eating</b> food items <b>fit for its</b> consumption. <b>The domesticated animal is</b> deemed <b>forewarned</b> with regard <b>to eating fruits and vegetables.</b> If the animal <b>ate garments or vessels,</b> the owner <b>pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b> As these are not items fit for its consumption, the animal is not deemed forewarned in this case. <b>In what</b> case <b>is this statement</b> applied, that one pays the full value of the food eaten by the animal? It is a case where the animal ate the food <b>on the property of the injured</b> party; <b>but</b> if the animal ate food <b>in the public domain,</b> the owner of the animal is <b>exempt</b> from liability. <b>And</b> even if the animal ate food in the public domain, <b>if</b> the animal <b>derives benefit</b> from eating another’s produce in the public domain, the owner <b>pays</b> for <b>the benefit that it derives,</b> just not for the full cost of the food. <b>Under what</b> circumstances does the owner of the animal <b>pay</b> for <b>the benefit that it derives?</b> If the animal <b>ate</b> produce <b>in</b> the public <b>square</b> in the area before the storefronts, the owner of the animal <b>pays</b> for <b>the benefit that it derives.</b> If the animal ate <b>from</b> food placed at <b>the side of</b> the public <b>square,</b> which is not a public thoroughfare, the owner of the animal <b>pays</b> for <b>what it damaged,</b> as the legal status of that area is like that of the property of the injured party. If the animal ate produce <b>from the entrance of the store,</b> its owner <b>pays</b> for <b>the benefit that it derives,</b> as the status of a store entrance is like that of the public domain. If the animal ate produce <b>from inside the store,</b> its owner <b>pays</b> for <b>what it damaged.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>a dog or a goat that jumped from a rooftop and broke vessels</b> while doing so, their owners <b>must pay the full</b> cost of the <b>damage</b> to the vessels <b>because</b> these animals <b>are</b> deemed <b>forewarned</b> concerning to jumping. With regard to <b>a dog that took a cake</b> that had been baked directly on hot coals, <b>and went to a stack</b> of grain to eat it, <b>and it ate the cake</b> and at the same time <b>ignited the stack</b> of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must <b>pay the full</b> cost of the <b>damage for the cake, and</b> he must <b>pay for half</b> the cost of <b>the damage to the stack</b> of grain.", | |
| "<b>Which</b> type of ox <b>is</b> deemed <b>innocuous and which</b> is deemed <b>forewarned?</b> An ox is deemed <b>forewarned</b> in <b>any</b> case <b>where</b> witnesses <b>testified about it</b> that it gored on <b>three</b> different <b>days. And</b> it reverts back to its previous <b>innocuous</b> status <b>from when it reverses its</b> behavior and refrains from goring for <b>three</b> consecutive <b>days;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says:</b> It is deemed <b>forewarned</b> in any case <b>where</b> witnesses <b>testified</b> that <b>it</b> gored <b>three times,</b> regardless of the number of days on which this behavior occurred. <b>And</b> it reverts back to its previous <b>innocuous</b> status in <b>any</b> case <b>where children pet it</b> and play with it <b>and it does not gore</b> them.", | |
| "<b>And what is</b> the case of the <b>ox that causes damage</b> while <b>on the property of the injured</b> party, mentioned in an earlier mishna (15b) that listed animals that are forewarned? If the animal <b>gored, pushed, bit, squatted</b> upon, or <b>kicked</b> another animal <b>in the public domain,</b> the owner is liable to <b>pay half</b> the cost of <b>the damage</b> if the ox was innocuous, but if it acted while <b>on the property of the injured</b> party, <b>Rabbi Tarfon says:</b> He must pay the <b>full</b> cost of <b>the damage, and the Rabbis say:</b> He must pay <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage,</b> as in any other case classified as Goring. <b>Rabbi Tarfon said to the</b> Rabbis: <b>If in a place where</b> the Torah <b>was lenient with regard to</b> damage classified as <b>Eating and with regard to Trampling,</b> specifically <b>in the public domain, as</b> the owner <b>is exempt</b> from liability, nevertheless the Torah was <b>strict with regard to these</b> forms of damage if they occurred <b>on the property of the injured</b> party, requiring him <b>to pay</b> the <b>full</b> cost of <b>the damage,</b> then in <b>a place where</b> the Torah <b>was strict with regard to</b> cases of damage classified as <b>Goring,</b> specifically <b>in the public domain,</b> requiring the owner liable <b>to pay for half</b> the cost of <b>the damage, is it not right that we</b> should <b>be strict with regard to this</b> form of damage if it occurs <b>on the property of the injured</b> party to likewise require the owner of the animal <b>to pay</b> the <b>full</b> cost of <b>the damage?</b> The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> Although there is an <i>a fortiori</i> inference being applied here, still <b>it is sufficient for the</b> conclusion that <b>emerges from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference to be like</b> its <b>source,</b> meaning that the <i>halakha</i> cannot be stricter with the inference than it is with the case that serves as the source of the inference. Therefore, <b>just as</b> one is liable to pay <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage</b> classified as Goring <b>in the public domain, so too,</b> for damage classified as Goring <b>on the property of the injured</b> party he is liable to pay only <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b> Rabbi Tarfon <b>said to them:</b> If that is your opinion, then <b>I as well</b> <b>will not derive an inference</b> with regard to <b>Goring from</b> a different case of <b>Goring. I will</b> instead <b>derive an inference</b> with regard to <b>Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where</b> the Torah <b>was lenient with regard to</b> damage classified as <b>Eating and Trampling,</b> specifically <b>in the public domain,</b> as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was <b>strict with regard to</b> damage classified as <b>Goring,</b> requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in <b>a place where</b> the Torah <b>was strict with regard to</b> damage classified as <b>Eating and Trampling,</b> specifically <b>on the property of the injured</b> party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, <b>is it not right that we</b> should <b>be</b> equally <b>strict with regard to</b> damage classified as <b>Goring</b> and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well? The Rabbis <b>said to him:</b> Here as well, <b>it is sufficient for the</b> conclusion that <b>emerges from</b> an <i>a fortiori</i> <b>inference to be like</b> its <b>source,</b> and therefore, <b>just as</b> one is liable to pay <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage</b> classified as Goring <b>in the public domain, so too,</b> for damage classified as Goring <b>on the property of the injured</b> party he will be liable to pay only <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage,</b> as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.", | |
| "The legal status of <b>a person</b> is <b>always</b> that of one <b>forewarned.</b> Therefore, <b>whether</b> the damage was <b>unintentional or intentional, whether</b> he was <b>awake</b> while he caused the damage <b>or asleep,</b> whether <b>he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full</b> cost of <b>the damage.</b>" | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "In the case of <b>one who places a <i>kad</i>,</b> a type of vessel, <b>in the public domain and another</b> person <b>comes and stumbles on it and breaks it,</b> the other person is <b>exempt</b> from paying for what he broke. <b>And if</b> the one who stumbled <b>incurred damaged by</b> it, <b>the owner of the <i>ḥavit</i>,</b> a type of vessel, <b>is liable</b> to pay restitution <b>for his damage.</b> If one’s <b>jug broke in the public domain and</b> another person <b>slipped in the water</b> from the jug and was injured from the fall, <b>or</b> if he <b>was injured by the shards</b> of the broken jug, the owner of the jug is <b>liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In</b> a case where the owner of the jug acted <b>with intent,</b> he is <b>liable,</b> and <b>in</b> a case where he acted <b>without intent,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who pours water in the public domain, and another</b> person <b>in-curred damage due to it,</b> the one who poured water <b>is liable</b> to pay <b>for his damage.</b> In the case of <b>one who conceals a thorn or a piece of glass</b> in his wall adjacent to the public domain, <b>or one who puts up a fence of thorns, or</b> one who puts up <b>a fence that</b> subsequently <b>fell into the public domain, and others incurred damage due to</b> any of <b>these, he is liable</b> to pay <b>for their damage.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who takes out his straw [<i>teven</i>] and his hay [<i>kash</i>] to the public domain to</b> use afterward as <b>fertilizer and another</b> person <b>incurred damage due to them,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>for his damage, and whoever</b> takes possession of the hay and straw <b>first acquires</b> them for himself. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> With regard to <b>anyone who places obstacles in the public domain and they cause damage,</b> he is <b>liable to pay</b> damages, <b>and whoever</b> takes possession <b>of them first acquires</b> them. In the case of <b>one who turns over dung in the public domain and another</b> person <b>incurred damage due to it,</b> the former <b>is liable</b> to pay <b>for his damage.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>two potters</b> carrying pots <b>who were walking one after the other</b> in the public domain, <b>and the first stumbled</b> on a bump <b>and fell, and the second stumbled over the first</b> and fell too, <b>the first</b> is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>for the damage incurred by the second.</b>", | |
| "If <b>this</b> person <b>came</b> in the public domain <b>with his barrel, and that</b> person <b>came</b> from the opposite direction <b>with his</b> cross <b>beam,</b> and <b>this one’s jug was broken by that one’s</b> cross <b>beam,</b> the one carrying the cross beam is <b>exempt, because this one had permission to walk</b> in the public domain, <b>and that one</b> also <b>had permission to walk</b> there. If they were walking in the same direction, so that <b>the owner of the</b> cross <b>beam was</b> walking <b>first,</b> in front, <b>and the owner of a barrel last,</b> behind him, and <b>the barrel was broken by the</b> cross <b>beam, the owner of the</b> cross <b>beam</b> is <b>exempt,</b> since the owner of the barrel saw him in front of him and should have been more careful. <b>But if the owner of the</b> cross <b>beam stopped,</b> causing the barrel to collide with the beam and break, the former is <b>liable,</b> since the latter had no way of anticipating that he would stop. <b>And if he said to the owner of the barrel: Stop,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from liability for breaking the barrel. Conversely, if <b>the owner of the barrel was</b> walking <b>first and the owner of the</b> cross <b>beam last,</b> and <b>the barrel was broken by the</b> cross <b>beam,</b> the owner of the cross beam is <b>liable. But if owner of the barrel stopped,</b> the owner of the cross beam is <b>exempt</b> from liability for breaking the barrel. <b>And if he said to the owner of the</b> cross <b>beam: Stop,</b> the owner of the cross beam is <b>liable. And similarly,</b> these <i>halakhot</i> apply in a case where <b>this one came with his lamp and that one came with his flax,</b> and the lamp set fire to the flax.", | |
