CVE ID
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⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
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⌀ | CWE ID
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stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
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stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
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| func_before
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values | project
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2018-17204 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/ | CWE-617 | https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde | 4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde | ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com> | ofputil_capabilities_mask(enum ofp_version ofp_version)
{
/* Handle capabilities whose bit is unique for all OpenFlow versions */
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP10_VERSION:
case OFP11_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC_ARP_MATCH_IP;
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC12_PORT_BLOCKED;
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC12_PORT_BLOCKED | OFPC14_BUNDLES
| OFPC14_FLOW_MONITORING;
default:
/* Caller needs to check osf->header.version itself */
return 0;
}
}
| ofputil_capabilities_mask(enum ofp_version ofp_version)
{
/* Handle capabilities whose bit is unique for all OpenFlow versions */
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP10_VERSION:
case OFP11_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC_ARP_MATCH_IP;
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC12_PORT_BLOCKED;
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
return OFPC_COMMON | OFPC12_PORT_BLOCKED | OFPC14_BUNDLES
| OFPC14_FLOW_MONITORING;
default:
/* Caller needs to check osf->header.version itself */
return 0;
}
}
| C | ovs | 0 |
CVE-2016-1621 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | 5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426 | Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
dec_cfg_ = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
| void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
| C | Android | 1 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7 | a3987c8b93d3abbba6ea4e438493bf996fff66b7 | Make Surface creation lazy for OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl
This CL shifts the SurfaceFactory pointer and SurfaceFactoryClient implementation
from OffscreenCanvasSurfaceImpl to OffscreenCanvasFrameReceiverImpl to
facilitate resource handling after compositor frame is submitted. As a result,
surface on browser is lazily created (only happened on the first commit()).
BUG=563852
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2333133003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418402} | void CanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClientImpl::asyncSatisfy(const cc::SurfaceSequence& sequence)
{
m_service->Satisfy(sequence);
}
| void CanvasSurfaceLayerBridgeClientImpl::asyncSatisfy(const cc::SurfaceSequence& sequence)
{
m_service->Satisfy(sequence);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5194 | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251 | d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251 | Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <austinct@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782} | TestEntryInfo& SetEntryFolderFeature(
const EntryFolderFeature& new_folder_feature) {
folder_feature = new_folder_feature;
return *this;
}
| TestEntryInfo& SetEntryFolderFeature(
const EntryFolderFeature& new_folder_feature) {
folder_feature = new_folder_feature;
return *this;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-1641 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1641/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662 | 75ca8ffd7bd7c58ace1144df05e1307d8d707662 | Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700} | void WebContentsImpl::DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(
const GURL& url,
NavigationController::ReloadType reload_type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(url, reload_type));
}
| void WebContentsImpl::DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(
const GURL& url,
NavigationController::ReloadType reload_type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(url, reload_type));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-15932 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15932/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/44ded3ff35b8264f54b5a900cab32ec489d9e5b9 | 44ded3ff35b8264f54b5a900cab32ec489d9e5b9 | Fix #8743 - Crash in ELF version parser on 32bit systems | static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux;
if (vnaux < 1) {
goto beach;
}
vstart += vnaux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
| static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
ut8 *end, *need = NULL;
const char *section_name = "";
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
const char *link_section_name = "";
Sdb *sdb_vernaux = NULL;
Sdb *sdb_version = NULL;
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
int i, cnt;
if (!bin || !bin->dynstr) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return NULL;
}
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb) {
return NULL;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!(need = (ut8*) calloc (R_MAX (1, shdr->sh_size), sizeof (ut8)))) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory for Elf_(Verneed)\n");
goto beach;
}
end = need + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "num_entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
if (shdr->sh_offset > bin->size || shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size > bin->size) {
goto beach;
}
if (shdr->sh_offset + shdr->sh_size < shdr->sh_size) {
goto beach;
}
i = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset, need, shdr->sh_size);
if (i < 0)
goto beach;
for (i = 0, cnt = 0; cnt < shdr->sh_info; ++cnt) {
int j, isum;
ut8 *vstart = need + i;
Elf_(Verneed) vvn = {0};
if (vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verneed)) > end) {
goto beach;
}
Elf_(Verneed) *entry = &vvn;
char key[32] = {0};
sdb_version = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_version) {
goto beach;
}
j = 0;
vvn.vn_version = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_cnt = READ16 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_file = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_aux = READ32 (vstart, j)
vvn.vn_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "vn_version", entry->vn_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "idx", i, 0);
if (entry->vn_file > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
{
char *s = r_str_ndup (&bin->dynstr[entry->vn_file], 16);
sdb_set (sdb_version, "file_name", s, 0);
free (s);
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_version, "cnt", entry->vn_cnt, 0);
st32 vnaux = entry->vn_aux;
if (vnaux < 1) {
goto beach;
}
vstart += vnaux;
for (j = 0, isum = i + entry->vn_aux; j < entry->vn_cnt && vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Vernaux)) <= end; ++j) {
int k;
Elf_(Vernaux) * aux = NULL;
Elf_(Vernaux) vaux = {0};
sdb_vernaux = sdb_new0 ();
if (!sdb_vernaux) {
goto beach;
}
aux = (Elf_(Vernaux)*)&vaux;
k = 0;
vaux.vna_hash = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_flags = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_other = READ16 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
vaux.vna_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux->vna_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
goto beach;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "idx", isum, 0);
if (aux->vna_name > 0 && aux->vna_name + 8 < bin->dynstr_size) {
char name [16];
strncpy (name, &bin->dynstr[aux->vna_name], sizeof (name)-1);
name[sizeof(name)-1] = 0;
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "name", name, 0);
}
sdb_set (sdb_vernaux, "flags", get_ver_flags (aux->vna_flags), 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_vernaux, "version", aux->vna_other, 0);
isum += aux->vna_next;
vstart += aux->vna_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "vernaux%d", j);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_version, key, sdb_vernaux);
}
if ((int)entry->vn_next < 0) {
bprintf ("Invalid vn_next\n");
break;
}
i += entry->vn_next;
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "version%d", cnt );
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_version);
if (!entry->vn_next) {
break;
}
}
free (need);
return sdb;
beach:
free (need);
sdb_free (sdb_vernaux);
sdb_free (sdb_version);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
| C | radare2 | 0 |
CVE-2018-6063 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6063/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608 | 673ce95d481ea9368c4d4d43ac756ba1d6d9e608 | Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268} | RenderProcessHost* RenderProcessHostImpl::FindReusableProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& site_url) {
if (!ShouldFindReusableProcessHostForSite(browser_context, site_url))
return nullptr;
std::set<RenderProcessHost*> eligible_foreground_hosts;
std::set<RenderProcessHost*> eligible_background_hosts;
SiteProcessCountTracker* pending_tracker =
static_cast<SiteProcessCountTracker*>(
browser_context->GetUserData(kPendingSiteProcessCountTrackerKey));
if (pending_tracker) {
pending_tracker->FindRenderProcessesForSite(
site_url, &eligible_foreground_hosts, &eligible_background_hosts);
}
if (eligible_foreground_hosts.empty()) {
SiteProcessCountTracker* committed_tracker =
static_cast<SiteProcessCountTracker*>(
browser_context->GetUserData(kCommittedSiteProcessCountTrackerKey));
if (committed_tracker) {
committed_tracker->FindRenderProcessesForSite(
site_url, &eligible_foreground_hosts, &eligible_background_hosts);
}
}
if (!eligible_foreground_hosts.empty()) {
int index = base::RandInt(0, eligible_foreground_hosts.size() - 1);
auto iterator = eligible_foreground_hosts.begin();
for (int i = 0; i < index; ++i)
++iterator;
return (*iterator);
}
if (!eligible_background_hosts.empty()) {
int index = base::RandInt(0, eligible_background_hosts.size() - 1);
auto iterator = eligible_background_hosts.begin();
for (int i = 0; i < index; ++i)
++iterator;
return (*iterator);
}
return nullptr;
}
| RenderProcessHost* RenderProcessHostImpl::FindReusableProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& site_url) {
if (!ShouldFindReusableProcessHostForSite(browser_context, site_url))
return nullptr;
std::set<RenderProcessHost*> eligible_foreground_hosts;
std::set<RenderProcessHost*> eligible_background_hosts;
SiteProcessCountTracker* pending_tracker =
static_cast<SiteProcessCountTracker*>(
browser_context->GetUserData(kPendingSiteProcessCountTrackerKey));
if (pending_tracker) {
pending_tracker->FindRenderProcessesForSite(
site_url, &eligible_foreground_hosts, &eligible_background_hosts);
}
if (eligible_foreground_hosts.empty()) {
SiteProcessCountTracker* committed_tracker =
static_cast<SiteProcessCountTracker*>(
browser_context->GetUserData(kCommittedSiteProcessCountTrackerKey));
if (committed_tracker) {
committed_tracker->FindRenderProcessesForSite(
site_url, &eligible_foreground_hosts, &eligible_background_hosts);
}
}
if (!eligible_foreground_hosts.empty()) {
int index = base::RandInt(0, eligible_foreground_hosts.size() - 1);
auto iterator = eligible_foreground_hosts.begin();
for (int i = 0; i < index; ++i)
++iterator;
return (*iterator);
}
if (!eligible_background_hosts.empty()) {
int index = base::RandInt(0, eligible_background_hosts.size() - 1);
auto iterator = eligible_background_hosts.begin();
for (int i = 0; i < index; ++i)
++iterator;
return (*iterator);
}
return nullptr;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0886 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | 18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76 | Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetViewBounds() const {
return window_->GetBoundsInScreen();
}
| gfx::Rect RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetViewBounds() const {
return window_->GetBoundsInScreen();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0921 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4 | e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4 | Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ChromeContentBrowserClient::BrowserURLHandlerCreated(
BrowserURLHandler* handler) {
handler->AddHandlerPair(&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverride,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(BrowserURLHandler::null_handler(),
&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverrideReverse);
handler->AddHandlerPair(&WillHandleBrowserAboutURL,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(&HandleWebUI, &HandleWebUIReverse);
}
| void ChromeContentBrowserClient::BrowserURLHandlerCreated(
BrowserURLHandler* handler) {
handler->AddHandlerPair(&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverride,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(BrowserURLHandler::null_handler(),
&ExtensionWebUI::HandleChromeURLOverrideReverse);
handler->AddHandlerPair(&WillHandleBrowserAboutURL,
BrowserURLHandler::null_handler());
handler->AddHandlerPair(&HandleWebUI, &HandleWebUIReverse);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-6414 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6414/ | CWE-772 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/libcacard/commit/?id=9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c | 9113dc6a303604a2d9812ac70c17d076ef11886c | null | vcard_init_buffer_response(VCard *card, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
VCardResponse *response;
VCardBufferResponse *buffer_response;
buffer_response = vcard_get_buffer_response(card);
if (buffer_response) {
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, NULL);
vcard_buffer_response_delete(buffer_response);
}
buffer_response = vcard_buffer_response_new(buf, len);
if (buffer_response == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
response = vcard_response_new_status_bytes(VCARD7816_SW1_RESPONSE_BYTES,
len > 255 ? 0 : len);
if (response == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, buffer_response);
return response;
}
| vcard_init_buffer_response(VCard *card, unsigned char *buf, int len)
{
VCardResponse *response;
VCardBufferResponse *buffer_response;
buffer_response = vcard_get_buffer_response(card);
if (buffer_response) {
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, NULL);
vcard_buffer_response_delete(buffer_response);
}
buffer_response = vcard_buffer_response_new(buf, len);
if (buffer_response == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
response = vcard_response_new_status_bytes(VCARD7816_SW1_RESPONSE_BYTES,
len > 255 ? 0 : len);
if (response == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, buffer_response);
return response;
}
| C | spice | 0 |
CVE-2017-13658 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13658/ | CWE-617 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/e5c063a1007506ba69e97a35effcdef944421c89 | e5c063a1007506ba69e97a35effcdef944421c89 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/598 | static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
{
MATLAB_KO:
if (clone_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned long)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
END_OF_READING:
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
| static Image *ReadMATImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image *image, *image2=NULL,
*rotated_image;
PixelPacket *q;
unsigned int status;
MATHeader MATLAB_HDR;
size_t size;
size_t CellType;
QuantumInfo *quantum_info;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
int i;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff = NULL;
double MinVal, MaxVal;
size_t Unknown6;
unsigned z, z2;
unsigned Frames;
int logging;
int sample_size;
MagickOffsetType filepos=0x80;
BlobInfo *blob;
size_t one;
unsigned int (*ReadBlobXXXLong)(Image *image);
unsigned short (*ReadBlobXXXShort)(Image *image);
void (*ReadBlobDoublesXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, double *data);
void (*ReadBlobFloatsXXX)(Image * image, size_t len, float *data);
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
logging = LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"enter");
/*
Open image file.
*/
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) NULL;
image = AcquireImage(image_info);
status = OpenBlob(image_info, image, ReadBinaryBlobMode, exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MATLAB image.
*/
clone_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
if(ReadBlob(image,124,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.identific) != 124)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific,"MATLAB",6) != 0)
{
image2=ReadMATImageV4(image_info,image,exception);
if (image2 == NULL)
goto MATLAB_KO;
image=image2;
goto END_OF_READING;
}
MATLAB_HDR.Version = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(ReadBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) &MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator) != 2)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Endian %c%c",
MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[0],MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator[1]);
if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "IM", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobLSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobLSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesLSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsLSB;
image->endian = LSBEndian;
}
else if (!strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.EndianIndicator, "MI", 2))
{
ReadBlobXXXLong = ReadBlobMSBLong;
ReadBlobXXXShort = ReadBlobMSBShort;
ReadBlobDoublesXXX = ReadBlobDoublesMSB;
ReadBlobFloatsXXX = ReadBlobFloatsMSB;
image->endian = MSBEndian;
}
else
goto MATLAB_KO; /* unsupported endian */
if (strncmp(MATLAB_HDR.identific, "MATLAB", 6))
{
MATLAB_KO:
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
filepos = TellBlob(image);
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
Frames = 1;
(void) SeekBlob(image,filepos,SEEK_SET);
/* printf("pos=%X\n",TellBlob(image)); */
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize = ReadBlobXXXLong(image);
if(EOFBlob(image)) break;
if((MagickSizeType) (MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize+filepos) > GetBlobSize(image))
goto MATLAB_KO;
filepos += MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize + 4 + 4;
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
image2 = image;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType == miCOMPRESSED)
{
image2 = decompress_block(image,&MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize,clone_info,exception);
if(image2==NULL) continue;
MATLAB_HDR.DataType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* replace compressed object type. */
}
#endif
if(MATLAB_HDR.DataType!=miMATRIX) continue; /* skip another objects. */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown1 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown2 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass = MATLAB_HDR.unknown5 & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag = (MATLAB_HDR.unknown5>>8) & 0xFF;
MATLAB_HDR.unknown3 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if(image!=image2)
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* ??? don't understand why ?? */
MATLAB_HDR.unknown4 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeX = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.SizeY = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
switch(MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag)
{
case 8: z2=z=1; break; /* 2D matrix*/
case 12: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 3D matrix RGB*/
Unknown6 = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
(void) Unknown6;
if(z!=3) ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
break;
case 16: z2=z = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* 4D matrix animation */
if(z!=3 && z!=1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
Frames = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2);
if (Frames == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
default: ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "MultidimensionalMatricesAreNotSupported");
}
MATLAB_HDR.Flag1 = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag = ReadBlobXXXShort(image2);
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass %d",MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass);
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxCHAR_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxSINGLE_CLASS && /* float + complex float */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxDOUBLE_CLASS && /* double + complex double */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT8_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT8_CLASS && /* uint8 + uint8 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT16_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT16_CLASS && /* uint16 + uint16 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT32_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT32_CLASS && /* uint32 + uint32 3D */
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxINT64_CLASS &&
MATLAB_HDR.StructureClass != mxUINT64_CLASS) /* uint64 + uint64 3D */
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
switch (MATLAB_HDR.NameFlag)
{
case 0:
size = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Object name string size */
size = 4 * (ssize_t) ((size + 3 + 1) / 4);
(void) SeekBlob(image2, size, SEEK_CUR);
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 3:
case 4:
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* Object name string */
break;
default:
goto MATLAB_KO;
}
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
if (logging)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"MATLAB_HDR.CellType: %.20g",(double) CellType);
(void) ReadBlob(image2, 4, (unsigned char *) &size); /* data size */
NEXT_FRAME:
switch (CellType)
{
case miINT8:
case miUINT8:
sample_size = 8;
if(MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL)
image->depth = 1;
else
image->depth = 8; /* Byte type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
break;
case miINT16:
case miUINT16:
sample_size = 16;
image->depth = 16; /* Word type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (2 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT32:
case miUINT32:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* Dword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miINT64:
case miUINT64:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* Qword type cell */
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miSINGLE:
sample_size = 32;
image->depth = 32; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex float type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (4 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
case miDOUBLE:
sample_size = 64;
image->depth = 64; /* double type cell */
(void) SetImageOption(clone_info,"quantum:format","floating-point");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (sizeof(double) != 8)
RestoreMSCWarning
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "IncompatibleSizeOfDouble");
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* complex double type cell */
}
ldblk = (ssize_t) (8 * MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
break;
default:
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError, "UnsupportedCellTypeInTheMatrix");
}
(void) sample_size;
image->columns = MATLAB_HDR.SizeX;
image->rows = MATLAB_HDR.SizeY;
one=1;
image->colors = one << image->depth;
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
goto MATLAB_KO;
if((unsigned long)ldblk*MATLAB_HDR.SizeY > MATLAB_HDR.ObjectSize)
goto MATLAB_KO;
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->type=GrayscaleType;
}
/*
If ping is true, then only set image size and colors without
reading any image data.
