| { | |
| "title": "Mishnah Makkot", | |
| "language": "en", | |
| "versionTitle": "merged", | |
| "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Mishnah_Makkot", | |
| "text": [ | |
| [ | |
| "<b>How are witnesses rendered conspiring</b> witnesses? This applies in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: <b>We testify with regard to so-and-so,</b> who is a priest, <b>that he is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a <i>ḥalutza</i>,</b> a <i>yevama</i> who performed the rite of <i>ḥalitza</i> to free herself from the levirate bond. Those testimonies render him a <i>ḥalal</i> (see Leviticus 21:6–7), one disqualified from the priesthood due to flawed lineage. If a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, <b>one does not say</b> with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: <b>This</b> witness <b>shall be rendered the son of a divorced woman or the son of a <i>ḥalutza</i> in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes</b> as punishment for his false testimony. Likewise, in a case where two witnesses came before the court and said: <b>We testify with regard to so-and-so that he is liable to be exiled</b> to a city of refuge for unwittingly killing another (see Numbers 35:11), and a second set of witnesses testifies in court and renders the first set conspiring witnesses, <b>one does not say</b> with regard to each of the conspiring witnesses: <b>This</b> witness <b>shall be exiled in his stead. Rather, he receives forty lashes.</b> In the case of witnesses who said: <b>We testify</b> with regard to <b>a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that he divorced his wife and did not give her</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract,</b> and they were then rendered conspiring witnesses, the question arises with regard to the manner in which the sum of their payment is calculated. It is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum of the marriage contract, as they can claim: <b>But isn’t</b> it so that <b>either today or tomorrow,</b> i.e., at some point in the future, he may divorce his wife or die and <b>ultimately he</b> will be liable <b>to give her</b> payment of <b>her marriage contract?</b> That being the case, the witnesses did not conspire to render him liable to pay a sum that he would otherwise not be liable to pay. The sum of their payment is calculated as follows: The court <b>assesses how much</b> money another <b>person</b> would be <b>willing to give in</b> order to purchase the rights to <b>this</b> woman’s <b>marriage contract,</b> cognizant of the uncertainty <b>that if she was widowed or divorced</b> the purchaser will receive payment of the marriage contract <b>but if she dies, her husband will inherit</b> from <b>her,</b> and the one who purchased her marriage contract will receive nothing. In the case of witnesses who said: <b>We testify with regard to a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that he owes another</b> person <b>one thousand dinars</b> that he borrowed <b>on the condition</b> that he is <b>to give</b> the money back <b>to him from now until thirty days</b> have passed, <b>and</b> the borrower <b>says</b> that he borrowed that sum but it was on the condition that he is to give the money back to him <b>from now until ten years</b> have passed, and they were rendered conspiring witnesses, here too, it is not possible to render the witnesses liable to pay the entire sum. Rather, the court <b>estimates how much</b> money <b>a person</b> would be <b>willing to give</b> so that he <b>would</b> keep a loan of <b>one thousand dinars in his possession,</b> and one calculates the difference <b>between</b> that sum in a situation where he would be required to <b>give</b> the money back <b>from now until thirty days</b> have passed, <b>and</b> that same sum in a situation where he would be required to <b>give</b> the money back <b>from now until ten years</b> have passed. That difference is the sum that the testimony of the conspiring witnesses sought to have the borrower lose; therefore, it is the sum that they must pay.", | |
| "If witnesses said: <b>We testify with regard to a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that he is liable to</b> pay <b>another</b> person <b>two hundred dinars, and they were found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>they are flogged, and they pay</b> the money they sought to render him liable to pay. Why do they receive two punishments? It is due to the fact <b>that the source that brings them to</b> liability to receive <b>lashes</b> is <b>not</b> the source that <b>brings them to</b> liability for <b>payment;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Anyone who pays</b> as punishment for a transgression <b>is not flogged</b> for that same transgression.", | |
| "Likewise, if witnesses said: <b>We testify with regard to a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that he is liable</b> to receive <b>forty lashes, and they were discovered</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>they are flogged</b> with <b>eighty</b> lashes; one set of lashes <b>due to</b> violation of the prohibition: <b>“You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor”</b> (Exodus 20:13), <b>and</b> one set of lashes <b>due to</b> the verse: <b>“And you shall do to him as he conspired”</b> (Deuteronomy 19:19), which is the punishment for conspiring witnesses; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: They are flogged</b> with <b>only forty</b> lashes, due to the verse “And you shall do to him as he conspired.” When punishing conspiring witnesses based on the verse: “As he conspired to do to his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:19), <b>one divides</b> the punishment <b>of money</b> among them, <b>but one does not divide</b> the punishment <b>of lashes</b> among them; each receives thirty-nine lashes. The mishna elaborates: <b>How so?</b> If the witnesses <b>testified about</b> someone <b>that he owes another</b> person <b>two hundred dinars and they were</b> then <b>found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, the witnesses <b>divide</b> the sum <b>among themselves</b> and pay a total of two hundred dinars. <b>But if they testified about</b> someone <b>that he was liable</b> to receive <b>forty lashes and they were</b> then <b>found</b> to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>each and every one</b> of the witnesses <b>receives forty lashes.</b> ", | |