| "With regard to <b>two</b> people <b>who were walking in the public domain,</b> or <b>one</b> who was <b>running and</b> another <b>one</b> who was <b>walking, or who were both running, and they damaged one another, both of them are exempt.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>one who was chopping</b> wood <b>in</b> his <b>private property and</b> a chip flew off and <b>caused damage in</b> the <b>public property</b>, or one who was chopping wood <b>in</b> the <b>public property and caused damage in</b> the <b>private property</b> of another, or one who was chopping wood <b>in</b> his <b>private property</b> and <b>caused damage in</b> the <b>private property</b> of <b>another,</b> in all these cases he is <b>liable.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>two innocuous oxen that injured each other,</b> the respective damages are evaluated, and if one amount is more than the other, the owner <b>pays half the damages with regard to the difference.</b> In other words, the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage pays the other owner half the difference. If <b>both oxen were forewarned,</b> the owner of the ox that caused the greater damage <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference.</b> In a case where <b>one</b> of the oxen was <b>innocuous and</b> the other <b>one</b> was <b>forewarned,</b> if the <b>forewarned</b> ox caused greater damage <b>to</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox than the reverse, the owner of the forewarned ox <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference.</b> If the <b>innocuous</b> ox caused greater damage <b>to</b> the <b>forewarned</b> ox, its owner <b>pays half the damage with regard to the difference.</b> <b>And similarly,</b> with regard to <b>two people who injured each other,</b> the one who did greater damage <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference,</b> since one is always considered forewarned with regard to damage he causes. If <b>a person</b> caused damage <b>to a forewarned</b> ox <b>and</b> the <b>forewarned</b> ox caused damage <b>to</b> the <b>person,</b> whichever side caused the greater damage <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference.</b> In a case where <b>a person</b> caused damage <b>to an innocuous</b> ox <b>and</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox caused damage <b>to</b> the <b>person,</b> if <b>the person</b> caused greater financial damage <b>to</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox <b>he pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference.</b> If the <b>innocuous</b> ox caused greater damage <b>to the person,</b> its owner <b>pays</b> only <b>half the damage with regard to the difference. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> The owner of the <b>innocuous</b> ox <b>that injured a person also pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage with regard to the difference.</b> Rabbi Akiva does not distinguish between an innocuous and a forewarned ox in a case where an ox injures a person.", | |
| "With regard to an innocuous <b>ox worth one hundred dinars that gored an ox worth two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and the carcass</b> of the dead ox <b>is not worth anything,</b> its owner <b>takes the</b> entire <b>ox</b> that gored it, since it is worth half the value of the damage. With regard to an innocuous <b>ox worth two hundred</b> dinars <b>that gored</b> another <b>ox worth two hundred, and the carcass is worth nothing, Rabbi Meir said:</b> It is <b>about this</b> type of case that <b>it is stated: “Then they shall sell the live ox, and divide its monetary value”</b> (Exodus 21:35). <b>Rabbi Yehuda said to him: And that is</b> the <b><i>halakha</i>,</b> yet your interpretation of the verse is incorrect. <b>You have upheld</b> the clause: <b>“Then they shall sell the live ox and divide its monetary value,”</b> which fits your interpretation of the case. But <b>you have not upheld</b> the latter clause of the verse: <b>“And the dead they shall also divide,”</b> since in the case you mentioned the carcass is worthless. Rather, to <b>which</b> case is the verse referring? <b>It is</b> the case of <b>an ox worth two hundred</b> dinars <b>that gored</b> another <b>ox worth two hundred</b> dinars, <b>and the carcass is worth fifty dinars.</b> In this case, <b>this</b> party <b>takes half</b> the value of <b>the living</b> ox, one hundred dinars, <b>and half the</b> value of the <b>dead</b> ox, twenty-five dinars; <b>and that</b> party also <b>takes half</b> the value of <b>the living</b> ox <b>and half</b> the value of <b>the dead</b> ox.", | |
| "<b>There</b> are cases where one is <b>liable for an act of</b> damage caused by <b>his ox, but exempt</b> from liability <b>for</b> the same <b>action</b> if he performed it <b>himself.</b> Conversely, there are also cases where one is <b>exempt</b> from liability <b>for the action of his ox, but liable for his own action.</b> <b>How so?</b> If <b>his ox caused</b> a person <b>humilation,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from paying compensation, <b>but</b> if <b>he</b> himself <b>humiliated</b> another, he is <b>liable.</b> Similarly, if <b>his ox blinded the eye of his slave or knocked out his</b> slave’s <b>tooth,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from having to emancipate the slave for this mutilation. <b>But if he</b> himself <b>blinded his slave’s eye or knocked out his tooth,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to emancipate him, as stated in the Torah (Exodus 21:26–27). By contrast, if <b>his ox injured</b> the owner’s <b>father or his mother,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay damages, <b>but</b> if <b>he</b> himself <b>injured his father or his mother,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from paying compensation. Similarly, if <b>his ox set fire to a haystack on Shabbat,</b> he is <b>liable</b> to pay damages. <b>But if he</b> himself <b>set fire to a haystack on Shabbat,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from paying damages. He is exempt from payment in these cases <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that he is liable to</b> receive the <b>death</b> penalty for injuring his father or mother or for desecrating Shabbat.", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox that was pursuing another ox, and</b> the ox being pursued <b>became injured,</b> but there are no witnesses as to how it was injured, and <b>this</b> one, the owner of the injured ox, <b>says</b> to the owner of the pursuing ox: <b>Your ox injured</b> my ox, and you are liable to pay me damages, <b>and that</b> one, the owner of the pursuing ox, <b>says</b> in response: <b>No; rather, it was hurt by a rock,</b> and I am not liable, then in this case, <b>the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.</b> As long as the owner of the injured ox cannot prove that the injury was inflicted by the pursuing ox, the owner of the pursuing ox is not liable. In a case where <b>two</b> oxen, belonging to two different owners, <b>were pursuing one</b> ox belonging to a third person, and that ox was injured by one of the pursuing oxen, and <b>this</b> one, the owner of one of the pursuing oxen, <b>says</b> to the owner of the other: It was <b>your ox</b> that <b>caused the injury, and that</b> one, the owner of the other pursuing ox, <b>says:</b> No, it was <b>your ox</b> that <b>caused the injury,</b> <b>the two of them are exempt,</b> since each of them rejects the claim of the injured party that his ox caused the injury. <b>If both</b> oxen <b>belonged to one person, both are liable,</b> as will be explained in the Gemara. If the pursuing oxen both belonged to one person, and were both innocuous, so that restitution is paid exclusively from proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox, and <b>one was large and</b> the other <b>one small,</b> in this case, if <b>the injured</b> party <b>says</b> that <b>the large</b> ox <b>caused the damage,</b> and he is therefore entitled to receive restitution for half the damage from the value of the large ox, <b>but the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the small</b> ox <b>caused the damage,</b> and half of its value is not sufficient to cover half the damage; or, similarly, in a case where <b>one</b> ox <b>is innocuous and one is forewarned,</b> and <b>the injured</b> party <b>says:</b> The <b>forewarned</b> ox <b>caused the damage,</b> and the injured party is therefore eligible to receive full damages, <b>but the one liable for damage says: No; rather,</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox <b>caused the damage,</b> in which case he is liable to pay only half the damage; in both of the above cases, the principle is that <b>the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.</b> If the <b>injured</b> animals <b>were two</b> oxen, <b>one large and</b> the other <b>one small, and the ones that caused the damage</b> were also <b>two</b> oxen, <b>one large and one small,</b> and <b>the injured</b> party <b>says: The large one injured the large one and the small one injured the small one, and the one liable for damage says: No; rather, the small one</b> injured <b>the large one,</b> in which case, if half the value of the belligerent ox does not cover half the damage, he is not required to pay more, <b>and the large one</b> injured <b>the small one;</b> or, similarly, if <b>one</b> of the belligerent oxen was <b>innocuous and one forewarned,</b> and <b>the injured</b> party <b>says:</b> The <b>forewarned</b> ox <b>injured the large</b> one, <b>and</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox injured <b>the small one, and the one liable for damage says: No; rather,</b> the <b>innocuous</b> ox injured <b>the large one and</b> the <b>forewarned</b> ox injured <b>the small one;</b> here too, <b>the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.</b>" | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "With regard to an innocuous <b>ox that gored four or five</b> other <b>oxen one after the other,</b> its owner <b>shall pay</b> the owner of <b>the last</b> one <b>of them</b> half of the damages from the proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox; <b>and if there is surplus</b> value left <b>in</b> his ox after he pays that owner, <b>he shall return</b> it <b>to</b> the owner of <b>the previous</b> ox that was gored; <b>and if there is</b> still <b>surplus</b> value left <b>in</b> his ox after he pays that owner, <b>he shall return</b> it <b>to the</b> one <b>prior to the previous</b> one. The principle is that the owner of <b>the latest</b> of the oxen gored in succession <b>gains.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that the division of the compensation is as follows: With regard to an innocuous <b>ox worth two hundred</b> dinars <b>that gored an ox worth two hundred</b> dinars, thereby killing it, <b>and the carcass is worthless,</b> the injured party <b>takes one hundred dinars,</b> i.e., half the cost of the damage, from the proceeds of the sale of the belligerent ox, <b>and</b> the owner of the belligerent ox <b>takes</b> the remaining <b>one hundred dinars.</b> If the ox, after goring the first ox but before compensation had been paid, <b>again gored another ox worth two hundred</b> dinars, and the carcass is worthless, the owner of <b>the last</b> ox that was gored <b>takes one hundred dinars, and</b> with regard to payment for <b>the previous</b> goring, the owner of <b>this</b> ox that was gored <b>takes fifty dinars,</b> which is half the remaining value of the belligerent ox after one hundred dinars were paid to the last injured party, <b>and</b> the owner of <b>that</b> belligerent ox <b>takes</b> the remaining <b>fifty dinars.</b> If the ox, after goring the first two oxen but before compensation had been paid, again <b>gored another ox worth two hundred</b> dinars, and the carcass is worthless, <b>the last</b> injured party <b>takes one hundred dinars, the previous one</b> takes <b>fifty dinars, and the first two,</b> i.e., the first injured party and the owner of the belligerent ox, divide the remainder, each receiving <b>one gold dinar,</b> which is worth twenty-five silver dinars.", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox that is forewarned with regard to its</b> own <b>species,</b> as it already gored other oxen three times, <b>but is not forewarned with regard to other species;</b> or an ox that is <b>forewarned with regard to people, but is not forewarned with regard to animals;</b> or one that is <b>forewarned with regard to small</b> specimens of a species, <b>but is not forewarned with regard to large</b> specimens of that species; in all these cases, if the ox gores the type of animal or person <b>with regard to which it is forewarned,</b> its owner <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage, and</b> if it gores an animal or person <b>with regard to which it is not forewarned, he pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b> The Sages <b>said before Rabbi Yehuda:</b> What would be the <i>halakha</i> if <b>this</b> ox <b>is forewarned with regard to <i>Shabbatot</i> but is not forewarned with regard to weekdays? He said to them: For</b> damage it causes on <b><i>Shabbatot</i></b> its owner <b>pays</b> the <b>full</b> cost of the <b>damage, and for</b> damage it causes on <b>weekdays, he pays half</b> the cost of the <b>damage.</b> <b>When is it</b> rendered <b>innocuous</b> again after being forewarned with regard to Shabbat? It reverts to its innocuous status <b>when</b> its behavior <b>reverts</b> to normal, i.e., when it refrains from goring for <b>three days of Shabbat,</b> i.e., Shabbat in three successive weeks.", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox of a Jew that gored a consecrated ox, and</b> conversely, <b>a consecrated</b> ox <b>that gored a non-sacred ox,</b> i.e., an ox owned by a Jew, the owner of the ox is <b>exempt</b> from paying compensation, <b>as it is stated:</b> “And if one man’s ox hurts <b>the ox of another”</b> (Exodus 21:35). It is derived from the phrase “the ox of another” that one is liable only if it is a non-sacred ox, <b>but not</b> if it is <b>a consecrated ox,</b> which belongs to the Temple treasury, regardless of whether the latter was the ox that gored or the ox that was gored. With regard to <b>an ox of a Jew that gored the ox of a gentile,</b> the owner of the belligerent ox is <b>exempt</b> from liability. <b>But</b> with regard to an ox <b>of a gentile that gored the ox of a Jew,</b> regardless of <b>whether</b> the goring ox was <b>innocuous or forewarned,</b> the owner of the ox <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage.</b>", | |
