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Abdullah Öcalan | 11. The public prosecutor accused the applicant of being one of the leaders of the PKK in Europe and of having been involved in the training of PKK members in Romania. According to the indictment, the applicant had been in contact with Mr |
Nursultan Nazarbaev | 171. In its 2011 Annual Report on “the State of the World’s Human Rights” Amnesty International stated, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“ ... Reports of torture or other ill-treatment remained widespread, despite government promises to adopt a zero tolerance policy toward its practice. Impunity for such human rights violations persisted ...
In January, Kazakhstan assumed chairmanship of the OSCE, making counter-terror and security measures in Europe and Central Asia the OSCE’s priority. Human rights commitments did not figure prominently in the chairmanship’s agenda.
In May, parliament approved a constitutional amendment that made President |
the Agent of the Government | 40. The Government to a large extent contested the applicants’ account of the facts. They relied on a report of 19 June 2004 addressed by the head of the Rīga Department of the State Border Guard Service to |
Aminat Dugayeva | 9. At the material time Kurbika Zinabdiyeva was assisting her mother, who worked as a house painter. Aminat Dugayeva, then fifteen years old, was attending the 9th grade of secondary school. Kurbika Zinabdiyeva lived with the first applicant at 12 Shkolnaya Street, the village of Ulus-Kert. |
the Minister of Education | 25. On 25 October 2005, the applicants signed a statement written by the teachers of Aspropyrgos School expressing their wish to have their children transferred to the building separate from the primary school. The applicants allege that they had signed the statement in question under pressure from |
Nurettin Bülbül | 37. The trial court observed that the police officers had fired a total of eighteen bullets and that Mr Bektaş had been shot in the head, whereas the police officers should have aimed at other parts of his body, such as his legs and feet, in order to avoid the risk to his life. The trial court concluded that |
Abdullah Öcalan | 6. On 21 March 1999 the applicant was questioned by two police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In the verbatim records, signed by the applicant, the latter admitted, inter alia, to taking part in three separate acts of arson together with Mr M.K. and Mr F.D. in order to protest against the arrest of |
Kenan Bilgin | 74. After making his statement he had been intimidated, in the presence of his wife, by a police officer who had visited him at the school where he taught. The police officer had made threats such as: “You eat from the State’s plate. I will not allow you to dirty that plate. You will suffer the same fate as |
Faik Akdeniz | 35. In a statement taken by the Kulp Prosecutor on 13 June 1996, Halit Akdeniz stated that a large number of soldiers had come to the village in February 1994 and gathered the villagers outside the village. They then set fire to the houses in the village. He, his son İrfan, the applicant’s son Mehdi, and the other three persons had been singled out by the soldiers and ill-treated in the village. They had then been taken to the Sivrice gendarme station where they had stayed that evening. The following morning they had been taken to the Kulp Commando Brigade where they had been detained for four days during which they were blindfolded, beaten up and questioned. At the end of the four days they had been brought to the Kulp Central gendarme Station where the applicant’s son Mehdi had been separated from the rest of them and he had not been seen again. They had continued to be detained for another 15 days and at the end of their detention all but |
Timur Khambulatov | 38. On the same date, 18 March 2004, the investigators questioned police officer Mr V.T., who stated that he had taken part in the special operation against Timur Khambulatov; the latter had been brought from his house to the Naurskiy OVD by FSB officers in a UAZ car and that after that, in the OVD, after the FSB officers had left, he had noticed that |
Zakshevskiy | 23. On 7 November 2001 the second applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer about the circumstances of the Crimea attack (Episode 7) and participated in a reconstruction. He described his and Mr |
Murad Gelayev | 13. Meanwhile the fourth applicant, who had been told by her neighbours that the servicemen were raiding her son's house, arrived at the yard and joined the second applicant in attempts to prevent the abduction of |
Islam Dubayev | 44. On 12 December 2000 the interim head of the Chechnya department of the FSB informed the first applicant that on 14 March 2000 Islam Dubayev had voluntarily surrendered to the Russian federal troops and had handed over his AK-74 machine gun with ammunition. Pursuant to Articles 208 and 222 of the Criminal Code and the Russian State Duma's decree of 13 December 1999 “On amnesty to persons who committed socially dangerous acts during the antiterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus”, |
Murad Khachukayev | 73. On 31 July 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant’s relative Mr A.E., who stated that on 6 February 2003 the applicant had told him that a group of unidentified men had abducted his son. On 12 February 2003 a resident of Urus-Martan had told him about the discovery of human remains in the orchard in Michurina district and that these remains had been identified as those of |
William Stobie | 16. In or around September 1990 the police found firearms in the attic of William Stobie's flat. The latter was arrested. He was, according to the applicant, questioned about the Finucane murder from 13 to 20 September 1990. A journalist had allegedly interviewed |
Akhdan Akhmetkhanov | 73. On 4 July 2002 the applicants applied to various domestic authorities, including the Urus-Martan District Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the Chechen Republic (“the Urus‑Martan ROVD”) asking for assistance in the search for Mr |
the Justice of the Peace | 33. On 30 October 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges. She examined three eyewitnesses called at the applicant’s request, but refused his request that the police officers who had arrested him be called and examined. The applicant’s request that a video recording of the relevant events be admitted as evidence was also refused, as was the request that a written report from an NGO which had observed the pickets be admitted in evidence. The three eyewitnesses examined at the applicant’s request testified that the applicant, after ending his picket, had walked down the street while speaking with a fellow activist, surrounded by journalists; he remained on the pavement, did not chant slogans, and carried no banners; several other participants in the picket remained standing with their banners, at a certain distance from each other; the police arrested the applicant without any warning or explanation. On the basis of written reports by two police officers |
