data/5_en.txt

For the second time in its history, Cyprus became a valuable possession of England. It is a significant fact because, to date, the English hold the unique distinction of being the only foreign power to control the Island twice. In 1191, it was acquired by chance and recourse to war and then sold within a few months for a handsome fee. In 1878 (687 years later), it was taken over by diplomatic agency and it remained under the English Crown for 82 years. To protect their commercial and strategic interests, the British, according to Lord Salisbury (then Foreign Secretary), saw fit to erect another dyke behind the shattered Turkish breakwater.
A combination of factors, including the general European concern over the worsening state of the sick man of Europe (Ottoman Empire), the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 (leading to the Treaty of San Stefano on 3 March 1878) and above all, perhaps, Disraeli's (Britain's first Jewish Prime Minister) forward policy, led to possession of the island.
Hence, the myth of the takeover of Cyprus became a reality and a necessity. On 10 May, the outlines of an agreement had been sent to Sir Austen Henry Layard, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, with instructions to proceed with the negotiations as soon as word arrived from London. Six days later the British cabinet approved the projected convention and, as soon as it became clear that Russia would insist on the retention of Kars and Batum, Layard was instructed on 23 May, to submit the draft agreement to the Sultan. He was given 48 hours to take it or leave it. How could he refuse? Four days earlier, in fact, he had sent a telegram to London asking for help, money and an alliance.
On 25 May, during an interview with Layard, the Sultan, who was suffering from great depression, relieved to hear that only Cyprus was demanded, gladly conceded it. According to the Layard Papers, Abdul Hamid II on that occasion, and unlike all previous audiences with him, had a host of guards around him because he had heard that Layard was about to assassinate him. At all events, in view of the English threat to desist from further opposition to the Russian advance and from further efforts to postpone the partition of his Empire - at one stage in June 1878 the Turks suspected that there was a secret understanding between England, Austria and Russia for the dissection of their country - the Sultan made no objection and the Convention was signed in secret on 4 June. Its publication during the 1878 Berlin Congress came as a thunder-clap upon the diplomatic world.
The first step in the transfer of Cyprus from Turkish to British rule was the signature of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between the two countries with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey (known as the Cyprus Convention) in the following terms:
If Batum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reforms, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection, of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in these territories; and in order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England.
That was Article 1 of the Convention, signed on 4 June at the Imperial Palace of Yeldiz. Furthermore, an Annex containing six conditions was signed on 1 July. The two most important (the third and sixth) read as follows:
That England will pay to the Porte whatever is the present excess of revenue over expenditure in the Island; this excess to be calculated upon and determined by the average of the last five years;
That if Russia restores to Turkey, Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be evacuated by England, and the Convention of 4 June 1878, will be at an end.
Thus, in return for the protection of his bankrupt Empire, a tribute of around £92.800 and, as it turned out (though uncertain) 4.166.220 okes (or 10.865.416 lbs) of salt per annum, the Sultan agreed that Great Britain could occupy and administer Cyprus.
Moreover, according to the sixth condition, the Island was to return to him. This was a hollow condition which few took seriously. Even those, and there were many, who were sceptical of its strategic value described it as a promise of a perfectly illusory character.� Undoubtedly, Cyprus directly commanded the entrance to the Suez Canal (HMG in 1875 became the owner of around one half of the Suez Canal Company shares) the coasts of Palestine and Syria and the southern provinces of Asia Minor. With Gibraltar (1713) in the west of the Mediterranean, Malta (1814) in the centre and now Cyprus (the key to Western Asia) the process of converting it into a distant British lake was complete. However, with the occupation of Egypt in 1882, Cyprus reverted, temporarily at least, to the role of a somnolent resort.
A supplementary Agreement to the Convention signed on 14 August 1878 solidified further the British hold on the island. In fact, on 16 March 1921, when Russia transferred to Turkey two of the three Armenian territories (Ardahan and Kars but not Batum) referred to in the Convention, Britain still retained control over Cyprus. Moreover, in 1923 both Greece and Turkey acknowledged British sovereignty over the Island, and two years later it was declared a Crown Colony.
