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(forthcoming) 4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 71 Box 4-7: Scheme design shapes stakeholder interests in Uganda’s NSSF Despite its name, the current National Social Security Fund (NSSF) in Uganda is structured as a provident fund, which is essentially a mandatory savings scheme offering only lump sums for narrowly defined contingencies, notably old age, disability, and survivors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In this system, the responsibility for ‘saving’ for the cost of incurring these common lifecycle risks is expected to be borne almost entirely by private individuals and, in the case of formally employed persons, by their employers who are required – if they comply – to pay contributions to NSSF and provide paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, severance pay, and cover the costs from work-related accidents and diseases. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In the absence of basic protections for working-age risks, workers’ representatives demanded that an NSSF Bill “expand the scope of benefits to allow individuals with various challenges such as unemployment, sickness, and school fees to help them solve their issues…without waiting for retirement.”209 However, in a savings-based system, early withdrawal drains individual accounts leaving little to cover long-term risks. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Seen in this light, workers’ recent demands for so-called ‘midterm accesses to their savings from age 45 are an understandable clarion call that originates primarily from an absence of social security, rather than from a poor understanding of the value of saving for the future.
Rather than early access, broader reforms are required, reforms that would secure protection for lifecycle contingencies – like sickness and unemployment.
Source: McClanahan et al., (forthcoming). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Source: McClanahan et al., (forthcoming).
Whereas in contributory schemes, participation must comply with formal statutes and follow established good governance guidelines, avenues for stakeholder and rights holder participation are less clear cut in many of the emerging tax-financed, non-contributory schemes in low- and middle- income countries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
One of the forms citizen participation can take is through civil society-organised platforms to weigh in on an upcoming law or policy (often through a pilot scheme) that could lead to a social protection initiative.
The prevalence, form and impact of these fora will vary depending on the country and level of civil society within that country. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Moreover, the success of participation depends on the degree of freedom of association and the level of ‘tolerance’ the government has for such organisations to assemble and voice their views. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The “policy outcomes are often the result of long and sustained efforts and the productive combination of political acumen and coalition- building, from policy champions at different levels of government, grassroots civil society organizations to academia, often with the support of international partners; they do not necessarily emanate from the top” and once in train, they reach a point of “political irreversibility”.
210 There are several positive examples of citizen participation avenues. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, in Latin America, several countries convene consultation groups (Consejos Consultivos) comprised of representatives of civil society as a way of involving stakeholders in problem-solving and to perform complementary monitoring functions.211 While not always specific to social protection, they are concerned primarily with ‘social issues’ and can take up specific thematic issues, such as a particular social protection programme, within their remit. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
South Africa provides another important example of a government- led initiative to encourage local participation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency (DPME) initiated a “Framework for Strengthening Citizen-Government Partnerships for Monitoring Frontline Service Delivery”, which involved a Citizen-Based Monitoring (CBM) Pilot as a means to include the beneficiaries so they could give feedback based on their experiences so far of service delivery under the pilot scheme.212 There have also been examples of more informal, citizen-based groups set up by communities focused older people’s associations in 209 See Ahimbisibwe (2019) 210 Davis (2016), cited in UNDP and African Union (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Davis (2016), cited in UNDP and African Union (2019) 211 See, e.g., https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sinagir/institucional/ong/consejo-consultivo-sociedad-civil.
212 Livingstone (2014), cited in UNDP and African Union (2019).
4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 72 Cameroon, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Kenya and Uganda.213 Box 4-8 describes a number of examples of citizen participation in social protection decision making in Mozambique, India and Brazil. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Box 4-8: Citizenship participation in social protection programme management In Mozambique, a union of various NGOs and civil society groups worked collaboratively to strengthen national and sub-national engagement with the government to become a “key partner” in social protection policy and programmes.
This has seen the involvement of beneficiaries and citizens more widely by monitoring of the government’s actions and improving programme awareness amongst the wider public. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
This gives greater ownership of programmes overall at local and national level (HelpAge International, cited in UNDP and African Union (2019)).