Mahmut Nalbant | 24. Between 8 April 1987 and 18 July 2001 the court held numerous hearings. During this time, the court adjourned the onsite inspection twenty‑three times, either due to adverse weather conditions (6 times) or the plaintiffs’ failure to attend the onsite inspection (14 times). On at least three occasions the onsite inspection could not take place because another onsite inspection was being conducted. In the course of the proceedings, several hearings were adjourned pending the intervention of the heirs of some of the plaintiffs to the proceedings. During this time, |
Salambek Movsayev’s | 46. On 27 March, 23 and 25 April and 7 June 2006 the investigators requested that the Grozny ROVD, the Oktyabrskiy ROVD, Grozny Search Bureau-2 and the Chechnya FSB take a number of steps to identify eyewitnesses to |
Movsar Musitov | 27. In a letter of 12 August 2001 the Chechen Department of the FSB informed the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office that on 12 May 2001 their two officers, T. and M., had detained Isa Kaplanov, Ruslan Sadulayev and |
Ivaylo Kalfin | 23. On 3 November 2006, a few days after the Sofia City Court gave its judgment, there was a meeting in Sofia between the Macedonian and Bulgarian Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The news agencies reported that during the meeting Bulgaria’s then Foreign Minister, Mr |
Yeraly Israilov | 22. On 16 March 2005 the Khasavyurt Town Prosecutor’s Office (“the town prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicant that they had investigated her complaint and found out that on 19 October 2004 A.I., M.I. and R.I., as well as |
Kavalieris A. | 24. On 11 May 2011 the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling in case no. 2010-55-0106 and held that the contested legal provisions complied with the Constitution and the Convention. The relevant part reads as follows:
“11. ...
It follows from the case materials that, on 27 December 2005, the KNAB opened an operational investigation. Interception of the Applicant’s telephone conversations was carried out from 29 to 31 December 2005, that is, for three days under section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 85 – 86). There is no dispute that the Applicant also participated in the telephone conversations which were intercepted.
... 13. The Applicant and the Ombudsman argue that the restriction of rights established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear. It is impossible to understand the meaning of ‘to prevent’. Nor can it be understood what preconditions need to be fulfilled in order to take operational measures under the special procedure where immediate action is required. Therefore, the restriction of rights established in the above-mentioned legal provision has not been provided for by a properly adopted law (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 7 – 8, and Vol. 3, pp. 46‑48).
... 13.2. The Applicant argues that the provisions of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be applied only when necessary to prevent serious or especially serious crimes. Consequently, the operational measures contained in this provision cannot be performed for the purpose of detecting (atklāt) a criminal offence.
...
The first sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that ... operational activities may be carried out to react immediately to threats of criminal offences as referred to in this provision and [that] corresponding operational measures [may be taken] to prevent these offences. However, the fact that detection of criminal offences has not been mentioned expressis verbis in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, does not exclude the obligation to observe the purpose of operational activities. [The Constitutional Court] can agree with the arguments of Parliament and the KNAB, namely, that when carrying out activities mentioned in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, a criminal offence can be prevented and detected as well. When taking operational measures to prevent criminal offences, some [other] criminal offence may also be detected. For instance, in the case of the taking of a bribe, operational measures may prevent a criminal offence, as well as identifying the persons involved in giving such a bribe. Therefore, it can be concluded that the term ‘to prevent’ in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities includes not only prevention of crime, but also detection of other criminal offences. 13.3. ...
[The Constitutional Court] does not agree with the opinion by the Ombudsman that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities is unclear as it fails to establish preconditions which are necessary to allow immediate action to be taken in the form of operational measures under the special procedure. Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes two preconditions which allow ... operational measures.
First, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities enumerates specific circumstances ... Operational measures may be taken when required to prevent acts of terrorism, murder, banditry, riots, or other serious or especially serious offences. They are permissible also in circumstances of a real threat to the life, health or property of an individual. [The Constitutional Court considers that] this enumeration ... is exhaustive and sufficiently precise. Consequently, it excludes any possibility of operational measures under the special procedure in relation to the prevention of such criminal offences which are not indicated in the legal provision.
Second, operational measures ... may be taken ... only when an immediate action is required.
Interpreting this legal provision in conjunction with section 17(3) of the Law on Operational Activities, [the Constitutional Court] concludes that covert interception of non-public conversations is allowed only when [there is] reliable information (pamatotas ziņas) about persons’ involvement in a criminal offence, as well as a threat to important interests of the State, its security or defence. Consequently ... operational measures ... may be taken if [there is] reliable information regarding the involvement of an individual in a criminal offence.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for an exceptional procedure, namely, it allows ... immediate operational measures to be taken because any delay might significantly influence their results. Taking into account the seriousness of the offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it is important to provide a timely and effective response to prevent all threats related to such crimes.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes the preconditions for its application [with sufficient precision]; consequently, the restriction on the fundamental rights has been established by law.