| "<b>If an ox of</b> a halakhically <b>competent person gored an ox of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,</b> all of whom are not considered halakhically competent, the owner is <b>liable</b> for damages. <b>But if</b> an ox <b>of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor gored an ox of</b> a halakhically <b>competent person,</b> the owner of the ox is <b>exempt</b> from liability. <b>If an ox belonging to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor gored</b> another ox and caused damage, <b>the court appoints a steward for them and warns them</b> with regard to the ox that gored <b>in the presence of the steward.</b> The ox is thereby rendered a forewarned ox, since the steward is considered its owner with regard to the requirement of the verse: “And warning has been given to its owner” (Exodus 21:29). If, after the ox was rendered forewarned in this manner, <b>the deaf-mute regained his hearing, the imbecile became</b> halakhically <b>competent, or the minor reached</b> the age of <b>majority,</b> the ox has thereby <b>reverted to its</b> status of <b>innocuousness.</b> This is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir,</b> who maintains that the ox had the status of a forewarned ox only while it was under the custody of the steward. <b>Rabbi Yosei says: It retains its</b> previous <b>status</b> of being forewarned. If <b>a stadium [<i>ha’itztadin</i>] ox,</b> i.e., one that is trained to fight in a stadium, gores and kills a person, it <b>is not liable</b> to be put to <b>death, as it is stated:</b> “And <b>if an ox gores</b> a man or a woman” (Exodus 21:28). This is referring only to an ox that gores on its own initiative, <b>but not to</b> the case of an ox where others <b>induced it to gore.</b> Therefore, the owner of a stadium ox, which is trained to gore, is exempt from liability if it does.", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox that gored a person and</b> the person <b>died,</b> if the ox was <b>forewarned</b> its owner <b>pays ransom, but</b> if it was <b>innocuous he is exempt from</b> paying <b>the ransom. And</b> both <b>this</b> forewarned ox <b>and that</b> innocuous ox <b>are liable</b> to be put to <b>death</b> for killing a person. <b>And the same</b> <i>halakha</i> applies <b>in</b> a case where the animal killed <b>a boy and the same</b> applies <b>in</b> a case where it killed <b>a girl.</b> If the ox <b>gored</b> and killed a Canaanite <b>slave or</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant,</b> its owner <b>gives</b> the victim’s master <b>thirty <i>sela</i>, whether he was</b> a slave <b>worth one hundred <i>maneh</i>,</b> i.e., one hundred silver dinars, <b>or worth only one dinar.</b>", | |
| "If <b>an ox was rubbing against a wall, and</b> as a result the wall <b>fell on a person</b> and killed him; or if the ox <b>intended to kill</b> another <b>animal but killed a person;</b> or if it intended <b>to</b> kill <b>a gentile but killed a Jew;</b> or intended <b>to</b> kill <b>a non-viable baby but killed a viable person;</b> in all these cases the ox is <b>exempt</b> from being killed.", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox belonging to a woman, and</b> similarly <b>an ox belonging to</b> orphans, and <b>an ox</b> belonging to orphans that is in the custody <b>of</b> their <b>steward,</b> and <b>a desert ox,</b> which is ownerless, and <b>an ox</b> that was <b>consecrated</b> to the Temple treasury, and <b>an ox belonging to a convert who died and has no heirs,</b> rendering the ox ownerless; all of <b>these</b> oxen <b>are liable</b> to be put to <b>death</b> for killing a person. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: A desert ox, a consecrated ox,</b> and <b>an ox belonging to a convert who died are exempt from</b> being put to <b>death, since they have no owners.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>an ox that is leaving</b> court <b>to be stoned</b> for killing a person <b>and its owner</b> then <b>consecrated it, it is not</b> considered <b>consecrated,</b> i.e., the consecration does not take effect, since deriving benefit from the ox is prohibited and the ox is therefore worthless. If one <b>slaughtered it, its flesh is forbidden</b> to be eaten and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it. <b>But if its owner consecrated it before its verdict</b> the ox <b>is</b> considered <b>consecrated, and if he slaughtered it its flesh is permitted.</b>", | |
| "If the owner of an ox <b>conveyed it to an unpaid bailee, or to a borrower,</b> or <b>to a paid bailee, or to a renter,</b> and it caused damage while in their custody, <b>they enter</b> into the responsibilities and liabilities <b>in place of the owner.</b> Therefore, if it was <b>forewarned</b> the bailee <b>pays the full</b> cost of the <b>damage, and</b> if it was <b>innocuous he pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage.</b> If <b>the</b> ox’s <b>owner tied it with reins</b> to a fence <b>or locked</b> the gate <b>before it in an appropriate manner, but</b> nevertheless the ox <b>emerged and caused damage, whether</b> the ox is <b>innocuous or forewarned</b> the owner is <b>liable,</b> since this is not considered sufficient precaution to prevent damage; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir.</b> <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that if the ox is <b>innocuous</b> the owner is <b>liable</b> even if he safeguarded it appropriately, since the Torah does not limit the required safeguarding for an innocuous ox. <b>But</b> if the ox is <b>forewarned,</b> the owner is <b>exempt</b> from paying compensation for damage, <b>as it is stated</b> in the verse describing damage by a forewarned ox: <b>“And the owner has not secured it”</b> (Exodus 21:36), <b>and this</b> ox that was tied with reins or behind a locked gate <b>was secured.</b> <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> An ox <b>has no</b> sufficient <b>safeguarding</b> at all <b>other than</b> slaughtering it with <b>a knife;</b> there is no degree of safeguarding that exempts the ox’s owner from liability." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "In the case of an innocuous <b>ox that gored</b> and killed <b>a cow, and</b> the cow’s <b>fetus was found</b> dead <b>at its side, and it is not known whether</b> the cow <b>gave birth before</b> the ox <b>gored it</b> and the fetus’s death is unrelated to the goring or <b>whether it gave birth after</b> the ox <b>gored it</b> and the fetus died on account of the goring, the owner of the ox <b>pays half</b> the cost of <b>the damage for the cow and one-quarter</b> of the cost <b>of the damage for the offspring.</b> Since it is uncertain whether the ox was responsible for the death of the fetus, in which case he would pay half the damages, its owner pays only half the amount for the fetus that he would ordinarily be required to pay, i.e., one-quarter. <b>And likewise,</b> there is uncertainty in the case of an innocuous <b>cow that gored an ox, and</b> the cow’s newborn <b>offspring was found at its side</b> dead or alive, <b>and it is not known whether</b> the cow <b>gave birth before it gored</b> the ox or <b>whether</b> the cow <b>gave birth after it gored.</b> When damage is caused by an innocuous animal, the liability of the owner is limited to the value of the animal that gored. Therefore, <b>half</b> the cost of <b>the damage is paid from</b> the value of <b>the cow,</b> as in the standard case of an innocuous animal. <b>And</b> if that does not suffice to pay for half the cost of the damage, <b>one-quarter of</b> the cost of <b>the damage</b> is paid <b>from the offspring.</b> Since it is uncertain whether the offspring was part of the cow at the time the cow gored, the owner pays only half of what he would pay if it were certain that it was part of the cow.", | |
| "In the case of <b>a potter who brought his pots into a homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal broke</b> the pots, the homeowner is <b>exempt. If</b> the owner’s animal <b>was injured by</b> the pots, <b>the owner of the pots is liable. But if</b> the potter <b>brought</b> them <b>inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable</b> if his animal caused damage to the pots. Similarly, if someone <b>brought his produce into the homeowner’s courtyard without permission, and the homeowner’s animal ate them,</b> the homeowner is <b>exempt. If</b> his animal was <b>injured by them,</b> e.g., if it slipped on them, <b>the owner of the produce is liable. But if he brought</b> his produce <b>inside with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable</b> for the damage caused by his animal to them.", | |
| "Similarly, if one <b>brought his ox into the homeowner’s courtyard without</b> <b>permission, and the homeowner’s ox gored it or the homeowner’s dog bit it,</b> the homeowner is <b>exempt.</b> If it <b>gored the homeowner’s ox,</b> the owner of the goring ox is <b>liable.</b> Furthermore, if the ox that he brought into the courtyard without permission <b>fell into</b> the owner’s <b>pit and contaminated its water,</b> the owner of the ox is <b>liable</b> to pay compensation for despoiling the water. If the homeowner’s <b>father or son were inside</b> the pit at the time the ox fell and the person died as a result, the owner of the ox <b>pays the ransom. But if he brought</b> the ox into the courtyard <b>with permission, the owner of the courtyard is liable</b> for the damage caused. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> The homeowner <b>is not liable in any</b> of the cases in the mishna, even if he gave his permission for the items to be brought into his premises, <b>unless he</b> explicitly <b>accepts</b> responsibility <b>upon himself to safeguard</b> them.", | |
| "In the case of <b>an ox that was intending to</b> gore <b>another</b> ox <b>but struck</b> a pregnant <b>woman, and her offspring,</b> i.e., the fetuses, <b>emerged</b> due to miscarriage, the owner of the ox is <b>exempt from</b> paying <b>compensation for</b> miscarried <b>offspring. But</b> in the case of <b>a person who was intending to</b> injure <b>another but struck</b> a pregnant <b>woman</b> instead, <b>and her offspring emerged</b> due to miscarriage, <b>he pays compensation for</b> miscarried <b>offspring.</b> <b>How does he pay compensation for</b> miscarried <b>offspring,</b> i.e., how is their value assessed? The court <b>appraises</b> the value of <b>the woman</b> by calculating <b>how much she</b> would be <b>worth</b> if sold as a maidservant <b>before giving birth, and how much she</b> would be <b>worth after giving birth.</b> He then pays the difference in value to the woman’s husband. <b>Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said:</b> <b>If so,</b> the consequences would be absurd, as <b>when a woman gives birth</b> her value <b>increases. Rather,</b> the court <b>appraises how much the offspring are worth, and</b> the one liable for the damage <b>gives</b> that amount <b>to the husband. And if she does not have a husband,</b> e.g., her husband died, he <b>gives</b> the money <b>to his heirs.</b> If the pregnant woman <b>was</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant and</b> then <b>she was emancipated, or a convert,</b> and she was married to an emancipated Canaanite slave or to a convert who died without any heirs, the one who caused the damage is <b>exempt</b> from pay-ing compensation for miscarried offspring. This is because this payment is made specifically to the husband, not to the woman.", | |
