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<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: BOOL ber_read_application_tag(wStream* s, BYTE tag, int* length)
{
BYTE byte;
if (tag > 30)
{
if(Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 1)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, byte);
if (byte != ((BER_CLASS_APPL | BER_CONSTRUCT) | BER_TAG_MASK))
return FALSE;
if(Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 1)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, byte);
if (byte != tag)
return FALSE;
return ber_read_length(s, length);
}
else
{
if(Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 1)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, byte);
if (byte != ((BER_CLASS_APPL | BER_CONSTRUCT) | (BER_TAG_MASK & tag)))
return FALSE;
return ber_read_length(s, length);
}
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fixed a range of BER boundary encoding bugs which would occur when any NLA packet hit the 127 character mark. Removed ber#get_content_length as it was not behaving deterministically.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int credssp_skip_pub_key_auth(int length)
{
length = ber_skip_octet_string(length);
length += ber_skip_contextual_tag(length);
return length;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fixed a range of BER boundary encoding bugs which would occur when any NLA packet hit the 127 character mark. Removed ber#get_content_length as it was not behaving deterministically.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void ber_write_universal_tag(wStream* s, BYTE tag, BOOL pc)
{
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, (BER_CLASS_UNIV | BER_PC(pc)) | (BER_TAG_MASK & tag));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'Fixed a range of BER boundary encoding bugs which would occur when any NLA packet hit the 127 character mark. Removed ber#get_content_length as it was not behaving deterministically.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: BOOL transport_connect_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->layer == TRANSPORT_LAYER_TSG)
return TRUE;
if (!transport_connect_tls(transport))
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
if (!connectErrorCode)
connectErrorCode = AUTHENTICATIONERROR;
fprintf(stderr, "Authentication failure, check credentials.\n"
"If credentials are valid, the NTLMSSP implementation may be to blame.\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476', 'CWE-125'], 'message': 'nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xmlParseEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (RAW != '&')
return(NULL);
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityRef: no name\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
/*
* Predefined entities override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL)
return(ent);
}
/*
* Increase the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
if ((ctxt->inSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->reference != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->reference(ctxt->userData, name);
}
}
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if ((ent->checked & 1) || ((ent->checked == 0) &&
(ent->content != NULL) &&(xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<')))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n", name);
}
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
return(ent);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Improve handling of xmlStopParser()
Add a specific parser error
Try to stop parsing as quickly as possible'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void _xml_characterDataHandler(void *userData, const XML_Char *s, int len)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser) {
zval *retval, *args[2];
if (parser->characterDataHandler) {
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(s, len, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->characterDataHandler, parser->characterDataPtr, 2, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (parser->data) {
int i;
int doprint = 0;
char *decoded_value;
int decoded_len;
decoded_value = xml_utf8_decode(s,len,&decoded_len,parser->target_encoding);
for (i = 0; i < decoded_len; i++) {
switch (decoded_value[i]) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
case '\n':
continue;
default:
doprint = 1;
break;
}
if (doprint) {
break;
}
}
if (doprint || (! parser->skipwhite)) {
if (parser->lastwasopen) {
zval **myval;
/* check if the current tag already has a value - if yes append to that! */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(parser->ctag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
} else {
add_assoc_string(*(parser->ctag),"value",decoded_value,0);
}
} else {
zval *tag;
zval **curtag, **mytype, **myval;
HashPosition hpos=NULL;
zend_hash_internal_pointer_end_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), &hpos);
if (hpos && (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data), (void **) &curtag, &hpos) == SUCCESS)) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"type",sizeof("type"),(void **) &mytype) == SUCCESS) {
if (!strcmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(mytype), "cdata")) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(curtag),"value",sizeof("value"),(void **) &myval) == SUCCESS) {
int newlen = Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) + decoded_len;
Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) = erealloc(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval),newlen+1);
strncpy(Z_STRVAL_PP(myval) + Z_STRLEN_PP(myval), decoded_value, decoded_len + 1);
Z_STRLEN_PP(myval) += decoded_len;
efree(decoded_value);
return;
}
}
}
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tag);
array_init(tag);
_xml_add_to_info(parser,parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset);
add_assoc_string(tag,"tag",parser->ltags[parser->level-1] + parser->toffset,1);
add_assoc_string(tag,"value",decoded_value,0);
add_assoc_string(tag,"type","cdata",1);
add_assoc_long(tag,"level",parser->level);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->data),&tag,sizeof(zval*),NULL);
}
} else {
efree(decoded_value);
}
}
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-787'], 'message': 'truncate results at depth of 255 to prevent corruption'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs)
{
kref_put(&ubufs->kref, vhost_net_zerocopy_done_signal);
wait_event(ubufs->wait, !atomic_read(&ubufs->kref.refcount));
kfree(ubufs);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: TEST_METHOD(5) {
// The destructor doesnn't remove the server instance directory if it
// wasn't created with the ownership flag or if it's been detached.
string path, path2;
{
ServerInstanceDir dir(parentDir + "/passenger-test.1234", false);
ServerInstanceDir dir2(parentDir + "/passenger-test.5678", false);
dir2.detach();
path = dir.getPath();
path2 = dir2.getPath();
}
ensure_equals(getFileType(path), FT_DIRECTORY);
ensure_equals(getFileType(path2), FT_DIRECTORY);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-59', 'CWE-61'], 'message': 'If the server instance directory already exists, it is now removed first in order get correct directory permissions.
If the directory still exists after removal, Phusion Passenger aborts to avoid writing to a directory with unexpected permissions.
Fixes issue #910.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: PHPAPI void php_session_start(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zval **ppid;
zval **data;
char *p, *value;
int nrand;
int lensess;
if (PS(use_only_cookies)) {
PS(apply_trans_sid) = 0;
} else {
PS(apply_trans_sid) = PS(use_trans_sid);
}
switch (PS(session_status)) {
case php_session_active:
php_error(E_NOTICE, "A session had already been started - ignoring session_start()");
return;
break;
case php_session_disabled:
value = zend_ini_string("session.save_handler", sizeof("session.save_handler"), 0);
if (!PS(mod) && value) {
PS(mod) = _php_find_ps_module(value TSRMLS_CC);
if (!PS(mod)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot find save handler '%s' - session startup failed", value);
return;
}
}
value = zend_ini_string("session.serialize_handler", sizeof("session.serialize_handler"), 0);
if (!PS(serializer) && value) {
PS(serializer) = _php_find_ps_serializer(value TSRMLS_CC);
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot find serialization handler '%s' - session startup failed", value);
return;
}
}
PS(session_status) = php_session_none;
/* fallthrough */
default:
case php_session_none:
PS(define_sid) = 1;
PS(send_cookie) = 1;
}
lensess = strlen(PS(session_name));
/* Cookies are preferred, because initially
* cookie and get variables will be available. */
if (!PS(id)) {
if (PS(use_cookies) && zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), "_COOKIE", sizeof("_COOKIE"), (void **) &data) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), PS(session_name), lensess + 1, (void **) &ppid) == SUCCESS
) {
PPID2SID;
PS(apply_trans_sid) = 0;
PS(send_cookie) = 0;
PS(define_sid) = 0;
}
if (!PS(use_only_cookies) && !PS(id) &&
zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), "_GET", sizeof("_GET"), (void **) &data) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), PS(session_name), lensess + 1, (void **) &ppid) == SUCCESS
) {
PPID2SID;
PS(send_cookie) = 0;
}
if (!PS(use_only_cookies) && !PS(id) &&
zend_hash_find(&EG(symbol_table), "_POST", sizeof("_POST"), (void **) &data) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), PS(session_name), lensess + 1, (void **) &ppid) == SUCCESS
) {
PPID2SID;
PS(send_cookie) = 0;
}
}
/* Check the REQUEST_URI symbol for a string of the form
* '<session-name>=<session-id>' to allow URLs of the form
* http://yoursite/<session-name>=<session-id>/script.php */
if (!PS(use_only_cookies) && !PS(id) && PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER] &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]), "REQUEST_URI", sizeof("REQUEST_URI"), (void **) &data) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_STRING &&
(p = strstr(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), PS(session_name))) &&
p[lensess] == '='
) {
char *q;
p += lensess + 1;
if ((q = strpbrk(p, "/?\\"))) {
PS(id) = estrndup(p, q - p);
PS(send_cookie) = 0;
}
}
/* Check whether the current request was referred to by
* an external site which invalidates the previously found id. */
if (PS(id) &&
PS(extern_referer_chk)[0] != '\0' &&
PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER] &&
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]), "HTTP_REFERER", sizeof("HTTP_REFERER"), (void **) &data) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(data) != 0 &&
strstr(Z_STRVAL_PP(data), PS(extern_referer_chk)) == NULL
) {
efree(PS(id));
PS(id) = NULL;
PS(send_cookie) = 1;
if (PS(use_trans_sid) && !PS(use_only_cookies)) {
PS(apply_trans_sid) = 1;
}
}
php_session_initialize(TSRMLS_C);
if (!PS(use_cookies) && PS(send_cookie)) {
if (PS(use_trans_sid) && !PS(use_only_cookies)) {
PS(apply_trans_sid) = 1;
}
PS(send_cookie) = 0;
}
php_session_reset_id(TSRMLS_C);
PS(session_status) = php_session_active;
php_session_cache_limiter(TSRMLS_C);
if ((PS(mod_data) || PS(mod_user_implemented)) && PS(gc_probability) > 0) {
int nrdels = -1;
nrand = (int) ((float) PS(gc_divisor) * php_combined_lcg(TSRMLS_C));
if (nrand < PS(gc_probability)) {
PS(mod)->s_gc(&PS(mod_data), PS(gc_maxlifetime), &nrdels TSRMLS_CC);
#ifdef SESSION_DEBUG
if (nrdels != -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "purged %d expired session objects", nrdels);
}
#endif
}
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Strict session'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_id)
{
char *name = NULL;
int name_len, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PS(id)) {
RETVAL_STRING(PS(id), 1);
} else {
RETVAL_EMPTY_STRING();
}
if (name) {
if (PS(use_strict_mode) && argc) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Set session ID while session.use_strict_mode is enabled");
}
if (PS(id)) {
efree(PS(id));
}
PS(id) = estrndup(name, name_len);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'fix crash, enable session_id and fix test'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void CLASS bad_pixels (const char *cfname)
{
FILE *fp=NULL;
#ifndef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
char *fname, *cp, line[128];
int len, time, row, col, r, c, rad, tot, n, fixed=0;
#else
char *cp, line[128];
int time, row, col, r, c, rad, tot, n;
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
int fixed = 0;
#endif
#endif
if (!filters) return;
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
RUN_CALLBACK(LIBRAW_PROGRESS_BAD_PIXELS,0,2);
#endif
if (cfname)
fp = fopen (cfname, "r");
#line 4009 "dcraw/dcraw.c"
if (!fp)
{
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
imgdata.process_warnings |= LIBRAW_WARN_NO_BADPIXELMAP;
#endif
return;
}
while (fgets (line, 128, fp)) {
cp = strchr (line, '#');
if (cp) *cp = 0;
if (sscanf (line, "%d %d %d", &col, &row, &time) != 3) continue;
if ((unsigned) col >= width || (unsigned) row >= height) continue;
if (time > timestamp) continue;
for (tot=n=0, rad=1; rad < 3 && n==0; rad++)
for (r = row-rad; r <= row+rad; r++)
for (c = col-rad; c <= col+rad; c++)
if ((unsigned) r < height && (unsigned) c < width &&
(r != row || c != col) && fcol(r,c) == fcol(row,col)) {
tot += BAYER2(r,c);
n++;
}
BAYER2(row,col) = tot/n;
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
if (verbose) {
if (!fixed++)
fprintf (stderr,_("Fixed dead pixels at:"));
fprintf (stderr, " %d,%d", col, row);
}
#endif
}
#ifdef DCRAW_VERBOSE
if (fixed) fputc ('\n', stderr);
#endif
fclose (fp);
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
RUN_CALLBACK(LIBRAW_PROGRESS_BAD_PIXELS,1,2);
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'cumulated data checks patch'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
int mode, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len)
{
switch( ctx->padding )
{
case RSA_PKCS_V15:
return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, mode, olen, input, output,
output_max_len );
#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
case RSA_PKCS_V21:
return rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, mode, NULL, 0, olen, input,
output, output_max_len );
#endif
default:
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
int mode, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len)
{
int ret, correct = 1;
size_t ilen, pad_count = 0;
unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char bt;
unsigned char buf[POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ilen = ctx->len;
if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ret = ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
? rsa_public( ctx, input, buf )
: rsa_private( ctx, input, buf );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
p = buf;
if( *p++ != 0 )
correct = 0;
bt = *p++;
if( ( bt != RSA_CRYPT && mode == RSA_PRIVATE ) ||
( bt != RSA_SIGN && mode == RSA_PUBLIC ) )
{
correct = 0;
}
if( bt == RSA_CRYPT )
{
while( *p != 0 && p < buf + ilen - 1 )
pad_count += ( *p++ != 0 );
correct &= ( *p == 0 && p < buf + ilen - 1 );
q = p;
// Also pass over all other bytes to reduce timing differences
//
while ( q < buf + ilen - 1 )
pad_count += ( *q++ != 0 );
// Prevent compiler optimization of pad_count
//
correct |= pad_count & 0x100000; /* Always 0 unless 1M bit keys */
p++;
}
else
{
while( *p == 0xFF && p < buf + ilen - 1 )
pad_count += ( *p++ == 0xFF );
correct &= ( *p == 0 && p < buf + ilen - 1 );
q = p;
// Also pass over all other bytes to reduce timing differences
//
while ( q < buf + ilen - 1 )
pad_count += ( *q++ != 0 );
// Prevent compiler optimization of pad_count
//
correct |= pad_count & 0x100000; /* Always 0 unless 1M bit keys */
p++;
}
if( correct == 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
if (ilen - (p - buf) > output_max_len)
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE );
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
return( 0 );
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
if( rng_state != NULL )
rng_state = NULL;
for( i = 0; i < len; ++i )
output[i] = rand();
return( 0 );
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
int mode,
int hash_id,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
unsigned char *sig )
{
size_t olen;
unsigned char *p = sig;
unsigned char salt[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
int ret;
size_t msb;
const md_info_t *md_info;
md_context_t md_ctx;
if( ctx->padding != RSA_PKCS_V21 || f_rng == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
olen = ctx->len;
switch( hash_id )
{
case SIG_RSA_MD2:
case SIG_RSA_MD4:
case SIG_RSA_MD5:
hashlen = 16;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA1:
hashlen = 20;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA224:
hashlen = 28;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA256:
hashlen = 32;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA384:
hashlen = 48;
break;
case SIG_RSA_SHA512:
hashlen = 64;
break;
default:
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
md_info = md_info_from_type( ctx->hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
slen = hlen;
if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
memset( sig, 0, olen );
msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
// Generate salt of length slen
//
if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret );
// Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
//
msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
*p++ = 0x01;
memcpy( p, salt, slen );
p += slen;
md_init_ctx( &md_ctx, md_info );
// Generate H = Hash( M' )
//
md_starts( &md_ctx );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 );
md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen );
md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
// Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
//
if( msb % 8 == 0 )
offset = 1;
// maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB
//
mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, &md_ctx );
md_free_ctx( &md_ctx );
msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb );
p += hlen;
*p++ = 0xBC;
return( ( mode == RSA_PUBLIC )
? rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig )
: rsa_private( ctx, sig, sig ) );
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int dane_state_set_dlv_file(dane_state_t s, const char* file)
{
int ret;
ret = ub_ctx_set_option(s->ctx, (char*)"dlv-anchor-file:", (void*)file);
if (ret != 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(DANE_E_FILE_ERROR);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Adding dane_raw_tlsa to allow initialization of dane_query_t from DANE records based on external DNS resolutions. Also fixing a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int newary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
int id;
int retval;
struct sem_array *sma;
int size;
key_t key = params->key;
int nsems = params->u.nsems;
int semflg = params->flg;
int i;
if (!nsems)
return -EINVAL;
if (ns->used_sems + nsems > ns->sc_semmns)
return -ENOSPC;
size = sizeof (*sma) + nsems * sizeof (struct sem);
sma = ipc_rcu_alloc(size);
if (!sma) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset (sma, 0, size);
sma->sem_perm.mode = (semflg & S_IRWXUGO);
sma->sem_perm.key = key;
sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
retval = security_sem_alloc(sma);
if (retval) {
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return retval;
}
id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids(ns), &sma->sem_perm, ns->sc_semmni);
if (id < 0) {
security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return id;
}
ns->used_sems += nsems;
sma->sem_base = (struct sem *) &sma[1];
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_base[i].sem_pending);
sma->complex_count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_pending);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->list_id);
sma->sem_nsems = nsems;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
sem_unlock(sma);
return sma->sem_perm.id;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int semctl_down(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid,
int cmd, int version, void __user *p)
{
struct sem_array *sma;
int err;
struct semid64_ds semid64;
struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp;
if(cmd == IPC_SET) {
if (copy_semid_from_user(&semid64, p, version))
return -EFAULT;
}
ipcp = ipcctl_pre_down_nolock(ns, &sem_ids(ns), semid, cmd,
&semid64.sem_perm, 0);
if (IS_ERR(ipcp))
return PTR_ERR(ipcp);
sma = container_of(ipcp, struct sem_array, sem_perm);
err = security_sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
if (err) {
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out_unlock;
}
switch(cmd){
case IPC_RMID:
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
freeary(ns, ipcp);
goto out_up;
case IPC_SET:
ipc_lock_object(&sma->sem_perm);
err = ipc_update_perm(&semid64.sem_perm, ipcp);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
break;
default:
rcu_read_unlock();
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_up;
}
out_unlock:
sem_unlock(sma);
out_up:
up_write(&sem_ids(ns).rw_mutex);
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int gg_change_status_descr(struct gg_session *sess, int status, const char *descr)
{
struct gg_new_status80 p;
char *gen_descr = NULL;
int descr_len = 0;
int res;
gg_debug_session(sess, GG_DEBUG_FUNCTION, "** gg_change_status_descr(%p, %d, \"%s\");\n", sess, status, descr);
if (!sess) {
errno = EFAULT;
return -1;
}
if (sess->state != GG_STATE_CONNECTED) {
errno = ENOTCONN;
return -1;
}
sess->status = status;
if (descr != NULL && sess->encoding != GG_ENCODING_UTF8) {
descr = gen_descr = gg_encoding_convert(descr, GG_ENCODING_CP1250, GG_ENCODING_UTF8, -1, -1);
if (!gen_descr)
return -1;
}
if (descr) {
descr_len = strlen(descr);
if (descr_len > GG_STATUS_DESCR_MAXSIZE)
descr_len = GG_STATUS_DESCR_MAXSIZE;
/* XXX pamiętać o tym, żeby nie ucinać w środku znaku utf-8 */
} else {
descr = "";
}
p.status = gg_fix32(status);
p.flags = gg_fix32(sess->status_flags);
p.description_size = gg_fix32(descr_len);
if (sess->protocol_version >= GG_PROTOCOL_110) {
p.flags = gg_fix32(0x00000014);
descr_len++; /* dodaj \0 na końcu */
}
res = gg_send_packet(sess, GG_NEW_STATUS80,
&p, sizeof(p),
descr, descr_len,
NULL);
free(gen_descr);
if (GG_S_NA(status)) {
sess->state = GG_STATE_DISCONNECTING;
sess->timeout = GG_TIMEOUT_DISCONNECT;
}
return res;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'Poprawka ograniczania długości opisu.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: find_alternate_tgs(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_principal princ,
krb5_db_entry **server_ptr, const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_principal *plist = NULL, *pl2;
krb5_data tmp;
krb5_db_entry *server = NULL;
*server_ptr = NULL;
assert(is_cross_tgs_principal(princ));
if ((retval = krb5_walk_realm_tree(kdc_context,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, princ),
krb5_princ_component(kdc_context, princ, 1),
&plist, KRB5_REALM_BRANCH_CHAR))) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* move to the end */
for (pl2 = plist; *pl2; pl2++);
/* the first entry in this array is for krbtgt/local@local, so we
ignore it */
while (--pl2 > plist) {
tmp = *krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, *pl2);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2,
krb5_princ_realm(kdc_context, tgs_server));
retval = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, *pl2, 0, &server, status);
krb5_princ_set_realm(kdc_context, *pl2, &tmp);
if (retval == KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
continue;
else if (retval)
goto cleanup;
log_tgs_alt_tgt(kdc_context, server->princ);
*server_ptr = server;
server = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
if (retval != 0)
*status = "UNKNOWN_SERVER";
krb5_free_realm_tree(kdc_context, plist);
krb5_db_free_principal(kdc_context, server);
return retval;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'KDC null deref due to referrals [CVE-2013-1417]
An authenticated remote client can cause a KDC to crash by making a
valid TGS-REQ to a KDC serving a realm with a single-component name.
The process_tgs_req() function dereferences a null pointer because an
unusual failure condition causes a helper function to return success.
While attempting to provide cross-realm referrals for host-based
service principals, the find_referral_tgs() function could return a
TGS principal for a zero-length realm name (indicating that the
hostname in the service principal has no known realm associated with
it).
Subsequently, the find_alternate_tgs() function would attempt to
construct a path to this empty-string realm, and return success along
with a null pointer in its output parameter. This happens because
krb5_walk_realm_tree() returns a list of length one when it attempts
to construct a transit path between a single-component realm and the
empty-string realm. This list causes a loop in find_alternate_tgs()
to iterate over zero elements, resulting in the unexpected output of a
null pointer, which process_tgs_req() proceeds to dereference because
there is no error condition.
Add an error condition to find_referral_tgs() when
krb5_get_host_realm() returns an empty realm name. Also add an error
condition to find_alternate_tgs() to handle the length-one output from
krb5_walk_realm_tree().
The vulnerable configuration is not likely to arise in practice.
(Realm names that have a single component are likely to be test
realms.) Releases prior to krb5-1.11 are not vulnerable.
Thanks to Sol Jerome for reporting this problem.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
(cherry picked from commit 3c7f1c21ffaaf6c90f1045f0f5440303c766acc0)
ticket: 7668
version_fixed: 1.11.4
status: resolved'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: struct json_object* json_tokener_parse_ex(struct json_tokener *tok,
const char *str, int len)
{
struct json_object *obj = NULL;
char c = '\1';
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
char *oldlocale=NULL, *tmplocale;
tmplocale = setlocale(LC_NUMERIC, NULL);
if (tmplocale) oldlocale = strdup(tmplocale);
setlocale(LC_NUMERIC, "C");
#endif
tok->char_offset = 0;
tok->err = json_tokener_success;
while (PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
redo_char:
switch(state) {
case json_tokener_state_eatws:
/* Advance until we change state */
while (isspace((int)c)) {
if ((!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok)) || (!PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)))
goto out;
}
if(c == '/' && !(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT)) {
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
state = json_tokener_state_comment_start;
} else {
state = saved_state;
goto redo_char;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_start:
switch(c) {
case '{':
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_field_start;
current = json_object_new_object();
break;
case '[':
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
saved_state = json_tokener_state_array;
current = json_object_new_array();
break;
case 'I':
case 'i':
state = json_tokener_state_inf;
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
tok->st_pos = 0;
goto redo_char;
case 'N':
case 'n':
state = json_tokener_state_null; // or NaN
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
tok->st_pos = 0;
goto redo_char;
case '\'':
if (tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) {
/* in STRICT mode only double-quote are allowed */
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
goto out;
}
case '"':
state = json_tokener_state_string;
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
tok->quote_char = c;
break;
case 'T':
case 't':
case 'F':
case 'f':
state = json_tokener_state_boolean;
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
tok->st_pos = 0;
goto redo_char;
#if defined(__GNUC__)
case '0' ... '9':
#else
case '0':
case '1':
case '2':
case '3':
case '4':
case '5':
case '6':
case '7':
case '8':
case '9':
#endif
case '-':
state = json_tokener_state_number;
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
tok->is_double = 0;
goto redo_char;
default:
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
goto out;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_finish:
if(tok->depth == 0) goto out;
obj = json_object_get(current);
json_tokener_reset_level(tok, tok->depth);
tok->depth--;
goto redo_char;
case json_tokener_state_inf: /* aka starts with 'i' */
{
int size;
int size_inf;
int is_negative = 0;
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
size = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_null_str_len);
size_inf = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_inf_str_len);
char *infbuf = tok->pb->buf;
if (*infbuf == '-')
{
infbuf++;
is_negative = 1;
}
if ((!(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) &&
strncasecmp(json_inf_str, infbuf, size_inf) == 0) ||
(strncmp(json_inf_str, infbuf, size_inf) == 0)
)
{
if (tok->st_pos == json_inf_str_len)
{
current = json_object_new_double(is_negative ? -INFINITY : INFINITY);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
goto out;
}
tok->st_pos++;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_null: /* aka starts with 'n' */
{
int size;
int size_nan;
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
size = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_null_str_len);
size_nan = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_nan_str_len);
if((!(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) &&
strncasecmp(json_null_str, tok->pb->buf, size) == 0)
|| (strncmp(json_null_str, tok->pb->buf, size) == 0)
) {
if (tok->st_pos == json_null_str_len) {
current = NULL;
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
}
else if ((!(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) &&
strncasecmp(json_nan_str, tok->pb->buf, size_nan) == 0) ||
(strncmp(json_nan_str, tok->pb->buf, size_nan) == 0)
)
{
if (tok->st_pos == json_nan_str_len)
{
current = json_object_new_double(NAN);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_null;
goto out;
}
tok->st_pos++;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_comment_start:
if(c == '*') {
state = json_tokener_state_comment;
} else if(c == '/') {
state = json_tokener_state_comment_eol;
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_comment;
goto out;
}
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
break;
case json_tokener_state_comment:
{
/* Advance until we change state */
const char *case_start = str;
while(c != '*') {
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
goto out;
}
}
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, 1+str-case_start);
state = json_tokener_state_comment_end;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_comment_eol:
{
/* Advance until we change state */
const char *case_start = str;
while(c != '\n') {
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
goto out;
}
}
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
MC_DEBUG("json_tokener_comment: %s\n", tok->pb->buf);
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_comment_end:
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
if(c == '/') {
MC_DEBUG("json_tokener_comment: %s\n", tok->pb->buf);
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else {
state = json_tokener_state_comment;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_string:
{
/* Advance until we change state */
const char *case_start = str;
while(1) {
if(c == tok->quote_char) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
current = json_object_new_string_len(tok->pb->buf, tok->pb->bpos);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
break;
} else if(c == '\\') {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_string;
state = json_tokener_state_string_escape;
break;
}
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
goto out;
}
}
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_string_escape:
switch(c) {
case '"':
case '\\':
case '/':
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
state = saved_state;
break;
case 'b':
case 'n':
case 'r':
case 't':
case 'f':
if(c == 'b') printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, "\b", 1);
else if(c == 'n') printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, "\n", 1);
else if(c == 'r') printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, "\r", 1);
else if(c == 't') printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, "\t", 1);
else if(c == 'f') printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, "\f", 1);
state = saved_state;
break;
case 'u':
tok->ucs_char = 0;
tok->st_pos = 0;
state = json_tokener_state_escape_unicode;
break;
default:
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_string;
goto out;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_escape_unicode:
{
unsigned int got_hi_surrogate = 0;
/* Handle a 4-byte sequence, or two sequences if a surrogate pair */
while(1) {
if(strchr(json_hex_chars, c)) {
tok->ucs_char += ((unsigned int)hexdigit(c) << ((3-tok->st_pos++)*4));
if(tok->st_pos == 4) {
unsigned char unescaped_utf[4];
if (got_hi_surrogate) {
if (IS_LOW_SURROGATE(tok->ucs_char)) {
/* Recalculate the ucs_char, then fall thru to process normally */
tok->ucs_char = DECODE_SURROGATE_PAIR(got_hi_surrogate, tok->ucs_char);
} else {
/* Hi surrogate was not followed by a low surrogate */
/* Replace the hi and process the rest normally */
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
}
got_hi_surrogate = 0;
}
if (tok->ucs_char < 0x80) {
unescaped_utf[0] = tok->ucs_char;
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)unescaped_utf, 1);
} else if (tok->ucs_char < 0x800) {
unescaped_utf[0] = 0xc0 | (tok->ucs_char >> 6);
unescaped_utf[1] = 0x80 | (tok->ucs_char & 0x3f);
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)unescaped_utf, 2);
} else if (IS_HIGH_SURROGATE(tok->ucs_char)) {
/* Got a high surrogate. Remember it and look for the
* the beginning of another sequence, which should be the
* low surrogate.
*/
got_hi_surrogate = tok->ucs_char;
/* Not at end, and the next two chars should be "\u" */
if ((tok->char_offset+1 != len) &&
(tok->char_offset+2 != len) &&
(str[1] == '\\') &&
(str[2] == 'u'))
{
/* Advance through the 16 bit surrogate, and move on to the
* next sequence. The next step is to process the following
* characters.
*/
if( !ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) ) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
}
/* Advance to the first char of the next sequence and
* continue processing with the next sequence.
*/
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
goto out;
}
tok->ucs_char = 0;
tok->st_pos = 0;
continue; /* other json_tokener_state_escape_unicode */
} else {
/* Got a high surrogate without another sequence following
* it. Put a replacement char in for the hi surrogate
* and pretend we finished.