Cyprus, then, became a British responsibility in 1878. What was needed next was for a British contingent to land on the island. That task was performed by Vice-Admiral Lord John Hay who, during the first week of July, sighted the bay of Larnaca. His stay however, was only temporary. At 7:30 a.m. on 22 July 1878, Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in HMS Himalaya, landing at Larnaca at around 5:35 p.m. accompanied by some 1.500 troops. At 6:00 p.m. he proceeded to the Kania Khanate of Larnaca and there directed that a proclamation be issued in which he gave assurances of the Queen's wishes for the prosperity of the island and her desire to take measures for the promotion and development of commerce and agriculture, and to endow the people with the benefits of liberty, justice and security. The edict, read in English, Greek and Turkish was greeted with cheers. In fact, the substitution of a Moslem Empire for a Christian one was seen by the island's Greeks as the golden bridge which would ultimately unite Cyprus with Greece. The leading Greeks of the island (mainly professional and ecclesiastic) welcomed the new administration as a break in Cypriot affairs and proceeded to set their sights on even higher achievements: self-government, autonomy, self-determination and finally union with Greece. The 1950s especially, and beyond, reflected the visions of the 19th century enlightened few.
By the so-called thieves' deal, Britain acquired de facto, if not de jure, sovereignty of Cyprus. British citizenship was not acquired by the Cypriots until after 1914, when the island was annexed. Cyprus however, as Sir Winston Churchill emphasised on 19 October 1907, came under British rule ruined and prostrate from centuries of ill-usage. Consequently, improvements all round were necessary. The problems for settlement were numerous:
1. The Sultan's lands and other land issues provoked massive disagreements and took much time and energy before they were eventually resolved.
2. Tax problems were beyond comprehension. The process of clearing up the accounts of the outgoing administration was complicated by the endeavours of the Turks to present as large a balance as possible in the Treasury. It was in their interests to do this, since the annual tribute was to be based on the average surplus of the last five years. Moreover, to meet the expenses of the Russian war taxes had to be doubled. This created further problems for the officials who had the difficult task of extracting more and more from Cypriot peasants who could hardly make ends meet. Reflecting on the virtual collapse of the Turkish administrative machinery, Wolseley wrote to Layard on 10 February 1879 explaining that the Sultan should place his finances in the hands of some able Englishmen who should soon restore the prosperity of his Empire.
3. The question of privilege was also a prominent issue. Both Wolseley and his successor Sir Robert Biddulph informed their superiors in London that the peasantry were quite satisfied but the privileged classes, those who had exemptions from taxation, were not. The bishops, appointed during the previous administration as tax collectors, had amassed a great fortune out of the poor villagers. This came to an end after 1878. However, a new grievance was born which ultimately played a major role in increased agitation for union with Greece.
4. Nepotism, bribery and corruption had been allowed to grow and flourish without check. Wolseley explained that officials once appointed became untrustworthy, dishonest and arrogant. Under such conditions of administration the island had subsided into utter stagnation. A strong hand was therefore needed to stir her energies and set forward her welfare. However, following a strong hint from Whitehall, Wolseley set about purifying rather than abolishing Turkish institutions. The British excuse, of course, was uncertainty of tenure. One of his first acts, therefore, was to nominate six British officers to take the place of the Turkish kaimakans, who had administered the six districts into which the island had been divided. It must be said that one of the outstanding successes of the British occupation was the elimination of corruption from all branches of the government.
5. Law and order. Wolseley asserted that impartial justice was his motto and mentioned as illustration that he had, in the first three months, imprisoned one tax collector for robbery, one Greek churchman for refusing to pay tithes and one Maltese antiquity hunter for breaking the law. He also insisted on the immediate deportation of a large number of Turkish convicts whose presence on the island was as undesirable as it was dangerous. The island's prisons in fact, resembled penal establishments keeping the worst criminals of the Sultan's Empire.
6. Obviously, acts of nature such as earthquakes could not be prevented but the poor health of the inhabitants and afflictions such as cattle disease (an outbreak occurred in 1879/80) and locust destruction to crops (for the prevention of which a considerable amount of money was spent between 1881 and 1885) could, with the right men and resources, be alleviated.
7. Illiteracy and therefore apathy were the rule rather than the exception. A small number of children had to rely for their education almost entirely on private donations and on religious institutions.
8. Charles F. Watkins (H.Ms consul in Cyprus) informed Layard on 5 March 1878 that, the Governor of Cyprus had received a telegram from Constantinople to the effect that 3.000 refugees had embarked from there heading for Cyprus. The news of their probable arrival, between 5th and 7th of March, created a great panic amongst the inhabitants of Larnaca and Nicosia; in the latter place, the Archbishop and the principal Greek residents protested against their being allowed to land but without avail. It is unclear what exactly happened to these new arrivals.