| "<b>One who digs</b> part of <b>a pit on private property and opens its</b> entrance <b>in the public domain, or</b> digs a pit <b>in the public domain and opens its</b> entrance <b>on private property,</b> or digs a pit <b>on private property and opens its</b> entrance <b>on another</b> person’s <b>private property,</b> is <b>liable</b> for damage caused by the pit in each case. In the case of <b>one who digs a pit in the public domain and an ox or a donkey fell into it,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> The <i>halakha</i> is the <b>same</b> for <b>one who digs</b> either <b>a pit; a ditch,</b> which is narrow and long; <b>or a cave,</b> which is rectangular and roofed; <b>trenches and</b> water <b>channels.</b> In all these cases he is <b>liable. If so, why is</b> the verse <b>stated</b> as referring to <b>a pit,</b> as it states: “And if a man shall open a pit” (Exodus 21:33)? To teach that <b>just as a pit that has sufficient</b> depth <b>to cause death</b> when falling into it is at least <b>ten handbreadths</b> deep, <b>so too, any</b> other excavations <b>that have sufficient</b> depth <b>to cause death</b> may be no less than <b>ten handbreadths.</b> If any of the types of excavations <b>were less than ten handbreadths</b> deep, <b>and an ox or a donkey fell into</b> one of <b>them and died,</b> the digger of the excavation is <b>exempt. But if it was injured in it,</b> not killed, he is <b>liable</b> to pay damages.", | |
| "If <b>a pit belonging to two partners</b> was uncovered and <b>the first</b> partner <b>passed by it and did not cover it, and</b> then <b>the second</b> passed by it <b>and did not cover it, the second</b> is <b>liable</b> for any damage caused by means of the pit. The mishna lists several <i>halakhot</i> that pertain to damage classified as Pit: In the case of a pit that <b>the first</b> person who passed by <b>covered</b> after using <b>it, and</b> then <b>the second came</b> to use it <b>and found it uncovered</b> after the cover fell off or was damaged, <b>and</b> he <b>did not cover it, the second</b> one is <b>liable</b> for damage caused by the pit. If the owner <b>covered</b> the pit <b>appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b> If he <b>did not cover</b> the pit <b>appropriately and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> If a man was digging or widening a pit, and an ox passing by <b>fell forward</b> into it in fright <b>due to the sound</b> of <b>the digging,</b> he is <b>liable.</b> If it fell <b>backward</b> into the pit <b>due to the sound</b> of <b>the digging,</b> he is <b>exempt.</b> If <b>an ox and its accoutrements,</b> i.e., the vessels it was carrying, <b>fell into</b> the pit <b>and</b> the vessels <b>were broken,</b> or if <b>a donkey and its accoutrements</b> fell in <b>and</b> the accoutrements <b>were torn,</b> the owner of the pit is <b>liable for</b> damage to <b>the animal</b> caused by the pit, <b>but</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from liability <b>for</b> damage caused to <b>the vessels,</b> by Torah edict. If <b>an ox</b> that was impaired by being <b>deaf,</b> or an ox that was <b>an imbecile, or</b> an ox that was very <b>young fell into</b> the pit, he is <b>liable.</b> If <b>a boy or a girl,</b> a Canaanite <b>slave or</b> a Canaanite <b>maidservant</b> fell in, he is <b>exempt,</b> since there is a Torah edict that the digger of a pit is liable only for damage caused to an animal. ", | |
| "The <i>halakha</i> is the same <b>whether</b> concerning <b>an ox or whether</b> concerning <b>any</b> other <b>animal with regard to</b> liability for <b>falling</b> into <b>a pit, and with regard to</b> keeping its <b>distance</b> from <b>Mount Sinai</b> at the time of the receiving of the Torah, when it was forbidden for any animal to ascend the mountain, <b>and with regard to the payment of double</b> the principal by a thief, <b>and with regard to</b> the mitzva of <b>returning a lost item, and with regard to unloading</b> its burden, and <b>with regard to</b> the prohibition of <b>muzzling</b> it while threshing, and <b>with regard to</b> the prohibition of <b>diverse kinds, and with regard to</b> the prohibition against its working on <b>Shabbat.</b> <b>And similarly, undomesticated animals and birds</b> are subject to the same <i>halakhot</i> <b>as</b> domesticated animals. <b>If so,</b> why <b>are</b> all of the above <i>halakhot</i> <b>stated</b> in the Torah only in reference to <b>an ox or a donkey? Rather,</b> the reason is <b>that the verse speaks of a common</b> scenario, from which the other cases may be derived." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "In the case of <b>one who brought</b> his flock of <b>sheep into the pen and locked</b> the door <b>before it</b> in a manner that is <b>appropriate, and</b> despite this sheep <b>went out and caused damage</b> in another person’s field by eating produce or trampling it, the owner is <b>exempt,</b> since he safeguarded the animals appropriately. If <b>he did not lock</b> the door <b>before</b> the sheep in a manner that is <b>appropriate, and</b> sheep <b>went out and caused damage,</b> the owner is <b>liable,</b> since his negligence led to the damage. If the owner locked the door appropriately but the wall of the pen <b>was breached at night, or bandits breached it, and</b> sheep subsequently <b>went out and caused damage</b> by eating or trampling, the owner of the sheep is <b>exempt</b> from liability. If the <b>bandits</b> themselves <b>took</b> the sheep <b>out</b> of the pen and the animals subsequently caused damage, the <b>bandits</b> are <b>liable.</b>", | |
| "If the owner <b>left</b> the animal <b>in the sun,</b> causing it to suffer, <b>or</b> if <b>he conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,</b> who are not able to safeguard it, <b>and</b> the animal <b>went out and caused damage,</b> the owner is <b>liable</b> because he was negligent. If the owner <b>conveyed</b> the animal <b>to a shepherd</b> to care for it, <b>the shepherd enters in his place</b> and is responsible for the damage. If the animal <b>fell into a garden and derives benefit</b> from produce there, its owner <b>pays</b> for <b>the benefit that</b> it <b>derives</b> and not for other damage caused. If the animal <b>descended</b> into the garden <b>in its usual manner and caused damage</b> there, its owner <b>pays</b> for <b>what it damaged. How does</b> the court appraise the value of the damage when the owner <b>pays</b> for <b>what it damaged?</b> The court <b>appraises</b> a large piece of land with <b>an area required for</b> sowing <b>one <i>se’a</i> of seed [<i>beit se’a</i>] in that field,</b> including the garden bed in which the damage took place. This appraisal includes <b>how much it was worth</b> before the animal damaged it <b>and how much is it worth</b> now, and the owner must pay the difference. The court appraises not only the garden bed that was eaten or trampled, rather the depreciation in value of the bed as part of the surrounding area. This results in a smaller payment, as the damage appears less significant in the context of a larger area. <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> This principle of appraisal applies only in a case where the animal ate unripe produce; but if <b>it ate ripe produce,</b> the owner <b>pays</b> the value of the <b>ripe produce.</b> Therefore, <b>if</b> it ate <b>one <i>se’a</i></b> of produce, he pays for <b>one <i>se’a</i>,</b> and <b>if</b> it ate <b>two <i>se’a</i>,</b> he pays for <b>two <i>se’a</i>.</b>", | |
| "In a case of <b>one who stacks</b> his produce <b>in another’s field without permission</b> from the owner of that field, <b>and an animal belonging to the owner of the field eats</b> the produce, the owner of the field is <b>exempt. And if</b> the animal <b>is injured by</b> the produce, <b>the owner of the stack</b> is <b>liable. But if he stacked</b> them in that field <b>with permission, the owner of the field</b> is <b>liable</b> for damage caused to the produce.", | |
| "<b>One who sends a fire,</b> i.e., places a burning object, <b>in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor</b> is <b>exempt</b> for any damage later caused by the fire <b>according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.</b> If <b>he sent</b> it <b>in the hand of a</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> person, <b>the</b> halakhically <b>competent</b> person is <b>liable,</b> not the one who sent him. If <b>one</b> person <b>brought the fire, and one</b> other person subsequently <b>brought the wood,</b> causing the fire to spread, <b>the one who brought the wood</b> is <b>liable</b> for any damage caused. Conversely, if <b>one</b> person first <b>brought the wood, and</b> subsequently <b>one</b> other person <b>brought the fire, the one who brought the fire</b> is <b>liable,</b> since it was he who actually kindled the wood. If <b>another came and fanned</b> the flame, and as a result the fire spread and caused damage, <b>the one who fanned it</b> is <b>liable,</b> since he is the proximate cause of the damage. If <b>the wind fanned</b> the flames, <b>all</b> the people involved are <b>exempt,</b> since none of them actually caused the damage. If one <b>sends</b> forth <b>a fire,</b> i.e., allows it to escape, <b>and it consumes wood, or stones, or earth,</b> he is <b>liable, as it is stated: “If a fire breaks out, and catches in thorns, so that a stack of grain, or standing grain, or the field, is consumed, the one who kindled the fire shall pay compensation”</b> (Exodus 22:5), which teaches that he is liable also for destroying the field itself. If one kindled a fire that <b>crossed a fence that is four cubits high, or</b> if the fire crossed <b>the public thoroughfare, or</b> if the fire crossed <b>a river,</b> and in each case it caused damage on the other side, he is <b>exempt</b> from liability. In a case of <b>one who kindles</b> a fire <b>on his own</b> premises, <b>up to what</b> distance <b>may the fire travel</b> within his property for him to still bear liability for damage caused? <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria says:</b> The court <b>views his</b> location where he kindled the fire <b>as if it were in the center of a <i>beit kor</i>.</b> Therefore, if the fire spreads and causes damage farther away than half a <i>beit kor</i>, the one who kindled the fire is exempt, since he could not anticipate that the fire would spread so far. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says:</b> One is liable up to a distance of <b>sixteen cubits, like</b> the width of <b>a public thoroughfare. Rabbi Akiva says:</b> One is liable up to a distance of <b>fifty cubits. Rabbi Shimon says:</b> The verse states: <b>“The one who kindled the fire shall pay [<i>shallem yeshallem</i>] compensation”</b> (Exodus 22:5), to teach that <b>everything is according to the fire.</b>", | |