*/
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
}
} else if (IS_LOW_SURROGATE(tok->ucs_char)) {
/* Got a low surrogate not preceded by a high */
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
} else if (tok->ucs_char < 0x10000) {
unescaped_utf[0] = 0xe0 | (tok->ucs_char >> 12);
unescaped_utf[1] = 0x80 | ((tok->ucs_char >> 6) & 0x3f);
unescaped_utf[2] = 0x80 | (tok->ucs_char & 0x3f);
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)unescaped_utf, 3);
} else if (tok->ucs_char < 0x110000) {
unescaped_utf[0] = 0xf0 | ((tok->ucs_char >> 18) & 0x07);
unescaped_utf[1] = 0x80 | ((tok->ucs_char >> 12) & 0x3f);
unescaped_utf[2] = 0x80 | ((tok->ucs_char >> 6) & 0x3f);
unescaped_utf[3] = 0x80 | (tok->ucs_char & 0x3f);
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)unescaped_utf, 4);
} else {
/* Don't know what we got--insert the replacement char */
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
}
state = saved_state;
break;
}
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_string;
goto out;
}
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
if (got_hi_surrogate) /* Clean up any pending chars */
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, (char*)utf8_replacement_char, 3);
goto out;
}
}
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_boolean:
{
int size1, size2;
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, &c, 1);
size1 = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_true_str_len);
size2 = json_min(tok->st_pos+1, json_false_str_len);
if((!(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) &&
strncasecmp(json_true_str, tok->pb->buf, size1) == 0)
|| (strncmp(json_true_str, tok->pb->buf, size1) == 0)
) {
if(tok->st_pos == json_true_str_len) {
current = json_object_new_boolean(1);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
} else if((!(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT) &&
strncasecmp(json_false_str, tok->pb->buf, size2) == 0)
|| (strncmp(json_false_str, tok->pb->buf, size2) == 0)) {
if(tok->st_pos == json_false_str_len) {
current = json_object_new_boolean(0);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_boolean;
goto out;
}
tok->st_pos++;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_number:
{
/* Advance until we change state */
const char *case_start = str;
int case_len=0;
while(c && strchr(json_number_chars, c)) {
++case_len;
if(c == '.' || c == 'e' || c == 'E')
tok->is_double = 1;
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, case_len);
goto out;
}
}
if (case_len>0)
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, case_len);
// Check for -Infinity
if (tok->pb->buf[0] == '-' && case_len == 1 &&
(c == 'i' || c == 'I'))
{
state = json_tokener_state_inf;
goto redo_char;
}
}
{
int64_t num64;
double numd;
if (!tok->is_double && json_parse_int64(tok->pb->buf, &num64) == 0) {
if (num64 && tok->pb->buf[0]=='0' && (tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT)) {
/* in strict mode, number must not start with 0 */
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_number;
goto out;
}
current = json_object_new_int64(num64);
}
else if(tok->is_double && json_parse_double(tok->pb->buf, &numd) == 0)
{
current = json_object_new_double_s(numd, tok->pb->buf);
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_number;
goto out;
}
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_array_after_sep:
case json_tokener_state_array:
if(c == ']') {
if (state == json_tokener_state_array_after_sep &&
(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT))
{
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
goto out;
}
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else {
if(tok->depth >= tok->max_depth-1) {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_depth;
goto out;
}
state = json_tokener_state_array_add;
tok->depth++;
json_tokener_reset_level(tok, tok->depth);
goto redo_char;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_array_add:
json_object_array_add(current, obj);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_array_sep;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
case json_tokener_state_array_sep:
if(c == ']') {
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else if(c == ',') {
saved_state = json_tokener_state_array_after_sep;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_array;
goto out;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_object_field_start:
case json_tokener_state_object_field_start_after_sep:
if(c == '}') {
if (state == json_tokener_state_object_field_start_after_sep &&
(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT))
{
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
goto out;
}
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else if (c == '"' || c == '\'') {
tok->quote_char = c;
printbuf_reset(tok->pb);
state = json_tokener_state_object_field;
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_object_key_name;
goto out;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_object_field:
{
/* Advance until we change state */
const char *case_start = str;
while(1) {
if(c == tok->quote_char) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
obj_field_name = strdup(tok->pb->buf);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_field_end;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
break;
} else if(c == '\\') {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_field;
state = json_tokener_state_string_escape;
break;
}
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok) || !PEEK_CHAR(c, tok)) {
printbuf_memappend_fast(tok->pb, case_start, str-case_start);
goto out;
}
}
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_object_field_end:
if(c == ':') {
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_value;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_object_key_sep;
goto out;
}
break;
case json_tokener_state_object_value:
if(tok->depth >= tok->max_depth-1) {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_depth;
goto out;
}
state = json_tokener_state_object_value_add;
tok->depth++;
json_tokener_reset_level(tok, tok->depth);
goto redo_char;
case json_tokener_state_object_value_add:
json_object_object_add(current, obj_field_name, obj);
free(obj_field_name);
obj_field_name = NULL;
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_sep;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
goto redo_char;
case json_tokener_state_object_sep:
if(c == '}') {
saved_state = json_tokener_state_finish;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else if(c == ',') {
saved_state = json_tokener_state_object_field_start_after_sep;
state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
} else {
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_object_value_sep;
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (!ADVANCE_CHAR(str, tok))
goto out;
} /* while(POP_CHAR) */
out:
if (c &&
(state == json_tokener_state_finish) &&
(tok->depth == 0) &&
(tok->flags & JSON_TOKENER_STRICT)) {
/* unexpected char after JSON data */
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_unexpected;
}
if (!c) { /* We hit an eof char (0) */
if(state != json_tokener_state_finish &&
saved_state != json_tokener_state_finish)
tok->err = json_tokener_error_parse_eof;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
setlocale(LC_NUMERIC, oldlocale);
if (oldlocale) free(oldlocale);
#endif
if (tok->err == json_tokener_success)
{
json_object *ret = json_object_get(current);
int ii;
/* Partially reset, so we parse additional objects on subsequent calls. */
for(ii = tok->depth; ii >= 0; ii--)
json_tokener_reset_level(tok, ii);
return ret;
}
MC_DEBUG("json_tokener_parse_ex: error %s at offset %d\n",
json_tokener_errors[tok->err], tok->char_offset);
return NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119', 'CWE-310'], 'message': 'Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: json_t *json_object(void)
{
json_object_t *object = jsonp_malloc(sizeof(json_object_t));
if(!object)
return NULL;
json_init(&object->json, JSON_OBJECT);
if(hashtable_init(&object->hashtable))
{
jsonp_free(object);
return NULL;
}
object->serial = 0;
object->visited = 0;
return &object->json;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
list_t *list, *next;
pair_t *pair;
size_t i, index, new_size;
jsonp_free(hashtable->buckets);
hashtable->num_buckets++;
new_size = num_buckets(hashtable);
hashtable->buckets = jsonp_malloc(new_size * sizeof(bucket_t));
if(!hashtable->buckets)
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < num_buckets(hashtable); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
list = hashtable->list.next;
list_init(&hashtable->list);
for(; list != &hashtable->list; list = next) {
next = list->next;
pair = list_to_pair(list);
index = pair->hash % new_size;
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, &hashtable->buckets[index], &pair->list);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int scan(Scanner *s)
{
uchar *cursor = s->cur;
char *str, *ptr = NULL;
std:
s->tok = cursor;
s->len = 0;
#line 311 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
#line 291 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
{
YYCTYPE yych;
unsigned int yyaccept = 0;
static const unsigned char yybm[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,
128, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};
YYDEBUG(0, *YYCURSOR);
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 20) YYFILL(20);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych <= '\n') {
if (yych <= 0x00) goto yy9;
if (yych <= 0x08) goto yy11;
if (yych <= '\t') goto yy7;
goto yy9;
} else {
if (yych == ' ') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '+') goto yy11;
goto yy7;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'O') {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy11;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy4;
goto yy11;
} else {
if (yych <= 'P') goto yy5;
if (yych != 'R') goto yy11;
}
}
YYDEBUG(2, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((yych = *YYCURSOR) <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy3:
YYDEBUG(3, *YYCURSOR);
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
add_error(s, "Unexpected character");
goto std;
}
#line 366 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy4:
YYDEBUG(4, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 0;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy59;
goto yy3;
yy5:
YYDEBUG(5, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy12;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
yy6:
YYDEBUG(6, *YYCURSOR);
#line 351 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_sll nr;
int in_time = 0;
DEBUG_OUTPUT("period");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
do {
if ( *ptr == 'T' ) {
in_time = 1;
ptr++;
}
if ( *ptr == '\0' ) {
add_error(s, "Missing expected time part");
break;
}
nr = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 12);
switch (*ptr) {
case 'Y': s->period->y = nr; break;
case 'W': s->period->d = nr * 7; break;
case 'D': s->period->d = nr; break;
case 'H': s->period->h = nr; break;
case 'S': s->period->s = nr; break;
case 'M':
if (in_time) {
s->period->i = nr;
} else {
s->period->m = nr;
}
break;
default:
add_error(s, "Undefined period specifier");
break;
}
ptr++;
} while (*ptr);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy7:
YYDEBUG(7, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(8, *YYCURSOR);
#line 413 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
goto std;
}
#line 433 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy9:
YYDEBUG(9, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(10, *YYCURSOR);
#line 418 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
s->pos = cursor; s->line++;
goto std;
}
#line 443 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy11:
YYDEBUG(11, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy3;
yy12:
YYDEBUG(12, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych >= '0') goto yy25;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych >= 'W') goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
}
}
yy13:
YYDEBUG(13, *YYCURSOR);
YYCURSOR = YYMARKER;
if (yyaccept <= 0) {
goto yy3;
} else {
goto yy6;
}
yy14:
YYDEBUG(14, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
goto yy6;
yy15:
YYDEBUG(15, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(16, *YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych == 'H') goto yy19;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych != 'S') goto yy13;
}
yy17:
YYDEBUG(17, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy6;
yy18:
YYDEBUG(18, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
goto yy6;
yy19:
YYDEBUG(19, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy6;
yy20:
YYDEBUG(20, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(21, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy20;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
}
yy22:
YYDEBUG(22, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(23, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
yy24:
YYDEBUG(24, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy25:
YYDEBUG(25, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy35;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy26:
YYDEBUG(26, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy27:
YYDEBUG(27, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy28:
YYDEBUG(28, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy29:
YYDEBUG(29, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(30, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'D') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych <= 'C') goto yy13;
goto yy24;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') {
if (yych <= 'L') goto yy13;
goto yy27;
} else {
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy31:
YYDEBUG(31, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(32, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'C') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy24;
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
yy33:
YYDEBUG(33, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(34, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
yy35:
YYDEBUG(35, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
YYDEBUG(36, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy39;
YYDEBUG(37, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy40;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy41;
goto yy13;
yy38:
YYDEBUG(38, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
yy39:
YYDEBUG(39, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy38;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy40:
YYDEBUG(40, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy42;
goto yy13;
yy41:
YYDEBUG(41, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy42:
YYDEBUG(42, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(43, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy44;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy45;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy46;
goto yy13;
yy44:
YYDEBUG(44, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy45:
YYDEBUG(45, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy46:
YYDEBUG(46, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy47:
YYDEBUG(47, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(48, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy49;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy50;
goto yy13;
yy49:
YYDEBUG(49, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy51;
goto yy13;
yy50:
YYDEBUG(50, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy51:
YYDEBUG(51, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(52, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(53, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(54, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(55, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(56, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(57, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(58, *YYCURSOR);
#line 393 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("combinedrep");
TIMELIB_INIT;
s->period->y = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
ptr++;
s->period->m = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->d = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->h = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->i = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->s = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 792 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy59:
YYDEBUG(59, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(60, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(61, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych == '-') goto yy64;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= '0') goto yy62;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy63;
goto yy13;
}
yy62:
YYDEBUG(62, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy63:
YYDEBUG(63, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy64:
YYDEBUG(64, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy65;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy66;
goto yy13;
yy65:
YYDEBUG(65, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy13;
yy66:
YYDEBUG(66, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy67:
YYDEBUG(67, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(68, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy69;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy70;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy71;
goto yy13;
yy69:
YYDEBUG(69, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy70:
YYDEBUG(70, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy71:
YYDEBUG(71, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy72:
YYDEBUG(72, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(73, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy74;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy75;
goto yy13;
yy74:
YYDEBUG(74, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy76;
goto yy13;
yy75:
YYDEBUG(75, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy76:
YYDEBUG(76, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(77, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(78, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(79, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(80, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(81, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(82, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'Z') goto yy13;
yy83:
YYDEBUG(83, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(84, *YYCURSOR);
#line 327 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_time *current;
if (s->have_date || s->have_period) {
current = s->end;
s->have_end_date = 1;
} else {
current = s->begin;
s->have_begin_date = 1;
}
DEBUG_OUTPUT("datetimebasic | datetimeextended");
TIMELIB_INIT;
current->y = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
current->m = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->d = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->h = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->i = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->s = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_date = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_ISO_DATE;
}
#line 944 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy85:
YYDEBUG(85, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy86;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy87;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy88;
goto yy13;
yy86:
YYDEBUG(86, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy87:
YYDEBUG(87, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy88:
YYDEBUG(88, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy89:
YYDEBUG(89, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(90, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy91;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy92;
goto yy13;
yy91:
YYDEBUG(91, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy93;
goto yy13;
yy92:
YYDEBUG(92, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy93:
YYDEBUG(93, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(94, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(95, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(96, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(97, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'Z') goto yy83;
goto yy13;
yy98:
YYDEBUG(98, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(99, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy100;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy100:
YYDEBUG(100, *YYCURSOR);
#line 316 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("recurrences");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
s->recurrences = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 9);
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
s->have_recurrences = 1;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 1032 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
}
#line 428 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #66060 (Heap buffer over-read in DateInterval)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int udpv6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int ulen, copied;
int peeked, off = 0;
int err;
int is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int is_udp4;
bool slow;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len);
try_again:
skb = __skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags | (noblock ? MSG_DONTWAIT : 0),
&peeked, &off, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
ulen = skb->len - sizeof(struct udphdr);
copied = len;
if (copied > ulen)
copied = ulen;
else if (copied < ulen)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
is_udp4 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP));
/*
* If checksum is needed at all, try to do it while copying the
* data. If the data is truncated, or if we only want a partial
* coverage checksum (UDP-Lite), do it before the copy.
*/
if (copied < ulen || UDP_SKB_CB(skb)->partial_cov) {
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb))
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr),
msg->msg_iov, copied);
else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr), msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
trace_kfree_skb(skb, udpv6_recvmsg);
if (!peeked) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS,
is_udplite);
}
goto out_free;
}
if (!peeked) {
if (is_udp4)
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
else
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INDATAGRAMS, is_udplite);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = udp_hdr(skb)->source;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (is_udp4) {
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&sin6->sin6_addr);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = 0;
} else {
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
}
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (is_udp4) {
if (inet->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
} else {
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = ulen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram_locked(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
slow = lock_sock_fast(sk);
if (!skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags)) {
if (is_udp4) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
} else {
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, is_udplite);
UDP6_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_udplite);
}
}
unlock_sock_fast(sk, slow);
if (noblock)
return -EAGAIN;
/* starting over for a new packet */
msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_TRUNC;
goto try_again;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'inet: fix addr_len/msg->msg_namelen assignment in recv_error and rxpmtu functions
Commit bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69 ("inet: prevent leakage
of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls") conditionally updated
addr_len if the msg_name is written to. The recv_error and rxpmtu
functions relied on the recvmsg functions to set up addr_len before.
As this does not happen any more we have to pass addr_len to those
functions as well and set it to the size of the corresponding sockaddr
length.
This broke traceroute and such.
Fixes: bceaa90240b6 ("inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls")
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Reported-by: Tom Labanowski
Cc: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (timestr->length < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "extension author too lazy to parse %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)timestr->data);
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + timestr->length - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_min = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_hour = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mday = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2013-6420 - memory corruption in openssl_x509_parse'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static bool authenticated(conn *c) {
assert(settings.sasl);
bool rv = false;
switch (c->cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_LIST_MECHS: /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_AUTH: /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_STEP: /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_VERSION: /* FALLTHROUGH */
rv = true;
break;
default:
if (c->sasl_conn) {
const void *uname = NULL;
sasl_getprop(c->sasl_conn, SASL_USERNAME, &uname);
rv = uname != NULL;
}
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "authenticated() in cmd 0x%02x is %s\n",
c->cmd, rv ? "true" : "false");
}
return rv;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-287'], 'message': 'explicitly record sasl auth states
It was previously possible to bypass authentication due to implicit
state management. Now we explicitly consider ourselves
unauthenticated on any new connections and authentication attempts.
bug316
Signed-off-by: Dustin Sallings <dustin@spy.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: BSONTool::BSONTool( const char * name, DBAccess access , bool objcheck )
: Tool( name , access , "" , "" , false ) , _objcheck( objcheck ) {
add_options()
("objcheck" , "validate object before inserting" )
("filter" , po::value<string>() , "filter to apply before inserting" )
;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'SERVER-7769 - turn objcheck on by default and use new fast bson validate'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void ikev2_parent_outI1_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct ke_continuation *ke = (struct ke_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = ke->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent outI1: calculated ke+nonce, sending I1"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == ke->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_outI1_tail(pcrc, r);
if (ke->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&ke->md, e);
if (ke->md)
release_md(ke->md);
}
reset_cur_state();
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xps_parse_glyphs(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm,
char *base_uri, xps_resource *dict, fz_xml *root)
{
fz_xml *node;
char *fill_uri;
char *opacity_mask_uri;
char *bidi_level_att;
char *fill_att;
char *font_size_att;
char *font_uri_att;
char *origin_x_att;
char *origin_y_att;
char *is_sideways_att;
char *indices_att;
char *unicode_att;
char *style_att;
char *transform_att;
char *clip_att;
char *opacity_att;
char *opacity_mask_att;
char *navigate_uri_att;
fz_xml *transform_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *clip_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *fill_tag = NULL;
fz_xml *opacity_mask_tag = NULL;
char *fill_opacity_att = NULL;
xps_part *part;
fz_font *font;
char partname[1024];
char fakename[1024];
char *subfont;
float font_size = 10;
int subfontid = 0;
int is_sideways = 0;
int bidi_level = 0;
fz_text *text;
fz_rect area;
fz_matrix local_ctm = *ctm;
/*
* Extract attributes and extended attributes.
*/
bidi_level_att = fz_xml_att(root, "BidiLevel");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Fill");
font_size_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FontRenderingEmSize");
font_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FontUri");
origin_x_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OriginX");
origin_y_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OriginY");
is_sideways_att = fz_xml_att(root, "IsSideways");
indices_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Indices");
unicode_att = fz_xml_att(root, "UnicodeString");
style_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StyleSimulations");
transform_att = fz_xml_att(root, "RenderTransform");
clip_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Clip");
opacity_att = fz_xml_att(root, "Opacity");
opacity_mask_att = fz_xml_att(root, "OpacityMask");
navigate_uri_att = fz_xml_att(root, "FixedPage.NavigateUri");
for (node = fz_xml_down(root); node; node = fz_xml_next(node))
{
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.RenderTransform"))
transform_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.OpacityMask"))
opacity_mask_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.Clip"))
clip_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
if (!strcmp(fz_xml_tag(node), "Glyphs.Fill"))
fill_tag = fz_xml_down(node);
}
fill_uri = base_uri;
opacity_mask_uri = base_uri;
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &transform_att, &transform_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &clip_att, &clip_tag, NULL);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &fill_att, &fill_tag, &fill_uri);
xps_resolve_resource_reference(doc, dict, &opacity_mask_att, &opacity_mask_tag, &opacity_mask_uri);
/*
* Check that we have all the necessary information.
*/
if (!font_size_att || !font_uri_att || !origin_x_att || !origin_y_att) {
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "missing attributes in glyphs element");
return;
}
if (!indices_att && !unicode_att)
return; /* nothing to draw */
if (is_sideways_att)
is_sideways = !strcmp(is_sideways_att, "true");
if (bidi_level_att)
bidi_level = atoi(bidi_level_att);
/*
* Find and load the font resource
*/
xps_resolve_url(partname, base_uri, font_uri_att, sizeof partname);
subfont = strrchr(partname, '#');
if (subfont)
{
subfontid = atoi(subfont + 1);
*subfont = 0;
}
/* Make a new part name for font with style simulation applied */
fz_strlcpy(fakename, partname, sizeof fakename);
if (style_att)
{
if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#Bold", sizeof fakename);
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "ItalicSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#Italic", sizeof fakename);
else if (!strcmp(style_att, "BoldItalicSimulation"))
fz_strlcat(fakename, "#BoldItalic", sizeof fakename);
}
font = xps_lookup_font(doc, fakename);
if (!font)
{
fz_try(doc->ctx)
{
part = xps_read_part(doc, partname);
}
fz_catch(doc->ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(doc->ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot find font resource part '%s'", partname);
return;
}
/* deobfuscate if necessary */
if (strstr(part->name, ".odttf"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(doc, part);
if (strstr(part->name, ".ODTTF"))
xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(doc, part);
fz_try(doc->ctx)
{
fz_buffer *buf = fz_new_buffer_from_data(doc->ctx, part->data, part->size);
font = fz_new_font_from_buffer(doc->ctx, NULL, buf, subfontid, 1);
fz_drop_buffer(doc->ctx, buf);
}
fz_catch(doc->ctx)
{
fz_rethrow_if(doc->ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER);
fz_warn(doc->ctx, "cannot load font resource '%s'", partname);
xps_free_part(doc, part);
return;
}
if (style_att)
{
font->ft_bold = !!strstr(style_att, "Bold");
font->ft_italic = !!strstr(style_att, "Italic");
}
xps_select_best_font_encoding(doc, font);
xps_insert_font(doc, fakename, font);
/* NOTE: we already saved part->data in the buffer in the font */
fz_free(doc->ctx, part->name);
fz_free(doc->ctx, part);
}
/*
* Set up graphics state.
*/
if (transform_att || transform_tag)
{
fz_matrix transform;
if (transform_att)
xps_parse_render_transform(doc, transform_att, &transform);
if (transform_tag)
xps_parse_matrix_transform(doc, transform_tag, &transform);
fz_concat(&local_ctm, &transform, &local_ctm);
}
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
xps_clip(doc, &local_ctm, dict, clip_att, clip_tag);
font_size = fz_atof(font_size_att);
text = xps_parse_glyphs_imp(doc, &local_ctm, font, font_size,
fz_atof(origin_x_att), fz_atof(origin_y_att),
is_sideways, bidi_level, indices_att, unicode_att);
fz_bound_text(doc->ctx, text, NULL, &local_ctm, &area);
if (navigate_uri_att)
xps_add_link(doc, &area, base_uri, navigate_uri_att);
xps_begin_opacity(doc, &local_ctm, &area, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
/* If it's a solid color brush fill/stroke do a simple fill */
if (fill_tag && !strcmp(fz_xml_tag(fill_tag), "SolidColorBrush"))
{
fill_opacity_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Opacity");
fill_att = fz_xml_att(fill_tag, "Color");
fill_tag = NULL;
}
if (fill_att)
{
float samples[32];
fz_colorspace *colorspace;
xps_parse_color(doc, base_uri, fill_att, &colorspace, samples);
if (fill_opacity_att)
samples[0] *= fz_atof(fill_opacity_att);
xps_set_color(doc, colorspace, samples);
fz_fill_text(doc->dev, text, &local_ctm,
doc->colorspace, doc->color, doc->alpha);
}
/* If it's a complex brush, use the charpath as a clip mask */
if (fill_tag)
{
fz_clip_text(doc->dev, text, &local_ctm, 0);
xps_parse_brush(doc, &local_ctm, &area, fill_uri, dict, fill_tag);
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
}
xps_end_opacity(doc, opacity_mask_uri, dict, opacity_att, opacity_mask_tag);
fz_free_text(doc->ctx, text);
if (clip_att || clip_tag)
fz_pop_clip(doc->dev);
fz_drop_font(doc->ctx, font);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Bug 694957: fix stack buffer overflow in xps_parse_color
xps_parse_color happily reads more than FZ_MAX_COLORS values out of a
ContextColor array which overflows the passed in samples array.
Limiting the number of allowed samples to FZ_MAX_COLORS and make sure
to use that constant for all callers fixes the problem.
Thanks to Jean-Jamil Khalifé for reporting and investigating the issue
and providing a sample exploit file.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static void php_imagepolygon(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int filled)
{
zval *IM, *POINTS;
long NPOINTS, COL;
zval **var = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
gdPointPtr points;
int npoints, col, nelem, i;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rall", &IM, &POINTS, &NPOINTS, &COL) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
npoints = NPOINTS;
col = COL;
nelem = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS));
if (nelem < 6) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must have at least 3 points in your array");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (npoints <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "You must give a positive number of points");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (nelem < npoints * 2) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to use %d points in array with only %d points", npoints, nelem/2);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
points = (gdPointPtr) safe_emalloc(npoints, sizeof(gdPoint), 0);
for (i = 0; i < npoints; i++) {
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2), (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL((var));
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].x = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(POINTS), (i * 2) + 1, (void **) &var) == SUCCESS) {
SEPARATE_ZVAL(var);
convert_to_long(*var);
points[i].y = Z_LVAL_PP(var);
}
}
if (filled) {
gdImageFilledPolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
} else {
gdImagePolygon(im, points, npoints, col);
}
efree(points);
RETURN_TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: plpgsql_validator(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Oid funcoid = PG_GETARG_OID(0);
HeapTuple tuple;
Form_pg_proc proc;
char functyptype;
int numargs;
Oid *argtypes;
char **argnames;
char *argmodes;
bool is_dml_trigger = false;
bool is_event_trigger = false;
int i;
/* Get the new function's pg_proc entry */
tuple = SearchSysCache1(PROCOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(funcoid));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
elog(ERROR, "cache lookup failed for function %u", funcoid);
proc = (Form_pg_proc) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
functyptype = get_typtype(proc->prorettype);
/* Disallow pseudotype result */
/* except for TRIGGER, RECORD, VOID, or polymorphic */
if (functyptype == TYPTYPE_PSEUDO)
{
/* we assume OPAQUE with no arguments means a trigger */
if (proc->prorettype == TRIGGEROID ||
(proc->prorettype == OPAQUEOID && proc->pronargs == 0))
is_dml_trigger = true;
else if (proc->prorettype == EVTTRIGGEROID)
is_event_trigger = true;
else if (proc->prorettype != RECORDOID &&
proc->prorettype != VOIDOID &&
!IsPolymorphicType(proc->prorettype))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("PL/pgSQL functions cannot return type %s",
format_type_be(proc->prorettype))));
}
/* Disallow pseudotypes in arguments (either IN or OUT) */
/* except for polymorphic */
numargs = get_func_arg_info(tuple,
&argtypes, &argnames, &argmodes);
for (i = 0; i < numargs; i++)
{
if (get_typtype(argtypes[i]) == TYPTYPE_PSEUDO)
{
if (!IsPolymorphicType(argtypes[i]))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("PL/pgSQL functions cannot accept type %s",
format_type_be(argtypes[i]))));
}
}
/* Postpone body checks if !check_function_bodies */
if (check_function_bodies)
{
FunctionCallInfoData fake_fcinfo;
FmgrInfo flinfo;
int rc;
TriggerData trigdata;
EventTriggerData etrigdata;
/*
* Connect to SPI manager (is this needed for compilation?)
*/
if ((rc = SPI_connect()) != SPI_OK_CONNECT)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_connect failed: %s", SPI_result_code_string(rc));
/*
* Set up a fake fcinfo with just enough info to satisfy
* plpgsql_compile().
*/
MemSet(&fake_fcinfo, 0, sizeof(fake_fcinfo));
MemSet(&flinfo, 0, sizeof(flinfo));
fake_fcinfo.flinfo = &flinfo;
flinfo.fn_oid = funcoid;
flinfo.fn_mcxt = CurrentMemoryContext;
if (is_dml_trigger)
{
MemSet(&trigdata, 0, sizeof(trigdata));
trigdata.type = T_TriggerData;
fake_fcinfo.context = (Node *) &trigdata;
}
else if (is_event_trigger)
{
MemSet(&etrigdata, 0, sizeof(etrigdata));
etrigdata.type = T_EventTriggerData;
fake_fcinfo.context = (Node *) &etrigdata;
}
/* Test-compile the function */
plpgsql_compile(&fake_fcinfo, true);
/*
* Disconnect from SPI manager
*/
if ((rc = SPI_finish()) != SPI_OK_FINISH)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_finish failed: %s", SPI_result_code_string(rc));
}
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
PG_RETURN_VOID();
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Prevent privilege escalation in explicit calls to PL validators.
The primary role of PL validators is to be called implicitly during
CREATE FUNCTION, but they are also normal functions that a user can call
explicitly. Add a permissions check to each validator to ensure that a
user cannot use explicit validator calls to achieve things he could not
otherwise achieve. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).
Non-core procedural language extensions ought to make the same two-line
change to their own validators.
Andres Freund, reviewed by Tom Lane and Noah Misch.
Security: CVE-2014-0061'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: index_constraint_create(Relation heapRelation,
Oid indexRelationId,
IndexInfo *indexInfo,
const char *constraintName,
char constraintType,
bool deferrable,
bool initdeferred,
bool mark_as_primary,
bool update_pgindex,
bool remove_old_dependencies,
bool allow_system_table_mods,
bool is_internal)
{
Oid namespaceId = RelationGetNamespace(heapRelation);
ObjectAddress myself,
referenced;
Oid conOid;
/* constraint creation support doesn't work while bootstrapping */
Assert(!IsBootstrapProcessingMode());
/* enforce system-table restriction */
if (!allow_system_table_mods &&
IsSystemRelation(heapRelation) &&
IsNormalProcessingMode())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("user-defined indexes on system catalog tables are not supported")));
/* primary/unique constraints shouldn't have any expressions */
if (indexInfo->ii_Expressions &&
constraintType != CONSTRAINT_EXCLUSION)
elog(ERROR, "constraints cannot have index expressions");
/*
* If we're manufacturing a constraint for a pre-existing index, we need
* to get rid of the existing auto dependencies for the index (the ones
* that index_create() would have made instead of calling this function).