| "<b>Witnesses are not rendered conspiring</b> witnesses <b>until</b> the witnesses who come to render them conspiring <b>impeach</b> the witnesses <b>themselves</b> and not merely their testimony. <b>How so?</b> A set of witnesses <b>said: We testify with regard to a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that he killed a person,</b> and they attested to the precise time and place that the murder took place. Then, a second set of witnesses came to court and <b>said to them: How can you testify</b> about this event? <b>This</b> person who <b>was killed, or this</b> person <b>who killed, was with us,</b> i.e., with the second set of witnesses, on <b>that day in such and such place,</b> which is not the location identified by the first set of witnesses. In that case, although the second set of witnesses contradicted the testimony of the first set, <b>these</b> first witnesses are <b>not</b> rendered <b>conspiring</b> witnesses. <b>But</b> if the second set of witnesses came to court and <b>said to them: How can you testify</b> about that event? <b>You were with us</b> on <b>that day in such and such place.</b> In this case, <b>these</b> first witnesses are rendered <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>and are executed on the basis of their,</b> i.e., the second set’s, testimony.", | |
| "If <b>other</b> witnesses, i.e., a third set, <b>came</b> and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses, and the second set of witnesses testified that this third set of witnesses were also with them elsewhere that day <b>and rendered them conspiring</b> witnesses, and similarly, if yet <b>other</b> witnesses, i.e., a fourth set, <b>came</b> and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses <b>and</b> the second set <b>rendered them conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>even</b> if <b>one hundred</b> sets of witnesses were all rendered conspiring witnesses by the same second set of witnesses, <b>all of them are executed</b> on the basis of their testimony, as the authority of two witnesses is equivalent to the authority of numerous witnesses. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: This</b> situation where a set of witnesses renders all the others conspiring witnesses <b>is a conspiracy [<i>istatit</i>],</b> as there is room for suspicion that they simply decided to impeach all witnesses who offer that testimony, <b>and</b> it is <b>only the first set alone</b> that is <b>executed.</b> ", | |
| "<b>The conspiring witnesses are executed only</b> if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after <b>the verdict</b> of the accused <b>is concluded.</b> This is in contrast to the opinion of the Sadducees, <b>as the Sadducees say:</b> Conspiring witnesses are executed <b>only</b> if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after the accused <b>is killed</b> on the basis of their testimony, <b>as it is stated: “A life for a life”</b> (Exodus 21:23; see Deuteronomy 19:21). <b>The Rabbis said to</b> the Sadducees: <b>But wasn’t it already stated: “And you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother”</b> (Deuteronomy 19:19), <b>and</b> this latter verse indicates that <b>his</b> accused <b>brother is alive? And if so, why is it stated: “A life for a life”?</b> One <b>might</b> have thought that if they are rendered conspiring witnesses <b>from the moment</b> the judges <b>accepted their testimony</b> in court, <b>they will be executed,</b> even though no verdict was concluded. Therefore, <b>the verse states: “A life for a life,”</b> teaching that <b>they are executed only</b> if they are rendered conspiring witnesses after <b>the verdict</b> of the accused <b>will be concluded,</b> from the moment that the court is on the verge of taking his life.", | |
| "It is written: <b>“At the mouth of two witnesses or three witnesses shall he who is to die be executed”</b> (Deuteronomy 17:6). The question is: <b>If the testimony is valid with two</b> witnesses, <b>why did the verse specify</b> that it is valid <b>with three? Rather,</b> it is <b>to juxtapose</b> and liken <b>three to two: Just as three</b> witnesses <b>can render the two</b> witnesses <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>so too, the two</b> witnesses <b>can render the three</b> wit-nesses <b>conspiring</b> witnesses. <b>And from where</b> is it derived that two witnesses can render <b>even one hundred</b> witnesses conspiring witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as <b>the verse states:</b> “Three <b>witnesses.”</b> Since the verse is obviously discussing witnesses, the term witnesses is superfluous, as it could have stated: Two or three. The term “witnesses” teaches that two witnesses can render a set of witnesses conspiring witnesses irrespective of their number. <b>Rabbi Shimon says</b> that three witnesses are mentioned in the verse in order to teach: <b>Just as two</b> witnesses who testified that a person is liable to be executed <b>are not killed</b> for this testimony <b>unless both of them are</b> found to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, <b>so too, three</b> witnesses who testified together <b>are not killed unless</b> all <b>three of them are</b> found to be <b>conspiring</b> witnesses. <b>And from where</b> is it derived that the same <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even</b> to <b>one hundred</b> witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as <b>the verse states:</b> “Three <b>witnesses.”</b> The superfluous term “witnesses” teaches that the status of all witnesses who come to court as a single set of witnesses is that of one testimony with regard to this <i>halakha</i>. <b>Rabbi Akiva says: The third</b> witness mentioned in this verse <b>does not come</b> for the judges <b>to be lenient</b> concerning him; <b>rather,</b> its mention comes for the judges <b>to be stringent concerning him and to render his halakhic status like</b> that of <b>these</b> two witnesses who testified with him. One could claim that since the testimony of the third witness is superfluous, as the testimony of the other two witnesses sufficed, the third witness and any other witnesses beyond the first two should be exempt. Therefore, the verse teaches that since he testified with them and was rendered a conspiring witness with them, he too is executed. One can learn a moral from this <i>halakha</i>: <b>And if the verse punished one who associates with transgressors</b> with a punishment <b>like</b> the one received by the <b>transgressors,</b> even though his role in the transgression is ancillary, <b>all the more so will</b> God <b>pay a reward to one who associates with those who perform a mitzva like</b> the reward of those <b>who perform</b> the <b>mitzva</b> themselves, even though his role in performing the mitzva is ancillary. ", | |