*/
if (image_info->ping)
{
size_t temp = image->columns;
image->columns = image->rows;
image->rows = temp;
goto done_reading; /* !!!!!! BAD !!!! */
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(clone_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/* ----- Load raster data ----- */
BImgBuff = (unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (ldblk),sizeof(double)); /* Ldblk was set in the check phase */
if (BImgBuff == NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(BImgBuff,0,ldblk*sizeof(double));
MinVal = 0;
MaxVal = 0;
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE) /* Find Min and Max Values for floats */
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &quantum_info->minimum, &quantum_info->maximum);
}
/* Main loop for reading all scanlines */
if(z==1) z=0; /* read grey scanlines */
/* else read color scanlines */
do
{
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT set image pixels returns unexpected NULL on a row %u.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto done_reading; /* Skip image rotation, when cannot set image pixels */
}
if(ReadBlob(image2,ldblk,(unsigned char *)BImgBuff) != (ssize_t) ldblk)
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT cannot read scanrow %u from a file.", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
if((CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miUINT8) && (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_LOGICAL))
{
FixLogical((unsigned char *)BImgBuff,ldblk);
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
{
ImportQuantumPixelsFailed:
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to ImportQuantumPixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
break;
}
}
else
{
if(ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,z2qtype[z],BImgBuff,exception) <= 0)
goto ImportQuantumPixelsFailed;
if (z<=1 && /* fix only during a last pass z==0 || z==1 */
(CellType==miINT8 || CellType==miINT16 || CellType==miINT32 || CellType==miINT64))
FixSignedValues(q,MATLAB_HDR.SizeX);
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
{
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MAT failed to sync image pixels for a row %u", (unsigned)(MATLAB_HDR.SizeY-i-1));
goto ExitLoop;
}
}
} while(z-- >= 2);
ExitLoop:
/* Read complex part of numbers here */
if (MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX)
{ /* Find Min and Max Values for complex parts of floats */
CellType = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* Additional object type */
i = ReadBlobXXXLong(image2); /* size of a complex part - toss away*/
if (CellType==miDOUBLE || CellType==miSINGLE)
{
CalcMinMax(image2, image_info->endian, MATLAB_HDR.SizeX, MATLAB_HDR.SizeY, CellType, ldblk, BImgBuff, &MinVal, &MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miDOUBLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobDoublesXXX(image2, ldblk, (double *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexDoubleRow((double *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
if (CellType==miSINGLE)
for (i = 0; i < (ssize_t) MATLAB_HDR.SizeY; i++)
{
ReadBlobFloatsXXX(image2, ldblk, (float *)BImgBuff);
InsertComplexFloatRow((float *)BImgBuff, i, image, MinVal, MaxVal);
}
}
/* Image is gray when no complex flag is set and 2D Matrix AGAIN!!! */
if ((MATLAB_HDR.DimFlag == 8) &&
((MATLAB_HDR.StructureFlag & FLAG_COMPLEX) == 0))
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (image->depth == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
if(image2==image)
image2 = NULL; /* Remove shadow copy to an image before rotation. */
/* Rotate image. */
rotated_image = RotateImage(image, 90.0, exception);
if (rotated_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
/* Remove page offsets added by RotateImage */
rotated_image->page.x=0;
rotated_image->page.y=0;
blob = rotated_image->blob;
rotated_image->blob = image->blob;
rotated_image->colors = image->colors;
image->blob = blob;
AppendImageToList(&image,rotated_image);
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
}
done_reading:
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image)
{
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL) break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=0;
image->colors=0;
/* row scan buffer is no longer needed */
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
BImgBuff = NULL;
if(--Frames>0)
{
z = z2;
if(image2==NULL) image2 = image;
goto NEXT_FRAME;
}
if(image2!=NULL)
if(image2!=image) /* Does shadow temporary decompressed image exist? */
{
/* CloseBlob(image2); */
DeleteImageFromList(&image2);
if(clone_info)
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) unlink(clone_info->filename);
}
}
}
}
RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
END_OF_READING:
if (clone_info)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
CloseBlob(image);
{
Image *p;
ssize_t scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=scene++;
}
if(clone_info != NULL) /* cleanup garbage file from compression */
{
if(clone_info->file)
{
fclose(clone_info->file);
clone_info->file = NULL;
(void) remove_utf8(clone_info->filename);
}
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info = NULL;
}
if (logging) (void)LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"return");
if ((image != image2) && (image2 != (Image *) NULL))
image2=DestroyImage(image2);
if(image==NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
return (image);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 1 |
CVE-2013-0911 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0911/ | CWE-22 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ccfb891dc0c936a8806d663fe6581bf659761819 | ccfb891dc0c936a8806d663fe6581bf659761819 | WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseScheduledForDeletion(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
Send(new DatabaseMsg_CloseImmediately(origin_identifier, database_name));
}
| void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnDatabaseScheduledForDeletion(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
Send(new DatabaseMsg_CloseImmediately(origin_identifier, database_name));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa | a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa | Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | virtual bool GetWifiAccessPoints(WifiAccessPointVector* result) {
if (!EnsureCrosLoaded())
return false;
DeviceNetworkList* network_list = GetDeviceNetworkList();
if (network_list == NULL)
return false;
result->clear();
result->reserve(network_list->network_size);
const base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
for (size_t i = 0; i < network_list->network_size; ++i) {
DCHECK(network_list->networks[i].address);
DCHECK(network_list->networks[i].name);
WifiAccessPoint ap;
ap.mac_address = SafeString(network_list->networks[i].address);
ap.name = SafeString(network_list->networks[i].name);
ap.timestamp = now -
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(network_list->networks[i].age_seconds);
ap.signal_strength = network_list->networks[i].strength;
ap.channel = network_list->networks[i].channel;
result->push_back(ap);
}
FreeDeviceNetworkList(network_list);
return true;
}
| virtual bool GetWifiAccessPoints(WifiAccessPointVector* result) {
if (!EnsureCrosLoaded())
return false;
DeviceNetworkList* network_list = GetDeviceNetworkList();
if (network_list == NULL)
return false;
result->clear();
result->reserve(network_list->network_size);
const base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
for (size_t i = 0; i < network_list->network_size; ++i) {
DCHECK(network_list->networks[i].address);
DCHECK(network_list->networks[i].name);
WifiAccessPoint ap;
ap.mac_address = SafeString(network_list->networks[i].address);
ap.name = SafeString(network_list->networks[i].name);
ap.timestamp = now -
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(network_list->networks[i].age_seconds);
ap.signal_strength = network_list->networks[i].strength;
ap.channel = network_list->networks[i].channel;
result->push_back(ap);
}
FreeDeviceNetworkList(network_list);
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c4363d1ca65494cb7b271625e1ff6541a9f593c9 | c4363d1ca65494cb7b271625e1ff6541a9f593c9 | ozone: evdev: Add a couple more trace events
Add trace event inside each read notification for evdev.
BUG=none
TEST=chrome://tracing in link_freon
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1110693003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#327110} | bool EventConverterEvdevImpl::HasCapsLockLed() const {
return has_caps_lock_led_;
}
| bool EventConverterEvdevImpl::HasCapsLockLed() const {
return has_caps_lock_led_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2860 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2860/ | CWE-284 | http://git.openafs.org/?p=openafs.git;a=commitdiff;h=396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0 | 396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0 | null | SPR_ListEntry(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, struct prcheckentry *aentry)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = listEntry(call, aid, aentry, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_LstEntEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_ListEntry: code %d cid %d aid %d\n", code, cid, aid));
return code;
}
| SPR_ListEntry(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, struct prcheckentry *aentry)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = listEntry(call, aid, aentry, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_LstEntEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_ListEntry: code %d cid %d aid %d\n", code, cid, aid));
return code;
}
| C | openafs | 0 |
CVE-2013-0838 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0838/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc | 0bd1a6ddb5fb23dfea3e72d60e5e8df4cf5826bc | Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | TransportDIB::Id TransportDIB::id() const {
return key_;
}
| TransportDIB::Id TransportDIB::id() const {
return key_;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-6903 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/ | CWE-269 | https://github.com/iortcw/iortcw/commit/b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20 | b6ff2bcb1e4e6976d61e316175c6d7c99860fe20 | All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s | static unsigned int Sys_CountFileList( char **list ) {
int i = 0;
if (list)
{
while (*list)
{
list++;
i++;
}
}
return i;
}
| static unsigned int Sys_CountFileList( char **list ) {
int i = 0;
if (list)
{
while (*list)
{
list++;
i++;
}
}
return i;
}
| C | OpenJK | 0 |
CVE-2019-12589 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12589/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/commit/eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134 | eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134 | mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more | void start_application(int no_sandbox, FILE *fp) {
if (no_sandbox == 0) {
env_defaults();
env_apply();
}
umask(orig_umask);
if (arg_debug) {
printf("starting application\n");
printf("LD_PRELOAD=%s\n", getenv("LD_PRELOAD"));
}
if (arg_audit) {
assert(arg_audit_prog);
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
execl(arg_audit_prog, arg_audit_prog, NULL);
perror("execl");
exit(1);
}
else if (arg_shell_none) {
if (arg_debug) {
int i;
for (i = cfg.original_program_index; i < cfg.original_argc; i++) {
if (cfg.original_argv[i] == NULL)
break;
printf("execvp argument %d: %s\n", i - cfg.original_program_index, cfg.original_argv[i]);
}
}
if (cfg.original_program_index == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: --shell=none configured, but no program specified\n");
exit(1);
}
if (!arg_command && !arg_quiet)
print_time();
int rv = ok_to_run(cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
if (rv)
execvp(cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index], &cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no suitable %s executable found\n", cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
exit(1);
}
else {
assert(cfg.shell);
assert(cfg.command_line);
char *arg[5];
int index = 0;
arg[index++] = cfg.shell;
if (login_shell) {
arg[index++] = "-l";
if (arg_debug)
printf("Starting %s login shell\n", cfg.shell);
} else {
arg[index++] = "-c";
if (arg_debug)
printf("Running %s command through %s\n", cfg.command_line, cfg.shell);
if (arg_doubledash)
arg[index++] = "--";
arg[index++] = cfg.command_line;
}
arg[index] = NULL;
assert(index < 5);
if (arg_debug) {
char *msg;
if (asprintf(&msg, "sandbox %d, execvp into %s", sandbox_pid, cfg.command_line) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
logmsg(msg);
free(msg);
}
if (arg_debug) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
if (arg[i] == NULL)
break;
printf("execvp argument %d: %s\n", i, arg[i]);
}
}
if (!arg_command && !arg_quiet)
print_time();
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
execvp(arg[0], arg);
}
perror("execvp");
exit(1); // it should never get here!!!
}
| void start_application(int no_sandbox, FILE *fp) {
if (no_sandbox == 0) {
env_defaults();
env_apply();
}
umask(orig_umask);
if (arg_debug) {
printf("starting application\n");
printf("LD_PRELOAD=%s\n", getenv("LD_PRELOAD"));
}
if (arg_audit) {
assert(arg_audit_prog);
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
execl(arg_audit_prog, arg_audit_prog, NULL);
perror("execl");
exit(1);
}
else if (arg_shell_none) {
if (arg_debug) {
int i;
for (i = cfg.original_program_index; i < cfg.original_argc; i++) {
if (cfg.original_argv[i] == NULL)
break;
printf("execvp argument %d: %s\n", i - cfg.original_program_index, cfg.original_argv[i]);
}
}
if (cfg.original_program_index == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: --shell=none configured, but no program specified\n");
exit(1);
}
if (!arg_command && !arg_quiet)
print_time();
int rv = ok_to_run(cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
if (rv)
execvp(cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index], &cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Error: no suitable %s executable found\n", cfg.original_argv[cfg.original_program_index]);
exit(1);
}
else {
assert(cfg.shell);
assert(cfg.command_line);
char *arg[5];
int index = 0;
arg[index++] = cfg.shell;
if (login_shell) {
arg[index++] = "-l";
if (arg_debug)
printf("Starting %s login shell\n", cfg.shell);
} else {
arg[index++] = "-c";
if (arg_debug)
printf("Running %s command through %s\n", cfg.command_line, cfg.shell);
if (arg_doubledash)
arg[index++] = "--";
arg[index++] = cfg.command_line;
}
arg[index] = NULL;
assert(index < 5);
if (arg_debug) {
char *msg;
if (asprintf(&msg, "sandbox %d, execvp into %s", sandbox_pid, cfg.command_line) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
logmsg(msg);
free(msg);
}
if (arg_debug) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
if (arg[i] == NULL)
break;
printf("execvp argument %d: %s\n", i, arg[i]);
}
}
if (!arg_command && !arg_quiet)
print_time();
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "ready\n");
fclose(fp);
}
#ifdef HAVE_GCOV
__gcov_dump();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
seccomp_install_filters();
#endif
execvp(arg[0], arg);
}
perror("execvp");
exit(1); // it should never get here!!!
}
| C | firejail | 0 |
CVE-2016-10066 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | null | ModuleExport void UnregisterAAIImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("AAI");
}
| ModuleExport void UnregisterAAIImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("AAI");
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2018-19045 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19045/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067 | c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067 | Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk> | bfd_rt_priority_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
int priority = get_realtime_priority(strvec, "BFD");
if (priority >= 0)
global_data->bfd_realtime_priority = priority;
}
| bfd_rt_priority_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
int priority = get_realtime_priority(strvec, "BFD");
if (priority >= 0)
global_data->bfd_realtime_priority = priority;
}
| C | keepalived | 0 |
CVE-2011-4930 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/ | CWE-134 | https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | 5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | null | ReadUserLogStateAccess::ReadUserLogStateAccess(
const ReadUserLog::FileState &state)
{
m_state = new ReadUserLogFileState(state);
}
| ReadUserLogStateAccess::ReadUserLogStateAccess(
const ReadUserLog::FileState &state)
{
m_state = new ReadUserLogFileState(state);
}
| CPP | htcondor | 0 |
CVE-2017-15128 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15128/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df | 1e3921471354244f70fe268586ff94a97a6dd4df | userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static void __init hugetlb_register_all_nodes(void)
{
int nid;
for_each_node_state(nid, N_MEMORY) {
struct node *node = node_devices[nid];
if (node->dev.id == nid)
hugetlb_register_node(node);
}
/*
* Let the node device driver know we're here so it can
* [un]register hstate attributes on node hotplug.
*/
register_hugetlbfs_with_node(hugetlb_register_node,
hugetlb_unregister_node);
}
| static void __init hugetlb_register_all_nodes(void)
{
int nid;
for_each_node_state(nid, N_MEMORY) {
struct node *node = node_devices[nid];
if (node->dev.id == nid)
hugetlb_register_node(node);
}
/*
* Let the node device driver know we're here so it can
* [un]register hstate attributes on node hotplug.
*/
register_hugetlbfs_with_node(hugetlb_register_node,
hugetlb_unregister_node);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-12904 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-12904/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | 727ba748e110b4de50d142edca9d6a9b7e6111d8 | kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static struct kvm *vmx_vm_alloc(void)
{
struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = vzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_vmx));
return &kvm_vmx->kvm;
}
| static struct kvm *vmx_vm_alloc(void)
{
struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = vzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_vmx));
return &kvm_vmx->kvm;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-8109 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8109/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb | 3f1693d558d0758f829c8b53993f1749ddf6ffcb | Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | static int ldump_writer(lua_State *L, const void *b, size_t size, void *B)
{
(void) L;
luaL_addlstring((luaL_Buffer *) B, (const char *) b, size);
return 0;
}
| static int ldump_writer(lua_State *L, const void *b, size_t size, void *B)
{
(void) L;
luaL_addlstring((luaL_Buffer *) B, (const char *) b, size);
return 0;
}
| C | httpd | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2953a669ec0a32a25c6250d34bf895ec0eb63d27 | 2953a669ec0a32a25c6250d34bf895ec0eb63d27 | Avoid an overflow in harfbuzz-myanmar.c
Adds a guard to prevent invalid assignment.
BUG=108006
TEST=manually with ASAN.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8997001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115859 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | HB_Bool HB_MyanmarShape(HB_ShaperItem *item)
{
HB_Bool openType = FALSE;
unsigned short *logClusters = item->log_clusters;
HB_ShaperItem syllable = *item;
int first_glyph = 0;
int sstart = item->item.pos;
int end = sstart + item->item.length;
int i = 0;
assert(item->item.script == HB_Script_Myanmar);
#ifndef NO_OPENTYPE
openType = HB_SelectScript(item, myanmar_features);
#endif
MMDEBUG("myanmar_shape: from %d length %d", item->item.pos, item->item.length);
while (sstart < end) {
HB_Bool invalid;
int send = myanmar_nextSyllableBoundary(item->string, sstart, end, &invalid);
MMDEBUG("syllable from %d, length %d, invalid=%s", sstart, send-sstart,
invalid ? "TRUE" : "FALSE");
syllable.item.pos = sstart;
syllable.item.length = send-sstart;
syllable.glyphs = item->glyphs + first_glyph;
syllable.attributes = item->attributes + first_glyph;
syllable.advances = item->advances + first_glyph;
syllable.offsets = item->offsets + first_glyph;
syllable.num_glyphs = item->num_glyphs - first_glyph;
if (!myanmar_shape_syllable(openType, &syllable, invalid)) {
MMDEBUG("syllable shaping failed, syllable requests %d glyphs", syllable.num_glyphs);
item->num_glyphs += syllable.num_glyphs;
return FALSE;
}
/* fix logcluster array */
MMDEBUG("syllable:");
for (i = first_glyph; i < first_glyph + (int)syllable.num_glyphs; ++i)
MMDEBUG(" %d -> glyph %x", i, item->glyphs[i]);
MMDEBUG(" logclusters:");
for (i = sstart; i < send; ++i) {
MMDEBUG(" %d -> glyph %d", i, first_glyph);
logClusters[i-item->item.pos] = first_glyph;
}
sstart = send;
first_glyph += syllable.num_glyphs;
}
item->num_glyphs = first_glyph;
return TRUE;
}
| HB_Bool HB_MyanmarShape(HB_ShaperItem *item)
{
HB_Bool openType = FALSE;
unsigned short *logClusters = item->log_clusters;
HB_ShaperItem syllable = *item;
int first_glyph = 0;
int sstart = item->item.pos;
int end = sstart + item->item.length;
int i = 0;
assert(item->item.script == HB_Script_Myanmar);
#ifndef NO_OPENTYPE
openType = HB_SelectScript(item, myanmar_features);
#endif
MMDEBUG("myanmar_shape: from %d length %d", item->item.pos, item->item.length);
while (sstart < end) {
HB_Bool invalid;
int send = myanmar_nextSyllableBoundary(item->string, sstart, end, &invalid);
MMDEBUG("syllable from %d, length %d, invalid=%s", sstart, send-sstart,
invalid ? "TRUE" : "FALSE");
syllable.item.pos = sstart;
syllable.item.length = send-sstart;
syllable.glyphs = item->glyphs + first_glyph;
syllable.attributes = item->attributes + first_glyph;
syllable.advances = item->advances + first_glyph;
syllable.offsets = item->offsets + first_glyph;
syllable.num_glyphs = item->num_glyphs - first_glyph;
if (!myanmar_shape_syllable(openType, &syllable, invalid)) {
MMDEBUG("syllable shaping failed, syllable requests %d glyphs", syllable.num_glyphs);
item->num_glyphs += syllable.num_glyphs;
return FALSE;
}
/* fix logcluster array */
MMDEBUG("syllable:");
for (i = first_glyph; i < first_glyph + (int)syllable.num_glyphs; ++i)
MMDEBUG(" %d -> glyph %x", i, item->glyphs[i]);
MMDEBUG(" logclusters:");
for (i = sstart; i < send; ++i) {
MMDEBUG(" %d -> glyph %d", i, first_glyph);
logClusters[i-item->item.pos] = first_glyph;
}
sstart = send;
first_glyph += syllable.num_glyphs;
}
item->num_glyphs = first_glyph;
return TRUE;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b | 961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b | Extract generation logic from the accessory controller into a separate one
This change adds a controller that is responsible for mediating
communication between ChromePasswordManagerClient and
PasswordAccessoryController for password generation. It is also
responsible for managing the modal dialog used to present the generated
password.