*
* Note: this code would not necessarily do the right thing if the index
* has any expressions or predicate, but we'd never be turning such an
* index into a UNIQUE or PRIMARY KEY constraint.
*/
if (remove_old_dependencies)
deleteDependencyRecordsForClass(RelationRelationId, indexRelationId,
RelationRelationId, DEPENDENCY_AUTO);
/*
* Construct a pg_constraint entry.
*/
conOid = CreateConstraintEntry(constraintName,
namespaceId,
constraintType,
deferrable,
initdeferred,
true,
RelationGetRelid(heapRelation),
indexInfo->ii_KeyAttrNumbers,
indexInfo->ii_NumIndexAttrs,
InvalidOid, /* no domain */
indexRelationId, /* index OID */
InvalidOid, /* no foreign key */
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
0,
' ',
' ',
' ',
indexInfo->ii_ExclusionOps,
NULL, /* no check constraint */
NULL,
NULL,
true, /* islocal */
0, /* inhcount */
true, /* noinherit */
is_internal);
/*
* Register the index as internally dependent on the constraint.
*
* Note that the constraint has a dependency on the table, so we don't
* need (or want) any direct dependency from the index to the table.
*/
myself.classId = RelationRelationId;
myself.objectId = indexRelationId;
myself.objectSubId = 0;
referenced.classId = ConstraintRelationId;
referenced.objectId = conOid;
referenced.objectSubId = 0;
recordDependencyOn(&myself, &referenced, DEPENDENCY_INTERNAL);
/*
* If the constraint is deferrable, create the deferred uniqueness
* checking trigger. (The trigger will be given an internal dependency on
* the constraint by CreateTrigger.)
*/
if (deferrable)
{
RangeVar *heapRel;
CreateTrigStmt *trigger;
heapRel = makeRangeVar(get_namespace_name(namespaceId),
pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(heapRelation)),
-1);
trigger = makeNode(CreateTrigStmt);
trigger->trigname = (constraintType == CONSTRAINT_PRIMARY) ?
"PK_ConstraintTrigger" :
"Unique_ConstraintTrigger";
trigger->relation = heapRel;
trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("unique_key_recheck");
trigger->args = NIL;
trigger->row = true;
trigger->timing = TRIGGER_TYPE_AFTER;
trigger->events = TRIGGER_TYPE_INSERT | TRIGGER_TYPE_UPDATE;
trigger->columns = NIL;
trigger->whenClause = NULL;
trigger->isconstraint = true;
trigger->deferrable = true;
trigger->initdeferred = initdeferred;
trigger->constrrel = NULL;
(void) CreateTrigger(trigger, NULL, conOid, indexRelationId, true);
}
/*
* If needed, mark the table as having a primary key. We assume it can't
* have been so marked already, so no need to clear the flag in the other
* case.
*
* Note: this might better be done by callers. We do it here to avoid
* exposing index_update_stats() globally, but that wouldn't be necessary
* if relhaspkey went away.
*/
if (mark_as_primary)
index_update_stats(heapRelation,
true,
true,
-1.0);
/*
* If needed, mark the index as primary and/or deferred in pg_index.
*
* Note: When making an existing index into a constraint, caller must
* have a table lock that prevents concurrent table updates; otherwise,
* there is a risk that concurrent readers of the table will miss seeing
* this index at all.
*/
if (update_pgindex && (mark_as_primary || deferrable))
{
Relation pg_index;
HeapTuple indexTuple;
Form_pg_index indexForm;
bool dirty = false;
pg_index = heap_open(IndexRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
indexTuple = SearchSysCacheCopy1(INDEXRELID,
ObjectIdGetDatum(indexRelationId));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(indexTuple))
elog(ERROR, "cache lookup failed for index %u", indexRelationId);
indexForm = (Form_pg_index) GETSTRUCT(indexTuple);
if (mark_as_primary && !indexForm->indisprimary)
{
indexForm->indisprimary = true;
dirty = true;
}
if (deferrable && indexForm->indimmediate)
{
indexForm->indimmediate = false;
dirty = true;
}
if (dirty)
{
simple_heap_update(pg_index, &indexTuple->t_self, indexTuple);
CatalogUpdateIndexes(pg_index, indexTuple);
InvokeObjectPostAlterHookArg(IndexRelationId, indexRelationId, 0,
InvalidOid, is_internal);
}
heap_freetuple(indexTuple);
heap_close(pg_index, RowExclusiveLock);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: createForeignKeyTriggers(Relation rel, Constraint *fkconstraint,
Oid constraintOid, Oid indexOid)
{
RangeVar *myRel;
CreateTrigStmt *fk_trigger;
/*
* Reconstruct a RangeVar for my relation (not passed in, unfortunately).
*/
myRel = makeRangeVar(get_namespace_name(RelationGetNamespace(rel)),
pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel)),
-1);
/* Make changes-so-far visible */
CommandCounterIncrement();
/*
* Build and execute a CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER statement for the ON
* DELETE action on the referenced table.
*/
fk_trigger = makeNode(CreateTrigStmt);
fk_trigger->trigname = "RI_ConstraintTrigger_a";
fk_trigger->relation = fkconstraint->pktable;
fk_trigger->row = true;
fk_trigger->timing = TRIGGER_TYPE_AFTER;
fk_trigger->events = TRIGGER_TYPE_DELETE;
fk_trigger->columns = NIL;
fk_trigger->whenClause = NULL;
fk_trigger->isconstraint = true;
fk_trigger->constrrel = myRel;
switch (fkconstraint->fk_del_action)
{
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_NOACTION:
fk_trigger->deferrable = fkconstraint->deferrable;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = fkconstraint->initdeferred;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_noaction_del");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_RESTRICT:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_restrict_del");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_CASCADE:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_cascade_del");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_SETNULL:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_setnull_del");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_SETDEFAULT:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_setdefault_del");
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized FK action type: %d",
(int) fkconstraint->fk_del_action);
break;
}
fk_trigger->args = NIL;
(void) CreateTrigger(fk_trigger, NULL, constraintOid, indexOid, true);
/* Make changes-so-far visible */
CommandCounterIncrement();
/*
* Build and execute a CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER statement for the ON
* UPDATE action on the referenced table.
*/
fk_trigger = makeNode(CreateTrigStmt);
fk_trigger->trigname = "RI_ConstraintTrigger_a";
fk_trigger->relation = fkconstraint->pktable;
fk_trigger->row = true;
fk_trigger->timing = TRIGGER_TYPE_AFTER;
fk_trigger->events = TRIGGER_TYPE_UPDATE;
fk_trigger->columns = NIL;
fk_trigger->whenClause = NULL;
fk_trigger->isconstraint = true;
fk_trigger->constrrel = myRel;
switch (fkconstraint->fk_upd_action)
{
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_NOACTION:
fk_trigger->deferrable = fkconstraint->deferrable;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = fkconstraint->initdeferred;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_noaction_upd");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_RESTRICT:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_restrict_upd");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_CASCADE:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_cascade_upd");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_SETNULL:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_setnull_upd");
break;
case FKCONSTR_ACTION_SETDEFAULT:
fk_trigger->deferrable = false;
fk_trigger->initdeferred = false;
fk_trigger->funcname = SystemFuncName("RI_FKey_setdefault_upd");
break;
default:
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized FK action type: %d",
(int) fkconstraint->fk_upd_action);
break;
}
fk_trigger->args = NIL;
(void) CreateTrigger(fk_trigger, NULL, constraintOid, indexOid, true);
/* Make changes-so-far visible */
CommandCounterIncrement();
/*
* Build and execute CREATE CONSTRAINT TRIGGER statements for the CHECK
* action for both INSERTs and UPDATEs on the referencing table.
*/
CreateFKCheckTrigger(myRel, fkconstraint, constraintOid, indexOid, true);
CreateFKCheckTrigger(myRel, fkconstraint, constraintOid, indexOid, false);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: poly_path(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(0);
PATH *path;
int size;
int i;
size = offsetof(PATH, p[0]) +sizeof(path->p[0]) * poly->npts;
path = (PATH *) palloc(size);
SET_VARSIZE(path, size);
path->npts = poly->npts;
path->closed = TRUE;
/* prevent instability in unused pad bytes */
path->dummy = 0;
for (i = 0; i < poly->npts; i++)
{
path->p[i].x = poly->p[i].x;
path->p[i].y = poly->p[i].y;
}
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: hstore_slice_to_hstore(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
HStore *hs = PG_GETARG_HS(0);
HEntry *entries = ARRPTR(hs);
char *ptr = STRPTR(hs);
ArrayType *key_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
HStore *out;
int nkeys;
Pairs *key_pairs = hstoreArrayToPairs(key_array, &nkeys);
Pairs *out_pairs;
int bufsiz;
int lastidx = 0;
int i;
int out_count = 0;
if (nkeys == 0)
{
out = hstorePairs(NULL, 0, 0);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
out_pairs = palloc(sizeof(Pairs) * nkeys);
bufsiz = 0;
/*
* we exploit the fact that the pairs list is already sorted into strictly
* increasing order to narrow the hstoreFindKey search; each search can
* start one entry past the previous "found" entry, or at the lower bound
* of the last search.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; ++i)
{
int idx = hstoreFindKey(hs, &lastidx,
key_pairs[i].key, key_pairs[i].keylen);
if (idx >= 0)
{
out_pairs[out_count].key = key_pairs[i].key;
bufsiz += (out_pairs[out_count].keylen = key_pairs[i].keylen);
out_pairs[out_count].val = HS_VAL(entries, ptr, idx);
bufsiz += (out_pairs[out_count].vallen = HS_VALLEN(entries, idx));
out_pairs[out_count].isnull = HS_VALISNULL(entries, idx);
out_pairs[out_count].needfree = false;
++out_count;
}
}
/*
* we don't use uniquePairs here because we know that the pairs list is
* already sorted and uniq'ed.
*/
out = hstorePairs(out_pairs, out_count, bufsiz);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: hstore_from_array(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
ArrayType *in_array = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(0);
int ndims = ARR_NDIM(in_array);
int count;
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
Datum *in_datums;
bool *in_nulls;
int in_count;
int i;
Assert(ARR_ELEMTYPE(in_array) == TEXTOID);
switch (ndims)
{
case 0:
out = hstorePairs(NULL, 0, 0);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
case 1:
if ((ARR_DIMS(in_array)[0]) % 2)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("array must have even number of elements")));
break;
case 2:
if ((ARR_DIMS(in_array)[1]) != 2)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("array must have two columns")));
break;
default:
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
}
deconstruct_array(in_array,
TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&in_datums, &in_nulls, &in_count);
count = in_count / 2;
pairs = palloc(count * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i)
{
if (in_nulls[i * 2])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
if (in_nulls[i * 2 + 1])
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(in_datums[i * 2]);
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in_datums[i * 2]));
pairs[i].vallen = 4;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
else
{
pairs[i].key = VARDATA_ANY(in_datums[i * 2]);
pairs[i].val = VARDATA_ANY(in_datums[i * 2 + 1]);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in_datums[i * 2]));
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(in_datums[i * 2 + 1]));
pairs[i].isnull = false;
pairs[i].needfree = false;
}
}
count = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, count, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, count, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703', 'CWE-189'], 'message': 'Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: ConvertTimeZoneAbbrevs(TimeZoneAbbrevTable *tbl,
struct tzEntry *abbrevs, int n)
{
datetkn *newtbl = tbl->abbrevs;
int i;
tbl->numabbrevs = n;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
{
strncpy(newtbl[i].token, abbrevs[i].abbrev, TOKMAXLEN);
newtbl[i].type = abbrevs[i].is_dst ? DTZ : TZ;
TOVAL(&newtbl[i], abbrevs[i].offset / MINS_PER_HOUR);
}
/* Check the ordering, if testing */
Assert(CheckDateTokenTable("timezone offset", newtbl, n));
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers.
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt()'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: results_differ(const char *testname, const char *resultsfile, const char *default_expectfile)
{
char expectfile[MAXPGPATH];
char diff[MAXPGPATH];
char cmd[MAXPGPATH * 3];
char best_expect_file[MAXPGPATH];
FILE *difffile;
int best_line_count;
int i;
int l;
const char *platform_expectfile;
/*
* We can pass either the resultsfile or the expectfile, they should have
* the same type (filename.type) anyway.
*/
platform_expectfile = get_expectfile(testname, resultsfile);
strcpy(expectfile, default_expectfile);
if (platform_expectfile)
{
/*
* Replace everything afer the last slash in expectfile with what the
* platform_expectfile contains.
*/
char *p = strrchr(expectfile, '/');
if (p)
strcpy(++p, platform_expectfile);
}
/* Name to use for temporary diff file */
snprintf(diff, sizeof(diff), "%s.diff", resultsfile);
/* OK, run the diff */
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
SYSTEMQUOTE "diff %s \"%s\" \"%s\" > \"%s\"" SYSTEMQUOTE,
basic_diff_opts, expectfile, resultsfile, diff);
/* Is the diff file empty? */
if (run_diff(cmd, diff) == 0)
{
unlink(diff);
return false;
}
/* There may be secondary comparison files that match better */
best_line_count = file_line_count(diff);
strcpy(best_expect_file, expectfile);
for (i = 0; i <= 9; i++)
{
char *alt_expectfile;
alt_expectfile = get_alternative_expectfile(expectfile, i);
if (!file_exists(alt_expectfile))
continue;
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
SYSTEMQUOTE "diff %s \"%s\" \"%s\" > \"%s\"" SYSTEMQUOTE,
basic_diff_opts, alt_expectfile, resultsfile, diff);
if (run_diff(cmd, diff) == 0)
{
unlink(diff);
return false;
}
l = file_line_count(diff);
if (l < best_line_count)
{
/* This diff was a better match than the last one */
best_line_count = l;
strcpy(best_expect_file, alt_expectfile);
}
free(alt_expectfile);
}
/*
* fall back on the canonical results file if we haven't tried it yet and
* haven't found a complete match yet.
*/
if (platform_expectfile)
{
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
SYSTEMQUOTE "diff %s \"%s\" \"%s\" > \"%s\"" SYSTEMQUOTE,
basic_diff_opts, default_expectfile, resultsfile, diff);
if (run_diff(cmd, diff) == 0)
{
/* No diff = no changes = good */
unlink(diff);
return false;
}
l = file_line_count(diff);
if (l < best_line_count)
{
/* This diff was a better match than the last one */
best_line_count = l;
strcpy(best_expect_file, default_expectfile);
}
}
/*
* Use the best comparison file to generate the "pretty" diff, which we
* append to the diffs summary file.
*/
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
SYSTEMQUOTE "diff %s \"%s\" \"%s\" >> \"%s\"" SYSTEMQUOTE,
pretty_diff_opts, best_expect_file, resultsfile, difffilename);
run_diff(cmd, difffilename);
/* And append a separator */
difffile = fopen(difffilename, "a");
if (difffile)
{
fprintf(difffile,
"\n======================================================================\n\n");
fclose(difffile);
}
unlink(diff);
return true;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers.
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt()'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code:
private int
mget(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *s, struct magic *m,
size_t nbytes, size_t o, unsigned int cont_level, int mode, int text,
int flip, int *returnval)
{
uint32_t offset = ms->offset;
uint32_t count = m->str_range;
int rv;
char *sbuf, *rbuf;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
struct mlist ml;
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, m->flag & INDIR, s, (uint32_t)(offset + o),
(uint32_t)nbytes, count) == -1)
return -1;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mget(type=%d, flag=%x, offset=%u, o=%zu, "
"nbytes=%zu, count=%u)\n", m->type, m->flag, offset, o,
nbytes, count);
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p, sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
int off = m->in_offset;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) {
const union VALUETYPE *q = CAST(const union VALUETYPE *,
((const void *)(s + offset + off)));
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
off = q->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
off = q->h;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[0]<<8)|(q->hs[1]));
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[1]<<8)|(q->hs[0]));
break;
case FILE_LONG:
off = q->l;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[0]<<24)|(q->hl[1]<<16)|
(q->hl[2]<<8)|(q->hl[3]));
break;
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_LELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[3]<<24)|(q->hl[2]<<16)|
(q->hl[1]<<8)|(q->hl[0]));
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[1]<<24)|(q->hl[0]<<16)|
(q->hl[3]<<8)|(q->hl[2]));
break;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect offs=%u\n", off);
}
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (nbytes < (offset + 1))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->b & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->b | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->b ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->b + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->b - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->b * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->b / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->b % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->b;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (short)((p->hs[0]<<8)|
(p->hs[1]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (short)((p->hs[1]<<8)|
(p->hs[0]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->h & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->h | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->h ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->h + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->h - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->h * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->h / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->h % off;
break;
}
}
else
offset = p->h;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[0]<<24)|
(p->hl[1]<<16)|
(p->hl[2]<<8)|
(p->hl[3]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEID3:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[3]<<24)|
(p->hl[2]<<16)|
(p->hl[1]<<8)|
(p->hl[0]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) &
off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) |
off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) ^
off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) +
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) -
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) *
off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) /
off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2])) %
off;
break;
}
} else
offset = (int32_t)((p->hl[1]<<24)|
(p->hl[0]<<16)|
(p->hl[3]<<8)|
(p->hl[2]));
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->l & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->l | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->l ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->l + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->l - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->l * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->l / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->l % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->l;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
}
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_BEID3:
offset = ((((offset >> 0) & 0x7f) << 0) |
(((offset >> 8) & 0x7f) << 7) |
(((offset >> 16) & 0x7f) << 14) |
(((offset >> 24) & 0x7f) << 21)) + 10;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (m->flag & INDIROFFADD) {
offset += ms->c.li[cont_level-1].off;
if (offset == 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,
"indirect *zero* offset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect +offs=%u\n", offset);
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, 0, s, offset, nbytes, count) == -1)
return -1;
ms->offset = offset;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p,
sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
}
/* Verify we have enough data to match magic type */
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (nbytes < (offset + 1)) /* should alway be true */
return 0;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 2))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
if (nbytes < (offset + 4))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
if (nbytes < (offset + 8))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (nbytes < (offset + m->vallen))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = ms->o.buf;
ms->o.buf = NULL;
ms->offset = 0;
rv = file_softmagic(ms, s + offset, nbytes - offset,
BINTEST, text);
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect @offs=%u[%d]\n", offset, rv);
if (rv == 1) {
rbuf = ms->o.buf;
ms->o.buf = sbuf;
if ((ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE)) == 0 &&
file_printf(ms, m->desc, offset) == -1)
return -1;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", rbuf) == -1)
return -1;
free(rbuf);
} else
ms->o.buf = sbuf;
return rv;
case FILE_USE:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = m->value.s;
if (*sbuf == '^') {
sbuf++;
flip = 1;
} else
flip = 0;
if (file_magicfind(ms, sbuf, &ml) == -1) {
file_error(ms, 0, "cannot find entry `%s'", sbuf);
return -1;
}
return match(ms, ml.magic, ml.nmagic, s, nbytes, offset + o,
mode, text, flip, returnval);
case FILE_NAME:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
return 1;
case FILE_DEFAULT: /* nothing to check */
default:
break;
}
if (!mconvert(ms, m, flip))
return 0; ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-755'], 'message': 'limit recursion level for mget'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
supported_features = k->get_features(qbus->parent);
error_report("Features 0x%x unsupported. Allowed features: 0x%x",
features, supported_features);
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-94'], 'message': 'virtio: avoid buffer overrun on incoming migration
CVE-2013-6399
vdev->queue_sel is read from the wire, and later used in the
emulation code as an index into vdev->vq[]. If the value of
vdev->queue_sel exceeds the length of vdev->vq[], currently
allocated to be VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX elements, subsequent PIO
operations such as VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_PFN can be used to overrun
the buffer with arbitrary data originating from the source.
Fix this by failing migration if the value from the wire exceeds
VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static struct inet_frag_queue *inet_frag_intern(struct netns_frags *nf,
struct inet_frag_queue *qp_in, struct inet_frags *f,
void *arg)
{
struct inet_frag_bucket *hb;
struct inet_frag_queue *qp;
unsigned int hash;
read_lock(&f->lock); /* Protects against hash rebuild */
/*
* While we stayed w/o the lock other CPU could update
* the rnd seed, so we need to re-calculate the hash
* chain. Fortunatelly the qp_in can be used to get one.
*/
hash = f->hashfn(qp_in);
hb = &f->hash[hash];
spin_lock(&hb->chain_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/* With SMP race we have to recheck hash table, because
* such entry could be created on other cpu, while we
* released the hash bucket lock.
*/
hlist_for_each_entry(qp, &hb->chain, list) {
if (qp->net == nf && f->match(qp, arg)) {
atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);
spin_unlock(&hb->chain_lock);
read_unlock(&f->lock);
qp_in->last_in |= INET_FRAG_COMPLETE;
inet_frag_put(qp_in, f);
return qp;
}
}
#endif
qp = qp_in;
if (!mod_timer(&qp->timer, jiffies + nf->timeout))
atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);
atomic_inc(&qp->refcnt);
hlist_add_head(&qp->list, &hb->chain);
spin_unlock(&hb->chain_lock);
read_unlock(&f->lock);
inet_frag_lru_add(nf, qp);
return qp;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362'], 'message': 'net: fix for a race condition in the inet frag code
I stumbled upon this very serious bug while hunting for another one,
it's a very subtle race condition between inet_frag_evictor,
inet_frag_intern and the IPv4/6 frag_queue and expire functions
(basically the users of inet_frag_kill/inet_frag_put).
What happens is that after a fragment has been added to the hash chain
but before it's been added to the lru_list (inet_frag_lru_add) in
inet_frag_intern, it may get deleted (either by an expired timer if
the system load is high or the timer sufficiently low, or by the
fraq_queue function for different reasons) before it's added to the
lru_list, then after it gets added it's a matter of time for the
evictor to get to a piece of memory which has been freed leading to a
number of different bugs depending on what's left there.
I've been able to trigger this on both IPv4 and IPv6 (which is normal
as the frag code is the same), but it's been much more difficult to
trigger on IPv4 due to the protocol differences about how fragments
are treated.
The setup I used to reproduce this is: 2 machines with 4 x 10G bonded
in a RR bond, so the same flow can be seen on multiple cards at the
same time. Then I used multiple instances of ping/ping6 to generate
fragmented packets and flood the machines with them while running
other processes to load the attacked machine.
*It is very important to have the _same flow_ coming in on multiple CPUs
concurrently. Usually the attacked machine would die in less than 30
minutes, if configured properly to have many evictor calls and timeouts
it could happen in 10 minutes or so.
An important point to make is that any caller (frag_queue or timer) of
inet_frag_kill will remove both the timer refcount and the
original/guarding refcount thus removing everything that's keeping the
frag from being freed at the next inet_frag_put. All of this could
happen before the frag was ever added to the LRU list, then it gets
added and the evictor uses a freed fragment.
An example for IPv6 would be if a fragment is being added and is at
the stage of being inserted in the hash after the hash lock is
released, but before inet_frag_lru_add executes (or is able to obtain
the lru lock) another overlapping fragment for the same flow arrives
at a different CPU which finds it in the hash, but since it's
overlapping it drops it invoking inet_frag_kill and thus removing all
guarding refcounts, and afterwards freeing it by invoking
inet_frag_put which removes the last refcount added previously by
inet_frag_find, then inet_frag_lru_add gets executed by
inet_frag_intern and we have a freed fragment in the lru_list.
The fix is simple, just move the lru_add under the hash chain locked
region so when a removing function is called it'll have to wait for
the fragment to be added to the lru_list, and then it'll remove it (it
works because the hash chain removal is done before the lru_list one
and there's no window between the two list adds when the frag can get
dropped). With this fix applied I couldn't kill the same machine in 24
hours with the same setup.
Fixes: 3ef0eb0db4bf ("net: frag, move LRU list maintenance outside of
rwlock")
CC: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
CC: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int ssh_bind_accept_fd(ssh_bind sshbind, ssh_session session, socket_t fd){
int i, rc;
if (session == NULL){
ssh_set_error(sshbind, SSH_FATAL,"session is null");
return SSH_ERROR;
}
session->server = 1;
session->version = 2;
/* copy options */
for (i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
if (sshbind->wanted_methods[i]) {
session->opts.wanted_methods[i] = strdup(sshbind->wanted_methods[i]);
if (session->opts.wanted_methods[i] == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
}
}
if (sshbind->bindaddr == NULL)
session->opts.bindaddr = NULL;
else {
SAFE_FREE(session->opts.bindaddr);
session->opts.bindaddr = strdup(sshbind->bindaddr);
if (session->opts.bindaddr == NULL) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
}
session->common.log_verbosity = sshbind->common.log_verbosity;
if(sshbind->banner != NULL)
session->opts.custombanner = strdup(sshbind->banner);
ssh_socket_free(session->socket);
session->socket = ssh_socket_new(session);
if (session->socket == NULL) {
/* perhaps it may be better to copy the error from session to sshbind */
ssh_set_error_oom(sshbind);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
ssh_socket_set_fd(session->socket, fd);
ssh_socket_get_poll_handle_out(session->socket);
/* We must try to import any keys that could be imported in case
* we are not using ssh_bind_listen (which is the other place
* where keys can be imported) on this ssh_bind and are instead
* only using ssh_bind_accept_fd to manage sockets ourselves.
*/
rc = ssh_bind_import_keys(sshbind);
if (rc != SSH_OK) {
return SSH_ERROR;
}
#ifdef HAVE_ECC
if (sshbind->ecdsa) {
session->srv.ecdsa_key = ssh_key_dup(sshbind->ecdsa);
if (session->srv.ecdsa_key == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(sshbind);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
}
#endif
if (sshbind->dsa) {
session->srv.dsa_key = ssh_key_dup(sshbind->dsa);
if (session->srv.dsa_key == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(sshbind);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
}
if (sshbind->rsa) {
session->srv.rsa_key = ssh_key_dup(sshbind->rsa);
if (session->srv.rsa_key == NULL) {
ssh_set_error_oom(sshbind);
return SSH_ERROR;
}
}
return SSH_OK;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'security: fix for vulnerability CVE-2014-0017
When accepting a new connection, a forking server based on libssh forks
and the child process handles the request. The RAND_bytes() function of
openssl doesn't reset its state after the fork, but simply adds the
current process id (getpid) to the PRNG state, which is not guaranteed
to be unique.