| "The mishna cites another derivation based on the juxtaposition of two to three: <b>And just as</b> with regard to <b>two</b> witnesses, if <b>one of them is found</b> to be <b>a relative or</b> is otherwise <b>disqualified, their</b> entire <b>testimony is voided,</b> as it is no longer the testimony of two witnesses, <b>so too,</b> with regard to <b>three</b> witnesses who came to testify as one set, if <b>one of them is found</b> to be <b>a relative or</b> is otherwise <b>disqualified, their</b> entire <b>testimony is voided,</b> even though two valid witnesses remain. <b>From where</b> is it derived that the same <i>halakha</i> applies <b>even</b> in the case of <b>one hundred</b> witnesses? It is derived from a verse, as <b>the verse states: “Witnesses.”</b> <b>Rabbi Yosei says: In what</b> case <b>is this statement,</b> that if one of the three witnesses is disqualified the entire testimony is voided, <b>said?</b> It is said <b>with regard to</b> cases of <b>capital law,</b> which are adjudicated stringently. <b>But with regard to</b> cases of <b>monetary law,</b> which are adjudicated more leniently, even if one of the witnesses is disqualified, <b>the testimony will be validated with</b> the testimony of <b>the rest</b> of the witnesses, and if it is sufficient the case can be adjudicated on that basis. <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi disagrees and <b>says:</b> If one of the three witnesses is disqualified the entire testimony is voided in <b>both</b> cases of <b>monetary law and</b> cases of <b>capital law.</b> <b>And when</b> does one disqualified witness void the entire testimony? Only <b>when</b> the witnesses <b>forewarned them</b> before they performed the transgression, thereby demonstrating their desire to fill the role of witnesses in that case. <b>But when they did not forewarn them, what shall two brothers do</b> in a case <b>where</b> they, together with others, <b>saw someone who killed a person?</b> Will the murderer escape punishment because two relatives happened to be there at the time of the murder and their presence voids the entire testimony? No, the testimony is voided by the presence of relatives or disqualified witnesses only when their intent was to testify. If that was not their intent, they do not void the testimony.", | |
| "In a case where there <b>were two</b> witnesses <b>observing</b> an individual violating a capital transgression <b>from this window</b> in a house, <b>and two observing him from that window</b> in a house, <b>and one</b> person was <b>forewarning</b> the transgressor <b>in the middle</b> between the two sets of witnesses, the <i>halakha</i> depends on the circumstances. In a situation <b>where some of</b> the witnesses observing from the two windows <b>see each other,</b> the testimony of all <b>these</b> witnesses constitutes <b>one testimony, but if</b> they do <b>not</b> see each other, the testimony of <b>these</b> witnesses constitutes <b>two</b> independent <b>testimonies. Therefore,</b> as two independent sets of witnesses, <b>if one of</b> the sets <b>was found</b> to be a set of <b>conspiring</b> witnesses, while the testimony of the other set remained valid, both <b>he,</b> the one accused of violating the capital transgression, <b>and they,</b> the conspiring witnesses, <b>are executed, and the second</b> set, whose testimony remained valid, <b>is exempt.</b> <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> Transgressors <b>are never executed unless his two witnesses are</b> the ones <b>forewarning him, as it is stated: “At the mouth of two witnesses…</b>he who is to be put to death shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:6), from which it is derived that it is from the mouths of the two witnesses that the accused must be forewarned, and forewarning issued by someone else is insufficient. <b>Alternatively,</b> from the phrase <b>“at the mouth of two witnesses”</b> one derives <b>that</b> the judges must hear the testimony directly from the witnesses, and the <b>Sanhedrin will not hear</b> testimony <b>from the mouth of an interpreter.</b>", | |
| "This mishna continues to discuss the matter of testimony in the case of one who is liable to be executed. Concerning <b>one whose verdict was delivered</b> and he was sentenced to death <b>and he fled, and he</b> then <b>came before the same court</b> that sentenced him, <b>they do not overturn his verdict</b> and retry him. Rather, the court administers the previous verdict. Consequently, in <b>any place where two</b> witnesses <b>will stand and say: We testify with regard to a man</b> called <b>so-and-so that his verdict was delivered</b> and he was sentenced to death <b>in the court of so-and-so, and so-and-so and so-and-so</b> were <b>his witnesses, that</b> person <b>shall be executed</b> on the basis of that testimony. The mishna continues: The mitzva to establish <b>a Sanhedrin</b> with the authority to administer capital punishments <b>is in effect</b> both <b>in Eretz</b> Yisrael <b>and outside Eretz</b> Yisrael. <b>A Sanhedrin that executes</b> a transgressor <b>once in seven years is characterized</b> as <b>a destructive</b> tribunal. Since the Sanhedrin would subject the testimony to exacting scrutiny, it was extremely rare for a defendant to be executed. <b>Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says:</b> This categorization applies to a Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor <b>once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been</b> members <b>of the Sanhedrin,</b> we would have conducted trials in a manner whereby <b>no person would have ever been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:</b> In adopting that approach, <b>they too</b> would <b>increase</b> the number of <b>murderers among the Jewish people.</b> The death penalty would lose its deterrent value, as all potential murderers would know that no one is ever executed." | |
| ], | |
| [ | |