... 17. The Applicant indicates that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities does not provide an obligation ... to receive approval by a judge in cases where operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 26 – 27). 17.1. Sections 7(2) and 7(3) of the Law on Operational Activities establish two procedures for taking operational measures, namely, under the general and special procedures. Such classification is closely related to the nature of operational measures and their impact on the fundamental rights of persons. In the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, operational measures must be taken under the special procedure as they significantly impinge on the fundamental rights of persons.
The Constitutional Court considers that the grammatical wording of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities [does not clearly indicate] whether it is necessary to obtain approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in cases when operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours. 17.2. In order to determine the content of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, it must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions of the same section regulating operational measures to be taken under the special procedure.
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains a reference to section 7(4) setting out the operational measures to be taken under the special procedure. These measures, including monitoring of correspondence and covert interception of non-public conversations, must be taken with the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.
Although section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides for exceptional circumstances where ... immediate action may be taken, it also establishes the obligation ... to obtain the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge for operational measures under section 7(4). Already when the draft of the Law on Operational Activities was being drawn up ... the need to receive a judge’s approval was emphasised in cases where operational measures would be taken under the special procedure (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 171 and 173).
The third sentence of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities indicated that the operational measures had to be discontinued where no approval by a judge was obtained. According to the KNAB, this indication confirms that a judge’s approval must be sought only in cases where operational measures have not been terminated within ... 72 hours (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 45). However, the Ministry of Justice and the Ombudsman indicate that such an interpretation ... would not comply with the essence of the Constitution (see Case materials, Vol. 3, pp. 48 and 54 – 55).
Section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities contains no reference to the fact that no approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge is necessary for operational measures to be taken under section 7(4) in the event that it is planned to terminate them within ... 72 hours. Consequently, [the Constitutional Court] cannot agree with the opinion by the KNAB that a judge’s approval does not have to be obtained if operational measures are terminated within ... 72 hours.
... 17.3. ... Consequently, section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides that a prosecutor must always be informed of the operational measures taken; this provision also obliges ... [the seeking of] approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge.
The restriction established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as the most lenient measure for fulfilling the legitimate aim because monitoring by a prosecutor and subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of operational measures ensures effective protection of the rights of persons. 18. ...
It is not possible to agree with the Applicant’s statement to the effect that the infringement of his right is greater than the benefit gained by society. By means of a lawful restriction of a person’s right to respect for his or her private life, the State helps to combat crime and permits ... immediate reaction to threats of criminal offences that are particularly dangerous for society, serving to prevent them and identifying the persons involved. When intercepting non-public conversations in the cases established in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities, the protection of public safety is ensured.
Consequently, operational measures taken to prevent criminal offences referred to in section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities must be regarded as proportionate and compliant with Article 96 of the Constitution only if approval by the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge has been obtained irrespective of the time when the operational measures are terminated. 19. The Applicant indicates that the [prosecutor’s office] cannot be regarded as an effective remedy in respect of his rights within the meaning of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 17 – 18).
The Constitutional Court has already established in its case-law that [an application to] the prosecutor’s office in Latvia may be regarded as an effective and available remedy, because the status and the role of the prosecutor in the supervision of law secures independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention (see Judgment of 11 October 2004 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2004-06-01. Para 19).
In the present case it is necessary to examine whether section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities provides a person with protection compliant with Article 13 of the Convention in cases where the right to the inviolability of private life and correspondence guaranteed in the Convention is infringed.
The Constitutional Court concludes that section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities establishes circumstances ... where operational measures may be taken immediately, as well as the procedure in accordance with which this has to be notified to a prosecutor and approval by a judge is to be obtained. However, this provision is not related to the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention. Consequently, the compliance of section 7(5) of the Law on Operational Activities with Article 13 of the Convention must be assessed in conjunction with the first sentence of section 35(1) of that Law, the latter establishing a mechanism for monitoring operational measures and being contested by the Applicant as to its compliance with Article 92 of the Constitution. 20. The Applicant indicates that the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities fails to comply with Article 92 of the Constitution because it has no legitimate aim and it is not necessary in a democratic society. The provision fails to establish a procedure according to which the supervision and monitoring of performance of operational measures would be carried out. In the monitoring of operational measures, the first sentence of section 35(1) of the Law on Operational Activities confers on the prosecutor’s office a broad margin of appreciation (see Case materials, Vol. 1, pp. 20 – 21). 21.1. ...
The Constitutional Court has already concluded in paragraph 17 above that [there is] an obligation to request, in any event, the approval of the President of the Supreme Court or a specially authorised judge in relation to operational measures. Consequently, the legislature has established such a regulatory framework for operational measures that requires not only monitoring by a prosecutor but also judicial supervision or at least subsequent judicial scrutiny of the lawfulness of the measures taken and their compliance with the requirements of the law. 20.2. ...
The Constitutional Court has already indicated in its case-law that the prosecutor’s office, as a judicial institution, has a twofold nature. On the one hand it is a single, centralised three-level institutional system, under the management of the Prosecutor General, but – on the other – prosecutorial functions are carried out independently and solely by officials of the prosecutor’s office, that is, the individual prosecutors (see Judgment of 20 December 2006 by the Constitutional Court in the case No. 2006-12-01, Para 12.2).