This can cause several children to end up with same PRNG state which is
a security issue.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int qcow2_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
unsigned int len, i;
int ret = 0;
QCowHeader header;
QemuOpts *opts;
Error *local_err = NULL;
uint64_t ext_end;
uint64_t l1_vm_state_index;
const char *opt_overlap_check;
int overlap_check_template = 0;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &header, sizeof(header));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
be32_to_cpus(&header.magic);
be32_to_cpus(&header.version);
be64_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.size);
be32_to_cpus(&header.cluster_bits);
be32_to_cpus(&header.crypt_method);
be64_to_cpus(&header.l1_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.l1_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_clusters);
be64_to_cpus(&header.snapshots_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.nb_snapshots);
if (header.magic != QCOW_MAGIC) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is not in qcow2 format");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.version < 2 || header.version > 3) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "QCOW version %d", header.version);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->qcow_version = header.version;
/* Initialise cluster size */
if (header.cluster_bits < MIN_CLUSTER_BITS ||
header.cluster_bits > MAX_CLUSTER_BITS) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported cluster size: 2^%i", header.cluster_bits);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->cluster_bits = header.cluster_bits;
s->cluster_size = 1 << s->cluster_bits;
s->cluster_sectors = 1 << (s->cluster_bits - 9);
/* Initialise version 3 header fields */
if (header.version == 2) {
header.incompatible_features = 0;
header.compatible_features = 0;
header.autoclear_features = 0;
header.refcount_order = 4;
header.header_length = 72;
} else {
be64_to_cpus(&header.incompatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.compatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.autoclear_features);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_order);
be32_to_cpus(&header.header_length);
if (header.header_length < 104) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2 header too short");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
}
if (header.header_length > s->cluster_size) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2 header exceeds cluster size");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.header_length > sizeof(header)) {
s->unknown_header_fields_size = header.header_length - sizeof(header);
s->unknown_header_fields = g_malloc(s->unknown_header_fields_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sizeof(header), s->unknown_header_fields,
s->unknown_header_fields_size);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read unknown qcow2 header "
"fields");
goto fail;
}
}
if (header.backing_file_offset > s->cluster_size) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid backing file offset");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.backing_file_offset) {
ext_end = header.backing_file_offset;
} else {
ext_end = 1 << header.cluster_bits;
}
/* Handle feature bits */
s->incompatible_features = header.incompatible_features;
s->compatible_features = header.compatible_features;
s->autoclear_features = header.autoclear_features;
if (s->incompatible_features & ~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK) {
void *feature_table = NULL;
qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end,
&feature_table, NULL);
report_unsupported_feature(bs, errp, feature_table,
s->incompatible_features &
~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
g_free(feature_table);
goto fail;
}
if (s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_CORRUPT) {
/* Corrupt images may not be written to unless they are being repaired
*/
if ((flags & BDRV_O_RDWR) && !(flags & BDRV_O_CHECK)) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2: Image is corrupt; cannot be opened "
"read/write");
ret = -EACCES;
goto fail;
}
}
/* Check support for various header values */
if (header.refcount_order != 4) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "%d bit reference counts",
1 << header.refcount_order);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->refcount_order = header.refcount_order;
if (header.crypt_method > QCOW_CRYPT_AES) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported encryption method: %i",
header.crypt_method);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->crypt_method_header = header.crypt_method;
if (s->crypt_method_header) {
bs->encrypted = 1;
}
s->l2_bits = s->cluster_bits - 3; /* L2 is always one cluster */
s->l2_size = 1 << s->l2_bits;
bs->total_sectors = header.size / 512;
s->csize_shift = (62 - (s->cluster_bits - 8));
s->csize_mask = (1 << (s->cluster_bits - 8)) - 1;
s->cluster_offset_mask = (1LL << s->csize_shift) - 1;
s->refcount_table_offset = header.refcount_table_offset;
s->refcount_table_size =
header.refcount_table_clusters << (s->cluster_bits - 3);
if (header.refcount_table_clusters > qcow2_max_refcount_clusters(s)) {
error_setg(errp, "Reference count table too large");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, s->refcount_table_offset,
s->refcount_table_size, sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid reference count table offset");
goto fail;
}
/* Snapshot table offset/length */
if (header.nb_snapshots > QCOW_MAX_SNAPSHOTS) {
error_setg(errp, "Too many snapshots");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, header.snapshots_offset,
header.nb_snapshots,
sizeof(QCowSnapshotHeader));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid snapshot table offset");
goto fail;
}
s->snapshots_offset = header.snapshots_offset;
s->nb_snapshots = header.nb_snapshots;
/* read the level 1 table */
if (header.l1_size > 0x2000000) {
/* 32 MB L1 table is enough for 2 PB images at 64k cluster size
* (128 GB for 512 byte clusters, 2 EB for 2 MB clusters) */
error_setg(errp, "Active L1 table too large");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_size = header.l1_size;
l1_vm_state_index = size_to_l1(s, header.size);
if (l1_vm_state_index > INT_MAX) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is too big");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_vm_state_index = l1_vm_state_index;
/* the L1 table must contain at least enough entries to put
header.size bytes */
if (s->l1_size < s->l1_vm_state_index) {
error_setg(errp, "L1 table is too small");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, header.l1_table_offset,
header.l1_size, sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid L1 table offset");
goto fail;
}
s->l1_table_offset = header.l1_table_offset;
if (s->l1_size > 0) {
s->l1_table = g_malloc0(
align_offset(s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t), 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, s->l1_table_offset, s->l1_table,
s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read L1 table");
goto fail;
}
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
}
/* alloc L2 table/refcount block cache */
s->l2_table_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, L2_CACHE_SIZE);
s->refcount_block_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, REFCOUNT_CACHE_SIZE);
s->cluster_cache = g_malloc(s->cluster_size);
/* one more sector for decompressed data alignment */
s->cluster_data = qemu_blockalign(bs, QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_size
+ 512);
s->cluster_cache_offset = -1;
s->flags = flags;
ret = qcow2_refcount_init(bs);
if (ret != 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not initialize refcount handling");
goto fail;
}
QLIST_INIT(&s->cluster_allocs);
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->discards);
/* read qcow2 extensions */
if (qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end, NULL,
&local_err)) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
/* read the backing file name */
if (header.backing_file_offset != 0) {
len = header.backing_file_size;
if (len > MIN(1023, s->cluster_size - header.backing_file_offset)) {
error_setg(errp, "Backing file name too long");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, header.backing_file_offset,
bs->backing_file, len);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read backing file name");
goto fail;
}
bs->backing_file[len] = '\0';
}
ret = qcow2_read_snapshots(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read snapshots");
goto fail;
}
/* Clear unknown autoclear feature bits */
if (!bs->read_only && !(flags & BDRV_O_INCOMING) && s->autoclear_features) {
s->autoclear_features = 0;
ret = qcow2_update_header(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not update qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Initialise locks */
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
/* Repair image if dirty */
if (!(flags & (BDRV_O_CHECK | BDRV_O_INCOMING)) && !bs->read_only &&
(s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_DIRTY)) {
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
ret = qcow2_check(bs, &result, BDRV_FIX_ERRORS);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not repair dirty image");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Enable lazy_refcounts according to image and command line options */
opts = qemu_opts_create(&qcow2_runtime_opts, NULL, 0, &error_abort);
qemu_opts_absorb_qdict(opts, options, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->use_lazy_refcounts = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS,
(s->compatible_features & QCOW2_COMPAT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS));
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_NEVER] = false;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_ALWAYS] = true;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_REQUEST] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_REQUEST,
flags & BDRV_O_UNMAP);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT, true);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_OTHER, false);
opt_overlap_check = qemu_opt_get(opts, "overlap-check") ?: "cached";
if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "none")) {
overlap_check_template = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "constant")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CONSTANT;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "cached")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CACHED;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "all")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_ALL;
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported value '%s' for qcow2 option "
"'overlap-check'. Allowed are either of the following: "
"none, constant, cached, all", opt_overlap_check);
qemu_opts_del(opts);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->overlap_check = 0;
for (i = 0; i < QCOW2_OL_MAX_BITNR; i++) {
/* overlap-check defines a template bitmask, but every flag may be
* overwritten through the associated boolean option */
s->overlap_check |=
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, overlap_bool_option_names[i],
overlap_check_template & (1 << i)) << i;
}
qemu_opts_del(opts);
if (s->use_lazy_refcounts && s->qcow_version < 3) {
error_setg(errp, "Lazy refcounts require a qcow2 image with at least "
"qemu 1.1 compatibility level");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC
{
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
qcow2_check_refcounts(bs, &result, 0);
}
#endif
return ret;
fail:
g_free(s->unknown_header_fields);
cleanup_unknown_header_ext(bs);
qcow2_free_snapshots(bs);
qcow2_refcount_close(bs);
g_free(s->l1_table);
/* else pre-write overlap checks in cache_destroy may crash */
s->l1_table = NULL;
if (s->l2_table_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->l2_table_cache);
}
if (s->refcount_block_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
}
g_free(s->cluster_cache);
qemu_vfree(s->cluster_data);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-476'], 'message': 'qcow2: Fix NULL dereference in qcow2_open() error path (CVE-2014-0146)
The qcow2 code assumes that s->snapshots is non-NULL if s->nb_snapshots
!= 0. By having the initialisation of both fields separated in
qcow2_open(), any error occuring in between would cause the error path
to dereference NULL in qcow2_free_snapshots() if the image had any
snapshots.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int queue_userspace_packet(struct datapath *dp, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct dp_upcall_info *upcall_info)
{
struct ovs_header *upcall;
struct sk_buff *nskb = NULL;
struct sk_buff *user_skb; /* to be queued to userspace */
struct nlattr *nla;
struct genl_info info = {
.dst_sk = ovs_dp_get_net(dp)->genl_sock,
.snd_portid = upcall_info->portid,
};
size_t len;
unsigned int hlen;
int err, dp_ifindex;
dp_ifindex = get_dpifindex(dp);
if (!dp_ifindex)
return -ENODEV;
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
return -ENOMEM;
nskb = __vlan_put_tag(nskb, nskb->vlan_proto, vlan_tx_tag_get(nskb));
if (!nskb)
return -ENOMEM;
nskb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb = nskb;
}
if (nla_attr_size(skb->len) > USHRT_MAX) {
err = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
/* Complete checksum if needed */
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
(err = skb_checksum_help(skb)))
goto out;
/* Older versions of OVS user space enforce alignment of the last
* Netlink attribute to NLA_ALIGNTO which would require extensive
* padding logic. Only perform zerocopy if padding is not required.
*/
if (dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED)
hlen = skb_zerocopy_headlen(skb);
else
hlen = skb->len;
len = upcall_msg_size(upcall_info->userdata, hlen);
user_skb = genlmsg_new_unicast(len, &info, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!user_skb) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
upcall = genlmsg_put(user_skb, 0, 0, &dp_packet_genl_family,
0, upcall_info->cmd);
upcall->dp_ifindex = dp_ifindex;
nla = nla_nest_start(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_KEY);
ovs_nla_put_flow(upcall_info->key, upcall_info->key, user_skb);
nla_nest_end(user_skb, nla);
if (upcall_info->userdata)
__nla_put(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_USERDATA,
nla_len(upcall_info->userdata),
nla_data(upcall_info->userdata));
/* Only reserve room for attribute header, packet data is added
* in skb_zerocopy() */
if (!(nla = nla_reserve(user_skb, OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET, 0))) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
nla->nla_len = nla_attr_size(skb->len);
skb_zerocopy(user_skb, skb, skb->len, hlen);
/* Pad OVS_PACKET_ATTR_PACKET if linear copy was performed */
if (!(dp->user_features & OVS_DP_F_UNALIGNED)) {
size_t plen = NLA_ALIGN(user_skb->len) - user_skb->len;
if (plen > 0)
memset(skb_put(user_skb, plen), 0, plen);
}
((struct nlmsghdr *) user_skb->data)->nlmsg_len = user_skb->len;
err = genlmsg_unicast(ovs_dp_get_net(dp), user_skb, upcall_info->portid);
out:
kfree_skb(nskb);
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors
skb_zerocopy can copy elements of the frags array between skbs, but it doesn't
orphan them. Also, it doesn't handle errors, so this patch takes care of that
as well, and modify the callers accordingly. skb_tx_error() is also added to
the callers so they will signal the failed delivery towards the creator of the
skb.
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
if (s->block_size % 512) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be a multiple of 512",
s->block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (s->block_size == 0) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size cannot be zero");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cloop's create_compressed_fs.c warns about block sizes beyond 256 KB but
* we can accept more. Prevent ridiculous values like 4 GB - 1 since we
* need a buffer this big.
*/
if (s->block_size > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be %u MB or less",
s->block_size,
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / (1024 * 1024));
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4 + 4, s->offsets, offsets_size);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
/* initialize zlib engine */
s->compressed_block = g_malloc(max_compressed_block_size + 1);
s->uncompressed_block = g_malloc(s->block_size);
if (inflateInit(&s->zstream) != Z_OK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->current_block = s->n_blocks;
s->sectors_per_block = s->block_size/512;
bs->total_sectors = s->n_blocks * s->sectors_per_block;
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
return 0;
fail:
g_free(s->offsets);
g_free(s->compressed_block);
g_free(s->uncompressed_block);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-190'], 'message': 'block/cloop: prevent offsets_size integer overflow (CVE-2014-0143)
The following integer overflow in offsets_size can lead to out-of-bounds
memory stores when n_blocks has a huge value:
uint32_t n_blocks, offsets_size;
[...]
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
[...]
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
[...]
for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);
offsets_size can be smaller than n_blocks due to integer overflow.
Therefore s->offsets[] is too small when the for loop byteswaps offsets.
This patch refuses to open files if offsets_size would overflow.
Note that changing the type of offsets_size is not a fix since 32-bit
hosts still only have 32-bit size_t.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int qcow2_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int len, i, ret = 0;
QCowHeader header;
QemuOpts *opts;
Error *local_err = NULL;
uint64_t ext_end;
uint64_t l1_vm_state_index;
const char *opt_overlap_check;
int overlap_check_template = 0;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &header, sizeof(header));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
be32_to_cpus(&header.magic);
be32_to_cpus(&header.version);
be64_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.size);
be32_to_cpus(&header.cluster_bits);
be32_to_cpus(&header.crypt_method);
be64_to_cpus(&header.l1_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.l1_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_clusters);
be64_to_cpus(&header.snapshots_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.nb_snapshots);
if (header.magic != QCOW_MAGIC) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is not in qcow2 format");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.version < 2 || header.version > 3) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "QCOW version %d", header.version);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->qcow_version = header.version;
/* Initialise version 3 header fields */
if (header.version == 2) {
header.incompatible_features = 0;
header.compatible_features = 0;
header.autoclear_features = 0;
header.refcount_order = 4;
header.header_length = 72;
} else {
be64_to_cpus(&header.incompatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.compatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.autoclear_features);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_order);
be32_to_cpus(&header.header_length);
}
if (header.header_length > sizeof(header)) {
s->unknown_header_fields_size = header.header_length - sizeof(header);
s->unknown_header_fields = g_malloc(s->unknown_header_fields_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sizeof(header), s->unknown_header_fields,
s->unknown_header_fields_size);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read unknown qcow2 header "
"fields");
goto fail;
}
}
if (header.backing_file_offset) {
ext_end = header.backing_file_offset;
} else {
ext_end = 1 << header.cluster_bits;
}
/* Handle feature bits */
s->incompatible_features = header.incompatible_features;
s->compatible_features = header.compatible_features;
s->autoclear_features = header.autoclear_features;
if (s->incompatible_features & ~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK) {
void *feature_table = NULL;
qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end,
&feature_table, NULL);
report_unsupported_feature(bs, errp, feature_table,
s->incompatible_features &
~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
g_free(feature_table);
goto fail;
}
if (s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_CORRUPT) {
/* Corrupt images may not be written to unless they are being repaired
*/
if ((flags & BDRV_O_RDWR) && !(flags & BDRV_O_CHECK)) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2: Image is corrupt; cannot be opened "
"read/write");
ret = -EACCES;
goto fail;
}
}
/* Check support for various header values */
if (header.refcount_order != 4) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "%d bit reference counts",
1 << header.refcount_order);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->refcount_order = header.refcount_order;
if (header.cluster_bits < MIN_CLUSTER_BITS ||
header.cluster_bits > MAX_CLUSTER_BITS) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported cluster size: 2^%i", header.cluster_bits);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.crypt_method > QCOW_CRYPT_AES) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported encryption method: %i",
header.crypt_method);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->crypt_method_header = header.crypt_method;
if (s->crypt_method_header) {
bs->encrypted = 1;
}
s->cluster_bits = header.cluster_bits;
s->cluster_size = 1 << s->cluster_bits;
s->cluster_sectors = 1 << (s->cluster_bits - 9);
s->l2_bits = s->cluster_bits - 3; /* L2 is always one cluster */
s->l2_size = 1 << s->l2_bits;
bs->total_sectors = header.size / 512;
s->csize_shift = (62 - (s->cluster_bits - 8));
s->csize_mask = (1 << (s->cluster_bits - 8)) - 1;
s->cluster_offset_mask = (1LL << s->csize_shift) - 1;
s->refcount_table_offset = header.refcount_table_offset;
s->refcount_table_size =
header.refcount_table_clusters << (s->cluster_bits - 3);
s->snapshots_offset = header.snapshots_offset;
s->nb_snapshots = header.nb_snapshots;
/* read the level 1 table */
s->l1_size = header.l1_size;
l1_vm_state_index = size_to_l1(s, header.size);
if (l1_vm_state_index > INT_MAX) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is too big");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_vm_state_index = l1_vm_state_index;
/* the L1 table must contain at least enough entries to put
header.size bytes */
if (s->l1_size < s->l1_vm_state_index) {
error_setg(errp, "L1 table is too small");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_table_offset = header.l1_table_offset;
if (s->l1_size > 0) {
s->l1_table = g_malloc0(
align_offset(s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t), 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, s->l1_table_offset, s->l1_table,
s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read L1 table");
goto fail;
}
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
}
/* alloc L2 table/refcount block cache */
s->l2_table_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, L2_CACHE_SIZE);
s->refcount_block_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, REFCOUNT_CACHE_SIZE);
s->cluster_cache = g_malloc(s->cluster_size);
/* one more sector for decompressed data alignment */
s->cluster_data = qemu_blockalign(bs, QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_size
+ 512);
s->cluster_cache_offset = -1;
s->flags = flags;
ret = qcow2_refcount_init(bs);
if (ret != 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not initialize refcount handling");
goto fail;
}
QLIST_INIT(&s->cluster_allocs);
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->discards);
/* read qcow2 extensions */
if (qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end, NULL,
&local_err)) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
/* read the backing file name */
if (header.backing_file_offset != 0) {
len = header.backing_file_size;
if (len > 1023) {
len = 1023;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, header.backing_file_offset,
bs->backing_file, len);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read backing file name");
goto fail;
}
bs->backing_file[len] = '\0';
}
ret = qcow2_read_snapshots(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read snapshots");
goto fail;
}
/* Clear unknown autoclear feature bits */
if (!bs->read_only && !(flags & BDRV_O_INCOMING) && s->autoclear_features) {
s->autoclear_features = 0;
ret = qcow2_update_header(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not update qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Initialise locks */
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
/* Repair image if dirty */
if (!(flags & (BDRV_O_CHECK | BDRV_O_INCOMING)) && !bs->read_only &&
(s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_DIRTY)) {
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
ret = qcow2_check(bs, &result, BDRV_FIX_ERRORS);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not repair dirty image");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Enable lazy_refcounts according to image and command line options */
opts = qemu_opts_create(&qcow2_runtime_opts, NULL, 0, &error_abort);
qemu_opts_absorb_qdict(opts, options, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->use_lazy_refcounts = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS,
(s->compatible_features & QCOW2_COMPAT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS));
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_NEVER] = false;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_ALWAYS] = true;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_REQUEST] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_REQUEST,
flags & BDRV_O_UNMAP);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT, true);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_OTHER, false);
opt_overlap_check = qemu_opt_get(opts, "overlap-check") ?: "cached";
if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "none")) {
overlap_check_template = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "constant")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CONSTANT;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "cached")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CACHED;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "all")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_ALL;
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported value '%s' for qcow2 option "
"'overlap-check'. Allowed are either of the following: "
"none, constant, cached, all", opt_overlap_check);
qemu_opts_del(opts);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->overlap_check = 0;
for (i = 0; i < QCOW2_OL_MAX_BITNR; i++) {
/* overlap-check defines a template bitmask, but every flag may be
* overwritten through the associated boolean option */
s->overlap_check |=
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, overlap_bool_option_names[i],
overlap_check_template & (1 << i)) << i;
}
qemu_opts_del(opts);
if (s->use_lazy_refcounts && s->qcow_version < 3) {
error_setg(errp, "Lazy refcounts require a qcow2 image with at least "
"qemu 1.1 compatibility level");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC
{
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
qcow2_check_refcounts(bs, &result, 0);
}
#endif
return ret;
fail:
g_free(s->unknown_header_fields);
cleanup_unknown_header_ext(bs);
qcow2_free_snapshots(bs);
qcow2_refcount_close(bs);
g_free(s->l1_table);
/* else pre-write overlap checks in cache_destroy may crash */
s->l1_table = NULL;
if (s->l2_table_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->l2_table_cache);
}
if (s->refcount_block_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
}
g_free(s->cluster_cache);
qemu_vfree(s->cluster_data);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'qcow2: Check header_length (CVE-2014-0144)
This fixes an unbounded allocation for s->unknown_header_fields.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int xenvif_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
{
struct xenvif *vif = container_of(napi, struct xenvif, napi);
int work_done;
work_done = xenvif_tx_action(vif, budget);
if (work_done < budget) {
int more_to_do = 0;
unsigned long flags;
/* It is necessary to disable IRQ before calling
* RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS. Otherwise we might
* lose event from the frontend.
*
* Consider:
* RING_HAS_UNCONSUMED_REQUESTS
* <frontend generates event to trigger napi_schedule>
* __napi_complete
*
* This handler is still in scheduled state so the
* event has no effect at all. After __napi_complete
* this handler is descheduled and cannot get
* scheduled again. We lose event in this case and the ring
* will be completely stalled.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
RING_FINAL_CHECK_FOR_REQUESTS(&vif->tx, more_to_do);
if (!more_to_do)
__napi_complete(napi);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
return work_done;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'xen-netback: disable rogue vif in kthread context
When netback discovers frontend is sending malformed packet it will
disables the interface which serves that frontend.
However disabling a network interface involving taking a mutex which
cannot be done in softirq context, so we need to defer this process to
kthread context.
This patch does the following:
1. introduce a flag to indicate the interface is disabled.
2. check that flag in TX path, don't do any work if it's true.
3. check that flag in RX path, turn off that interface if it's true.
The reason to disable it in RX path is because RX uses kthread. After
this change the behavior of netback is still consistent -- it won't do
any TX work for a rogue frontend, and the interface will be eventually
turned off.
Also change a "continue" to "break" after xenvif_fatal_tx_err, as it
doesn't make sense to continue processing packets if frontend is rogue.
This is a fix for XSA-90.
Reported-by: Török Edwin <edwin@etorok.net>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src)
{
flush_fp_to_thread(src);
flush_altivec_to_thread(src);
flush_vsx_to_thread(src);
flush_spe_to_thread(src);
*dst = *src;
clear_task_ebb(dst);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int fpm_unix_resolve_socket_premissions(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_config_s *c = wp->config;
/* uninitialized */
wp->socket_uid = -1;
wp->socket_gid = -1;
wp->socket_mode = 0666;
if (!c) {
return 0;
}
if (c->listen_owner && *c->listen_owner) {
struct passwd *pwd;
pwd = getpwnam(c->listen_owner);
if (!pwd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get uid for user '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_owner);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
wp->socket_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
}
if (c->listen_group && *c->listen_group) {
struct group *grp;
grp = getgrnam(c->listen_group);
if (!grp) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "[pool %s] cannot get gid for group '%s'", wp->config->name, c->listen_group);
return -1;
}
wp->socket_gid = grp->gr_gid;
}
if (c->listen_mode && *c->listen_mode) {
wp->socket_mode = strtoul(c->listen_mode, 0, 8);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-284', 'CWE-264', 'CWE-269'], 'message': 'Fix bug #67060: use default mode of 660'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int rtnl_group_changelink(struct net *net, int group,
struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb)
{
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
for_each_netdev(net, dev) {
if (dev->group == group) {
err = do_setlink(dev, ifm, tb, NULL, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int dn_nl_newaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nlattr *tb[IFA_MAX+1];
struct net_device *dev;
struct dn_dev *dn_db;
struct ifaddrmsg *ifm;
struct dn_ifaddr *ifa;
int err;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EINVAL;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*ifm), tb, IFA_MAX, dn_ifa_policy);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tb[IFA_LOCAL] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
ifm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if ((dev = __dev_get_by_index(&init_net, ifm->ifa_index)) == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if ((dn_db = rtnl_dereference(dev->dn_ptr)) == NULL) {
dn_db = dn_dev_create(dev, &err);
if (!dn_db)
return err;
}
if ((ifa = dn_dev_alloc_ifa()) == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
if (tb[IFA_ADDRESS] == NULL)
tb[IFA_ADDRESS] = tb[IFA_LOCAL];
ifa->ifa_local = nla_get_le16(tb[IFA_LOCAL]);
ifa->ifa_address = nla_get_le16(tb[IFA_ADDRESS]);
ifa->ifa_flags = tb[IFA_FLAGS] ? nla_get_u32(tb[IFA_FLAGS]) :
ifm->ifa_flags;
ifa->ifa_scope = ifm->ifa_scope;
ifa->ifa_dev = dn_db;
if (tb[IFA_LABEL])
nla_strlcpy(ifa->ifa_label, tb[IFA_LABEL], IFNAMSIZ);
else
memcpy(ifa->ifa_label, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
err = dn_dev_insert_ifa(dn_db, ifa);
if (err)
dn_dev_free_ifa(ifa);
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int do_setlink(struct net_device *dev, struct ifinfomsg *ifm,
struct nlattr **tb, char *ifname, int modified)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
int err;
if (tb[IFLA_NET_NS_PID] || tb[IFLA_NET_NS_FD]) {
struct net *net = rtnl_link_get_net(dev_net(dev), tb);
if (IS_ERR(net)) {
err = PTR_ERR(net);
goto errout;
}
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto errout;
}
err = dev_change_net_namespace(dev, net, ifname);
put_net(net);
if (err)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_MAP]) {
struct rtnl_link_ifmap *u_map;
struct ifmap k_map;
if (!ops->ndo_set_config) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto errout;
}
if (!netif_device_present(dev)) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto errout;
}
u_map = nla_data(tb[IFLA_MAP]);
k_map.mem_start = (unsigned long) u_map->mem_start;
k_map.mem_end = (unsigned long) u_map->mem_end;
k_map.base_addr = (unsigned short) u_map->base_addr;
k_map.irq = (unsigned char) u_map->irq;
k_map.dma = (unsigned char) u_map->dma;
k_map.port = (unsigned char) u_map->port;
err = ops->ndo_set_config(dev, &k_map);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) {
struct sockaddr *sa;
int len;
len = sizeof(sa_family_t) + dev->addr_len;
sa = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sa) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
sa->sa_family = dev->type;
memcpy(sa->sa_data, nla_data(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]),
dev->addr_len);
err = dev_set_mac_address(dev, sa);
kfree(sa);
if (err)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {
err = dev_set_mtu(dev, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_MTU]));
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_GROUP]) {
dev_set_group(dev, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_GROUP]));
modified = 1;
}
/*
* Interface selected by interface index but interface
* name provided implies that a name change has been
* requested.
*/
if (ifm->ifi_index > 0 && ifname[0]) {
err = dev_change_name(dev, ifname);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_IFALIAS]) {
err = dev_set_alias(dev, nla_data(tb[IFLA_IFALIAS]),
nla_len(tb[IFLA_IFALIAS]));
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_BROADCAST]) {
nla_memcpy(dev->broadcast, tb[IFLA_BROADCAST], dev->addr_len);
call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGEADDR, dev);
}
if (ifm->ifi_flags || ifm->ifi_change) {
err = dev_change_flags(dev, rtnl_dev_combine_flags(dev, ifm));
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
}
if (tb[IFLA_MASTER]) {
err = do_set_master(dev, nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_MASTER]));
if (err)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_CARRIER]) {
err = dev_change_carrier(dev, nla_get_u8(tb[IFLA_CARRIER]));
if (err)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_TXQLEN])
dev->tx_queue_len = nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_TXQLEN]);
if (tb[IFLA_OPERSTATE])
set_operstate(dev, nla_get_u8(tb[IFLA_OPERSTATE]));
if (tb[IFLA_LINKMODE]) {
write_lock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
dev->link_mode = nla_get_u8(tb[IFLA_LINKMODE]);
write_unlock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
}
if (tb[IFLA_VFINFO_LIST]) {
struct nlattr *attr;
int rem;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, tb[IFLA_VFINFO_LIST], rem) {
if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VF_INFO) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto errout;
}
err = do_setvfinfo(dev, attr);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
}
err = 0;
if (tb[IFLA_VF_PORTS]) {
struct nlattr *port[IFLA_PORT_MAX+1];
struct nlattr *attr;
int vf;
int rem;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!ops->ndo_set_vf_port)
goto errout;
nla_for_each_nested(attr, tb[IFLA_VF_PORTS], rem) {
if (nla_type(attr) != IFLA_VF_PORT)
continue;
err = nla_parse_nested(port, IFLA_PORT_MAX,
attr, ifla_port_policy);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
if (!port[IFLA_PORT_VF]) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto errout;
}
vf = nla_get_u32(port[IFLA_PORT_VF]);
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_port(dev, vf, port);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
}
err = 0;
if (tb[IFLA_PORT_SELF]) {
struct nlattr *port[IFLA_PORT_MAX+1];
err = nla_parse_nested(port, IFLA_PORT_MAX,
tb[IFLA_PORT_SELF], ifla_port_policy);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (ops->ndo_set_vf_port)
err = ops->ndo_set_vf_port(dev, PORT_SELF_VF, port);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
if (tb[IFLA_AF_SPEC]) {
struct nlattr *af;
int rem;
nla_for_each_nested(af, tb[IFLA_AF_SPEC], rem) {
const struct rtnl_af_ops *af_ops;
if (!(af_ops = rtnl_af_lookup(nla_type(af))))
BUG();
err = af_ops->set_link_af(dev, af);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
modified = 1;
}
}
err = 0;
errout:
if (err < 0 && modified)
net_warn_ratelimited("A link change request failed with some changes committed already. Interface %s may have been left with an inconsistent configuration, please check.\n",
dev->name);
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static __always_inline int __do_follow_link(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
{
int error;
void *cookie;
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
touch_atime(path->mnt, dentry);
nd_set_link(nd, NULL);
if (path->mnt != nd->path.mnt) {
path_to_nameidata(path, nd);
dget(dentry);
}
mntget(path->mnt);
cookie = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
error = PTR_ERR(cookie);
if (!IS_ERR(cookie)) {
char *s = nd_get_link(nd);
error = 0;
if (s)
error = __vfs_follow_link(nd, s);
else if (nd->last_type == LAST_BIND) {
error = force_reval_path(&nd->path, nd);
if (error)
path_put(&nd->path);
}
if (dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link)
dentry->d_inode->i_op->put_link(dentry, nd, cookie);
}
return error;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-362', 'CWE-416'], 'message': 'fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
* the script interpreter */
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
old_tsec = current_security();
new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
/* Default to the current task SID. */
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
/* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
} else {
/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
&new_tsec->sid);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
} else {
/* Check permissions for the transition. */
rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Check for shared state */
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
NULL);
if (rc)
return -EPERM;
}
/* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
* changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
if (bprm->unsafe &
(LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
struct task_struct *tracer;
struct task_security_struct *sec;
u32 ptsid = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
ptsid = sec->sid;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (ptsid != 0) {
rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
if (rc)
return -EPERM;
}
}
/* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static struct tevent_req *sdap_initgr_rfc2307bis_send(
TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct sdap_options *opts,
struct sdap_domain *sdom,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
const char *name,
const char *orig_dn)
{
errno_t ret;
struct tevent_req *req;
struct sdap_initgr_rfc2307bis_state *state;
const char **attr_filter;
char *clean_orig_dn;
bool use_id_mapping;
req = tevent_req_create(memctx, &state, struct sdap_initgr_rfc2307bis_state);
if (!req) return NULL;
state->ev = ev;
state->opts = opts;
state->sysdb = sdom->dom->sysdb;
state->dom = sdom->dom;
state->sh = sh;
state->op = NULL;
state->name = name;
state->direct_groups = NULL;
state->num_direct_parents = 0;
state->timeout = dp_opt_get_int(state->opts->basic, SDAP_SEARCH_TIMEOUT);
state->base_iter = 0;
state->search_bases = sdom->group_search_bases;
state->orig_dn = orig_dn;
if (!state->search_bases) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
"Initgroups lookup request without a group search base\n");
ret = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
ret = sss_hash_create(state, 32, &state->group_hash);
if (ret != EOK) {
talloc_free(req);
return NULL;
}
attr_filter = talloc_array(state, const char *, 2);
if (!attr_filter) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
attr_filter[0] = opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_MEMBER].name;
attr_filter[1] = NULL;
ret = build_attrs_from_map(state, opts->group_map, SDAP_OPTS_GROUP,
attr_filter, &state->attrs, NULL);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
ret = sss_filter_sanitize(state, orig_dn, &clean_orig_dn);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
use_id_mapping = sdap_idmap_domain_has_algorithmic_mapping(
opts->idmap_ctx,
sdom->dom->name,
sdom->dom->domain_id);
state->base_filter =
talloc_asprintf(state, "(&(%s=%s)(objectclass=%s)(%s=*)",
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_MEMBER].name,
clean_orig_dn,
opts->group_map[SDAP_OC_GROUP].name,
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_NAME].name);
if (!state->base_filter) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
if (use_id_mapping) {
/* When mapping IDs or looking for SIDs, we don't want to limit
* ourselves to groups with a GID value. But there must be a SID to map
* from.