| "With regard to <b>one who kindles a stack</b> of wheat or barley <b>and there were vessels</b> concealed <b>inside</b> the stack <b>and they</b> caught fire and <b>burned</b> together with the stack, <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> The one who kindled the fire also <b>pays</b> compensation <b>for what was inside</b> the stack, <b>but the Rabbis say: He pays</b> compensation <b>only</b> for <b>the stack of wheat or barley,</b> as the case may be, and he is not responsible for that which was concealed within it. If <b>there was a goat tied to</b> the stack of grain, <b>and</b> there was a Canaanite <b>slave nearby</b> who was not tied to it, <b>and</b> both the goat and the slave <b>were burned</b> together <b>with</b> the stack and killed, the one who kindled the fire is <b>liable</b> to pay compensation for both. Conversely, if the <b>slave was tied</b> to the stack <b>and</b> there was <b>a goat nearby</b> that was not tied to it, <b>and</b> they were both <b>burned together with it,</b> the one who kindled the fire is <b>exempt</b> from payment for damage because he is liable to receive capital punishment for murder, and he is punished only for the greater transgression. <b>And the Rabbis,</b> who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda and exempt one from payment for vessels concealed inside the stack in the field, <b>concede to Rabbi Yehuda</b> that if one <b>sets fire to a building,</b> he <b>pays</b> compensation <b>for everything that was</b> burned <b>inside it, since it is the</b> normal <b>way of people to place</b> items <b>in houses.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>a spark that emerged from under the hammer</b> of a blacksmith and started a fire, <b>causing damage,</b> the blacksmith is <b>liable</b> for the damage caused. In the case of <b>a camel that was laden with flax and was passing through the public domain, and its flax extended into a store and</b> the flax <b>caught fire from a lamp</b> in the store <b>belonging to the storekeeper, and</b> as a result of the burning flax the camel <b>set fire to the building</b> together with all its contents, <b>the owner of the camel</b> is <b>liable.</b> But if <b>the storekeeper placed his lamp outside,</b> thereby causing the flax on the camel to catch fire, and consequently the building was set on fire, <b>the storekeeper</b> is <b>liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In</b> a case where the lamp placed outside was <b>a Hanukkah lamp,</b> the storekeeper is <b>exempt,</b> since it is a mitzva for a Hanukkah lamp to be placed outside." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "<b>The principle of double payment</b> applies <b>more broadly than the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment, as the principle of double payment applies both to</b> the theft of <b>something that is alive and to</b> the theft of <b>something that is not alive, but the principle of fourfold or fivefold payment applies only to</b> the theft of <b>an ox or a sheep, as it is stated: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it or sell it,</b> he shall pay five oxen for an ox and four sheep for a sheep” (Exodus 21:37). Having stated a limitation to the <i>halakha</i> of fourfold and fivefold payment, the mishna mentions a further limitation, which applies to all three types of payments. <b>One who steals</b> an item <b>after a thief</b> has already stolen it, i.e., one who steals a stolen item, <b>does not pay</b> the <b>double payment</b> to the thief or to the prior owner, <b>nor does one who slaughters or sells</b> an ox or a sheep <b>after a thief</b> has already stolen it <b>pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> Rather, he pays only the principal, i.e., the value of the item he stole.", | |
| "The mishna lists a series of cases in which a thief is required to pay the fourfold or fivefold penalty. If one <b>stole</b> an animal, as established <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>two</b> witnesses, <b>and he</b> subsequently <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>or sold</b> it, also <b>based on</b> the testimony of the same witnesses, <b>or based on</b> the testimony of <b>two other</b> witnesses, he <b>pays</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> If one <b>stole</b> an animal <b>and sold</b> it <b>on Shabbat,</b> or if <b>he stole</b> it <b>and sold</b> it <b>for idol worship,</b> or if <b>he stole</b> it <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>on Yom Kippur,</b> he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. Although his sale or slaughter in these circumstances involved a sin, he is not liable to receive the death penalty for the sale and must consequently pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. If one <b>stole</b> an animal <b>of his father’s and</b> then <b>slaughtered</b> it <b>or sold</b> it, <b>and afterward his father died</b> and he inherited his father’s estate either on his own or in partnership with his brothers, or if <b>he stole</b> an animal <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>and afterward he consecrated</b> it, he <b>pays</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> In the case of one who <b>stole</b> an animal <b>and slaughtered it,</b> not for the purpose of eating its meat, but to use it <b>for medicinal purposes or to</b> feed the meat to <b>dogs,</b> and likewise a thief <b>who slaughters</b> the animal to eat its meat <b>but it was found to be an animal with a condition that will cause it to die within twelve months [<i>tereifa</i>],</b> or a thief <b>who slaughters a non-sacred</b> animal <b>in the</b> Temple <b>courtyard,</b> he <b>pays the fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon exempts</b> the thief from the fourfold or fivefold payment <b>in these</b> last <b>two</b> cases, as he maintains that the legal status of an act of slaughter that is not fit for accomplishing its full ritual purpose is not considered an act of slaughter.", | |
| "If one <b>stole</b> an ox or a sheep, as established <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>two</b> witnesses, <b>and he</b> subsequently <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>or sold</b> it, also <b>based on</b> the testimony of the same witnesses, <b>and</b> these witnesses <b>were found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, these witnesses <b>pay everything,</b> i.e., not only the principal amount but also the fourfold or fivefold payment. This is in accordance with the Torah’s decree with regard to conspiring witnesses: “You shall do to him as he had conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19). Since these witnesses attempted to obligate the alleged thief to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment, they themselves must pay that full amount. With regard to one who <b>stole</b> an ox or a sheep, as established <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>two</b> witnesses, <b>and he</b> subsequently <b>slaughtered</b> the animal <b>or sold</b> it, <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>two other</b> witnesses, if both <b>these</b> witnesses <b>and those</b> witnesses <b>were found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>the first</b> set of witnesses, who testified about the theft of the animal, <b>pay</b> the alleged thief the <b>double payment,</b> which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay. <b>And the last</b> set of witnesses, who attested to the slaughter or sale of the animal, <b>pay</b> the alleged thief a twofold payment for a sheep or <b>a threefold payment</b> for an ox, which they had conspired to cause him to pay over and above the double payment. If only the witnesses in the <b>last</b> set <b>were found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, while the testimony about the theft remains intact, the thief <b>pays</b> the <b>double payment</b> to the animal’s owner <b>and</b> the second set of witnesses <b>pay</b> the alleged thief the twofold or <b>threefold payment,</b> the amount over and above the double payment, which is what they had conspired to cause him to pay. If only <b>one</b> individual <b>from the last</b> set of witnesses was found to be <b>a conspiring</b> witness, <b>the second testimony</b> is <b>nullified,</b> as it was not submitted by two valid witnesses, whereas the first testimony remains intact. If <b>one</b> individual <b>from the first</b> set of witnesses is found to be <b>a conspiring</b> witness, <b>the entire testimony</b> concerning the thief is <b>nullified.</b> The reason is <b>that if there is no theft</b> established by reliable testimony <b>there is no</b> liability for <b>slaughtering</b> the animal <b>and there is no</b> liability for <b>selling</b> it.", | |
| "If one <b>stole</b> an ox or a sheep, as established <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>two</b> witnesses, <b>and he</b> subsequently <b>slaughtered or sold</b> the stolen animal, as established <b>based on</b> the testimony of <b>one witness or based on his own</b> admission, i.e., he himself admitted that he performed these acts, without there being any witness testimony, <b>he pays</b> the <b>double payment, but he does not pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> If one <b>stole</b> an animal <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>on Shabbat,</b> which is a capital offense, or if <b>he stole</b> an animal <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>for the</b> purpose of <b>idol worship,</b> or if <b>he stole his father’s</b> animal <b>and</b> subsequently <b>his father died, and afterward he slaughtered or sold</b> it, or if <b>he stole</b> an animal <b>and</b> subsequently <b>he consecrated</b> it as an offering <b>and afterward he slaughtered or sold</b> it, in all these cases the thief <b>pays</b> the <b>double payment, but he does not pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> In the case of <b>sacrificial</b> animals <b>for which</b> the owner <b>bears</b> financial <b>responsibility</b> to replace with another animal if one of the original animals that one stole is lost or dies, the thief is obligated to <b>pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment</b> if he slaughters one of the animals. If it is a sacrificial animal <b>for which</b> the owner <b>bears no</b> financial <b>responsibility,</b> the thief <b>is exempt</b> from the fourfold or fivefold payment.", | |
| "If a thief <b>sold</b> a stolen animal in a partial fashion, e.g., <b>except for</b> one <b>one-hundredth of it,</b> which he kept for himself; <b>or</b> if <b>he had a partnership in</b> owning the animal before stealing it; or in the case of a thief <b>who slaughtered</b> the stolen animal <b>and it became non-kosher</b> meat <b>in his hand</b> because he slaughtered it improperly; or in the case of a thief <b>who ripped open</b> the animal rather than slaughtering it halakhically; <b>or</b> in the case of a thief <b>who tore loose</b> the gullet or windpipe of the animal as he slaughtered it, rendering the slaughter invalid, in all these cases <b>he pays</b> the <b>double payment but does not pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment.</b> The fourfold or five-fold payment applies only if the animal is entirely sold or if it is slaughtered in accordance with the halakhic definition of animal slaughter. If one <b>stole</b> an animal <b>in</b> its <b>owner’s domain,</b> i.e., he took hold of it or established control over it but had not yet removed it from the owner’s premises, <b>and</b> then <b>he slaughtered</b> it <b>or sold</b> it <b>outside</b> of the owner’s <b>domain; or</b> if <b>he stole</b> an animal <b>outside</b> of the owner’s <b>domain and slaughtered</b> it <b>or sold</b> it <b>in</b> the owner’s <b>domain; or</b> if <b>he stole</b> an animal <b>and slaughtered</b> it <b>or sold</b> it, and all of this occurred <b>outside</b> the owner’s <b>domain,</b> in all of these cases, <b>he must pay</b> the <b>fourfold or fivefold payment. But</b> if <b>he stole</b> it <b>and slaughtered or sold</b> it, and all of this occurred <b>in</b> the owner’s <b>domain,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from any of the fines for theft, as it is not considered theft until the stolen object is actually removed from the owner’s premises.", | |
| "If the thief <b>was</b> in the process of <b>leading</b> the animal <b>and leaving</b> the owner’s premises, <b>and it died</b> while it was still <b>in the owner’s domain,</b> the thief is <b>exempt</b> from payment. If <b>he lifted it up or led it out of</b> the <b>owner’s domain and</b> then the animal <b>died,</b> he is <b>liable</b> for his theft. For an act to be considered theft, the thief must acquire the item by pulling it or moving it, which are ineffective forms of acquisition on the owner’s premises; or by lifting it up, which is effective even when performed in the owner’s domain. If the thief <b>gave</b> the animal as payment <b>for the redemption of his firstborn son, or</b> as payment <b>to a creditor,</b> or conveyed it for safeguarding <b>to an unpaid bailee,</b> or lent it <b>to a borrower,</b> or conveyed it for safeguarding <b>to a paid bailee, or</b> leased it <b>to a renter, and he was leading out</b> the animal <b>and it died in the owner’s domain,</b> the thief is <b>exempt</b> from payment. If that individual, following the thief’s instructions, <b>lifted up</b> the animal <b>or led it out of the owner’s domain, and it</b> subsequently <b>died,</b> the thief is <b>liable</b> for the theft. The thief is liable for instructing another to remove the animal for the purposes of payment of a debt, safekeeping, borrowing, or rental, as this is tantamount to the thief taking it with his own hands.", | |