9. Miscellaneous problems. These included customs duties (originally paid direct to the Porte), currency, religious property, harvests and other fiscal issues. At one stage Cypriots were even liable for conscription in the Turkish army unless they paid a poll tax.
These and many other problems confronted Wolseley, in addition to the usual difficulties which always face an incoming administration.
The period between 1878 and 1914 (from occupation to outright cession) was dominated by four major themes: the Hellenic ideal or meghali idhea (great idea); the emergence of the Constitution; great expectations but slow economic progress; and Church disputation. A brief analysis of the first three will suffice:
The struggle to unite Cyprus with the Greek mainland (enosis), which was much older than the British occupation, was from the outset a Greek Cypriot affair - the struggle of the majority. Only certain elements of the Turkish minority objected. Contrary to what has been written elsewhere the vast majority of the Turkish population did not support the repressive measures imposed by the colonial administration to check the agitation of their compatriots. Witness the mass popular protest of October 1931 (the burning of Government House, the deportation of ten prominent Greek leaders, large penalties, imprisonments and finally the imposition of martial law) when the Turkish element sympathised with their fellow co-habitants and did nothing to betray the mass protest which was seen by them to be just.
Suffice it to say that from the time of the independence of Greece the Greek people were passionately attached to a foreign policy inspired by the meghali idhea. Greek Cypriots who sent volunteers to all the wars which the motherland was involved in, and there were many during the 19th century, believed that their turn to be received into the fold of Hellenism would arrive. Such expectations never materialised.
The second major trend was the emergence of the Constitution. Less than two months after the arrival of Wolseley, an Order in Council (14 September 1878) established a legislative council and an executive council to run the affairs of the island. The latter was constituted as might be directed by instructions addressed from time to time to the High Commissioner by HMG. In the meantime, Cyprus was transferred on 6 December 1880, from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. By late 1881 early 1882 the existing form of administration was modified and on 21 June 1883 the elected legislative council assembled for the first time. It can be rightly said, therefore, that Western traditions of political representation were introduced in the very early years of British rule.
The Constitution was unchanged when Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914; was modified in 1925 when the island became a Crown Colony but, following the burning of Government House and the hysteria of enosist and economic disenchantment of those years, was eventually abolished on 12 November 1931.
The third major event in 1914 was the economic situation and the most important factor in the fortunes of Cyprus was the tribute. Churchill's scathing attack in 1907 when he wrote that, an improvement upon Turkish standards is not a sufficient or suitable defence for British policy was possibly the catalyst that led to the abolition of the tribute in 1927.
Without a doubt, the island, for the first time in its history, was better off than it ever had been. Money was spent on medicine, education and road construction, there was greater fairness and equality in the administrative and legal machinery and participation in government was more widespread. In fact, Cyprus was one of the first territories in the region where the popular vote was established. Moreover, the population showed a marked increase from 186.173 in 1881 to 237.002 in 1901 - an increase of over 27 per cent in just 20 years. Yes Cyprus might have been neglected (this can be seen from comments made over the years by the Colonial Office) but it was certainly on the road to recovery and it surely fared much better than at any time in its recent history. A brief comparison of the period before the occupation and the early 1920s will suffice:
1. Communications were practically non-existent. Generally speaking there were only mule and camel tracks. In the early 1920s good roads and bridges existed and a railway ran from Famagusta to Nicosia. It was later extended to the mining area of Skouriotissa and beyond.
2. Post offices were hardly in evidence. In the latter period over 65 were in operation with about 200 rural mail stations dealing with three million letters, cards, newspapers, books and parcels.
3. Hospitals did not exist. After the War there was at least one in each district, usually under the supervision of government medical officers.
4. Printing presses were not in evidence even as late as the 1870s. After 1920 some 15 newspapers were published. This was an eloquent proof of material and educational advancement.
5. Some 170 schools which were very inadequately staffed were operating. In the 1920s around 740, most with well-trained teachers, were scattered all over the island.
6. Trade was minimal. In the latter period imports showed an increase of 550 per cent and exports 500 per cent.
In addition, and as already mentioned, the annexation of Cyprus (5 November 1914), was generally well received with great enthusiasm. Correspondence to and from the Colonial Office showed that even the most senior Turkish officials of the island rejoiced at the change in its legal status. The island henceforth formed both de facto and de jure a part of His Majesty's Dominions. The advent of World War I gave the inhabitants British citizenship. This was finally settled on 27 November 1917. Furthermore, on 10 March 1925, Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown Colony.
