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stringlengths 46
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13.3k
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CVE-2014-4503 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4503/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/sgminer-dev/sgminer/commit/910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | 910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this. | void thr_info_cancel(struct thr_info *thr)
{
if (!thr)
return;
if (PTH(thr) != 0L) {
pthread_cancel(thr->pth);
PTH(thr) = 0L;
}
cgsem_destroy(&thr->sem);
}
| void thr_info_cancel(struct thr_info *thr)
{
if (!thr)
return;
if (PTH(thr) != 0L) {
pthread_cancel(thr->pth);
PTH(thr) = 0L;
}
cgsem_destroy(&thr->sem);
}
| C | sgminer | 0 |
CVE-2015-6787 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6787/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7 | f911e11e7f6b5c0d6f5ee694a9871de6619889f7 | Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateTransform() {
if (object_.IsSVGChild()) {
UpdateTransformForNonRootSVG();
return;
}
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsTransform(object_)) {
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
if (object_.IsBox()) {
auto& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
state.origin = TransformOrigin(box);
style.ApplyTransform(
state.matrix, box.Size(), ComputedStyle::kExcludeTransformOrigin,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeMotionPath,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeIndependentTransformProperties);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.rendering_context_id = context_.current.rendering_context_id;
if (style.Preserves3D() && !state.rendering_context_id) {
state.rendering_context_id =
PtrHash<const LayoutObject>::GetHash(&object_);
}
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReasonsForTransform(box);
}
}
state.flattens_inherited_transform =
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.backface_visibility =
object_.HasHiddenBackface()
? TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kHidden
: TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kVisible;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kPrimary);
}
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateTransform(*context_.current.transform,
std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearTransform());
}
}
if (properties_->Transform()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->Transform();
if (object_.StyleRef().Preserves3D()) {
context_.current.rendering_context_id =
properties_->Transform()->RenderingContextId();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
} else {
context_.current.rendering_context_id = 0;
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = true;
}
}
}
| void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateTransform() {
if (object_.IsSVGChild()) {
UpdateTransformForNonRootSVG();
return;
}
DCHECK(properties_);
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsTransform(object_)) {
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State state;
if (object_.IsBox()) {
auto& box = ToLayoutBox(object_);
state.origin = TransformOrigin(box);
style.ApplyTransform(
state.matrix, box.Size(), ComputedStyle::kExcludeTransformOrigin,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeMotionPath,
ComputedStyle::kIncludeIndependentTransformProperties);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.rendering_context_id = context_.current.rendering_context_id;
if (style.Preserves3D() && !state.rendering_context_id) {
state.rendering_context_id =
PtrHash<const LayoutObject>::GetHash(&object_);
}
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReasonsForTransform(box);
}
}
state.flattens_inherited_transform =
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.backface_visibility =
object_.HasHiddenBackface()
? TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kHidden
: TransformPaintPropertyNode::BackfaceVisibility::kVisible;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kPrimary);
}
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateTransform(context_.current.transform,
std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearTransform());
}
}
if (properties_->Transform()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->Transform();
if (object_.StyleRef().Preserves3D()) {
context_.current.rendering_context_id =
properties_->Transform()->RenderingContextId();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
} else {
context_.current.rendering_context_id = 0;
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = true;
}
}
}
| C | Chrome | 1 |
CVE-2015-7515 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7515/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96 | 8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96 | Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | aiptek_command(struct aiptek *aiptek, unsigned char command, unsigned char data)
{
const int sizeof_buf = 3 * sizeof(u8);
int ret;
u8 *buf;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof_buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[0] = 2;
buf[1] = command;
buf[2] = data;
if ((ret =
aiptek_set_report(aiptek, 3, 2, buf, sizeof_buf)) != sizeof_buf) {
dev_dbg(&aiptek->intf->dev,
"aiptek_program: failed, tried to send: 0x%02x 0x%02x\n",
command, data);
}
kfree(buf);
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
| aiptek_command(struct aiptek *aiptek, unsigned char command, unsigned char data)
{
const int sizeof_buf = 3 * sizeof(u8);
int ret;
u8 *buf;
buf = kmalloc(sizeof_buf, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf[0] = 2;
buf[1] = command;
buf[2] = data;
if ((ret =
aiptek_set_report(aiptek, 3, 2, buf, sizeof_buf)) != sizeof_buf) {
dev_dbg(&aiptek->intf->dev,
"aiptek_program: failed, tried to send: 0x%02x 0x%02x\n",
command, data);
}
kfree(buf);
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-3412 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/ | CWE-254 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | 4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | null | PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
tmp_name = "public";
}
smart_str_appends(&querystr,
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
| PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
tmp_name = "public";
}
smart_str_appends(&querystr,
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2017-5118 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | 0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333} | v8::Local<v8::Value> WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteScriptAndReturnValue(
const WebScriptSource& source) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
TextPosition position(OrdinalNumber::FromOneBasedInt(source.start_line),
OrdinalNumber::First());
return GetFrame()
->GetScriptController()
.ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(source.code, source.url, position));
}
| v8::Local<v8::Value> WebLocalFrameImpl::ExecuteScriptAndReturnValue(
const WebScriptSource& source) {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
TextPosition position(OrdinalNumber::FromOneBasedInt(source.start_line),
OrdinalNumber::First());
return GetFrame()
->GetScriptController()
.ExecuteScriptInMainWorldAndReturnValue(
ScriptSourceCode(source.code, source.url, position));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2449 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2449/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
| status_t Camera3Device::disconnect() {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
ALOGV("%s: E", __FUNCTION__);
status_t res = OK;
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (mStatus == STATUS_UNINITIALIZED) return res;
if (mStatus == STATUS_ACTIVE ||
(mStatus == STATUS_ERROR && mRequestThread != NULL)) {
res = mRequestThread->clearRepeatingRequests();
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't stop streaming");
} else {
res = waitUntilStateThenRelock(/*active*/ false, kShutdownTimeout);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Timeout waiting for HAL to drain");
}
}
}
if (mStatus == STATUS_ERROR) {
CLOGE("Shutting down in an error state");
}
if (mStatusTracker != NULL) {
mStatusTracker->requestExit();
}
if (mRequestThread != NULL) {
mRequestThread->requestExit();
}
mOutputStreams.clear();
mInputStream.clear();
}
if (mRequestThread != NULL && mStatus != STATUS_ERROR) {
mRequestThread->join();
}
if (mStatusTracker != NULL) {
mStatusTracker->join();
}
camera3_device_t *hal3Device;
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mRequestThread.clear();
mStatusTracker.clear();
hal3Device = mHal3Device;
}
if (hal3Device != NULL) {
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->close");
hal3Device->common.close(&hal3Device->common);
ATRACE_END();
}
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mHal3Device = NULL;
internalUpdateStatusLocked(STATUS_UNINITIALIZED);
}
ALOGV("%s: X", __FUNCTION__);
return res;
}
| status_t Camera3Device::disconnect() {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
ALOGV("%s: E", __FUNCTION__);
status_t res = OK;
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (mStatus == STATUS_UNINITIALIZED) return res;
if (mStatus == STATUS_ACTIVE ||
(mStatus == STATUS_ERROR && mRequestThread != NULL)) {
res = mRequestThread->clearRepeatingRequests();
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Can't stop streaming");
} else {
res = waitUntilStateThenRelock(/*active*/ false, kShutdownTimeout);
if (res != OK) {
SET_ERR_L("Timeout waiting for HAL to drain");
}
}
}
if (mStatus == STATUS_ERROR) {
CLOGE("Shutting down in an error state");
}
if (mStatusTracker != NULL) {
mStatusTracker->requestExit();
}
if (mRequestThread != NULL) {
mRequestThread->requestExit();
}
mOutputStreams.clear();
mInputStream.clear();
}
if (mRequestThread != NULL && mStatus != STATUS_ERROR) {
mRequestThread->join();
}
if (mStatusTracker != NULL) {
mStatusTracker->join();
}
camera3_device_t *hal3Device;
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mRequestThread.clear();
mStatusTracker.clear();
hal3Device = mHal3Device;
}
if (hal3Device != NULL) {
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->close");
hal3Device->common.close(&hal3Device->common);
ATRACE_END();
}
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
mHal3Device = NULL;
internalUpdateStatusLocked(STATUS_UNINITIALIZED);
}
ALOGV("%s: X", __FUNCTION__);
return res;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2013-7421 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7421/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b | 5d26a105b5a73e5635eae0629b42fa0a90e07b7b | crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | static void __exit des_s390_exit(void)
{
if (ctrblk) {
crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_des3_alg);
free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
}
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&des_alg);
}
| static void __exit des_s390_exit(void)
{
if (ctrblk) {
crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ctr_des3_alg);
free_page((unsigned long) ctrblk);
}
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&des3_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&cbc_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&ecb_des_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&des_alg);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-10030 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee | 92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee | Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030. | _steps_completed_now(uint32_t jobid)
{
List steps;
ListIterator i;
step_loc_t *stepd;
bool rc = true;
steps = stepd_available(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name);
i = list_iterator_create(steps);
while ((stepd = list_next(i))) {
if (stepd->jobid == jobid) {
int fd;
fd = stepd_connect(stepd->directory, stepd->nodename,
stepd->jobid, stepd->stepid,
&stepd->protocol_version);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
if (stepd_state(fd, stepd->protocol_version)
!= SLURMSTEPD_NOT_RUNNING) {
rc = false;
close(fd);
break;
}
close(fd);
}
}
list_iterator_destroy(i);
FREE_NULL_LIST(steps);
return rc;
}
| _steps_completed_now(uint32_t jobid)
{
List steps;
ListIterator i;
step_loc_t *stepd;
bool rc = true;
steps = stepd_available(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name);
i = list_iterator_create(steps);
while ((stepd = list_next(i))) {
if (stepd->jobid == jobid) {
int fd;
fd = stepd_connect(stepd->directory, stepd->nodename,
stepd->jobid, stepd->stepid,
&stepd->protocol_version);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
if (stepd_state(fd, stepd->protocol_version)
!= SLURMSTEPD_NOT_RUNNING) {
rc = false;
close(fd);
break;
}
close(fd);
}
}
list_iterator_destroy(i);
FREE_NULL_LIST(steps);
return rc;
}
| C | slurm | 0 |
CVE-2014-0203 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b | 86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b | fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | static int do_path_lookup(int dfd, const char *name,
unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
int retval = path_init(dfd, name, flags, nd);
if (!retval)
retval = path_walk(name, nd);
if (unlikely(!retval && !audit_dummy_context() && nd->path.dentry &&
nd->path.dentry->d_inode))
audit_inode(name, nd->path.dentry);
if (nd->root.mnt) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
| static int do_path_lookup(int dfd, const char *name,
unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd)
{
int retval = path_init(dfd, name, flags, nd);
if (!retval)
retval = path_walk(name, nd);
if (unlikely(!retval && !audit_dummy_context() && nd->path.dentry &&
nd->path.dentry->d_inode))
audit_inode(name, nd->path.dentry);
if (nd->root.mnt) {
path_put(&nd->root);
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-0274 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0274/ | CWE-19 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59 | 8275cdd0e7ac550dcce2b3ef6d2fb3b808c1ae59 | xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> | xfs_attr_name_to_xname(
struct xfs_name *xname,
const unsigned char *aname)
{
if (!aname)
return EINVAL;
xname->name = aname;
xname->len = strlen((char *)aname);
if (xname->len >= MAXNAMELEN)
return EFAULT; /* match IRIX behaviour */
return 0;
}
| xfs_attr_name_to_xname(
struct xfs_name *xname,
const unsigned char *aname)
{
if (!aname)
return EINVAL;
xname->name = aname;
xname->len = strlen((char *)aname);
if (xname->len >= MAXNAMELEN)
return EFAULT; /* match IRIX behaviour */
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-7533 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7533/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e | 49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e | dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | static void __d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target,
bool exchange)
{
struct inode *dir = NULL;
unsigned n;
if (!dentry->d_inode)
printk(KERN_WARNING "VFS: moving negative dcache entry\n");
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(dentry, target));
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(target, dentry));
dentry_lock_for_move(dentry, target);
if (unlikely(d_in_lookup(target))) {
dir = target->d_parent->d_inode;
n = start_dir_add(dir);
__d_lookup_done(target);
}
write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
write_seqcount_begin_nested(&target->d_seq, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
/* unhash both */
/* __d_drop does write_seqcount_barrier, but they're OK to nest. */
__d_drop(dentry);
__d_drop(target);
/* Switch the names.. */
if (exchange)
swap_names(dentry, target);
else
copy_name(dentry, target);
/* rehash in new place(s) */
__d_rehash(dentry);
if (exchange)
__d_rehash(target);
/* ... and switch them in the tree */
if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
/* splicing a tree */
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
target->d_parent = target;
list_del_init(&target->d_child);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
} else {
/* swapping two dentries */
swap(dentry->d_parent, target->d_parent);
list_move(&target->d_child, &target->d_parent->d_subdirs);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
if (exchange)
fsnotify_update_flags(target);
fsnotify_update_flags(dentry);
}
write_seqcount_end(&target->d_seq);
write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
if (dir)
end_dir_add(dir, n);
dentry_unlock_for_move(dentry, target);
}
| static void __d_move(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target,
bool exchange)
{
struct inode *dir = NULL;
unsigned n;
if (!dentry->d_inode)
printk(KERN_WARNING "VFS: moving negative dcache entry\n");
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(dentry, target));
BUG_ON(d_ancestor(target, dentry));
dentry_lock_for_move(dentry, target);
if (unlikely(d_in_lookup(target))) {
dir = target->d_parent->d_inode;
n = start_dir_add(dir);
__d_lookup_done(target);
}
write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
write_seqcount_begin_nested(&target->d_seq, DENTRY_D_LOCK_NESTED);
/* unhash both */
/* __d_drop does write_seqcount_barrier, but they're OK to nest. */
__d_drop(dentry);
__d_drop(target);
/* Switch the names.. */
if (exchange)
swap_names(dentry, target);
else
copy_name(dentry, target);
/* rehash in new place(s) */
__d_rehash(dentry);
if (exchange)
__d_rehash(target);
/* ... and switch them in the tree */
if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
/* splicing a tree */
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
target->d_parent = target;
list_del_init(&target->d_child);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
} else {
/* swapping two dentries */
swap(dentry->d_parent, target->d_parent);
list_move(&target->d_child, &target->d_parent->d_subdirs);
list_move(&dentry->d_child, &dentry->d_parent->d_subdirs);
if (exchange)
fsnotify_update_flags(target);
fsnotify_update_flags(dentry);
}
write_seqcount_end(&target->d_seq);
write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
if (dir)
end_dir_add(dir, n);
dentry_unlock_for_move(dentry, target);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-7909 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7909/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2571533bbb5b554ff47205c8ef1513ccc0817c3e | 2571533bbb5b554ff47205c8ef1513ccc0817c3e | DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001} | void DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
{
m_client = nullptr;
if (!m_async)
return;
m_timeoutTimer.stop();
m_requestStartedSeconds = 0.0;
clearResource();
}
| void DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
{
m_client = nullptr;
if (!m_async)
return;
m_timeoutTimer.stop();
m_requestStartedSeconds = 0.0;
clearResource();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-1019 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1019/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b | 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b | net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | __be32 try_6rd(struct in6_addr *v6dst, struct ip_tunnel *tunnel)
{
__be32 dst = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
if (ipv6_prefix_equal(v6dst, &tunnel->ip6rd.prefix,
tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen)) {
unsigned int pbw0, pbi0;
int pbi1;
u32 d;
pbw0 = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen >> 5;
pbi0 = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen & 0x1f;
d = (ntohl(v6dst->s6_addr32[pbw0]) << pbi0) >>
tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
pbi1 = pbi0 - tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
if (pbi1 > 0)
d |= ntohl(v6dst->s6_addr32[pbw0 + 1]) >>
(32 - pbi1);
dst = tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefix | htonl(d);
}
#else
if (v6dst->s6_addr16[0] == htons(0x2002)) {
/* 6to4 v6 addr has 16 bits prefix, 32 v4addr, 16 SLA, ... */
memcpy(&dst, &v6dst->s6_addr16[1], 4);
}
#endif
return dst;
}
| __be32 try_6rd(struct in6_addr *v6dst, struct ip_tunnel *tunnel)
{
__be32 dst = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
if (ipv6_prefix_equal(v6dst, &tunnel->ip6rd.prefix,
tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen)) {
unsigned int pbw0, pbi0;
int pbi1;
u32 d;
pbw0 = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen >> 5;
pbi0 = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen & 0x1f;
d = (ntohl(v6dst->s6_addr32[pbw0]) << pbi0) >>
tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
pbi1 = pbi0 - tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
if (pbi1 > 0)
d |= ntohl(v6dst->s6_addr32[pbw0 + 1]) >>
(32 - pbi1);
dst = tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefix | htonl(d);
}
#else
if (v6dst->s6_addr16[0] == htons(0x2002)) {
/* 6to4 v6 addr has 16 bits prefix, 32 v4addr, 16 SLA, ... */
memcpy(&dst, &v6dst->s6_addr16[1], 4);
}
#endif
return dst;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-5218 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303 | 45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303 | Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | void TabAnimationDelegate::AnimationProgressed(
const gfx::Animation* animation) {
tab_->SetVisible(tab_strip_->ShouldTabBeVisible(tab_));
}
| void TabAnimationDelegate::AnimationProgressed(
const gfx::Animation* animation) {
tab_->SetVisible(tab_strip_->ShouldTabBeVisible(tab_));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149 | 41a7e42ef575c10375f574145e5d023118fbd149 | chromeos: Send 'keypress' for the content when composing a character with dead keys
This change leaves characters outside BMP unable to be typed on docs.google.com, but surely fixes the problem for most use cases.