In the future it will make it easier to add manual generation to the
password accessory.
Bug: 845458
Change-Id: I0adbb2de9b9f5012745ae3963154f7d3247b3051
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1448181
Commit-Queue: Ioana Pandele <ioanap@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Friedrich [CET] <fhorschig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629542} | void ChromePasswordManagerClient::PasswordFormsParsed(
const std::vector<autofill::PasswordForm>& forms) {
if (!password_manager::bad_message::CheckChildProcessSecurityPolicy(
password_manager_driver_bindings_.GetCurrentTargetFrame(), forms,
BadMessageReason::CPMD_BAD_ORIGIN_FORMS_PARSED))
return;
password_manager::PasswordManagerDriver* driver =
driver_factory_->GetDriverForFrame(
password_manager_driver_bindings_.GetCurrentTargetFrame());
GetPasswordManager()->OnPasswordFormsParsed(driver, forms);
}
| void ChromePasswordManagerClient::PasswordFormsParsed(
const std::vector<autofill::PasswordForm>& forms) {
if (!password_manager::bad_message::CheckChildProcessSecurityPolicy(
password_manager_driver_bindings_.GetCurrentTargetFrame(), forms,
BadMessageReason::CPMD_BAD_ORIGIN_FORMS_PARSED))
return;
password_manager::PasswordManagerDriver* driver =
driver_factory_->GetDriverForFrame(
password_manager_driver_bindings_.GetCurrentTargetFrame());
GetPasswordManager()->OnPasswordFormsParsed(driver, forms);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-9476 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9476/ | CWE-416 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/dd28d8ddf2985d654781770c691c60b45d7f32b4 | dd28d8ddf2985d654781770c691c60b45d7f32b4 | DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
| bool btif_av_is_connected(void) {
btif_sm_state_t state = btif_sm_get_state(btif_av_cb.sm_handle);
return ((state == BTIF_AV_STATE_OPENED) || (state == BTIF_AV_STATE_STARTED));
}
| bool btif_av_is_connected(void) {
btif_sm_state_t state = btif_sm_get_state(btif_av_cb.sm_handle);
return ((state == BTIF_AV_STATE_OPENED) || (state == BTIF_AV_STATE_STARTED));
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2015-4645 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-4645/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/plougher/squashfs-tools/commit/f95864afe8833fe3ad782d714b41378e860977b1 | f95864afe8833fe3ad782d714b41378e860977b1 | unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk> | void disable_progress_bar()
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&screen_mutex);
if(progress_enabled) {
progress_bar(sym_count + dev_count + fifo_count + cur_blocks,
total_inodes - total_files + total_blocks, columns);
printf("\n");
}
progress_enabled = FALSE;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&screen_mutex);
}
| void disable_progress_bar()
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&screen_mutex);
if(progress_enabled) {
progress_bar(sym_count + dev_count + fifo_count + cur_blocks,
total_inodes - total_files + total_blocks, columns);
printf("\n");
}
progress_enabled = FALSE;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&screen_mutex);
}
| C | squashfs-tools | 0 |
CVE-2013-1767 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1767/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f00110f7273f9ff04ac69a5f85bb535a4fd0987 | 5f00110f7273f9ff04ac69a5f85bb535a4fd0987 | tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static inline struct page *shmem_swapin(swp_entry_t swap, gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
return swapin_readahead(swap, gfp, NULL, 0);
}
| static inline struct page *shmem_swapin(swp_entry_t swap, gfp_t gfp,
struct shmem_inode_info *info, pgoff_t index)
{
return swapin_readahead(swap, gfp, NULL, 0);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-0281 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0281/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93 | 564f7cc2a51dcd2f28ab12a13394f31be5aa3c93 | High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend. | mainloop_add_trigger(int priority, int(*dispatch) (gpointer user_data), gpointer userdata)
{
GSource *source = NULL;
CRM_ASSERT(sizeof(crm_trigger_t) > sizeof(GSource));
source = g_source_new(&crm_trigger_funcs, sizeof(crm_trigger_t));
CRM_ASSERT(source != NULL);
return mainloop_setup_trigger(source, priority, dispatch, userdata);
}
| mainloop_add_trigger(int priority, int(*dispatch) (gpointer user_data), gpointer userdata)
{
GSource *source = NULL;
CRM_ASSERT(sizeof(crm_trigger_t) > sizeof(GSource));
source = g_source_new(&crm_trigger_funcs, sizeof(crm_trigger_t));
CRM_ASSERT(source != NULL);
return mainloop_setup_trigger(source, priority, dispatch, userdata);
}
| C | pacemaker | 0 |
CVE-2017-18234 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/ | CWE-416 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c | c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c | null | bool xmp_get_property_bool(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
bool *property, uint32_t *propsBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
try {
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<const SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
XMP_OptionBits optionBits;
ret = txmp->GetProperty_Bool(schema, name, property, &optionBits);
if (propsBits) {
*propsBits = optionBits;
}
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return ret;
}
| bool xmp_get_property_bool(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
bool *property, uint32_t *propsBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
try {
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<const SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
XMP_OptionBits optionBits;
ret = txmp->GetProperty_Bool(schema, name, property, &optionBits);
if (propsBits) {
*propsBits = optionBits;
}
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return ret;
}
| CPP | exempi | 0 |
CVE-2015-8818 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8818/ | CWE-20 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=b242e0e0e2969c044a318e56f7988bbd84de1f63 | b242e0e0e2969c044a318e56f7988bbd84de1f63 | null | static inline void address_space_stw_internal(AddressSpace *as,
hwaddr addr, uint32_t val,
MemTxAttrs attrs,
MemTxResult *result,
enum device_endian endian)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
MemoryRegion *mr;
hwaddr l = 2;
hwaddr addr1;
MemTxResult r;
bool release_lock = false;
rcu_read_lock();
mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &addr1, &l, true);
if (l < 2 || !memory_access_is_direct(mr, true)) {
release_lock |= prepare_mmio_access(mr);
#if defined(TARGET_WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
if (endian == DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
val = bswap16(val);
}
#else
if (endian == DEVICE_BIG_ENDIAN) {
val = bswap16(val);
}
#endif
r = memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 2, attrs);
} else {
/* RAM case */
addr1 += memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr) & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
ptr = qemu_get_ram_ptr(addr1);
switch (endian) {
case DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN:
stw_le_p(ptr, val);
break;
case DEVICE_BIG_ENDIAN:
stw_be_p(ptr, val);
break;
default:
stw_p(ptr, val);
break;
}
invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, 2);
r = MEMTX_OK;
}
if (result) {
*result = r;
}
if (release_lock) {
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
| static inline void address_space_stw_internal(AddressSpace *as,
hwaddr addr, uint32_t val,
MemTxAttrs attrs,
MemTxResult *result,
enum device_endian endian)
{
uint8_t *ptr;
MemoryRegion *mr;
hwaddr l = 2;
hwaddr addr1;
MemTxResult r;
bool release_lock = false;
rcu_read_lock();
mr = address_space_translate(as, addr, &addr1, &l, true);
if (l < 2 || !memory_access_is_direct(mr, true)) {
release_lock |= prepare_mmio_access(mr);
#if defined(TARGET_WORDS_BIGENDIAN)
if (endian == DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN) {
val = bswap16(val);
}
#else
if (endian == DEVICE_BIG_ENDIAN) {
val = bswap16(val);
}
#endif
r = memory_region_dispatch_write(mr, addr1, val, 2, attrs);
} else {
/* RAM case */
addr1 += memory_region_get_ram_addr(mr) & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
ptr = qemu_get_ram_ptr(addr1);
switch (endian) {
case DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN:
stw_le_p(ptr, val);
break;
case DEVICE_BIG_ENDIAN:
stw_be_p(ptr, val);
break;
default:
stw_p(ptr, val);
break;
}
invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, 2);
r = MEMTX_OK;
}
if (result) {
*result = r;
}
if (release_lock) {
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2016-1678 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1678/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1f5ad409dbf5334523931df37598ea49e9849c87 | 1f5ad409dbf5334523931df37598ea49e9849c87 | Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259} | bool SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& real_src_url,
const GURL& real_dest_url,
bool should_compare_effective_urls) {
GURL src_url =
should_compare_effective_urls
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, real_src_url)
: real_src_url;
GURL dest_url =
should_compare_effective_urls
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, real_dest_url)
: real_dest_url;
if (IsRendererDebugURL(src_url) || IsRendererDebugURL(dest_url))
return true;
if (!src_url.is_valid() || !dest_url.is_valid())
return false;
GURL blank_page(url::kAboutBlankURL);
if (dest_url == blank_page)
return true;
if (src_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(dest_url))
return true;
url::Origin src_origin = url::Origin::Create(src_url);
url::Origin dest_origin = url::Origin::Create(dest_url);
if (src_origin.scheme() != dest_origin.scheme())
return false;
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
src_origin, dest_origin,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
return false;
}
if (src_origin == dest_origin)
return true;
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
url::Origin src_isolated_origin;
url::Origin dest_isolated_origin;
bool src_origin_is_isolated =
policy->GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(src_origin, &src_isolated_origin);
bool dest_origin_is_isolated =
policy->GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(dest_origin, &dest_isolated_origin);
if (src_origin_is_isolated || dest_origin_is_isolated) {
return src_isolated_origin == dest_isolated_origin;
}
return true;
}
| bool SiteInstanceImpl::IsSameWebSite(BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& real_src_url,
const GURL& real_dest_url,
bool should_compare_effective_urls) {
GURL src_url =
should_compare_effective_urls
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, real_src_url)
: real_src_url;
GURL dest_url =
should_compare_effective_urls
? SiteInstanceImpl::GetEffectiveURL(browser_context, real_dest_url)
: real_dest_url;
if (IsRendererDebugURL(src_url) || IsRendererDebugURL(dest_url))
return true;
if (!src_url.is_valid() || !dest_url.is_valid())
return false;
GURL blank_page(url::kAboutBlankURL);
if (dest_url == blank_page)
return true;
if (src_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(dest_url))
return true;
url::Origin src_origin = url::Origin::Create(src_url);
url::Origin dest_origin = url::Origin::Create(dest_url);
if (src_origin.scheme() != dest_origin.scheme())
return false;
if (!net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost(
src_origin, dest_origin,
net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES)) {
return false;
}
if (src_origin == dest_origin)
return true;
auto* policy = ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
url::Origin src_isolated_origin;
url::Origin dest_isolated_origin;
bool src_origin_is_isolated =
policy->GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(src_origin, &src_isolated_origin);
bool dest_origin_is_isolated =
policy->GetMatchingIsolatedOrigin(dest_origin, &dest_isolated_origin);
if (src_origin_is_isolated || dest_origin_is_isolated) {
return src_isolated_origin == dest_isolated_origin;
}
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3896 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d | 5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d | Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | string16 Browser::GetWindowTitleForCurrentTab() const {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
string16 title;
if (contents) {
title = contents->GetTitle();
FormatTitleForDisplay(&title);
}
if (title.empty())
title = TabContentsWrapper::GetDefaultTitle();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return title;
#else
int string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT;
if (is_app())
string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT_NO_LOGO;
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(string_id, title);
#endif
}
| string16 Browser::GetWindowTitleForCurrentTab() const {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
string16 title;
if (contents) {
title = contents->GetTitle();
FormatTitleForDisplay(&title);
}
if (title.empty())
title = TabContentsWrapper::GetDefaultTitle();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return title;
#else
int string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT;
if (is_app())
string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT_NO_LOGO;
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(string_id, title);
#endif
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3eb1f512d8646db3a70aaef108a8f5ad8b3f013d | 3eb1f512d8646db3a70aaef108a8f5ad8b3f013d | 2010-06-18 Adam Barth <abarth@webkit.org>
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
noAccess url schemes block access to inline stylesheets
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32309
Test that data URLs can access their inline style sheets.
* http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css-expected.txt: Added.
* http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css.html: Added.
2010-06-18 Adam Barth <abarth@webkit.org>
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
noAccess url schemes block access to inline stylesheets
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32309
Instead of using baseURL() to grab the security context we should just
use finalURL directly. When I wrote the original patch that added this
security check, finalURL didn't exist yet.
If finalURL is an empty URL, that means we generated the style sheet
from text that didn't have a URL. It would be slightly safer to store
a bit on CSSStyleSheet indicating whether it came from an inline style
sheet, but I think this check is fairly accurate.
Test: http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css.html
* css/CSSStyleSheet.cpp:
(WebCore::CSSStyleSheet::cssRules):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@61391 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | CSSRule *CSSStyleSheet::ownerRule() const
{
return (parent() && parent()->isRule()) ? static_cast<CSSRule*>(parent()) : 0;
}
| CSSRule *CSSStyleSheet::ownerRule() const
{
return (parent() && parent()->isRule()) ? static_cast<CSSRule*>(parent()) : 0;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-11487 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb | 15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb | fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static void queue_interrupt(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq, struct fuse_req *req)
{
spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
if (test_bit(FR_FINISHED, &req->flags)) {
spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
return;
}
if (list_empty(&req->intr_entry)) {
list_add_tail(&req->intr_entry, &fiq->interrupts);
wake_up_locked(&fiq->waitq);
}
spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
kill_fasync(&fiq->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
| static void queue_interrupt(struct fuse_iqueue *fiq, struct fuse_req *req)
{
spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
if (test_bit(FR_FINISHED, &req->flags)) {
spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
return;
}
if (list_empty(&req->intr_entry)) {
list_add_tail(&req->intr_entry, &fiq->interrupts);
wake_up_locked(&fiq->waitq);
}
spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
kill_fasync(&fiq->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-5057 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5057/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/cbc5d5153b18ea387f4769caa01d1339261f6ed6 | cbc5d5153b18ea387f4769caa01d1339261f6ed6 | gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826} | void FeatureInfo::InitializeForTesting(ContextType context_type) {
initialized_ = false;
Initialize(context_type, false /* is_passthrough_cmd_decoder */,
DisallowedFeatures());
}
| void FeatureInfo::InitializeForTesting(ContextType context_type) {
initialized_ = false;
Initialize(context_type, false /* is_passthrough_cmd_decoder */,
DisallowedFeatures());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-18200 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18200/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4 | 638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4 | f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
unsigned int main_segs, blocks_per_seg;
int i;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| int sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
unsigned int total, fsmeta;
struct f2fs_super_block *raw_super = F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi);
struct f2fs_checkpoint *ckpt = F2FS_CKPT(sbi);
unsigned int ovp_segments, reserved_segments;
unsigned int main_segs, blocks_per_seg;
int i;
total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count);
fsmeta = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ckpt);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_sit);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_nat);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
fsmeta += le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_ssa);
if (unlikely(fsmeta >= total))
return 1;
ovp_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->overprov_segment_count);
reserved_segments = le32_to_cpu(ckpt->rsvd_segment_count);
if (unlikely(fsmeta < F2FS_MIN_SEGMENTS ||
ovp_segments == 0 || reserved_segments == 0)) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR,
"Wrong layout: check mkfs.f2fs version");
return 1;
}
main_segs = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count_main);
blocks_per_seg = sbi->blocks_per_seg;
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_NODE_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_node_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_CURSEG_DATA_TYPE; i++) {
if (le32_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_segno[i]) >= main_segs ||
le16_to_cpu(ckpt->cur_data_blkoff[i]) >= blocks_per_seg)
return 1;
}
if (unlikely(f2fs_cp_error(sbi))) {
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_ERR, "A bug case: need to run fsck");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-10517 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50 | 874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50 | Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed. | static void sigShutdownHandler(int sig) {
char *msg;
switch (sig) {
case SIGINT:
msg = "Received SIGINT scheduling shutdown...";
break;
case SIGTERM:
msg = "Received SIGTERM scheduling shutdown...";
break;
default:
msg = "Received shutdown signal, scheduling shutdown...";
};
/* SIGINT is often delivered via Ctrl+C in an interactive session.
* If we receive the signal the second time, we interpret this as
* the user really wanting to quit ASAP without waiting to persist
* on disk. */
if (server.shutdown_asap && sig == SIGINT) {
serverLogFromHandler(LL_WARNING, "You insist... exiting now.");
rdbRemoveTempFile(getpid());
exit(1); /* Exit with an error since this was not a clean shutdown. */
} else if (server.loading) {
exit(0);
}
serverLogFromHandler(LL_WARNING, msg);
server.shutdown_asap = 1;
}
| static void sigShutdownHandler(int sig) {
char *msg;
switch (sig) {
case SIGINT:
msg = "Received SIGINT scheduling shutdown...";
break;
case SIGTERM:
msg = "Received SIGTERM scheduling shutdown...";
break;
default:
msg = "Received shutdown signal, scheduling shutdown...";
};
/* SIGINT is often delivered via Ctrl+C in an interactive session.