In India, launched in 2006 and extended nationwide in 2008, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, later renamed the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act – MGNREGA. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Best known for its public works components, the Act also strengthen decentralized, participatory planning through local government empowerment and improve governance through better transparency and accountability (Sabates et al., (2017)). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
MGNREGA included specific design features which were, according to Mann and Pande, “bottom-up, people-centred, demand driven, rights-based” and allowed citizens to be engaged as “shapers and makers” (Sabates et al., (2017: 20)) at the delivery phase that actively allowed beneficiaries to formulate and change the policy.
The result may have been unsatisfactory, but it demonstrated the potential for civil society engagement amongst those who would be directly affected by a specific social policy initiative. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In Brazil, the Bolsa Família programme became a flagship, national policy, and was hailed as “a global success story, and a reference point for social policy around the world” (Sabates et al., 2017: 24).
However, it emerged at the local level from the active citizen involvement with the municipal-run poverty focused pilot schemes.
Social assistance had been included as a right of citizenship coupled with a decentralisation agenda in Brazil’s Constitution from 1988. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Municipalities piloted schemes that proved to be so successful that they were then eventually adopted at state, nationwide level.
Multi-stakeholder and policy analysis by Sugiyama illustrates that BFP is evidence of “well-functioning and responsive state-centred mechanisms and demonstrate a bottom-up oversight – nurtured by decentralisation and a history of protest politics” (as cited in Sabates et al., (2017: 25)). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Involvement by stakeholders and rights holders may not always be straightforward, but in the long run, everyone is better served by increased participation.
The more explicit, specific, and transparent social protection systems can be in creating and promoting spaces for this type of engagement – including through formal representation, where possible, the better. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Therefore, establishing formal avenues for stakeholder and rights holder participation in social protection management and oversight is vital to the long-term management of vested and emerging societal interests.
Þ These spaces are usually established by law in contributory systems, but law and practices vary around the world. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Creating formal spaces for engagement is more challenging for tax-financed, non- contributory benefits where interests and voices are more diffuse, but promising examples of citizen participation exist.
4.5 Grievance and appeals mechanisms for accountability.
While enforcement is often viewed as unidirectional – i.e., the state enforcing compliance with obligations – it also works the other way through formal mechanisms for citizens and stakeholders to hold the state to account. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Even well-governed systems sometimes fail to honour the rights and entitlements to social protection, whether due to policy failures, to technical or administrative errors, or in the worst case, corruption.
It is vital that social protection systems offer mechanisms for ensuring accountability for rights holders and stakeholders and appropriate structures and 213 HelpAge International, cited in UNDP and African Union (2019). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 73 mechanisms for facilitating grievance claims and complaints on social protection schemes and service delivery. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Moreover, this right to complain and appeal about the quality and quantity of benefits is firmly enshrined in international social security instruments,214 besides being consistent with broader human rights standards that provide for the right to an effective remedy when rights have been violated.215 According to Recommendation 202 (Article 7), social protection laws should specify complaint and appeal procedures that are “impartial, transparent, effective, simple, rapid, accessible and inexpensive” and that access to them should be “free of charge”. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Similarly, human rights standards call for an appeal process that is “independent, accessible, simple, fair and effective.”216 Furthermore, to mitigate power imbalances and protect complainants, officials should provide for certain guarantees, including: “multiple channels for presenting complaints; provision for anonymous complaints…; protections for the confidentiality of the complainant; and provision for low levels of literacy or alternative languages of the complainants.”217 Many countries have formally established procedures for filing complaints and appealing social security decisions. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The form that formal appeals and complaints mechanisms can take varies significantly across countries.
The ILO (International Labour Conference, 2011) has identified four main types of procedures: 1) Internal administrative procedures, where the right to seek a change in decision is only possible at the administrative level, even if they may be elevated from lower to higher levels on appeal.
2) Special judicial procedures, such as labour tribunals or courts.
3) Judicial procedures before general courts. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
3) Judicial procedures before general courts.
4) Mixed procedures, where initial complaints can be lodged with administrative bodies, and appeals are processed in the various types of courts.218 214 See e.g.