| "<b>These are</b> the people <b>who are exiled:</b> Anyone <b>who kills a person unintentionally.</b> Whether one is liable to be exiled depends on the particular circumstances of the case: If <b>one was rolling a roller</b> to smooth the covering of mortar that he applied to seal his roof <b>and</b> the roller <b>fell upon</b> a person <b>and killed him,</b> or if <b>one was lowering a barrel</b> from the roof <b>and it fell on</b> a person <b>and killed him,</b> or if he <b>was descending a ladder and he fell on</b> a person <b>and killed him,</b> in all of these cases, <b>he is exiled. But if one was pulling a roller</b> toward him <b>and it fell</b> from his hands <b>upon</b> a person <b>and killed him,</b> or if <b>one was lifting a barrel and the rope was severed and it fell upon</b> a person <b>and killed him,</b> or if <b>one was climbing a ladder and he fell upon</b> a person <b>and killed him, that</b> unintentional murderer <b>is not exiled. This is the principle: Any</b> murderer <b>who</b> kills unintentionally <b>through his downward</b> motion <b>is exiled, and</b> one <b>who</b> kills <b>not through his downward</b> motion <b>is not exiled.</b> If <b>the blade</b> of an ax or hatchet <b>was displaced from its handle,</b> and it flew through the air <b>and killed</b> a person, <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says: He is not exiled, and the Rabbis say:</b> He is <b>exiled.</b> If part <b>of a tree that is being split</b> flew through the air and killed a person, <b>Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says:</b> The murderer is <b>exiled, and the Rabbis say: He is not exiled.</b>", | |
| "<b>One who threw a stone into the public domain and killed</b> a person <b>is exiled. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: If after the stone left his hand the other</b> person <b>placed his head out</b> into the public domain <b>and received</b> a blow from the stone, <b>he is exempt,</b> as when he cast the stone into the public domain there was no one there. In the case of one who <b>threw the stone into his courtyard and killed</b> a person, <b>if the victim had permission to enter into there,</b> the murderer is <b>exiled, but if not, he is not exiled, as it is stated</b> with regard to the cities of refuge: <b>“And as one who goes with his neighbor into the forest”</b> (Deuteronomy 19:5), from which it is derived: <b>Just as</b> with regard to <b>a forest, the victim and the assailant</b> both <b>have</b> equal <b>permission to enter there, so too,</b> with regard to <b>all</b> places that <b>the victim and the assailant have permission to enter there,</b> the killer is liable. This serves <b>to exclude</b> the <b>courtyard of the homeowner, where the victim and the assailant do not</b> both <b>have permission to enter there.</b> Since the victim had no right to enter his courtyard, the unintentional murderer is exempt from exile. <b>Abba Shaul says:</b> Another <i>halakha</i> can be derived from that verse: <b>Just as the cutting of wood</b> that is mentioned in the verse is <b>optional, so too, all</b> those liable to be exiled are examples of cases where the unintentional murderer was engaged in an activity that is <b>optional.</b> This serves <b>to exclude a father who strikes his son, and a teacher who oppresses his student, and an agent of the court</b> deputized to flog transgressors. If, in the course of performing the mitzva with which they are charged, they unintentionally murdered the son, the student, or the person being flogged, respectively, they are exempt.", | |
| "<b>The father is exiled</b> to a city of refuge <b>due to</b> his unintentional murder of his <b>son. And the son is exiled due to</b> his unintentional murder of his <b>father. Everyone is exiled due to</b> their unintentional murder of <b>a Jew, and a Jew is exiled due to</b> his unintentional murder of any of <b>them, except for</b> the unintentional murder of <b>a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [<i>ger toshav</i>]. And a <i>ger toshav</i> is exiled only due to</b> his unintentional murder of <b>a <i>ger toshav</i>.</b> <b>A blind person</b> who unintentionally murdered another <b>is not exiled;</b> this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says:</b> He is <b>exiled. The enemy</b> of the victim <b>is not exiled,</b> as presumably it was not a completely unintentional act. <b>Rabbi Yosei says:</b> Not only is <b>an enemy</b> not exiled, but he <b>is executed</b> by the court, <b>because</b> his halakhic status is <b>like</b> that of one who is <b>forewarned</b> by witnesses not to perform the action, as presumably he performed the action intentionally. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: There is an enemy who is exiled and there is an enemy who is not exiled. This is the principle:</b> In <b>any</b> case <b>where</b> an observer <b>could say he killed knowingly,</b> where circumstances lead to the assumption that it was an intentional act, the enemy <b>is not exiled,</b> even if he claims that he acted unintentionally. <b>And</b> if it is clear that <b>he killed unknowingly,</b> as circumstances indicate that he acted unintentionally, <b>he is exiled,</b> even though the victim is his enemy.", | |
| " <b>To where are</b> the unintentional murderers <b>exiled?</b> They are exiled <b>to cities of refuge, to three</b> cities <b>that</b> were <b>in</b> the east <b>bank of the Jordan and to three cities that</b> were <b>in the land of Canaan,</b> i.e., Eretz Yisrael, <b>as it is stated: “Three cities shall you give beyond the Jordan and three cities shall you give in the land of Canaan;</b> they shall be cities of refuge” (Numbers 35:14). The mishna comments: <b>Until</b> the <b>three</b> cities of refuge <b>that</b> were <b>in Eretz Yisrael were selected,</b> an unintentional murderer <b>would not be admitted</b> to the <b>three that</b> were <b>in</b> the east <b>bank of the Jordan,</b> even though the latter three were already selected by Moses (see Deuteronomy 4:41), <b>as it is stated: “Six cities of refuge shall they be”</b> (Numbers 35:13), from which it is derived that they do not become cities of refuge <b>until</b> all <b>six of them admit</b> unintentional murderers <b>as one.</b>", | |
| "The mishna continues: <b>And roads were aligned for them from this</b> city, i.e., all cities, <b>to that</b> city, i.e., they would pave and straighten the access roads to the cities of refuge, <b>as it is stated: “Prepare for you the road, and divide</b> the borders of your land, which the Lord your God causes you to inherit, into three parts, that every murderer may flee there” (Deuteronomy 19:3). <b>And</b> the court <b>would provide</b> the unintentional murderers fleeing to a city of refuge with <b>two Torah scholars,</b> due to the concern that <b>perhaps</b> the blood redeemer, i.e., a relative of the murder victim seeking to avenge his death, <b>will</b> seek to <b>kill him in transit, and</b> in that case <b>they,</b> the scholars, <b>will talk to</b> the blood redeemer and dissuade him from killing the unintentional murderer. <b>Rabbi Meir says:</b> The unintentional murderer <b>also speaks [<i>medabber</i>] on his own behalf</b> to dissuade the blood redeemer, <b>as it is stated: “And this is the matter [<i>devar</i>] of the murderer,</b> who shall flee there and live” (Deuteronomy 19:4), indicating that the murderer himself speaks.", | |