*/
state->base_filter = talloc_asprintf_append(state->base_filter,
"(%s=*))",
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_OBJECTSID].name);
} else {
/* When not ID-mapping, make sure there is a non-NULL UID */
state->base_filter = talloc_asprintf_append(state->base_filter,
"(&(%s=*)(!(%s=0))))",
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_GID].name,
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_GID].name);
}
if (!state->base_filter) {
talloc_zfree(req);
return NULL;
}
talloc_zfree(clean_orig_dn);
ret = sdap_initgr_rfc2307bis_next_base(req);
done:
if (ret != EOK) {
tevent_req_error(req, ret);
tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
return req;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-264'], 'message': 'AD: process non-posix nested groups w/o tokenGroups
When initgr is performed for AD not supporting tokenGroups, do not
filter out groups without gid attribute or with gid equal to zero.
Resolves:
https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2343
Reviewed-by: Michal Židek <mzidek@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 981bf55532fbec91a106f82d7daf32094c76dfe0)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: asn1_get_octet_der (const unsigned char *der, int der_len,
int *ret_len, unsigned char *str, int str_size,
int *str_len)
{
int len_len;
if (der_len <= 0)
return ASN1_GENERIC_ERROR;
/* if(str==NULL) return ASN1_SUCCESS; */
*str_len = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len_len);
if (*str_len < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
*ret_len = *str_len + len_len;
if (str_size >= *str_len)
memcpy (str, der + len_len, *str_len);
else
{
return ASN1_MEM_ERROR;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-131'], 'message': 'Do not return illegal values in asn1_get_bit_der().'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
{
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
u32 uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
int ret;
retry:
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We release only a lock we actually own:
*/
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
hb = hash_futex(&key);
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
/*
* To avoid races, try to do the TID -> 0 atomic transition
* again. If it succeeds then we can return without waking
* anyone else up:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) &&
cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr, vpid, 0))
goto pi_faulted;
/*
* Rare case: we managed to release the lock atomically,
* no need to wake anyone else up:
*/
if (unlikely(uval == vpid))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Ok, other tasks may need to be woken up - check waiters
* and do the wakeup if necessary:
*/
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
if (!match_futex (&this->key, &key))
continue;
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, this);
/*
* The atomic access to the futex value
* generated a pagefault, so retry the
* user-access and the wakeup:
*/
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
goto out_unlock;
}
/*
* No waiters - kernel unlocks the futex:
*/
if (!(uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED)) {
ret = unlock_futex_pi(uaddr, uval);
if (ret == -EFAULT)
goto pi_faulted;
}
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
out:
return ret;
pi_faulted:
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
put_futex_key(&key);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-269'], 'message': 'futex: Always cleanup owner tid in unlock_pi
If the owner died bit is set at futex_unlock_pi, we currently do not
cleanup the user space futex. So the owner TID of the current owner
(the unlocker) persists. That's observable inconsistant state,
especially when the ownership of the pi state got transferred.
Clean it up unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: cdf_read_property_info(const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_header_t *h,
uint32_t offs, cdf_property_info_t **info, size_t *count, size_t *maxcount)
{
const cdf_section_header_t *shp;
cdf_section_header_t sh;
const uint8_t *p, *q, *e;
int16_t s16;
int32_t s32;
uint32_t u32;
int64_t s64;
uint64_t u64;
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
size_t i, o, o4, nelements, j;
cdf_property_info_t *inp;
if (offs > UINT32_MAX / 4) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
shp = CAST(const cdf_section_header_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)sst->sst_tab + offs));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, shp, sizeof(*shp), __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
sh.sh_len = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_len);
#define CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / 8)
if (sh.sh_len > CDF_SHLEN_LIMIT) {
errno = EFTYPE;
goto out;
}
sh.sh_properties = CDF_TOLE4(shp->sh_properties);
#define CDF_PROP_LIMIT (UINT32_MAX / (4 * sizeof(*inp)))
if (sh.sh_properties > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
DPRINTF(("section len: %u properties %u\n", sh.sh_len,
sh.sh_properties));
if (*maxcount) {
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
} else {
*maxcount = sh.sh_properties;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
malloc(*maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
}
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp += *count;
*count += sh.sh_properties;
p = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)sst->sst_tab +
offs + sizeof(sh)));
e = CAST(const uint8_t *, (const void *)
(((const char *)(const void *)shp) + sh.sh_len));
if (cdf_check_stream_offset(sst, h, e, 0, __LINE__) == -1)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < sh.sh_properties; i++) {
size_t ofs = CDF_GETUINT32(p, (i << 1) + 1);
q = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)
((const char *)(const void *)p + ofs
- 2 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (q > e) {
DPRINTF(("Ran of the end %p > %p\n", q, e));
goto out;
}
inp[i].pi_id = CDF_GETUINT32(p, i << 1);
inp[i].pi_type = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 0);
DPRINTF(("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) id=%x type=%x offs=0x%tx,0x%x\n",
i, inp[i].pi_id, inp[i].pi_type, q - p, offs));
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR) {
nelements = CDF_GETUINT32(q, 1);
if (nelements == 0) {
DPRINTF(("CDF_VECTOR with nelements == 0\n"));
goto out;
}
o = 2;
} else {
nelements = 1;
o = 1;
}
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (inp[i].pi_type & (CDF_ARRAY|CDF_BYREF|CDF_RESERVED))
goto unknown;
switch (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_TYPEMASK) {
case CDF_NULL:
case CDF_EMPTY:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s16, &q[o4], sizeof(s16));
inp[i].pi_s16 = CDF_TOLE2(s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s32, &q[o4], sizeof(s32));
inp[i].pi_s32 = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)s32);
break;
case CDF_BOOL:
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
inp[i].pi_u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&s64, &q[o4], sizeof(s64));
inp[i].pi_s64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)s64);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED64:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
inp[i].pi_u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
break;
case CDF_FLOAT:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u32, &q[o4], sizeof(u32));
u32 = CDF_TOLE4(u32);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_f, &u32, sizeof(inp[i].pi_f));
break;
case CDF_DOUBLE:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&u64, &q[o4], sizeof(u64));
u64 = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)u64);
memcpy(&inp[i].pi_d, &u64, sizeof(inp[i].pi_d));
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
if (nelements > 1) {
size_t nelem = inp - *info;
if (*maxcount > CDF_PROP_LIMIT
|| nelements > CDF_PROP_LIMIT)
goto out;
*maxcount += nelements;
inp = CAST(cdf_property_info_t *,
realloc(*info, *maxcount * sizeof(*inp)));
if (inp == NULL)
goto out;
*info = inp;
inp = *info + nelem;
}
DPRINTF(("nelements = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u\n",
nelements));
for (j = 0; j < nelements && i < sh.sh_properties;
j++, i++)
{
uint32_t l = CDF_GETUINT32(q, o);
inp[i].pi_str.s_len = l;
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf = (const char *)
(const void *)(&q[o4 + sizeof(l)]);
DPRINTF(("l = %d, r = %" SIZE_T_FORMAT
"u, s = %s\n", l,
CDF_ROUND(l, sizeof(l)),
inp[i].pi_str.s_buf));
if (l & 1)
l++;
o += l >> 1;
if (q + o >= e)
goto out;
o4 = o * sizeof(uint32_t);
}
i--;
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
(void)memcpy(&tp, &q[o4], sizeof(tp));
inp[i].pi_tp = CDF_TOLE8((uint64_t)tp);
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
if (inp[i].pi_type & CDF_VECTOR)
goto unknown;
break;
default:
unknown:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
inp[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
return 0;
out:
free(*info);
return -1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed Bug #67413 fileinfo: cdf_read_property_info insufficient boundary chec
Upstream:
https://github.com/file/file/commit/93e063ee374b6a75729df9e7201fb511e47e259d
Adapted for C standard.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int fullSpeedBench(char** fileNamesTable, int nbFiles)
{
int fileIdx=0;
char* orig_buff;
# define NB_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS 13
# define MINCOMPRESSIONCHAR '0'
double totalCTime[NB_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS+1] = {0};
double totalCSize[NB_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS+1] = {0};
# define NB_DECOMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS 7
# define MINDECOMPRESSIONCHAR '0'
# define MAXDECOMPRESSIONCHAR (MINDECOMPRESSIONCHAR + NB_DECOMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS)
static char* decompressionNames[] = { "LZ4_decompress_fast", "LZ4_decompress_fast_withPrefix64k", "LZ4_decompress_fast_usingDict",
"LZ4_decompress_safe", "LZ4_decompress_safe_withPrefix64k", "LZ4_decompress_safe_usingDict", "LZ4_decompress_safe_partial" };
double totalDTime[NB_DECOMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS+1] = {0};
U64 totals = 0;
// Loop for each file
while (fileIdx<nbFiles)
{
FILE* inFile;
char* inFileName;
U64 inFileSize;
size_t benchedSize;
int nbChunks;
int maxCompressedChunkSize;
struct chunkParameters* chunkP;
size_t readSize;
char* compressed_buff; int compressedBuffSize;
U32 crcOriginal;
// Init
stateLZ4 = malloc(LZ4_sizeofState());
stateLZ4HC = malloc(LZ4_sizeofStateHC());
// Check file existence
inFileName = fileNamesTable[fileIdx++];
inFile = fopen( inFileName, "rb" );
if (inFile==NULL)
{
DISPLAY( "Pb opening %s\n", inFileName);
return 11;
}
// Memory allocation & restrictions
inFileSize = BMK_GetFileSize(inFileName);
benchedSize = (size_t) BMK_findMaxMem(inFileSize) / 2;
if ((U64)benchedSize > inFileSize) benchedSize = (size_t)inFileSize;
if (benchedSize < inFileSize)
{
DISPLAY("Not enough memory for '%s' full size; testing %i MB only...\n", inFileName, (int)(benchedSize>>20));
}
// Alloc
chunkP = (struct chunkParameters*) malloc(((benchedSize / (size_t)chunkSize)+1) * sizeof(struct chunkParameters));
orig_buff = (char*) malloc((size_t)benchedSize);
nbChunks = (int) ((int)benchedSize / chunkSize) + 1;
maxCompressedChunkSize = LZ4_compressBound(chunkSize);
compressedBuffSize = nbChunks * maxCompressedChunkSize;
compressed_buff = (char*)malloc((size_t)compressedBuffSize);
if(!orig_buff || !compressed_buff)
{
DISPLAY("\nError: not enough memory!\n");
free(orig_buff);
free(compressed_buff);
free(chunkP);
fclose(inFile);
return 12;
}
// Init chunks data
{
int i;
size_t remaining = benchedSize;
char* in = orig_buff;
char* out = compressed_buff;
for (i=0; i<nbChunks; i++)
{
chunkP[i].id = i;
chunkP[i].origBuffer = in; in += chunkSize;
if ((int)remaining > chunkSize) { chunkP[i].origSize = chunkSize; remaining -= chunkSize; } else { chunkP[i].origSize = (int)remaining; remaining = 0; }
chunkP[i].compressedBuffer = out; out += maxCompressedChunkSize;
chunkP[i].compressedSize = 0;
}
}
// Fill input buffer
DISPLAY("Loading %s... \r", inFileName);
readSize = fread(orig_buff, 1, benchedSize, inFile);
fclose(inFile);
if(readSize != benchedSize)
{
DISPLAY("\nError: problem reading file '%s' !! \n", inFileName);
free(orig_buff);
free(compressed_buff);
free(chunkP);
return 13;
}
// Calculating input Checksum
crcOriginal = XXH32(orig_buff, (unsigned int)benchedSize,0);
// Bench
{
int loopNb, nb_loops, chunkNb, cAlgNb, dAlgNb;
size_t cSize=0;
double ratio=0.;
DISPLAY("\r%79s\r", "");
DISPLAY(" %s : \n", inFileName);
// Compression Algorithms
for (cAlgNb=1; (cAlgNb <= NB_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS) && (compressionTest); cAlgNb++)
{
char* compressorName;
int (*compressionFunction)(const char*, char*, int);
void* (*initFunction)(const char*) = NULL;
double bestTime = 100000000.;
if ((compressionAlgo != ALL_COMPRESSORS) && (compressionAlgo != cAlgNb)) continue;
switch(cAlgNb)
{
case 1 : compressionFunction = LZ4_compress; compressorName = "LZ4_compress"; break;
case 2 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_limitedOutput; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_limitedOutput"; break;
case 3 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_withState; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_withState"; break;
case 4 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_limitedOutput_withState; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_limitedOutput_withState"; break;
case 5 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_continue; initFunction = LZ4_create; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_continue"; break;
case 6 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_limitedOutput_continue; initFunction = LZ4_create; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_limitedOutput_continue"; break;
case 7 : compressionFunction = LZ4_compressHC; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC"; break;
case 8 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput"; break;
case 9 : compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compressHC_withStateHC; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC_withStateHC"; break;
case 10: compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput_withStateHC; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput_withStateHC"; break;
case 11: compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compressHC_continue; initFunction = LZ4_createHC; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC_continue"; break;
case 12: compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput_continue; initFunction = LZ4_createHC; compressorName = "LZ4_compressHC_limitedOutput_continue"; break;
case 13: compressionFunction = local_LZ4_compress_forceDict; initFunction = local_LZ4_resetDictT; compressorName = "LZ4_compress_forceDict"; break;
default : DISPLAY("ERROR ! Bad algorithm Id !! \n"); free(chunkP); return 1;
}
for (loopNb = 1; loopNb <= nbIterations; loopNb++)
{
double averageTime;
int milliTime;
PROGRESS("%1i-%-26.26s : %9i ->\r", loopNb, compressorName, (int)benchedSize);
{ size_t i; for (i=0; i<benchedSize; i++) compressed_buff[i]=(char)i; } // warmimg up memory
nb_loops = 0;
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliStart();
while(BMK_GetMilliStart() == milliTime);
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliStart();
while(BMK_GetMilliSpan(milliTime) < TIMELOOP)
{
if (initFunction!=NULL) ctx = initFunction(chunkP[0].origBuffer);
for (chunkNb=0; chunkNb<nbChunks; chunkNb++)
{
chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize = compressionFunction(chunkP[chunkNb].origBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].compressedBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].origSize);
if (chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize==0) DISPLAY("ERROR ! %s() = 0 !! \n", compressorName), exit(1);
}
if (initFunction!=NULL) free(ctx);
nb_loops++;
}
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliSpan(milliTime);
averageTime = (double)milliTime / nb_loops;
if (averageTime < bestTime) bestTime = averageTime;
cSize=0; for (chunkNb=0; chunkNb<nbChunks; chunkNb++) cSize += chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize;
ratio = (double)cSize/(double)benchedSize*100.;
PROGRESS("%1i-%-26.26s : %9i -> %9i (%5.2f%%),%7.1f MB/s\r", loopNb, compressorName, (int)benchedSize, (int)cSize, ratio, (double)benchedSize / bestTime / 1000.);
}
if (ratio<100.)
DISPLAY("%-28.28s : %9i -> %9i (%5.2f%%),%7.1f MB/s\n", compressorName, (int)benchedSize, (int)cSize, ratio, (double)benchedSize / bestTime / 1000.);
else
DISPLAY("%-28.28s : %9i -> %9i (%5.1f%%),%7.1f MB/s\n", compressorName, (int)benchedSize, (int)cSize, ratio, (double)benchedSize / bestTime / 1000.);
totalCTime[cAlgNb] += bestTime;
totalCSize[cAlgNb] += cSize;
}
// Prepare layout for decompression
for (chunkNb=0; chunkNb<nbChunks; chunkNb++)
{
chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize = LZ4_compress(chunkP[chunkNb].origBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].compressedBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].origSize);
if (chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize==0) DISPLAY("ERROR ! %s() = 0 !! \n", "LZ4_compress"), exit(1);
}
{ size_t i; for (i=0; i<benchedSize; i++) orig_buff[i]=0; } // zeroing source area, for CRC checking
// Decompression Algorithms
for (dAlgNb=0; (dAlgNb < NB_DECOMPRESSION_ALGORITHMS) && (decompressionTest); dAlgNb++)
{
char* dName = decompressionNames[dAlgNb];
int (*decompressionFunction)(const char*, char*, int, int);
double bestTime = 100000000.;
if ((decompressionAlgo != ALL_DECOMPRESSORS) && (decompressionAlgo != dAlgNb+1)) continue;
switch(dAlgNb)
{
case 0: decompressionFunction = local_LZ4_decompress_fast; break;
case 1: decompressionFunction = local_LZ4_decompress_fast_withPrefix64k; break;
case 2: decompressionFunction = local_LZ4_decompress_fast_usingDict; break;
case 3: decompressionFunction = LZ4_decompress_safe; break;
case 4: decompressionFunction = LZ4_decompress_safe_withPrefix64k; break;
case 5: decompressionFunction = local_LZ4_decompress_safe_usingDict; break;
case 6: decompressionFunction = local_LZ4_decompress_safe_partial; break;
default : DISPLAY("ERROR ! Bad decompression algorithm Id !! \n"); free(chunkP); return 1;
}
for (loopNb = 1; loopNb <= nbIterations; loopNb++)
{
double averageTime;
int milliTime;
U32 crcDecoded;
PROGRESS("%1i-%-29.29s :%10i ->\r", loopNb, dName, (int)benchedSize);
nb_loops = 0;
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliStart();
while(BMK_GetMilliStart() == milliTime);
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliStart();
while(BMK_GetMilliSpan(milliTime) < TIMELOOP)
{
for (chunkNb=0; chunkNb<nbChunks; chunkNb++)
{
int decodedSize = decompressionFunction(chunkP[chunkNb].compressedBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].origBuffer, chunkP[chunkNb].compressedSize, chunkP[chunkNb].origSize);
if (chunkP[chunkNb].origSize != decodedSize) DISPLAY("ERROR ! %s() == %i != %i !! \n", dName, decodedSize, chunkP[chunkNb].origSize), exit(1);
}
nb_loops++;
}
milliTime = BMK_GetMilliSpan(milliTime);
averageTime = (double)milliTime / nb_loops;
if (averageTime < bestTime) bestTime = averageTime;
PROGRESS("%1i-%-29.29s :%10i -> %7.1f MB/s\r", loopNb, dName, (int)benchedSize, (double)benchedSize / bestTime / 1000.);
// CRC Checking
crcDecoded = XXH32(orig_buff, (int)benchedSize, 0);
if (crcOriginal!=crcDecoded) { DISPLAY("\n!!! WARNING !!! %14s : Invalid Checksum : %x != %x\n", inFileName, (unsigned)crcOriginal, (unsigned)crcDecoded); exit(1); }
}
DISPLAY("%-31.31s :%10i -> %7.1f MB/s\n", dName, (int)benchedSize, (double)benchedSize / bestTime / 1000.);
totalDTime[dAlgNb] += bestTime;
}
totals += benchedSize;
}
free(orig_buff);
free(compressed_buff);
free(chunkP);
}
if (BMK_pause) { printf("press enter...\n"); getchar(); }
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Fixed : issue 52 (reported by Ludwig Strigeus)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void sctp_association_free(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
int i;
/* Only real associations count against the endpoint, so
* don't bother for if this is a temporary association.
*/
if (!asoc->temp) {
list_del(&asoc->asocs);
/* Decrement the backlog value for a TCP-style listening
* socket.
*/
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))
sk->sk_ack_backlog--;
}
/* Mark as dead, so other users can know this structure is
* going away.
*/
asoc->base.dead = true;
/* Dispose of any data lying around in the outqueue. */
sctp_outq_free(&asoc->outqueue);
/* Dispose of any pending messages for the upper layer. */
sctp_ulpq_free(&asoc->ulpq);
/* Dispose of any pending chunks on the inqueue. */
sctp_inq_free(&asoc->base.inqueue);
sctp_tsnmap_free(&asoc->peer.tsn_map);
/* Free ssnmap storage. */
sctp_ssnmap_free(asoc->ssnmap);
/* Clean up the bound address list. */
sctp_bind_addr_free(&asoc->base.bind_addr);
/* Do we need to go through all of our timers and
* delete them? To be safe we will try to delete all, but we
* should be able to go through and make a guess based
* on our state.
*/
for (i = SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_NONE; i < SCTP_NUM_TIMEOUT_TYPES; ++i) {
if (del_timer(&asoc->timers[i]))
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
/* Free peer's cached cookie. */
kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
/* Release the transport structures. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
list_del_rcu(pos);
sctp_transport_free(transport);
}
asoc->peer.transport_count = 0;
sctp_asconf_queue_teardown(asoc);
/* Free pending address space being deleted */
if (asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending != NULL)
kfree(asoc->asconf_addr_del_pending);
/* AUTH - Free the endpoint shared keys */
sctp_auth_destroy_keys(&asoc->endpoint_shared_keys);
/* AUTH - Free the association shared key */
sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-241'], 'message': 'sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
Consider the scenario:
For a TCP-style socket, while processing the COOKIE_ECHO chunk in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(), after it has passed a series of sanity check,
a new association would be created in sctp_unpack_cookie(), but afterwards,
some processing maybe failed, and sctp_association_free() will be called to
free the previously allocated association, in sctp_association_free(),
sk_ack_backlog value is decremented for this socket, since the initial
value for sk_ack_backlog is 0, after the decrement, it will be 65535,
a wrap-around problem happens, and if we want to establish new associations
afterward in the same socket, ABORT would be triggered since sctp deem the
accept queue as full.
Fix this issue by only decrementing sk_ack_backlog for associations in
the endpoint's list.
Fix-suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Xufeng Zhang <xufeng.zhang@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: init_ctx_reselect(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
OM_uint32 acc_negState, gss_OID supportedMech,
gss_buffer_t *responseToken, gss_buffer_t *mechListMIC,
OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 tmpmin;
size_t i;
generic_gss_release_oid(&tmpmin, &sc->internal_mech);
gss_delete_sec_context(&tmpmin, &sc->ctx_handle,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
/* Find supportedMech in sc->mech_set. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->mech_set->count; i++) {
if (g_OID_equal(supportedMech, &sc->mech_set->elements[i]))
break;
}
if (i == sc->mech_set->count)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->internal_mech = &sc->mech_set->elements[i];
/*
* Windows 2003 and earlier don't correctly send a
* negState of request-mic when counter-proposing a
* mechanism. They probably don't handle mechListMICs
* properly either.
*/
if (acc_negState != REQUEST_MIC)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
sc->mech_complete = 0;
sc->mic_reqd = 1;
*negState = REQUEST_MIC;
*tokflag = CONT_TOKEN_SEND;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-415'], 'message': 'Fix double-free in SPNEGO [CVE-2014-4343]
In commit cd7d6b08 ("Verify acceptor's mech in SPNEGO initiator") the
pointer sc->internal_mech became an alias into sc->mech_set->elements,
which should be considered constant for the duration of the SPNEGO
context. So don't free it.
CVE-2014-4343:
In MIT krb5 releases 1.10 and newer, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to spoof packets appearing to be from a
GSSAPI acceptor can cause a double-free condition in GSSAPI initiators
(clients) which are using the SPNEGO mechanism, by returning a
different underlying mechanism than was proposed by the initiator. At
this stage of the negotiation, the acceptor is unauthenticated, and
the acceptor's response could be spoofed by an attacker with the
ability to inject traffic to the initiator.
Historically, some double-free vulnerabilities can be translated into
remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be tailored
to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated. Double-frees can also be exploited to cause an
application crash, for a denial of service. However, most GSSAPI
client applications are not vulnerable, as the SPNEGO mechanism is not
used by default (when GSS_C_NO_OID is passed as the mech_type argument
to gss_init_sec_context()). The most common use of SPNEGO is for
HTTP-Negotiate, used in web browsers and other web clients. Most such
clients are believed to not offer HTTP-Negotiate by default, instead
requiring a whitelist of sites for which it may be used to be
configured. If the whitelist is configured to only allow
HTTP-Negotiate over TLS connections ("https://"), a successful
attacker must also spoof the web server's SSL certificate, due to the
way the WWW-Authenticate header is sent in a 401 (Unauthorized)
response message. Unfortunately, many instructions for enabling
HTTP-Negotiate in common web browsers do not include a TLS
requirement.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary and CVSSv2 vector]
ticket: 7969 (new)
target_version: 1.12.2
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
lock_mount_hash();
mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_PROPAGATION_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
unlock_mount_hash();
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-269'], 'message': 'mnt: Only change user settable mount flags in remount
Kenton Varda <kenton@sandstorm.io> discovered that by remounting a
read-only bind mount read-only in a user namespace the
MNT_LOCK_READONLY bit would be cleared, allowing an unprivileged user
to the remount a read-only mount read-write.
Correct this by replacing the mask of mount flags to preserve
with a mask of mount flags that may be changed, and preserve
all others. This ensures that any future bugs with this mask and
remount will fail in an easy to detect way where new mount flags
simply won't change.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int ceph_x_decrypt(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,
void **p, void *end, void *obuf, size_t olen)
{
struct ceph_x_encrypt_header head;
size_t head_len = sizeof(head);
int len, ret;
len = ceph_decode_32(p);
if (*p + len > end)
return -EINVAL;
dout("ceph_x_decrypt len %d\n", len);
ret = ceph_decrypt2(secret, &head, &head_len, obuf, &olen,
*p, len);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (head.struct_v != 1 || le64_to_cpu(head.magic) != CEPHX_ENC_MAGIC)
return -EPERM;
*p += len;
return olen;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399', 'CWE-119'], 'message': 'libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: evbuffer_add_vprintf(struct evbuffer *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char *buffer;
size_t space;
size_t oldoff = buf->off;
int sz;
va_list aq;
/* make sure that at least some space is available */
evbuffer_expand(buf, 64);
for (;;) {
size_t used = buf->misalign + buf->off;
buffer = (char *)buf->buffer + buf->off;
assert(buf->totallen >= used);
space = buf->totallen - used;
#ifndef va_copy
#define va_copy(dst, src) memcpy(&(dst), &(src), sizeof(va_list))
#endif
va_copy(aq, ap);
sz = evutil_vsnprintf(buffer, space, fmt, aq);
va_end(aq);
if (sz < 0)
return (-1);
if ((size_t)sz < space) {
buf->off += sz;
if (buf->cb != NULL)
(*buf->cb)(buf, oldoff, buf->off, buf->cbarg);
return (sz);
}
if (evbuffer_expand(buf, sz + 1) == -1)
return (-1);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 1.4
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _evbuffer_expand_fast(struct evbuffer *buf, size_t datlen, int n)
{
struct evbuffer_chain *chain = buf->last, *tmp, *next;
size_t avail;
int used;
ASSERT_EVBUFFER_LOCKED(buf);
EVUTIL_ASSERT(n >= 2);
if (chain == NULL || (chain->flags & EVBUFFER_IMMUTABLE)) {
/* There is no last chunk, or we can't touch the last chunk.