International Labour Conference (2011), Chapter 3.
For example, ILO Convention 102 (Article 70) establishes that every claimant should have the right to appeal in case of refusal of a benefit or to complain about its quality or quantity.
215 Sepúlveda & Nyst (2012) 216 Ibid.
217 Ibid. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
215 Sepúlveda & Nyst (2012) 216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Examples of countries that follow the different models for procedures can be found in International Labour Conference (2011), Chapter 3, and in the Background note on Social Security Complaint and Appeal Mechanisms as part of this project.
4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 74 Reviews of international experiences have highlighted several success factors to ensure maximum effectiveness of grievance and complaints mechanisms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, some have suggested that grievance and complaints mechanisms should ideally comprise three levels or ‘tiers’: first, a simple procedure with the payment provider to report non-payment, errors or fraud; a second tier granting access to programme administrators; and a third tier that enables complaints to pass to an independent authority, such as an Ombudsman, as a last resort.219 A review of international best practice confirms the importance of allowing for multiple levels, where resolution of complaints at the point of service (lowest level, closest to the citizen) is more effective due to low information and transaction costs, while also ensuring access to independent channels for redress, such as an ombudsman, audit institutions, or third-party contracting out of complaints collection/facilitation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In addition, grievance mechanisms and structures must be adequately staffed and resourced and follow standard operating procedures, which is easiest when grievance mechanisms are incorporated into programme monitoring information system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Finally, it is imperative that the public understands the nature of their entitlements (including programme objectives, selection criteria, registration) as well as how to access the redress system if necessary.220 The experience of Fiji’s complaints system for the Care and Protection Allowance illustrates the importance of many of these issues (Box 4-9). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In addition to allowing for multiple levels of appeals and grievance resolution, it is important that social protection systems and programmes provide multiple channels for presenting complaints to ensure equal access for people who are more likely to face administrative barriers, such as women and people with disabilities.
Table 4-1 presents the pros and cons of different channels, as summarised by Barca (2016). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Table 4-1: Pros and cons of main types of programme grievance channels Type of grievance channel Pros Cons Social assistant/social worker Þ Strong understanding of social protection programmes Þ Very accessible locally Þ Regular contact with social protection programme Þ Can be easily trained Þ Potential conflict of interest (cannot complain to them about their conduct) Þ Not always capable of solutions (e.g., targeting) Þ Not anonymous of confidential Þ Could be biased against certain community members 219 UNICEF and MWCPA (2015). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
220 Barca (2016) Box 4-9: Complaints and appeals mechanisms in Fiji.
Fiji’s Department of Social Welfare (DSW) Grievance and Complaint’s Mechanism complies with most international standards of good practice. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
However, challenges in recent years have centred around access to information for claimants (low awareness of the process), the long waiting times and repeat visits required for application of benefits, slow grievance process, and lack of ‘third-tier’ grievance mechanism (the only recourse currently is to take the complaint to the Prime Minister’s office, but it ends up back at DSW).
Addressing complaints is time consuming and therefore costly. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The Director at DSW is reported to spend “half his time addressing complaints, mainly due to the challenges of the Poverty Benefit re-certification process” – that is, complaints are generally about exclusion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
According to the UNICEF analysis, simplifying systems and in particular, “a key issue will be whether to address the challenges with the PMT targeting mechanism, which has significantly increased the workload of staff and led to a significant increase in grievances.” Source: UNICEF and MWCPA (2015) and Fiji case study in this report series.
4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 75 Complaint’s box Þ Easy to set up. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Can be anonymous (if form clearly states that name and address are not needed) Þ Not appropriate for those who are illiterate.
Þ Conviction on behalf of complainants that it would not be acted upon Call centre Þ Direct Þ Simple Þ No problems linked to illiteracy.
Þ Theoretically can be anonymous/confidential.
Þ Useful in decentralised contexts Þ Poor people are less likely to have access to a phone or to be willing to pay for the call. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Less trust in revealing their identify and problems to someone they do not know.
Þ More difficult for the household to follow up on how the complaint is being managed.