... As to the taking of operational measures referred to in section 7(4) of the Law on Operational Activities, in cases established in section 7(5), ... a prosecutor, that is, the Prosecutor General or specialised prosecutors, must be notified within ... 24 hours (see |
Soltymuradov | 110. In April 2002 the fifth applicant asked other relatives of missing persons who regularly gathered in front of the VOVD building if they knew K. from Gekhi, about whom she had been questioned in the VOVD. She met the brothers of K., who was also missing, and they told her that they in turn had been questioned about Mr |
Ali Vadilov’s | 27. The following morning the applicants complained about the abductions of the three men to a number of law-enforcement agencies and offices in the Achkhoy-Martan district. On 9 December 2001, after the curfew, |
Saydi Malsagov | 11. The first and the fourth applicants were awakened by a group of servicemen who walked into their room, turned on the lights and ordered them to remain in bed and not to move. Two men searched the wardrobes in the room while the third stood at the doors on guard. The servicemen did not talk to the women. Once they had finished searching, two servicemen left and went to the adjacent room where |
Jishkariani | 18. On 20 September 2005 the daily newspaper Rezonansi published an interview with the Minister. He discussed allegations of corruption in the management of medical facilities in the penal system. The relevant excerpts of the interview read as follows:
“Journalist: You give two names – |
Abubakar Tsechoyev | 12. Early in the morning of 23 March 2012 the applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Sunzhenskiy district department of the interior (Сунженский районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД)) (hereinafter “the Sunzhenskiy ROVD”) and the Sunzhenskiy district prosecutor. In his complaint the applicant stated the following:
“... Yesterday, on 22 March 2012, at about 9 p.m. my brother |
Mariam Jishkariani | 13. On 16 September 2005, while speaking live on a private television channel, Rustavi 2, about allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the Ministry and its Medical Department, the Minister, Mr K.K., stated:
“I am impelled to specify surnames and specific facts... |
Anne Tuarze | 10. The applicants, who are all French nationals, are Mr Pierre Lambert and his wife Mrs Viviane Lambert, who were born in 1929 and 1945 respectively and live in Reims, Mr David Philippon, who was born in 1971 and lives in Mourmelon, and Mrs |
Aslanbek Khamzayev’s | 31. On 22 August 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She submitted that Aslanbek Khamzayev had resided in the village of Gekhi. On 24 July 2002 he had gone to the Zavodskoy District to visit his relative, Ms Yu. On 25 July 2002 Ms Yu. had told the first applicant that earlier that day federal servicemen carrying out a “sweeping” security operation had checked |
the Lord Ordinary | 10. On 20 March 2001, upon remittal to the Outer House, further directions were given for disclosure. On 14 September 2001, on the motion of the first defenders, the court appointed the case to the procedure roll for a debate (hearing) on pleas-in-law. After two dates for that debate were vacated, a two-day hearing was fixed for 20 and 21 June 2002. On 15 May 2002, the court allowed the applicant to lodge further supplementary arguments alleging a lack of candour in the defenders’ pleading but refused his motion for further disclosure. The case was heard on 21 June 2002. As a result of that hearing, the applicant’s action was dismissed on 4 September 2002 by the Outer House. In a written judgment, |
Bashir Velkhiyev | 16. When he was taken out of the yard into the street, the first applicant saw a large number of servicemen, two khaki UAZ-452 vehicles (“Tabletka”) with no registration numbers, and a VAZ-2109 car. The first applicant was ordered to get into one of the UAZ vehicles, where he saw Mr |
Stana Stanković | 15. On 8 July 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal in respect of all applicants except the applicants Ms Jagoda Jančić (application no. 62499/10), Mr Predrag Stamenković (application no. 63100/10) and Ms |
Draško Veljković | 59. On 23 March 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as unsubstantiated. The Constitutional Court failed to separately address his complaint concerning the divergent case-law.
(iii) Mr |
Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev's | 12. They testified in writing that initially four of them had been placed in one APC, together with Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev, while M. was in the second APC. They were blindfolded, and a black bag was placed on |
Khaskhan Mezhiyev | 17. On 26 March 2003 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20116 (“the unit prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicants that military personnel had not been implicated in Viskhadzhi Magamadov and |
Ramazan Ayçiçek | 141. About a month after the Orhans were detained, Ramazan Ayçiçek sent word to the applicant to contact him. The applicant was allowed to see him in Lice prison as he told the prison officers that Ramazan Ayçiçek was a close acquaintance and that he was asking about his brothers and his son. |
the Governor of Ankara | 112. Unlike the prison staff, who had benefited from a final discontinuance decision (see paragraph 106 above), the members of the gendarmerie were placed under formal investigation after the close of the administrative proceedings before |
Mayrudin Khantiyev | 64. On an unspecified date the investigators questioned as a witness Mr Ut., a serviceman of the district military commander's office. Mr Ut. stated that on 4 December 2000 he and other servicemen of the district military commander's office had been on duty on the roof of house no. 269 at Ugolnaya Street in Grozny. House no. 269 was located near the district military commander's office. On the night of 4 December 2000 everything had been calm and nothing had attracted Mr Ut.'s attention. He had not seen a NIVA vehicle arrive at house no. 269. At about 6 a.m. he had seen a group of civilians who were shouting something. He had had a permanent connection to the district military commander's office via military communication channels but on that morning he had not communicated with them. No one had mentioned a NIVA vehicle to him. He had learnt about the abduction of |
Şahap Yaralı | 52. On 12 March 1996 the Lice gendarmerie commander replied to Lieutenant-Colonel Alpı's requests and enclosed copies of two pages of custody ledgers and copies of two pages of operation logbooks in which the day-to-day activities of the Lice gendarmerie were recorded. The Lice commander further stated in his letter that his soldiers had not conducted an operation in Türeli village on 18 May 1994 and that Servet and İkram İpek had not been detained. The letter further states that Major |
Tsintsabadze | 53. On 4 May 2006, representatives from the Public Defender's Office visited X in the prison Y. He reiterated word for word his deposition of 3 April 2006 (see paragraphs 47-50 above). The inmate added that when, on 1 October 2005, the expert had asked him to undress Mr |
Yakup Aktaş | 105. The witness, a corporal in the gendarmerie, stated that he remembered having been on guard duty at the detention area of the interrogation centre on 20 November 1990. During his turn of duty he had let |
Cavit Nacitarhan | 26. On 17 March 1995 the public prosecutor Selahattin Kemaloğlu took witness statements from Cavit Nacitarhan, Özer Akdemir, Salman Mazı, Murat Demir and Müjdat Yılmaz, who were all accused of being members of an illegal extreme left-wing organisation, the TDKP. The following depositions were taken.