| "<b>One may not raise small domesticated animals,</b> i.e., sheep and goats, <b>in</b> settled areas of <b>Eretz Yisrael,</b> as they graze on people’s crops. <b>But one may raise</b> them <b>in Syria,</b> despite the fact that with regard to many other <i>halakhot</i> Syria is treated like Eretz Yisrael, <b>and in the wilderness of Eretz Yisrael.</b> <b>One may not raise chickens in Jerusalem, due to the sacrificial meat</b> that is common there. There is a concern that chickens will pick up garbage that imparts ritual impurity and bring it into contact with sacrificial meat, thereby rendering it ritually impure. <b>And priests may not</b> raise chickens anywhere <b>in Eretz Yisrael, because of the</b> many foods in a priest’s possession that must be kept <b>ritually pure,</b> e.g., <i>teruma</i>. Furthermore, <b>one may not raise pigs anywhere,</b> and <b>a person may not raise a dog unless it is tied with chains. One may spread out traps [<i>nishovim</i>] for pigeons only if</b> this was performed <b>at a distance of</b> at least <b>thirty <i>ris</i>,</b> which is 8,000 cubits, <b>from</b> any <b>settled area,</b> to ensure that privately owned pigeons are not caught in the traps." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "<b>One who injures another is liable</b> to pay compensation <b>for that</b> injury <b>due to five types</b> of indemnity: He must pay <b>for damage, for pain, for medical costs, for loss of livelihood, and</b> for <b>humiliation.</b> <b>How</b> is payment <b>for damage</b> assessed? If <b>one blinded</b> another’s <b>eye, severed his hand, broke his leg,</b> or caused any other injury, the court <b>views</b> the injured party <b>as though he were a slave</b> being <b>sold in the</b> slave <b>market, and</b> the court <b>appraises how much he was worth</b> before the injury <b>and how much he is worth</b> after the injury. The difference between these two sums is the amount that one must pay for causing damage. How is payment for <b>pain</b> assessed? If <b>one burned</b> another <b>with a skewer [<i>beshapud</i>] or with</b> a hot <b>nail, or even</b> if one burned another <b>on his fingernail,</b> which is <b>a place where he does not cause a bruise</b> that would affect the victim’s value on the slave market, the court <b>evaluates how much</b> money <b>a person</b> with <b>a similar</b> threshold for pain <b>as</b> the victim <b>is willing to take</b> in order to be made <b>to suffer in this way.</b> The one who burned the victim must then pay this amount. How is payment for <b>medical costs</b> assessed? If one <b>struck</b> another, then he is <b>liable to heal him</b> by paying for his medical costs. In a case where <b>growths,</b> e.g., blisters or rashes, <b>appeared on</b> the injured party, <b>if</b> the growths are <b>due to the blow,</b> the one who struck him is <b>liable;</b> if the growths are <b>not due to the blow,</b> the one who struck him is <b>exempt.</b> In a case where the wound <b>healed, and</b> then <b>reopened,</b> and again <b>healed, and</b> then <b>reopened,</b> the one who struck him remains <b>liable to heal</b> the injured party by paying for his medical costs, as it is apparent that the current wound resulted from the original injury. If the injury <b>healed fully,</b> the one who struck him <b>is not liable to heal him</b> by paying for any subsequent medical costs. How is payment for <b>loss of livelihood</b> assessed? The court <b>views</b> the injured party <b>as though he were a watchman of cucumbers,</b> and the one who caused him injury must compensate him based on that pay scale for the income that he lost during his convalescence. This indemnity does not take into account the value of the standard wages of the injured party <b>because</b> the one who caused him injury <b>already gave him compensation for his hand or compensation for his leg,</b> and that compensation took into account his professional skills. How is payment for <b>humiliation</b> assessed? <b>It all depends on</b> the stature of <b>the one who humiliates</b> the other <b>and the one who is humiliated.</b> <b>One who humiliates a naked person,</b> or <b>one who humiliates a blind person, or one who humiliates a sleeping person</b> is <b>liable, but a sleeping person who humiliates</b> another is <b>exempt.</b> If one <b>fell from the roof</b> onto another person, <b>and</b> thereby <b>caused</b> him <b>damage and humiliated</b> him, then the one who fell is <b>liable for the</b> indemnity of <b>damage,</b> since a person is always considered forewarned, <b>and exempt from the</b> indemnity of <b>humiliation, as it is stated: “and putting out her hand, she takes hold of his private parts”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:11); a person is not liable for humiliation <b>unless he intends</b> to humiliate the other person.", | |
| "<b>This</b> <i>halakha</i> <b>is a stringency with regard to a person</b> who caused injury, <b>compared to</b> the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to an ox</b> that caused injury: The <i>halakha</i> is <b>that the person pays</b> compensation for <b>damage, pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation; and</b> if he caused a woman to miscarry he also <b>pays compensation for</b> miscarried <b>offspring,</b> as the verse states (see Exodus 21:22). <b>But</b> in the case of <b>an ox</b> that caused injury, the owner <b>pays only</b> compensation for <b>damage, and</b> he is <b>exempt from</b> paying <b>compensation for</b> miscarried <b>offspring.</b>", | |
| "The mishna continues: <b>One who strikes his father or his mother but did not cause them</b> to have <b>a bruise,</b> and therefore is not liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, <b>and one who injures another on Yom Kippur,</b> the punishment for which is not court-imposed capital punishment, is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>for all of</b> the five types of indemnity. <b>One who injures a Hebrew slave</b> is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>for all of</b> the five types of indemnity. This is <b>except for</b> compensation for <b>loss of livelihood</b> suffered <b>during the time that</b> the injured slave <b>belongs to</b> the one that injured him. Since the right to the slave’s labor belongs to his master, his inability to work is his master’s loss. <b>One who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to others is liable</b> to pay <b>for all of</b> the five types of indemnity. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Canaanite <b>slaves do not have humiliation,</b> so the one who injures the slave pays only the other four types of indemnity.", | |
| "The mishna continues: With regard to <b>a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, an encounter with them is disadvantageous.</b> In other words, no favorable outcome is possible for someone involved in an incident with one of these people, since <b>one who injures them</b> is <b>liable. But</b> if <b>they were</b> the ones <b>who injured others, they</b> are <b>exempt.</b> This is because they lack awareness and are not responsible for their actions. Similarly, with regard to <b>a slave and</b> a married <b>woman, an encounter with them is disadvantageous,</b> since <b>one who injures them</b> is <b>liable. But</b> if <b>they</b> were the ones <b>who injured others, they</b> are <b>exempt,</b> because they do not have money with which to pay compensation. <b>But they pay</b> compensation <b>at a later time.</b> The exemption is only temporary, as, if <b>the woman becomes divorced</b> or <b>the slave becomes emancipated,</b> and they then have their own money, they are <b>liable to pay</b> compensation.", | |
| "The mishna continues: <b>One who strikes his father or his mother and causes them</b> to have <b>a bruise, or one who injures another on Shabbat,</b> is <b>exempt from</b> paying <b>all of</b> the five types of indemnity, <b>because he is judged with</b> losing <b>his life.</b> The court imposes capital punishment for these acts, so there is no additional monetary punishment. <b>And one who injures his own Canaanite slave</b> is <b>exempt from</b> paying <b>all of</b> the five types of indemnity, because his slave is his property.", | |
| "<b>One who strikes another</b> must <b>give him a <i>sela</i>. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili</b> that he must give him <b>one hundred dinars.</b> If he <b>slapped</b> another on the cheek, he must <b>give him two hundred dinars.</b> If he slapped him on the cheek with <b>the back of his hand,</b> which is more degrading than a slap with the palm, he must <b>give him four hundred dinars.</b> If <b>he pulled his ear,</b> or <b>pulled out his hair,</b> or <b>spat</b> at him <b>and his spittle reached him,</b> or if <b>he removed</b> the other’s <b>cloak from him,</b> or if <b>he uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace,</b> in all of these cases, he must <b>give</b> the injured party <b>four hundred dinars.</b> <b>This is the principle</b> of assessing payment for humiliation caused to another: It is <b>all</b> evaluated <b>in accordance with the honor of</b> the one who was humiliated, as the Gemara will explain. <b>Rabbi Akiva said: Even</b> with regard to the <b>poor among the Jewish people, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property</b> and were impoverished. And their humiliation is calculated according to this status, <b>as they are the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,</b> and are all of prominent lineage. The mishna relates: <b>And an incident</b> occurred <b>involving one who uncovered the head of a woman in the marketplace,</b> and the woman <b>came before Rabbi Akiva</b> to request that he render the assailant liable to pay for the humiliation that she suffered, <b>and</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>rendered</b> the assailant <b>liable to give her four hundred dinars.</b> The man <b>said to</b> Rabbi Akiva: <b>My teacher, give me time</b> to pay the penalty, <b>and</b> Rabbi Akiva <b>gave him time.</b> The man then <b>waited for her</b> until <b>she was standing by the opening of her courtyard, and he broke a jug in front of her, and</b> there was the value of <b>about an <i>issar</i> of oil inside</b> the jug. The woman then <b>exposed her</b> own <b>head and she was wetting [<i>metapaḥat</i>]</b> her hand in the oil, <b>and placing her hand on her head</b> to make use of the oil. The man <b>set up witnesses</b> to observe <b>her</b> actions, <b>and he came before Rabbi Akiva,</b> and <b>he said to him: Will I give four hundred dinars to this</b> woman for having uncovered her head? By uncovering her head for a minimal benefit, she has demonstrated that this does not cause her humiliation. Rabbi Akiva <b>said to him: You did not say anything,</b> i.e., this claim will not exempt you. <b>One who injures himself, although it is not permitted for him</b> to do so, is nevertheless <b>exempt</b> from any sort of penalty, but <b>others who injured him</b> are <b>liable</b> to pay him. In this case as well, the man was liable to compensate the woman for shaming her, despite the fact that she did the same to herself. Similarly, <b>one who cuts</b> down <b>his</b> own <b>saplings, although it is not permitted for him</b> to do so, as this violates the prohibition of: “You shall not destroy” (see Deuteronomy 20:19), is <b>exempt</b> from any penalty, but <b>others</b> who cut down his saplings are <b>liable</b> to pay him.", | |