Þ Needs to operate very well, or can backfire Community grievance committees Þ Members are from the community; widely known and trusted.
Þ Easy to access (direct and simple) Þ No problems linked to illiteracy Þ Not anonymous or confidential Þ More costly to set up (identify actors) and train. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Cannot make up for general programme weaknesses Mobile unit Þ Direct Þ Simple to access Þ No problems linked to illiteracy.
Þ Theoretically can be anonymous/confidential.
Þ Unbiased/external Þ Reluctance to involve external actors (no trust in revealing them identify/problems to someone they do not know) Þ Not easily organised throughout the country Þ Costly to set up.
Þ People can only complain periodically.
Source: Reproduced from Table 1 in Barca, (2016). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Source: Reproduced from Table 1 in Barca, (2016).
In fact, grievances and appeals are an ‘individualised’ accountability mechanism that form part of a broader set of ‘social accountability’ mechanisms that can be leveraged for both statutory and non- statutory programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Social accountability has been defined as “the extent and capacity of citizens to hold the state and service providers accountable and make them responsive to needs of citizens and beneficiaries”.221 The fundamental importance of social accountability for social protection governance on the frontlines is clear in the conceptual framework depicted in Figure 4-4. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Effective social accountability requires that all parties have access to the required information, that beneficiaries act on their concerns (e.g., through grievances and appeals), if concerns are collective – that citizens mobilize to overcome obstacles to collective action, and that the service providers themselves (on behalf of the state, if relevant) have the capacity and authority to respond to the grievances.
221 Grandvoinnet et al.
(2015), cited in T. Ayliffe et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
(2015), cited in T. Ayliffe et al.
(2017) 4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 76 Figure 4-4: Conceptual framework for social accountability in social protection Source: Ayliffe et al., (2018).
This body of research, which drew on an extensive literature review222 as well as detailed case studies on India,223 Nepal,224 Ethiopia,225 South Africa,226 has revealed that success of social accountability in social protection is highly context dependent. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Moreover, the type of social accountability mechanisms matter; while grievance redress mechanisms are often the default mechanism for social protection programmes, they may not be the most appropriate for all types of issues.
In general, grievance redress mechanisms are appropriate when issues are individual and can be solved by applying the rules, while collective mechanisms (e.g., community scorecards, social audits, etc.)
may be better suited to issues that are collective in nature or sensitive. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
There are nevertheless several design features of social protection, both in terms of policy design and operations systems, and that help to facilitate the process of social accountability and grievance redress, including: • Easily comprehensible and clear eligibility criteria, transfer values and programme rules – citizens are more likely to be able to exercise their rights when they understand the rules of the game, where ‘categorical’ (lifecycle) benefits are more straightforward than poverty targeted ones, which are typically paid at household level. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, in Nepal, citizens 222 T. Ayliffe et al. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
(2017) 223 Schjoedt (2018) 224 Schjoedt (2017) 225 Ayliffe (2017) 226 Aslam (2018) 4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 77 are well informed of the eligibility criteria for benefits, largely because they are individual entitlements (old age pension, single woman allowance, child grant) with high coverage, but in Pakistan, many cases have been reported of people making repeated visit to programme offices to raise grievances because they do not understand why they are above the PMT eligibility threshold. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
• Alignment of financing with entitlements – if financing is not guaranteed (such as programmes that use quotas to control costs) access is perceived to be arbitrary, which undermines the sense of entitlement. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
• Positive face-to-face interaction between marginalised citizens and programme officials – while digital technology is valued by many better off beneficiaries, evidence suggests that people living in poverty may prefer to interact personally with frontline staff, and that this personal interaction – if it is positive (and e.g., not linked to enforcement of conditionalities) – it can build trust and confidence in the system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
• Incentives, authorities, and capacities of service providers to respond to demands – in particular, where local officials lack authority, where authority over budgets is not adequately decentralised to enable response to decisions with budgetary implications, incentives are lacking for programme staff to elevate concerns or to respond; or where local officials lack knowledge or capacity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
A consistent finding across the literature, then, is that programme design matters for exercising citizens’ right to complain.