Between 1914 and 1925 the political movement among the Christian majority for union with Greece was the most powerful force in Cypriot politics. By and large, however, agitation for enosis was successfully contained - sometimes even suppressed by force of arms as in 1931 - until the 1950s when a guerrilla campaign ousted the British.
Let us now throw some light on the various offers and promises of Cyprus to Greece, which has been touched on only very lightly by historians and political analysts alike. Before 1920 there were two British offers in 1912 and 1915 and two promises in 1919. And it appeared there was another promise in 1930. After the first phase of the Balkan Wars the combatants met in London from 16 December 1912 to 6 January 1913, to discuss peace terms. At the head of the Greek delegation was Eleftherios Venizelos, the maker of modern Greece. With a major war looming, Lloyd George asked Venizelos whether Britain could use the naval facilities provided at Argostoli in return for Cyprus. This unofficial request and offer was accepted by Venizelos in principle. Lloyd George, of course, added that an official offer could be made only by Sir Edward (later Viscount) Grey, the Foreign Secretary, who was not present at the meeting. Grey, of course, had always been in favour of giving up Cyprus. As to the above offer, Asquith, the Prime Minister, was in favour of the proposal. However, neither the British nor the Greek governments pursued the proposal to any sort of conclusion in 1912 or 1913.
Further offers however were transmitted to Greece in November 1914 and January 1915. North Epirus and even concessions in Asia Minor were promised. On 6 March the pro-German King Constantine refused such overtures, Venizelos resigning in disgust. From the private papers of Sir Edward Grey we learn that the Queen of Greece declared in 1915 that if a single German soldier was killed by a Greek she would immediately leave Greece for ever. In fact, British diplomats in Athens, frustrated at Greece not joining the Allies in 1915, believed that the only way to get them in was to get the king out.
Closer to home, on 13 October 1915, Grey informed Sir Francis Elliot (HMG's supremo in Athens) that if Greece joins now her territory will be guaranteed and she will receive proper territorial acquisitions at the end of the war. The offer of Cyprus to Greece was telegraphed by Grey to Elliot on 16 October. The relevant parts read as follows:
"If Greece is prepared to give support as an Ally to Serbia, now that she has been attacked by Bulgaria, HMG will be prepared to give Cyprus to Greece. Should Greece join the Allies for all purposes she would naturally have a share with them in advantages secured at the end of the war, but the offer of Cyprus is made by HMG independently on condition that Greece gives immediate and full support with her army to Serbia".
On the following day Elliot replied to Grey that he had pointed out this "unique" opportunity for Greece that Cyprus was "assured" to her whatever was the result of the war. Bonar Law informed the Cyprus High Commissioner of the offer. On 16 October he telegraphed the following:
"Please communicate this fact to the Archbishop or other leading personages in Cyprus and suggest to them that if they wish to take advantage of this opportunity for securing the union of Cyprus with Greece, which is unlikely to recur, they should immediately proceed to Athens and press their demand on the King and Parliament. You are authorised to give them any assistance in your power with this object.
The October and other British promptings to Greece not only included Cyprus but further concessions in western Thrace and Asia Minor - both inhabited mainly by Turks and not British sovereign territory. There was, furthermore, no mention of naval facilities. Similarly, there was no talk of the Turkish minority in Cyprus being an obstacle. However, the opportunity of acquiring the island was lost. In Cyprus the offer was received with mixed feelings: the Moslems expressed their concerns and the Greeks were perplexed by the refusal.
The possession of Cyprus, with its population in 1921 of 250.000 Greeks (80%), had long been an ideal of Hellenic nationalism and it had been expected that such a cession would be welcomed with enthusiasm. The gift however, was refused and such action was tantamount to an admission that King Constantine had received promises from the opposite camp of a still more alluring kind in the event of the German victory which he was persuaded would occur. This refusal must certainly be ascribed to the influence of the pro-German group of advisers who were daily putting more and more pressure on the king, rather than to Zaimis, the Prime Minister. The latter's policy was certainly one of genuine neutrality; during his term of office he maintained as far as he could friendly relations with the Entente, which even supplied him with a loan to bolster up Greece's ailing economy. At all events, this wonderful opportunity of settling the Cypriot question once and for all was lost. In a speech delivered to the Greek Parliament in August 1917, Venizelos, elaborating on his pro-Entente policy, said that such a cession undoubtedly had multiple advantages for Hellenism but the saviours' who were in office at the time spurned the opportunity and Cyprus was lost.