* If we receive the signal the second time, we interpret this as
* the user really wanting to quit ASAP without waiting to persist
* on disk. */
if (server.shutdown_asap && sig == SIGINT) {
serverLogFromHandler(LL_WARNING, "You insist... exiting now.");
rdbRemoveTempFile(getpid());
exit(1); /* Exit with an error since this was not a clean shutdown. */
} else if (server.loading) {
exit(0);
}
serverLogFromHandler(LL_WARNING, msg);
server.shutdown_asap = 1;
}
| C | redis | 0 |
CVE-2018-10017 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-10017/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/OpenMPT/openmpt/commit/492022c7297ede682161d9c0ec2de15526424e76 | 492022c7297ede682161d9c0ec2de15526424e76 | [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27 | void CSoundFile::ExtendedS3MCommands(CHANNELINDEX nChn, ModCommand::PARAM param)
{
ModChannel *pChn = &m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
uint8 command = param & 0xF0;
param &= 0x0F;
switch(command)
{
case 0x10: pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_GLISSANDO, param != 0); break;
case 0x20: if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK]) break;
if(GetType() != MOD_TYPE_669)
{
pChn->nC5Speed = S3MFineTuneTable[param];
pChn->nFineTune = MOD2XMFineTune(param);
if (pChn->nPeriod) pChn->nPeriod = GetPeriodFromNote(pChn->nNote, pChn->nFineTune, pChn->nC5Speed);
} else if(pChn->pModSample != nullptr)
{
pChn->nC5Speed = pChn->pModSample->nC5Speed + param * 80;
}
break;
case 0x30: if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nVibratoType = param & 0x03;
} else
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
pChn->nVibratoType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
else
pChn->nVibratoType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x40: if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nTremoloType = param & 0x03;
} else
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
pChn->nTremoloType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
else
pChn->nTremoloType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x50:
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
{
pChn->nPanbrelloType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
pChn->nPanbrelloPos = 0;
} else
{
pChn->nPanbrelloType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x60:
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] && m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0)
{
m_PlayState.m_nFrameDelay += param;
}
break;
case 0x70: if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK]) break;
switch(param)
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
{
ModChannel *bkp = &m_PlayState.Chn[m_nChannels];
for (CHANNELINDEX i=m_nChannels; i<MAX_CHANNELS; i++, bkp++)
{
if (bkp->nMasterChn == nChn+1)
{
if (param == 1)
{
KeyOff(bkp);
} else if (param == 2)
{
bkp->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
} else
{
bkp->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
bkp->nFadeOutVol = 0;
}
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
const ModInstrument *pIns = bkp->pModInstrument;
IMixPlugin *pPlugin;
if(pIns != nullptr && pIns->nMixPlug && (pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[pIns->nMixPlug - 1].pMixPlugin) != nullptr)
{
pPlugin->MidiCommand(GetBestMidiChannel(nChn), pIns->nMidiProgram, pIns->wMidiBank, bkp->nNote + NOTE_MAX_SPECIAL, 0, nChn);
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
}
}
}
break;
case 3: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTECUT; break;
case 4: pChn->nNNA = NNA_CONTINUE; break;
case 5: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTEOFF; break;
case 6: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTEFADE; break;
case 7: pChn->VolEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 8: pChn->VolEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 9: pChn->PanEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 10: pChn->PanEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 11: pChn->PitchEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 12: pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 13: // S7D: Enable pitch envelope, force to play as pitch envelope
case 14: // S7E: Enable pitch envelope, force to play as filter envelope
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MPT)
{
pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED);
pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_FILTER, param != 13);
}
break;
}
break;
case 0x80:
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
Panning(pChn, param, Pan4bit);
}
break;
case 0x90: ExtendedChannelEffect(pChn, param); break;
case 0xA0: if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
pChn->nOldHiOffset = static_cast<uint8>(param);
if (!m_playBehaviour[kITHighOffsetNoRetrig] && pChn->rowCommand.IsNote())
{
SmpLength pos = param << 16;
if (pos < pChn->nLength) pChn->position.SetInt(pos);
}
}
break;
case 0xC0:
if(param == 0)
{
if(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT))
param = 1;
else if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
return;
}
NoteCut(nChn, param, m_playBehaviour[kITSCxStopsSample] || GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M);
break;
case 0xF0:
if(GetType() != MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nActiveMacro = static_cast<uint8>(param);
}
break;
}
}
| void CSoundFile::ExtendedS3MCommands(CHANNELINDEX nChn, ModCommand::PARAM param)
{
ModChannel *pChn = &m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
uint8 command = param & 0xF0;
param &= 0x0F;
switch(command)
{
case 0x10: pChn->dwFlags.set(CHN_GLISSANDO, param != 0); break;
case 0x20: if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK]) break;
if(GetType() != MOD_TYPE_669)
{
pChn->nC5Speed = S3MFineTuneTable[param];
pChn->nFineTune = MOD2XMFineTune(param);
if (pChn->nPeriod) pChn->nPeriod = GetPeriodFromNote(pChn->nNote, pChn->nFineTune, pChn->nC5Speed);
} else if(pChn->pModSample != nullptr)
{
pChn->nC5Speed = pChn->pModSample->nC5Speed + param * 80;
}
break;
case 0x30: if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nVibratoType = param & 0x03;
} else
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
pChn->nVibratoType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
else
pChn->nVibratoType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x40: if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nTremoloType = param & 0x03;
} else
{
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
pChn->nTremoloType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
else
pChn->nTremoloType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x50:
if(m_playBehaviour[kITVibratoTremoloPanbrello])
{
pChn->nPanbrelloType = (param < 0x04) ? param : 0;
pChn->nPanbrelloPos = 0;
} else
{
pChn->nPanbrelloType = param & 0x07;
}
break;
case 0x60:
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] && m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0)
{
m_PlayState.m_nFrameDelay += param;
}
break;
case 0x70: if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK]) break;
switch(param)
{
case 0:
case 1:
case 2:
{
ModChannel *bkp = &m_PlayState.Chn[m_nChannels];
for (CHANNELINDEX i=m_nChannels; i<MAX_CHANNELS; i++, bkp++)
{
if (bkp->nMasterChn == nChn+1)
{
if (param == 1)
{
KeyOff(bkp);
} else if (param == 2)
{
bkp->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
} else
{
bkp->dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
bkp->nFadeOutVol = 0;
}
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
const ModInstrument *pIns = bkp->pModInstrument;
IMixPlugin *pPlugin;
if(pIns != nullptr && pIns->nMixPlug && (pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[pIns->nMixPlug - 1].pMixPlugin) != nullptr)
{
pPlugin->MidiCommand(GetBestMidiChannel(nChn), pIns->nMidiProgram, pIns->wMidiBank, bkp->nNote + NOTE_MAX_SPECIAL, 0, nChn);
}
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
}
}
}
break;
case 3: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTECUT; break;
case 4: pChn->nNNA = NNA_CONTINUE; break;
case 5: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTEOFF; break;
case 6: pChn->nNNA = NNA_NOTEFADE; break;
case 7: pChn->VolEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 8: pChn->VolEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 9: pChn->PanEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 10: pChn->PanEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 11: pChn->PitchEnv.flags.reset(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 12: pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED); break;
case 13: // S7D: Enable pitch envelope, force to play as pitch envelope
case 14: // S7E: Enable pitch envelope, force to play as filter envelope
if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MPT)
{
pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_ENABLED);
pChn->PitchEnv.flags.set(ENV_FILTER, param != 13);
}
break;
}
break;
case 0x80:
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
Panning(pChn, param, Pan4bit);
}
break;
case 0x90: ExtendedChannelEffect(pChn, param); break;
case 0xA0: if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
pChn->nOldHiOffset = static_cast<uint8>(param);
if (!m_playBehaviour[kITHighOffsetNoRetrig] && pChn->rowCommand.IsNote())
{
SmpLength pos = param << 16;
if (pos < pChn->nLength) pChn->position.SetInt(pos);
}
}
break;
case 0xC0:
if(param == 0)
{
if(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT | MOD_TYPE_MPT))
param = 1;
else if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M)
return;
}
NoteCut(nChn, param, m_playBehaviour[kITSCxStopsSample] || GetType() == MOD_TYPE_S3M);
break;
case 0xF0:
if(GetType() != MOD_TYPE_S3M)
{
pChn->nActiveMacro = static_cast<uint8>(param);
}
break;
}
}
| C | openmpt | 0 |
CVE-2018-6148 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6148/ | CWE-93 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fa68dcfd12e376aa880b3193a77b896e6c54efdf | fa68dcfd12e376aa880b3193a77b896e6c54efdf | Verify that header values set from Blink don't contain '\n'.
Because that would be silly.
Bug: 845961
Change-Id: I69de2cb093a3629de63c48652c9499f7387b8334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1109757
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#570206} | void CheckHeaderFails(const char* header_field) {
CheckHeaderFails(header_field, "foo");
}
| void CheckHeaderFails(const char* header_field) {
CheckHeaderFails(header_field, "foo");
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-1683 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | 96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | exsltDateHourInDay (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
double ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_TIME)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
ret = (double) dt->value.date.hour;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
| exsltDateHourInDay (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
double ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_TIME)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
ret = (double) dt->value.date.hour;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-3538 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3538/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/file/file/commit/4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320 | 4a284c89d6ef11aca34da65da7d673050a5ea320 | * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible. | file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
| file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
| C | file | 0 |
CVE-2018-20482 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20482/ | CWE-835 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454 | c15c42ccd1e2377945fd0414eca1a49294bff454 | null | sparse_scan_file (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
/* always check for completely sparse files */
if (sparse_scan_file_wholesparse (file))
return true;
switch (hole_detection)
{
case HOLE_DETECTION_DEFAULT:
case HOLE_DETECTION_SEEK:
#ifdef SEEK_HOLE
if (sparse_scan_file_seek (file))
return true;
#else
if (hole_detection == HOLE_DETECTION_SEEK)
WARN((0, 0,
_("\"seek\" hole detection is not supported, using \"raw\".")));
/* fall back to "raw" for this and all other files */
hole_detection = HOLE_DETECTION_RAW;
#endif
FALLTHROUGH;
case HOLE_DETECTION_RAW:
if (sparse_scan_file_raw (file))
return true;
}
return false;
}
| sparse_scan_file (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
/* always check for completely sparse files */
if (sparse_scan_file_wholesparse (file))
return true;
switch (hole_detection)
{
case HOLE_DETECTION_DEFAULT:
case HOLE_DETECTION_SEEK:
#ifdef SEEK_HOLE
if (sparse_scan_file_seek (file))
return true;
#else
if (hole_detection == HOLE_DETECTION_SEEK)
WARN((0, 0,
_("\"seek\" hole detection is not supported, using \"raw\".")));
/* fall back to "raw" for this and all other files */
hole_detection = HOLE_DETECTION_RAW;
#endif
FALLTHROUGH;
case HOLE_DETECTION_RAW:
if (sparse_scan_file_raw (file))
return true;
}
return false;
}
| C | savannah | 0 |
CVE-2012-5148 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599 | Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void BrowserView::Paste() {
if (!DoCutCopyPaste(&content::RenderWidgetHost::Paste)) {
ui_controls::SendKeyPress(GetNativeWindow(), ui::VKEY_V,
true, false, false, false);
}
}
| void BrowserView::Paste() {
if (!DoCutCopyPaste(&content::RenderWidgetHost::Paste)) {
ui_controls::SendKeyPress(GetNativeWindow(), ui::VKEY_V,
true, false, false, false);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-1271 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1271/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376 | 74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376 | Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032} | MediaControlPlayButtonElement::MediaControlPlayButtonElement(
MediaControls& mediaControls)
: MediaControlInputElement(mediaControls, MediaPlayButton) {}
| MediaControlPlayButtonElement::MediaControlPlayButtonElement(
MediaControls& mediaControls)
: MediaControlInputElement(mediaControls, MediaPlayButton) {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3209 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static void mmtimer_setup_int_0(int cpu, u64 expires)
{
u64 val;
/* Disable interrupt */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE), 0UL);
/* Initialize comparator value */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_INT_CMPB), -1L);
/* Clear pending bit */
mmtimer_clr_int_pending(0);
val = ((u64)SGI_MMTIMER_VECTOR << SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG_IDX_SHFT) |
((u64)cpu_physical_id(cpu) <<
SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG_PID_SHFT);
/* Set configuration */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG), val);
/* Enable RTC interrupts */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE), 1UL);
/* Initialize comparator value */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_INT_CMPB), expires);
}
| static void mmtimer_setup_int_0(int cpu, u64 expires)
{
u64 val;
/* Disable interrupt */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE), 0UL);
/* Initialize comparator value */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_INT_CMPB), -1L);
/* Clear pending bit */
mmtimer_clr_int_pending(0);
val = ((u64)SGI_MMTIMER_VECTOR << SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG_IDX_SHFT) |
((u64)cpu_physical_id(cpu) <<
SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG_PID_SHFT);
/* Set configuration */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_CONFIG), val);
/* Enable RTC interrupts */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE), 1UL);
/* Initialize comparator value */
HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_INT_CMPB), expires);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-1759 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1759/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9 | 0f22072ab50cac7983f9660d33974b45184da4f9 | ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semop(int semid, struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops)
{
return sys_oabi_semtimedop(semid, tsops, nsops, NULL);
}
| asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semop(int semid, struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops)
{
return sys_oabi_semtimedop(semid, tsops, nsops, NULL);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-5194 | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251 | d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251 | Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <austinct@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782} | static void RegisterJSONConverter(
base::JSONValueConverter<ExpectFileTasksMessage>* converter) {
converter->RegisterCustomField(
"openType", &ExpectFileTasksMessage::open_type, &MapStringToOpenType);
converter->RegisterRepeatedString("fileNames",
&ExpectFileTasksMessage::file_names);
}
| static void RegisterJSONConverter(
base::JSONValueConverter<ExpectFileTasksMessage>* converter) {
converter->RegisterCustomField(
"openType", &ExpectFileTasksMessage::open_type, &MapStringToOpenType);
converter->RegisterRepeatedString("fileNames",
&ExpectFileTasksMessage::file_names);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-6111 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6111/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f | 3c8e4852477d5b1e2da877808c998dc57db9460f | DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Response EmulationHandler::ClearDeviceMetricsOverride() {
if (!device_emulation_enabled_)
return Response::OK();
if (GetWebContents())
GetWebContents()->ClearDeviceEmulationSize();
else
return Response::Error("Can't find the associated web contents");
device_emulation_enabled_ = false;
device_emulation_params_ = blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams();
UpdateDeviceEmulationState();
return Response::FallThrough();
}
| Response EmulationHandler::ClearDeviceMetricsOverride() {
if (!device_emulation_enabled_)
return Response::OK();
if (GetWebContents())
GetWebContents()->ClearDeviceEmulationSize();
else
return Response::Error("Can't find the associated web contents");
device_emulation_enabled_ = false;
device_emulation_params_ = blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams();
UpdateDeviceEmulationState();
return Response::FallThrough();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-2861 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce | 8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce | DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void DevToolsClient::OnDispatchOnInspectorFrontend(const std::string& message) {
web_tools_frontend_->dispatchOnInspectorFrontend(
WebString::fromUTF8(message));
}
| void DevToolsClient::OnDispatchOnInspectorFrontend(const std::string& message) {
web_tools_frontend_->dispatchOnInspectorFrontend(
WebString::fromUTF8(message));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206 | b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206 | Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool NavigationController::IsURLInPageNavigation(const GURL& url) const {
NavigationEntry* last_committed = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!last_committed)
return false;
return AreURLsInPageNavigation(last_committed->url(), url);
}
| bool NavigationController::IsURLInPageNavigation(const GURL& url) const {
NavigationEntry* last_committed = GetLastCommittedEntry();
if (!last_committed)
return false;
return AreURLsInPageNavigation(last_committed->url(), url);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-1713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154 | document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt8MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithEnforceRangeUInt8Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt8MethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithEnforceRangeUInt8Method(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3103 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3103/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2dfe7c175fb21263f06eb586f1ed235482a3281 | b2dfe7c175fb21263f06eb586f1ed235482a3281 | [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | ewk_frame_scroll_size_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame, int* width, int* height)
{
if (width)
*width = 0;
if (height)
*height = 0;
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->view(), false);
WebCore::IntPoint point = smartData->frame->view()->maximumScrollPosition();
if (width)
*width = point.x();
if (height)
*height = point.y();
return true;
}
| ewk_frame_scroll_size_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame, int* width, int* height)
{
if (width)
*width = 0;
if (height)
*height = 0;
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->view(), false);
WebCore::IntPoint point = smartData->frame->view()->maximumScrollPosition();
if (width)
*width = point.x();
if (height)
*height = point.y();
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-14463 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14463/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/stephane/libmodbus/commit/5ccdf5ef79d742640355d1132fa9e2abc7fbaefc | 5ccdf5ef79d742640355d1132fa9e2abc7fbaefc | Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust. | int modbus_flush(modbus_t *ctx)
{
int rc;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
rc = ctx->backend->flush(ctx);
if (rc != -1 && ctx->debug) {
/* Not all backends are able to return the number of bytes flushed */
printf("Bytes flushed (%d)\n", rc);
}
return rc;
}
| int modbus_flush(modbus_t *ctx)
{
int rc;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
rc = ctx->backend->flush(ctx);
if (rc != -1 && ctx->debug) {
/* Not all backends are able to return the number of bytes flushed */
printf("Bytes flushed (%d)\n", rc);
}
return rc;
}
| C | libmodbus | 0 |
CVE-2016-10708 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10708/ | CWE-476 | https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737 | 28652bca29046f62c7045e933e6b931de1d16737 | null | choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
| choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
} else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
| C | mindrot | 0 |
CVE-2011-2861 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2861/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce | 8262245d384be025f13e2a5b3a03b7e5c98374ce | DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void RenderView::didReceiveResponse(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier, const WebURLResponse& response) {
SiteIsolationMetrics::LogMimeTypeForCrossOriginRequest(frame,
identifier,
response);
if (!frame->provisionalDataSource() || frame->parent())
return;
if (frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled())
return;
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource());
CHECK(navigation_state);
int http_status_code = response.httpStatusCode();
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_spdy(response.wasFetchedViaSPDY());
navigation_state->set_was_npn_negotiated(response.wasNpnNegotiated());
navigation_state->set_was_alternate_protocol_available(
response.wasAlternateProtocolAvailable());
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_proxy(response.wasFetchedViaProxy());
navigation_state->set_http_status_code(http_status_code);
navigation_state->set_use_error_page(true);
}
| void RenderView::didReceiveResponse(
WebFrame* frame, unsigned identifier, const WebURLResponse& response) {
SiteIsolationMetrics::LogMimeTypeForCrossOriginRequest(frame,
identifier,
response);
if (!frame->provisionalDataSource() || frame->parent())
return;
if (frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled())
return;
NavigationState* navigation_state =
NavigationState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource());
CHECK(navigation_state);
int http_status_code = response.httpStatusCode();
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_spdy(response.wasFetchedViaSPDY());
navigation_state->set_was_npn_negotiated(response.wasNpnNegotiated());
navigation_state->set_was_alternate_protocol_available(
response.wasAlternateProtocolAvailable());
navigation_state->set_was_fetched_via_proxy(response.wasFetchedViaProxy());
navigation_state->set_http_status_code(http_status_code);
navigation_state->set_use_error_page(true);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-10196 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10196/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/libevent/libevent/commit/329acc18a0768c21ba22522f01a5c7f46cacc4d5 | 329acc18a0768c21ba22522f01a5c7f46cacc4d5 | evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318 | need_socktype_protocol_hack(void)
{
if (!tested_for_getaddrinfo_hacks)
test_for_getaddrinfo_hacks();
return need_socktype_protocol_hack_;
}
| need_socktype_protocol_hack(void)
{
if (!tested_for_getaddrinfo_hacks)
test_for_getaddrinfo_hacks();
return need_socktype_protocol_hack_;
}
| C | libevent | 0 |
CVE-2013-0918 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0918/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b | 0a57375ad73780e61e1770a9d88b0529b0dbd33b | Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void RenderViewImpl::DidFlushPaint() {
pepper_helper_->ViewFlushedPaint();
if (!webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame->provisionalDataSource()) {
WebDataSource* ds = main_frame->dataSource();
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
Time now = Time::Now();
if (document_state->first_paint_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_time(now);
}
if (document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().is_null() &&
!document_state->finish_load_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_after_load_time(now);
}
}
}
| void RenderViewImpl::DidFlushPaint() {
pepper_helper_->ViewFlushedPaint();
if (!webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame->provisionalDataSource()) {
WebDataSource* ds = main_frame->dataSource();
DocumentState* document_state = DocumentState::FromDataSource(ds);
Time now = Time::Now();
if (document_state->first_paint_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_time(now);
}
if (document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().is_null() &&
!document_state->finish_load_time().is_null()) {
document_state->set_first_paint_after_load_time(now);
}
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2480 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2480/ | CWE-20 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/560ccdb509a7b86186fac0fce1b25bd9a3e6a6e8 | 560ccdb509a7b86186fac0fce1b25bd9a3e6a6e8 | DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vidc: validate omx param/config data
Check the sanity of config/param strcuture objects
passed to get/set _ config()/parameter() methods.