* Just add a new chunk. */
chain = evbuffer_chain_new(datlen);
if (chain == NULL)
return (-1);
evbuffer_chain_insert(buf, chain);
return (0);
}
used = 0; /* number of chains we're using space in. */
avail = 0; /* how much space they have. */
/* How many bytes can we stick at the end of buffer as it is? Iterate
* over the chains at the end of the buffer, tring to see how much
* space we have in the first n. */
for (chain = *buf->last_with_datap; chain; chain = chain->next) {
if (chain->off) {
size_t space = (size_t) CHAIN_SPACE_LEN(chain);
EVUTIL_ASSERT(chain == *buf->last_with_datap);
if (space) {
avail += space;
++used;
}
} else {
/* No data in chain; realign it. */
chain->misalign = 0;
avail += chain->buffer_len;
++used;
}
if (avail >= datlen) {
/* There is already enough space. Just return */
return (0);
}
if (used == n)
break;
}
/* There wasn't enough space in the first n chains with space in
* them. Either add a new chain with enough space, or replace all
* empty chains with one that has enough space, depending on n. */
if (used < n) {
/* The loop ran off the end of the chains before it hit n
* chains; we can add another. */
EVUTIL_ASSERT(chain == NULL);
tmp = evbuffer_chain_new(datlen - avail);
if (tmp == NULL)
return (-1);
buf->last->next = tmp;
buf->last = tmp;
/* (we would only set last_with_data if we added the first
* chain. But if the buffer had no chains, we would have
* just allocated a new chain earlier) */
return (0);
} else {
/* Nuke _all_ the empty chains. */
int rmv_all = 0; /* True iff we removed last_with_data. */
chain = *buf->last_with_datap;
if (!chain->off) {
EVUTIL_ASSERT(chain == buf->first);
rmv_all = 1;
avail = 0;
} else {
avail = (size_t) CHAIN_SPACE_LEN(chain);
chain = chain->next;
}
for (; chain; chain = next) {
next = chain->next;
EVUTIL_ASSERT(chain->off == 0);
evbuffer_chain_free(chain);
}
tmp = evbuffer_chain_new(datlen - avail);
if (tmp == NULL) {
if (rmv_all) {
ZERO_CHAIN(buf);
} else {
buf->last = *buf->last_with_datap;
(*buf->last_with_datap)->next = NULL;
}
return (-1);
}
if (rmv_all) {
buf->first = buf->last = tmp;
buf->last_with_datap = &buf->first;
} else {
(*buf->last_with_datap)->next = tmp;
buf->last = tmp;
}
return (0);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.0
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: get_n_bytes_readable_on_socket(evutil_socket_t fd)
{
#if defined(FIONREAD) && defined(_WIN32)
unsigned long lng = EVBUFFER_MAX_READ;
if (ioctlsocket(fd, FIONREAD, &lng) < 0)
return -1;
return (int)lng;
#elif defined(FIONREAD)
int n = EVBUFFER_MAX_READ;
if (ioctl(fd, FIONREAD, &n) < 0)
return -1;
return n;
#else
return EVBUFFER_MAX_READ;
#endif
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'Fix CVE-2014-6272 in Libevent 2.1
For this fix, we need to make sure that passing too-large inputs to
the evbuffer functions can't make us do bad things with the heap.
Also, lower the maximum chunk size to the lower of off_t, size_t maximum.
This is necessary since otherwise we could get into an infinite loop
if we make a chunk that 'misalign' cannot index into.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *last_asconf = asoc->addip_last_asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *abort;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *addip_hdr;
__u32 sent_serial, rcvd_serial;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(asconf_ack, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf_ack->skb->data;
rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)addip_hdr->params,
(void *)asconf_ack->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
if (last_asconf) {
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)last_asconf->subh.addip_hdr;
sent_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
} else {
sent_serial = asoc->addip_serial - 1;
}
/* D0) If an endpoint receives an ASCONF-ACK that is greater than or
* equal to the next serial number to be used but no ASCONF chunk is
* outstanding the endpoint MUST ABORT the association. Note that a
* sequence number is greater than if it is no more than 2^^31-1
* larger than the current sequence number (using serial arithmetic).
*/
if (ADDIP_SERIAL_gte(rcvd_serial, sent_serial + 1) &&
!(asoc->addip_last_asconf)) {
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
if ((rcvd_serial == sent_serial) && asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack((struct sctp_association *)asoc,
asconf_ack)) {
/* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can
* release the next asconf if we have one.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF,
SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-399'], 'message': 'net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: _gnutls_server_select_suite(gnutls_session_t session, uint8_t * data,
unsigned int datalen)
{
int ret;
unsigned int i, j, cipher_suites_size;
size_t pk_algos_size;
uint8_t cipher_suites[MAX_CIPHERSUITE_SIZE];
int retval;
gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pk_algos[MAX_ALGOS]; /* will hold the pk algorithms
* supported by the peer.
*/
/* First, check for safe renegotiation SCSV.
*/
if (session->internals.priorities.sr != SR_DISABLED) {
unsigned int offset;
for (offset = 0; offset < datalen; offset += 2) {
/* TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST = { 0x00, 0xff } */
if (data[offset] ==
GNUTLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST_MAJOR
&& data[offset + 1] ==
GNUTLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST_MINOR) {
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%p]: Received safe renegotiation CS\n",
session);
retval = _gnutls_ext_sr_recv_cs(session);
if (retval < 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return retval;
}
break;
}
}
}
pk_algos_size = MAX_ALGOS;
ret =
server_find_pk_algos_in_ciphersuites(data, datalen, pk_algos,
&pk_algos_size);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
ret =
_gnutls_supported_ciphersuites(session, cipher_suites,
sizeof(cipher_suites));
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
cipher_suites_size = ret;
/* Here we remove any ciphersuite that does not conform
* the certificate requested, or to the
* authentication requested (e.g. SRP).
*/
ret =
_gnutls_remove_unwanted_ciphersuites(session, cipher_suites,
cipher_suites_size,
pk_algos, pk_algos_size);
if (ret <= 0) {
gnutls_assert();
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
else
return GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE;
}
cipher_suites_size = ret;
/* Data length should be zero mod 2 since
* every ciphersuite is 2 bytes. (this check is needed
* see below).
*/
if (datalen % 2 != 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_UNEXPECTED_PACKET_LENGTH;
}
memset(session->security_parameters.cipher_suite, 0, 2);
retval = GNUTLS_E_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_SUITE;
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%p]: Requested cipher suites[size: %d]: \n", session,
(int) datalen);
if (session->internals.priorities.server_precedence == 0) {
for (j = 0; j < datalen; j += 2) {
_gnutls_handshake_log("\t0x%.2x, 0x%.2x %s\n",
data[j], data[j + 1],
_gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name
(&data[j]));
for (i = 0; i < cipher_suites_size; i += 2) {
if (memcmp(&cipher_suites[i], &data[j], 2)
== 0) {
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%p]: Selected cipher suite: %s\n",
session,
_gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name
(&data[j]));
memcpy(session->
security_parameters.
cipher_suite,
&cipher_suites[i], 2);
_gnutls_epoch_set_cipher_suite
(session, EPOCH_NEXT,
session->security_parameters.
cipher_suite);
retval = 0;
goto finish;
}
}
}
} else { /* server selects */
for (i = 0; i < cipher_suites_size; i += 2) {
for (j = 0; j < datalen; j += 2) {
if (memcmp(&cipher_suites[i], &data[j], 2)
== 0) {
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%p]: Selected cipher suite: %s\n",
session,
_gnutls_cipher_suite_get_name
(&data[j]));
memcpy(session->
security_parameters.
cipher_suite,
&cipher_suites[i], 2);
_gnutls_epoch_set_cipher_suite
(session, EPOCH_NEXT,
session->security_parameters.
cipher_suite);
retval = 0;
goto finish;
}
}
}
}
finish:
if (retval != 0) {
gnutls_assert();
return retval;
}
/* check if the credentials (username, public key etc.) are ok
*/
if (_gnutls_get_kx_cred
(session,
_gnutls_cipher_suite_get_kx_algo(session->security_parameters.
cipher_suite)) == NULL) {
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INSUFFICIENT_CREDENTIALS;
}
/* set the mod_auth_st to the appropriate struct
* according to the KX algorithm. This is needed since all the
* handshake functions are read from there;
*/
session->internals.auth_struct =
_gnutls_kx_auth_struct(_gnutls_cipher_suite_get_kx_algo
(session->security_parameters.
cipher_suite));
if (session->internals.auth_struct == NULL) {
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%p]: Cannot find the appropriate handler for the KX algorithm\n",
session);
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-310'], 'message': 'handshake: check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV
If TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV was sent by the client during the handshake, and
the advertised protocol version is lower than GNUTLS_TLS_VERSION_MAX,
send the "Inappropriate fallback" fatal alert and abort the handshake.
This mechanism was defined in RFC7507.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: CURLcode Curl_dupset(struct SessionHandle *dst, struct SessionHandle *src)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
enum dupstring i;
/* Copy src->set into dst->set first, then deal with the strings
afterwards */
dst->set = src->set;
/* clear all string pointers first */
memset(dst->set.str, 0, STRING_LAST * sizeof(char *));
/* duplicate all strings */
for(i=(enum dupstring)0; i< STRING_LAST; i++) {
result = setstropt(&dst->set.str[i], src->set.str[i]);
if(result)
break;
}
/* If a failure occurred, freeing has to be performed externally. */
return result;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'curl_easy_duphandle: CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS read out of bounds
When duplicating a handle, the data to post was duplicated using
strdup() when it could be binary and contain zeroes and it was not even
zero terminated! This caused read out of bounds crashes/segfaults.
Since the lib/strdup.c file no longer is easily shared with the curl
tool with this change, it now uses its own version instead.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20141105.html
CVE: CVE-2014-3707
Reported-By: Symeon Paraschoudis'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: sctp_chunk_length_valid(struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__u16 required_length)
{
__u16 chunk_length = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (unlikely(chunk_length < required_length))
return 0;
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int net_get(int s, void *arg, int *len)
{
struct net_hdr nh;
int plen;
if (net_read_exact(s, &nh, sizeof(nh)) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
plen = ntohl(nh.nh_len);
if (!(plen <= *len))
printf("PLEN %d type %d len %d\n",
plen, nh.nh_type, *len);
assert(plen <= *len); /* XXX */
*len = plen;
if ((*len) && (net_read_exact(s, arg, *len) == -1))
{
return -1;
}
return nh.nh_type;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-787'], 'message': 'OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation_fail;
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_failed(vcpu);
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return EMULATE_FAIL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-362', 'CWE-401'], 'message': 'KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to user-space
This patch prevents that emulation failures which result
from emulating an instruction for an L2-Guest results in
being reported to userspace.
Without this patch a malicious L2-Guest would be able to
kill the L1 by triggering a race-condition between an vmexit
and the instruction emulator.
With this patch the L2 will most likely only kill itself in
this situation.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int parse_token(char **name, char **value, char **cp)
{
char *end;
if (!name || !value || !cp)
return -BLKID_ERR_PARAM;
if (!(*value = strchr(*cp, '=')))
return 0;
**value = '\0';
*name = strip_line(*cp);
*value = skip_over_blank(*value + 1);
if (**value == '"') {
end = strchr(*value + 1, '"');
if (!end) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("unbalanced quotes at: %s", *value));
*cp = *value;
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
(*value)++;
*end = '\0';
end++;
} else {
end = skip_over_word(*value);
if (*end) {
*end = '\0';
end++;
}
}
*cp = end;
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-77'], 'message': 'libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'bump recursion to 15, and allow it to be set from the command line.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: magic_getparam(struct magic_set *ms, int param, void *val)
{
switch (param) {
case MAGIC_PARAM_INDIR_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->indir_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_NAME_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->name_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_PHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_phnum_max;
return 0;
case MAGIC_PARAM_ELF_SHNUM_MAX:
*(size_t *)val = ms->elf_shnum_max;
return 0;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': '- Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: donote(struct magic_set *ms, void *vbuf, size_t offset, size_t size,
int clazz, int swap, size_t align, int *flags, uint16_t *notecount)
{
Elf32_Nhdr nh32;
Elf64_Nhdr nh64;
size_t noff, doff;
uint32_t namesz, descsz;
unsigned char *nbuf = CAST(unsigned char *, vbuf);
if (*notecount == 0)
return 0;
--*notecount;
if (xnh_sizeof + offset > size) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return xnh_sizeof + offset;
}
(void)memcpy(xnh_addr, &nbuf[offset], xnh_sizeof);
offset += xnh_sizeof;
namesz = xnh_namesz;
descsz = xnh_descsz;
if ((namesz == 0) && (descsz == 0)) {
/*
* We're out of note headers.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if (namesz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note name size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)namesz);
return 0;
}
if (descsz & 0x80000000) {
(void)file_printf(ms, ", bad note description size 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)descsz);
return 0;
}
noff = offset;
doff = ELF_ALIGN(offset + namesz);
if (offset + namesz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return doff;
}
offset = ELF_ALIGN(doff + descsz);
if (doff + descsz > size) {
/*
* We're past the end of the buffer.
*/
return (offset >= size) ? offset : size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_OS_NOTE) == 0) {
if (do_os_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_BUILD_ID) == 0) {
if (do_bid_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_PAX) == 0) {
if (do_pax_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags))
return size;
}
if ((*flags & FLAGS_DID_CORE) == 0) {
if (do_core_note(ms, nbuf, xnh_type, swap,
namesz, descsz, noff, doff, flags, size, clazz))
return size;
}
if (namesz == 7 && strcmp((char *)&nbuf[noff], "NetBSD") == 0) {
switch (xnh_type) {
case NT_NETBSD_VERSION:
return size;
case NT_NETBSD_MARCH:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_MARCH)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiled for: %.*s", (int)descsz,
(const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
case NT_NETBSD_CMODEL:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_CMODEL)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", compiler model: %.*s",
(int)descsz, (const char *)&nbuf[doff]) == -1)
return size;
break;
default:
if (*flags & FLAGS_DID_NETBSD_UNKNOWN)
return size;
if (file_printf(ms, ", note=%u", xnh_type) == -1)
return size;
break;
}
return size;
}
return offset;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'Limit string printing to 100 chars, and add flags I forgot in the previous
commit.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int jpc_dec_process_sot(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_sot_t *sot = &ms->parms.sot;
jas_image_cmptparm_t *compinfos;
jas_image_cmptparm_t *compinfo;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
int cmptno;
if (dec->state == JPC_MH) {
compinfos = jas_malloc(dec->numcomps * sizeof(jas_image_cmptparm_t));
assert(compinfos);
for (cmptno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, compinfo = compinfos;
cmptno < dec->numcomps; ++cmptno, ++cmpt, ++compinfo) {
compinfo->tlx = 0;
compinfo->tly = 0;
compinfo->prec = cmpt->prec;
compinfo->sgnd = cmpt->sgnd;
compinfo->width = cmpt->width;
compinfo->height = cmpt->height;
compinfo->hstep = cmpt->hstep;
compinfo->vstep = cmpt->vstep;
}
if (!(dec->image = jas_image_create(dec->numcomps, compinfos,
JAS_CLRSPC_UNKNOWN))) {
return -1;
}
jas_free(compinfos);
/* Is the packet header information stored in PPM marker segments in
the main header? */
if (dec->ppmstab) {
/* Convert the PPM marker segment data into a collection of streams
(one stream per tile-part). */
if (!(dec->pkthdrstreams = jpc_ppmstabtostreams(dec->ppmstab))) {
abort();
}
jpc_ppxstab_destroy(dec->ppmstab);
dec->ppmstab = 0;
}
}
if (sot->len > 0) {
dec->curtileendoff = jas_stream_getrwcount(dec->in) - ms->len -
4 + sot->len;
} else {
dec->curtileendoff = 0;
}
if (JAS_CAST(int, sot->tileno) > dec->numtiles) {
jas_eprintf("invalid tile number in SOT marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
/* Set the current tile. */
dec->curtile = &dec->tiles[sot->tileno];
tile = dec->curtile;
/* Ensure that this is the expected part number. */
if (sot->partno != tile->partno) {
return -1;
}
if (tile->numparts > 0 && sot->partno >= tile->numparts) {
return -1;
}
if (!tile->numparts && sot->numparts > 0) {
tile->numparts = sot->numparts;
}
tile->pptstab = 0;
switch (tile->state) {
case JPC_TILE_INIT:
/* This is the first tile-part for this tile. */
tile->state = JPC_TILE_ACTIVE;
assert(!tile->cp);
if (!(tile->cp = jpc_dec_cp_copy(dec->cp))) {
return -1;
}
jpc_dec_cp_resetflags(dec->cp);
break;
default:
if (sot->numparts == sot->partno - 1) {
tile->state = JPC_TILE_ACTIVELAST;
}
break;
}
/* Note: We do not increment the expected tile-part number until
all processing for this tile-part is complete. */
/* We should expect to encounter other tile-part header marker
segments next. */
dec->state = JPC_TPH;
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-189'], 'message': 'CVE-2014-8157'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
OM_uint32 minor, major;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_union_ctx_id_desc uctx;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec kgctx;
krb5_key k1, k2;
krb5_keyblock kb1, kb2;
gss_buffer_desc in, out;
unsigned char k1buf[32], k2buf[32], outbuf[44];
size_t i;
/*
* Fake up just enough of a krb5 GSS context to make gss_pseudo_random
* work, with chosen subkeys and acceptor subkeys. If we implement
* gss_import_lucid_sec_context, we can rewrite this to use public
* interfaces and stop using private headers and internal knowledge of the
* implementation.
*/
context = (gss_ctx_id_t)&uctx;
uctx.mech_type = &mech_krb5;
uctx.internal_ctx_id = (gss_ctx_id_t)&kgctx;
kgctx.k5_context = NULL;
kgctx.have_acceptor_subkey = 1;
kb1.contents = k1buf;
kb2.contents = k2buf;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
/* Set up the keys for this test. */
kb1.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb1.length = fromhex(tests[i].key1, k1buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb1, &k1));
kgctx.subkey = k1;
kb2.enctype = tests[i].enctype;
kb2.length = fromhex(tests[i].key2, k2buf);
check_k5err(NULL, "create_key", krb5_k_create_key(NULL, &kb2, &k2));
kgctx.acceptor_subkey = k2;
/* Generate a PRF value with the subkey and an empty input, and compare
* it to the first expected output. */
in.length = 0;
in.value = NULL;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL, &in,
44, &out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out1, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Generate a PRF value with the acceptor subkey and the 61-byte input
* string, and compare it to the second expected output. */
in.length = strlen(inputstr);
in.value = (char *)inputstr;
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 44,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
(void)fromhex(tests[i].out2, outbuf);
assert(out.length == 44 && memcmp(out.value, outbuf, 44) == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
/* Also check that generating zero bytes of output works. */
major = gss_pseudo_random(&minor, context, GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL, &in, 0,
&out);
check_gsserr("gss_pseudo_random", major, minor);
assert(out.length == 0);
(void)gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k1);
krb5_k_free_key(NULL, k2);
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: krb5_gss_context_time(minor_status, context_handle, time_rec)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
OM_uint32 *time_rec;
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(ctx->k5_context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, ctx->k5_context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) <= 0) {
*time_rec = 0;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED);
} else {
*time_rec = lifetime;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-703'], 'message': 'Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: refresh_by_match_merge(Oid matviewOid, Oid tempOid, Oid relowner,
int save_sec_context)
{
StringInfoData querybuf;
Relation matviewRel;
Relation tempRel;
char *matviewname;
char *tempname;
char *diffname;
TupleDesc tupdesc;
bool foundUniqueIndex;
List *indexoidlist;
ListCell *indexoidscan;
int16 relnatts;
bool *usedForQual;
initStringInfo(&querybuf);
matviewRel = heap_open(matviewOid, NoLock);
matviewname = quote_qualified_identifier(get_namespace_name(RelationGetNamespace(matviewRel)),
RelationGetRelationName(matviewRel));
tempRel = heap_open(tempOid, NoLock);
tempname = quote_qualified_identifier(get_namespace_name(RelationGetNamespace(tempRel)),
RelationGetRelationName(tempRel));
diffname = make_temptable_name_n(tempname, 2);
relnatts = matviewRel->rd_rel->relnatts;
usedForQual = (bool *) palloc0(sizeof(bool) * relnatts);
/* Open SPI context. */
if (SPI_connect() != SPI_OK_CONNECT)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_connect failed");
/* Analyze the temp table with the new contents. */
appendStringInfo(&querybuf, "ANALYZE %s", tempname);
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_UTILITY)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
/*
* We need to ensure that there are not duplicate rows without NULLs in
* the new data set before we can count on the "diff" results. Check for
* that in a way that allows showing the first duplicated row found. Even
* after we pass this test, a unique index on the materialized view may
* find a duplicate key problem.
*/
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf,
"SELECT newdata FROM %s newdata "
"WHERE newdata IS NOT NULL AND EXISTS "
"(SELECT * FROM %s newdata2 WHERE newdata2 IS NOT NULL "
"AND newdata2 OPERATOR(pg_catalog.*=) newdata "
"AND newdata2.ctid OPERATOR(pg_catalog.<>) "
"newdata.ctid) LIMIT 1",
tempname, tempname);
if (SPI_execute(querybuf.data, false, 1) != SPI_OK_SELECT)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
if (SPI_processed > 0)
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CARDINALITY_VIOLATION),
errmsg("new data for \"%s\" contains duplicate rows without any null columns",
RelationGetRelationName(matviewRel)),
errdetail("Row: %s",
SPI_getvalue(SPI_tuptable->vals[0], SPI_tuptable->tupdesc, 1))));
}
SetUserIdAndSecContext(relowner,
save_sec_context | SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE);
/* Start building the query for creating the diff table. */
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf,
"CREATE TEMP TABLE %s AS "
"SELECT mv.ctid AS tid, newdata "
"FROM %s mv FULL JOIN %s newdata ON (",
diffname, matviewname, tempname);
/*
* Get the list of index OIDs for the table from the relcache, and look up
* each one in the pg_index syscache. We will test for equality on all
* columns present in all unique indexes which only reference columns and
* include all rows.
*/
tupdesc = matviewRel->rd_att;
foundUniqueIndex = false;
indexoidlist = RelationGetIndexList(matviewRel);
foreach(indexoidscan, indexoidlist)
{
Oid indexoid = lfirst_oid(indexoidscan);
Relation indexRel;
Form_pg_index indexStruct;
indexRel = index_open(indexoid, RowExclusiveLock);
indexStruct = indexRel->rd_index;
/*
* We're only interested if it is unique, valid, contains no
* expressions, and is not partial.
*/
if (indexStruct->indisunique &&
IndexIsValid(indexStruct) &&
RelationGetIndexExpressions(indexRel) == NIL &&
RelationGetIndexPredicate(indexRel) == NIL)
{
int numatts = indexStruct->indnatts;
int i;
/* Add quals for all columns from this index. */
for (i = 0; i < numatts; i++)
{
int attnum = indexStruct->indkey.values[i];
Oid type;
Oid op;
const char *colname;
/*
* Only include the column once regardless of how many times
* it shows up in how many indexes.
*/
if (usedForQual[attnum - 1])
continue;
usedForQual[attnum - 1] = true;
/*
* Actually add the qual, ANDed with any others.
*/
if (foundUniqueIndex)
appendStringInfoString(&querybuf, " AND ");
colname = quote_identifier(NameStr((tupdesc->attrs[attnum - 1])->attname));
appendStringInfo(&querybuf, "newdata.%s ", colname);
type = attnumTypeId(matviewRel, attnum);
op = lookup_type_cache(type, TYPECACHE_EQ_OPR)->eq_opr;
mv_GenerateOper(&querybuf, op);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf, " mv.%s", colname);
foundUniqueIndex = true;
}
}
/* Keep the locks, since we're about to run DML which needs them. */
index_close(indexRel, NoLock);
}
list_free(indexoidlist);
if (!foundUniqueIndex)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_NOT_IN_PREREQUISITE_STATE),
errmsg("cannot refresh materialized view \"%s\" concurrently",
matviewname),
errhint("Create a unique index with no WHERE clause on one or more columns of the materialized view.")));
appendStringInfoString(&querybuf,
" AND newdata OPERATOR(pg_catalog.*=) mv) "
"WHERE newdata IS NULL OR mv IS NULL "
"ORDER BY tid");
/* Create the temporary "diff" table. */
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_UTILITY)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
SetUserIdAndSecContext(relowner,
save_sec_context | SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION);
/*
* We have no further use for data from the "full-data" temp table, but we
* must keep it around because its type is referenced from the diff table.
*/
/* Analyze the diff table. */
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf, "ANALYZE %s", diffname);
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_UTILITY)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
OpenMatViewIncrementalMaintenance();
/* Deletes must come before inserts; do them first. */
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf,
"DELETE FROM %s mv WHERE ctid OPERATOR(pg_catalog.=) ANY "
"(SELECT diff.tid FROM %s diff "
"WHERE diff.tid IS NOT NULL "
"AND diff.newdata IS NULL)",
matviewname, diffname);
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_DELETE)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
/* Inserts go last. */
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf,
"INSERT INTO %s SELECT (diff.newdata).* "
"FROM %s diff WHERE tid IS NULL",
matviewname, diffname);
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_INSERT)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
/* We're done maintaining the materialized view. */
CloseMatViewIncrementalMaintenance();
heap_close(tempRel, NoLock);
heap_close(matviewRel, NoLock);
/* Clean up temp tables. */
resetStringInfo(&querybuf);
appendStringInfo(&querybuf, "DROP TABLE %s, %s", diffname, tempname);
if (SPI_exec(querybuf.data, 0) != SPI_OK_UTILITY)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_exec failed: %s", querybuf.data);
/* Close SPI context. */
if (SPI_finish() != SPI_OK_FINISH)
elog(ERROR, "SPI_finish failed");
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-209'], 'message': 'Fix column-privilege leak in error-message paths
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev)
{
char *s;
lin context = 0;
size_t chars_read;
char numbuf0[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf1[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf2[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf3[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
while (p_end >= 0) {
if (p_end == p_efake)
p_end = p_bfake; /* don't free twice */
else
free(p_line[p_end]);
p_end--;
}
assert(p_end == -1);
p_efake = -1;
if (p_c_function)
{
free (p_c_function);
p_c_function = NULL;
}
p_max = hunkmax; /* gets reduced when --- found */
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
/* file pos of the current line */
lin repl_beginning = 0; /* index of --- line */
lin fillcnt = 0; /* #lines of missing ptrn or repl */
lin fillsrc; /* index of first line to copy */
lin filldst; /* index of first missing line */
bool ptrn_spaces_eaten = false; /* ptrn was slightly misformed */
bool some_context = false; /* (perhaps internal) context seen */
bool repl_could_be_missing = true;
bool ptrn_missing = false; /* The pattern was missing. */
bool repl_missing = false; /* Likewise for replacement. */
file_offset repl_backtrack_position = 0;
/* file pos of first repl line */
lin repl_patch_line; /* input line number for same */
lin repl_context; /* context for same */
lin ptrn_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern prefix context */
lin ptrn_suffix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern suffix context */
lin repl_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in replac. prefix context */
lin ptrn_copiable = 0; /* # of copiable lines in ptrn */
lin repl_copiable = 0; /* Likewise for replacement. */
/* Pacify 'gcc -Wall'. */
fillsrc = filldst = repl_patch_line = repl_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 8
|| strncmp (buf, "********", 8) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = buf;
while (*s == '*')
s++;
if (*s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (p_end < p_max) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
return -1;
if (!chars_read) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (p_max - p_end < 4) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 3;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
p_end++;
if (p_end == hunkmax)
fatal ("unterminated hunk starting at line %s; giving up at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_input_line), buf);
assert(p_end < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end] = *buf;
p_len[p_end] = 0;
p_line[p_end] = 0;
switch (*buf) {
case '*':
if (strnEQ(buf, "********", 8)) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
else
fatal ("unexpected end of hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
if (p_end != 0) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
fatal ("unexpected '***' at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line), buf);
}
context = 0;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
for (s = buf; *s && !ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(s,"0,0",3))
remove_prefix (s, 2);
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
while (*s && !ISDIGIT (*s))
s++;
scan_linenum (s, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
if (p_ptrn_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_first)
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
else {
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
p_first = 1;
}
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines ||
p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - 6)
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + 6; /* we need this much at least */
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
p_max = hunkmax;
break;
case '-':
if (buf[1] != '-')
goto change_line;
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
ptrn_suffix_context = context;
if (repl_beginning
|| (p_end
!= p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n')))
{
if (p_end == 1)
{
/* 'Old' lines were omitted. Set up to fill
them in from 'new' context lines. */
ptrn_missing = true;
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + 1;
ptrn_prefix_context = ptrn_suffix_context = -1;
fillsrc = p_end + 1;
filldst = 1;
fillcnt = p_ptrn_lines;
}
else if (! repl_beginning)
fatal ("%s '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
(p_end <= p_ptrn_lines
? "Premature"
: "Overdue"),
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_hunk_beg));
else if (! repl_could_be_missing)
fatal ("duplicate '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1,
p_hunk_beg + repl_beginning));
else
{
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
}
repl_beginning = p_end;
repl_backtrack_position = file_tell (pfp);
repl_patch_line = p_input_line;
repl_context = context;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf)))
{
p_end--;
return -1;
}
p_Char[p_end] = '=';
for (s = buf; *s && ! ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
{
do
{
if (!*++s)
malformed ();
}
while (! ISDIGIT (*s));
scan_linenum (s, &p_repl_lines);
p_repl_lines += 1 - p_newfirst;
if (p_repl_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_newfirst)
p_repl_lines = 1;
else
{
p_repl_lines = 0;
p_newfirst = 1;
}
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines ||
p_repl_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - p_end)
malformed ();
p_max = p_repl_lines + p_end;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
if (p_repl_lines != ptrn_copiable
&& (p_prefix_context != 0
|| context != 0
|| p_repl_lines != 1))
repl_could_be_missing = false;
context = 0;
break;
case '+': case '!':
repl_could_be_missing = false;
change_line:
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, " \n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (! repl_beginning)
{
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
}
else
{
if (repl_prefix_context == -1)
repl_prefix_context = context;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
context = 0;
break;
case '\t': case '\n': /* assume spaces got eaten */
s = buf;
if (*buf == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
}
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing &&
(!ptrn_spaces_eaten || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) ) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
if (p_end != p_ptrn_lines + 1) {
ptrn_spaces_eaten |= (repl_beginning != 0);
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
p_Char[p_end] = ' ';
}
break;
case ' ':
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, "\n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
malformed ();
}
}
hunk_done:
if (p_end >=0 && !repl_beginning)
fatal ("no '---' found in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()));
if (repl_missing) {
/* reset state back to just after --- */
p_input_line = repl_patch_line;
context = repl_context;
for (p_end--; p_end > repl_beginning; p_end--)
free(p_line[p_end]);
Fseek (pfp, repl_backtrack_position, SEEK_SET);
/* redundant 'new' context lines were omitted - set */
/* up to fill them in from the old file context */
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = repl_beginning+1;
fillcnt = p_repl_lines;
p_end = p_max;
}
else if (! ptrn_missing && ptrn_copiable != repl_copiable)
fatal ("context mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
else if (!some_context && fillcnt == 1) {
/* the first hunk was a null hunk with no context */
/* and we were expecting one line -- fix it up. */
while (filldst < p_end) {
p_line[filldst] = p_line[filldst+1];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[filldst+1];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[filldst+1];
filldst++;
}
#if 0
repl_beginning--; /* this doesn't need to be fixed */
#endif
p_end--;
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
fillcnt = 0;
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
}
p_prefix_context = ((repl_prefix_context == -1
|| (ptrn_prefix_context != -1
&& ptrn_prefix_context < repl_prefix_context))
? ptrn_prefix_context : repl_prefix_context);
p_suffix_context = ((ptrn_suffix_context != -1
&& ptrn_suffix_context < context)
? ptrn_suffix_context : context);
if (p_prefix_context == -1 || p_suffix_context == -1)
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF
&& (fillcnt
|| (p_first > 1
&& p_prefix_context + p_suffix_context < ptrn_copiable))) {
if (verbosity == VERBOSE)
say ("%s\n%s\n%s\n",
"(Fascinating -- this is really a new-style context diff but without",
"the telltale extra asterisks on the *** line that usually indicate",
"the new style...)");
diff_type = difftype = NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF;
}
/* if there were omitted context lines, fill them in now */
if (fillcnt) {
p_bfake = filldst; /* remember where not to free() */
p_efake = filldst + fillcnt - 1;
while (fillcnt-- > 0) {
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning
&& p_Char[fillsrc] != ' ')
fillsrc++;
if (p_end < fillsrc || fillsrc == repl_beginning)
{
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
}
p_line[filldst] = p_line[fillsrc];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[fillsrc];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[fillsrc];
fillsrc++; filldst++;
}
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning)
{
if (p_Char[fillsrc] == ' ')
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
fillsrc++;
}
if (debug & 64)
printf ("fillsrc %s, filldst %s, rb %s, e+1 %s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, fillsrc),
format_linenum (numbuf1, filldst),
format_linenum (numbuf2, repl_beginning),
format_linenum (numbuf3, p_end + 1));
assert(fillsrc==p_end+1 || fillsrc==repl_beginning);
assert(filldst==p_end+1 || filldst==repl_beginning);
}
}
else if (difftype == UNI_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp); /* file pos of the current line */
lin fillsrc; /* index of old lines */
lin filldst; /* index of new lines */
char ch = '\0';
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 4
|| strncmp (buf, "@@ -", 4) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf + 4, &p_first);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
else
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s != '+')
malformed ();
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_repl_lines);
else
p_repl_lines = 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s++ != '@')
malformed ();
if (*s++ == '@' && *s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
if (!p_ptrn_lines)
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
if (!p_repl_lines)
p_newfirst++;
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = fillsrc + p_ptrn_lines;
p_end = filldst + p_repl_lines;
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s ****\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s ----\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_newfirst + p_repl_lines - 1));
p_len[filldst] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[filldst] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = 0;
return -1;
}
p_Char[filldst++] = '=';
p_prefix_context = -1;
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (fillsrc <= p_ptrn_lines || filldst <= p_end) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (!chars_read) {
if (p_max - filldst < 3) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 2;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
s = 0;
else if (*buf == '\t' || *buf == '\n') {
ch = ' '; /* assume the space got eaten */
s = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
}
else {
ch = *buf;
s = savebuf (buf+1, --chars_read);
}
if (chars_read && ! s)
{
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
switch (ch) {
case '-':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
p_end = filldst-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
break;
case '=':
ch = ' ';
/* FALL THROUGH */
case ' ':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
context++;
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
s = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! s) {
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
case '+':
if (filldst > p_end) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= filldst == p_end && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[filldst] = ch;
p_line[filldst] = s;
p_len[filldst++] = chars_read;
break;
default:
p_end = filldst;
malformed ();
}
if (ch != ' ') {
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
p_prefix_context = context;
context = 0;
}
}/* while */
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
malformed ();
p_suffix_context = context;
}
else { /* normal diff--fake it up */
char hunk_type;
int i;
lin min, max;
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
p_prefix_context = p_suffix_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1 || !chars_read || !ISDIGIT (*buf)) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
}
else
p_ptrn_lines = (*s != 'a');
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
hunk_type = *s;
if (hunk_type == 'a')
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &min);
if (*s == ',')
scan_linenum (s + 1, &max);
else
max = min;
if (min > max || max - min == LINENUM_MAX)
malformed ();
if (hunk_type == 'd')
min++;
p_newfirst = min;
p_repl_lines = max - min + 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_end + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
{
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
for (i=1; i<=p_ptrn_lines; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '<' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'<' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '-';
}
if (hunk_type == 'c') {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (! chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (*buf != '-')
fatal ("'---' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, min),
format_linenum (numbuf1, max));
p_len[i] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[i] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '=';
for (i++; i<=p_end; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '>' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'>' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_end && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '+';
}
}
if (rev) /* backwards patch? */
if (!pch_swap())
say ("Not enough memory to swap next hunk!\n");
assert (p_end + 1 < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end + 1] = '^'; /* add a stopper for apply_hunk */
if (debug & 2) {
lin i;
for (i = 0; i <= p_end + 1; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "%s %c",
format_linenum (numbuf0, i),
p_Char[i]);
if (p_Char[i] == '*')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_ptrn_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] == '=')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_repl_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] != '^')
{
fputs(" |", stderr);
pch_write_line (i, stderr);
}
else
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
fflush (stderr);
}
return 1;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-399'], 'message': 'Fail when out of memory in set_hunkmax()
src/pch.c (another_hunk): Call set_hunkmax() from here to make sure it is
called even when falling back from plan A to plan B.