| "<b>Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: Initially, either</b> one who killed another <b>unintentionally or</b> one who killed another <b>intentionally</b> would <b>hurry</b> and flee <b>to the cities of refuge, and the court</b> in his city would <b>send</b> for him <b>and</b> would <b>bring him from there</b> to stand trial. For <b>one who was</b> found <b>liable</b> to receive the <b>death</b> penalty <b>in court</b> for intentional murder, the court would <b>execute him, and</b> for <b>one who was not</b> found <b>liable</b> to receive the <b>death</b> penalty, e.g., if they deemed that the death occurred due to circumstances beyond his control, <b>they</b> would <b>free him.</b> For <b>one who was</b> found <b>liable to be exiled,</b> the court would <b>restore him to his place</b> in the city of refuge, <b>as it is stated:</b> “And the congregation shall judge between the murderer and the blood redeemer…<b>and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge,</b> that he fled there” (Numbers 35:24–25), indicating that he had been in a city of refuge before his trial. The Torah states that an unintentional murderer is required to remain in the city of refuge to which he fled until the death of the High Priest. The mishna elaborates: With regard to High Priests, who were appointed in several different manners, <b>one anointed with the anointing oil,</b> which was the method through which High Priests were consecrated until the oil was sequestered toward the end of the First Temple period; <b>and one</b> consecrated by donning <b>multiple garments,</b> the eight vestments unique to the High Priest, which was the practice during the Second Temple period; <b>and one</b> who received a temporary appointment due to the unfitness of the serving High Priest, <b>who departed from his anointment</b> with the restoration of the serving High Priest to active service, their deaths <b>facilitate</b> the <b>return of the murderer</b> from the city of refuge to his home. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: Even</b> the death of a priest <b>anointed for war</b> to address the soldiers (see Deuteronomy 20:1–7) <b>facilitates</b> the <b>return of the murderer.</b> The mishna continues: <b>Therefore, the mothers of</b> High <b>Priests</b> would <b>provide</b> those exiled to cities of refuge with <b>sustenance and garments so that they would not pray that their sons would die.</b> ", | |
| "The more comfortable their lives in the city of refuge, the less urgency they would feel to leave, and the less likely it would be that they would pray for the death of the High Priests. If, <b>after</b> the unintentional murderer’s <b>verdict was decided</b> and he was sentenced to exile, <b>the High Priest died,</b> he <b>is not exiled,</b> as the death of the High Priest exempts him from exile. <b>If</b> it was <b>before his verdict was decided</b> that <b>the High Priest died and they appointed another in his place, and thereafter his verdict was decided, he returns</b> from exile <b>with the death of the second</b> High Priest. If <b>the verdict of</b> a murderer <b>was decided</b> at a time <b>when</b> there was <b>no High Priest, and</b> likewise in the cases of <b>one who</b> unintentionally <b>killed a High Priest and</b> in the case of <b>a High Priest who killed</b> unintentionally, the unintentional murderer <b>never leaves</b> the city of refuge. <b>And</b> one who is exiled may <b>not leave</b> the city at all, <b>either for testimony</b> relating to <b>a mitzva, or for testimony</b> relating to <b>monetary matters, or for testimony</b> relating to <b>capital</b> matters. <b>And even</b> if <b>the Jewish people require</b> his services, <b>and even</b> if he is <b>the general of the army of Israel like Joab ben Zeruiah, he never leaves</b> the city of refuge, <b>as it is stated:</b> “And the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, <b>that he fled there”</b> (Numbers 35:25), from which it is derived: <b>There shall be his dwelling, there shall be his death, there shall be his burial.</b> The mishna continues: <b>Just as</b> an unintentional murderer <b>is admitted</b> to <b>the city</b> of refuge, <b>so is he admitted</b> to <b>its outskirts, located</b> within the Shabbat <b>boundary.</b> Once he entered the outskirts of the city, the blood redeemer may not kill him. In a case <b>where a murderer emerged beyond the</b> Shabbat <b>boundary</b> of the city of refuge <b>and the blood redeemer found him</b> there, <b>Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says:</b> It is <b>a mitzva for the blood redeemer</b> to kill him, <b>and</b> it is <b>optional for every</b> other <b>person</b> to do so. <b>Rabbi Akiva says:</b> It is <b>optional for the blood redeemer, and every</b> other <b>person is liable for</b> killing <b>him.</b> The previous mishna teaches that the halakhic status of the outskirts of the city is like that of the city itself in terms of the unintentional murderer being provided refuge there. The mishna adds: With regard to <b>a tree that stands within the</b> Shabbat <b>boundary</b> of a city of refuge, <b>whose boughs extend outside the boundary, or</b> a tree that <b>stands outside the boundary and its boughs extend inside the boundary,</b> the status of the tree, whether it is considered inside or outside the boundary, in <b>all</b> cases <b>follows the boughs.</b> If an unintentional murderer, exiled to a city of refuge, unintentionally <b>killed</b> a person <b>in the same city,</b> he <b>is exiled from</b> that <b>neighborhood</b> where he resided <b>to</b> another <b>neighborhood</b> within that city. <b>And a Levite</b> who is a permanent resident of a city of refuge and unintentionally killed a person <b>is exiled from</b> that <b>city to</b> another <b>city.</b> ", | |
| "<b>Similarly,</b> in the case of <b>a murderer who was exiled to a city of refuge and the people of the city sought to honor him</b> due to his prominence, <b>he shall say to them: I am a murderer.</b> If the residents of the city <b>say to him:</b> We are aware of your status and <b>nevertheless,</b> we wish to honor you, <b>he may accept</b> the honor <b>from them, as it is stated: “And this is the matter [<i>devar</i>] of the murderer”</b> (Deuteronomy 19:4), from which it is derived that the murderer is required to say [<i>ledabber</i>] to them that he is a murderer. He is not required to tell them any more than that. The unintentional murderers <b>would pay a fee to the Levites</b> as rent for their living quarters in the cities of refuge, which were Levite cities; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Meir says: They would not pay a fee to them,</b> but would reside rent free, as they are required to live there by Torah law. They also disagreed with regard to the status of the unintentional murderer when he returns home after the death of the High Priest. <b>He returns to the</b> same public <b>office that he occupied</b> prior to his exile; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: He does not return to the office that he occupied.</b>" | |
| ], | |
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| "After enumerating in tractate <i>Sanhedrin</i> those liable to be executed and in the previous chapter those liable to be exiled, the mishna proceeds to enumerate those liable to receive lashes. <b>These are</b> the people <b>who are flogged</b> by Torah law for violating a prohibition: <b>One who engages in intercourse with his sister, or with his father’s sister, or with his mother’s sister, or with his wife’s sister, or with his brother’s wife, or with the wife of his father’s brother, or with a menstruating woman.</b> Likewise, one is flogged in the case of <b>a widow</b> who married <b>a High Priest, a divorcée or a <i>ḥalutza</i></b> who married <b>an ordinary priest, a <i>mamzeret</i>,</b> i.e., a daughter born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship, <b>or a Gibeonite woman</b> who married <b>a Jew</b> of unflawed lineage, and <b>a Jewish woman</b> of unflawed lineage who married <b>a Gibeonite or a <i>mamzer</i>,</b> i.e., a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship. The mishna elaborates: If a woman was both <b>a widow and a divorcée,</b> as after she was widowed she remarried and was divorced, a High Priest <b>is liable</b> to receive two sets of lashes <b>for</b> marrying <b>her due to</b> the violation of <b>two</b> different <b>prohibitions,</b> that of his marrying a widow and that of his marrying a divorced woman. If a woman was both <b>a divorcée and a <i>ḥalutza</i>,</b> from two different men, an ordinary priest who marries her <b>is liable</b> to receive <b>only</b> one set of lashes, <b>due to</b> the violation of <b>one</b> prohibition <b>alone.</b>", | |
| "The mishna continues enumerating those liable to receive lashes: <b>A ritually impure person who ate sacrificial</b> food <b>and one who entered the Temple</b> while <b>ritually impure. And one</b> who <b>eats</b> the forbidden <b>fat</b> of a domesticated animal; <b>or blood; or <i>notar</i>,</b> leftover flesh from an offering after the time allotted for its consumption; <b>or <i>piggul</i>,</b> an offering invalidated due to intent to sprinkle its blood, burn its fats on the altar, or consume it, beyond its designated time; <b>or</b> one who partakes of an offering that became <b>impure,</b> is flogged. <b>And one who slaughters</b> a sacrificial animal <b>or sacrifices</b> it on an altar <b>outside</b> the Temple courtyard, <b>and one who eats leavened bread on Passover, and one who eats</b> on Yom Kippur <b>and one who performs labor on Yom Kippur, and one who blends the</b> anointing <b>oil</b> for non-sacred use, <b>and one who blends the incense</b> that was burned on the altar in the Sanctuary for non-sacred use, <b>and one who applies the anointing oil, and one who eats unslaughtered</b> animal or bird <b>carcasses, or <i>tereifot</i>,</b> which are animals or birds with a condition that will lead to their death within twelve months, or <b>repugnant creatures, or creeping animals,</b> is liable to receive lashes. If <b>one ate untithed produce,</b> i.e., produce from which <i>terumot</i> and tithes were not separated; <b>or first-tithe</b> produce <b>whose <i>teruma</i></b> of the tithe <b>was not taken; or second-tithe</b> produce <b>or sacrificial</b> food <b>that was not redeemed;</b> he is liable to receive lashes. With regard to the measure for liability for eating forbidden food, the mishna asks: <b>How much does one</b> need to <b>eat from untithed produce and be liable</b> to receive lashes? <b>Rabbi Shimon says:</b> If one ate <b>any amount</b> of untithed produce he is liable to receive lashes. <b>And the Rabbis say:</b> He is liable only if he eats <b>an olive-bulk,</b> which is the minimum measure characterized as eating. <b>Rabbi Shimon said to them: Do you not concede to me with regard to one who eats an ant of any size that he is liable</b> to receive lashes? The Rabbis <b>said to</b> Rabbi Shimon: He receives lashes for eating an ant of any size <b>due to</b> the fact <b>that it is</b> an intact entity in the form <b>of its creation,</b> and that is what the Torah prohibited. Rabbi Shimon <b>said to them: One</b> kernel of <b>wheat</b> is <b>also</b> in the form <b>of its creation,</b> and therefore one should be liable to receive lashes for eating any intact entity.", | |
| "In the case of a priest <b>who eats first fruits before</b> the one who brought the fruits to the Temple <b>recited over</b> those fruits the Torah verses that he is obligated to recite (see Deuteronomy 26:3–10); and one who ate <b>offerings of the most sacred order outside the curtains</b> surrounding the Tabernacle courtyard, or outside the Temple courtyard; and one who ate <b>offerings of lesser sanctity or second-tithe</b> produce <b>outside the wall</b> of Jerusalem; and also <b>one who breaks the bone of a ritually pure Paschal offering;</b> in all these cases <b>he is flogged</b> with <b>forty</b> lashes. <b>But one who leaves</b> the flesh <b>of the ritually pure</b> Paschal offering until the morning of the fifteenth of Nisan, <b>and one who breaks</b> a bone <b>of a ritually impure</b> Paschal offering, is <b>not flogged</b> with <b>forty</b> lashes.", | |
| "With regard to <b>one who takes the mother</b> bird <b>with</b> her <b>fledglings,</b> thereby violating the Torah prohibition: “You shall not take the mother with her fledglings; you shall send the mother, and the fledglings you may take for yourself” (Deuteronomy 22:6–7), <b>Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged</b> for taking the mother bird, <b>and does not send</b> the mother, <b>and the Rabbis say: He sends</b> the mother <b>and is not flogged,</b> as <b>this is the principle:</b> With regard to <b>any prohibition that entails</b> a command to <b>arise</b> and <b>perform</b> a mitzva, <b>he is not liable</b> to receive lashes <b>for its</b> violation.", | |