Greece eventually entered the war on the side of the Allies but by 1917 they were already on the road to victory and there was no reason to change the island's administration. Its contribution to the war effort however was, for so small an Island, phenomenal. The total population was only around 280.000 in 1914, yet over 13.000 between the ages of 18 and 41 served as auxiliary troops - mainly muleteers for the British Salonica Force. The participation of this large number of men naturally resulted in a shortage of labour at a time when the resources of the Island were being strained to the utmost for the production of foodstuffs and other commodities to supply the needs of the Allies. Thousands of animals (mules, donkeys, horses and goats); some £9.000 for the British and Belgian Red Crosses, and thousands of tons of foodstuffs, fuel and timber were also contributed by the islanders.
However, even though many sacrifices were made and the Cypriots distinguished themselves between 1914 and 1918, neither Britain nor Greece seriously mentioned the problem during those years. The question was next raised by Venizelos during the peace conferences that terminated the war. Furthermore, according to the writings of Professor Paul Mantoux, the celebrated interpreter of the Peace Conference, a conversation between the American and British leaders on 13 May 1919, during a meeting of the Council of Four' (composed of Woodrow Wilson, President of the US; Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of France; and V.E. Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy), went like this:
L.G.: It is my intention to give Cyprus to Greece.
WW: Excellent idea.
This was the first "promise". It was not kept for several reasons:
1. Military tacticians of the early 20th century believed that such a transaction was undesirable since there were strong strategic considerations for not giving up the island.
2. It was strongly urged by some officials that it was the duty of Britain to develop the island economically. In so doing the Cypriot authorities would find it much easier to convince the inhabitants that Britain regarded the island as an important part of the Empire and that it was not simply playing dog in the manger.'
3. British foreign and colonial affairs experts also believed that the chief difficulty HMG had in handing Cyprus to Greece was the claims of Turkey, based not only on historical but on strategic and ethnological grounds. Much the same kind of problem had been faced over the Dodecanese islands. It was believed, however, that Turkey would prove far more intractable in the case of Cyprus.
4. The pressure applied by the Greeks was not strong enough. Indeed, the problem was nearly forgotten altogether after 1920 following the Asia Minor disaster of 1922 and the somewhat negative policies of the leading enosist proponents.
5. The British contended all along that the islanders were not yet ready to run their country entirely on their own.
6. After the lapse of the offer of October 1915, France was given a veto over the disposal of Cyprus in the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded in April/May 1916. This provision appeared as Article 4 of the Franco-British Convention signed at Paris on 23 December 1920. There was also a secret clause in the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement of 1919 by which Italy agreed to hold a plebiscite in Rhodes if Great Britain should be willing to cede Cyprus to Greece.
The second promise was made by Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the labour party, in February 1919. Speaking to 102 delegates from 26 countries at the Socialist International Conference held at Berne, he emphasised that his party supported Cypriot self-determination and that, if he ever came to power, he would do everything he could to carry out this commitment. However, MacDonald, who led the short-lived minority government of 1924 (22 January to 3 November), failed to honour his pledge. In 1930 there was yet another promise.' According to Sir Patrick Ramsay, in a private and secret report to O.G. Sargent of the foreign office dated 7 November 1931, Commander J.M.Kenworthy MP., (later baron Strabolgi) who visited Athens in 1930 told Venizelos (based on the latter's testimony) that the labour party was willing to give Cyprus to Greece, but that military experts objected for strategic reasons. Venizelos then said that he was quite willing to hand over Famagusta or any other suitable site in Cyprus, with a hinterland of a few miles for barracks, aerodromes etc., in absolute sovereignty to England. Expanding further on the military subject, Venizelos pointed to a volume of memoirs on the table and said that Lord Salisbury once remarked that, "his military experts were capable of finding reasons to occupy Mars for the defence of the British Empire."