(open_patch_file): No need to call set_hunkmax() anymore.
src/pch.c (set_hunkmax): Fail when out of memory. Make static.
src/pch.h: Remove set_hunkmax() prototype.'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: GetCode_(gdIOCtx *fd, CODE_STATIC_DATA *scd, int code_size, int flag, int *ZeroDataBlockP)
{
int i, j, ret;
unsigned char count;
if (flag) {
scd->curbit = 0;
scd->lastbit = 0;
scd->last_byte = 0;
scd->done = FALSE;
return 0;
}
if ( (scd->curbit + code_size) >= scd->lastbit) {
if (scd->done) {
if (scd->curbit >= scd->lastbit) {
/* Oh well */
}
return -1;
}
scd->buf[0] = scd->buf[scd->last_byte-2];
scd->buf[1] = scd->buf[scd->last_byte-1];
if ((count = GetDataBlock(fd, &scd->buf[2], ZeroDataBlockP)) <= 0)
scd->done = TRUE;
scd->last_byte = 2 + count;
scd->curbit = (scd->curbit - scd->lastbit) + 16;
scd->lastbit = (2+count)*8 ;
}
ret = 0;
for (i = scd->curbit, j = 0; j < code_size; ++i, ++j)
if (i < CSD_BUF_SIZE * 8) {
ret |= ((scd->buf[i / 8] & (1 << (i % 8))) != 0) << j;
} else {
ret = -1;
break;
}
scd->curbit += code_size;
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-119'], 'message': 'Better fix for #68601 for perf
https://bitbucket.org/libgd/gd-libgd/commits/81e9a993f2893d651d225646378e3fd1b7465467'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
{
int mtype;
StringInfoData buf;
SECURITY_STATUS r;
CredHandle sspicred;
CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
newctx;
TimeStamp expiry;
ULONG contextattr;
SecBufferDesc inbuf;
SecBufferDesc outbuf;
SecBuffer OutBuffers[1];
SecBuffer InBuffers[1];
HANDLE token;
TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
DWORD retlen;
char accountname[MAXPGPATH];
char domainname[MAXPGPATH];
DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
HMODULE secur32;
QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;
/*
* SSPI auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
* relies on the overall message length word to determine the SSPI payload
* size in AuthenticationGSSContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (This
* is, in fact, a design error in our SSPI support, because protocol
* messages are supposed to be parsable without relying on the length
* word; but it's not worth changing it now.)
*/
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("SSPI is not supported in protocol version 2")));
/*
* Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
*/
r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
"negotiate",
SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
&sspicred,
&expiry);
if (r != SEC_E_OK)
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR, _("could not acquire SSPI credentials"), r);
/*
* Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
* multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
* the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
* (type 'p').
*/
do
{
mtype = pq_getbyte();
if (mtype != 'p')
{
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
if (mtype != EOF)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
mtype)));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* Get the actual SSPI token */
initStringInfo(&buf);
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH))
{
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
pfree(buf.data);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* Map to SSPI style buffer */
inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
/* Prepare output buffer */
OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SSPI token of length %u",
(unsigned int) buf.len);
r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
sspictx,
&inbuf,
ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
&newctx,
&outbuf,
&contextattr,
NULL);
/* input buffer no longer used */
pfree(buf.data);
if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
{
/*
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
*/
elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
(unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
}
if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
{
if (sspictx != NULL)
{
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
free(sspictx);
}
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
_("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
}
/*
* Overwrite the current context with the one we just received. If
* sspictx is NULL it was the first loop and we need to allocate a
* buffer for it. On subsequent runs, we can just overwrite the buffer
* contents since the size does not change.
*/
if (sspictx == NULL)
{
sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
if (sspictx == NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg("out of memory")));
}
memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
} while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
/*
* Release service principal credentials
*/
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
/*
* SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
*
* Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
* username that was specified for the connection.
*
* MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
* secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
*/
secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
if (secur32 == NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg_internal("could not load secur32.dll: error code %lu",
GetLastError())));
_QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
{
FreeLibrary(secur32);
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: error code %lu",
GetLastError())));
}
r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
if (r != SEC_E_OK)
{
FreeLibrary(secur32);
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
_("could not get token from SSPI security context"), r);
}
FreeLibrary(secur32);
/*
* No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
* token instead.
*/
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
free(sspictx);
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg_internal("could not get token user size: error code %lu",
GetLastError())));
tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
if (tokenuser == NULL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg("out of memory")));
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg_internal("could not get user token: error code %lu",
GetLastError())));
if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg_internal("could not look up account SID: error code %lu",
GetLastError())));
free(tokenuser);
/*
* Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
* insensitive.
*/
if (port->hba->krb_realm && strlen(port->hba->krb_realm))
{
if (pg_strcasecmp(port->hba->krb_realm, domainname) != 0)
{
elog(DEBUG2,
"SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
domainname, port->hba->krb_realm);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
* the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
*
* If set to include realm, append it in <username>@<realm> format.
*/
if (port->hba->include_realm)
{
char *namebuf;
int retval;
namebuf = psprintf("%s@%s", accountname, domainname);
retval = check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, namebuf, true);
pfree(namebuf);
return retval;
}
else
return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, accountname, true);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-89'], 'message': 'Be more careful to not lose sync in the FE/BE protocol.
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: HandleFunctionRequest(StringInfo msgBuf)
{
Oid fid;
AclResult aclresult;
FunctionCallInfoData fcinfo;
int16 rformat;
Datum retval;
struct fp_info my_fp;
struct fp_info *fip;
bool callit;
bool was_logged = false;
char msec_str[32];
/*
* Read message contents if not already done.
*/
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
{
if (GetOldFunctionMessage(msgBuf))
{
if (IsTransactionState())
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONNECTION_FAILURE),
errmsg("unexpected EOF on client connection with an open transaction")));
else
{
/*
* Can't send DEBUG log messages to client at this point.
* Since we're disconnecting right away, we don't need to
* restore whereToSendOutput.
*/
whereToSendOutput = DestNone;
ereport(DEBUG1,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONNECTION_DOES_NOT_EXIST),
errmsg("unexpected EOF on client connection")));
}
return EOF;
}
}
/*
* Now that we've eaten the input message, check to see if we actually
* want to do the function call or not. It's now safe to ereport(); we
* won't lose sync with the frontend.
*/
if (IsAbortedTransactionBlockState())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_IN_FAILED_SQL_TRANSACTION),
errmsg("current transaction is aborted, "
"commands ignored until end of transaction block")));
/*
* Now that we know we are in a valid transaction, set snapshot in case
* needed by function itself or one of the datatype I/O routines.
*/
PushActiveSnapshot(GetTransactionSnapshot());
/*
* Begin parsing the buffer contents.
*/
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
(void) pq_getmsgstring(msgBuf); /* dummy string */
fid = (Oid) pq_getmsgint(msgBuf, 4); /* function oid */
/*
* There used to be a lame attempt at caching lookup info here. Now we
* just do the lookups on every call.
*/
fip = &my_fp;
fetch_fp_info(fid, fip);
/* Log as soon as we have the function OID and name */
if (log_statement == LOGSTMT_ALL)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("fastpath function call: \"%s\" (OID %u)",
fip->fname, fid)));
was_logged = true;
}
/*
* Check permission to access and call function. Since we didn't go
* through a normal name lookup, we need to check schema usage too.
*/
aclresult = pg_namespace_aclcheck(fip->namespace, GetUserId(), ACL_USAGE);
if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
aclcheck_error(aclresult, ACL_KIND_NAMESPACE,
get_namespace_name(fip->namespace));
InvokeNamespaceSearchHook(fip->namespace, true);
aclresult = pg_proc_aclcheck(fid, GetUserId(), ACL_EXECUTE);
if (aclresult != ACLCHECK_OK)
aclcheck_error(aclresult, ACL_KIND_PROC,
get_func_name(fid));
InvokeFunctionExecuteHook(fid);
/*
* Prepare function call info block and insert arguments.
*
* Note: for now we pass collation = InvalidOid, so collation-sensitive
* functions can't be called this way. Perhaps we should pass
* DEFAULT_COLLATION_OID, instead?
*/
InitFunctionCallInfoData(fcinfo, &fip->flinfo, 0, InvalidOid, NULL, NULL);
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) >= 3)
rformat = parse_fcall_arguments(msgBuf, fip, &fcinfo);
else
rformat = parse_fcall_arguments_20(msgBuf, fip, &fcinfo);
/* Verify we reached the end of the message where expected. */
pq_getmsgend(msgBuf);
/*
* If func is strict, must not call it for null args.
*/
callit = true;
if (fip->flinfo.fn_strict)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < fcinfo.nargs; i++)
{
if (fcinfo.argnull[i])
{
callit = false;
break;
}
}
}
if (callit)
{
/* Okay, do it ... */
retval = FunctionCallInvoke(&fcinfo);
}
else
{
fcinfo.isnull = true;
retval = (Datum) 0;
}
/* ensure we do at least one CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS per function call */
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS();
SendFunctionResult(retval, fcinfo.isnull, fip->rettype, rformat);
/* We no longer need the snapshot */
PopActiveSnapshot();
/*
* Emit duration logging if appropriate.
*/
switch (check_log_duration(msec_str, was_logged))
{
case 1:
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("duration: %s ms", msec_str)));
break;
case 2:
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("duration: %s ms fastpath function call: \"%s\" (OID %u)",
msec_str, fip->fname, fid)));
break;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-89'], 'message': 'Be more careful to not lose sync in the FE/BE protocol.
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
size_t nbadcap = 0;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (nbadcap > 5)
break;
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
// gnu attributes
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
if (nbadcap++ > 2)
coff = xsh_size;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20', 'CWE-703'], 'message': 'Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: keyring_get_keyblock (KEYRING_HANDLE hd, KBNODE *ret_kb)
{
PACKET *pkt;
int rc;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL, node, lastnode;
IOBUF a;
int in_cert = 0;
int pk_no = 0;
int uid_no = 0;
int save_mode;
if (ret_kb)
*ret_kb = NULL;
if (!hd->found.kr)
return -1; /* no successful search */
a = iobuf_open (hd->found.kr->fname);
if (!a)
{
log_error(_("can't open '%s'\n"), hd->found.kr->fname);
return GPG_ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
}
if (iobuf_seek (a, hd->found.offset) ) {
log_error ("can't seek '%s'\n", hd->found.kr->fname);
iobuf_close(a);
return GPG_ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
}
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
init_packet (pkt);
hd->found.n_packets = 0;;
lastnode = NULL;
save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
while ((rc=parse_packet (a, pkt)) != -1) {
hd->found.n_packets++;
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET) {
free_packet (pkt);
init_packet (pkt);
continue;
}
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY)
break; /* Upper layer needs to handle this. */
if (rc) {
log_error ("keyring_get_keyblock: read error: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc) );
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING;
break;
}
if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED) {
log_error ("skipped compressed packet in keyring\n");
free_packet(pkt);
init_packet(pkt);
continue;
}
if (in_cert && (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)) {
hd->found.n_packets--; /* fix counter */
break; /* ready */
}
in_cert = 1;
if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
{
/*(this code is duplicated after the loop)*/
if ( lastnode
&& lastnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 1) ) {
/* This is a ring trust packet with a checked signature
* status cache following directly a signature paket.
* Set the cache status into that signature packet. */
PKT_signature *sig = lastnode->pkt->pkt.signature;
sig->flags.checked = 1;
sig->flags.valid = !!(pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 2);
}
/* Reset LASTNODE, so that we set the cache status only from
* the ring trust packet immediately following a signature. */
lastnode = NULL;
free_packet(pkt);
init_packet(pkt);
continue;
}
node = lastnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
if (!keyblock)
keyblock = node;
else
add_kbnode (keyblock, node);
switch (pkt->pkttype)
{
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
if (++pk_no == hd->found.pk_no)
node->flag |= 1;
break;
case PKT_USER_ID:
if (++uid_no == hd->found.uid_no)
node->flag |= 2;
break;
default:
break;
}
pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
init_packet(pkt);
}
set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
if (rc == -1 && keyblock)
rc = 0; /* got the entire keyblock */
if (rc || !ret_kb)
release_kbnode (keyblock);
else {
/*(duplicated form the loop body)*/
if ( pkt && pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST
&& lastnode
&& lastnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 1) ) {
PKT_signature *sig = lastnode->pkt->pkt.signature;
sig->flags.checked = 1;
sig->flags.valid = !!(pkt->pkt.ring_trust->sigcache & 2);
}
*ret_kb = keyblock;
}
free_packet (pkt);
xfree (pkt);
iobuf_close(a);
/* Make sure that future search operations fail immediately when
* we know that we are working on a invalid keyring
*/
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
hd->current.error = rc;
return rc;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'gpg: Prevent an invalid memory read using a garbled keyring.
* g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Whitelist allowed packet
types.
* g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Ditto.
--
The keyring DB code did not reject packets which don't belong into a
keyring. If for example the keyblock contains a literal data packet
it is expected that the processing code stops at the data packet and
reads from the input stream which is referenced from the data packets.
Obviously the keyring processing code does not and cannot do that.
However, when exporting this messes up the IOBUF and leads to an
invalid read of sizeof (int).
We now skip all packets which are not allowed in a keyring.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
Test data:
gpg2 --no-default-keyring --keyring FILE --export >/dev/null
With this unpacked data for FILE:
-----BEGIN PGP ARMORED FILE-----
mI0EVNP2zQEEALvETPVDCJDBXkegF4esiV1fqlne40yJnCmJeDEJYocwFPXfFA86
sSGjInzgDbpbC9gQPwq91Qe9x3Vy81CkyVonPOejhINlzfpzqAAa3A6viJccZTwt
DJ8E/I9jg53sbYW8q+VgfLn1hlggH/XQRT0HkXMP5y9ClURYnTsNwJhXABEBAAGs
CXRlc3QgdGVzdIi5BBMBCgAjBQJU0/bNAhsDBwsJCAcDAgEGFQgCCQoLBBYCAwEC
HgECF4AACgkQlsmuCapsqYLvtQP/byY0tM0Lc3moftbHQZ2eHj9ykLjsCjeMDfPx
kZUUtUS3HQaqgZLZOeqPjM7XgGh5hJsd9pfhmRWJ0x+iGB47XQNpRTtdLBV/WMCS
l5z3uW7e9Md7QVUVuSlJnBgQHTS6EgP8JQadPkAiF+jgpJZXP+gFs2j3gobS0qUF
eyTtxs+wAgAD
=uIt9
-----END PGP ARMORED FILE-----
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: block_filter (void *opaque, int control, iobuf_t chain, byte * buffer,
size_t * ret_len)
{
block_filter_ctx_t *a = opaque;
char *buf = (char *)buffer;
size_t size = *ret_len;
int c, needed, rc = 0;
char *p;
if (control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW)
{
size_t n = 0;
p = buf;
assert (size); /* need a buffer */
if (a->eof) /* don't read any further */
rc = -1;
while (!rc && size)
{
if (!a->size)
{ /* get the length bytes */
if (a->partial == 2)
{
a->eof = 1;
if (!n)
rc = -1;
break;
}
else if (a->partial)
{
/* These OpenPGP introduced huffman like encoded length
* bytes are really a mess :-( */
if (a->first_c)
{
c = a->first_c;
a->first_c = 0;
}
else if ((c = iobuf_get (chain)) == -1)
{
log_error ("block_filter: 1st length byte missing\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
break;
}
if (c < 192)
{
a->size = c;
a->partial = 2;
if (!a->size)
{
a->eof = 1;
if (!n)
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
else if (c < 224)
{
a->size = (c - 192) * 256;
if ((c = iobuf_get (chain)) == -1)
{
log_error
("block_filter: 2nd length byte missing\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
break;
}
a->size += c + 192;
a->partial = 2;
if (!a->size)
{
a->eof = 1;
if (!n)
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
else if (c == 255)
{
a->size = iobuf_get (chain) << 24;
a->size |= iobuf_get (chain) << 16;
a->size |= iobuf_get (chain) << 8;
if ((c = iobuf_get (chain)) == -1)
{
log_error ("block_filter: invalid 4 byte length\n");
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
break;
}
a->size |= c;
a->partial = 2;
if (!a->size)
{
a->eof = 1;
if (!n)
rc = -1;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* Next partial body length. */
a->size = 1 << (c & 0x1f);
}
/* log_debug("partial: ctx=%p c=%02x size=%u\n", a, c, a->size); */
}
else
BUG ();
}
while (!rc && size && a->size)
{
needed = size < a->size ? size : a->size;
c = iobuf_read (chain, p, needed);
if (c < needed)
{
if (c == -1)
c = 0;
log_error
("block_filter %p: read error (size=%lu,a->size=%lu)\n",
a, (ulong) size + c, (ulong) a->size + c);
rc = GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
}
else
{
size -= c;
a->size -= c;
p += c;
n += c;
}
}
}
*ret_len = n;
}
else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH)
{
if (a->partial)
{ /* the complicated openpgp scheme */
size_t blen, n, nbytes = size + a->buflen;
assert (a->buflen <= OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
if (nbytes < OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK)
{
/* not enough to write a partial block out; so we store it */
if (!a->buffer)
a->buffer = xmalloc (OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
memcpy (a->buffer + a->buflen, buf, size);
a->buflen += size;
}
else
{ /* okay, we can write out something */
/* do this in a loop to use the most efficient block lengths */
p = buf;
do
{
/* find the best matching block length - this is limited
* by the size of the internal buffering */
for (blen = OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK * 2,
c = OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK_2POW + 1; blen <= nbytes;
blen *= 2, c++)
;
blen /= 2;
c--;
/* write the partial length header */
assert (c <= 0x1f); /*;-) */
c |= 0xe0;
iobuf_put (chain, c);
if ((n = a->buflen))
{ /* write stuff from the buffer */
assert (n == OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
if (iobuf_write (chain, a->buffer, n))
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
a->buflen = 0;
nbytes -= n;
}
if ((n = nbytes) > blen)
n = blen;
if (n && iobuf_write (chain, p, n))
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
p += n;
nbytes -= n;
}
while (!rc && nbytes >= OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
/* store the rest in the buffer */
if (!rc && nbytes)
{
assert (!a->buflen);
assert (nbytes < OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
if (!a->buffer)
a->buffer = xmalloc (OP_MIN_PARTIAL_CHUNK);
memcpy (a->buffer, p, nbytes);
a->buflen = nbytes;
}
}
}
else
BUG ();
}
else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_INIT)
{
if (DBG_IOBUF)
log_debug ("init block_filter %p\n", a);
if (a->partial)
a->count = 0;
else if (a->use == 1)
a->count = a->size = 0;
else
a->count = a->size; /* force first length bytes */
a->eof = 0;
a->buffer = NULL;
a->buflen = 0;
}
else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_DESC)
{
*(char **) buf = "block_filter";
}
else if (control == IOBUFCTRL_FREE)
{
if (a->use == 2)
{ /* write the end markers */
if (a->partial)
{
u32 len;
/* write out the remaining bytes without a partial header
* the length of this header may be 0 - but if it is
* the first block we are not allowed to use a partial header
* and frankly we can't do so, because this length must be
* a power of 2. This is _really_ complicated because we
* have to check the possible length of a packet prior
* to it's creation: a chain of filters becomes complicated
* and we need a lot of code to handle compressed packets etc.
* :-(((((((
*/
/* construct header */
len = a->buflen;
/*log_debug("partial: remaining length=%u\n", len ); */
if (len < 192)
rc = iobuf_put (chain, len);
else if (len < 8384)
{
if (!(rc = iobuf_put (chain, ((len - 192) / 256) + 192)))
rc = iobuf_put (chain, ((len - 192) % 256));
}
else
{ /* use a 4 byte header */
if (!(rc = iobuf_put (chain, 0xff)))
if (!(rc = iobuf_put (chain, (len >> 24) & 0xff)))
if (!(rc = iobuf_put (chain, (len >> 16) & 0xff)))
if (!(rc = iobuf_put (chain, (len >> 8) & 0xff)))
rc = iobuf_put (chain, len & 0xff);
}
if (!rc && len)
rc = iobuf_write (chain, a->buffer, len);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("block_filter: write error: %s\n",
strerror (errno));
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
}
xfree (a->buffer);
a->buffer = NULL;
a->buflen = 0;
}
else
BUG ();
}
else if (a->size)
{
log_error ("block_filter: pending bytes!\n");
}
if (DBG_IOBUF)
log_debug ("free block_filter %p\n", a);
xfree (a); /* we can free our context now */
}
return rc;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: get32 (const byte *buffer)
{
ulong a;
a = *buffer << 24;
a |= buffer[1] << 16;
a |= buffer[2] << 8;
a |= buffer[3];
return a;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: b64enc_write (struct b64state *state, const void *buffer, size_t nbytes)
{
unsigned char radbuf[4];
int idx, quad_count;
const unsigned char *p;
if (state->lasterr)
return state->lasterr;
if (!nbytes)
{
if (buffer)
if (state->stream? es_fflush (state->stream) : fflush (state->fp))
goto write_error;
return 0;
}
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_DID_HEADER))
{
if (state->title)
{
if ( my_fputs ("-----BEGIN ", state) == EOF
|| my_fputs (state->title, state) == EOF
|| my_fputs ("-----\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
if ( (state->flags & B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
state->flags |= B64ENC_DID_HEADER;
}
idx = state->idx;
quad_count = state->quad_count;
assert (idx < 4);
memcpy (radbuf, state->radbuf, idx);
if ( (state->flags & B64ENC_USE_PGPCRC) )
{
size_t n;
u32 crc = state->crc;
for (p=buffer, n=nbytes; n; p++, n-- )
crc = (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[((crc >> 16)&0xff) ^ *p];
state->crc = (crc & 0x00ffffff);
}
for (p=buffer; nbytes; p++, nbytes--)
{
radbuf[idx++] = *p;
if (idx > 2)
{
char tmp[4];
tmp[0] = bintoasc[(*radbuf >> 2) & 077];
tmp[1] = bintoasc[(((*radbuf<<4)&060)|((radbuf[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
tmp[2] = bintoasc[(((radbuf[1]<<2)&074)|((radbuf[2]>>6)&03))&077];
tmp[3] = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077];
if (state->stream)
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
es_putc (tmp[idx], state->stream);
idx = 0;
if (es_ferror (state->stream))
goto write_error;
}
else
{
for (idx=0; idx < 4; idx++)
putc (tmp[idx], state->fp);
idx = 0;
if (ferror (state->fp))
goto write_error;
}
if (++quad_count >= (64/4))
{
quad_count = 0;
if (!(state->flags & B64ENC_NO_LINEFEEDS)
&& my_fputs ("\n", state) == EOF)
goto write_error;
}
}
}
memcpy (state->radbuf, radbuf, idx);
state->idx = idx;
state->quad_count = quad_count;
return 0;
write_error:
state->lasterr = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (state->title)
{
xfree (state->title);
state->title = NULL;
}
return state->lasterr;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: send_fprtime_if_not_null (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *keyword,
int number, const unsigned char *stamp)
{
char numbuf1[50], numbuf2[50];
unsigned long value;
value = (stamp[0] << 24) | (stamp[1]<<16) | (stamp[2]<<8) | stamp[3];
if (!value)
return;
sprintf (numbuf1, "%d", number);
sprintf (numbuf2, "%lu", value);
send_status_info (ctrl, keyword,
numbuf1, (size_t)strlen(numbuf1),
numbuf2, (size_t)strlen(numbuf2), NULL, 0);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: convert_le_u32 (const unsigned char *buf)
{
return buf[0] | (buf[1] << 8) | (buf[2] << 16) | (buf[3] << 24);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static zval *phar_rename_archive(phar_archive_data *phar, char *ext, zend_bool compress TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *oldname = NULL;
char *oldpath = NULL;
char *basename = NULL, *basepath = NULL;
char *newname = NULL, *newpath = NULL;
zval *ret, arg1;
zend_class_entry *ce;
char *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int ext_len = ext ? strlen(ext) : 0;
int oldname_len;
phar_archive_data **pphar = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (!ext) {
if (phar->is_zip) {
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "zip";
} else {
ext = "phar.zip";
}
} else if (phar->is_tar) {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.gz";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.gz";
}
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.bz2";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.bz2";
}
break;
default:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar";
}
}
} else {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
ext = "phar.gz";
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
ext = "phar.bz2";
break;
default:
ext = "phar";
}
}
} else if (phar_path_check(&ext, &ext_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
if (phar->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ext[0] == '.') {
++ext;
}
oldpath = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
oldname = zend_memrchr(phar->fname, '/', phar->fname_len);
++oldname;
oldname_len = strlen(oldname);
basename = estrndup(oldname, oldname_len);
spprintf(&newname, 0, "%s.%s", strtok(basename, "."), ext);
efree(basename);
basepath = estrndup(oldpath, (strlen(oldpath) - oldname_len));
phar->fname_len = spprintf(&newpath, 0, "%s%s", basepath, newname);
phar->fname = newpath;
phar->ext = newpath + phar->fname_len - strlen(ext) - 1;
efree(basepath);
efree(newname);
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&cached_phars, newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, new phar name is in phar.cache_list", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void **) &pphar)) {
if ((*pphar)->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp((*pphar)->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
(*pphar)->is_tar = phar->is_tar;
(*pphar)->is_zip = phar->is_zip;
(*pphar)->is_data = phar->is_data;
(*pphar)->flags = phar->flags;
(*pphar)->fp = phar->fp;
phar->fp = NULL;
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar TSRMLS_CC);
phar = *pphar;
phar->refcount++;
newpath = oldpath;
goto its_ok;
}
}
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, a phar with that name already exists", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
its_ok:
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path(newpath, &ssb)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" exists and must be unlinked prior to conversion", newpath);
return NULL;
}
if (!phar->is_data) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 1, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
if (phar->alias) {
if (phar->is_temporary_alias) {
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
} else {
phar->alias = estrndup(newpath, strlen(newpath));
phar->alias_len = strlen(newpath);
phar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL);
}
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 0, 1, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "data phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
}
if ((!pphar || phar == *pphar) && SUCCESS != zend_hash_update(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), newpath, phar->fname_len, (void*)&phar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 1, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
efree(oldpath);
if (phar->is_data) {
ce = phar_ce_data;
} else {
ce = phar_ce_archive;
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(ret);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(ret, ce)) {
zval_dtor(ret);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Unable to instantiate phar object when converting archive \"%s\"", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
INIT_PZVAL(&arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, phar->fname, phar->fname_len, 0);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&ret, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1);
return ret;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-416'], 'message': 'Fixed bug #68901 (use after free)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_get(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map[ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE];
struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
__uint8_t *dst = args->value;
int valuelen = args->valuelen;
int nmap;
int error;
int blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
int i;
int offset = 0;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_get(args);
ASSERT(!(args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL));
while (valuelen > 0) {
nmap = ATTR_RMTVALUE_MAPSIZE;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(args->dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, map, &nmap,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return error;
ASSERT(nmap >= 1);
for (i = 0; (i < nmap) && (valuelen > 0); i++) {
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
ASSERT((map[i].br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map[i].br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map[i].br_startblock);
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map[i].br_blockcount);
error = xfs_trans_read_buf(mp, NULL, mp->m_ddev_targp,
dblkno, dblkcnt, 0, &bp,
&xfs_attr3_rmt_buf_ops);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_attr_rmtval_copyout(mp, bp, args->dp->i_ino,
&offset, &valuelen,
&dst);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
if (error)
return error;
/* roll attribute extent map forwards */
lblkno += map[i].br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map[i].br_blockcount;
}
}
ASSERT(valuelen == 0);
return 0;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-241', 'CWE-19'], 'message': 'xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
{
MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
mpi_normalize (a);
mpi_normalize (b);
/* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
#if 0
if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
}
#endif
mpi_free(t1);
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-200'], 'message': 'Use ciphertext blinding for Elgamal decryption.