Bug: 27533317
Security Vulnerability in MediaServer
omx_vdec::get_config() Can lead to arbitrary write
Change-Id: I6c3243afe12055ab94f1a1ecf758c10e88231809
Conflicts:
mm-core/inc/OMX_QCOMExtns.h
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/vdec/src/omx_vdec_msm8974.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_base.cpp
mm-video-v4l2/vidc/venc/src/omx_video_encoder.cpp
| OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/*set_parameter can be called in loaded state
or disabled port */
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded
|| m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE
|| m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
if (!dev_is_video_session_supported(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("video session not supported");
omx_report_unsupported_setting();
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (In_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
memcpy(&m_sInPortDef, portDefn,sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
#endif
/*Query Input Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else if (PORT_INDEX_OUT == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (Out_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param output failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
#endif
memcpy(&m_sOutPortDef,portDefn,sizeof(struct OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
update_profile_level(); //framerate , bitrate
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = portDefn->format.video.xFramerate;
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
update_profile_level(); //framerate
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portFmt->eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
#endif
{
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB;
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
}
m_sInPortFormat.xFramerate = portFmt->xFramerate;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{ //TODO, do we need this index set param
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE);
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE*)(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set OMX_IndexParamVideoInit called");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.eControlRate = pParam->eControlRate;
update_profile_level(); //bitrate
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("bitrate = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE mp4_param;
memcpy(&mp4_param, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
mp4_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MPEG4: %u BFrames are being set", (unsigned int)mp4_param.nBFrames);
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&mp4_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamMPEG4,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = mp4_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoH263) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamH263,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamH263.nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamH263.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE avc_param;
memcpy(&avc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
if ((pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh)||
(pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain)) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: 2 RefFrames are needed, changing RefFrames from %u to 2", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 2;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes) {
avc_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
avc_param.nRefFrames = (avc_param.nBFrames < 4)? avc_param.nBFrames + 1 : 4;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("AVC: RefFrames: %u, BFrames: %u", (unsigned int)avc_param.nRefFrames, (unsigned int)avc_param.nBFrames);
avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC = (OMX_BOOL)(avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC && entropy);
avc_param.nCabacInitIdc = entropy ? avc_param.nCabacInitIdc : 0;
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&avc_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamAVC,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamAVC.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = avc_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames;
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE vp8_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
if (pParam->nDCTPartitions != m_sParamVP8.nDCTPartitions ||
pParam->bErrorResilientMode != m_sParamVP8.bErrorResilientMode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VP8 doesn't support nDCTPartitions or bErrorResilientMode");
}
memcpy(&vp8_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&vp8_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamVP8,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE hevc_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(&hevc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&hevc_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed : set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamHEVC, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
if (handle->venc_set_param(pParam,OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent failed for Profile: %u "
"Level :%u", (unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MPEG4 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile,
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamH263.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_H263PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamH263.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_H263LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamH263.eProfile,
m_sParamH263.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("\n AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamVP8.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamVP8.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VP8 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamVP8.eProfile,
m_sParamVP8.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamHEVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("HEVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamHEVC.eProfile,
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel);
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE);
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s\n", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %s", m_nkind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_sInBufSupplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpI = session_qp->nQpI;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpP = session_qp->nQpP;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpB = session_qp->nQpB;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for Session QP setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
if (qp_range->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQPRange.minQP= qp_range->minQP;
m_sSessionQPRange.maxQP= qp_range->maxQP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for QP range setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE);
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: SetParameter called on unsupported Port Index for QcomPortDefn");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Error Resilience failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sErrorCorrection,pParam, sizeof(m_sErrorCorrection));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra refresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sIntraRefresh, pParam, sizeof(m_sIntraRefresh));
break;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams);
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *pParam =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode: "
"port_index = %u, meta_mode = %d", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex, pParam->bStoreMetaData);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
if (meta_mode_enable) {
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin;
if (handle->venc_set_param(&m_sInPortDef,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
/*TODO: reset encoder driver Meta mode*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT && secure_session) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("\nERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: metamode is "
"valid for input port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
bool enable = false;
OMX_U32 mask = 0;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SliceInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MBInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTRInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: unsupported extrdata index (%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
m_sExtraData |= mask;
else
m_sExtraData &= ~mask;
enable = !!(m_sExtraData & mask);
if (handle->venc_set_param(&enable,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)pParam->nIndex) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Extradata (%x) failed", pParam->nIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("updated out_buf_req: buffer cnt=%u, "
"count min=%u, buffer size=%u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRMode, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRMode));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE);
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR count failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRCount, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
handle->m_max_allowed_bitrate_check =
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? true : false);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: max allowed bitrate check %s",
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck "
" called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE);
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, PrependSPSPPSToIDRFramesParams);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:",
"request for inband sps/pps failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_CONFIG_H264_AUD);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamh264AUDelimiter:",
"request for AU Delimiters failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS);
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if((pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType == QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_B) && pParam->nNumLayers)
hier_b_enabled = true;
m_sHierLayers.nNumLayers = pParam->nNumLayers;
m_sHierLayers.eHierarchicalCodingType = pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PERF_LEVEL);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting performance level");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_VUI_TIMING_INFO);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VUI timing info");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_PEAK_BITRATE);
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting peak bitrate");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_INITIALQP);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable initial QP failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamInitqp, paramData, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Searchrange");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
VALIDATE_OMX_PARAM_DATA(paramData, QOMX_EXTNINDEX_VIDEO_HYBRID_HP_MODE);
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable Hybrid Hier-P failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
| OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::set_parameter(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_IN OMX_INDEXTYPE paramIndex,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR paramData)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Param in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (paramData == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Get Param in Invalid paramData");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
/*set_parameter can be called in loaded state
or disabled port */
if (m_state == OMX_StateLoaded
|| m_sInPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE
|| m_sOutPortDef.bEnabled == OMX_FALSE) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
switch ((int)paramIndex) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDefn;
portDefn = (OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition H= %d, W = %d",
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight,
(int)portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
if (!dev_is_video_session_supported(portDefn->format.video.nFrameWidth,
portDefn->format.video.nFrameHeight)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("video session not supported");
omx_report_unsupported_setting();
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (In_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return handle->hw_overload ? OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources :
OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("i/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
memcpy(&m_sInPortDef, portDefn,sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portDefn->format.video.eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
#endif
/*Query Input Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sInPortDef.nPortIndex);
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else if (PORT_INDEX_OUT == portDefn->nPortIndex) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p actual cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p min cnt requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p buffersize requested = %u", (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferSize);
if (portDefn->nBufferCountMin > portDefn->nBufferCountActual) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: (Out_PORT) Min buffers (%u) > actual count (%u)",
(unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountMin, (unsigned int)portDefn->nBufferCountActual);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param output failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/*Query ouput Buffer Requirements*/
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
#endif
memcpy(&m_sOutPortDef,portDefn,sizeof(struct OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE));
update_profile_level(); //framerate , bitrate
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("o/p previous min cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin);
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual = portDefn->nBufferCountActual;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set_parameter: Bad Port idx %d",
(int)portDefn->nPortIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
m_sConfigFramerate.xEncodeFramerate = portDefn->format.video.xFramerate;
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = portDefn->format.video.nBitrate;
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *portFmt =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
if (PORT_INDEX_IN == portFmt->nPortIndex) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat %d",
portFmt->eColorFormat);
update_profile_level(); //framerate
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (portFmt->eColorFormat ==
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)QOMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE)
QOMX_COLOR_FORMATYUV420PackedSemiPlanar32m;
if (!mUseProxyColorFormat) {
if (!c2d_conv.init()) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("C2D init failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("C2D init is successful");
}
mUseProxyColorFormat = true;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB_OPQ;
} else
#endif
{
m_sInPortFormat.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.eColorFormat = portFmt->eColorFormat;
m_input_msg_id = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_ETB;
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
}
m_sInPortFormat.xFramerate = portFmt->xFramerate;
}
}
break;
case OMX_IndexParamVideoInit:
{ //TODO, do we need this index set param
OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE* pParam = (OMX_PORT_PARAM_TYPE*)(paramData);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set OMX_IndexParamVideoInit called");
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamBitrate.nTargetBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sParamBitrate.eControlRate = pParam->eControlRate;
update_profile_level(); //bitrate
m_sConfigBitrate.nEncodeBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sInPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate = pParam->nTargetBitrate;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("bitrate = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.format.video.nBitrate);
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE mp4_param;
memcpy(&mp4_param, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4");
if (pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileAdvancedSimple) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
mp4_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MPEG4: %u BFrames are being set", (unsigned int)mp4_param.nBFrames);
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
mp4_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&mp4_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamMPEG4,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames = mp4_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamMPEG4.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoH263");
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoH263) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamH263,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamH263.nPFrames;
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamH263.nBFrames;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE avc_param;
memcpy(&avc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc");
if ((pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileHigh)||
(pParam->eProfile == OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileMain)) {
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("INFO: Only 1 Bframe is supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 2) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: 2 RefFrames are needed, changing RefFrames from %u to 2", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 2;
}
#else
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes) {
avc_param.nBFrames = (pParam->nBFrames > (unsigned int) bframes)? pParam->nBFrames : bframes;
avc_param.nRefFrames = (avc_param.nBFrames < 4)? avc_param.nBFrames + 1 : 4;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("AVC: RefFrames: %u, BFrames: %u", (unsigned int)avc_param.nRefFrames, (unsigned int)avc_param.nBFrames);
avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC = (OMX_BOOL)(avc_param.bEntropyCodingCABAC && entropy);
avc_param.nCabacInitIdc = entropy ? avc_param.nCabacInitIdc : 0;
#endif
} else {
if (pParam->nRefFrames != 1) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: Only 1 RefFrame is supported, changing RefFrame from %u to 1)", (unsigned int)pParam->nRefFrames);
avc_param.nRefFrames = 1;
}
if (pParam->nBFrames) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Warning: B frames not supported");
avc_param.nBFrames = 0;
}
}
if (handle->venc_set_param(&avc_param,OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamAVC,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE));
m_sIntraperiod.nPFrames = m_sParamAVC.nPFrames;
if (pParam->nBFrames || bframes)
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames = avc_param.nBFrames;
else
m_sIntraperiod.nBFrames = m_sParamAVC.nBFrames;
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE vp8_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8");
if (pParam->nDCTPartitions != m_sParamVP8.nDCTPartitions ||
pParam->bErrorResilientMode != m_sParamVP8.bErrorResilientMode) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("VP8 doesn't support nDCTPartitions or bErrorResilientMode");
}
memcpy(&vp8_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&vp8_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamVP8,pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE));
break;
}
case (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE*)paramData;
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE hevc_param;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
memcpy(&hevc_param, pParam, sizeof( struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
if (handle->venc_set_param(&hevc_param, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed : set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoHevc");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamHEVC, pParam, sizeof(struct OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_HEVCTYPE));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE* pParam = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent");
if (handle->venc_set_param(pParam,OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent failed for Profile: %u "
"Level :%u", (unsigned int)pParam->eProfile, (unsigned int)pParam->eLevel);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile = pParam->eProfile;
m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel = pParam->eLevel;
if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("MPEG4 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamMPEG4.eProfile,
m_sParamMPEG4.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamH263.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_H263PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamH263.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_H263LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("H263 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamH263.eProfile,
m_sParamH263.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
} else if (!strncmp((char *)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamAVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamAVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("\n AVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamAVC.eProfile,
m_sParamAVC.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamVP8.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8PROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamVP8.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_VP8LEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("VP8 profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamVP8.eProfile,
m_sParamVP8.eLevel);
}
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",\
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
m_sParamHEVC.eProfile = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCPROFILETYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eProfile;
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_HEVCLEVELTYPE)m_sParamProfileLevel.eLevel;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("HEVC profile = %d, level = %d", m_sParamHEVC.eProfile,
m_sParamHEVC.eLevel);
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *comp_role;
comp_role = (OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole %s",
comp_role->cRole);
if ((m_state == OMX_StateLoaded)&&
!BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Set Parameter called in valid state");
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc.secure",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s\n", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet =OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
#endif
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if (!strncmp((const char*)comp_role->cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
strlcpy((char*)m_cRole,"video_encoder.hevc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown Index %s", comp_role->cRole);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %s", m_nkind);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt");
if (m_state != OMX_StateLoaded) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Set Parameter called in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorIncorrectStateOperation;
}
OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE *priorityMgmtype = (OMX_PRIORITYMGMTTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamPriorityMgmt %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupID);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: priorityMgmtype %u",
(unsigned int)priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority);
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupID = priorityMgmtype->nGroupID;
m_sPriorityMgmt.nGroupPriority = priorityMgmtype->nGroupPriority;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier");
OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE *bufferSupplierType = (OMX_PARAM_BUFFERSUPPLIERTYPE*) paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamCompBufferSupplier %d",
bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier);
if (bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex == 0 || bufferSupplierType->nPortIndex ==1)
m_sInBufSupplier.eBufferSupplier = bufferSupplierType->eBufferSupplier;
else
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE *session_qp = (OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_QUANTIZATIONTYPE*) paramData;
if (session_qp->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoQuantization) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpI = session_qp->nQpI;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpP = session_qp->nQpP;
m_sSessionQuantization.nQpB = session_qp->nQpB;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for Session QP setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange");
OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE *qp_range = (OMX_QCOM_VIDEO_PARAM_QPRANGETYPE*) paramData;
if (qp_range->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoQPRange) != true) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
m_sSessionQPRange.minQP= qp_range->minQP;
m_sSessionQPRange.maxQP= qp_range->maxQP;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Unsupported port Index for QP range setting");
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn:
{
OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_QCOM_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexPortDefn");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_input_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == (OMX_U32)PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->nMemRegion > OMX_QCOM_MemRegionInvalid &&
pParam->nMemRegion < OMX_QCOM_MemRegionMax) {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_TRUE;
} else {
m_use_output_pmem = OMX_FALSE;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: SetParameter called on unsupported Port Index for QcomPortDefn");
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ERRORCORRECTIONTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting Error Resilience failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sErrorCorrection,pParam, sizeof(m_sErrorCorrection));
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("set_param:OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh");
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE* pParam =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_INTRAREFRESHTYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,OMX_IndexParamVideoIntraRefresh)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting intra refresh failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sIntraRefresh, pParam, sizeof(m_sIntraRefresh));
break;
}
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode:
{
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *pParam =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter:OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMetaBufferMode: "
"port_index = %u, meta_mode = %d", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex, pParam->bStoreMetaData);
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
if (meta_mode_enable) {
m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual = m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountMin;
if (handle->venc_set_param(&m_sInPortDef,OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: venc_set_param input failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
/*TODO: reset encoder driver Meta mode*/
dev_get_buf_req (&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
}
}
} else if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT && secure_session) {
if (pParam->bStoreMetaData != meta_mode_enable) {
if (!handle->venc_set_meta_mode(pParam->bStoreMetaData)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("\nERROR: set Metabuffer mode %d fail",
pParam->bStoreMetaData);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
meta_mode_enable = pParam->bStoreMetaData;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: metamode is "
"valid for input port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
break;
#endif
#if !defined(MAX_RES_720P) || defined(_MSM8974_)
case OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: OMX_QcomIndexParamIndexExtraDataType");
QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *pParam = (QOMX_INDEXEXTRADATATYPE *)paramData;
bool enable = false;
OMX_U32 mask = 0;
if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_SLICEINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("SliceInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: Slice information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
} else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_MBINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("MBInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: MB information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#ifndef _MSM8974_
else if (pParam->nIndex == (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_ExtraDataVideoLTRInfo) {
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
mask = VEN_EXTRADATA_LTRINFO;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("LTRInfo extradata %s",
((pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: LTR information is "
"valid for output port only");
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
#endif
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("set_parameter: unsupported extrdata index (%x)",
pParam->nIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
if (pParam->bEnabled == OMX_TRUE)
m_sExtraData |= mask;
else
m_sExtraData &= ~mask;
enable = !!(m_sExtraData & mask);
if (handle->venc_set_param(&enable,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)pParam->nIndex) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Extradata (%x) failed", pParam->nIndex);
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
} else {
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
dev_get_buf_req(&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
&m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
m_sOutPortDef.nPortIndex);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("updated out_buf_req: buffer cnt=%u, "
"count min=%u, buffer size=%u",
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountMin,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRMODE_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRMode, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRMode));
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_PARAM_LTRCOUNT_TYPE*)paramData;
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoLTRCount)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting LTR count failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamLTRCount, pParam, sizeof(m_sParamLTRCount));
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
handle->m_max_allowed_bitrate_check =
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? true : false);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("set_parameter: max allowed bitrate check %s",
((pParam->bEnable == OMX_TRUE) ? "enabled" : "disabled"));
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoMaxAllowedBitrateCheck "
" called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#ifdef MAX_RES_1080P
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting slice delivery mode failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableSliceDeliveryMode "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
#endif
case OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType:
{
QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE* pParam =
(QOMX_EXTNINDEX_PARAMTYPE*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexEnableH263PlusPType "
"called on wrong port(%u)", (unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamSequenceHeaderWithIDR:",
"request for inband sps/pps failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamH264AUDelimiter)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("%s: %s",
"OMX_QComIndexParamh264AUDelimiter:",
"request for AU Delimiters failed.");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure:
{
QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS* pParam =
(QOMX_VIDEO_HIERARCHICALLAYERS*)paramData;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure");
if (pParam->nPortIndex == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting PlusPType failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
if((pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType == QOMX_HIERARCHICALCODING_B) && pParam->nNumLayers)
hier_b_enabled = true;
m_sHierLayers.nNumLayers = pParam->nNumLayers;
m_sHierLayers.eHierarchicalCodingType = pParam->eHierarchicalCodingType;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: OMX_QcomIndexHierarchicalStructure called on wrong port(%u)",
(unsigned int)pParam->nPortIndex);
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPerfLevel)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting performance level");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamH264VUITimingInfo)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting VUI timing info");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamPeakBitrate)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting peak bitrate");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)QOMX_IndexParamVideoInitialQp)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable initial QP failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
memcpy(&m_sParamInitqp, paramData, sizeof(m_sParamInitqp));
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange:
{
if (!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE) OMX_QcomIndexParamSetMVSearchrange)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setting Searchrange");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode:
{
if(!handle->venc_set_param(paramData,
(OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_QcomIndexParamVideoHybridHierpMode)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Request to Enable Hybrid Hier-P failed");
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
break;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoSliceFMO:
default:
{
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Setparameter: unknown param %d", paramIndex);
eRet = OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
break;
}
}
return eRet;
}
| C | Android | 1 |
CVE-2016-1683 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | 96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab | Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | xsltStyleInitializeStylesheetModule(xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtDataPtr dataContainer;
void *userData = NULL;
xsltExtModulePtr module;
if ((style == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return(NULL);
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Not registered extension module: %s\n", URI);
#endif
return(NULL);
}
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
module = xmlHashLookup(xsltExtensionsHash, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
if (module == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Not registered extension module: %s\n", URI);
#endif
return (NULL);
}
/*
* The specified module was registered so initialize it.