| "<b>Despite</b> the fact <b>that</b> the assailant who caused damage <b>gives to</b> the victim all of the required payments for the injury, his transgression is <b>not forgiven for him</b> in the heavenly court <b>until he requests</b> forgiveness <b>from</b> the victim, <b>as it is stated</b> that God told Abimelech after he had taken Sarah from Abraham: <b>“Now therefore restore the wife</b> of the man; for he is a prophet, and he shall pray for you, and you shall live” (Genesis 20:7). <b>And from where</b> is it derived <b>that if</b> the victim <b>does not forgive him that he is cruel? As it is stated: “And Abraham prayed to God; and God healed Abimelech,</b> and his wife, and his maidservants; and they bore children” (Genesis 20:17). The mishna continues: With regard to <b>one who says</b> to another: <b>Blind my eye,</b> or: <b>cut off my hand,</b> or: <b>break my leg,</b> and he does so, the one who performed these actions is <b>liable</b> to pay for the damage, despite having been instructed to do so. Even if he explicitly instructed him: Do so <b>on the condition that</b> you will <b>be exempt</b> from payment, he is nevertheless <b>liable.</b> With regard to one who says to another: <b>Tear my garment,</b> or: <b>break my jug,</b> and he does so, he is <b>liable</b> to pay for the damage. But if he instructed him explicitly: Do so <b>on the condition that</b> you will <b>be exempt</b> from payment, he is <b>exempt</b> from payment. If one says to another: <b>Do so,</b> i.e., cause damage, <b>to so-and-so on the condition that</b> you will <b>be exempt</b> from payment, and he did so, he is <b>liable, whether</b> the instructions were <b>with regard to</b> the victim <b>himself,</b> or <b>whether</b> the instructions were <b>with regard to his property.</b>" | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "In the case of <b>one who robs</b> another of <b>wood and fashions it</b> into <b>vessels,</b> or one who robs another of <b>wool and fashions it</b> into <b>garments,</b> he <b>pays</b> the robbery victim <b>according to</b> the value of the goods at the <b>time of the robbery,</b> but he need not return the vessels or garments. He has acquired the stolen items because they had undergone a change. If one <b>robbed</b> another of <b>a pregnant cow and it</b> then <b>gave birth</b> while in his possession, or if one robbed another of <b>a ewe</b> that was <b>laden</b> with wool <b>and</b> the robber then <b>sheared it,</b> the robber <b>pays</b> the <b>value of a cow that is ready to give birth or</b> the <b>value of a ewe that is ready to be shorn.</b> He pays the value of the animal at the time of the robbery, and the calf or the wool remains his. If one <b>robbed</b> another of <b>a cow, and it became pregnant in his</b> possession, <b>and it</b> then <b>gave birth;</b> or if one robbed another of <b>a ewe, and it became laden</b> with wool <b>in his</b> possession, <b>and</b> he then <b>sheared it,</b> then the robber <b>pays according to</b> the value of the animal at the <b>time of the robbery. This is the principle: All robbers pay according to</b> the value of the stolen item at the <b>time of the robbery.</b>", | |
| "If one <b>robbed</b> another of <b>an animal and it aged</b> while in his possession, consequently diminishing its value, or if one robbed another of Canaanite <b>slaves and they aged</b> while in his possession, they have been changed. The robber therefore <b>pays according to</b> the value of the stolen item at <b>the time of the robbery. Rabbi Meir says: With regard to</b> Canaanite <b>slaves, he says to</b> the robbery victim: <b>That which is yours is before you.</b> If one <b>robbed</b> another of <b>a coin and it cracked,</b> thereby reducing its value; or if one robbed another of <b>produce and it rotted;</b> or if one robbed another of <b>wine and it fermented,</b> then <b>he pays according to</b> the value of the stolen item at <b>the time of the robbery.</b> If he robbed another of <b>a coin and it was invalidated</b> by the government; or if he robbed another of <b><i>teruma</i> and it became ritually impure;</b> or if he robbed another of <b>leavened bread and Passover elapsed over it,</b> and therefore it is prohibited to derive benefit from it; or if he robbed another of <b>an animal and a sin was performed with it,</b> thereby disqualifying it for use as an offering; <b>or if</b> the animal <b>was disqualified from</b> being sacrificed <b>upon the altar</b> for some other reason; <b>or</b> if the animal <b>was going out to be stoned</b> because it gored and killed a person at some point after the robbery, the robber <b>says to</b> the robbery victim: <b>That which is yours is before you.</b> In all of these cases, although the value of the stolen item has been diminished or altogether lost, since the change is not externally discernible, the robber returns the item in its current state.", | |
| "If one <b>gave</b> items <b>to craftsmen to fix and they damaged</b> them, the craftsmen are <b>liable to pay</b> for the damage. For example, if one <b>gave a chest, a box, or a cabinet to a carpenter to fix, and he damaged</b> it, he is <b>liable to pay. And a builder who committed to demolish a wall and</b> while demolishing it he <b>broke the stones, or who damaged them,</b> is <b>liable to pay.</b> If <b>he was demolishing on this side</b> of the wall, <b>and</b> the wall <b>fell from another side</b> and caused damage, he is <b>exempt</b> from liability. <b>But if</b> a stone fell and caused damage <b>due to</b> the force of <b>the blow,</b> he is <b>liable.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who gives wool to a dyer and it was burned in the cauldron</b> during the dyeing process, thereby completely ruining the wool so that there is no enhancement, only loss, the dyer <b>gives</b> the owner <b>the value of his wool.</b> If he <b>dyed it unattractively [<i>ka’ur</i>]</b> so that the dye is not absorbed well by the wool, <b>if the enhancement,</b> i.e., the amount that the value of the wool has increased by being dyed, <b>exceeds the</b> dyer’s <b>expenses,</b> the owner of the wool <b>gives</b> the dyer <b>the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him</b> the value of <b>the enhancement.</b> If the owner gave wool to a dyer <b>to dye</b> it <b>red for him and</b> instead <b>he dyed it black,</b> or to dye it <b>black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says:</b> The dyer <b>gives</b> the owner of the wool <b>the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says:</b> Here too, <b>if</b> the value of <b>the enhancement exceeds the</b> dyer’s <b>expenses,</b> the owner of the wool <b>gives</b> the dyer <b>the expenses. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him</b> the value of <b>the enhancement.</b>", | |
| "<b>One who robs another</b> of an item having <b>the value of</b> at least <b>one <i>peruta</i> and takes</b> a false <b>oath to</b> the robbery victim claiming his innocence, and then later wishes to repent, must <b>bring</b> the money, which includes the principal together with an additional one-fifth payment, to the robbery victim, even if this necessitates following <b>after him to</b> a distant place like <b>Medea.</b> The robber <b>may not give</b> the payment <b>to</b> the robbery victim’s <b>son</b> to return it to the robbery victim, <b>and neither</b> may he give it <b>to his agent, but he may give</b> the payment <b>to an agent of the court. And if</b> the robbery victim <b>dies, he returns it to his heirs.</b>", | |
| "If <b>he gave</b> the robbery victim <b>the principal</b> value of the stolen item <b>but did not give him</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, or if the owner <b>forgave him concerning the principal but did not forgive him concerning</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, or if <b>he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of less than one <i>peruta</i> of the principal, he need not pursue him</b> to repay the remaining debt. By contrast, if <b>he gave</b> the robbery victim the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment <b>but did not give him the principal,</b> or if the robbery victim <b>forgave him concerning</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment <b>but did not forgive him concerning the principal,</b> or if <b>he forgave him concerning this and concerning that, with the exception of the value of one <i>peruta</i> of the principal, he must pursue him</b> to repay the remaining debt.", | |
| "If the robber <b>gave</b> the robbery victim <b>the principal and took</b> a false <b>oath to him concerning</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, asserting that he had already paid it, then the additional one-fifth is considered a new principal obligation. The robber <b>pays</b> an additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment <b>apart from</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment about which he had taken a false oath. If he then takes a false oath concerning the second one-fifth payment, he is assessed an additional one-fifth payment for that oath, <b>until the principal,</b> i.e., the additional one-fifth payment about which he has most recently taken the false oath, <b>is reduced to less than the value of one <i>peruta</i>.</b> <b>And such</b> is the <i>halakha</i> <b>with regard to a deposit, as it is stated:</b> “If anyone sins, and commits a trespass against the Lord, and he defrauds his counterpart <b>with regard to a deposit, or with regard to a pledge, or with regard to a robbery, or if he exploited his counterpart; or he has found that which was lost, and deals falsely with it, and swears to a lie</b>…he shall restore it in full, and shall add the fifth part more to it” (Leviticus 5:21–24). <b>This</b> one must <b>pay</b> the <b>principal and</b> an additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, <b>and</b> bring <b>a guilt-offering.</b> If the owner asked the bailee: <b>Where is my deposit?</b> And the bailee <b>said to him:</b> It was <b>lost.</b> And the owner said: <b>I administer an oath to you, and</b> the bailee <b>said: Amen,</b> therefore accepting the oath; <b>and the witnesses testify about</b> the bailee <b>that he consumed it,</b> then he must <b>pay</b> the <b>principal.</b> If the bailee <b>admitted on his own</b> that he had taken a false oath, then he must <b>pay</b> the <b>principal and</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, <b>and</b> bring <b>a guilt-offering.</b>", | |
| "If the owner asked the bailee: <b>Where is my deposit,</b> and the bailee <b>said to him: It was stolen;</b> and the owner said: <b>I administer an oath to you, and</b> the bailee <b>said: Amen,</b> therefore accepting the oath; <b>and the witnesses testify about</b> the bailee <b>that he stole it,</b> he must <b>pay</b> the <b>payment of double</b> the principal. If the bailee <b>admitted on his own</b> that he had taken a false oath, then he must <b>pay the principal,</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, <b>and</b> bring <b>a guilt-offering.</b>", | |
| "The mishna continues: In the case of <b>one who robs his father</b> and the father demands that he return the stolen item, <b>and he takes an oath to</b> his father that he did not rob him; <b>and</b> then the father <b>dies;</b> and then the son admits that he robbed him and took a false oath, necessitating the return of the principal and the giving of the additional one-fifth payment to his father’s heirs, of which he is either one of several or the only one; what should he do? <b>This</b> son <b>pays</b> the <b>principal and</b> the additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment <b>to his</b> father’s <b>sons or brothers, and</b> brings <b>a guilt-offering</b> and does not keep his own share. <b>And if he does not want</b> to forfeit his share <b>or where he does not have</b> sufficient funds to pay the other heirs while forfeiting his share, he <b>borrows</b> money in the amount of the value of the stolen item <b>and the creditors come and are repaid</b> in part from his share in the stolen item.", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who says to his son</b> in a vow: It is forbidden <b>like an offering [<i>konam</i>],</b> and for that reason <b>you may not derive benefit from my property, if</b> the father then <b>dies</b> the son <b>inherits</b> from <b>him,</b> because it is no longer the father’s property once he dies. The mishna continues: If the father stated in his vow that his son may not derive benefit from his property <b>in his life and in his death,</b> then even <b>if</b> the father then <b>dies</b> the son <b>does not inherit</b> from <b>him,</b> as the prohibition is still in effect. <b>And</b> instead of taking his inheritance, <b>he returns</b> his portion in the estate <b>to his sons or to his brothers. And if he does not have</b> sufficient funds to subsist without his inheritance, he <b>borrows</b> money in the amount of the value of his share in the inheritance <b>and</b> the <b>creditors come and are repaid</b> from his share.", | |
| "With regard to <b>one who robs a convert and takes a</b> false <b>oath</b> denying having done so, <b>and</b> then the convert <b>dies,</b> the robber, in order to achieve repentance, <b>pays</b> the <b>principal,</b> i.e., the stolen item or, if it is no longer extant, its monetary value, <b>and</b> an additional <b>one-fifth</b> of its value <b>to the priests, and</b> presents <b>a guilt-offering to the altar, as it is stated: “But if the man has no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt, the restitution for guilt that is made shall be the Lord’s, even the priest’s; besides the ram of the atonement, whereby atonement shall be made for him”</b> (Numbers 5:8). If the robber <b>was bringing the money and the guilt-offering up</b> to Jerusalem <b>and he died</b> before paying the priests and bringing his offering, <b>the money shall be given to</b> the robber’s <b>children, and the</b> animal designated for the <b>guilt-offering shall graze until it becomes blemished</b> and consequently disqualified from being sacrificed. <b>And</b> the animal <b>shall</b> then <b>be sold and</b> the <b>money</b> received <b>for it shall be allocated for</b> communal <b>gift</b> offerings. ", | |