The educated proponents of the meghali idhea intensified their efforts to achieve national self-realisation. They were spurred on not only by the "offers' and "promises' already referred to but by the Cretan example of 1913. In that year Crete proclaimed its union with the mainland, an action legalised when Turkey expressly abandoned her suzerain rights in a clause of the Treaty of London (1912-13). A statement by the President of the US also raised their hopes. Wilson, in his note to all the belligerent governments, called upon both parties to state "in the full light of day' the "aims" they had set themselves in prosecuting the war. The Allies, in their joint response made public on 11 January 1917, stated that they had no difficulty in meeting his request and offered a list of definite objectives. Among them were:
the liberation of the peoples who lay beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, which had proved itself radically alien to western civilisation.'
Expectations were on a high. The masses, however, who in the post-war economic boom enjoyed unexampled prosperity, were not at the forefront of the enosis movement and perhaps indeed, as long as their bellies were full, cared very little, though their passions were roused on several occasions as in 1921 in 1931 and of course in the 1950s. Greek nationalism is not an artificial conception of theorists, but a real force which impels all fragments of the Greek-speaking population to make sustained efforts towards political union with the national state. In the post-1878 period, the political consciousness of the inhabitants had been awakened and had expressed itself in a growing desire of the Christian majority to realise its nationality. They also believed that the Moslem preference for the status quo and antipathy to union should not prove permanent. Memoranda, petitions and deputations fill the annals of Cypriot history between 1914 and 1925, just as they had done after 1878.
There is also widespread confusion over the significance of two treaties of the early 1920s:
The Treaty of Sevres, which developed from the San Remo one of the same year, was signed on 10 August 1920. The Treaty of Lausanne was initialled on 24 July 1923. For Cyprus they had a twofold importance. First, and without a doubt, Turkey surrendered all titles and claims over Cyprus. Likewise, by accepting the agreements Greece endorsed and put her name to the cession of Cyprus to Britain. Hence, not even a whisper was raised when Cyprus became a Crown Colony in 1925. Second, the Greeks of the island believed that Britain would sooner or later grant them their ultimate wish (union with Greece), since Turkey was definitely out of the way. Britain's uncertainty of tenure, especially between 1878 and 1914, was often cited as a reason for not granting such a union and for not carrying out wide-ranging reforms.
The next distinct stage in the development of Cyprus was the financial and political crisis of the 1930s, which we briefly touched on. Labour relations, political confrontation and economic agitation were all major problems. Yet, all were overshadowed by World War II. These years (1939-1945) were crucial for the Cypriots and their aspirations. As in 1914, the total contribution of Cyprus to the war effort of the Allies was massive. It has been estimated that if only those between the ages of 18 and 32 were included then total involvement was over 50 per cent. Certainly this was a unique input which was not repeated elsewhere by any colony, protectorate or even warring party.
Cypriot gallantry was evident on all fronts. They took part for example, in the historic evacuation of Dunkirk (29 May to 4 June 1940), where they were ordered to destroy their mules - an order which they very reluctantly carried out. The Cypriots then took part in the East African operation (1941) when the successful conclusion of the battle for Keren (situated 4.000 feet above sea level) was greatly helped by the ability of Cypriot pack transport companies to supply units under fire in the most inaccessible places. The presence of these detachments shortened the siege by weeks and this campaign in itself more than justified the formation of the Cypriot muleteers.
At the battle for Monte Cassino ("gateway to Rome'), February to May 1944, the toughest spot and perhaps the most crucial in Italy, Cypriots distinguished themselves on its rugged slopes by bringing up supplies and taking down the wounded under the hail of enemy bullets and shells doubled in intensity by the splintering rock. Cypriots also served in Egypt, the Sudan and under Lord Wavell at Tobruk and Palestine. Above all, the Cyprus Regiment fought many a bloody contest with the enemy on Greek soil. Suffice it to say the other side did not make a serious attempt to capture or occupy the island even though it served as an invaluable supply and relief station for the Allies. However, it was raided on numerous occasions by Italian Savoia and Cantz 1007B bombers, German Junkers (dive-bombers) and other unidentified aircraft.
In the immediate post-war years there was great unrest. Military expenditure decreased considerably; the intensive strategic expansion of the island had not yet begun; the ten-year development programme was only in its initial stages and competitors were returning to the markets which during the war had provided easy outlets for Cypriot produce, such as tobacco, vines and carobs. In its attempt to address the problem the government announced in October 1946 that it would press on with its policy of economic development and social welfare initiated during the last few years. Though not enough, it was certainly a good start.