(a) |
Makarchykov | 60. On 5 June 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly composed of 30 members, 21 of whom were present, decided that Mr S.G. could not remain a member as he had joined a new religious group. The Parishioners' Assembly discussed the judgment in which the Kyiv City Court had found that the Parishioners' Assembly contained 309 members. However, it reiterated its view that as from 24 December 1999 it had been composed of only 27 members. Two of the members of the Assembly (K.V. and T.L.) reported that their witness statements had been taken incorrectly. The Assembly also re-elected the Parish's governing bodies (Mr |
Movsar Musitov | 14. The applicant’s two relatives and Movsar Musitov spent a night in a cell, along with another person. On 13 May 2001 at about 11.30 a.m. Isa Kaplanov and Ruslan Sadulayev were taken away from the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD in a UAZ all-terrain vehicle. |
Farrukh Gapirov | 74. The Kyrgyzstan chapter of Amnesty International’s “2013 Annual Report”, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“Torture and other ill-treatment remained pervasive throughout the country and law enforcement and judicial authorities failed to act on such allegations. The authorities continued to fail to impartially and effectively investigate the June 2010 violence and its aftermath and provide justice for the thousands of victims of serious crimes and human rights violations, including crimes against humanity. Ethnic Uzbeks continued to be targeted disproportionately for detention and prosecution in relation to the June 2010 violence.
...
The Osh City Prosecutor stated in April that out of 105 cases which had gone to trial in relation to the June 2010 violence, only two resulted in acquittals. Only one of those cases involved an ethnic Uzbek, |
Shchiborshch | 81. The first applicant submitted that he believed that Mr Shchiborshch had wounded G. for the first time in the lobby while L. had been holding open the door to the flat. However, he did not actually see the wound being inflicted. He did not see Mr |
Angel Georgiev | 25. On 30 April 2002 the Sofia Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment, finding that O.V.’s conviction had been impermissibly based on assumptions. It acquitted him and disallowed the applicants’ civil claim, noting, in particular, that it had not been established that when he had attacked |
Vincent Lambert’s | 34. The Conseil d’État went on to find that its task was to satisfy itself, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that the statutory conditions governing any decision to withdraw treatment whose continuation would amount to unreasonable obstinacy had been met. To that end it needed to have the fullest information possible at its disposal, in particular concerning |
M. Saakashvili | 55. In December 2003, well before the applicant had been placed under investigation and arrested, and shortly after the Rose Revolution that led to the resignation of President Shevardnadze (see Georgian Labour Party v. Georgia, no. 9103/04, §§ 11-13, ECHR 2008), Mr |
Elaine B. Z. | 8. In issue no. 19/05 of Falter, an article was published on page 14 concerning the criminal proceedings against P., which read as follows:
“‘Sex with a nigger woman’
The courts: An asylum seeker lodges a criminal complaint alleging rape against a security officer. The case takes on a political dimension because it exposes conditions in the Traiskirchen centre. One year later only the victim is still before the courts. The chronicling of a judicial scandal. H.P., 48, is interviewed as the presumed perpetrator. When first questioned the trained bricklayer with the thick moustache states: ‘I didn’t have sex with the nigger woman.’ The next time his recall is more accurate: ‘It’s possible that I had intercourse with the nigger woman. I’d had twelve and a half litres of beer and one and a half litres of herb lemonade mixed with red wine.’ He claims it was entirely consensual. However, he doesn’t recognise Elaine in a photo. Police officer: ‘Could the woman have left the room if she’d wanted to?’ Answer: ‘No, only I had a key’. Again the question: ‘Did you pay the nigger woman for sexual intercourse?’ Answer: ‘No way!’ Third [interview] record: ‘I’d noticed the nigger woman about a week before we had sex. I fancied her from the beginning. I went into her room and gestured to her to come out.’ According to him, she followed him out of her own accord, undressed in front of him, took hold of his penis, inserted it and then got dressed again. Then she disappeared for good – without making any demands. ‘Maybe she thought she’d be given asylum sooner’ speculates the security officer. Something else occurs to him. He had offered to buy the woman a drink in the bakery a few days before. She had stroked his back and ‘cosied up’ to him.
Elaine B. denies this version of events. She says that she had other things on her mind at the time. She is not a whore. She felt repelled by this fat man with a moustache who smelled of alcohol, she was afraid of him. Also: if she had really been hoping to be granted asylum, why would she then have defamed the security officer?