| "If the robber <b>gave the money to the members of the priestly watch and</b> then <b>died</b> before they sacrificed his guilt-offering, <b>the heirs cannot remove</b> the money <b>from</b> the priests’ <b>possession, as it is stated:</b> “And every man’s hallowed things shall be his; <b>whatsoever any man gives to the priest, it shall be his”</b> (Numbers 5:10). The mishna continues: If the robber <b>gave the money to</b> the priestly watch of <b>Joiarib and</b> then gave the <b>guilt-offering to</b> the priestly watch of <b>Jedaiah,</b> the following priestly watch, to sacrifice on his behalf, he has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation. By contrast, if he first gave the <b>guilt-offering to</b> the priestly watch of <b>Joiarib and</b> then gave the <b>money to</b> the priestly watch of <b>Jedaiah, if</b> the animal designated for <b>the guilt-offering</b> is <b>extant,</b> then <b>members of</b> the priestly watch of <b>Jedaiah,</b> who received the money, <b>should sacrifice it. But if</b> it is <b>no</b> longer extant because the priestly watch of Joiarib had already sacrificed it, he <b>should return and bring another guilt-offering; for one who brings his stolen item</b> to the priests <b>before</b> he <b>brings his guilt-offering</b> has <b>fulfilled</b> his obligation, but one who <b>brings his guilt-offering before</b> he <b>brings his stolen item</b> has <b>not fulfilled</b> his obligation. Although he cannot sacrifice the offering before paying the principal, if <b>he gave the principal but did not</b> yet <b>give the</b> additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment, the lack of having given <b>the</b> additional <b>one-fifth</b> payment <b>does not preclude</b> sacrificing the offering." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "In the case of <b>one who robs</b> another of food <b>and feeds</b> it to <b>his children, or</b> who <b>left</b> a stolen item <b>to them</b> and then died, the children <b>are exempt from paying</b> the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. But <b>if</b> the stolen item <b>was something that serves</b> as a legal <b>guarantee</b> of a loan, the heirs <b>are obligated to pay.</b> <b>One may not exchange</b> larger coins for smaller ones <b>from the trunk of customs collectors nor from the purse of tax collectors, and one may not take charity from them,</b> as they are assumed to have obtained their funds illegally. <b>But one may take</b> money <b>from</b> the collector’s <b>house or from</b> money he has with him in <b>the market</b> that he did not take from his collection trunk or purse.", | |
| "If <b>customs collectors took one’s donkey and gave him a different donkey</b> that was taken from another Jew in its stead, or if <b>bandits took his garment and gave him a different garment</b> that was taken from a Jew in its stead, <b>these</b> items <b>are</b> now <b>his because the owners despaired of</b> retrieving <b>them</b> when they were stolen, and they may therefore be acquired by another. In a case of <b>one who salvages</b> items <b>from a river, or from a troop [<i>hagayis</i>]</b> of soldiers, <b>or from bandits, if the owners</b> of the items <b>despaired</b> of retrieving them, <b>they are his,</b> i.e., they belong to the one who salvaged them. <b>And so too,</b> with regard to <b>a swarm of bees, if</b> the owners <b>despaired</b> of retrieving the bees, <b>they are his,</b> i.e., they belong to the one who found them. <b>Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka said: A woman or a minor,</b> whose testimony is not generally accepted by the court, <b>is deemed credible to say:</b> It was <b>from here that this swarm emerged,</b> and it therefore belongs to a certain individual. <b>And</b> one <b>may walk into another’s field</b> in order <b>to salvage his</b> own <b>swarm</b> of bees that has relocated there, <b>and if he damaged</b> some property in the process, <b>he must pay</b> for <b>what he has damaged. But</b> if the bees settled on a branch of a tree, <b>he may not cut</b> off the other’s <b>branch</b> in order to take the bees, even <b>on the condition</b> that he will later <b>give him the money</b> for it. <b>Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: He may even cut</b> off the branch <b>and</b> later <b>give</b> him <b>the money</b> for it as compensation.", | |
| "In a case of <b>one who recognizes his</b> stolen <b>vessels and scrolls in another’s possession, and a rumor had spread in the city</b> that the former had been the victim of <b>theft, the purchaser,</b> i.e., the one in possession of these items, <b>must take an oath to</b> the victim as to <b>how much</b> money <b>he spent</b> on the purchase, <b>and he</b> then <b>takes</b> that sum of money in exchange for returning the items. <b>And if no</b> such rumor had spread, <b>it is not in</b> the purported victim’s <b>power</b> to assert that the items were stolen, and he is not entitled to demand their return, <b>as I</b> could <b>say:</b> The items were never stolen; rather, the purported victim <b>sold them to another, and this</b> individual who currently possesses the item <b>purchased them from</b> that other person.", | |
| "In a situation where <b>this</b> individual <b>came with his barrel of wine, and that</b> individual <b>came with his jug of honey,</b> if <b>the barrel of honey cracked and this</b> first individual <b>poured</b> out <b>his wine and salvaged the</b> other’s <b>honey,</b> which is worth more than the wine, by collecting it <b>into</b> his wine barrel, the owner of the wine <b>has</b> the right to collect <b>only his wage,</b> i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging the honey. He is not, however, entitled to compensation for the wine itself. <b>But if</b> the owner of the wine <b>said: I will salvage your</b> honey <b>and you will pay me the value of my</b> wine, the owner of the honey is <b>obligated to pay him</b> compensation for the wine. Similarly, if <b>a river washed away his donkey and the donkey of another,</b> and <b>his</b> donkey was <b>worth one hundred dinars and</b> the donkey <b>of the other</b> was <b>worth two hundred, and</b> the individual with the less valuable donkey <b>abandoned his</b> donkey <b>and</b> instead <b>salvaged</b> the donkey <b>of the other, he has</b> the right to collect <b>only his wage,</b> i.e., compensation for the effort he put into salvaging his fellow’s donkey. <b>But if he said to</b> the owner of the more valuable donkey: <b>I will salvage your</b> donkey <b>and you will pay me the</b> monetary value <b>of mine</b> in exchange, the owner of the more valuable donkey is <b>obligated to pay</b> the rescuer compensation for his donkey.", | |
| "In a case of <b>one who robs a field from an-other and thugs [<i>massikin</i>]</b> subsequently <b>take</b> the field from the robber, the <i>halakha</i> is dependent upon the circumstances: <b>If it is a regional disaster</b> in which the thugs seize all the property in the region, the robber <b>says to</b> the owner of the field: <b>That which is yours is before you,</b> i.e., it is your prerogative to try to reclaim it from the thugs. No compensation is required since the thugs would have seized the property in any event. But <b>if</b> the thugs took that field alone <b>due to the robber,</b> the robber is <b>obligated to provide</b> the owner with <b>a different field.</b> If <b>a river flooded</b> a misappropriated field, the robber <b>may say to</b> its owner: <b>That which is yours is before you,</b> and no compensation is required. Since the field would have been flooded in any case, the robber has not caused the damage to the field, and is therefore exempt.", | |
| "With regard to <b>one who robs another or</b> who <b>borrowed</b> money <b>from him, or</b> one <b>with whom</b> another had <b>deposited</b> an item, if any of these interactions took place <b>in a settled area, he may not return</b> the item <b>to him in an unsettled area,</b> where it is of little benefit to the owner and he cannot safeguard it. If the loan or deposit was given <b>on the condition</b> that the recipient <b>may go out</b> and return it to the owner <b>in an unsettled area, he may return</b> it <b>to him in an unsettled area.</b>", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who says to another: I robbed you,</b> or: <b>You lent me</b> money, or: <b>You deposited</b> an item <b>with me, and I do not know if I returned</b> your property <b>to you</b> or <b>if I did not return</b> it <b>to you,</b> he is <b>liable to pay</b> the sum or item in question. <b>But if he said to him: I do not know if I robbed you,</b> or: I do not know <b>if you lent me money,</b> or: I do not know <b>if you deposited</b> an item <b>with me,</b> he is <b>exempt from paying</b> the sum or item in question.", | |
| "In the case of <b>one who stole a lamb from a flock and returned it</b> without informing the owner that he had done so, <b>and</b> then <b>it died or was stolen,</b> the thief is <b>liable</b> to pay <b>restitution</b> for <b>it.</b> If <b>the</b> lamb’s <b>owners did not know</b> about the entire incident, i.e., they did <b>not</b> know <b>that it was stolen and</b> they did <b>not</b> know <b>that it was returned, and they counted the</b> flock of <b>sheep and</b> found <b>it whole,</b> the thief is <b>exempt</b> from paying.", | |
| "<b>One may not purchase wool, milk, and kids from the shepherds</b> who tend the flocks of others, due to the concern that they have stolen these items from the owners of the flocks. <b>And</b> similarly, one may <b>not</b> purchase <b>wood and produce from produce watchmen.</b> <b>But one may purchase from women woolen goods in Judea, and linen goods in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon,</b> as women in these locations often work with those commodities and it can be assumed that they are selling the items with the owner’s consent. <b>And</b> with regard to <b>all these</b> items, in a case <b>where</b> the seller <b>told</b> the buyer <b>to conceal</b> the purchase, <b>it is prohibited,</b> as there is good reason to suspect that the items are stolen. <b>And one may purchase eggs and chickens from everywhere,</b> as it is unlikely that one would steal and sell these commodities.", | |
| "<b>Strands</b> of wool <b>that the launderer removes</b> from the garment <b>belong to him,</b> as it can be assumed that the customer is uninterested in them, <b>but</b> strands that <b>the carder,</b> i.e., one who prepares wool for use as a textile, <b>removes belong to the customer,</b> as it is assumed that the customer would want them, since the carder often removes a significant number of strands. <b>A launderer takes three threads</b> that were inserted at the edge of a garment, <b>and they are his,</b> but with regard to <b>more</b> threads <b>than this, these</b> additional threads <b>belong to the customer. If</b> these <b>were black</b> threads <b>on a white</b> garment, <b>he takes all of them and they are his.</b> As the removal of the threads improves the appearance of the garment, the customer does not want them. In the case of <b>a tailor who left</b> enough <b>thread</b> attached to the cloth that it could be used <b>in order to sew with it, or</b> if there was <b>a patch</b> of cloth <b>that is three</b> fingerbreadths <b>by three</b> fingerbreadths left from the cloth given to the tailor by the customer, <b>these</b> items <b>belong to the customer. That which a carpenter removes with an adze belongs to him,</b> because an adze removes only small shavings of wood, which the customer is uninterested in; <b>but</b> what he removes <b>with an ax [<i>uvakashil</i>] belongs to the customer. And if he was doing</b> his work <b>in</b> the domain of <b>the customer,</b> then <b>even the sawdust belongs to the customer.</b>" | |
| ] | |
| ], | |
| "versions": [ | |
| [ | |
| "William Davidson Edition - English", | |
| "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1" | |
| ] | |
| ], | |
| "heTitle": "משנה בבא קמא", | |
| "categories": [ | |
| "Mishnah", | |
| "Seder Nezikin" | |
| ], | |
| "sectionNames": [ | |
| "Chapter", | |
| "Mishnah" | |
| ] | |
| } |