BUG=132668
TEST=Create a document on docs.google.com and try typing a character with dead keys (e.g. type '^'+'a' with keyboard layout "English - US international")
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10565032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142705 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void InputMethodIBus::OnDestroy(IBusInputContext* context) {
DCHECK_EQ(context_, context);
g_object_unref(context_);
context_ = NULL;
context_focused_ = false;
ConfirmCompositionText();
OnInputMethodChanged();
}
| void InputMethodIBus::OnDestroy(IBusInputContext* context) {
DCHECK_EQ(context_, context);
g_object_unref(context_);
context_ = NULL;
context_focused_ = false;
ConfirmCompositionText();
OnInputMethodChanged();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-10664 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-10664/ | CWE-89 | https://github.com/domoticz/domoticz/commit/ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!) | void CWebServer::Cmd_DeletePlan(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx.empty())
return;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "DeletePlan";
m_sql.safe_query(
"DELETE FROM DeviceToPlansMap WHERE (PlanID == '%q')",
idx.c_str()
);
m_sql.safe_query(
"DELETE FROM Plans WHERE (ID == '%q')",
idx.c_str()
);
}
| void CWebServer::Cmd_DeletePlan(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
if (idx.empty())
return;
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "DeletePlan";
m_sql.safe_query(
"DELETE FROM DeviceToPlansMap WHERE (PlanID == '%q')",
idx.c_str()
);
m_sql.safe_query(
"DELETE FROM Plans WHERE (ID == '%q')",
idx.c_str()
);
}
| C | domoticz | 0 |
CVE-2011-4930 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/ | CWE-134 | https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | 5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | null | int getJobAdExitSignal(ClassAd *jad, int &exit_signal)
{
if( ! jad->LookupInteger(ATTR_ON_EXIT_SIGNAL, exit_signal) ) {
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| int getJobAdExitSignal(ClassAd *jad, int &exit_signal)
{
if( ! jad->LookupInteger(ATTR_ON_EXIT_SIGNAL, exit_signal) ) {
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| CPP | htcondor | 0 |
CVE-2014-3168 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3168/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d | f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d | SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void SVGDocumentExtensions::dispatchSVGLoadEventToOutermostSVGElements()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator it = timeContainers.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
SVGSVGElement* outerSVG = (*it).get();
if (!outerSVG->isOutermostSVGSVGElement())
continue;
if (outerSVG->document().wellFormed() || !outerSVG->document().isSVGDocument())
outerSVG->sendSVGLoadEventIfPossible();
}
}
| void SVGDocumentExtensions::dispatchSVGLoadEventToOutermostSVGElements()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator it = timeContainers.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
SVGSVGElement* outerSVG = (*it).get();
if (!outerSVG->isOutermostSVGSVGElement())
continue;
if (outerSVG->document().wellFormed() || !outerSVG->document().isSVGDocument())
outerSVG->sendSVGLoadEventIfPossible();
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-2868 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2868/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8c95ab0b50f8a257514f9647929267e62b1e611d | 8c95ab0b50f8a257514f9647929267e62b1e611d | Fix syncing of NPAPI plugins.
This fix adds a check for |plugin| permission
while syncing NPAPI plugins.
BUG=252034
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16816024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207830 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool IsSyncable(const Extension* extension) {
bool is_syncable = (extension->location() == Manifest::INTERNAL &&
!extension->was_installed_by_default());
is_syncable |= (extension->id() == extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId);
return is_syncable;
}
| bool IsSyncable(const Extension* extension) {
bool is_syncable = (extension->location() == Manifest::INTERNAL &&
!extension->was_installed_by_default());
is_syncable |= (extension->id() == extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId);
return is_syncable;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-13006 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) | static GF_Err gf_isom_dump_srt_track(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 track, FILE *dump)
{
u32 i, j, k, count, di, len, ts, cur_frame;
u64 start, end;
GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *txtd;
GF_BitStream *bs;
char szDur[100];
GF_TrackBox *trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, track);
if (!trak) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
switch (trak->Media->handler->handlerType) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_TEXT:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_SUBT:
break;
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
ts = trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale;
cur_frame = 0;
end = 0;
count = gf_isom_get_sample_count(the_file, track);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_TextSample *txt;
GF_ISOSample *s = gf_isom_get_sample(the_file, track, i+1, &di);
if (!s) continue;
start = s->DTS;
if (s->dataLength==2) {
gf_isom_sample_del(&s);
continue;
}
if (i+1<count) {
GF_ISOSample *next = gf_isom_get_sample_info(the_file, track, i+2, NULL, NULL);
if (next) {
end = next->DTS;
gf_isom_sample_del(&next);
}
} else {
end = gf_isom_get_media_duration(the_file, track) ;
}
cur_frame++;
fprintf(dump, "%d\n", cur_frame);
tx3g_format_time(start, ts, szDur, GF_TRUE);
fprintf(dump, "%s --> ", szDur);
tx3g_format_time(end, ts, szDur, GF_TRUE);
fprintf(dump, "%s\n", szDur);
bs = gf_bs_new(s->data, s->dataLength, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
txt = gf_isom_parse_texte_sample(bs);
gf_bs_del(bs);
txtd = (GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, di-1);
if (!txt->len) {
fprintf(dump, "\n");
} else {
u32 styles, char_num, new_styles, color, new_color;
u16 utf16Line[10000];
/*UTF16*/
if ((txt->len>2) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[0] == (unsigned char) 0xFE) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[1] == (unsigned char) 0xFF)) {
memcpy(utf16Line, txt->text+2, sizeof(char)*txt->len);
( ((char *)utf16Line)[txt->len] ) = 0;
len = txt->len;
} else {
u8 *str = (u8 *) (txt->text);
size_t res = gf_utf8_mbstowcs(utf16Line, 10000, (const char **) &str);
if (res==(size_t)-1) return GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;
len = (u32) res;
utf16Line[len] = 0;
}
char_num = 0;
styles = 0;
new_styles = txtd->default_style.style_flags;
color = new_color = txtd->default_style.text_color;
for (j=0; j<len; j++) {
Bool is_new_line;
if (txt->styles) {
new_styles = txtd->default_style.style_flags;
new_color = txtd->default_style.text_color;
for (k=0; k<txt->styles->entry_count; k++) {
if (txt->styles->styles[k].startCharOffset>char_num) continue;
if (txt->styles->styles[k].endCharOffset<char_num+1) continue;
if (txt->styles->styles[k].style_flags & (GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC | GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD | GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) {
new_styles = txt->styles->styles[k].style_flags;
new_color = txt->styles->styles[k].text_color;
break;
}
}
}
if (new_styles != styles) {
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD)) fprintf(dump, "<b>");
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC)) fprintf(dump, "<i>");
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) fprintf(dump, "<u>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) fprintf(dump, "</u>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC)) fprintf(dump, "</i>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD)) fprintf(dump, "</b>");
styles = new_styles;
}
if (new_color != color) {
if (new_color ==txtd->default_style.text_color) {
fprintf(dump, "</font>");
} else {
fprintf(dump, "<font color=\"%s\">", gf_color_get_name(new_color) );
}
color = new_color;
}
/*not sure if styles must be reseted at line breaks in srt...*/
is_new_line = GF_FALSE;
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\n') || (utf16Line[j]=='\r') ) {
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\r') && (utf16Line[j+1]=='\n')) j++;
fprintf(dump, "\n");
is_new_line = GF_TRUE;
}
if (!is_new_line) {
size_t sl;
char szChar[30];
s16 swT[2], *swz;
swT[0] = utf16Line[j];
swT[1] = 0;
swz= (s16 *)swT;
sl = gf_utf8_wcstombs(szChar, 30, (const unsigned short **) &swz);
if (sl == (size_t)-1) sl=0;
szChar[(u32) sl]=0;
fprintf(dump, "%s", szChar);
}
char_num++;
}
new_styles = 0;
if (new_styles != styles) {
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) fprintf(dump, "</u>");
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) fprintf(dump, "</i>");
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) fprintf(dump, "</b>");
}
if (color != txtd->default_style.text_color) {
fprintf(dump, "</font>");
}
fprintf(dump, "\n");
}
gf_isom_sample_del(&s);
gf_isom_delete_text_sample(txt);
fprintf(dump, "\n");
gf_set_progress("SRT Extract", i, count);
}
if (count) gf_set_progress("SRT Extract", i, count);
return GF_OK;
}
| static GF_Err gf_isom_dump_srt_track(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 track, FILE *dump)
{
u32 i, j, k, count, di, len, ts, cur_frame;
u64 start, end;
GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *txtd;
GF_BitStream *bs;
char szDur[100];
GF_TrackBox *trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, track);
if (!trak) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
switch (trak->Media->handler->handlerType) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_TEXT:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_SUBT:
break;
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
ts = trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale;
cur_frame = 0;
end = 0;
count = gf_isom_get_sample_count(the_file, track);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_TextSample *txt;
GF_ISOSample *s = gf_isom_get_sample(the_file, track, i+1, &di);
if (!s) continue;
start = s->DTS;
if (s->dataLength==2) {
gf_isom_sample_del(&s);
continue;
}
if (i+1<count) {
GF_ISOSample *next = gf_isom_get_sample_info(the_file, track, i+2, NULL, NULL);
if (next) {
end = next->DTS;
gf_isom_sample_del(&next);
}
} else {
end = gf_isom_get_media_duration(the_file, track) ;
}
cur_frame++;
fprintf(dump, "%d\n", cur_frame);
tx3g_format_time(start, ts, szDur, GF_TRUE);
fprintf(dump, "%s --> ", szDur);
tx3g_format_time(end, ts, szDur, GF_TRUE);
fprintf(dump, "%s\n", szDur);
bs = gf_bs_new(s->data, s->dataLength, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
txt = gf_isom_parse_texte_sample(bs);
gf_bs_del(bs);
txtd = (GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, di-1);
if (!txt->len) {
fprintf(dump, "\n");
} else {
u32 styles, char_num, new_styles, color, new_color;
u16 utf16Line[10000];
/*UTF16*/
if ((txt->len>2) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[0] == (unsigned char) 0xFE) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[1] == (unsigned char) 0xFF)) {
memcpy(utf16Line, txt->text+2, sizeof(char)*txt->len);
( ((char *)utf16Line)[txt->len] ) = 0;
len = txt->len;
} else {
u8 *str = (u8 *) (txt->text);
size_t res = gf_utf8_mbstowcs(utf16Line, 10000, (const char **) &str);
if (res==(size_t)-1) return GF_NON_COMPLIANT_BITSTREAM;
len = (u32) res;
utf16Line[len] = 0;
}
char_num = 0;
styles = 0;
new_styles = txtd->default_style.style_flags;
color = new_color = txtd->default_style.text_color;
for (j=0; j<len; j++) {
Bool is_new_line;
if (txt->styles) {
new_styles = txtd->default_style.style_flags;
new_color = txtd->default_style.text_color;
for (k=0; k<txt->styles->entry_count; k++) {
if (txt->styles->styles[k].startCharOffset>char_num) continue;
if (txt->styles->styles[k].endCharOffset<char_num+1) continue;
if (txt->styles->styles[k].style_flags & (GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC | GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD | GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) {
new_styles = txt->styles->styles[k].style_flags;
new_color = txt->styles->styles[k].text_color;
break;
}
}
}
if (new_styles != styles) {
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD)) fprintf(dump, "<b>");
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC)) fprintf(dump, "<i>");
if ((new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) && !(styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) fprintf(dump, "<u>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED)) fprintf(dump, "</u>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC)) fprintf(dump, "</i>");
if ((styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) && !(new_styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD)) fprintf(dump, "</b>");
styles = new_styles;
}
if (new_color != color) {
if (new_color ==txtd->default_style.text_color) {
fprintf(dump, "</font>");
} else {
fprintf(dump, "<font color=\"%s\">", gf_color_get_name(new_color) );
}
color = new_color;
}
/*not sure if styles must be reseted at line breaks in srt...*/
is_new_line = GF_FALSE;
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\n') || (utf16Line[j]=='\r') ) {
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\r') && (utf16Line[j+1]=='\n')) j++;
fprintf(dump, "\n");
is_new_line = GF_TRUE;
}
if (!is_new_line) {
size_t sl;
char szChar[30];
s16 swT[2], *swz;
swT[0] = utf16Line[j];
swT[1] = 0;
swz= (s16 *)swT;
sl = gf_utf8_wcstombs(szChar, 30, (const unsigned short **) &swz);
if (sl == (size_t)-1) sl=0;
szChar[(u32) sl]=0;
fprintf(dump, "%s", szChar);
}
char_num++;
}
new_styles = 0;
if (new_styles != styles) {
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_UNDERLINED) fprintf(dump, "</u>");
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_ITALIC) fprintf(dump, "</i>");
if (styles & GF_TXT_STYLE_BOLD) fprintf(dump, "</b>");
}
if (color != txtd->default_style.text_color) {
fprintf(dump, "</font>");
}
fprintf(dump, "\n");
}
gf_isom_sample_del(&s);
gf_isom_delete_text_sample(txt);
fprintf(dump, "\n");
gf_set_progress("SRT Extract", i, count);
}
if (count) gf_set_progress("SRT Extract", i, count);
return GF_OK;
}
| C | gpac | 0 |
CVE-2013-0886 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | 18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetHitTestMask(gfx::Path* mask) const {
}
| void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetHitTestMask(gfx::Path* mask) const {
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-7976 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7976/ | CWE-20 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=user/chrisl/ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d | 6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d | null | gs_lib_ctx_get_default_device_list(const gs_memory_t *mem, char** dev_list_str,
int *list_str_len)
{
/* In the case the lib ctx hasn't been initialised */
if (mem && mem->gs_lib_ctx && mem->gs_lib_ctx->default_device_list) {
*dev_list_str = mem->gs_lib_ctx->default_device_list;
}
else {
*dev_list_str = (char *)gs_dev_defaults;
}
*list_str_len = strlen(*dev_list_str);
return 0;
}
| gs_lib_ctx_get_default_device_list(const gs_memory_t *mem, char** dev_list_str,
int *list_str_len)
{
/* In the case the lib ctx hasn't been initialised */
if (mem && mem->gs_lib_ctx && mem->gs_lib_ctx->default_device_list) {
*dev_list_str = mem->gs_lib_ctx->default_device_list;
}
else {
*dev_list_str = (char *)gs_dev_defaults;
}
*list_str_len = strlen(*dev_list_str);
return 0;
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2011-2795 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2795/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2 | 73edae623529f04c668268de49d00324b96166a2 | There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | String createFullMarkup(const Node* node)
{
if (!node)
return String();
Document* document = node->document();
if (!document)
return String();
Frame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return String();
String markupString = createMarkup(node, IncludeNode, 0);
Node::NodeType nodeType = node->nodeType();
if (nodeType != Node::DOCUMENT_NODE && nodeType != Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE)
markupString = frame->documentTypeString() + markupString;
return markupString;
}
| String createFullMarkup(const Node* node)
{
if (!node)
return String();
Document* document = node->document();
if (!document)
return String();
Frame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return String();
String markupString = createMarkup(node, IncludeNode, 0);
Node::NodeType nodeType = node->nodeType();
if (nodeType != Node::DOCUMENT_NODE && nodeType != Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE)
markupString = frame->documentTypeString() + markupString;
return markupString;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-12232 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12232/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14 | 6d8c50dcb029872b298eea68cc6209c866fd3e14 | socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
return __sys_recvfrom(fd, ubuf, size, flags, addr, addr_len);
}
| SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
return __sys_recvfrom(fd, ubuf, size, flags, addr, addr_len);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-8109 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8109/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb | 3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb | Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | static const char *scope_to_string(unsigned int scope)
{
switch (scope) {
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_ONCE:
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_UNSET:
return "once";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_REQUEST:
return "request";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_CONN:
return "conn";
#if APR_HAS_THREADS
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_THREAD:
return "thread";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_SERVER:
return "server";
#endif
default:
ap_assert(0);
return 0;
}
}
| static const char *scope_to_string(unsigned int scope)
{
switch (scope) {
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_ONCE:
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_UNSET:
return "once";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_REQUEST:
return "request";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_CONN:
return "conn";
#if APR_HAS_THREADS
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_THREAD:
return "thread";
case AP_LUA_SCOPE_SERVER:
return "server";
#endif
default:
ap_assert(0);
return 0;
}
}
| C | httpd | 0 |
CVE-2012-2820 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2820/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dbcfe72cb16222c9f7e7907fcc5f35b27cc25331 | dbcfe72cb16222c9f7e7907fcc5f35b27cc25331 | Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void NetworkActionPredictor::BeginTransaction() {
if (!initialized_)
return;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(content::BrowserThread::DB, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::BeginTransaction, db_));
}
| void NetworkActionPredictor::BeginTransaction() {
if (!initialized_)
return;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(content::BrowserThread::DB, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::BeginTransaction, db_));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-11470 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11470/ | CWE-400 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/e3cdce6fe12193f235b8c0ae5efe6880a25eb957 | e3cdce6fe12193f235b8c0ae5efe6880a25eb957 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterCINImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("CIN","CIN","Cineon Image File");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadCINImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteCINImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsCIN;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| ModuleExport size_t RegisterCINImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("CIN","CIN","Cineon Image File");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadCINImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteCINImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsCIN;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4 | a03d4448faf2c40f4ef444a88cb9aace5b98e8c4 | Introduce background.scripts feature for extension manifests.
This optimizes for the common use case where background pages
just include a reference to one or more script files and no
additional HTML.
BUG=107791
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9150008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@117110 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void TestingAutomationProvider::SaveTabContents(
Browser* browser,
DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
int tab_index = 0;
FilePath::StringType filename;
FilePath::StringType parent_directory;
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!args->GetInteger("tab_index", &tab_index) ||
!args->GetString("filename", &filename)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("tab_index or filename param missing");
return;
} else {
web_contents = browser->GetWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (!web_contents) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError("no tab at tab_index");
return;
}
}
parent_directory = FilePath(filename).DirName().value();
if (!web_contents->SavePage(
FilePath(filename),
FilePath(parent_directory),
SavePackage::SAVE_AS_ONLY_HTML)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError(
"Could not initiate SavePage");
return;
}
new SavePackageNotificationObserver(
DownloadServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
browser->profile())->GetDownloadManager(),
this, reply_message);
}
| void TestingAutomationProvider::SaveTabContents(
Browser* browser,
DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
int tab_index = 0;
FilePath::StringType filename;
FilePath::StringType parent_directory;
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!args->GetInteger("tab_index", &tab_index) ||
!args->GetString("filename", &filename)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message)
.SendError("tab_index or filename param missing");
return;
} else {
web_contents = browser->GetWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (!web_contents) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError("no tab at tab_index");
return;
}
}
parent_directory = FilePath(filename).DirName().value();
if (!web_contents->SavePage(
FilePath(filename),
FilePath(parent_directory),
SavePackage::SAVE_AS_ONLY_HTML)) {
AutomationJSONReply(this, reply_message).SendError(
"Could not initiate SavePage");
return;
}
new SavePackageNotificationObserver(
DownloadServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
browser->profile())->GetDownloadManager(),
this, reply_message);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-5747 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5747/ | CWE-125 | https://git.busybox.net/busybox/commit/?id=74d9f1ba37010face4bd1449df4d60dd84450b06 | 74d9f1ba37010face4bd1449df4d60dd84450b06 | null | static NOINLINE int send_renew(uint32_t xid, uint32_t server, uint32_t ciaddr)
{
struct dhcp_packet packet;
struct in_addr temp_addr;
/*
* RFC 2131 4.3.2 DHCPREQUEST message
* ...
* DHCPREQUEST generated during RENEWING state:
*
* 'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
* option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
* client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
* configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message will
* be unicast, so no relay agents will be involved in its
* transmission. Because 'giaddr' is therefore not filled in, the
* DHCP server will trust the value in 'ciaddr', and use it when
* replying to the client.
*/
/* Fill in: op, htype, hlen, cookie, chaddr fields,
* random xid field (we override it below),
* client-id option (unless -C), message type option:
*/
init_packet(&packet, DHCPREQUEST);
packet.xid = xid;
packet.ciaddr = ciaddr;
/* Add options: maxsize,
* optionally: hostname, fqdn, vendorclass,
* "param req" option according to -O, and options specified with -x
*/
add_client_options(&packet);
temp_addr.s_addr = server;
bb_error_msg("sending renew to %s", inet_ntoa(temp_addr));
return bcast_or_ucast(&packet, ciaddr, server);
}
| static NOINLINE int send_renew(uint32_t xid, uint32_t server, uint32_t ciaddr)
{
struct dhcp_packet packet;
struct in_addr temp_addr;
/*
* RFC 2131 4.3.2 DHCPREQUEST message
* ...
* DHCPREQUEST generated during RENEWING state:
*
* 'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
* option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
* client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
* configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message will
* be unicast, so no relay agents will be involved in its
* transmission. Because 'giaddr' is therefore not filled in, the
* DHCP server will trust the value in 'ciaddr', and use it when
* replying to the client.
*/
/* Fill in: op, htype, hlen, cookie, chaddr fields,
* random xid field (we override it below),
* client-id option (unless -C), message type option:
*/
init_packet(&packet, DHCPREQUEST);
packet.xid = xid;
packet.ciaddr = ciaddr;
/* Add options: maxsize,
* optionally: hostname, fqdn, vendorclass,
* "param req" option according to -O, and options specified with -x
*/
add_client_options(&packet);
temp_addr.s_addr = server;
bb_error_msg("sending renew to %s", inet_ntoa(temp_addr));
return bcast_or_ucast(&packet, ciaddr, server);
}
| C | busybox | 0 |
CVE-2014-1713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static void testInterfacePythonAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestInterfacePythonImplementation*, cppValue, V8TestInterfacePython::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), jsValue));
imp->setTestInterfacePythonAttribute(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
| static void testInterfacePythonAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestInterfacePythonImplementation*, cppValue, V8TestInterfacePython::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), jsValue));
imp->setTestInterfacePythonAttribute(WTF::getPtr(cppValue));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3de7fc7dbb642ed034afa1c1fed70a748a60f35 | e3de7fc7dbb642ed034afa1c1fed70a748a60f35 | Add missing null-check in OverscrollControllerAndroid::Animate()
Without it, there's a crash when running with
disable-overscroll-edge-effect switch.
BUG=501472
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1195453003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#334897} | void OverscrollControllerAndroid::OnGestureEventAck(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& event,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (!enabled_)
return;
if (event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureScrollEnd ||
event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureFlingStart) {
OnOverscrolled(DidOverscrollParams());
}
if (event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureScrollUpdate &&
refresh_effect_) {
bool consumed = ack_result == INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED ||
event.data.scrollUpdate.previousUpdateInSequencePrevented;
refresh_effect_->OnScrollUpdateAck(consumed);
}
}
| void OverscrollControllerAndroid::OnGestureEventAck(
const blink::WebGestureEvent& event,
InputEventAckState ack_result) {
if (!enabled_)
return;
if (event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureScrollEnd ||
event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureFlingStart) {
OnOverscrolled(DidOverscrollParams());
}
if (event.type == blink::WebInputEvent::GestureScrollUpdate &&
refresh_effect_) {
bool consumed = ack_result == INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED ||
event.data.scrollUpdate.previousUpdateInSequencePrevented;
refresh_effect_->OnScrollUpdateAck(consumed);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1929 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1929/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | 715230a44310a8cf66fbfb5a46f9a62a9b2de424 | tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static int tg3_5700_link_polarity(struct tg3 *tp, u32 speed)
{
if (tp->led_ctrl == LED_CTRL_MODE_PHY_2)
return 1;
else if ((tp->phy_id & TG3_PHY_ID_MASK) == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM5411) {
if (speed != SPEED_10)
return 1;
} else if (speed == SPEED_10)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| static int tg3_5700_link_polarity(struct tg3 *tp, u32 speed)
{
if (tp->led_ctrl == LED_CTRL_MODE_PHY_2)
return 1;
else if ((tp->phy_id & TG3_PHY_ID_MASK) == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM5411) {
if (speed != SPEED_10)
return 1;
} else if (speed == SPEED_10)
return 1;
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-5019 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93 | f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93 | Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137} | WebBluetoothServiceImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothServiceRequest request) {
auto web_bluetooth_service =
std::make_unique<WebBluetoothServiceImpl>(this, std::move(request));
web_bluetooth_service->SetClientConnectionErrorHandler(
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::DeleteWebBluetoothService,
base::Unretained(this), web_bluetooth_service.get()));
web_bluetooth_services_.push_back(std::move(web_bluetooth_service));
return web_bluetooth_services_.back().get();
}
| WebBluetoothServiceImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothServiceRequest request) {
auto web_bluetooth_service =
std::make_unique<WebBluetoothServiceImpl>(this, std::move(request));
web_bluetooth_service->SetClientConnectionErrorHandler(
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::DeleteWebBluetoothService,
base::Unretained(this), web_bluetooth_service.get()));
web_bluetooth_services_.push_back(std::move(web_bluetooth_service));
return web_bluetooth_services_.back().get();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1797c8188e7d42f0adf6ce0e607307cd313e1d7d | 1797c8188e7d42f0adf6ce0e607307cd313e1d7d | Set the original URL for downloads
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49628
Reviewed by John Sullivan.
WebCore:
Export symbols needed by WebKit2.
* WebCore.exp.in:
WebKit2:
* WebProcess/Downloads/DownloadManager.cpp:
(WebKit::DownloadManager::startDownload):
* WebProcess/Downloads/DownloadManager.h:
startDownload now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/Downloads/cf/DownloadCFNet.cpp:
(WebKit::Download::start):
start now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/Downloads/mac/DownloadMac.mm:
(WebKit::originatingURL):
(WebKit::setOriginalURLForDownload):
Port code over from WebKit1 that sets the download URL.
(WebKit::Download::start):
Call setOriginalURLForDownload.
* WebProcess/Downloads/qt/DownloadQt.cpp:
(WebKit::Download::start):
start now takes the originating web page.
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebFrame.cpp:
(WebKit::WebFrame::startDownload):
Pass the web page to DownloadManager::startDownload.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@72145 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void WebFrame::suspendAnimations()
{
if (!m_coreFrame)
return;
AnimationController* controller = m_coreFrame->animation();
if (!controller)
return;
controller->suspendAnimations();
}
| void WebFrame::suspendAnimations()
{
if (!m_coreFrame)
return;
AnimationController* controller = m_coreFrame->animation();
if (!controller)
return;
controller->suspendAnimations();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-5148 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void TabStripGtk::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabChangedAt(new_contents, index, ALL);
}
| void TabStripGtk::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabChangedAt(new_contents, index, ALL);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2870 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2870/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9939d35f9827ed0929646607cbdb071af627ac38 | 9939d35f9827ed0929646607cbdb071af627ac38 | Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *token, int novar) {
xsltCompileStepPattern(ctxt, token, novar);
if (ctxt->error)
goto error;
SKIP_BLANKS;
while ((CUR != 0) && (CUR != '|')) {
if ((CUR == '/') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xsltCompileStepPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else if (CUR == '/') {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PARENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((CUR != 0) && (CUR != '|')) {
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
}
} else {
ctxt->error = 1;
}
if (ctxt->error)
goto error;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
error:
return;
}
| xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(xsltParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar *token, int novar) {
xsltCompileStepPattern(ctxt, token, novar);
if (ctxt->error)
goto error;
SKIP_BLANKS;
while ((CUR != 0) && (CUR != '|')) {
if ((CUR == '/') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_ANCESTOR, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xsltCompileStepPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
} else if (CUR == '/') {
PUSH(XSLT_OP_PARENT, NULL, NULL, novar);
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((CUR != 0) && (CUR != '|')) {
xsltCompileRelativePathPattern(ctxt, NULL, novar);
}
} else {
ctxt->error = 1;
}
if (ctxt->error)
goto error;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
error:
return;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-11922 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0 | 3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0 | fixed T36302429 | size_t ZSTD_initCStream_usingCDict_advanced(ZSTD_CStream* zcs,
const ZSTD_CDict* cdict,
ZSTD_frameParameters fParams,
unsigned long long pledgedSrcSize)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_initCStream_usingCDict_advanced");
if (!cdict) return ERROR(dictionary_wrong); /* cannot handle NULL cdict (does not know what to do) */
{ ZSTD_CCtx_params params = zcs->requestedParams;
params.cParams = ZSTD_getCParamsFromCDict(cdict);
params.fParams = fParams;
return ZSTD_initCStream_internal(zcs,
NULL, 0, cdict,
params, pledgedSrcSize);
}
}
| size_t ZSTD_initCStream_usingCDict_advanced(ZSTD_CStream* zcs,
const ZSTD_CDict* cdict,
ZSTD_frameParameters fParams,
unsigned long long pledgedSrcSize)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_initCStream_usingCDict_advanced");
if (!cdict) return ERROR(dictionary_wrong); /* cannot handle NULL cdict (does not know what to do) */
{ ZSTD_CCtx_params params = zcs->requestedParams;
params.cParams = ZSTD_getCParamsFromCDict(cdict);
params.fParams = fParams;
return ZSTD_initCStream_internal(zcs,
NULL, 0, cdict,
params, pledgedSrcSize);
}
}
| C | zstd | 0 |
CVE-2013-4248 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4248/ | CWE-20 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=2874696a5a8d46639d261571f915c493cd875897 | 2874696a5a8d46639d261571f915c493cd875897 | null | static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (timestr->length < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "extension author too lazy to parse %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)timestr->data);
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + timestr->length - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_min = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_hour = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mday = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| static time_t asn1_time_to_time_t(ASN1_UTCTIME * timestr TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
/*
This is how the time string is formatted:
snprintf(p, sizeof(p), "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ",ts->tm_year%100,
ts->tm_mon+1,ts->tm_mday,ts->tm_hour,ts->tm_min,ts->tm_sec);
*/
time_t ret;
struct tm thetime;
char * strbuf;
char * thestr;
long gmadjust = 0;
if (timestr->length < 13) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "extension author too lazy to parse %s correctly", timestr->data);
return (time_t)-1;
}
strbuf = estrdup((char *)timestr->data);
memset(&thetime, 0, sizeof(thetime));
/* we work backwards so that we can use atoi more easily */
thestr = strbuf + timestr->length - 3;
thetime.tm_sec = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_min = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_hour = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mday = atoi(thestr);
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_mon = atoi(thestr)-1;
*thestr = '\0';
thestr -= 2;
thetime.tm_year = atoi(thestr);
if (thetime.tm_year < 68) {
thetime.tm_year += 100;
}
thetime.tm_isdst = -1;
ret = mktime(&thetime);
#if HAVE_TM_GMTOFF
gmadjust = thetime.tm_gmtoff;
#else
/*
** If correcting for daylight savings time, we set the adjustment to
** the value of timezone - 3600 seconds. Otherwise, we need to overcorrect and
** set the adjustment to the main timezone + 3600 seconds.
*/
gmadjust = -(thetime.tm_isdst ? (long)timezone - 3600 : (long)timezone + 3600);
#endif
ret += gmadjust;
efree(strbuf);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2011-2351 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2351/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6 | bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6 | Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | PendingConfigureDataTypesState() : deleted_type(false),
reason(sync_api::CONFIGURE_REASON_UNKNOWN) {}
| PendingConfigureDataTypesState() : deleted_type(false),
reason(sync_api::CONFIGURE_REASON_UNKNOWN) {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-8849 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8849/ | CWE-20 | https://cgit.kde.org/smb4k.git/commit/?id=a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e | a90289b0962663bc1d247bbbd31b9e65b2ca000e | null | Smb4KShare* Smb4KGlobal::findShareByPath(const QString &path)
{
Smb4KShare *share = 0;
mutex.lock();
if (!path.isEmpty() && !p->mountedSharesList.isEmpty())
{
for (Smb4KShare *s : p->mountedSharesList)
{
if (QString::compare(s->path(), path, Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0 ||
QString::compare(s->canonicalPath(), path, Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0)
{
share = s;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
}
else
{
}
mutex.unlock();
return share;
}
| Smb4KShare* Smb4KGlobal::findShareByPath(const QString &path)
{
Smb4KShare *share = 0;
mutex.lock();
if (!path.isEmpty() && !p->mountedSharesList.isEmpty())
{
for (Smb4KShare *s : p->mountedSharesList)
{
if (QString::compare(s->path(), path, Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0 ||
QString::compare(s->canonicalPath(), path, Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0)
{
share = s;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
}
else
{
}
mutex.unlock();
return share;
}
| CPP | kde | 0 |
CVE-2017-5118 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5118/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | 0ab2412a104d2f235d7b9fe19d30ef605a410832 | Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333} | bool Document::IsSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> other = SecurityOrigin::Create(url);
return GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(other.Get());
}
| bool Document::IsSecureTransitionTo(const KURL& url) const {
RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> other = SecurityOrigin::Create(url);
return GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(other.Get());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-1019 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1019/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b | 8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b | net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | int netif_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (netdev_tstamp_prequeue)
net_timestamp_check(skb);
if (skb_defer_rx_timestamp(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
{
struct rps_dev_flow voidflow, *rflow = &voidflow;
int cpu, ret;
rcu_read_lock();
cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
if (cpu >= 0) {
ret = enqueue_to_backlog(skb, cpu, &rflow->last_qtail);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = __netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
return ret;
}
#else
return __netif_receive_skb(skb);
#endif
}
| int netif_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (netdev_tstamp_prequeue)
net_timestamp_check(skb);
if (skb_defer_rx_timestamp(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
{
struct rps_dev_flow voidflow, *rflow = &voidflow;
int cpu, ret;
rcu_read_lock();
cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
if (cpu >= 0) {
ret = enqueue_to_backlog(skb, cpu, &rflow->last_qtail);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
rcu_read_unlock();
ret = __netif_receive_skb(skb);
}
return ret;
}
#else
return __netif_receive_skb(skb);
#endif
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-3191 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | 11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | bool FrameView::isScrollable()
{
IntSize contentsSize = this->contentsSize();
IntSize visibleContentSize = visibleContentRect().size();
if ((contentsSize.height() <= visibleContentSize.height() && contentsSize.width() <= visibleContentSize.width()))
return false;
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = m_frame->deprecatedLocalOwner();
if (owner && (!owner->renderer() || !owner->renderer()->visibleToHitTesting()))
return false;
ScrollbarMode horizontalMode;
ScrollbarMode verticalMode;
calculateScrollbarModesForLayoutAndSetViewportRenderer(horizontalMode, verticalMode, RulesFromWebContentOnly);
if (horizontalMode == ScrollbarAlwaysOff && verticalMode == ScrollbarAlwaysOff)
return false;
return true;
}
| bool FrameView::isScrollable()
{
IntSize contentsSize = this->contentsSize();
IntSize visibleContentSize = visibleContentRect().size();
if ((contentsSize.height() <= visibleContentSize.height() && contentsSize.width() <= visibleContentSize.width()))
return false;
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = m_frame->deprecatedLocalOwner();
if (owner && (!owner->renderer() || !owner->renderer()->visibleToHitTesting()))
return false;
ScrollbarMode horizontalMode;
ScrollbarMode verticalMode;
calculateScrollbarModesForLayoutAndSetViewportRenderer(horizontalMode, verticalMode, RulesFromWebContentOnly);
if (horizontalMode == ScrollbarAlwaysOff && verticalMode == ScrollbarAlwaysOff)
return false;
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3909 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3909/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/d4271b792bdad85a80e2b83ab34c4b30b74f53ec | d4271b792bdad85a80e2b83ab34c4b30b74f53ec | SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
| android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
using namespace android;
if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.h263.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.h263", OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263,
kH263ProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kH263ProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.mpeg4.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.mpeg4", OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4,
kM4VProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kM4VProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else {
CHECK(!"Unknown component");
}
return NULL;
}
| android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
using namespace android;
if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.h263.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.h263", OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263,
kH263ProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kH263ProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else if (!strcmp(name, "OMX.google.mpeg4.decoder")) {
return new android::SoftMPEG4(
name, "video_decoder.mpeg4", OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4,
kM4VProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kM4VProfileLevels),
callbacks, appData, component);
} else {
CHECK(!"Unknown component");
}
return NULL;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2019-17547 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17547/ | null | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/ecf7c6b288e11e7e7f75387c5e9e93e423b98397 | ecf7c6b288e11e7e7f75387c5e9e93e423b98397 | ... | static MagickBooleanType TraceRoundRectangle(MVGInfo *mvg_info,
const PointInfo start,const PointInfo end,PointInfo arc)
{
PointInfo
degrees,
point,
segment;
PrimitiveInfo
*primitive_info;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=mvg_info->offset;
segment.x=fabs(end.x-start.x);
segment.y=fabs(end.y-start.y);
if ((segment.x < MagickEpsilon) || (segment.y < MagickEpsilon))
{
(*mvg_info->primitive_info+mvg_info->offset)->coordinates=0;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (arc.x > (0.5*segment.x))
arc.x=0.5*segment.x;
if (arc.y > (0.5*segment.y))
arc.y=0.5*segment.y;
point.x=start.x+segment.x-arc.x;
point.y=start.y+arc.y;
degrees.x=270.0;
degrees.y=360.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+segment.x-arc.x;
point.y=start.y+segment.y-arc.y;
degrees.x=0.0;
degrees.y=90.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+arc.x;
point.y=start.y+segment.y-arc.y;
degrees.x=90.0;
degrees.y=180.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+arc.x;
point.y=start.y+arc.y;
degrees.x=180.0;
degrees.y=270.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
if (CheckPrimitiveExtent(mvg_info,PrimitiveExtentPad) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
if (TracePoint(p,(*mvg_info->primitive_info+offset)->point) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
mvg_info->offset=offset;
primitive_info=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+offset;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
primitive_info->closed_subpath=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| static MagickBooleanType TraceRoundRectangle(MVGInfo *mvg_info,
const PointInfo start,const PointInfo end,PointInfo arc)
{
PointInfo
degrees,
point,
segment;
PrimitiveInfo
*primitive_info;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=mvg_info->offset;
segment.x=fabs(end.x-start.x);
segment.y=fabs(end.y-start.y);
if ((segment.x < MagickEpsilon) || (segment.y < MagickEpsilon))
{
(*mvg_info->primitive_info+mvg_info->offset)->coordinates=0;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (arc.x > (0.5*segment.x))
arc.x=0.5*segment.x;
if (arc.y > (0.5*segment.y))
arc.y=0.5*segment.y;
point.x=start.x+segment.x-arc.x;
point.y=start.y+arc.y;
degrees.x=270.0;
degrees.y=360.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+segment.x-arc.x;
point.y=start.y+segment.y-arc.y;
degrees.x=0.0;
degrees.y=90.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+arc.x;
point.y=start.y+segment.y-arc.y;
degrees.x=90.0;
degrees.y=180.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
point.x=start.x+arc.x;
point.y=start.y+arc.y;
degrees.x=180.0;
degrees.y=270.0;
if (TraceEllipse(mvg_info,point,arc,degrees) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
mvg_info->offset+=p->coordinates;
if (CheckPrimitiveExtent(mvg_info,PrimitiveExtentPad) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+mvg_info->offset;
if (TracePoint(p,(*mvg_info->primitive_info+offset)->point) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
p+=p->coordinates;
mvg_info->offset=offset;
primitive_info=(*mvg_info->primitive_info)+offset;
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
primitive_info->closed_subpath=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2011-3097 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3097/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d | 027429ee5abe6e2fb5e3b2b4542f0a6fe0dbc12d | Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void SessionService::UpdateTabNavigation(
const SessionID& window_id,
const SessionID& tab_id,
int index,
const NavigationEntry& entry) {
if (!ShouldTrackEntry(entry.GetVirtualURL()) ||
!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id)) {
return;
}
if (tab_to_available_range_.find(tab_id.id()) !=
tab_to_available_range_.end()) {
std::pair<int, int>& range = tab_to_available_range_[tab_id.id()];
range.first = std::min(index, range.first);
range.second = std::max(index, range.second);
}
ScheduleCommand(CreateUpdateTabNavigationCommand(kCommandUpdateTabNavigation,
tab_id.id(), index, entry));
}
| void SessionService::UpdateTabNavigation(
const SessionID& window_id,
const SessionID& tab_id,
int index,
const NavigationEntry& entry) {
if (!ShouldTrackEntry(entry.GetVirtualURL()) ||
!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id)) {
return;
}
if (tab_to_available_range_.find(tab_id.id()) !=
tab_to_available_range_.end()) {
std::pair<int, int>& range = tab_to_available_range_[tab_id.id()];
range.first = std::min(index, range.first);
range.second = std::max(index, range.second);
}
ScheduleCommand(CreateUpdateTabNavigationCommand(kCommandUpdateTabNavigation,
tab_id.id(), index, entry));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387 | 9d02cda7a634fbd6e53d98091f618057f0174387 | Coverity: Fixing pass by value.
CID=101462, 101458, 101437, 101471, 101467
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9006023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115257 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ExtensionHelper::OnInlineWebstoreInstallResponse(
int install_id,
bool success,
const std::string& error) {
ChromeWebstoreExtension::HandleInstallResponse(install_id, success, error);
}
| void ExtensionHelper::OnInlineWebstoreInstallResponse(
int install_id,
bool success,
const std::string& error) {
ChromeWebstoreExtension::HandleInstallResponse(install_id, success, error);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-1713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static void voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| static void voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-3171 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db | d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db | Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | DenseArrayState(v8::Handle<v8::Array> array, v8::Handle<v8::Array> propertyNames, StateBase* next, v8::Isolate* isolate)
: AbstractObjectState(array, next)
, m_arrayIndex(0)
, m_arrayLength(array->Length())
{
m_propertyNames = v8::Local<v8::Array>::New(isolate, propertyNames);
}
| DenseArrayState(v8::Handle<v8::Array> array, v8::Handle<v8::Array> propertyNames, StateBase* next, v8::Isolate* isolate)
: AbstractObjectState(array, next)
, m_arrayIndex(0)
, m_arrayLength(array->Length())
{
m_propertyNames = v8::Local<v8::Array>::New(isolate, propertyNames);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2375 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2375/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68 | 20e0fa98b751facf9a1101edaefbc19c82616a68 | Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> | static void nfs4_zap_acl_attr(struct inode *inode)
{
nfs4_set_cached_acl(inode, NULL);
}
| static void nfs4_zap_acl_attr(struct inode *inode)
{
nfs4_set_cached_acl(inode, NULL);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-4150 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4150/ | CWE-119 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=eea750a5623ddac7a61982eec8f1c93481857578 | eea750a5623ddac7a61982eec8f1c93481857578 | null | static void virtio_net_device_unrealize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(dev);
VirtIONet *n = VIRTIO_NET(dev);
int i;
/* This will stop vhost backend if appropriate. */
virtio_net_set_status(vdev, 0);
unregister_savevm(dev, "virtio-net", n);
if (n->netclient_name) {
g_free(n->netclient_name);
n->netclient_name = NULL;
}
if (n->netclient_type) {
g_free(n->netclient_type);
n->netclient_type = NULL;
}
g_free(n->mac_table.macs);
g_free(n->vlans);
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
VirtIONetQueue *q = &n->vqs[i];
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i);
qemu_purge_queued_packets(nc);
if (q->tx_timer) {
timer_del(q->tx_timer);
timer_free(q->tx_timer);
} else if (q->tx_bh) {
qemu_bh_delete(q->tx_bh);
}
}
g_free(n->vqs);
qemu_del_nic(n->nic);
virtio_cleanup(vdev);
}
| static void virtio_net_device_unrealize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(dev);
VirtIONet *n = VIRTIO_NET(dev);
int i;
/* This will stop vhost backend if appropriate. */
virtio_net_set_status(vdev, 0);
unregister_savevm(dev, "virtio-net", n);
if (n->netclient_name) {
g_free(n->netclient_name);
n->netclient_name = NULL;
}
if (n->netclient_type) {
g_free(n->netclient_type);
n->netclient_type = NULL;
}
g_free(n->mac_table.macs);
g_free(n->vlans);
for (i = 0; i < n->max_queues; i++) {
VirtIONetQueue *q = &n->vqs[i];
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, i);
qemu_purge_queued_packets(nc);
if (q->tx_timer) {
timer_del(q->tx_timer);
timer_free(q->tx_timer);
} else if (q->tx_bh) {
qemu_bh_delete(q->tx_bh);
}
}
g_free(n->vqs);
qemu_del_nic(n->nic);
virtio_cleanup(vdev);
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2018-6079 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6079/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd | d128139d53e9268e87921e82d89b3f2053cb83fd | Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111} | void ContextState::RestoreProgramSettings(
const ContextState* prev_state,
bool restore_transform_feedback_bindings) const {
bool flag = (restore_transform_feedback_bindings &&
feature_info_->IsES3Capable());
if (flag && prev_state) {
if (prev_state->bound_transform_feedback.get() &&
prev_state->bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!prev_state->bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
api()->glPauseTransformFeedbackFn();
}
}
api()->glUseProgramFn(current_program.get() ? current_program->service_id()
: 0);
if (flag) {
if (bound_transform_feedback.get()) {
bound_transform_feedback->DoBindTransformFeedback(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK);
} else {
api()->glBindTransformFeedbackFn(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK, 0);
}
}
}
| void ContextState::RestoreProgramSettings(
const ContextState* prev_state,
bool restore_transform_feedback_bindings) const {
bool flag = (restore_transform_feedback_bindings &&
feature_info_->IsES3Capable());
if (flag && prev_state) {
if (prev_state->bound_transform_feedback.get() &&
prev_state->bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!prev_state->bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
api()->glPauseTransformFeedbackFn();
}
}
api()->glUseProgramFn(current_program.get() ? current_program->service_id()
: 0);
if (flag) {
if (bound_transform_feedback.get()) {
bound_transform_feedback->DoBindTransformFeedback(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK);
} else {
api()->glBindTransformFeedbackFn(GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK, 0);
}
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-1000251 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000251/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe | f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe | Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> | static struct sock *__l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(struct l2cap_chan_list *l, u8 ident)
{
struct sock *s;
for (s = l->head; s; s = l2cap_pi(s)->next_c) {
if (l2cap_pi(s)->ident == ident)
break;
}
return s;
}
| static struct sock *__l2cap_get_chan_by_ident(struct l2cap_chan_list *l, u8 ident)
{
struct sock *s;
for (s = l->head; s; s = l2cap_pi(s)->next_c) {
if (l2cap_pi(s)->ident == ident)
break;
}
return s;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-1080 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1080/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a | d846f71195d57b0bbb143382647c2c6638b04c5a | bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> | ebt_basic_match(const struct ebt_entry *e, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out)
{
const struct ethhdr *h = eth_hdr(skb);
const struct net_bridge_port *p;
__be16 ethproto;
int verdict, i;
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb))
ethproto = htons(ETH_P_8021Q);
else
ethproto = h->h_proto;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3) {
if (FWINV2(ntohs(ethproto) >= 1536, EBT_IPROTO))
return 1;
} else if (!(e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) &&
FWINV2(e->ethproto != ethproto, EBT_IPROTO))
return 1;
if (FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->in, in), EBT_IIN))
return 1;
if (FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->out, out), EBT_IOUT))
return 1;
/* rcu_read_lock()ed by nf_hook_slow */
if (in && (p = br_port_get_rcu(in)) != NULL &&
FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->logical_in, p->br->dev), EBT_ILOGICALIN))
return 1;
if (out && (p = br_port_get_rcu(out)) != NULL &&
FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->logical_out, p->br->dev), EBT_ILOGICALOUT))
return 1;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_SOURCEMAC) {
verdict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
verdict |= (h->h_source[i] ^ e->sourcemac[i]) &
e->sourcemsk[i];
if (FWINV2(verdict != 0, EBT_ISOURCE) )
return 1;
}
if (e->bitmask & EBT_DESTMAC) {
verdict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
verdict |= (h->h_dest[i] ^ e->destmac[i]) &
e->destmsk[i];
if (FWINV2(verdict != 0, EBT_IDEST) )
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| ebt_basic_match(const struct ebt_entry *e, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in, const struct net_device *out)
{
const struct ethhdr *h = eth_hdr(skb);
const struct net_bridge_port *p;
__be16 ethproto;
int verdict, i;
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb))
ethproto = htons(ETH_P_8021Q);
else
ethproto = h->h_proto;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3) {
if (FWINV2(ntohs(ethproto) >= 1536, EBT_IPROTO))
return 1;
} else if (!(e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) &&
FWINV2(e->ethproto != ethproto, EBT_IPROTO))
return 1;
if (FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->in, in), EBT_IIN))
return 1;
if (FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->out, out), EBT_IOUT))
return 1;
/* rcu_read_lock()ed by nf_hook_slow */
if (in && (p = br_port_get_rcu(in)) != NULL &&
FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->logical_in, p->br->dev), EBT_ILOGICALIN))
return 1;
if (out && (p = br_port_get_rcu(out)) != NULL &&
FWINV2(ebt_dev_check(e->logical_out, p->br->dev), EBT_ILOGICALOUT))
return 1;
if (e->bitmask & EBT_SOURCEMAC) {
verdict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
verdict |= (h->h_source[i] ^ e->sourcemac[i]) &
e->sourcemsk[i];
if (FWINV2(verdict != 0, EBT_ISOURCE) )
return 1;
}
if (e->bitmask & EBT_DESTMAC) {
verdict = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
verdict |= (h->h_dest[i] ^ e->destmac[i]) &
e->destmsk[i];
if (FWINV2(verdict != 0, EBT_IDEST) )
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-1274 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1274/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1 | d27468a832d5316884bd02f459cbf493697fd7e1 | Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | DEFINE_TRACE(AXObjectCacheImpl) {
visitor->trace(m_document);
visitor->trace(m_nodeObjectMapping);
visitor->trace(m_objects);
visitor->trace(m_notificationsToPost);
AXObjectCache::trace(visitor);
}
| DEFINE_TRACE(AXObjectCacheImpl) {
visitor->trace(m_document);
visitor->trace(m_nodeObjectMapping);
visitor->trace(m_objects);
visitor->trace(m_notificationsToPost);
AXObjectCache::trace(visitor);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-11922 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11922/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/facebook/zstd/pull/1404/commits/3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0 | 3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0 | fixed T36302429 | static size_t ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
U32 lastFrameChunk)
{
size_t blockSize = cctx->blockSize;
size_t remaining = srcSize;
const BYTE* ip = (const BYTE*)src;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* op = ostart;
U32 const maxDist = (U32)1 << cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog;
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog <= 31);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (blockSize=%u)", (U32)blockSize);
if (cctx->appliedParams.fParams.checksumFlag && srcSize)
XXH64_update(&cctx->xxhState, src, srcSize);
while (remaining) {
ZSTD_matchState_t* const ms = &cctx->blockState.matchState;
U32 const lastBlock = lastFrameChunk & (blockSize >= remaining);
if (dstCapacity < ZSTD_blockHeaderSize + MIN_CBLOCK_SIZE)
return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space to store compressed block */
if (remaining < blockSize) blockSize = remaining;
if (ZSTD_window_needOverflowCorrection(ms->window, ip + blockSize)) {
U32 const cycleLog = ZSTD_cycleLog(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog, cctx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy);
U32 const correction = ZSTD_window_correctOverflow(&ms->window, cycleLog, maxDist, ip);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_CHAINLOG_MAX <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX_32 <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX <= 31);
ZSTD_reduceIndex(cctx, correction);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < correction) ms->nextToUpdate = 0;
else ms->nextToUpdate -= correction;
ms->loadedDictEnd = 0;
ms->dictMatchState = NULL;
}
ZSTD_window_enforceMaxDist(&ms->window, ip + blockSize, maxDist, &ms->loadedDictEnd, &ms->dictMatchState);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < ms->window.lowLimit) ms->nextToUpdate = ms->window.lowLimit;
{ size_t cSize = ZSTD_compressBlock_internal(cctx,
op+ZSTD_blockHeaderSize, dstCapacity-ZSTD_blockHeaderSize,
ip, blockSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
if (cSize == 0) { /* block is not compressible */
cSize = ZSTD_noCompressBlock(op, dstCapacity, ip, blockSize, lastBlock);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
} else {
U32 const cBlockHeader24 = lastBlock + (((U32)bt_compressed)<<1) + (U32)(cSize << 3);
MEM_writeLE24(op, cBlockHeader24);
cSize += ZSTD_blockHeaderSize;
}
ip += blockSize;
assert(remaining >= blockSize);
remaining -= blockSize;
op += cSize;
assert(dstCapacity >= cSize);
dstCapacity -= cSize;
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk: adding a block of size %u",
(U32)cSize);
} }
if (lastFrameChunk && (op>ostart)) cctx->stage = ZSTDcs_ending;
return op-ostart;
}
| static size_t ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
U32 lastFrameChunk)
{
size_t blockSize = cctx->blockSize;
size_t remaining = srcSize;
const BYTE* ip = (const BYTE*)src;
BYTE* const ostart = (BYTE*)dst;
BYTE* op = ostart;
U32 const maxDist = (U32)1 << cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog;
assert(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.windowLog <= 31);
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk (blockSize=%u)", (U32)blockSize);
if (cctx->appliedParams.fParams.checksumFlag && srcSize)
XXH64_update(&cctx->xxhState, src, srcSize);
while (remaining) {
ZSTD_matchState_t* const ms = &cctx->blockState.matchState;
U32 const lastBlock = lastFrameChunk & (blockSize >= remaining);
if (dstCapacity < ZSTD_blockHeaderSize + MIN_CBLOCK_SIZE)
return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall); /* not enough space to store compressed block */
if (remaining < blockSize) blockSize = remaining;
if (ZSTD_window_needOverflowCorrection(ms->window, ip + blockSize)) {
U32 const cycleLog = ZSTD_cycleLog(cctx->appliedParams.cParams.chainLog, cctx->appliedParams.cParams.strategy);
U32 const correction = ZSTD_window_correctOverflow(&ms->window, cycleLog, maxDist, ip);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_CHAINLOG_MAX <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX_32 <= 30);
ZSTD_STATIC_ASSERT(ZSTD_WINDOWLOG_MAX <= 31);
ZSTD_reduceIndex(cctx, correction);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < correction) ms->nextToUpdate = 0;
else ms->nextToUpdate -= correction;
ms->loadedDictEnd = 0;
ms->dictMatchState = NULL;
}
ZSTD_window_enforceMaxDist(&ms->window, ip + blockSize, maxDist, &ms->loadedDictEnd, &ms->dictMatchState);
if (ms->nextToUpdate < ms->window.lowLimit) ms->nextToUpdate = ms->window.lowLimit;
{ size_t cSize = ZSTD_compressBlock_internal(cctx,
op+ZSTD_blockHeaderSize, dstCapacity-ZSTD_blockHeaderSize,
ip, blockSize);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
if (cSize == 0) { /* block is not compressible */
cSize = ZSTD_noCompressBlock(op, dstCapacity, ip, blockSize, lastBlock);
if (ZSTD_isError(cSize)) return cSize;
} else {
U32 const cBlockHeader24 = lastBlock + (((U32)bt_compressed)<<1) + (U32)(cSize << 3);
MEM_writeLE24(op, cBlockHeader24);
cSize += ZSTD_blockHeaderSize;
}
ip += blockSize;
assert(remaining >= blockSize);
remaining -= blockSize;
op += cSize;
assert(dstCapacity >= cSize);
dstCapacity -= cSize;
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_compress_frameChunk: adding a block of size %u",
(U32)cSize);
} }
if (lastFrameChunk && (op>ostart)) cctx->stage = ZSTDcs_ending;
return op-ostart;
}
| C | zstd | 0 |
CVE-2019-17178 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17178/ | CWE-772 | https://github.com/akallabeth/FreeRDP/commit/fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007 | fc80ab45621bd966f70594c0b7393ec005a94007 | Fixed #5645: realloc return handling | static BOOL band_match(const RECTANGLE_16* band1, const RECTANGLE_16* band2, RECTANGLE_16* endPtr)
{
int refBand2 = band2->top;
const RECTANGLE_16* band2Start = band2;
while ((band1 < band2Start) && (band2 < endPtr) && (band2->top == refBand2))
{
if ((band1->left != band2->left) || (band1->right != band2->right))
return FALSE;
band1++;
band2++;
}
if (band1 != band2Start)
return FALSE;
return (band2 == endPtr) || (band2->top != refBand2);
}
| static BOOL band_match(const RECTANGLE_16* band1, const RECTANGLE_16* band2, RECTANGLE_16* endPtr)
{
int refBand2 = band2->top;
const RECTANGLE_16* band2Start = band2;
while ((band1 < band2Start) && (band2 < endPtr) && (band2->top == refBand2))
{
if ((band1->left != band2->left) || (band1->right != band2->right))
return FALSE;
band1++;
band2++;
}
if (band1 != band2Start)
return FALSE;
return (band2 == endPtr) || (band2->top != refBand2);
}
| C | FreeRDP | 0 |
CVE-2017-8072 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8072/ | CWE-388 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e9faa15469ed7c7467423db4c62aeed3ff4cae3 | 8e9faa15469ed7c7467423db4c62aeed3ff4cae3 | HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | static int __maybe_unused cp2112_allocate_irq(struct cp2112_device *dev,
int pin)
{
int ret;
if (dev->desc[pin])
return -EINVAL;
dev->desc[pin] = gpiochip_request_own_desc(&dev->gc, pin,
"HID/I2C:Event");
if (IS_ERR(dev->desc[pin])) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to request GPIO\n");
return PTR_ERR(dev->desc[pin]);
}
ret = gpiochip_lock_as_irq(&dev->gc, pin);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to lock GPIO as interrupt\n");
goto err_desc;
}
ret = gpiod_to_irq(dev->desc[pin]);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to translate GPIO to IRQ\n");
goto err_lock;
}
return ret;
err_lock:
gpiochip_unlock_as_irq(&dev->gc, pin);
err_desc:
gpiochip_free_own_desc(dev->desc[pin]);
dev->desc[pin] = NULL;
return ret;
}
| static int __maybe_unused cp2112_allocate_irq(struct cp2112_device *dev,
int pin)
{
int ret;
if (dev->desc[pin])
return -EINVAL;
dev->desc[pin] = gpiochip_request_own_desc(&dev->gc, pin,
"HID/I2C:Event");
if (IS_ERR(dev->desc[pin])) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to request GPIO\n");
return PTR_ERR(dev->desc[pin]);
}
ret = gpiochip_lock_as_irq(&dev->gc, pin);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to lock GPIO as interrupt\n");
goto err_desc;
}
ret = gpiod_to_irq(dev->desc[pin]);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_err(dev->gc.parent, "Failed to translate GPIO to IRQ\n");
goto err_lock;
}
return ret;
err_lock:
gpiochip_unlock_as_irq(&dev->gc, pin);
err_desc:
gpiochip_free_own_desc(dev->desc[pin]);
dev->desc[pin] = NULL;
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | 1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938 | Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Tab* TabStrip::GetTabAt(Tab* tab, const gfx::Point& tab_in_tab_coordinates) {
gfx::Point local_point = tab_in_tab_coordinates;
ConvertPointToTarget(tab, this, &local_point);
views::View* view = GetEventHandlerForPoint(local_point);
if (!view)
return NULL; // No tab contains the point.
while (view && view != this && view->id() != VIEW_ID_TAB)
view = view->parent();
return view && view->id() == VIEW_ID_TAB ? static_cast<Tab*>(view) : NULL;
}
| Tab* TabStrip::GetTabAt(Tab* tab, const gfx::Point& tab_in_tab_coordinates) {
gfx::Point local_point = tab_in_tab_coordinates;
ConvertPointToTarget(tab, this, &local_point);
views::View* view = GetEventHandlerForPoint(local_point);
if (!view)
return NULL; // No tab contains the point.
while (view && view != this && view->id() != VIEW_ID_TAB)
view = view->parent();
return view && view->id() == VIEW_ID_TAB ? static_cast<Tab*>(view) : NULL;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-5344 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-5344/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5 | ae6650163c66a7eff1acd6eb8b0f752dcfa8eba5 | loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> | static ssize_t loop_attr_show(struct device *dev, char *page,
ssize_t (*callback)(struct loop_device *, char *))
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data;
return callback(lo, page);
}
| static ssize_t loop_attr_show(struct device *dev, char *page,
ssize_t (*callback)(struct loop_device *, char *))
{
struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev);
struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data;
return callback(lo, page);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3454ed7b88318dcd4539c6e1a50d27b0ca535686 | 3454ed7b88318dcd4539c6e1a50d27b0ca535686 | Allow automatic search engine detection on https
BUG=521128
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1393113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352982} | bool SearchEngineTabHelper::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(SearchEngineTabHelper, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_PageHasOSDD, OnPageHasOSDD)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| bool SearchEngineTabHelper::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(SearchEngineTabHelper, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ChromeViewHostMsg_PageHasOSDD, OnPageHasOSDD)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-9526 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9526/ | CWE-200 | https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=commit;h=5a22de904a0a366ae79f03ff1e13a1232a89e26b | 5a22de904a0a366ae79f03ff1e13a1232a89e26b | null | eddsa_encodempi (gcry_mpi_t mpi, unsigned int minlen,
unsigned char **r_buffer, unsigned int *r_buflen)
{
unsigned char *rawmpi;
unsigned int rawmpilen;
rawmpi = _gcry_mpi_get_buffer (mpi, minlen, &rawmpilen, NULL);
if (!rawmpi)
return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
*r_buffer = rawmpi;
*r_buflen = rawmpilen;
return 0;
}
| eddsa_encodempi (gcry_mpi_t mpi, unsigned int minlen,
unsigned char **r_buffer, unsigned int *r_buflen)
{
unsigned char *rawmpi;
unsigned int rawmpilen;
rawmpi = _gcry_mpi_get_buffer (mpi, minlen, &rawmpilen, NULL);
if (!rawmpi)
return gpg_err_code_from_syserror ();
*r_buffer = rawmpi;
*r_buflen = rawmpilen;
return 0;
}
| C | gnupg | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a | aac449e7154720b895ff1e7f3497c2ce95ae1a5a | POSIX: make sure that we never pass directory descriptors into the sandbox.
BUG=43304
http://codereview.chromium.org/2733011/show
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@49446 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | int Lookup(const std::string& channel_id) {
AutoLock locked(lock_);
ChannelToFDMap::const_iterator i = map_.find(channel_id);
if (i == map_.end())
return -1;
return i->second;
}
| int Lookup(const std::string& channel_id) {
AutoLock locked(lock_);
ChannelToFDMap::const_iterator i = map_.find(channel_id);
if (i == map_.end())
return -1;
return i->second;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-8284 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8284/ | CWE-94 | https://github.com/qemu/qemu/commit/30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14 | 30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14 | tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static inline void gen_op_ld_v(DisasContext *s, int idx, TCGv t0, TCGv a0)
{
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_tl(t0, a0, s->mem_index, idx | MO_LE);
}
| static inline void gen_op_ld_v(DisasContext *s, int idx, TCGv t0, TCGv a0)
{
tcg_gen_qemu_ld_tl(t0, a0, s->mem_index, idx | MO_LE);
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2016-5189 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5189/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd | 2440e872debd68ae7c2a8bf9ddb34df2cce378cd | [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278} | HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::CreateGaiaLogonToken(
base::win::ScopedHandle* token,
PSID* sid) {
DCHECK(token);
DCHECK(sid);
auto policy = ScopedLsaPolicy::Create(POLICY_ALL_ACCESS);
if (!policy) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "LsaOpenPolicy failed";
return E_UNEXPECTED;
}
wchar_t gaia_username[kWindowsUsernameBufferLength];
HRESULT hr = policy->RetrievePrivateData(kLsaKeyGaiaUsername, gaia_username,
base::size(gaia_username));
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Retrieve gaia username hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
wchar_t password[32];
hr = policy->RetrievePrivateData(kLsaKeyGaiaPassword, password,
base::size(password));
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Retrieve password for gaia user '" << gaia_username
<< "' hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
base::string16 local_domain = OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain();
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->CreateLogonToken(local_domain.c_str(),
gaia_username, password,
/*interactive=*/false, token);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "CreateLogonToken hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
hr = OSProcessManager::Get()->GetTokenLogonSID(*token, sid);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "GetTokenLogonSID hr=" << putHR(hr);
token->Close();
return hr;
}
wchar_t* sid_string;
if (::ConvertSidToStringSid(*sid, &sid_string)) {
LOGFN(INFO) << "logon-sid=" << sid_string;
LocalFree(sid_string);
} else {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "logon-sid=<can't get string>";
}
return S_OK;
}
| HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::CreateGaiaLogonToken(
base::win::ScopedHandle* token,
PSID* sid) {
DCHECK(token);
DCHECK(sid);
auto policy = ScopedLsaPolicy::Create(POLICY_ALL_ACCESS);
if (!policy) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "LsaOpenPolicy failed";
return E_UNEXPECTED;
}
wchar_t gaia_username[kWindowsUsernameBufferLength];
HRESULT hr = policy->RetrievePrivateData(kLsaKeyGaiaUsername, gaia_username,
base::size(gaia_username));
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Retrieve gaia username hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
wchar_t password[32];
hr = policy->RetrievePrivateData(kLsaKeyGaiaPassword, password,
base::size(password));
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "Retrieve password for gaia user '" << gaia_username
<< "' hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
base::string16 local_domain = OSUserManager::GetLocalDomain();
hr = OSUserManager::Get()->CreateLogonToken(local_domain.c_str(),
gaia_username, password,
/*interactive=*/false, token);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "CreateLogonToken hr=" << putHR(hr);
return hr;
}
hr = OSProcessManager::Get()->GetTokenLogonSID(*token, sid);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "GetTokenLogonSID hr=" << putHR(hr);
token->Close();
return hr;
}
wchar_t* sid_string;
if (::ConvertSidToStringSid(*sid, &sid_string)) {
LOGFN(INFO) << "logon-sid=" << sid_string;
LocalFree(sid_string);
} else {
LOGFN(ERROR) << "logon-sid=<can't get string>";
}
return S_OK;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5218 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303 | 45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303 | Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498} | void TabStrip::OnMouseExited(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
UpdateHoverCard(nullptr, false);
}
| void TabStrip::OnMouseExited(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
UpdateHoverCard(nullptr, false);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-6817 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6817/ | CWE-287 | https://github.com/pgbouncer/pgbouncer/commit/7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38 | 7ca3e5279d05fceb1e8a043c6f5b6f58dea3ed38 | Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69. | static const char *hdr2hex(const struct MBuf *data, char *buf, unsigned buflen)
{
const uint8_t *bin = data->data + data->read_pos;
unsigned int dlen;
dlen = mbuf_avail_for_read(data);
return bin2hex(bin, dlen, buf, buflen);
}
| static const char *hdr2hex(const struct MBuf *data, char *buf, unsigned buflen)
{
const uint8_t *bin = data->data + data->read_pos;
unsigned int dlen;
dlen = mbuf_avail_for_read(data);
return bin2hex(bin, dlen, buf, buflen);
}
| C | pgbouncer | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf | 19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf | Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
TBR=akalin@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool SyncerProtoUtil::PostClientToServerMessage(
const ClientToServerMessage& msg,
ClientToServerResponse* response,
SyncSession* session) {
CHECK(response);
DCHECK(!msg.get_updates().has_from_timestamp()); // Deprecated.
DCHECK(!msg.get_updates().has_requested_types()); // Deprecated.
DCHECK(msg.has_store_birthday() || IsVeryFirstGetUpdates(msg))
<< "Must call AddRequestBirthday to set birthday.";
ScopedDirLookup dir(session->context()->directory_manager(),
session->context()->account_name());
if (!dir.good())
return false;
if (!PostAndProcessHeaders(session->context()->connection_manager(), session,
msg, response))
return false;
browser_sync::SyncProtocolError sync_protocol_error;
if (!VerifyResponseBirthday(dir, response)) {
sync_protocol_error.error_type = browser_sync::NOT_MY_BIRTHDAY;
sync_protocol_error.action =
browser_sync::DISABLE_SYNC_ON_CLIENT;
} else if (response->has_error()) {
sync_protocol_error = ConvertErrorPBToLocalType(response->error());
} else {
sync_protocol_error = ConvertLegacyErrorCodeToNewError(
response->error_code());
}
sessions::StatusController* status = session->status_controller();
status->set_sync_protocol_error(sync_protocol_error);
session->delegate()->OnSyncProtocolError(session->TakeSnapshot());
switch (sync_protocol_error.error_type) {
case browser_sync::UNKNOWN_ERROR:
LOG(WARNING) << "Sync protocol out-of-date. The server is using a more "
<< "recent version.";
return false;
case browser_sync::SYNC_SUCCESS:
LogResponseProfilingData(*response);
return true;
case browser_sync::THROTTLED:
LOG(WARNING) << "Client silenced by server.";
session->delegate()->OnSilencedUntil(base::TimeTicks::Now() +
GetThrottleDelay(*response));
return false;
case browser_sync::TRANSIENT_ERROR:
return false;
case browser_sync::MIGRATION_DONE:
HandleMigrationDoneResponse(response, session);
return false;
case browser_sync::CLEAR_PENDING:
case browser_sync::NOT_MY_BIRTHDAY:
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
}
| bool SyncerProtoUtil::PostClientToServerMessage(
const ClientToServerMessage& msg,
ClientToServerResponse* response,
SyncSession* session) {
CHECK(response);
DCHECK(!msg.get_updates().has_from_timestamp()); // Deprecated.
DCHECK(!msg.get_updates().has_requested_types()); // Deprecated.
DCHECK(msg.has_store_birthday() || IsVeryFirstGetUpdates(msg))
<< "Must call AddRequestBirthday to set birthday.";
ScopedDirLookup dir(session->context()->directory_manager(),
session->context()->account_name());
if (!dir.good())
return false;
if (!PostAndProcessHeaders(session->context()->connection_manager(), session,
msg, response))
return false;
browser_sync::SyncProtocolError sync_protocol_error;
if (!VerifyResponseBirthday(dir, response)) {
sync_protocol_error.error_type = browser_sync::NOT_MY_BIRTHDAY;
sync_protocol_error.action =
browser_sync::DISABLE_SYNC_ON_CLIENT;
} else if (response->has_error()) {
sync_protocol_error = ConvertErrorPBToLocalType(response->error());
} else {
sync_protocol_error = ConvertLegacyErrorCodeToNewError(
response->error_code());
}
sessions::StatusController* status = session->status_controller();
status->set_sync_protocol_error(sync_protocol_error);
session->delegate()->OnSyncProtocolError(session->TakeSnapshot());
switch (sync_protocol_error.error_type) {
case browser_sync::UNKNOWN_ERROR:
LOG(WARNING) << "Sync protocol out-of-date. The server is using a more "
<< "recent version.";
return false;
case browser_sync::SYNC_SUCCESS:
LogResponseProfilingData(*response);
return true;
case browser_sync::THROTTLED:
LOG(WARNING) << "Client silenced by server.";
session->delegate()->OnSilencedUntil(base::TimeTicks::Now() +
GetThrottleDelay(*response));
return false;
case browser_sync::TRANSIENT_ERROR:
return false;
case browser_sync::MIGRATION_DONE:
HandleMigrationDoneResponse(response, session);
return false;
case browser_sync::CLEAR_PENDING:
case browser_sync::NOT_MY_BIRTHDAY:
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3751 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/ | null | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca | 9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca | DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| allocbuffer(Image *image)
{
png_size_t size = PNG_IMAGE_BUFFER_SIZE(image->image, image->stride);
if (size+32 > image->bufsize)
{
freebuffer(image);
image->buffer = voidcast(png_bytep, malloc(size+32));
if (image->buffer == NULL)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr,
"simpletest: out of memory allocating %lu(+32) byte buffer\n",
(unsigned long)size);
exit(1);
}
image->bufsize = size+32;
}
memset(image->buffer, 95, image->bufsize);
memset(image->buffer+16, BUFFER_INIT8, size);
image->allocsize = size;
}
| allocbuffer(Image *image)
{
png_size_t size = PNG_IMAGE_BUFFER_SIZE(image->image, image->stride);
if (size+32 > image->bufsize)
{
freebuffer(image);
image->buffer = voidcast(png_bytep, malloc(size+32));
if (image->buffer == NULL)
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr,
"simpletest: out of memory allocating %lu(+32) byte buffer\n",
(unsigned long)size);
exit(1);
}
image->bufsize = size+32;
}
memset(image->buffer, 95, image->bufsize);
memset(image->buffer+16, BUFFER_INIT8, size);
image->allocsize = size;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2013-2853 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2853/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c18dbcb79e5f700c453d1ac01fb6d8768e4844a | 9c18dbcb79e5f700c453d1ac01fb6d8768e4844a | net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | int HttpStreamParser::DoReadBodyComplete(int result) {
if (result == 0 && !IsResponseBodyComplete() && CanFindEndOfResponse()) {
if (chunked_decoder_.get())
result = ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING;
else
result = ERR_CONTENT_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
if (result > 0 && chunked_decoder_.get()) {
result = chunked_decoder_->FilterBuf(user_read_buf_->data(), result);
if (result == 0 && !chunked_decoder_->reached_eof()) {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_BODY;
return OK;
}
}
if (result > 0)
response_body_read_ += result;
if (result <= 0 || IsResponseBodyComplete()) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
int additional_save_amount = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
int save_amount = 0;
if (chunked_decoder_.get()) {
save_amount = chunked_decoder_->bytes_after_eof();
} else if (response_body_length_ >= 0) {
int64 extra_data_read = response_body_read_ - response_body_length_;
if (extra_data_read > 0) {
save_amount = static_cast<int>(extra_data_read);
if (result > 0)
result -= save_amount;
}
}
CHECK_LE(save_amount + additional_save_amount, kMaxBufSize);
if (read_buf_->capacity() < save_amount + additional_save_amount) {
read_buf_->SetCapacity(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
if (save_amount) {
memcpy(read_buf_->StartOfBuffer(), user_read_buf_->data() + result,
save_amount);
}
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount);
if (additional_save_amount) {
memmove(read_buf_->data(),
read_buf_->StartOfBuffer() + read_buf_unused_offset_,
additional_save_amount);
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
} else {
io_state_ = STATE_BODY_PENDING;
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
}
return result;
}
| int HttpStreamParser::DoReadBodyComplete(int result) {
if (result == 0 && !IsResponseBodyComplete() && CanFindEndOfResponse()) {
if (chunked_decoder_.get())
result = ERR_INCOMPLETE_CHUNKED_ENCODING;
else
result = ERR_CONTENT_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
if (result > 0 && chunked_decoder_.get()) {
result = chunked_decoder_->FilterBuf(user_read_buf_->data(), result);
if (result == 0 && !chunked_decoder_->reached_eof()) {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_BODY;
return OK;
}
}
if (result > 0)
response_body_read_ += result;
if (result <= 0 || IsResponseBodyComplete()) {
io_state_ = STATE_DONE;
int additional_save_amount = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
int save_amount = 0;
if (chunked_decoder_.get()) {
save_amount = chunked_decoder_->bytes_after_eof();
} else if (response_body_length_ >= 0) {
int64 extra_data_read = response_body_read_ - response_body_length_;
if (extra_data_read > 0) {
save_amount = static_cast<int>(extra_data_read);
if (result > 0)
result -= save_amount;
}
}
CHECK_LE(save_amount + additional_save_amount, kMaxBufSize);
if (read_buf_->capacity() < save_amount + additional_save_amount) {
read_buf_->SetCapacity(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
if (save_amount) {
memcpy(read_buf_->StartOfBuffer(), user_read_buf_->data() + result,
save_amount);
}
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount);
if (additional_save_amount) {
memmove(read_buf_->data(),
read_buf_->StartOfBuffer() + read_buf_unused_offset_,
additional_save_amount);
read_buf_->set_offset(save_amount + additional_save_amount);
}
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
} else {
io_state_ = STATE_BODY_PENDING;
user_read_buf_ = NULL;
user_read_buf_len_ = 0;
}
return result;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-8543 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8543/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | 79462ad02e861803b3840cc782248c7359451cd9 | net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static int irda_open_lsap(struct irda_sock *self, int pid)
{
notify_t notify;
if (self->lsap) {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s(), busy!\n", __func__);
return -EBUSY;
}
/* Initialize callbacks to be used by the IrDA stack */
irda_notify_init(¬ify);
notify.udata_indication = irda_data_indication;
notify.instance = self;
strncpy(notify.name, "Ultra", NOTIFY_MAX_NAME);
self->lsap = irlmp_open_lsap(LSAP_CONNLESS, ¬ify, pid);
if (self->lsap == NULL) {
pr_debug("%s(), Unable to allocate LSAP!\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
| static int irda_open_lsap(struct irda_sock *self, int pid)
{
notify_t notify;
if (self->lsap) {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s(), busy!\n", __func__);
return -EBUSY;
}
/* Initialize callbacks to be used by the IrDA stack */
irda_notify_init(¬ify);
notify.udata_indication = irda_data_indication;
notify.instance = self;
strncpy(notify.name, "Ultra", NOTIFY_MAX_NAME);
self->lsap = irlmp_open_lsap(LSAP_CONNLESS, ¬ify, pid);
if (self->lsap == NULL) {
pr_debug("%s(), Unable to allocate LSAP!\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-1116 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1116/ | CWE-200 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/polkit/commit/?id=bc7ffad5364 | bc7ffad53643a9c80231fc41f5582d6a8931c32c | null | sd_source_prepare (GSource *source,
gint *timeout)
{
*timeout = -1;
return FALSE;
}
| sd_source_prepare (GSource *source,
gint *timeout)
{
*timeout = -1;
return FALSE;
}
| C | polkit | 0 |
CVE-2016-5337 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5337/ | CWE-200 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6 | 844864fbae66935951529408831c2f22367a57b6 | null | static int megasas_dcmd_ld_get_list(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
struct mfi_ld_list info;
size_t dcmd_size = sizeof(info), resid;
uint32_t num_ld_disks = 0, max_ld_disks;
uint64_t ld_size;
BusChild *kid;
memset(&info, 0, dcmd_size);
if (cmd->iov_size > dcmd_size) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_xfer_len(cmd->index, cmd->iov_size,
dcmd_size);
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
max_ld_disks = (cmd->iov_size - 8) / 16;
if (megasas_is_jbod(s)) {
max_ld_disks = 0;
}
if (max_ld_disks > MFI_MAX_LD) {
max_ld_disks = MFI_MAX_LD;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &s->bus.qbus.children, sibling) {
SCSIDevice *sdev = SCSI_DEVICE(kid->child);
if (num_ld_disks >= max_ld_disks) {
break;
}
/* Logical device size is in blocks */
blk_get_geometry(sdev->conf.blk, &ld_size);
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].ld.v.target_id = sdev->id;
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].state = MFI_LD_STATE_OPTIMAL;
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].size = cpu_to_le64(ld_size);
num_ld_disks++;
}
info.ld_count = cpu_to_le32(num_ld_disks);
trace_megasas_dcmd_ld_get_list(cmd->index, num_ld_disks, max_ld_disks);
resid = dma_buf_read((uint8_t *)&info, dcmd_size, &cmd->qsg);
cmd->iov_size = dcmd_size - resid;
return MFI_STAT_OK;
}
| static int megasas_dcmd_ld_get_list(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
struct mfi_ld_list info;
size_t dcmd_size = sizeof(info), resid;
uint32_t num_ld_disks = 0, max_ld_disks;
uint64_t ld_size;
BusChild *kid;
memset(&info, 0, dcmd_size);
if (cmd->iov_size > dcmd_size) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_xfer_len(cmd->index, cmd->iov_size,
dcmd_size);
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
max_ld_disks = (cmd->iov_size - 8) / 16;
if (megasas_is_jbod(s)) {
max_ld_disks = 0;
}
if (max_ld_disks > MFI_MAX_LD) {
max_ld_disks = MFI_MAX_LD;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &s->bus.qbus.children, sibling) {
SCSIDevice *sdev = SCSI_DEVICE(kid->child);
if (num_ld_disks >= max_ld_disks) {
break;
}
/* Logical device size is in blocks */
blk_get_geometry(sdev->conf.blk, &ld_size);
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].ld.v.target_id = sdev->id;
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].state = MFI_LD_STATE_OPTIMAL;
info.ld_list[num_ld_disks].size = cpu_to_le64(ld_size);
num_ld_disks++;
}
info.ld_count = cpu_to_le32(num_ld_disks);
trace_megasas_dcmd_ld_get_list(cmd->index, num_ld_disks, max_ld_disks);
resid = dma_buf_read((uint8_t *)&info, dcmd_size, &cmd->qsg);
cmd->iov_size = dcmd_size - resid;
return MFI_STAT_OK;
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2011-2858 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2858/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244 | c13e1da62b5f5f0e6fe8c1f769a5a28415415244 | Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void DoReleaseShaderCompiler() { }
| void DoReleaseShaderCompiler() { }
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3053 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae | c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae | chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | AddDNSCertProvenanceCheckingWarningInfoBarIfNecessary(
TabContentsWrapper* tab) {
if (!command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDNSCertProvenanceChecking))
return;
const char* kLearnMoreURL =
"http://dev.chromium.org/dnscertprovenancechecking";
string16 message = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_DNS_CERT_PROVENANCE_CHECKING_WARNING_MESSAGE);
tab->infobar_tab_helper()->AddInfoBar(
new LearnMoreInfoBar(tab->infobar_tab_helper(),
message,
GURL(kLearnMoreURL)));
}
| AddDNSCertProvenanceCheckingWarningInfoBarIfNecessary(
TabContentsWrapper* tab) {
if (!command_line_.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDNSCertProvenanceChecking))
return;
const char* kLearnMoreURL =
"http://dev.chromium.org/dnscertprovenancechecking";
string16 message = l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_DNS_CERT_PROVENANCE_CHECKING_WARNING_MESSAGE);
tab->infobar_tab_helper()->AddInfoBar(
new LearnMoreInfoBar(tab->infobar_tab_helper(),
message,
GURL(kLearnMoreURL)));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-16078 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16078/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7 | b025e82307a8490501bb030266cd955c391abcb7 | [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315} | bool AutofillManager::ShouldUploadForm(const FormStructure& form) {
return IsAutofillEnabled() && !driver()->IsIncognito() &&
form.ShouldBeUploaded();
}
| bool AutofillManager::ShouldUploadForm(const FormStructure& form) {
return IsAutofillEnabled() && !driver()->IsIncognito() &&
form.ShouldBeUploaded();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-1742 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1742/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/870f3e99a1282023753fe8d8aed90879cbc6838f | 870f3e99a1282023753fe8d8aed90879cbc6838f | Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690} | void EndTraceAndFlushInThreadWithMessageLoop() {
WaitableEvent flush_complete_event(false, false);
Thread flush_thread("flush");
flush_thread.Start();
flush_thread.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&TraceEventTestFixture::EndTraceAndFlushAsync,
base::Unretained(this), &flush_complete_event));
flush_complete_event.Wait();
}
| void EndTraceAndFlushInThreadWithMessageLoop() {
WaitableEvent flush_complete_event(false, false);
Thread flush_thread("flush");
flush_thread.Start();
flush_thread.task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&TraceEventTestFixture::EndTraceAndFlushAsync,
base::Unretained(this), &flush_complete_event));
flush_complete_event.Wait();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-20784 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20784/ | CWE-400 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | static inline bool nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle)
{
return false;
}
| static inline bool nohz_idle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, enum cpu_idle_type idle)
{
return false;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-20067 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823} | void RenderViewImpl::OnMoveOrResizeStarted() {
if (webview())
webview()->HidePopups();
}
| void RenderViewImpl::OnMoveOrResizeStarted() {
if (webview())
webview()->HidePopups();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-12904 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | 727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static inline void evmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value) {}
| static inline void evmcs_write16(unsigned long field, u16 value) {}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-17206 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/ | null | https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | 9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org> | parse_METER(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
*usable_protocols &= OFPUTIL_P_OF13_UP;
return str_to_u32(arg, &ofpact_put_METER(ofpacts)->meter_id);
}
| parse_METER(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
*usable_protocols &= OFPUTIL_P_OF13_UP;
return str_to_u32(arg, &ofpact_put_METER(ofpacts)->meter_id);
}
| C | ovs | 0 |
CVE-2017-1000198 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000198/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/open-iscsi/tcmu-runner/commit/61bd03e600d2abf309173e9186f4d465bb1b7157 | 61bd03e600d2abf309173e9186f4d465bb1b7157 | glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com> | static int tcmu_glfs_read(struct tcmu_device *dev,
struct tcmulib_cmd *cmd,
struct iovec *iov, size_t iov_cnt,
size_t length, off_t offset)
{
struct glfs_state *state = tcmu_get_dev_private(dev);
glfs_cbk_cookie *cookie;
cookie = calloc(1, sizeof(*cookie));
if (!cookie) {
tcmu_err("Could not allocate cookie: %m\n");
goto out;
}
cookie->dev = dev;
cookie->cmd = cmd;
cookie->length = length;
cookie->op = TCMU_GLFS_READ;
if (glfs_preadv_async(state->gfd, iov, iov_cnt, offset, SEEK_SET,
glfs_async_cbk, cookie) < 0) {
tcmu_err("glfs_preadv_async failed: %m\n");
goto out;
}
return 0;
out:
free(cookie);
return SAM_STAT_TASK_SET_FULL;
}
| static int tcmu_glfs_read(struct tcmu_device *dev,
struct tcmulib_cmd *cmd,
struct iovec *iov, size_t iov_cnt,
size_t length, off_t offset)
{
struct glfs_state *state = tcmu_get_dev_private(dev);
glfs_cbk_cookie *cookie;
cookie = calloc(1, sizeof(*cookie));
if (!cookie) {
tcmu_err("Could not allocate cookie: %m\n");
goto out;
}
cookie->dev = dev;
cookie->cmd = cmd;
cookie->length = length;
cookie->op = TCMU_GLFS_READ;
if (glfs_preadv_async(state->gfd, iov, iov_cnt, offset, SEEK_SET,
glfs_async_cbk, cookie) < 0) {
tcmu_err("glfs_preadv_async failed: %m\n");
goto out;
}
return 0;
out:
free(cookie);
return SAM_STAT_TASK_SET_FULL;
}
| C | tcmu-runner | 0 |
CVE-2017-8063 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8063/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc | 3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc | [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> | static int dib7070_set_param_override(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *p = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = fe->dvb->priv;
struct dib0700_adapter_state *state = adap->priv;
u16 offset;
u8 band = BAND_OF_FREQUENCY(p->frequency/1000);
switch (band) {
case BAND_VHF: offset = 950; break;
default:
case BAND_UHF: offset = 550; break;
}
state->dib7000p_ops.set_wbd_ref(fe, offset + dib0070_wbd_offset(fe));
return state->set_param_save(fe);
}
| static int dib7070_set_param_override(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *p = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap = fe->dvb->priv;
struct dib0700_adapter_state *state = adap->priv;
u16 offset;
u8 band = BAND_OF_FREQUENCY(p->frequency/1000);
switch (band) {
case BAND_VHF: offset = 950; break;
default:
case BAND_UHF: offset = 550; break;
}
state->dib7000p_ops.set_wbd_ref(fe, offset + dib0070_wbd_offset(fe));
return state->set_param_save(fe);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206 | b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206 | Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool WebFrameLoaderClient::representationExistsForURLScheme(const String& URLScheme) const {
return false;
}
| bool WebFrameLoaderClient::representationExistsForURLScheme(const String& URLScheme) const {
return false;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-1768 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1768/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d5aa407f59f5b83d2c50ec88f5bf56d40f1f8978 | d5aa407f59f5b83d2c50ec88f5bf56d40f1f8978 | tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static int ip4ip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return ip6_tnl_rcv(skb, ETH_P_IP, IPPROTO_IPIP,
ip4ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate);
}
| static int ip4ip6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return ip6_tnl_rcv(skb, ETH_P_IP, IPPROTO_IPIP,
ip4ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-0811 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0811/ | CWE-200 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform%2Fframeworks%2Fav/+/22f824feac43d5758f9a70b77f2aca840ba62c3b | 22f824feac43d5758f9a70b77f2aca840ba62c3b | Fix security vulnerability in ICrypto DO NOT MERGE
b/25800375
Change-Id: I03c9395f7c7de4ac5813a1207452aac57aa39484
| virtual status_t destroyPlugin() {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(ICrypto::getInterfaceDescriptor());
remote()->transact(DESTROY_PLUGIN, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
| virtual status_t destroyPlugin() {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(ICrypto::getInterfaceDescriptor());
remote()->transact(DESTROY_PLUGIN, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2016-9539 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9539/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/ae9365db1b271b62b35ce018eac8799b1d5e8a53 | ae9365db1b271b62b35ce018eac8799b1d5e8a53 | * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | static int writeBufferToContigTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth, tsample_t spp,
struct dump_opts* dump)
{
uint16 bps;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row, col, nrow, ncol;
uint32 src_rowsize, col_offset;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
tsize_t tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
if( !TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps) )
return 1;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0 || tl == 0 || tw == 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Tile size, tile row size, tile width, or tile length is zero");
exit(-1);
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 1;
src_rowsize = ((imagewidth * spp * bps) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
/* Calculate visible portion of tile. */
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
col_offset = (((col * bps * spp) + 7) / 8);
bufp = buf + (row * src_rowsize) + col_offset;
if (extractContigSamplesToTileBuffer(tilebuf, bufp, nrow, ncol, imagewidth,
tw, 0, spp, spp, bps, dump) > 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Unable to extract data to tile for row %lu, col %lu",
(unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)col);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Cannot write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 0;
} /* end writeBufferToContigTiles */
| static int writeBufferToContigTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth, tsample_t spp,
struct dump_opts* dump)
{
uint16 bps;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row, col, nrow, ncol;
uint32 src_rowsize, col_offset;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
tsize_t tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
if( !TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps) )
return 1;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0 || tl == 0 || tw == 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Tile size, tile row size, tile width, or tile length is zero");
exit(-1);
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 1;
src_rowsize = ((imagewidth * spp * bps) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
/* Calculate visible portion of tile. */
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
col_offset = (((col * bps * spp) + 7) / 8);
bufp = buf + (row * src_rowsize) + col_offset;
if (extractContigSamplesToTileBuffer(tilebuf, bufp, nrow, ncol, imagewidth,
tw, 0, spp, spp, bps, dump) > 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Unable to extract data to tile for row %lu, col %lu",
(unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)col);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Cannot write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 0;
} /* end writeBufferToContigTiles */
| C | libtiff | 0 |
CVE-2013-0904 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a | b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a | Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static inline int adjustedScrollDelta(int beginningDelta)
{
const int speedReducer = 12;
int adjustedDelta = beginningDelta / speedReducer;
if (adjustedDelta > 1)
adjustedDelta = static_cast<int>(adjustedDelta * sqrt(static_cast<double>(adjustedDelta))) - 1;
else if (adjustedDelta < -1)
adjustedDelta = static_cast<int>(adjustedDelta * sqrt(static_cast<double>(-adjustedDelta))) + 1;
return adjustedDelta;
}
| static inline int adjustedScrollDelta(int beginningDelta)
{
const int speedReducer = 12;
int adjustedDelta = beginningDelta / speedReducer;
if (adjustedDelta > 1)
adjustedDelta = static_cast<int>(adjustedDelta * sqrt(static_cast<double>(adjustedDelta))) - 1;
else if (adjustedDelta < -1)
adjustedDelta = static_cast<int>(adjustedDelta * sqrt(static_cast<double>(-adjustedDelta))) + 1;
return adjustedDelta;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-2875 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2875/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2 | ab5e55ff333def909d025ac45da9ffa0d88a63f2 | Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void WebRTCVoidRequest::requestFailed(const WebString& error) const
{
ASSERT(m_private.get());
m_private->requestFailed(error);
}
| void WebRTCVoidRequest::requestFailed(const WebString& error) const
{
ASSERT(m_private.get());
m_private->requestFailed(error);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-1213 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1213/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707 | faaa2fd0a05f1622d9a8806da118d4f3b602e707 | [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423} | void HTMLMediaElement::createPlaceholderTracksIfNecessary() {
if (!mediaTracksEnabledInternally())
return;
if (hasAudio() && !audioTracks().length()) {
addAudioTrack("audio", WebMediaPlayerClient::AudioTrackKindMain,
"Audio Track", "", false);
}
if (hasVideo() && !videoTracks().length()) {
addVideoTrack("video", WebMediaPlayerClient::VideoTrackKindMain,
"Video Track", "", false);
}
}
| void HTMLMediaElement::createPlaceholderTracksIfNecessary() {
if (!mediaTracksEnabledInternally())
return;
if (hasAudio() && !audioTracks().length()) {
addAudioTrack("audio", WebMediaPlayerClient::AudioTrackKindMain,
"Audio Track", "", false);
}
if (hasVideo() && !videoTracks().length()) {
addVideoTrack("video", WebMediaPlayerClient::VideoTrackKindMain,
"Video Track", "", false);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-1790 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1790/ | null | https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/59302b600e8d5b77ef144e447bb046fd7ab72686 | 59302b600e8d5b77ef144e447bb046fd7ab72686 | PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid)
{
int idx;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa;
idx = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(sk, nid, -1);
xa = X509at_get_attr(sk, idx);
return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(xa, 0);
}
| static ASN1_TYPE *get_attribute(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, int nid)
{
int idx;
X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa;
idx = X509at_get_attr_by_NID(sk, nid, -1);
xa = X509at_get_attr(sk, idx);
return X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(xa, 0);
}
| C | openssl | 0 |
CVE-2013-2635 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2635/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 | 84d73cd3fb142bf1298a8c13fd4ca50fd2432372 | rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static int rtnl_bridge_notify(struct net_device *dev, u16 flags)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct net_device *br_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = nlmsg_new(bridge_nlmsg_size(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
if ((!flags || (flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER)) &&
br_dev && br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink) {
err = br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink(skb, 0, 0, dev, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF) &&
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink) {
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink(skb, 0, 0, dev, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_LINK, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return 0;
errout:
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
return err;
}
| static int rtnl_bridge_notify(struct net_device *dev, u16 flags)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct net_device *br_dev = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = nlmsg_new(bridge_nlmsg_size(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
if ((!flags || (flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_MASTER)) &&
br_dev && br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink) {
err = br_dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink(skb, 0, 0, dev, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
}
if ((flags & BRIDGE_FLAGS_SELF) &&
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink) {
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_bridge_getlink(skb, 0, 0, dev, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
}
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_LINK, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
return 0;
errout:
WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
kfree_skb(skb);
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_LINK, err);
return err;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-9793 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9793/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 | b98b0bc8c431e3ceb4b26b0dfc8db509518fb290 | net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static void __sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
if (unlikely(sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk) && sk->sk_net_refcnt))
sock_diag_broadcast_destroy(sk);
else
sk_destruct(sk);
}
| static void __sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
if (unlikely(sock_diag_has_destroy_listeners(sk) && sk->sk_net_refcnt))
sock_diag_broadcast_destroy(sk);
else
sk_destruct(sk);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-0221 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0221/ | CWE-399 | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=d3152655d5319ce883c8e3ac4b99f8de4c59d846 | d3152655d5319ce883c8e3ac4b99f8de4c59d846 | null | dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
return p;
}
| dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
*p++ = msg_hdr->type;
l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
return p;
}
| C | openssl | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b | a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b | Move supports-high-dpi flag into registry.