Moreover, a paradox emerges, wherein human rights experts note that “appeal mechanisms are especially crucial when targeting methods are used, as it is likely that many eligible poor households have been excluded from the programme.”227 However, the main basis for complaints in these programmes — ineligibility — has been identified as inappropriate for grievance redress mechanisms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
According to Ayliffe et al.
(2018), “[grievance redress mechanisms] seem particularly ill-suited to addressing thick accountability challenges, such as exclusion error in poverty-targeted programmes.” They offer the examples of Kenya’s HSNP, which has both a community-based targeting mechanism, and Pakistan’s BISP, which uses a PMT, where, in both cases, complaints have “flooded the systems but remained largely unresolved”. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
These cases also demonstrate that positive results are not automatic and depend largely on the state’s capacity to respond. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Pakistan, state response has been identified as the weakest link in the complaints system when complaints have been unresolved.228 When complaints about denial of benefits are widespread, they can in some cases lead to changes in programme design and delivery, but typically this requires a recognition of the collective nature of the problem (and solution). | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, in Zambia, the Government had to change the targeting formula in response to public pressure.229 And, in Georgia, a high number of complaints about eligibility decisions under the Targeted Social Assistance (TSA) programme, bolstered by robust programme evaluations that showed high exclusion errors, particularly for poor children, led to the Government improvements in the targeting formula (although the PMT was retained).230 Finally, local appeals committees in Ethiopia were relatively effective, but only when they operated “as a collective mechanism” rather than as a traditional rules-based grievance mechanism.231 While formal complaints and appeals mechanisms are essential for the realization of rights, it is equally important that recipients of social protection programmes that are not grounded in legislation also have access to accountability mechanisms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Unfortunately, many are lacking any sort 227 Sepúlveda and Nyst (2012) 228 Ayliffe et al.
(2017) 229 UNDP and African Union (2019) 230 See Baum et al.
(2016); McClanahan (forthcoming) 231 Ayliffe et al.
(2018) 4 Frontline ‘street level’ governance 78 of grievance or appeals mechanisms, leaving beneficiaries with no legal recourse to argue against decisions even when they know them to be in error. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
For example, recent review of 51 social assistance programmes232 in Africa found that only 15 (less than a third) had any mechanisms for making appeals.233 There was a distinct regional dimension as well: programmes with appeals mechanisms were heavily concentrated in Southern Africa (7 programmes) and East Africa (5 programmes), with only three programmes elsewhere containing any official outlet for contesting programme-related decisions and outcomes.234 The absence of this fundamental frontline governance mechanism not only jeopardises the fulfilment of the right to social protection for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike but will erode citizens’ trust in the system and could undermine support for social protection expansion in the future. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Therefore, formal grievance redress mechanisms that outline clear procedures for complaints and appeals, utilise multiple levels and channels, are well resourced, are fundamental to good governance of social security systems.
Þ Evidence suggests that ‘individualised’ (lifecycle) programmes lend themselves more readily to redress and accountability than poverty-targeted schemes, where the main causes of complaints come down to programme design and exclusion errors. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Grievance and appeals mechanisms in non-statutory social protection programmes are nascent, and their widespread absence undermines rights and trust in the system.
232 The definition of social assistance in this instance refers to all non-contributory programmes.
233 UNDP and African Union (2019) 234 Ibid. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
233 UNDP and African Union (2019) 234 Ibid.
5 Identifying patterns in good governance 79 5 Identifying potential patterns in good governance This overview has uncovered several potential patterns that would seem to matter for the success of social protection system-wide governance at the service of coverage extension.
Broadly speaking, across all levels of governance examined here, a common theme emerges that policy and scheme design matters. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In particular, core lifecycle schemes that are based on individual entitlements and are available to the general population rather than narrowly defined groups or risks, are not only more conducive to more streamlined, integrated institutional frameworks, but are easier to coordinate and integrate through information management systems (mid-level), and, importantly, lend themselves to more effective and positive interactions between citizens, stakeholders and the social security system on the frontlines. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
In this sense, the paper has suggested that there are potentially strong associations between the core lifecycle schemes and the principles of good governance of social protection systems, particularly in the context of achieving universal social protection, laid out in the introductory chapter.