Next to take the witness stand are the employees of the bakery. The first to be examined is saleswoman R.Z.: ‘She gave him a kiss. She was fairly young, I’d say between 20 and 25. The two of them were talking quietly. I couldn’t describe the woman.’ When confronted with |
Zurab Iriskhanov's | 44. On 26 and 30 June and 5 July 2002 the investigators requested the ROVD and other district departments of the interior in Chechnya to take operational search measures to identify and question witnesses to |
the Justice of the Peace | 23. On 30 May 2012 the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 387 of the Basmannyy District examined the charges concerning the applicant’s administrative offence at Lubyanskiy Proyezd. The applicant was absent from the proceedings, but he was represented by his lawyer, who disputed the applicant’s participation in an irregular assembly and claimed that his client had not chanted any slogans. He asked |
Musa Bamatgiriyev | 105. On 15 November 2004 Mr Musa Bamatgiriyev’s brother was abducted by service personnel. During the night after his abduction a group of armed service personnel in masks broke into the applicants’ home and searched the premises. Having found that Mr |
Margvelashvili | 16. In the afternoon of 8 August 2000 the applicant called Ms Margvelashvili and threatened her and her son with death if she did not tell him who had been behind the abduction of his father. Fearing for her life and the lives of those detained by the applicant, Ms |
Abdula Edilov | 9. Between 5 and 6 p.m. on the same day a light coloured UAZ vehicle (“таблетка”) arrived at the applicant’s house. About ten armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks emerged from the vehicle. The applicant’s neighbours R.Z., Z.D. and L.D., who witnessed the arrival of the vehicle, inferred that those men were servicemen. Two servicemen stayed by the UAZ vehicle and the others rushed inside the applicant’s house. Shortly thereafter the servicemen came outside, leading |
[Giles Van Colle | 36. As to the telephone call of 13 October 2000, the High Court found:
“It is accepted by the Defendant both that DC Ridley took no further steps at this time in response to the threat to [Giles Van Colle] made by Mr Brougham, and that he should have done more by contacting or arresting Mr Brougham. His explanation for failing to arrest Mr Brougham, namely that he felt |
Tods Murray | 44. On 4 June 2009 the Inner House declared the applicant a vexatious litigant but excluded the Tods Murray litigation from the order. It referred to the applicant’s ill-founded allegations about lack of authenticity of documents which it said were a “serious abuse of process”. In coming to this conclusion it also took into account the finding that he had used a proof in the |
Michael Paporis | 74. Judgment was given on 7 July 1998 and the appeal was partly upheld. In its judgment the Supreme Court considered that the fairness of the proceedings ought to be considered with, and as part of, the proceedings relating to the action itself. It concluded that the district court should not have considered the applicant’s allegations within the context of an interim application but within the framework of the trial taken as a whole. Only in the latter context would it be possible to determine whether or not the trial had been fair. The protection of rights aimed at securing a fair trial and not hampering it. The Supreme Court further rejected the contention that the Law of Suspension of Limitation of Actions which permitted the filing of an action without any time limitation was unconstitutional as decided in its judgment in the case of |
Kashpruk V.A. | 6. On 4 June 2007 the applicant did not appear at the preliminary hearing scheduled by the Yuzhno-Sakhalinskiy Town Court and the Town Court ordered the applicant’s detention instead of his undertaking not to leave the place of residence. The detention order contained no time-limits. The relevant part of the order read as follows:
“The preliminary hearing was scheduled by the court for 29 May 2007...
The accused |
The General Inspectorate of | 12. On 13 September 2005 the then Minister of Justice, Mr K.K. (“the Minister”) commissioned an internal investigation concerning the activities of the Medical Department of the Ministry carried out between the period of 1 January 2005 and 13 September 2005. |
Aslan Sadulayev | 10. Meanwhile, the bus passengers saw from the windows that the servicemen at the intersection were checking the documents of the three men in the purple VAZ car. Ms Tamara S. and Ms Khamila D. recognised one of them as their acquaintance |
Rustam Kagirov | 37. On 30 December 2009 the investigators issued a decision concerning the seizure of the detainees’ registration log of the Shatoy ROVD owing to “the information concerning the involvement of its employees in Mr |
Muslim Nenkayev | 50. Between August and October 2003 the first applicant tried on four occasions to talk to the head of the ROVD, but the latter was unavailable. At the beginning of October 2003 the first applicant talked to an officer of the ROVD who said that he was trying to find out whether |
Apti Dalakov | 41. On 14 August 2008 the applicant complained to the Karabulak District Court under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about the failure of the investigating department to open a criminal case in connection with Mr |
Yeraly Israilov | 19. At about noon on 23 October 2004 the head of the Gudermes ROVD, Arslan D., called A.I., M.I. and R.I. into his office and told them that they would be released. He returned their passports and the mobile phone to them. He also instructed them not to tell anyone about their detention. They were escorted outside of the building, where their relatives, including the applicant, had been waiting. From Arslan D. and from Said they understood that |
O.I. Bogomolov | 28. On the same date the Presidium of the Kyiv City Court allowed the Deputy Prosecutor General's application and quashed the decision. On the same date the GPS ordered the applicant's detention pending trial. As a result, the applicant was immediately arrested and transferred to the SIZO SBU. In particular, the Kyiv City Court held:
“... it can be seen from the witness statement by Mr |
Mustafa Döleksoy | 13. In his report the prosecutor noted the presence of a large amount of dried blood on the floor which had come from Mustafa Döleksoy’s head. He observed that the corpse had swollen and the face had completely blackened. The doctor reported two fractures on both the left and right of the occipital region of the head and two cuts above the fractures. No indications of firearm injuries or stab wounds were noted on the body. A handful of hair found in the left hand of |
Adam Khurayev's | 46. On 11 November 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. She described in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointed out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant submitted that the investigation into |
Isa Aygumov | 45. On 10 February 2002 the investigators requested that the Shali FSB informed them whether they had detained the applicants’ relative. The text of the document included the following:
“... the investigation established that at about 3.35 p.m. on 9 January 2002 four vehicles, including two UAZ minivans, one of them with the registration number 635, had arrived at [the applicants’] address. Men of Slavic appearance in camouflage uniforms had put |
Ahmet Babayiğit | 131. On 26 January 1996 Captain İrfan Odabaş, the Bismil gendarmerie district commander, informed the Bismil public prosecutor, in reply to his request of 16 October 1995, that no officers or NCOs called Ahmet were currently serving under his command. Captain Odabaş further informed the Bismil public prosecutor that the expert gendarmerie sergeant Ahmet Uyar had been ordered to report to the public prosecutor's office as he was present, that the expert sergeant |
Urus-Martan | 40. On 8 September 2001 the criminal proceedings in case no. 24047 were adjourned as it was impossible to establish the identity of the alleged perpetrators. The proceedings were then resumed pursuant to a decision of the |
Ruslan Magomadov | 39. On 10 August 2004 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed a number of State authorities, including the Chechnya prosecutor's office, that the theory of the involvement of Russian military forces in the abduction of |
Murad Khachukayev | 80. On 25 May 2008 the investigators forwarded requests for information to a number of law enforcement agencies. According to the response received from the Central Archives of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, no special operations aimed at the detention of |
Sikharulidze | 35. The relevant national and international materials concerning the problem of tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in Georgian prisons at the material time, and the World Health Organization Guidelines for the Management of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis are summarised by the Court in the case of Makharadze and |
A.R. “Vanagas” | 33. After Lithuania regained its independence, on 13 June 2014 the applicant was charged with being an accessory to genocide, in accordance with Articles 24 § 6 and 99 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 58 below), for having taken part in the operation of 11-12 October 1956 during which |
Josip Stojanović | 6. On 4 April 1997 the weekly magazine Imperijal published two articles entitled “By exposing H.’s machinations I did not set up HDZ (Iznošenjem [H-ovih] makinacija nisam podvalio HDZ-u)” and “Dr I.V. fiercely attacked Dr. |
Ibn Khattab | 36. In its judgment of 29 October 2003, SIAC summarised the “open” case against the second applicant as follows:
“...
(1) he has links with both the GIA and the GSPC [Algerian terrorist groups: see paragraph 26 above] and is a close associate of a number of Islamic extremists with links to al-Qaeda and/or Bin Laden.
(2) he has been concerned in the preparation and/or instigation of acts of international terrorism by procuring high-tech equipment (including communications equipment) for the GSPC and/or Islamic extremists in Chechnya led by |
Yunus Dobriyev | 15. On 26 December 2009 the first applicant submitted a complaint to the local police department in St Petersburg about the disappearance of her husband and three of his relatives. She indicated that she had last seen her husband and the three other men at about 11.30 p.m. on 25 December 2009 at Kamskaya Street, driving away in his car. They had intended to drop two of the men at the Tekhnologicheskiy Institut metro station and then continue to her home address at Novikova Street. At about midnight |
Laurent-Désiré Kabila | 103. Even assuming that the applicant had been a member of the DSP, he would not face any danger if returned to that country at present. As had emerged in the case of K.K., she had been able, as a lower-ranking DSP member, to continue as a soldier in the army of Mobutu’s successor |
Shamad Durdiyev | 32. The order of the Ministry of the Interior for the district, also dated 14 October 2002, contained similar provisions. Finally, on 15 October 2002 the head of the detachments of the Ministry of the Interior based in the district produced a report on the results of the operation. It listed thirteen men who had been detained in Nagornoye on that day on suspicion of being involved with illegal armed groups, and who had been questioned, fingerprinted and delivered to the ROVD. |
Vakha Saydaliyev | 28. On 6 June 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic and the first applicant that, despite the suspension of the investigation in case no. 59186, investigative measures were being taken to find |
Atilla Osmanoğlu | 19. Upon receipt of the applicant's complaint, the prosecutor examined the custody records of police headquarters and concluded that Atilla Osmanoğlu had not been taken into custody. The prosecutor did not initiate an investigation, on the grounds that there were neither custody records showing that |
Shahin Vrioni | 6. Mr Shahin Vrioni, the applicant in application no. 35720/04, is an Albanian national who was born in 1925 and lives in Albania. Mr Gherardo La Francesca, Mr Dario La Francesca and Mr Oliver Vrioni, the applicants in application no. 42832/06, are Albanian and Italian nationals who were born in 1946, 1950 and 1974 respectively and live in Italy. Mr |
Mehmet Salim Acar | 79. On 9 December 1996 İlhan Ezer made another statement to the gendarmerie in which he declared that he knew Captain İzzet and NCO Ahmet very well and that they were definitely not the men who had abducted |