Calls to SetProcessDpiAwareness need to happen immediately when the app starts. Specifically, before user profile settings have been initialized.
This patch moves the --supports-high-dpi into the registry.
BUG=339152, 149881, 160457
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153403003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void PerformTestWithLeftRightRects(const gfx::Size& html_rect_size,
const gfx::Rect& copy_rect,
const gfx::Size& output_size,
const gfx::Size& expected_bitmap_size,
bool video_frame) {
const gfx::Size box_size(html_rect_size.width() / 2,
html_rect_size.height());
SetTestUrl(base::StringPrintf(
"data:text/html,<!doctype html>"
"<div class='left'>"
" <div class='right'></div>"
"</div>"
"<style>"
"body { padding: 0; margin: 0; }"
".left { position: absolute;"
" background: #0ff;"
" width: %dpx;"
" height: %dpx;"
"}"
".right { position: absolute;"
" left: %dpx;"
" background: #ff0;"
" width: %dpx;"
" height: %dpx;"
"}"
"</style>"
"<script>"
" domAutomationController.setAutomationId(0);"
" domAutomationController.send(\"DONE\");"
"</script>",
box_size.width(),
box_size.height(),
box_size.width(),
box_size.width(),
box_size.height()));
SET_UP_SURFACE_OR_PASS_TEST("\"DONE\"");
if (!ShouldContinueAfterTestURLLoad())
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* rwhvp = GetRenderWidgetHostViewPort();
if (video_frame && !rwhvp->CanCopyToVideoFrame()) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()->GpuAccessAllowed(NULL)) {
LOG(WARNING) << ("Blindly passing this test because copying to "
"video frames is not supported on this platform.");
return;
}
#endif
NOTREACHED();
}
uint32 frame = rwhvp->RendererFrameNumber();
while (!GetRenderWidgetHost()->ScheduleComposite())
GiveItSomeTime();
while (rwhvp->RendererFrameNumber() == frame)
GiveItSomeTime();
SkBitmap expected_bitmap;
SetupLeftRightBitmap(expected_bitmap_size, &expected_bitmap);
SetExpectedCopyFromCompositingSurfaceResult(true, expected_bitmap);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
if (video_frame) {
SetAllowableError(0x10);
SetExcludeRect(
gfx::Rect(output_size.width() / 2 - 1, 0, 2, output_size.height()));
scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame> video_frame =
media::VideoFrame::CreateFrame(media::VideoFrame::YV12,
expected_bitmap_size,
gfx::Rect(expected_bitmap_size),
expected_bitmap_size,
base::TimeDelta());
base::Callback<void(bool success)> callback =
base::Bind(&CompositingRenderWidgetHostViewBrowserTestTabCapture::
CopyFromCompositingSurfaceCallbackForVideo,
base::Unretained(this),
video_frame,
run_loop.QuitClosure());
rwhvp->CopyFromCompositingSurfaceToVideoFrame(copy_rect,
video_frame,
callback);
} else {
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (!content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()
->CanUseGpuBrowserCompositor()) {
SetAllowableError(2);
SetExcludeRect(
gfx::Rect(output_size.width() / 2 - 1, 0, 2, output_size.height()));
}
#endif
base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)> callback =
base::Bind(&CompositingRenderWidgetHostViewBrowserTestTabCapture::
CopyFromCompositingSurfaceCallback,
base::Unretained(this),
run_loop.QuitClosure());
rwhvp->CopyFromCompositingSurface(copy_rect,
output_size,
callback,
SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config);
}
run_loop.Run();
}
| void PerformTestWithLeftRightRects(const gfx::Size& html_rect_size,
const gfx::Rect& copy_rect,
const gfx::Size& output_size,
const gfx::Size& expected_bitmap_size,
bool video_frame) {
const gfx::Size box_size(html_rect_size.width() / 2,
html_rect_size.height());
SetTestUrl(base::StringPrintf(
"data:text/html,<!doctype html>"
"<div class='left'>"
" <div class='right'></div>"
"</div>"
"<style>"
"body { padding: 0; margin: 0; }"
".left { position: absolute;"
" background: #0ff;"
" width: %dpx;"
" height: %dpx;"
"}"
".right { position: absolute;"
" left: %dpx;"
" background: #ff0;"
" width: %dpx;"
" height: %dpx;"
"}"
"</style>"
"<script>"
" domAutomationController.setAutomationId(0);"
" domAutomationController.send(\"DONE\");"
"</script>",
box_size.width(),
box_size.height(),
box_size.width(),
box_size.width(),
box_size.height()));
SET_UP_SURFACE_OR_PASS_TEST("\"DONE\"");
if (!ShouldContinueAfterTestURLLoad())
return;
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* rwhvp = GetRenderWidgetHostViewPort();
if (video_frame && !rwhvp->CanCopyToVideoFrame()) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()->GpuAccessAllowed(NULL)) {
LOG(WARNING) << ("Blindly passing this test because copying to "
"video frames is not supported on this platform.");
return;
}
#endif
NOTREACHED();
}
uint32 frame = rwhvp->RendererFrameNumber();
while (!GetRenderWidgetHost()->ScheduleComposite())
GiveItSomeTime();
while (rwhvp->RendererFrameNumber() == frame)
GiveItSomeTime();
SkBitmap expected_bitmap;
SetupLeftRightBitmap(expected_bitmap_size, &expected_bitmap);
SetExpectedCopyFromCompositingSurfaceResult(true, expected_bitmap);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
if (video_frame) {
SetAllowableError(0x10);
SetExcludeRect(
gfx::Rect(output_size.width() / 2 - 1, 0, 2, output_size.height()));
scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame> video_frame =
media::VideoFrame::CreateFrame(media::VideoFrame::YV12,
expected_bitmap_size,
gfx::Rect(expected_bitmap_size),
expected_bitmap_size,
base::TimeDelta());
base::Callback<void(bool success)> callback =
base::Bind(&CompositingRenderWidgetHostViewBrowserTestTabCapture::
CopyFromCompositingSurfaceCallbackForVideo,
base::Unretained(this),
video_frame,
run_loop.QuitClosure());
rwhvp->CopyFromCompositingSurfaceToVideoFrame(copy_rect,
video_frame,
callback);
} else {
#if defined(USE_AURA)
if (!content::GpuDataManager::GetInstance()
->CanUseGpuBrowserCompositor()) {
SetAllowableError(2);
SetExcludeRect(
gfx::Rect(output_size.width() / 2 - 1, 0, 2, output_size.height()));
}
#endif
base::Callback<void(bool, const SkBitmap&)> callback =
base::Bind(&CompositingRenderWidgetHostViewBrowserTestTabCapture::
CopyFromCompositingSurfaceCallback,
base::Unretained(this),
run_loop.QuitClosure());
rwhvp->CopyFromCompositingSurface(copy_rect,
output_size,
callback,
SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config);
}
run_loop.Run();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-1296 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1296/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508 | c90c6ca59378d7e86d1a2f28fe96bada35df1508 | Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | AutomationProvider::~AutomationProvider() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(port_containers_.begin(),
port_containers_.end());
port_containers_.clear();
if (channel_.get())
channel_->Close();
g_browser_process->ReleaseModule();
}
| AutomationProvider::~AutomationProvider() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(port_containers_.begin(),
port_containers_.end());
port_containers_.clear();
if (channel_.get())
channel_->Close();
g_browser_process->ReleaseModule();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0842 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0842/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/10cbaf017570ba6454174c55b844647aa6a9b3b4 | 10cbaf017570ba6454174c55b844647aa6a9b3b4 | Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ParamTraits<base::FileDescriptor>::Log(const param_type& p,
std::string* l) {
if (p.auto_close) {
l->append(StringPrintf("FD(%d auto-close)", p.fd));
} else {
l->append(StringPrintf("FD(%d)", p.fd));
}
}
| void ParamTraits<base::FileDescriptor>::Log(const param_type& p,
std::string* l) {
if (p.auto_close) {
l->append(StringPrintf("FD(%d auto-close)", p.fd));
} else {
l->append(StringPrintf("FD(%d)", p.fd));
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd | 8353baf8d1504dbdd4ad7584ff2466de657521cd | Remove WebFrame::canHaveSecureChild
To simplify the public API, ServiceWorkerNetworkProvider can do the
parent walk itself.
Follow-up to https://crrev.com/ad1850962644e19.
BUG=607543
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2082493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400896} | void WebFrame::insertAfter(WebFrame* newChild, WebFrame* previousSibling)
{
newChild->m_parent = this;
WebFrame* next;
if (!previousSibling) {
next = m_firstChild;
m_firstChild = newChild;
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(previousSibling->m_parent, this);
next = previousSibling->m_nextSibling;
previousSibling->m_nextSibling = newChild;
newChild->m_previousSibling = previousSibling;
}
if (next) {
newChild->m_nextSibling = next;
next->m_previousSibling = newChild;
} else {
m_lastChild = newChild;
}
toImplBase()->frame()->tree().invalidateScopedChildCount();
toImplBase()->frame()->host()->incrementSubframeCount();
}
| void WebFrame::insertAfter(WebFrame* newChild, WebFrame* previousSibling)
{
newChild->m_parent = this;
WebFrame* next;
if (!previousSibling) {
next = m_firstChild;
m_firstChild = newChild;
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(previousSibling->m_parent, this);
next = previousSibling->m_nextSibling;
previousSibling->m_nextSibling = newChild;
newChild->m_previousSibling = previousSibling;
}
if (next) {
newChild->m_nextSibling = next;
next->m_previousSibling = newChild;
} else {
m_lastChild = newChild;
}
toImplBase()->frame()->tree().invalidateScopedChildCount();
toImplBase()->frame()->host()->incrementSubframeCount();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-4621 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64 | f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64 | Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | static unsigned long cpu_avg_load_per_task(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long nr_running = ACCESS_ONCE(rq->nr_running);
if (nr_running)
rq->avg_load_per_task = rq->load.weight / nr_running;
else
rq->avg_load_per_task = 0;
return rq->avg_load_per_task;
}
| static unsigned long cpu_avg_load_per_task(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
unsigned long nr_running = ACCESS_ONCE(rq->nr_running);
if (nr_running)
rq->avg_load_per_task = rq->load.weight / nr_running;
else
rq->avg_load_per_task = 0;
return rq->avg_load_per_task;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-2699 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2699/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c | 87c48fa3b4630905f98268dde838ee43626a060c | ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(const struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer __rcu **stack[PEER_MAXDEPTH], ***stackptr;
struct inet_peer_base *base = family_to_base(daddr->family);
struct inet_peer *p;
unsigned int sequence;
int invalidated, gccnt = 0;
/* Attempt a lockless lookup first.
* Because of a concurrent writer, we might not find an existing entry.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
sequence = read_seqbegin(&base->lock);
p = lookup_rcu(daddr, base);
invalidated = read_seqretry(&base->lock, sequence);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p)
return p;
/* If no writer did a change during our lookup, we can return early. */
if (!create && !invalidated)
return NULL;
/* retry an exact lookup, taking the lock before.
* At least, nodes should be hot in our cache.
*/
write_seqlock_bh(&base->lock);
relookup:
p = lookup(daddr, stack, base);
if (p != peer_avl_empty) {
atomic_inc(&p->refcnt);
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
if (!gccnt) {
gccnt = inet_peer_gc(base, stack, stackptr);
if (gccnt && create)
goto relookup;
}
p = create ? kmem_cache_alloc(peer_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC) : NULL;
if (p) {
p->daddr = *daddr;
atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count,
(daddr->family == AF_INET) ?
secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4) :
secure_ipv6_id(daddr->addr.a6));
p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
p->rate_tokens = 0;
p->rate_last = 0;
p->pmtu_expires = 0;
p->pmtu_orig = 0;
memset(&p->redirect_learned, 0, sizeof(p->redirect_learned));
/* Link the node. */
link_to_pool(p, base);
base->total++;
}
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
| struct inet_peer *inet_getpeer(struct inetpeer_addr *daddr, int create)
{
struct inet_peer __rcu **stack[PEER_MAXDEPTH], ***stackptr;
struct inet_peer_base *base = family_to_base(daddr->family);
struct inet_peer *p;
unsigned int sequence;
int invalidated, gccnt = 0;
/* Attempt a lockless lookup first.
* Because of a concurrent writer, we might not find an existing entry.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
sequence = read_seqbegin(&base->lock);
p = lookup_rcu(daddr, base);
invalidated = read_seqretry(&base->lock, sequence);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (p)
return p;
/* If no writer did a change during our lookup, we can return early. */
if (!create && !invalidated)
return NULL;
/* retry an exact lookup, taking the lock before.
* At least, nodes should be hot in our cache.
*/
write_seqlock_bh(&base->lock);
relookup:
p = lookup(daddr, stack, base);
if (p != peer_avl_empty) {
atomic_inc(&p->refcnt);
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
if (!gccnt) {
gccnt = inet_peer_gc(base, stack, stackptr);
if (gccnt && create)
goto relookup;
}
p = create ? kmem_cache_alloc(peer_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC) : NULL;
if (p) {
p->daddr = *daddr;
atomic_set(&p->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&p->rid, 0);
atomic_set(&p->ip_id_count, secure_ip_id(daddr->addr.a4));
p->tcp_ts_stamp = 0;
p->metrics[RTAX_LOCK-1] = INETPEER_METRICS_NEW;
p->rate_tokens = 0;
p->rate_last = 0;
p->pmtu_expires = 0;
p->pmtu_orig = 0;
memset(&p->redirect_learned, 0, sizeof(p->redirect_learned));
/* Link the node. */
link_to_pool(p, base);
base->total++;
}
write_sequnlock_bh(&base->lock);
return p;
}
| C | linux | 1 |
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