*/
if (style->extInfos == NULL) {
style->extInfos = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (style->extInfos == NULL)
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Fire the initialization callback if available.
*/
if (module->styleInitFunc == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Initializing module with *no* callback: %s\n", URI);
#endif
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Initializing module with callback: %s\n", URI);
#endif
/*
* Fire the initialization callback.
*/
userData = module->styleInitFunc(style, URI);
}
/*
* Store the user-data in the context of the given stylesheet.
*/
dataContainer = xsltNewExtData(module, userData);
if (dataContainer == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (xmlHashAddEntry(style->extInfos, URI,
(void *) dataContainer) < 0)
{
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"Failed to register module '%s'.\n", URI);
style->errors++;
if (module->styleShutdownFunc)
module->styleShutdownFunc(style, URI, userData);
xsltFreeExtData(dataContainer);
return (NULL);
}
return(dataContainer);
}
| xsltStyleInitializeStylesheetModule(xsltStylesheetPtr style,
const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltExtDataPtr dataContainer;
void *userData = NULL;
xsltExtModulePtr module;
if ((style == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return(NULL);
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Not registered extension module: %s\n", URI);
#endif
return(NULL);
}
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
module = xmlHashLookup(xsltExtensionsHash, URI);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
if (module == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Not registered extension module: %s\n", URI);
#endif
return (NULL);
}
/*
* The specified module was registered so initialize it.
*/
if (style->extInfos == NULL) {
style->extInfos = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (style->extInfos == NULL)
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Fire the initialization callback if available.
*/
if (module->styleInitFunc == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Initializing module with *no* callback: %s\n", URI);
#endif
} else {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_EXTENSIONS
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Initializing module with callback: %s\n", URI);
#endif
/*
* Fire the initialization callback.
*/
userData = module->styleInitFunc(style, URI);
}
/*
* Store the user-data in the context of the given stylesheet.
*/
dataContainer = xsltNewExtData(module, userData);
if (dataContainer == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (xmlHashAddEntry(style->extInfos, URI,
(void *) dataContainer) < 0)
{
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, NULL,
"Failed to register module '%s'.\n", URI);
style->errors++;
if (module->styleShutdownFunc)
module->styleShutdownFunc(style, URI, userData);
xsltFreeExtData(dataContainer);
return (NULL);
}
return(dataContainer);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-2351 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2351/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6 | bf381d8a02c3d272d4dd879ac719d8993dfb5ad6 | Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool SyncBackendHost::Core::IsCurrentThreadSafeForModel(
syncable::ModelType model_type) {
base::AutoLock lock(host_->registrar_lock_);
browser_sync::ModelSafeRoutingInfo::const_iterator routing_it =
host_->registrar_.routing_info.find(model_type);
if (routing_it == host_->registrar_.routing_info.end())
return false;
browser_sync::ModelSafeGroup group = routing_it->second;
WorkerMap::const_iterator worker_it = host_->registrar_.workers.find(group);
if (worker_it == host_->registrar_.workers.end())
return false;
ModelSafeWorker* worker = worker_it->second;
return worker->CurrentThreadIsWorkThread();
}
| bool SyncBackendHost::Core::IsCurrentThreadSafeForModel(
syncable::ModelType model_type) {
base::AutoLock lock(host_->registrar_lock_);
browser_sync::ModelSafeRoutingInfo::const_iterator routing_it =
host_->registrar_.routing_info.find(model_type);
if (routing_it == host_->registrar_.routing_info.end())
return false;
browser_sync::ModelSafeGroup group = routing_it->second;
WorkerMap::const_iterator worker_it = host_->registrar_.workers.find(group);
if (worker_it == host_->registrar_.workers.end())
return false;
ModelSafeWorker* worker = worker_it->second;
return worker->CurrentThreadIsWorkThread();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-9438 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9438/ | CWE-674 | https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/commit/10e8bd3071677dd1fa76beeef4bc2fc427cea5e7 | 10e8bd3071677dd1fa76beeef4bc2fc427cea5e7 | Fix issue #674 for hex strings. | yysyntax_error (YYSIZE_T *yymsg_alloc, char **yymsg,
yytype_int16 *yyssp, int yytoken)
{
YYSIZE_T yysize0 = yytnamerr (YY_NULLPTR, yytname[yytoken]);
YYSIZE_T yysize = yysize0;
enum { YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM = 5 };
/* Internationalized format string. */
const char *yyformat = YY_NULLPTR;
/* Arguments of yyformat. */
char const *yyarg[YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM];
/* Number of reported tokens (one for the "unexpected", one per
"expected"). */
int yycount = 0;
/* There are many possibilities here to consider:
- If this state is a consistent state with a default action, then
the only way this function was invoked is if the default action
is an error action. In that case, don't check for expected
tokens because there are none.
- The only way there can be no lookahead present (in yychar) is if
this state is a consistent state with a default action. Thus,
detecting the absence of a lookahead is sufficient to determine
that there is no unexpected or expected token to report. In that
case, just report a simple "syntax error".
- Don't assume there isn't a lookahead just because this state is a
consistent state with a default action. There might have been a
previous inconsistent state, consistent state with a non-default
action, or user semantic action that manipulated yychar.
- Of course, the expected token list depends on states to have
correct lookahead information, and it depends on the parser not
to perform extra reductions after fetching a lookahead from the
scanner and before detecting a syntax error. Thus, state merging
(from LALR or IELR) and default reductions corrupt the expected
token list. However, the list is correct for canonical LR with
one exception: it will still contain any token that will not be
accepted due to an error action in a later state.
*/
if (yytoken != YYEMPTY)
{
int yyn = yypact[*yyssp];
yyarg[yycount++] = yytname[yytoken];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
/* Start YYX at -YYN if negative to avoid negative indexes in
YYCHECK. In other words, skip the first -YYN actions for
this state because they are default actions. */
int yyxbegin = yyn < 0 ? -yyn : 0;
/* Stay within bounds of both yycheck and yytname. */
int yychecklim = YYLAST - yyn + 1;
int yyxend = yychecklim < YYNTOKENS ? yychecklim : YYNTOKENS;
int yyx;
for (yyx = yyxbegin; yyx < yyxend; ++yyx)
if (yycheck[yyx + yyn] == yyx && yyx != YYTERROR
&& !yytable_value_is_error (yytable[yyx + yyn]))
{
if (yycount == YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM)
{
yycount = 1;
yysize = yysize0;
break;
}
yyarg[yycount++] = yytname[yyx];
{
YYSIZE_T yysize1 = yysize + yytnamerr (YY_NULLPTR, yytname[yyx]);
if (! (yysize <= yysize1
&& yysize1 <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
return 2;
yysize = yysize1;
}
}
}
}
switch (yycount)
{
# define YYCASE_(N, S) \
case N: \
yyformat = S; \
break
YYCASE_(0, YY_("syntax error"));
YYCASE_(1, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s"));
YYCASE_(2, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s"));
YYCASE_(3, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s"));
YYCASE_(4, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s"));
YYCASE_(5, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s or %s"));
# undef YYCASE_
}
{
YYSIZE_T yysize1 = yysize + yystrlen (yyformat);
if (! (yysize <= yysize1 && yysize1 <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
return 2;
yysize = yysize1;
}
if (*yymsg_alloc < yysize)
{
*yymsg_alloc = 2 * yysize;
if (! (yysize <= *yymsg_alloc
&& *yymsg_alloc <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
*yymsg_alloc = YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM;
return 1;
}
/* Avoid sprintf, as that infringes on the user's name space.
Don't have undefined behavior even if the translation
produced a string with the wrong number of "%s"s. */
{
char *yyp = *yymsg;
int yyi = 0;
while ((*yyp = *yyformat) != '\0')
if (*yyp == '%' && yyformat[1] == 's' && yyi < yycount)
{
yyp += yytnamerr (yyp, yyarg[yyi++]);
yyformat += 2;
}
else
{
yyp++;
yyformat++;
}
}
return 0;
}
| yysyntax_error (YYSIZE_T *yymsg_alloc, char **yymsg,
yytype_int16 *yyssp, int yytoken)
{
YYSIZE_T yysize0 = yytnamerr (YY_NULLPTR, yytname[yytoken]);
YYSIZE_T yysize = yysize0;
enum { YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM = 5 };
/* Internationalized format string. */
const char *yyformat = YY_NULLPTR;
/* Arguments of yyformat. */
char const *yyarg[YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM];
/* Number of reported tokens (one for the "unexpected", one per
"expected"). */
int yycount = 0;
/* There are many possibilities here to consider:
- If this state is a consistent state with a default action, then
the only way this function was invoked is if the default action
is an error action. In that case, don't check for expected
tokens because there are none.
- The only way there can be no lookahead present (in yychar) is if
this state is a consistent state with a default action. Thus,
detecting the absence of a lookahead is sufficient to determine
that there is no unexpected or expected token to report. In that
case, just report a simple "syntax error".
- Don't assume there isn't a lookahead just because this state is a
consistent state with a default action. There might have been a
previous inconsistent state, consistent state with a non-default
action, or user semantic action that manipulated yychar.
- Of course, the expected token list depends on states to have
correct lookahead information, and it depends on the parser not
to perform extra reductions after fetching a lookahead from the
scanner and before detecting a syntax error. Thus, state merging
(from LALR or IELR) and default reductions corrupt the expected
token list. However, the list is correct for canonical LR with
one exception: it will still contain any token that will not be
accepted due to an error action in a later state.
*/
if (yytoken != YYEMPTY)
{
int yyn = yypact[*yyssp];
yyarg[yycount++] = yytname[yytoken];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
/* Start YYX at -YYN if negative to avoid negative indexes in
YYCHECK. In other words, skip the first -YYN actions for
this state because they are default actions. */
int yyxbegin = yyn < 0 ? -yyn : 0;
/* Stay within bounds of both yycheck and yytname. */
int yychecklim = YYLAST - yyn + 1;
int yyxend = yychecklim < YYNTOKENS ? yychecklim : YYNTOKENS;
int yyx;
for (yyx = yyxbegin; yyx < yyxend; ++yyx)
if (yycheck[yyx + yyn] == yyx && yyx != YYTERROR
&& !yytable_value_is_error (yytable[yyx + yyn]))
{
if (yycount == YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM)
{
yycount = 1;
yysize = yysize0;
break;
}
yyarg[yycount++] = yytname[yyx];
{
YYSIZE_T yysize1 = yysize + yytnamerr (YY_NULLPTR, yytname[yyx]);
if (! (yysize <= yysize1
&& yysize1 <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
return 2;
yysize = yysize1;
}
}
}
}
switch (yycount)
{
# define YYCASE_(N, S) \
case N: \
yyformat = S; \
break
YYCASE_(0, YY_("syntax error"));
YYCASE_(1, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s"));
YYCASE_(2, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s"));
YYCASE_(3, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s"));
YYCASE_(4, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s"));
YYCASE_(5, YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s or %s"));
# undef YYCASE_
}
{
YYSIZE_T yysize1 = yysize + yystrlen (yyformat);
if (! (yysize <= yysize1 && yysize1 <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
return 2;
yysize = yysize1;
}
if (*yymsg_alloc < yysize)
{
*yymsg_alloc = 2 * yysize;
if (! (yysize <= *yymsg_alloc
&& *yymsg_alloc <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
*yymsg_alloc = YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM;
return 1;
}
/* Avoid sprintf, as that infringes on the user's name space.
Don't have undefined behavior even if the translation
produced a string with the wrong number of "%s"s. */
{
char *yyp = *yymsg;
int yyi = 0;
while ((*yyp = *yyformat) != '\0')
if (*yyp == '%' && yyformat[1] == 's' && yyi < yycount)
{
yyp += yytnamerr (yyp, yyarg[yyi++]);
yyformat += 2;
}
else
{
yyp++;
yyformat++;
}
}
return 0;
}
| C | yara | 0 |
CVE-2018-20067 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823} | void LocalFrameClientImpl::AbortClientNavigation() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->AbortClientNavigation();
}
| void LocalFrameClientImpl::AbortClientNavigation() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->AbortClientNavigation();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-4112 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING;
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
| void bnep_net_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
memset(dev->broadcast, 0xff, ETH_ALEN);
dev->addr_len = ETH_ALEN;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->netdev_ops = &bnep_netdev_ops;
dev->watchdog_timeo = HZ * 2;
}
| C | linux | 1 |
CVE-2015-1296 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1296/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5fc08cfb098acce49344d2e89cc27c915903f81c | 5fc08cfb098acce49344d2e89cc27c915903f81c | Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332} | void DownloadController::Init(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
java_object_ = new JavaObject;
java_object_->obj_ = env->NewWeakGlobalRef(obj);
}
| void DownloadController::Init(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
java_object_ = new JavaObject;
java_object_->obj_ = env->NewWeakGlobalRef(obj);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3699 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3699/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/mjg59/linux/commit/a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76 | a4a5ed2835e8ea042868b7401dced3f517cafa76 | acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com> | dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
{
if (kaslr_enabled()) {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx (relocation range: 0x%lx-0x%lx)\n",
kaslr_offset(),
__START_KERNEL,
__START_KERNEL_map,
MODULES_VADDR-1);
} else {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: disabled\n");
}
return 0;
}
| dump_kernel_offset(struct notifier_block *self, unsigned long v, void *p)
{
if (kaslr_enabled()) {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: 0x%lx from 0x%lx (relocation range: 0x%lx-0x%lx)\n",
kaslr_offset(),
__START_KERNEL,
__START_KERNEL_map,
MODULES_VADDR-1);
} else {
pr_emerg("Kernel Offset: disabled\n");
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-7513 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7513/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8 | 0185604c2d82c560dab2f2933a18f797e74ab5a8 | KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | void kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
{
int ret;
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
if (!kvm_x86_ops->update_pi_irte) {
WARN_ON(irqfd->producer != NULL);
return;
}
WARN_ON(irqfd->producer != prod);
irqfd->producer = NULL;
/*
* When producer of consumer is unregistered, we change back to
* remapped mode, so we can re-use the current implementation
* when the irq is masked/disabed or the consumer side (KVM
* int this case doesn't want to receive the interrupts.
*/
ret = kvm_x86_ops->update_pi_irte(irqfd->kvm, prod->irq, irqfd->gsi, 0);
if (ret)
printk(KERN_INFO "irq bypass consumer (token %p) unregistration"
" fails: %d\n", irqfd->consumer.token, ret);
}
| void kvm_arch_irq_bypass_del_producer(struct irq_bypass_consumer *cons,
struct irq_bypass_producer *prod)
{
int ret;
struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd =
container_of(cons, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd, consumer);
if (!kvm_x86_ops->update_pi_irte) {
WARN_ON(irqfd->producer != NULL);
return;
}
WARN_ON(irqfd->producer != prod);
irqfd->producer = NULL;
/*
* When producer of consumer is unregistered, we change back to
* remapped mode, so we can re-use the current implementation
* when the irq is masked/disabed or the consumer side (KVM
* int this case doesn't want to receive the interrupts.