| "<b>One who creates a bald spot upon his head, and one who rounds the edge of his head</b> by shaving the hair adjacent to the ear, <b>and one who mars the edge of his beard, and one who cuts one incision</b> in a display of mourning <b>over the dead,</b> are all <b>liable</b> to receive lashes. If <b>he cut one incision over five dead</b> people, <b>or five incisions over one dead</b> person, he is <b>liable</b> to receive lashes <b>for each and every one.</b> <b>For</b> rounding the edges of his <b>head,</b> one is liable to receive <b>two</b> sets of lashes, <b>one from here,</b> the hair adjacent to one ear, <b>and one from there,</b> the hair adjacent to the other ear. <b>For</b> marring the edges of his <b>beard</b> there are <b>two</b> edges <b>from here,</b> on one side of his face, <b>and two from there,</b> on the other side, <b>and one from below,</b> on his chin. <b>Rabbi Eliezer says: If</b> he <b>removed</b> the hair on <b>all</b> the edges of his beard <b>in one</b> action, <b>he is liable</b> to receive <b>only one</b> set of lashes for all of them. <b>And one is liable</b> for marring the edges of his beard <b>only if he removes</b> the hair <b>with a razor. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if he removed</b> the hair <b>with tweezers [<i>malket</i>] or with a plane [<i>rehitni</i>],</b> he is <b>liable</b> to receive lashes. ", | |
| "<b>One who imprints a tattoo,</b> by inserting a dye into recesses carved in the skin, is also liable to receive lashes. If <b>one imprinted</b> on the skin with a dye <b>but did not carve</b> the skin, or if <b>one carved</b> the skin <b>but did not imprint</b> the tattoo by adding a dye, <b>he is not liable;</b> he is not liable <b>until he imprints and carves</b> the skin, <b>with ink, or with kohl [<i>keḥol</i>], or with any substance that marks. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: He is liable only if he writes the name there, as it is stated: “And a tattoo inscription you shall not place upon you, I am the Lord”</b> (Leviticus 19:28).", | |
| "<b>A nazirite who was drinking wine all day is liable</b> to receive <b>only one</b> set of lashes. If onlookers <b>said to him: Do not drink, do not drink,</b> forewarning him several times, <b>and he drinks</b> after each forewarning, he is <b>liable</b> to receive lashes <b>for each and every</b> drink. ", | |
| "If the nazirite <b>was rendering himself impure</b> through exposure <b>to corpses all day, he is liable</b> to receive <b>only one</b> set of lashes. If <b>they said to him: Do not render yourself impure, do not render yourself impure, and he renders himself impure</b> after each forewarning, he is <b>liable for each and every</b> incident. If the nazirite <b>was shaving</b> his hair <b>all day, he is liable</b> to receive <b>only one</b> set of lashes. If <b>they said to him: Do not shave, do not shave, and</b> after each forewarning <b>he shaves,</b> he is <b>liable for each and every</b> time he shaves. If a person <b>was wearing</b> a garment consisting of <b>diverse kinds</b> of wool and linen <b>all day, he is liable</b> to receive <b>only one</b> set of lashes. If <b>they said to him: Do not wear</b> it, <b>do not wear</b> it, <b>and he removes</b> it <b>and dons</b> it after each forewarning, he is <b>liable for each and every</b> time that he dons the garment.", | |
| "Apropos the case where one receives several sets of lashes for performing a single action, the mishna continues: <b>There is</b> one who <b>plows a single furrow and is liable</b> to receive lashes <b>for</b> violating <b>eight prohibitions.</b> How so? For <b>plowing with an ox and a donkey,</b> in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together” (Deuteronomy 22:10); <b>and they are consecrated,</b> and therefore he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property; <b>and</b> he is plowing <b>diverse kinds in a vineyard; and</b> it is <b>during the Sabbatical</b> Year, when it is prohibited to work the land; <b>and</b> it is on <b>a Festival,</b> when plowing is a prohibited labor; <b>and</b> he is both <b>a priest and a nazirite</b> and is performing the plowing <b>in a place of impurity</b> imparted by a corpse, which is prohibited for both a priest (see Leviticus 21:1) and a nazirite (see Numbers 6:6). <b>Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai says:</b> If he <b>was wearing</b> a garment consisting of <b>diverse kinds</b> of wool and linen while plowing he is <b>also</b> flogged for violating that prohibition. The Sages <b>said to him:</b> That is <b>not</b> a prohibition in <b>the</b> same <b>category</b> as the others, as it is not connected to the act of plowing. Ḥananya ben Ḥakhinai <b>said to them:</b> According to that criterion, the fact that he is <b>a nazirite is also not</b> in <b>the</b> same <b>category,</b> as a nazirite and a priest are not flogged for plowing; rather, they are flogged for contracting impurity imparted by a corpse. ", | |
| "With <b>how many</b> lashes <b>does one flog</b> a person sentenced to receive lashes? One flogs him with <b>forty</b> lashes <b>less one, as it is stated:</b> “And he shall strike him before him, in accordance with his wickedness, <b>by number. Forty</b> he shall strike him, he shall not add” (Deuteronomy 25:2–3). The mishna joins the end of the first verse and the beginning of the second, forming the phrase: “By number, forty,” which is interpreted as: <b>A sum adjacent to forty. Rabbi Yehuda says: He is flogged</b> with <b>a full forty</b> lashes. <b>And where is he flogged the extra</b> lash? As the mishna proceeds to explain, the thirty-nine lashes are divided into three and administered in three places on the body of the person being flogged; according to Rabbi Yehuda there is one lash that remains. That lash is administered <b>between his shoulders.</b> ", | |
| "<b>One assesses</b> the number of lashes that the one being punished is capable of withstanding <b>only with</b> a number of <b>lashes fit to be divided into three</b> equal groups. If the assessment was that he can survive twenty lashes, he is flogged with eighteen. Likewise, if doctors <b>assessed</b> concerning <b>him</b> that he is able <b>to receive forty</b> lashes and survive, <b>and he is</b> then <b>flogged some</b> of those forty lashes, <b>and</b> then <b>they assessed</b> him again and concluded <b>that he cannot receive forty</b> lashes and survive, he is <b>exempt</b> from the additional lashes. If the doctors initially <b>assessed</b> concerning <b>him</b> that he is able <b>to receive</b> only <b>eighteen</b> lashes, <b>and once he was flogged</b> eighteen times <b>they assessed that he is able to receive forty,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from receiving additional lashes. If <b>one performed a transgression that involves two prohibitions,</b> and <b>they assessed</b> concerning <b>him a single assessment</b> of the number of lashes that he could withstand in punishment for both transgressions, <b>he is flogged</b> in accordance with their assessment <b>and</b> is <b>exempt</b> from any additional lashes. <b>And if not,</b> if he was assessed with regard to the lashes that he could withstand for one transgression, <b>he is flogged and</b> is allowed to <b>heal, and then is flogged</b> again for violating the second prohibition. ", | |
| "<b>How do they flog him? He ties</b> the <b>two hands</b> of the person being flogged <b>on this</b> side <b>and that</b> side <b>of a post, and the attendant of the congregation takes hold of his garments</b> to remove them. <b>If they were ripped</b> in the process, <b>they were ripped, and if they were unraveled, they were unraveled,</b> and he continues <b>until he bares his chest. And the stone</b> upon which the attendant stands when flogging <b>is situated behind</b> the person being flogged. <b>The attendant of the congregation stands on it with a strap in his hand.</b> It is a strap <b>of calf</b> hide, and is <b>doubled, one into two, and two into four, and two straps of donkey</b> hide <b>go up and down</b> the doubled strap of calf hide. ", | |
| "The length of <b>its handle</b> is <b>one handbreadth,</b> and the <b>width</b> of the straps is <b>one handbreadth, and</b> the strap must be long enough so that <b>its end reaches the top of his abdomen,</b> i.e., his navel, when he is flogged from behind. <b>And</b> the attendant <b>flogs him</b> with <b>one-third</b> of the lashes <b>from the front of him,</b> on his chest, <b>and two</b> one-third <b>portions from behind him,</b> on his back. <b>And he does not flog him</b> when the one receiving lashes is <b>standing, nor</b> when he is <b>sitting; rather,</b> he flogs him when he is <b>hunched, as it is stated: “And the judge shall cause him to lie down,</b> and strike him” (Deuteronomy 25:2), which indicates that the one receiving lashes must be in a position that approximates lying down. <b>And the</b> attendant <b>flogging</b> the one receiving lashes <b>flogs [<i>makeh</i>] him with one hand with all his strength, </b>", | |
| "and the court <b>crier recites</b> the verses: <b>“If you do not observe to perform</b> all the words of this law that are written in this book, that you may fear this glorious and awesome name, the Lord your God. <b>And the Lord will make your plagues [<i>makkotekha</i>] outstanding, and the plagues</b> of your descendants, and even great plagues, and of long continuance, and severe sicknesses, and of long continuance” (Deuteronomy 28:58–59). <b>And</b> then <b>he returns to the beginning of the verse.</b> He also recites: <b>“And you shall observe the matters of this covenant,</b> and do them, that you may make all that you do to prosper” (Deuteronomy 29:8), <b>and concludes</b> with the verse: <b>“And He is merciful and shall atone for transgression, and destroys not;</b> and many a time does He turn His anger away, and does not stir up all His wrath” (Psalms 78:38), <b>and</b> then <b>returns to the beginning of the verse</b> that starts: “If you do not observe to perform.” <b>If</b> the one being flogged <b>dies at</b> the <b>hand</b> of the attendant, the latter is <b>exempt,</b> because he acted at the directive of the court. If the attendant <b>added for him an additional</b> lash with <b>a strap and he died,</b> the attendant <b>is exiled</b> to a city of refuge <b>on his account,</b> as an unwitting murderer. <b>If</b> the one being flogged involuntarily <b>sullies himself,</b> due to fear or pain, <b>whether with excrement or with urine,</b> he is <b>exempt</b> from further lashes. <b>Rabbi Yehuda says</b> that the threshold of shame for men and women is different: <b>The man</b> is exempted if he sullies himself <b>with excrement, and the woman</b> is exempted even <b>with urine.</b> ", | |
| "<b>All those liable</b> to receive <b><i>karet</i> who were flogged are exempted from their</b> punishment of <b><i>karet</i>, as it is stated: “And your brother shall be debased before your eyes”</b> (Deuteronomy 25:3), indicating: <b>Once he is flogged he is as your brother,</b> as his sin has been atoned and he is no longer excised from the Jewish people; this is <b>the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel.</b> <b>And Rabbi Ḥananya ben Gamliel says: And if</b> for <b>one who performs one transgression his soul is taken for it,</b> as one’s soul can be uprooted from the world for one transgression, for <b>one who performs a single mitzva,</b> it is <b>all the more so</b> the case <b>that his soul will be given to him,</b> as the reward for performing mitzvot is greater than the punishment for performing transgressions. <b>Rabbi Shimon says: It is derived from its</b> own <b>place</b> in the Torah, <b>as it is stated</b> at the conclusion of the passage discussing intercourse with forbidden relatives, which is punishable with <i>karet</i>: <b>“And the souls that perform</b> them <b>shall be excised”</b> (Leviticus 18:29), <b>and it states</b> toward the beginning of that chapter: <b>“That a person shall perform and live by them”</b> (Leviticus 18:5). It is inferred <b>that</b> with regard to <b>one who sits and did not perform a transgression,</b> God <b>gives him a reward like</b> that received by one who <b>performs a mitzva.</b> <b>Rabbi Shimon bar Rabbi</b> Yehuda HaNasi <b>says</b> that as the verse <b>states: “Only be steadfast to not eat the blood, as the blood is the soul”</b> (Deuteronomy 12:23), it can be derived <i>a fortiori</i>: <b>And if</b> with regard to <b>the blood, which a person’s soul loathes, one who abstains from its</b> consumption <b>receives a reward</b> for that action, as it is written in a subsequent verse: “You shall not eat it, so that it shall be good for you and for your children after you” (Deuteronomy 12:25); then concerning <b>robbery and</b> intercourse with <b>forbidden relatives, which a person’s soul desires and covets, one who abstains from their</b> performance and overcomes his inclination, <b>all the more so that he and his descendants and the descendants of his descendants until the end of all generations will merit</b> a reward.", | |
| "<b>Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akashya says: The Holy One, Blessed be He, sought to confer merit upon the Jewish people; therefore, He increased for them Torah and mitzvot,</b> as each mitzva increases merit, <b>as it is stated: “It pleased the Lord for the sake of His righteousness to make the Torah great and glorious”</b> (Isaiah 42:21). God sought to make the Torah great and glorious by means of the proliferation of mitzvot." | |
| ] | |
| ], | |
| "versions": [ | |
| [ | |
| "William Davidson Edition - English", | |
| "https://korenpub.com/collections/the-noe-edition-koren-talmud-bavli-1" | |
| ] | |
| ], | |
| "heTitle": "משנה מכות", | |
| "categories": [ | |
| "Mishnah", | |
| "Seder Nezikin" | |
| ], | |
| "sectionNames": [ | |
| "Chapter", | |
| "Mishnah" | |
| ] | |
| } |