* cipher/elgamal.c (USE_BLINDING): New.
(decrypt): Rewrite to use ciphertext blinding.
--
CVE-id: CVE-2014-3591
As a countermeasure to a new side-channel attacks on sliding windows
exponentiation we blind the ciphertext for Elgamal decryption. This
is similar to what we are doing with RSA.
Unfortunately, the performance impact of Elgamal blinding is quite
noticeable: For a 3072 bit Elgamal key the decryption used to take
13ms; with the blinding it takes 24ms. This has been measured using
time(1), calling gpg with a 100 byte message, and having gpg modified
to run the pubkey_decrypt function 100 times and finally scale the
result (using an i5-2410M CPU @ 2.30GHz TP 220).'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: void fput(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
if (likely(!in_interrupt() && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))) {
init_task_work(&file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, ____fput);
if (!task_work_add(task, &file->f_u.fu_rcuhead, true))
return;
/*
* After this task has run exit_task_work(),
* task_work_add() will fail. Fall through to delayed
* fput to avoid leaking *file.
*/
}
if (llist_add(&file->f_u.fu_llist, &delayed_fput_list))
schedule_work(&delayed_fput_work);
}
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-17'], 'message': 'get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: Status readUTF8String( StringData* out ) {
int sz;
if ( !readNumber<int>( &sz ) )
return makeError("invalid bson", _idElem);
if ( out ) {
*out = StringData( _buffer + _position, sz );
}
if ( !skip( sz - 1 ) )
return makeError("invalid bson", _idElem);
char c;
if ( !readNumber<char>( &c ) )
return makeError("invalid bson", _idElem);
if ( c != 0 )
return makeError("not null terminated string", _idElem);
return Status::OK();
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'SERVER-17264: improve bson validation for utf-8 strings
(cherry picked from commit 394a8569ff14a215c0691aa34440227b2e62a4de)'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static inline int xsave_state(struct xsave_struct *fx, u64 mask)
{
u32 lmask = mask;
u32 hmask = mask >> 32;
int err = 0;
/*
* If xsaves is enabled, xsaves replaces xsaveopt because
* it supports compact format and supervisor states in addition to
* modified optimization in xsaveopt.
*
* Otherwise, if xsaveopt is enabled, xsaveopt replaces xsave
* because xsaveopt supports modified optimization which is not
* supported by xsave.
*
* If none of xsaves and xsaveopt is enabled, use xsave.
*/
alternative_input_2(
"1:"XSAVE,
"1:"XSAVEOPT,
X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT,
"1:"XSAVES,
X86_FEATURE_XSAVES,
[fx] "D" (fx), "a" (lmask), "d" (hmask) :
"memory");
asm volatile("2:\n\t"
xstate_fault
: "0" (0)
: "memory");
return err;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-20'], 'message': 'x86/fpu/xsaves: Fix improper uses of __ex_table
Commit:
f31a9f7c7169 ("x86/xsaves: Use xsaves/xrstors to save and restore xsave area")
introduced alternative instructions for XSAVES/XRSTORS and commit:
adb9d526e982 ("x86/xsaves: Add xsaves and xrstors support for booting time")
added support for the XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions at boot time.
Unfortunately both failed to properly protect them against faulting:
The 'xstate_fault' macro will use the closest label named '1'
backward and that ends up in the .altinstr_replacement section
rather than in .text. This means that the kernel will never find
in the __ex_table the .text address where this instruction might
fault, leading to serious problems if userspace manages to
trigger the fault.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jamie Iles <jamie.iles@oracle.com>
[ Improved the changelog, fixed some whitespace noise. ]
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Allan Xavier <mr.a.xavier@gmail.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: adb9d526e982 ("x86/xsaves: Add xsaves and xrstors support for booting time")
Fixes: f31a9f7c7169 ("x86/xsaves: Use xsaves/xrstors to save and restore xsave area")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: int make_http_soap_request(zval *this_ptr,
char *buf,
int buf_size,
char *location,
char *soapaction,
int soap_version,
char **buffer,
int *buffer_len TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *request;
smart_str soap_headers = {0};
smart_str soap_headers_z = {0};
int request_size, err;
php_url *phpurl = NULL;
php_stream *stream;
zval **trace, **tmp;
int use_proxy = 0;
int use_ssl;
char *http_headers, *http_body, *content_type, *http_version, *cookie_itt;
int http_header_size, http_body_size, http_close;
char *connection;
int http_1_1;
int http_status;
int content_type_xml = 0;
long redirect_max = 20;
char *content_encoding;
char *http_msg = NULL;
zend_bool old_allow_url_fopen;
php_stream_context *context = NULL;
zend_bool has_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_proxy_authorization = 0;
zend_bool has_cookies = 0;
if (this_ptr == NULL || Z_TYPE_P(this_ptr) != IS_OBJECT) {
return FALSE;
}
request = buf;
request_size = buf_size;
/* Compress request */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "compression", sizeof("compression"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
int level = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & 0x0f;
int kind = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE;
if (level > 9) {level = 9;}
if ((Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) & SOAP_COMPRESSION_ACCEPT) != 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n");
}
if (level > 0) {
zval func;
zval retval;
zval param1, param2, param3;
zval *params[3];
int n;
params[0] = ¶m1;
INIT_PZVAL(params[0]);
params[1] = ¶m2;
INIT_PZVAL(params[1]);
params[2] = ¶m3;
INIT_PZVAL(params[2]);
ZVAL_STRINGL(params[0], buf, buf_size, 0);
ZVAL_LONG(params[1], level);
if (kind == SOAP_COMPRESSION_DEFLATE) {
n = 2;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzcompress", 0);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: deflate\r\n");
} else {
n = 3;
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzencode", 0);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers_z,"Content-Encoding: gzip\r\n");
ZVAL_LONG(params[2], 0x1f);
}
if (call_user_function(CG(function_table), (zval**)NULL, &func, &retval, n, params TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
request = Z_STRVAL(retval);
request_size = Z_STRLEN(retval);
} else {
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS) {
php_stream_from_zval_no_verify(stream,tmp);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
use_proxy = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
}
} else {
stream = NULL;
}
if (location != NULL && location[0] != '\000') {
phpurl = php_url_parse(location);
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr),
"_stream_context", sizeof("_stream_context"), (void**)&tmp)) {
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(*tmp, 0);
}
if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "max_redirects", &tmp) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) != IS_STRING || !is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp), &redirect_max, NULL, 1)) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG)
redirect_max = Z_LVAL_PP(tmp);
}
}
try_again:
if (phpurl == NULL || phpurl->host == NULL) {
if (phpurl != NULL) {php_url_free(phpurl);}
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unable to parse URL", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
use_ssl = 0;
if (phpurl->scheme != NULL && strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "https") == 0) {
use_ssl = 1;
} else if (phpurl->scheme == NULL || strcmp(phpurl->scheme, "http") != 0) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unknown protocol. Only http and https are allowed.", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
old_allow_url_fopen = PG(allow_url_fopen);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = 1;
if (use_ssl && php_stream_locate_url_wrapper("https://", NULL, STREAM_LOCATE_WRAPPERS_ONLY TSRMLS_CC) == NULL) {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "SSL support is not available in this build", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (phpurl->port == 0) {
phpurl->port = use_ssl ? 443 : 80;
}
/* Check if request to the same host */
if (stream != NULL) {
php_url *orig;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
(orig = (php_url *) zend_fetch_resource(tmp TSRMLS_CC, -1, "httpurl", NULL, 1, le_url)) != NULL &&
((use_proxy && !use_ssl) ||
(((use_ssl && orig->scheme != NULL && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") == 0) ||
(!use_ssl && orig->scheme == NULL) ||
(!use_ssl && strcmp(orig->scheme, "https") != 0)) &&
strcmp(orig->host, phpurl->host) == 0 &&
orig->port == phpurl->port))) {
} else {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
}
/* Check if keep-alive connection is still opened */
if (stream != NULL && php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
stream = NULL;
use_proxy = 0;
}
if (!stream) {
stream = http_connect(this_ptr, phpurl, use_ssl, context, &use_proxy TSRMLS_CC);
if (stream) {
php_stream_auto_cleanup(stream);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpsocket", php_stream_get_resource_id(stream));
add_property_long(this_ptr, "_use_proxy", use_proxy);
} else {
php_url_free(phpurl);
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Could not connect to host", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
}
PG(allow_url_fopen) = old_allow_url_fopen;
if (stream) {
zval **cookies, **login, **password;
int ret = zend_list_insert(phpurl, le_url TSRMLS_CC);
add_property_resource(this_ptr, "httpurl", ret);
/*zend_list_addref(ret);*/
if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "protocol_version", &tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_DOUBLE &&
Z_DVAL_PP(tmp) == 1.0) {
http_1_1 = 0;
} else {
http_1_1 = 1;
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "POST ");
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->scheme);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "://");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if (http_1_1) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.1\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, " HTTP/1.0\r\n");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Host: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->host);
if (phpurl->port != (use_ssl?443:80)) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ':');
smart_str_append_unsigned(&soap_headers, phpurl->port);
}
if (!http_1_1 ||
(zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_keep_alive", sizeof("_keep_alive"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(tmp) == 0)) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n"
"Connection: close\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n"
"Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n");
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_user_agent", sizeof("_user_agent"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (context &&
php_stream_context_get_option(context, "http", "user_agent", &tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) > 0) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
} else if (FG(user_agent)) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: ");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, FG(user_agent));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "User-Agent: PHP-SOAP/"PHP_VERSION"\r\n");
}
smart_str_append(&soap_headers, &soap_headers_z);
if (soap_version == SOAP_1_2) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: application/soap+xml; charset=utf-8");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"; action=\"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\"");
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"\r\n");
} else {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8\r\n");
if (soapaction) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "SOAPAction: \"");
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, soapaction);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers,"Content-Length: ");
smart_str_append_long(&soap_headers, request_size);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
/* HTTP Authentication */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(login) == IS_STRING) {
zval **digest;
has_authorization = 1;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"), (void **)&digest) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(digest) == IS_ARRAY) {
char HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9];
PHP_MD5_CTX md5ctx;
unsigned char hash[16];
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), "%ld", php_rand(TSRMLS_C));
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce));
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(cnonce, hash);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_LONG) {
Z_LVAL_PP(tmp)++;
snprintf(nc, sizeof(nc), "%08ld", Z_LVAL_PP(tmp));
} else {
add_assoc_long(*digest, "nc", 1);
strcpy(nc, "00000001");
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) == sizeof("md5-sess")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), "md5-sess") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA1, hash);
}
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"POST:", sizeof("POST:")-1);
if (phpurl->path) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->path, strlen(phpurl->path));
} else {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"/", 1);
}
if (phpurl->query) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"?", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)phpurl->query, strlen(phpurl->query));
}
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
/*
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING &&
Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp) == sizeof("auth-int")-1 &&
stricmp(Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), "auth-int") == 0) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, ":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, HEntity, HASHHEXLEN);
}
*/
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(HA2, hash);
PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA1, 32);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)nc, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, 8);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)"auth", sizeof("auth")-1);
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)":", 1);
}
PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)HA2, 32);
PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx);
make_digest(response, hash);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Digest username=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "realm", sizeof("realm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", realm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "nonce", sizeof("nonce"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", uri=\"");
if (phpurl->path) {
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->path);
} else {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '/');
}
if (phpurl->query) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '?');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->query);
}
if (phpurl->fragment) {
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '#');
smart_str_appends(&soap_headers, phpurl->fragment);
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "qop", sizeof("qop"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
/* TODO: Support for qop="auth-int" */
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", qop=\"auth");
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", nc=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, nc, 8);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", cnonce=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, cnonce, 8);
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", response=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, response, 32);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "opaque", sizeof("opaque"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", opaque=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(digest), "algorithm", sizeof("algorithm"), (void **)&tmp) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(tmp) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\", algorithm=\"");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp), Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\"\r\n");
}
} else {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
buf = php_base64_encode((unsigned char*)auth.c, auth.len, &len);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Authorization: Basic ");
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
}
}
/* Proxy HTTP Authentication */
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
has_proxy_authorization = proxy_authentication(this_ptr, &soap_headers TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* Send cookies along with request */
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies"), (void **)&cookies) == SUCCESS) {
zval **data;
char *key;
int i, n;
has_cookies = 1;
n = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies));
if (n > 0) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies));
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "Cookie: ");
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
zend_hash_get_current_data(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies), (void **)&data);
zend_hash_get_current_key(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies), &key, NULL, FALSE);
if (Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval** value;
if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 0, (void**)&value) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(value) == IS_STRING) {
zval **tmp;
if ((zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 1, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE ||
strncmp(phpurl->path?phpurl->path:"/",Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp),Z_STRLEN_PP(tmp)) == 0) &&
(zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 2, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE ||
in_domain(phpurl->host,Z_STRVAL_PP(tmp))) &&
(use_ssl || zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(data), 3, (void**)&tmp) == FAILURE)) {
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, key, strlen(key));
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, '=');
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, Z_STRVAL_PP(value), Z_STRLEN_PP(value));
smart_str_appendc(&soap_headers, ';');
}
}
}
zend_hash_move_forward(Z_ARRVAL_PP(cookies));
}
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
}
}
http_context_headers(context, has_authorization, has_proxy_authorization, has_cookies, &soap_headers TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_append_const(&soap_headers, "\r\n");
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace"), (void **) &trace) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(trace) > 0) {
add_property_stringl(this_ptr, "__last_request_headers", soap_headers.c, soap_headers.len, 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(&soap_headers, request, request_size);
smart_str_0(&soap_headers);
err = php_stream_write(stream, soap_headers.c, soap_headers.len);
if (err != soap_headers.len) {
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed Sending HTTP SOAP request", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers);
} else {
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Failed to create stream??", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (!buffer) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return TRUE;
}
do {
if (!get_http_headers(stream, &http_headers, &http_header_size TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (http_headers) {efree(http_headers);}
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Error Fetching http headers", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "trace", sizeof("trace"), (void **) &trace) == SUCCESS &&
Z_LVAL_PP(trace) > 0) {
add_property_stringl(this_ptr, "__last_response_headers", http_headers, http_header_size, 1);
}
/* Check to see what HTTP status was sent */
http_1_1 = 0;
http_status = 0;
http_version = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"HTTP/");
if (http_version) {
char *tmp;
if (!strncmp(http_version,"1.1", 3)) {
http_1_1 = 1;
}
tmp = strstr(http_version," ");
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmp++;
http_status = atoi(tmp);
}
tmp = strstr(tmp," ");
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmp++;
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
http_msg = estrdup(tmp);
}
efree(http_version);
/* Try and get headers again */
if (http_status == 100) {
efree(http_headers);
}
}
} while (http_status == 100);
/* Grab and send back every cookie */
/* Not going to worry about Path: because
we shouldn't be changing urls so path dont
matter too much
*/
cookie_itt = strstr(http_headers,"Set-Cookie: ");
while (cookie_itt) {
char *end_pos, *cookie;
char *eqpos, *sempos;
zval **cookies;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies"), (void **)&cookies) == FAILURE) {
zval *tmp_cookies;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp_cookies);
array_init(tmp_cookies);
zend_hash_update(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_cookies", sizeof("_cookies"), &tmp_cookies, sizeof(zval *), (void **)&cookies);
}
end_pos = strstr(cookie_itt,"\r\n");
cookie = get_http_header_value(cookie_itt,"Set-Cookie: ");
eqpos = strstr(cookie, "=");
sempos = strstr(cookie, ";");
if (eqpos != NULL && (sempos == NULL || sempos > eqpos)) {
smart_str name = {0};
int cookie_len;
zval *zcookie;
if (sempos != NULL) {
cookie_len = sempos-(eqpos+1);
} else {
cookie_len = strlen(cookie)-(eqpos-cookie)-1;
}
smart_str_appendl(&name, cookie, eqpos - cookie);
smart_str_0(&name);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(zcookie);
array_init(zcookie);
add_index_stringl(zcookie, 0, eqpos + 1, cookie_len, 1);
if (sempos != NULL) {
char *options = cookie + cookie_len+1;
while (*options) {
while (*options == ' ') {options++;}
sempos = strstr(options, ";");
if (strstr(options,"path=") == options) {
eqpos = options + sizeof("path=")-1;
add_index_stringl(zcookie, 1, eqpos, sempos?(sempos-eqpos):strlen(eqpos), 1);
} else if (strstr(options,"domain=") == options) {
eqpos = options + sizeof("domain=")-1;
add_index_stringl(zcookie, 2, eqpos, sempos?(sempos-eqpos):strlen(eqpos), 1);
} else if (strstr(options,"secure") == options) {
add_index_bool(zcookie, 3, 1);
}
if (sempos != NULL) {
options = sempos+1;
} else {
break;
}
}
}
if (!zend_hash_index_exists(Z_ARRVAL_P(zcookie), 1)) {
char *t = phpurl->path?phpurl->path:"/";
char *c = strrchr(t, '/');
if (c) {
add_index_stringl(zcookie, 1, t, c-t, 1);
}
}
if (!zend_hash_index_exists(Z_ARRVAL_P(zcookie), 2)) {
add_index_string(zcookie, 2, phpurl->host, 1);
}
add_assoc_zval_ex(*cookies, name.c, name.len+1, zcookie);
smart_str_free(&name);
}
cookie_itt = strstr(cookie_itt + sizeof("Set-Cookie: "), "Set-Cookie: ");
efree(cookie);
}
/* See if the server requested a close */
if (http_1_1) {
http_close = FALSE;
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
connection = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Proxy-Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "close", sizeof("close")-1) == 0) {
http_close = TRUE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
if (http_close == FALSE) {
connection = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "close", sizeof("close")-1) == 0) {
http_close = TRUE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
} else {
http_close = TRUE;
if (use_proxy && !use_ssl) {
connection = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Proxy-Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "Keep-Alive", sizeof("Keep-Alive")-1) == 0) {
http_close = FALSE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
if (http_close == TRUE) {
connection = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Connection: ");
if (connection) {
if (strncasecmp(connection, "Keep-Alive", sizeof("Keep-Alive")-1) == 0) {
http_close = FALSE;
}
efree(connection);
}
}
}
if (!get_http_body(stream, http_close, http_headers, &http_body, &http_body_size TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
php_stream_close(stream);
efree(http_headers);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Error Fetching http body, No Content-Length, connection closed or chunked data", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
if (request != buf) {efree(request);}
if (http_close) {
php_stream_close(stream);
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket"));
zend_hash_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy"));
stream = NULL;
}
/* Process HTTP status codes */
if (http_status >= 300 && http_status < 400) {
char *loc;
if ((loc = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Location: ")) != NULL) {
php_url *new_url = php_url_parse(loc);
if (new_url != NULL) {
efree(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
efree(loc);
if (new_url->scheme == NULL && new_url->path != NULL) {
new_url->scheme = phpurl->scheme ? estrdup(phpurl->scheme) : NULL;
new_url->host = phpurl->host ? estrdup(phpurl->host) : NULL;
new_url->port = phpurl->port;
if (new_url->path && new_url->path[0] != '/') {
if (phpurl->path) {
char *t = phpurl->path;
char *p = strrchr(t, '/');
if (p) {
char *s = emalloc((p - t) + strlen(new_url->path) + 2);
strncpy(s, t, (p - t) + 1);
s[(p - t) + 1] = 0;
strcat(s, new_url->path);
efree(new_url->path);
new_url->path = s;
}
} else {
char *s = emalloc(strlen(new_url->path) + 2);
s[0] = '/'; s[1] = 0;
strcat(s, new_url->path);
efree(new_url->path);
new_url->path = s;
}
}
}
phpurl = new_url;
if (--redirect_max < 1) {
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Redirection limit reached, aborting", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
return FALSE;
}
goto try_again;
}
}
} else if (http_status == 401) {
/* Digest authentication */
zval **digest, **login, **password;
char *auth = get_http_header_value(http_headers, "WWW-Authenticate: ");
if (auth &&
strstr(auth, "Digest") == auth &&
(zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"), (void **)&digest) == FAILURE ||
Z_TYPE_PP(digest) != IS_ARRAY) &&
zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(login) == IS_STRING &&
zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
char *s;
zval *digest = NULL;
s = auth + sizeof("Digest")-1;
while (*s != '\0') {
char *name, *val;
while (*s == ' ') ++s;
name = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != '=') ++s;
if (*s == '=') {
*s = '\0';
++s;
if (*s == '"') {
++s;
val = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != '"') ++s;
} else {
val = s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != ' ' && *s != ',') ++s;
}
if (*s != '\0') {
if (*s != ',') {
*s = '\0';
++s;
while (*s != '\0' && *s != ',') ++s;
if (*s != '\0') ++s;
} else {
*s = '\0';
++s;
}
}
if (digest == NULL) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(digest);
array_init(digest);
}
add_assoc_string(digest, name, val ,1);
}
}
if (digest != NULL) {
php_url *new_url = emalloc(sizeof(php_url));
Z_DELREF_P(digest);
add_property_zval_ex(this_ptr, "_digest", sizeof("_digest"), digest TSRMLS_CC);
*new_url = *phpurl;
if (phpurl->scheme) phpurl->scheme = estrdup(phpurl->scheme);
if (phpurl->user) phpurl->user = estrdup(phpurl->user);
if (phpurl->pass) phpurl->pass = estrdup(phpurl->pass);
if (phpurl->host) phpurl->host = estrdup(phpurl->host);
if (phpurl->path) phpurl->path = estrdup(phpurl->path);
if (phpurl->query) phpurl->query = estrdup(phpurl->query);
if (phpurl->fragment) phpurl->fragment = estrdup(phpurl->fragment);
phpurl = new_url;
efree(auth);
efree(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
goto try_again;
}
}
if (auth) efree(auth);
}
smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z);
/* Check and see if the server even sent a xml document */
content_type = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Content-Type: ");
if (content_type) {
char *pos = NULL;
int cmplen;
pos = strstr(content_type,";");
if (pos != NULL) {
cmplen = pos - content_type;
} else {
cmplen = strlen(content_type);
}
if (strncmp(content_type, "text/xml", cmplen) == 0 ||
strncmp(content_type, "application/soap+xml", cmplen) == 0) {
content_type_xml = 1;
/*
if (strncmp(http_body, "<?xml", 5)) {
zval *err;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(err);
ZVAL_STRINGL(err, http_body, http_body_size, 1);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Didn't receive an xml document", NULL, err TSRMLS_CC);
efree(content_type);
efree(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
return FALSE;
}
*/
}
efree(content_type);
}
/* Decompress response */
content_encoding = get_http_header_value(http_headers,"Content-Encoding: ");
if (content_encoding) {
zval func;
zval retval;
zval param;
zval *params[1];
if ((strcmp(content_encoding,"gzip") == 0 ||
strcmp(content_encoding,"x-gzip") == 0) &&
zend_hash_exists(EG(function_table), "gzinflate", sizeof("gzinflate"))) {
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzinflate", 0);
params[0] = ¶m;
ZVAL_STRINGL(params[0], http_body+10, http_body_size-10, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(params[0]);
} else if (strcmp(content_encoding,"deflate") == 0 &&
zend_hash_exists(EG(function_table), "gzuncompress", sizeof("gzuncompress"))) {
ZVAL_STRING(&func, "gzuncompress", 0);
params[0] = ¶m;
ZVAL_STRINGL(params[0], http_body, http_body_size, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(params[0]);
} else {
efree(content_encoding);
efree(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Unknown Content-Encoding", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
return FALSE;
}
if (call_user_function(CG(function_table), (zval**)NULL, &func, &retval, 1, params TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
efree(http_body);
*buffer = Z_STRVAL(retval);
*buffer_len = Z_STRLEN(retval);
} else {
efree(content_encoding);
efree(http_headers);
efree(http_body);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", "Can't uncompress compressed response", NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
return FALSE;
}
efree(content_encoding);
} else {
*buffer = http_body;
*buffer_len = http_body_size;
}
efree(http_headers);
if (http_status >= 400) {
int error = 0;
if (*buffer_len == 0) {
error = 1;
} else if (*buffer_len > 0) {
if (!content_type_xml) {
char *s = *buffer;
while (*s != '\0' && *s < ' ') {
s++;
}
if (strncmp(s, "<?xml", 5)) {
error = 1;
}
}
}
if (error) {
efree(*buffer);
add_soap_fault(this_ptr, "HTTP", http_msg, NULL, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
efree(http_msg);
return FALSE;
}
}
if (http_msg) {
efree(http_msg);
}
return TRUE;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-19'], 'message': 'Added type checks'</s> |
<s>[INST] Given the following code containing errors, provide Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers and corresponding messages in JSON format. Each identified weakness should have a unique entry in the JSON array.
Code: static int get_buffer(size_t *_buf_len, char **_buf)
{
long pw_max;
long gr_max;
size_t buf_len;
char *buf;
pw_max = sysconf(_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
gr_max = sysconf(_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
if (pw_max == -1 && gr_max == -1) {
buf_len = 16384;
} else {
buf_len = MAX(pw_max, gr_max);
}
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * buf_len);
if (buf == NULL) {
return LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
*_buf_len = buf_len;
*_buf = buf;
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
} ; Sample JSON Format Confermily Expected output: "examples" => "cwe": "xxx"; "message": "xxx"
[/INST] 'cwe': ['CWE-19'], 'message': 'extdom: handle ERANGE return code for getXXYYY_r() calls
The getXXYYY_r() calls require a buffer to store the variable data of
the passwd and group structs. If the provided buffer is too small ERANGE
is returned and the caller can try with a larger buffer again.
Cmocka/cwrap based unit-tests for get*_r_wrapper() are added.
Resolves https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4908
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>'</s> |