*/
ret = kvm_x86_ops->update_pi_irte(irqfd->kvm, prod->irq, irqfd->gsi, 0);
if (ret)
printk(KERN_INFO "irq bypass consumer (token %p) unregistration"
" fails: %d\n", irqfd->consumer.token, ret);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-1586 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1586/ | CWE-20 | https://git.launchpad.net/oxide/commit/?id=29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac | 29014da83e5fc358d6bff0f574e9ed45e61a35ac | null | bool WebContext::popupBlockerEnabled() const {
if (IsInitialized()) {
return context_->IsPopupBlockerEnabled();
}
return construct_props_->popup_blocker_enabled;
}
| bool WebContext::popupBlockerEnabled() const {
if (IsInitialized()) {
return context_->IsPopupBlockerEnabled();
}
return construct_props_->popup_blocker_enabled;
}
| CPP | launchpad | 0 |
CVE-2016-7539 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7539/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/4e81ce8b07219c69a9aeccb0f7f7b927ca6db74c | 4e81ce8b07219c69a9aeccb0f7f7b927ca6db74c | http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946 | static inline MagickBooleanType AcquireCacheNexusPixels(
const CacheInfo *magick_restrict cache_info,NexusInfo *nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (nexus_info->length != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) nexus_info->length))
return(MagickFalse);
nexus_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
nexus_info->cache=(PixelPacket *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
(size_t) nexus_info->length));
if (nexus_info->cache == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
nexus_info->mapped=MagickTrue;
nexus_info->cache=(PixelPacket *) MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,(size_t)
nexus_info->length);
}
if (nexus_info->cache == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
cache_info->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| static inline MagickBooleanType AcquireCacheNexusPixels(
const CacheInfo *magick_restrict cache_info,NexusInfo *nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (nexus_info->length != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t) nexus_info->length))
return(MagickFalse);
nexus_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
nexus_info->cache=(PixelPacket *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
(size_t) nexus_info->length));
if (nexus_info->cache == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
nexus_info->mapped=MagickTrue;
nexus_info->cache=(PixelPacket *) MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,(size_t)
nexus_info->length);
}
if (nexus_info->cache == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
cache_info->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2017-5125 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5125/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d | 1a90b2996bfd341a04073f0054047073865b485d | Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464} | void PushMessagingServiceImpl::IncreasePushSubscriptionCount(int add,
bool is_pending) {
DCHECK_GT(add, 0);
if (push_subscription_count_ + pending_push_subscription_count_ == 0) {
GetGCMDriver()->AddAppHandler(kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix, this);
}
if (is_pending) {
pending_push_subscription_count_ += add;
} else {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (UseBackgroundMode() && g_browser_process->background_mode_manager() &&
!push_subscription_count_) {
g_browser_process->background_mode_manager()->RegisterTrigger(
profile_, this, false /* should_notify_user */);
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
push_subscription_count_ += add;
}
}
| void PushMessagingServiceImpl::IncreasePushSubscriptionCount(int add,
bool is_pending) {
DCHECK_GT(add, 0);
if (push_subscription_count_ + pending_push_subscription_count_ == 0) {
GetGCMDriver()->AddAppHandler(kPushMessagingAppIdentifierPrefix, this);
}
if (is_pending) {
pending_push_subscription_count_ += add;
} else {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (UseBackgroundMode() && g_browser_process->background_mode_manager() &&
!push_subscription_count_) {
g_browser_process->background_mode_manager()->RegisterTrigger(
profile_, this, false /* should_notify_user */);
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
push_subscription_count_ += add;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-1658 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1658/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866 | 5c437bcc7a51edbef45242c5173cf7871fde2866 | Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381} | const char* ExtensionOptionsGuest::GetAPINamespace() const {
return extensionoptions::kAPINamespace;
}
| const char* ExtensionOptionsGuest::GetAPINamespace() const {
return extensionoptions::kAPINamespace;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-14058 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14058/ | CWE-835 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a | 7ec414892ddcad88313848494b6fc5f437c9ca4a | avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | static int set_stream_info_from_input_stream(AVStream *st, struct playlist *pls, AVStream *ist)
{
int err;
err = avcodec_parameters_copy(st->codecpar, ist->codecpar);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (pls->is_id3_timestamped) /* custom timestamps via id3 */
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 33, 1, MPEG_TIME_BASE);
else
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, ist->pts_wrap_bits, ist->time_base.num, ist->time_base.den);
st->internal->need_context_update = 1;
return 0;
}
| static int set_stream_info_from_input_stream(AVStream *st, struct playlist *pls, AVStream *ist)
{
int err;
err = avcodec_parameters_copy(st->codecpar, ist->codecpar);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (pls->is_id3_timestamped) /* custom timestamps via id3 */
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 33, 1, MPEG_TIME_BASE);
else
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, ist->pts_wrap_bits, ist->time_base.num, ist->time_base.den);
st->internal->need_context_update = 1;
return 0;
}
| C | FFmpeg | 0 |
CVE-2015-1539 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1539/ | CWE-189 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5e751957ba692658b7f67eb03ae5ddb2cd3d970c | 5e751957ba692658b7f67eb03ae5ddb2cd3d970c | Fix integer underflow in ESDS processing
Several arithmetic operations within parseESDescriptor could underflow, leading
to an out-of-bounds read operation. Ensure that subtractions from 'size' do not
cause it to wrap around.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit 07c0f59d6c48874982d2b5c713487612e5af465a)
Change-Id: I377d21051e07ca654ea1f7037120429d3f71924a
| status_t ESDS::InitCheck() const {
return mInitCheck;
}
| status_t ESDS::InitCheck() const {
return mInitCheck;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2019-5790 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5790/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997 | 88fcb3a6899d77b64195423333ad81a00803f997 | Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728} | void HTMLFormElement::ParseAttribute(
const AttributeModificationParams& params) {
const QualifiedName& name = params.name;
if (name == actionAttr) {
attributes_.ParseAction(params.new_value);
LogUpdateAttributeIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("form", params);
if (GetDocument().GetInsecureRequestPolicy() & kUpgradeInsecureRequests)
return;
KURL action_url = GetDocument().CompleteURL(
attributes_.Action().IsEmpty() ? GetDocument().Url().GetString()
: attributes_.Action());
if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedFormAction(GetDocument().GetFrame(),
action_url)) {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument().GetFrame(),
WebFeature::kMixedContentFormPresent);
}
} else if (name == targetAttr) {
attributes_.SetTarget(params.new_value);
} else if (name == methodAttr) {
attributes_.UpdateMethodType(params.new_value);
} else if (name == enctypeAttr) {
attributes_.UpdateEncodingType(params.new_value);
} else if (name == accept_charsetAttr) {
attributes_.SetAcceptCharset(params.new_value);
} else {
HTMLElement::ParseAttribute(params);
}
}
| void HTMLFormElement::ParseAttribute(
const AttributeModificationParams& params) {
const QualifiedName& name = params.name;
if (name == actionAttr) {
attributes_.ParseAction(params.new_value);
LogUpdateAttributeIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("form", params);
if (GetDocument().GetInsecureRequestPolicy() & kUpgradeInsecureRequests)
return;
KURL action_url = GetDocument().CompleteURL(
attributes_.Action().IsEmpty() ? GetDocument().Url().GetString()
: attributes_.Action());
if (MixedContentChecker::IsMixedFormAction(GetDocument().GetFrame(),
action_url)) {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument().GetFrame(),
WebFeature::kMixedContentFormPresent);
}
} else if (name == targetAttr) {
attributes_.SetTarget(params.new_value);
} else if (name == methodAttr) {
attributes_.UpdateMethodType(params.new_value);
} else if (name == enctypeAttr) {
attributes_.UpdateEncodingType(params.new_value);
} else if (name == accept_charsetAttr) {
attributes_.SetAcceptCharset(params.new_value);
} else {
HTMLElement::ParseAttribute(params);
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3896 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3896/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d | 5925dff83699508b5e2735afb0297dfb310e159d | Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | content::JavaScriptDialogCreator* Browser::GetJavaScriptDialogCreator() {
return GetJavaScriptDialogCreatorInstance();
}
| content::JavaScriptDialogCreator* Browser::GetJavaScriptDialogCreator() {
return GetJavaScriptDialogCreatorInstance();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-3552 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int err;
if (level != SOL_IP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = do_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL &&
optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY &&
optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY &&
!ip_mroute_opt(optname)) {
lock_sock(sk);
err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
}
#endif
return err;
}
| int ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int err;
if (level != SOL_IP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
err = do_ip_setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
/* we need to exclude all possible ENOPROTOOPTs except default case */
if (err == -ENOPROTOOPT && optname != IP_HDRINCL &&
optname != IP_IPSEC_POLICY &&
optname != IP_XFRM_POLICY &&
!ip_mroute_opt(optname)) {
lock_sock(sk);
err = nf_setsockopt(sk, PF_INET, optname, optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
}
#endif
return err;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-5219 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} | GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundColorDrawBufferInternalFormat(
GLint drawbuffer_i) {
DCHECK(drawbuffer_i >= 0 &&
drawbuffer_i < static_cast<GLint>(group_->max_draw_buffers()));
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetBoundDrawFramebuffer();
if (!framebuffer) {
return 0;
}
GLenum drawbuffer = static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0 + drawbuffer_i);
if (framebuffer->GetDrawBuffer(drawbuffer) == GL_NONE) {
return 0;
}
GLenum attachment = static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + drawbuffer_i);
const Framebuffer::Attachment* buffer =
framebuffer->GetAttachment(attachment);
if (!buffer) {
return 0;
}
return buffer->internal_format();
}
| GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundColorDrawBufferInternalFormat(
GLint drawbuffer_i) {
DCHECK(drawbuffer_i >= 0 &&
drawbuffer_i < static_cast<GLint>(group_->max_draw_buffers()));
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetBoundDrawFramebuffer();
if (!framebuffer) {
return 0;
}
GLenum drawbuffer = static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0 + drawbuffer_i);
if (framebuffer->GetDrawBuffer(drawbuffer) == GL_NONE) {
return 0;
}
GLenum attachment = static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + drawbuffer_i);
const Framebuffer::Attachment* buffer =
framebuffer->GetAttachment(attachment);
if (!buffer) {
return 0;
}
return buffer->internal_format();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533 | ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533 | Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void WebPluginDelegateStub::CreateSharedBuffer(
size_t size,
base::SharedMemory* shared_buf,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* remote_handle) {
if (!shared_buf->Create(std::wstring(), false, false, size)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!shared_buf->Map(size)) {
NOTREACHED();
shared_buf->Close();
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BOOL result = DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
shared_buf->handle(),
channel_->renderer_handle(),
remote_handle, 0, FALSE,
DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
DCHECK_NE(result, 0);
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
| void WebPluginDelegateStub::CreateSharedBuffer(
size_t size,
base::SharedMemory* shared_buf,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* remote_handle) {
if (!shared_buf->Create(std::wstring(), false, false, size)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!shared_buf->Map(size)) {
NOTREACHED();
shared_buf->Close();
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BOOL result = DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(),
shared_buf->handle(),
channel_->renderer_handle(),
remote_handle, 0, FALSE,
DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
DCHECK_NE(result, 0);
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-5016 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5016/ | CWE-1021 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8e17a3031b6ad69c399e5e04dd0084e577097fc | a8e17a3031b6ad69c399e5e04dd0084e577097fc | Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476} | void HTMLFormControlElement::willChangeForm() {
ListedElement::willChangeForm();
formOwnerSetNeedsValidityCheck();
if (formOwner() && canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton())
formOwner()->invalidateDefaultButtonStyle();
}
| void HTMLFormControlElement::willChangeForm() {
ListedElement::willChangeForm();
formOwnerSetNeedsValidityCheck();
if (formOwner() && canBeSuccessfulSubmitButton())
formOwner()->invalidateDefaultButtonStyle();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-12663 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12663/ | CWE-772 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/6233ef75bb973745ab1092b59aea8fe316f09074 | 6233ef75bb973745ab1092b59aea8fe316f09074 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/573 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterMAPImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("MAP");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMAPImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMAPImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->format_type=ExplicitFormatType;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Colormap intensities and indices");
entry->module=ConstantString("MAP");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| ModuleExport size_t RegisterMAPImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("MAP");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMAPImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMAPImage;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->format_type=ExplicitFormatType;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Colormap intensities and indices");
entry->module=ConstantString("MAP");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2017-8924 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8924/ | CWE-191 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e | 654b404f2a222f918af9b0cd18ad469d0c941a8e | USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> | static int do_boot_mode(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
int status = 0;
struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor *ti_manuf_desc;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - RUNNING IN BOOT MODE\n", __func__);
/* Configure the TI device so we can use the BULK pipes for download */
status = config_boot_dev(serial->serial->dev);
if (status)
return status;
if (le16_to_cpu(serial->serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
!= USB_VENDOR_ID_ION) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - VID = 0x%x\n", __func__,
le16_to_cpu(serial->serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor));
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto stayinbootmode;
}
/*
* We have an ION device (I2c Must be programmed)
* Determine I2C image type
*/
if (i2c_type_bootmode(serial))
goto stayinbootmode;
/* Check for ION Vendor ID and that the I2C is valid */
if (!check_i2c_image(serial)) {
struct ti_i2c_image_header *header;
int i;
__u8 cs = 0;
__u8 *buffer;
int buffer_size;
/*
* Validate Hardware version number
* Read Manufacturing Descriptor from TI Based Edgeport
*/
ti_manuf_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*ti_manuf_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ti_manuf_desc)
return -ENOMEM;
status = get_manuf_info(serial, (__u8 *)ti_manuf_desc);
if (status) {
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
goto stayinbootmode;
}
/* Check for version 2 */
if (!ignore_cpu_rev && ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc) < 2) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Wrong CPU Rev %d (Must be 2)\n",
__func__, ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc));
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
goto stayinbootmode;
}
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
/*
* In order to update the I2C firmware we must change the type
* 2 record to type 0xF2. This will force the UMP to come up
* in Boot Mode. Then while in boot mode, the driver will
* download the latest firmware (padded to 15.5k) into the
* UMP ram. Finally when the device comes back up in download
* mode the driver will cause the new firmware to be copied
* from the UMP Ram to I2C and the firmware will update the
* record type from 0xf2 to 0x02.
*
* Do we really have to copy the whole firmware image,
* or could we do this in place!
*/
/* Allocate a 15.5k buffer + 3 byte header */
buffer_size = (((1024 * 16) - 512) +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header));
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Initialize the buffer to 0xff (pad the buffer) */
memset(buffer, 0xff, buffer_size);
memcpy(buffer, &fw->data[4], fw->size - 4);
for (i = sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header);
i < buffer_size; i++) {
cs = (__u8)(cs + buffer[i]);
}
header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)buffer;
/* update length and checksum after padding */
header->Length = cpu_to_le16((__u16)(buffer_size -
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)));
header->CheckSum = cs;
/* Download the operational code */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Downloading operational code image version %d.%d (TI UMP)\n",
__func__,
fw_hdr->major_version, fw_hdr->minor_version);
status = download_code(serial, buffer, buffer_size);
kfree(buffer);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Error downloading operational code image\n", __func__);
return status;
}
/* Device will reboot */
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_TRANSITIONING;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Download successful -- Device rebooting...\n", __func__);
return 1;
}
stayinbootmode:
/* Eprom is invalid or blank stay in boot mode */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - STAYING IN BOOT MODE\n", __func__);
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_BOOT;
return 1;
}
| static int do_boot_mode(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
int status = 0;
struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor *ti_manuf_desc;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - RUNNING IN BOOT MODE\n", __func__);
/* Configure the TI device so we can use the BULK pipes for download */
status = config_boot_dev(serial->serial->dev);
if (status)
return status;
if (le16_to_cpu(serial->serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor)
!= USB_VENDOR_ID_ION) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - VID = 0x%x\n", __func__,
le16_to_cpu(serial->serial->dev->descriptor.idVendor));
serial->TI_I2C_Type = DTK_ADDR_SPACE_I2C_TYPE_II;
goto stayinbootmode;
}
/*
* We have an ION device (I2c Must be programmed)
* Determine I2C image type
*/
if (i2c_type_bootmode(serial))
goto stayinbootmode;
/* Check for ION Vendor ID and that the I2C is valid */
if (!check_i2c_image(serial)) {
struct ti_i2c_image_header *header;
int i;
__u8 cs = 0;
__u8 *buffer;
int buffer_size;
/*
* Validate Hardware version number
* Read Manufacturing Descriptor from TI Based Edgeport
*/
ti_manuf_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*ti_manuf_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ti_manuf_desc)
return -ENOMEM;
status = get_manuf_info(serial, (__u8 *)ti_manuf_desc);
if (status) {
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
goto stayinbootmode;
}
/* Check for version 2 */
if (!ignore_cpu_rev && ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc) < 2) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Wrong CPU Rev %d (Must be 2)\n",
__func__, ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc));
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
goto stayinbootmode;
}
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
/*
* In order to update the I2C firmware we must change the type
* 2 record to type 0xF2. This will force the UMP to come up
* in Boot Mode. Then while in boot mode, the driver will
* download the latest firmware (padded to 15.5k) into the
* UMP ram. Finally when the device comes back up in download
* mode the driver will cause the new firmware to be copied
* from the UMP Ram to I2C and the firmware will update the
* record type from 0xf2 to 0x02.
*
* Do we really have to copy the whole firmware image,
* or could we do this in place!