Table 5-1 summarises these broad associations and their rationale in terms of the potential to further good governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Table 5-1: Potential to further good governance of core lifecycle programmes compared with other (supplementary) benefits. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Good Governance Principles Core lifecycle benefits Other (supplementary) benefits Coherence, coordination Stronger Rationale: typically, larger programmes are concentrated under fewer larger, more powerful institutions with convening power in the sector Weaker Rationale: multiple programmes administered separately, often by relatively weaker actors/institutions Financial, fiscal, economic sustainability Stronger Rationale: high coverage potential based on shared/common risks and large policy coalitions, especially for age-related benefits, who have a stake in long-term viability; legally defined financing arrangements Weaker Rationale: low coverage potential based on based on uncommon or narrowly applicable risks and small policy coalitions; presence of donor funding in low- and middle-income countries Accountability Stronger Rationale: based on individual entitlements specified in law; permanent mandates; clear avenues for complaints and appeal Weaker Rationale: often household benefits with no rights-based entitlement; transient mandates; unclear avenues for complaints and appeal Transparency Stronger Rationale: large national schemes; high visibility; relatively few actors involved in delivery increases ease of access to information Weaker Rationale: smaller schemes; lower visibility; multiple actors often involved in administration Predictability and equal treatment Stronger Rationale: eligibility criteria simple to understand; exclusion errors less likely Weaker Rationale: eligibility criteria complex; high potential for exclusion under poverty targeted schemes; often transient nature undermines predictability Participation Stronger Weaker 5 Identifying patterns in good governance 80 Rationale: formal avenues for participation more likely to be legally defined; informal avenues for participation more likely due to large, politically strong policy coalitions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders Rationale: formal avenues for participation less likely to exist; informal avenues for participation less likely to be utilised due to small, weak policy coalitions Dynamism Neutral Rationale: programme resilience (e.g., resistance to retrenchment) may also mean programmes less responsive to reforms that could increase their coverage/inclusiveness Neutral Rationale: programme parameters change frequently, but not necessarily to further meaningful extension These patterns are by no means an exhaustive account of the determinants of good governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Indeed, while the core lifecycle versus other (supplementary) benefits distinction is clearly relevant, several other associations — such as the distinction between contributory and non-contributory systems for participation of stakeholders and MIS requirements — have also been identified that matter for governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Uncovering demonstrable and definitive relationships is beyond the scope of this cursory review, which sought to critically examine the role of governance in the context of achieving universal social protection and uncover key themes, issues, and potential relationships. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Because the achievement of universal social protection is inextricably linked to policy design, the focus has, perhaps inevitably, turned attention to the key drivers of extension – which are policy choices -- and how good governance, or its absence, can either further these goals or hinder them.
We summarise here the overarching patterns the analysis has suggested, based on the high-, mid- and street-level/frontline framework presented. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
At the highest levels, good governance shapes the ability of the system to act as such, rather than as disparate, even competing, units.
The analysis has suggested the following: A common definition of social protection at the national level Þ Therefore, it is vital that countries at earlier stages of planning and development of their social protection systems set out a nationally agreed definition of social protection through a consultative process. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ When defining social protection, it is imperative that countries include core lifecycle benefits in their delineation of the sector, its objectives, and its intended covered population.
Þ Narrower definitions that only consider — or emphasise too heavily — smaller, supplementary (‘safety net’) programmes are not only at odds with the broader international experience, but often preclude possibilities for greater integration and more effective system- wide governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
A strong legislative and regulatory framework Þ Anchoring social protection programmes in legislation is a minimum requirement for ensuring that rights are enforceable.
Þ Because they require consensus from social partners, contributory programmes tend to have a strong and specific statutory basis governing the obligations and rights of contributors and beneficiaries. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Non-contributory benefits are more likely to be grounded in legislation when they are tied to core lifecycle contingencies, such as old age, disability, or survivorship.
Þ Individual entitlements such as those specified in a lifecycle framework lend themselves more readily to being enforceable under a rights-based approach to social protection. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
5 Identifying patterns in good governance 81 Horizontal coordination Þ Horizontal coordination is a basic requirement for both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ policy coherence, as social protection increasingly interacts closely with other policy areas.
Þ Successful coordination depends heavily on clear, formal mandates for the central coordinating body in the sector as well as participating actors, agencies, and institutions, but can also occur in less formal, or targeted, smaller-scale spaces. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ However, the gains from engaging in complex, cross-sectoral coordination, particularly when involving small, complementary or supplementary social protection programmes, should be weighed carefully against the potential opportunity cost of not first investing more concertedly in within-sector coordination and integration through strong institutional frameworks for core inclusive social protection programmes. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Vertical coordination Þ Countries should clarify the formal rules of the game for vertical coordination within the social security system from the outset.
Þ In federal structures, formal structures may impede rapid development of the sector, and efficient mechanisms for information exchange are required to reduce the risk of bottlenecks. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Improving vertical coordination requires introducing mechanisms to facilitate the top-down and bottom-up flows of information and funds, which can take a variety of forms, from information management systems, to reporting mechanisms, to incentivising active participation by lower-level units. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Institutional frameworks for social protection delivery Þ Therefore, while there is no one solution for overcoming fragmentation, the experience of high-income countries and successful low- and middle-income countries suggests that a higher degree of concentration of authority and administrative responsibility, especially for administering core lifecycle social protection programmes, is often associated with broad- based coverage expansion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Countries with low state and institutional capacity are less able to cope with institutional complexity and would be better served to simplify institutional arrangements as early (or as soon) as possible.
Þ Even in low-capacity contexts with high degrees of fragmentation, increased concentration can occur gradually, and small steps can open the door for potentially meaningful expansion. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Policy design and governance Þ Therefore, it is a common misconception that good governance is independent from policy design, but in fact, the two are intricately linked.
Þ Simpler policy designs — the quintessential example being universal tax-financed benefits but also pension-tested or benefit-tested lifecycle schemes — have more straightforward implications for governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Complex policy designs — such as means-tested or conditional policies235 — have more complex administrative requirements, are less compatible with contributory programmes, and create more opportunities for error and violations of rights.
235 Conditional cash transfers or multi-sectoral policies also involve complexities that complicate governance, as discussed in the next section. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
5 Identifying patterns in good governance 82 Mid-level governance structures, in particular information management systems, are the backbone and the gateway to the social security system and are therefore fundamental to good system-wide governance. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The analysis has suggested the following: Programme-level MIS – Simpler designs for low-capacity contexts Þ Therefore, digital programme level MISs support social protection delivery by enhancing accuracy and integrity of data through appropriate data quality controls and verification, improving efficiency and effectiveness of programme operations, and enhancing accountability and citizen empowerment through public portals, self-registration portals, dashboard and programme reporting mechanisms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Scheme design has implications for information systems and management, where complex schemes require higher degrees of institutional capacity than simpler designs.
Þ Contributory schemes have inherently complex information management requirements, especially regarding contribution collection and compliance, which call for specific governance and management information systems, and social security agencies tasked with implementing contributory schemes tend to have higher institutional capacity. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Paradoxically, it is often the weaker (social development) line ministries that are tasked with implementing more complex non-contributory schemes, such as those requiring collection of additional monitoring information to support the targeting and compliance monitoring processes, which place a strain on collection, transmission, processing, and management of data. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ For non-contributory schemes, the simpler the programme design, the more effective, accurate and manageable the tools will be, particularly in low-resource contexts where ICT infrastructure, administrative capacity and human resources are limited. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
MIS for an integrated sector—high-stakes choices, with implications for governance Þ Therefore, governments must think strategically about how the social protection system is nested within the broader social protection information ‘ecosystem’ and ensure that the management of individual programmes and schemes corresponds and contributes to broader planning and development of the whole sector’s information systems. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Social registries offer a very limited potential for coordination across a collection of means- tested programmes, whereas single registries hold greater promise for system-wide integration, including across core lifecycle (contributory and non-contributory) schemes.
Þ While greater integration in social protection MISs can be a powerful tool to facilitate better system-wide governance, it is not without its own risks and likewise requires prudent governance to manage. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Emerging international frameworks for ICT in social protection Þ Countries need not re-invent the wheel but can learn from international guidance as well as from other countries facing similar challenges at similar stages of developing their social protection systems.
Finally, at ‘street level’, where citizens and stakeholders interface directly with the social security system, good governance can determine whether social protection strengthens or, potentially, undermines the social contract. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
5 Identifying patterns in good governance 83 Securing and facilitating payment of social contributions Þ Contribution collection and compliance involves a combination of enforcement and facilitation. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ For compliance enforcement to serve the broader goal of coverage extension, social security institutions and labour inspectorates should shift from a reactive role to playing a proactive role in extending coverage through the facilitation of contribution collection and compliance for workers in the informal economy.
Þ They can do so by leveraging ICT-based solutions, offering single window services, and strengthening collaboration with revenue authorities. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Facilitating payments of income transfers Þ Payment systems in social protection can be important avenues to promote financial inclusion among vulnerable groups; however, the governance frameworks around non- contributory benefit payment systems in low- and middle-income countries are under- developed. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Avenues for stakeholder participation in scheme design and management Þ Establishing formal avenues for stakeholder and rights holder participation in social protection management and oversight is vital to the long-term management of vested and emerging societal interests.
Þ These spaces are usually established by law in contributory systems, but law and practices vary around the world. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Creating formal spaces for engagement is more challenging for tax-financed, non- contributory benefits where interests and voices are more diffuse, but promising examples of citizen participation exist.
Grievance and appeals mechanisms for accountability.
Þ Formal grievance redress mechanisms that outline clear procedures for complaints and appeals, utilize multiple levels and channels, are well resourced, are fundamental to good governance of social security systems. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Þ Evidence suggests that ‘individualised’ (lifecycle) programmes lend themselves more readily to redress and accountability than poverty-targeted schemes, where the main causes of complaints come down to programme design and exclusion errors.
Þ Grievance and appeals mechanisms in non-statutory social protection programmes are nascent, and their widespread absence undermines rights and trust in the system. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
These emerging patterns are strongly suggestive of a mutually reinforcing relationship between a lifecycle approach to social security and better system-wide governance, particularly when in pursuit of universal social protection within the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.
6 Conclusion 84 6 Conclusion This overview has explored the links between social protection system governance and the achievement of universal social protection in broad terms. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
However, governance systems are ultimately shaped and determined by national politics, priorities, and historical legacies.
The relevance of international experiences will depend on where countries find themselves in the development of their social protection system.
The in-depth case studies offer an up-close look at governance challenges, processes, and solutions in four countries: Argentina, Kenya, and Mauritius and Fiji as small island states. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
The cases were selected for having achieved noteworthy expansion in social protection in recent years facilitated at least in part by governance decisions and/or structures.
Each case offers a unique lens into the specific governance challenges and solutions facing countries at very different stages of development of their social protection systems and within very different social, economic, and political contexts. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
• Argentina offers an example of a middle-high income country with a long tradition of a social welfare system, of a gradual expansion of coverage through a basic social protection floor across the lifecycle, and of an institutional consolidation process of the social protection sector. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
Moreover, as a country that has undergone a series of hard economic crises, it has shown considerable stability in terms of institutional arrangements while also weathering profound political changes and Government priorities.
It also provides an example of governance challenges and responses within a federal administrative structure. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |
• Kenya’s social protection system presents a leading example in sub-Saharan Africa of how a country can relatively rapidly move towards an inclusive lifecycle social protection system, including by taking ownership of the sector during heavy donor activity.
Kenya’s advances have been made possible through significant strengthening of institutional arrangements by the Government, primarily through the centralised administration of key programmes and the development of a robust MIS. | https://docs-lawep.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/1696755846392.pdf | https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2021/08/Global-overview_SP-Governance_June-2021.pdf |