On the political front Lord Winster, the governor, sent out invitations on 9 July 1947 to various persons and organisations to take part in a consultative assembly with a view of making recommendations on the form of constitution to be established in order to secure participation by the people of Cyprus in the direction of internal affairs, due respect being paid to the interests of minorities. The Right, headed by the newly-elected Archbishop, turned down the invitation but the Left, after some hesitation and a good deal of deliberation, decided to say "yes". However, disagreements soon emerged. At the forefront was the interpretation of the assembly's terms of reference. It was eventually adjourned then dissolved on 12 August 1948 after just six meetings.
The 1940s ended without any clear-cut resolution on either enosis or self-government. The waters were, however, muddied further by a more decisive factor; the "cold war' reached the island in 1948. Britain, with the US aiding and abetting, was constructing air bases equipped with radar and other intelligence mechanisms and was transferring to Cyprus from Palestine (where its mandate was due to expire on 15 May 1948) a considerable number of troops, the Middle East monitoring service and other facilities. Thus in October the RAF station in Cyprus was raised to the status of Air Headquarters Middle East and rumours were also current that Military Headquarters Middle East would be established there - as it was in 1954. Henceforth, the Cyprus dispute assumed a new dimension.
Such were the new realities facing Cyprus. In January 1950 the Church organised a plebiscite which intended to give free expression to the people's wishes for the Island's future. The petition for enosis was conclusive - 95.7 per cent voted "yes'. Delegations were immediately sent abroad to enlighten governments and people alike. Archbishop Makarios III was at the forefront of this new initiative. The UN was targeted but the "battle' there was inconclusive.
Diplomacy failed miserably. On 1 April 1955 the island's Greeks embarked on an armed campaign to oust the British and achieve enosis. The leader of the organisation, called EOKA, was Colonel George Grivas. The Turkish Cypriots were also in the fray demanding partition. "Kara Yilan' (Black Snake), an underground group, and presumably predecessor of "Volkan' (the Volcano), was also formed in April. The fighting arm of Volkan and its successor late in 1957 was called TMT. Though smaller and less well organised, TMT modelled itself on EOKA.
The island was ravaged by a guerrilla war unprecedented in its recent history. Attempts to come to an arrangement came to nothing. The Harding-Makarios talks (1955-56) and even the Radcliffe constitutional talks (1956) failed to resolve the issue. It appeared that unrestricted self-government was not an option any more. Yet by December 1958 the situation was completely transformed. International pressure plus the threat that things would get worse prompted a new initiative; a new round of talks of "give and take'.
The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey (Averoff and Zorlu) exchanged, according to British official documents "Turkish delights". The rapprochement between the two countries, for whatever reasons, and there were many, was clear for anyone to see. It was recognised that only negotiations and conciliation could provide a solution acceptable to all. On 11 February 1959, Greece and Turkey initialled a declaration which confirmed that Cyprus would become an independent state with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president and detailing the "Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus.' The joint communique stated that the two governments had reached a "compromise solution' subject to agreement with Britain.
The next stop was London. On 19 February the Agreements were finally sealed at Lancaster House. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, remarked that it was a "memorable occasion', that it was a victory for reason and co-operation and that no party had suffered defeat. The sovereignty of the island was safeguarded by Britain, Greece and Turkey under the Treaty of Guarantee which precluded under Article I either the union of Cyprus with any other state or its partition. The Treaty of Alliance provided for co-operation between Greece, Turkey and the Republic in common defence, for the stationing of Greek and Turkish military contingents (950 and 650 respectively) on the island and for the training of a Cypriot army. The Treaty of Establishment concerned the retention of British sovereign bases and ancillary facilities on the territory of the Republic and problems of finance and nationality arising out of the end of colonial rule. The texts of the first two treaties were presented at the Zurich and London Conferences and required little alteration. Work on the Treaty of Establishment, with its complex administrative and legal problems did not begin until after the Agreements were signed.
Thus under the Zurich-London Agreements, Britain relinquished sovereignty over the whole island except for two base areas (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) and various other facilities; in fact, some 99 square miles or 2,74 per cent of Cypriot territory.
Greece sacrificed enosis and Turkey partition. Makarios was reasonably happy, so was Kutchuk for the Turkish Cypriots. Yet many others took a critical view. Nevertheless, in 1960 Cyprus had its own flag, its own elected government and was no longer embarrassed by the stigma of colonial status.