Robert Megarry | 25. Dealing with the applicants’ submission that, in order for the United Kingdom to conform to its international obligations under the Convention, the House of Lords should find that there was (and in theory always had been) a tort of invasion of privacy under which the searches of the applicants were actionable and damages for emotional distress recoverable, Lord Hoffmann stated:
“32. Nor is there anything in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which suggests that the adoption of some high level principle of privacy is necessary to comply with Article 8 of the Convention. The European Court is concerned only with whether English law provides an adequate remedy in a specific case in which it considers that there has been an invasion of privacy contrary to Article 8 § 1 and not justifiable under Article 8 § 2. So in Earl Spencer v United Kingdom 25 EHRR CD 105 it was satisfied that the action for breach of confidence provided an adequate remedy for the Spencers’ complaint and looked no further into the rest of the armoury of remedies available to the victims of other invasions of privacy. Likewise, in Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 the court expressed some impatience, at paragraph 103, at being given a tour d’horizon of the remedies provided and to be provided by English law to deal with every imaginable kind of invasion of privacy. It was concerned with whether Mr Peck (who had been filmed in embarrassing circumstances by a CCTV camera) had an adequate remedy when the film was widely published by the media. It came to the conclusion that he did not. 33. Counsel for the Wainwrights relied upon Peck’s case as demonstrating the need for a general tort of invasion of privacy. But in my opinion it shows no more than the need, in English law, for a system of control of the use of film from CCTV cameras which shows greater sensitivity to the feelings of people who happen to have been caught by the lens. For the reasons so cogently explained by Sir |
Linda Kibalo | 26. Between 2008 and 2012 Ms Natalya Kibalo visited her husband in Blagoveshchensk on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, between 2008 and 2010, her travel expenses were sponsored. She visited her husband once in 2011 and once in 2012 but could not afford to travel at all in 2013 or 2014. Miss |
Ramirez Sanchez | 75. On 30 June and 5 October 2005 the senior doctor at the OCTU at Fleury-Mérogis Prison issued two medical certificates in exactly the same terms:
“I, the undersigned, ... certify that Mr Ramirez Sanchez Ilich, who was born on 12 October 1949, has been in my care since his arrival at the prison.
The problems which Mr |
Dzhabrail Yamadayev | 165. About two or three months after the abduction, the second applicant was informed by Mr A.Kh., an officer from Battalion Vostok, that his sons had been detained upon orders from the battalion’s commander Mr |
Shamil Khalidov | 27. On 3 June 2003 the Nadterechny prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that there were no grounds to prosecute Mr K. and the servicemen of his unit because they had not been in the village of Psedakh at the time of the detention of Isa and |
Hüseyin Koku | 15. As a prominent local HADEP politician, Hüseyin Koku was the subject of harassment and intimidation by the police, and, in particular, by the Governor of Elbistan, Mr Şükrü Görücü. Mr Görücü threatened to kill him and alleged that he was a traitor to the State and further alleged that HADEP was a terrorist party. Mr Görücü also told |
Makharbi Lorsanov | 136. In a decision of 9 February 2001 the investigator in charge ordered a medical forensic examination with a view to establishing the cause of death of Apti Abubakarov, Aminat Abubakarova, Vakha Tseltsayev, |
Graziella Avisse | 42. A number of applicants (Michelle Périoche, Germain Guiton, Mario Guiton and Stella Huet, Laetitia Winterstein, Catherine Herbrecht, Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and Patrick Lefèvre, Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche, |
Magomed Dzhabayev | 40. On the same date Ms H.A. was questioned. She submitted that on 10 March 2000 at 5.30 p.m. she had returned home and had learned that her husband, Mr T., had been apprehended by officers of the Oktyabrskiy VOVD dressed in camouflage uniform and masks. Mr |
Andrei Ivanţoc | 42. Both applicants were entitled to a daily one-hour walk in a closed courtyard; no other prisoner could be present at the same time. From the courtyard the applicants could only see the sky and four very high walls. The applicants had no access to the gym or other such facilities.
They were allowed to have a shower once a week. In summertime there was no warm water. During the winter of 2004-2005 there was no cold water at all in Tiraspol Prison no. 2, so that |
Aslan Ireziyev | 11. According to Mr Khaseyn Suleymanov, after the arrest the men took him and Mr Aslan Ireziyev to the Avtury collective farm. There they were handed over to other men, put in a UAZ car and driven away, passing through several roadblocks. At a certain point the men stopped and placed him and Mr |
Amirov Ruslan | 40. On 3 August 2007 a supervising prosecutor ordered the investigation to be resumed. The relevant decision stated that the investigating authorities had not taken the measures necessary for establishing the whereabouts of those missing and had not taken steps which could have been carried out in the absence of those responsible. In particular, the investigating authorities had not checked the information provided by the first applicant which claimed that servicemen of regiment no. 531 of the Russian Ministry of the Interior and a certain Mr |
Adam Ilyasov | 24. On 25 August 2003 the investigating authorities questioned Ms Z. Sh., who submitted that she was the Ilyasovs’ neighbour. She stated that shortly after 6 a.m. on 15 November 2002 two APCs had driven down Lenina Street and stopped at the Ilyasovs’ house. After a while she had heard screaming coming from their yard. Later she had learned that Mr |
Şevki Artar | 198. He denied having said to Major Şeker that if Yakup's death was the result of natural causes this would have been God's will. He had not dared or considered reading the record of his statement when Major Şeker had given it to him to sign.
iii. Public Prosecutor |
Subsets and Splits