*/
/* Allocate a 15.5k buffer + 3 byte header */
buffer_size = (((1024 * 16) - 512) +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header));
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Initialize the buffer to 0xff (pad the buffer) */
memset(buffer, 0xff, buffer_size);
memcpy(buffer, &fw->data[4], fw->size - 4);
for (i = sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header);
i < buffer_size; i++) {
cs = (__u8)(cs + buffer[i]);
}
header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)buffer;
/* update length and checksum after padding */
header->Length = cpu_to_le16((__u16)(buffer_size -
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)));
header->CheckSum = cs;
/* Download the operational code */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Downloading operational code image version %d.%d (TI UMP)\n",
__func__,
fw_hdr->major_version, fw_hdr->minor_version);
status = download_code(serial, buffer, buffer_size);
kfree(buffer);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Error downloading operational code image\n", __func__);
return status;
}
/* Device will reboot */
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_TRANSITIONING;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Download successful -- Device rebooting...\n", __func__);
return 1;
}
stayinbootmode:
/* Eprom is invalid or blank stay in boot mode */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - STAYING IN BOOT MODE\n", __func__);
serial->product_info.TiMode = TI_MODE_BOOT;
return 1;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-1477 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1477/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df | 4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df | sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | static void opl3_volume_method(int dev, int mode)
{
}
| static void opl3_volume_method(int dev, int mode)
{
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2015-6791 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6791/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2 | 7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2 | Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513} | void RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary() {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
if (base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() ||
!base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir)) {
return;
}
chromeos::RegisterStubPathOverrides(user_data_dir);
}
| void RegisterStubPathOverridesIfNecessary() {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
if (base::SysInfo::IsRunningOnChromeOS() ||
!base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir)) {
return;
}
chromeos::RegisterStubPathOverrides(user_data_dir);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-2669 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a | 31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a | Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064 | signconsistent(QUERYTYPE *query, BITVEC sign, bool calcnot)
{
return execute(GETQUERY(query) + query->size - 1,
(void *) sign, calcnot,
checkcondition_bit);
}
| signconsistent(QUERYTYPE *query, BITVEC sign, bool calcnot)
{
return execute(GETQUERY(query) + query->size - 1,
(void *) sign, calcnot,
checkcondition_bit);
}
| C | postgres | 0 |
CVE-2012-2875 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a | d345af9ed62ee5f431be327967f41c3cc3fe936a | [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void WebPagePrivate::deferredTasksTimerFired(WebCore::Timer<WebPagePrivate>*)
{
ASSERT(!m_deferredTasks.isEmpty());
if (m_deferredTasks.isEmpty())
return;
OwnPtr<DeferredTaskBase> task = m_deferredTasks[0].release();
m_deferredTasks.remove(0);
if (!m_deferredTasks.isEmpty())
m_deferredTasksTimer.startOneShot(0);
task->perform(this);
}
| void WebPagePrivate::deferredTasksTimerFired(WebCore::Timer<WebPagePrivate>*)
{
ASSERT(!m_deferredTasks.isEmpty());
if (m_deferredTasks.isEmpty())
return;
OwnPtr<DeferredTaskBase> task = m_deferredTasks[0].release();
m_deferredTasks.remove(0);
if (!m_deferredTasks.isEmpty())
m_deferredTasksTimer.startOneShot(0);
task->perform(this);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-3191 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | 11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95 | Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | IntRect RenderLayerScrollableArea::visibleContentRect(IncludeScrollbarsInRect scrollbarInclusion) const
{
int verticalScrollbarWidth = 0;
int horizontalScrollbarHeight = 0;
if (scrollbarInclusion == IncludeScrollbars) {
verticalScrollbarWidth = (verticalScrollbar() && !verticalScrollbar()->isOverlayScrollbar()) ? verticalScrollbar()->width() : 0;
horizontalScrollbarHeight = (horizontalScrollbar() && !horizontalScrollbar()->isOverlayScrollbar()) ? horizontalScrollbar()->height() : 0;
}
return IntRect(IntPoint(scrollXOffset(), scrollYOffset()),
IntSize(max(0, layer()->size().width() - verticalScrollbarWidth), max(0, layer()->size().height() - horizontalScrollbarHeight)));
}
| IntRect RenderLayerScrollableArea::visibleContentRect(IncludeScrollbarsInRect scrollbarInclusion) const
{
int verticalScrollbarWidth = 0;
int horizontalScrollbarHeight = 0;
if (scrollbarInclusion == IncludeScrollbars) {
verticalScrollbarWidth = (verticalScrollbar() && !verticalScrollbar()->isOverlayScrollbar()) ? verticalScrollbar()->width() : 0;
horizontalScrollbarHeight = (horizontalScrollbar() && !horizontalScrollbar()->isOverlayScrollbar()) ? horizontalScrollbar()->height() : 0;
}
return IntRect(IntPoint(scrollXOffset(), scrollYOffset()),
IntSize(max(0, layer()->size().width() - verticalScrollbarWidth), max(0, layer()->size().height() - horizontalScrollbarHeight)));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2860 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2860/ | CWE-284 | http://git.openafs.org/?p=openafs.git;a=commitdiff;h=396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0 | 396240cf070a806b91fea81131d034e1399af1e0 | null | dumpEntry(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 apos, struct prdebugentry *aentry,
afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
code = Initdb();
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTransReadAny(dbase, UBIK_READTRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKREAD);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = WhoIsThis(call, tt, cid);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, apos, (struct prentry *)aentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
if (!AccessOK(tt, *cid, 0, PRP_STATUS_MEM, 0))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
/* Since prdebugentry is in the form of a prentry not a coentry, we will
* return the coentry slots in network order where the string is. */
#if 0
if (aentry->flags & PRCONT) { /* wrong type, get coentry instead */
code = pr_ReadCoEntry(tt, 0, apos, aentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
}
#endif
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
| dumpEntry(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 apos, struct prdebugentry *aentry,
afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
code = Initdb();
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTransReadAny(dbase, UBIK_READTRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKREAD);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = WhoIsThis(call, tt, cid);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, apos, (struct prentry *)aentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
if (!AccessOK(tt, *cid, 0, PRP_STATUS_MEM, 0))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
/* Since prdebugentry is in the form of a prentry not a coentry, we will
* return the coentry slots in network order where the string is. */
#if 0
if (aentry->flags & PRCONT) { /* wrong type, get coentry instead */
code = pr_ReadCoEntry(tt, 0, apos, aentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
}
#endif
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
| C | openafs | 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/ | CWE-20 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607 | 83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881 | null | indexed_to_alt(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *color, float *alt)
{
struct indexed *idx = cs->data;
int i, k;
int n = idx->base->n;
i = color[0] * 255;
i = fz_clampi(i, 0, idx->high);
for (k = 0; k < n; k++)
alt[k] = idx->lookup[i * n + k] / 255.0f;
}
| indexed_to_alt(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs, const float *color, float *alt)
{
struct indexed *idx = cs->data;
int i, k;
int n = idx->base->n;
i = color[0] * 255;
i = fz_clampi(i, 0, idx->high);
for (k = 0; k < n; k++)
alt[k] = idx->lookup[i * n + k] / 255.0f;
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2015-6768 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6768/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01 | 4c8b008f055f79e622344627fed7f820375a4f01 | Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642} | void Document::updateLayoutTreeForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
if (!node->canParticipateInComposedTree())
return;
if (!needsLayoutTreeUpdate())
return;
if (!node->inDocument())
return;
bool needsRecalc = needsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() || node->needsStyleRecalc() || node->needsStyleInvalidation();
if (!needsRecalc) {
for (const ContainerNode* ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*node); ancestor && !needsRecalc; ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*ancestor))
needsRecalc = ancestor->needsStyleRecalc() || ancestor->needsStyleInvalidation() || ancestor->needsAdjacentStyleRecalc();
}
if (needsRecalc)
updateLayoutTreeIfNeeded();
}
| void Document::updateLayoutTreeForNodeIfNeeded(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
if (!node->canParticipateInComposedTree())
return;
if (!needsLayoutTreeUpdate())
return;
if (!node->inDocument())
return;
bool needsRecalc = needsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() || node->needsStyleRecalc() || node->needsStyleInvalidation();
if (!needsRecalc) {
for (const ContainerNode* ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*node); ancestor && !needsRecalc; ancestor = LayoutTreeBuilderTraversal::parent(*ancestor))
needsRecalc = ancestor->needsStyleRecalc() || ancestor->needsStyleInvalidation() || ancestor->needsAdjacentStyleRecalc();
}
if (needsRecalc)
updateLayoutTreeIfNeeded();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-20182 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | 4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1 | Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | rdp_out_colcache_caps(STREAM s)
{
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_COLCACHE);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_COLCACHE);
out_uint16_le(s, 6); /* cache size */
out_uint16(s, 0); /* pad */
}
| rdp_out_colcache_caps(STREAM s)
{
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPSET_COLCACHE);
out_uint16_le(s, RDP_CAPLEN_COLCACHE);
out_uint16_le(s, 6); /* cache size */
out_uint16(s, 0); /* pad */
}
| C | rdesktop | 0 |
CVE-2017-18234 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/ | CWE-416 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c | c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c | null | ImportTIFF_CheckStandardMapping ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const TIFF_MappingToXMP & mapInfo )
{
XMP_Assert ( (kTIFF_ByteType <= tagInfo.type) && (tagInfo.type <= kTIFF_LastType) );
XMP_Assert ( mapInfo.type <= kTIFF_LastType );
if ( (tagInfo.type < kTIFF_ByteType) || (tagInfo.type > kTIFF_LastType) ) return false;
if ( tagInfo.type != mapInfo.type ) {
if ( kTIFF_IsIntegerType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsIntegerType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else if ( kTIFF_IsRationalType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsRationalType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else if ( kTIFF_IsFloatType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsFloatType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else {
return false;
}
}
if ( (tagInfo.count != mapInfo.count) && // Maybe there is a problem because the counts don't match.
(mapInfo.count == 1) ) return false; // Be tolerant of mismatch in expected array size.
return true;
} // ImportTIFF_CheckStandardMapping
| ImportTIFF_CheckStandardMapping ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const TIFF_MappingToXMP & mapInfo )
{
XMP_Assert ( (kTIFF_ByteType <= tagInfo.type) && (tagInfo.type <= kTIFF_LastType) );
XMP_Assert ( mapInfo.type <= kTIFF_LastType );
if ( (tagInfo.type < kTIFF_ByteType) || (tagInfo.type > kTIFF_LastType) ) return false;
if ( tagInfo.type != mapInfo.type ) {
if ( kTIFF_IsIntegerType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsIntegerType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else if ( kTIFF_IsRationalType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsRationalType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else if ( kTIFF_IsFloatType[mapInfo.type] ) {
if ( ! kTIFF_IsFloatType[tagInfo.type] ) return false;
} else {
return false;
}
}
if ( (tagInfo.count != mapInfo.count) && // Maybe there is a problem because the counts don't match.
(mapInfo.count == 1) ) return false; // Be tolerant of mismatch in expected array size.
return true;
} // ImportTIFF_CheckStandardMapping
| CPP | exempi | 0 |
CVE-2016-9537 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9537/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/83a4b92815ea04969d494416eaae3d4c6b338e4a#diff-c8b4b355f9b5c06d585b23138e1c185f | 83a4b92815ea04969d494416eaae3d4c6b338e4a#diff-c8b4b355f9b5c06d585b23138e1c185f | * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | horizontalDifference16(unsigned short *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From14)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
/* assumption is unsigned pixel values */
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) From14[(v) >> 2]
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride,
wp[0] = (uint16)((CLAMP(ip[0])-CLAMP(ip[-stride])) & mask);
wp++; ip++)
n -= stride;
}
}
}
}
| horizontalDifference16(unsigned short *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From14)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
/* assumption is unsigned pixel values */
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) From14[(v) >> 2]
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
| C | libtiff | 1 |
CVE-2016-10192 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10192/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156 | a5d25faa3f4b18dac737fdb35d0dd68eb0dc2156 | ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc> | static void start_multicast(void)
{
FFServerStream *stream;
char session_id[32];
HTTPContext *rtp_c;
struct sockaddr_in dest_addr = {0};
int default_port, stream_index;
unsigned int random0, random1;
default_port = 6000;
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
if (!stream->is_multicast)
continue;
random0 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
random1 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
/* open the RTP connection */
snprintf(session_id, sizeof(session_id), "%08x%08x", random0, random1);
/* choose a port if none given */
if (stream->multicast_port == 0) {
stream->multicast_port = default_port;
default_port += 100;
}
dest_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
dest_addr.sin_addr = stream->multicast_ip;
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port);
rtp_c = rtp_new_connection(&dest_addr, stream, session_id,
RTSP_LOWER_TRANSPORT_UDP_MULTICAST);
if (!rtp_c)
continue;
if (open_input_stream(rtp_c, "") < 0) {
http_log("Could not open input stream for stream '%s'\n",
stream->filename);
continue;
}
/* open each RTP stream */
for(stream_index = 0; stream_index < stream->nb_streams;
stream_index++) {
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port +
2 * stream_index);
if (rtp_new_av_stream(rtp_c, stream_index, &dest_addr, NULL) >= 0)
continue;
http_log("Could not open output stream '%s/streamid=%d'\n",
stream->filename, stream_index);
exit(1);
}
rtp_c->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA;
}
}
| static void start_multicast(void)
{
FFServerStream *stream;
char session_id[32];
HTTPContext *rtp_c;
struct sockaddr_in dest_addr = {0};
int default_port, stream_index;
unsigned int random0, random1;
default_port = 6000;
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
if (!stream->is_multicast)
continue;
random0 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
random1 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
/* open the RTP connection */
snprintf(session_id, sizeof(session_id), "%08x%08x", random0, random1);
/* choose a port if none given */
if (stream->multicast_port == 0) {
stream->multicast_port = default_port;
default_port += 100;
}
dest_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
dest_addr.sin_addr = stream->multicast_ip;
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port);
rtp_c = rtp_new_connection(&dest_addr, stream, session_id,
RTSP_LOWER_TRANSPORT_UDP_MULTICAST);
if (!rtp_c)
continue;
if (open_input_stream(rtp_c, "") < 0) {
http_log("Could not open input stream for stream '%s'\n",
stream->filename);
continue;
}
/* open each RTP stream */
for(stream_index = 0; stream_index < stream->nb_streams;
stream_index++) {
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port +
2 * stream_index);
if (rtp_new_av_stream(rtp_c, stream_index, &dest_addr, NULL) >= 0)
continue;
http_log("Could not open output stream '%s/streamid=%d'\n",
stream->filename, stream_index);
exit(1);
}
rtp_c->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA;
}
}
| C | FFmpeg | 0 |
CVE-2015-2150 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-2150/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b | af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b | xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> | static int xen_pcibk_read_device(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset,
u16 *value, void *data)
{
*value = dev->device;
return 0;
}
| static int xen_pcibk_read_device(struct pci_dev *dev, int offset,
u16 *value, void *data)
{
*value = dev->device;
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-19198 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19198/ | CWE-787 | https://github.com/uriparser/uriparser/commit/864f5d4c127def386dd5cc926ad96934b297f04e | 864f5d4c127def386dd5cc926ad96934b297f04e | UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team | void testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19() {
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("scheme://host/source",
"scheme://host/source",
"schemelonger://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("schemelonger://host/source",
"schemelonger://host/source",
"scheme://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//host/source",
"http://host/source",
"http://hostlonger/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//hostlonger/source",
"http://hostlonger/source",
"http://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//[v7.host]/source",
"http://[v7.host]/source",
"http://[v7.hostlonger]/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//[v7.hostlonger]/source",
"http://[v7.hostlonger]/source",
"http://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("path1",
"http://host/path1",
"http://host/path111");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("../path1/path2",
"http://host/path1/path2",
"http://host/path111/path222");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("path111",
"http://host/path111",
"http://host/path1");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("../path111/path222",
"http://host/path111/path222",
"http://host/path1/path2");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//example/x/abc",
"http://example/x/abc",
"http://example2/x/y/z");
}
| void testRangeComparison_RemoveBaseUri_Issue19() {
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("scheme://host/source",
"scheme://host/source",
"schemelonger://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("schemelonger://host/source",
"schemelonger://host/source",
"scheme://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//host/source",
"http://host/source",
"http://hostlonger/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//hostlonger/source",
"http://hostlonger/source",
"http://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//[v7.host]/source",
"http://[v7.host]/source",
"http://[v7.hostlonger]/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//[v7.hostlonger]/source",
"http://[v7.hostlonger]/source",
"http://host/base");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("path1",
"http://host/path1",
"http://host/path111");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("../path1/path2",
"http://host/path1/path2",
"http://host/path111/path222");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("path111",
"http://host/path111",
"http://host/path1");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("../path111/path222",
"http://host/path111/path222",
"http://host/path1/path2");
testRemoveBaseUriHelper("//example/x/abc",
"http://example/x/abc",
"http://example2/x/y/z");
}
| C | uriparser | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a5333583f14284a411abac2fef7caed889a8bba3 | a5333583f14284a411abac2fef7caed889a8bba3 | Wire InstallFinished and add some InstallEvent.waitUntil tests
BUG=285976
TEST=content_browsertests:ServiceWorkerVersionBrowserTest.Install*
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=250804
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153553008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@250936 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void EmbeddedWorkerContextClient::workerContextDestroyed() {
script_context_.reset();
main_thread_proxy_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CallWorkerContextDestroyedOnMainThread,
embedded_worker_id_));
}
| void EmbeddedWorkerContextClient::workerContextDestroyed() {
script_context_.reset();
main_thread_proxy_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CallWorkerContextDestroyedOnMainThread,
embedded_worker_id_));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2014-4503 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-4503/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/sgminer-dev/sgminer/commit/910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | 910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this. | static bool sock_connecting(void)
{
#ifndef WIN32
return errno == EINPROGRESS;
#else
return WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK;
#endif
}
| static bool sock_connecting(void)
{
#ifndef WIN32
return errno == EINPROGRESS;
#else
return WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK;
#endif
}
| C | sgminer | 0 |
CVE-2015-3412 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/ | CWE-254 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | 4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257 | null | static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_element_ns)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *name, *prefix, *uri;
int name_len, prefix_len, uri_len, retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s!ss!",
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs!ss!", &pind,
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
XMLW_NAME_CHK("Invalid Element Name");
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = xmlTextWriterStartElementNS(ptr, (xmlChar *)prefix, (xmlChar *)name, (xmlChar *)uri);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
| static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_start_element_ns)
{
zval *pind;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *name, *prefix, *uri;
int name_len, prefix_len, uri_len, retval;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
if (this) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s!ss!",
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
} else
#endif
{
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs!ss!", &pind,
&prefix, &prefix_len, &name, &name_len, &uri, &uri_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(intern,xmlwriter_object *, &pind, -1, "XMLWriter", le_xmlwriter);
}
XMLW_NAME_CHK("Invalid Element Name");
ptr = intern->ptr;
if (ptr) {
retval = xmlTextWriterStartElementNS(ptr, (xmlChar *)prefix, (xmlChar *)name, (xmlChar *)uri);
if (retval != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
| C | php | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9 | 3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9 | sync: ensure sync init path doesn't block on CheckTime
The call to RequestEarlyExit (which calls Abort) only happens if the SyncBackendHost has received the initialization callback from the SyncManager. But during init, the SyncManager could make a call to CheckTime, meaning that call would never be aborted. This patch makes sure to cover that case.
BUG=93829
TEST=None at the moment :(
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7862011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100543 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCryptographerFromNigori() {
DCHECK(initialized_);
syncable::ScopedDirLookup lookup(dir_manager(), username_for_share());
if (!lookup.good()) {
NOTREACHED() << "BootstrapEncryption: lookup not good so bailing out";
return false;
}
if (!lookup->initial_sync_ended_for_type(syncable::NIGORI))
return false; // Should only happen during first time sync.
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
Cryptographer* cryptographer = trans.GetCryptographer();
WriteNode node(&trans);
if (!node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori(node.GetNigoriSpecifics());
Cryptographer::UpdateResult result = cryptographer->Update(nigori);
if (result == Cryptographer::NEEDS_PASSPHRASE) {
ObserverList<SyncManager::Observer> temp_obs_list;
CopyObservers(&temp_obs_list);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, temp_obs_list,
OnPassphraseRequired(sync_api::REASON_DECRYPTION));
}
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(&nigori);
node.SetNigoriSpecifics(nigori);
allstatus_.SetCryptographerReady(cryptographer->is_ready());
allstatus_.SetCryptoHasPendingKeys(cryptographer->has_pending_keys());
allstatus_.SetEncryptedTypes(cryptographer->GetEncryptedTypes());
return cryptographer->is_ready();
}
| bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCryptographerFromNigori() {
DCHECK(initialized_);
syncable::ScopedDirLookup lookup(dir_manager(), username_for_share());
if (!lookup.good()) {
NOTREACHED() << "BootstrapEncryption: lookup not good so bailing out";
return false;
}
if (!lookup->initial_sync_ended_for_type(syncable::NIGORI))
return false; // Should only happen during first time sync.
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
Cryptographer* cryptographer = trans.GetCryptographer();
WriteNode node(&trans);
if (!node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori(node.GetNigoriSpecifics());
Cryptographer::UpdateResult result = cryptographer->Update(nigori);
if (result == Cryptographer::NEEDS_PASSPHRASE) {
ObserverList<SyncManager::Observer> temp_obs_list;
CopyObservers(&temp_obs_list);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, temp_obs_list,
OnPassphraseRequired(sync_api::REASON_DECRYPTION));
}
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(&nigori);
node.SetNigoriSpecifics(nigori);
allstatus_.SetCryptographerReady(cryptographer->is_ready());
allstatus_.SetCryptoHasPendingKeys(cryptographer->has_pending_keys());
allstatus_.SetEncryptedTypes(cryptographer->GetEncryptedTypes());
return cryptographer->is_ready();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |