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stringlengths 46
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13.3k
⌀ | func_after
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2019-5829 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5829/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/17368442aec0f48859a3561ae5e441175c7041ba | 17368442aec0f48859a3561ae5e441175c7041ba | Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910} | void DownloadManagerImpl::OnHistoryNextIdRetrived(uint32_t next_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
is_history_download_id_retrieved_ = true;
if (next_id == download::DownloadItem::kInvalidId)
next_id++;
else
should_persist_new_download_ = true;
SetNextId(next_id);
}
| void DownloadManagerImpl::OnHistoryNextIdRetrived(uint32_t next_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
is_history_download_id_retrieved_ = true;
if (next_id == download::DownloadItem::kInvalidId)
next_id++;
else
should_persist_new_download_ = true;
SetNextId(next_id);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1819 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1819/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424 | eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424 | xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> | xfs_buf_unlock(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
XB_CLEAR_OWNER(bp);
up(&bp->b_sema);
trace_xfs_buf_unlock(bp, _RET_IP_);
}
| xfs_buf_unlock(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
XB_CLEAR_OWNER(bp);
up(&bp->b_sema);
trace_xfs_buf_unlock(bp, _RET_IP_);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-6156 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6156/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/096cdc6f52225835ff503f987a0d68ef770bb78e | 096cdc6f52225835ff503f987a0d68ef770bb78e | platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> | static int ec_device_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct cros_ec_dev *ec = container_of(inode->i_cdev,
struct cros_ec_dev, cdev);
filp->private_data = ec;
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
return 0;
}
| static int ec_device_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct cros_ec_dev *ec = container_of(inode->i_cdev,
struct cros_ec_dev, cdev);
filp->private_data = ec;
nonseekable_open(inode, filp);
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-9120 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9120/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7 | 9590232bb4f4cc824f3425a6e1349afbe6d6d2b7 | staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | void *ion_map_kernel(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer;
void *vaddr;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
if (!ion_handle_validate(client, handle)) {
pr_err("%s: invalid handle passed to map_kernel.\n",
__func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
buffer = handle->buffer;
if (!handle->buffer->heap->ops->map_kernel) {
pr_err("%s: map_kernel is not implemented by this heap.\n",
__func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
vaddr = ion_handle_kmap_get(handle);
mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return vaddr;
}
| void *ion_map_kernel(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer;
void *vaddr;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
if (!ion_handle_validate(client, handle)) {
pr_err("%s: invalid handle passed to map_kernel.\n",
__func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
buffer = handle->buffer;
if (!handle->buffer->heap->ops->map_kernel) {
pr_err("%s: map_kernel is not implemented by this heap.\n",
__func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
}
mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
vaddr = ion_handle_kmap_get(handle);
mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return vaddr;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b | 3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b | Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319} | void HTMLMediaElement::SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(bool should_delay) {
if (should_delay_load_event_ == should_delay)
return;
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setShouldDelayLoadEvent(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< BoolString(should_delay) << ")";
should_delay_load_event_ = should_delay;
if (should_delay)
GetDocument().IncrementLoadEventDelayCount();
else
GetDocument().DecrementLoadEventDelayCount();
}
| void HTMLMediaElement::SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(bool should_delay) {
if (should_delay_load_event_ == should_delay)
return;
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setShouldDelayLoadEvent(" << (void*)this << ", "
<< BoolString(should_delay) << ")";
should_delay_load_event_ = should_delay;
if (should_delay)
GetDocument().IncrementLoadEventDelayCount();
else
GetDocument().DecrementLoadEventDelayCount();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3055 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091 | e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091 | [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static v8::Handle<v8::Value> longLongAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.longLongAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Number::New(static_cast<double>(imp->longLongAttr()));
}
| static v8::Handle<v8::Value> longLongAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.longLongAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Number::New(static_cast<double>(imp->longLongAttr()));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-5818 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5818/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35 | 929f77d4173022a731ae91218ce6894d20f87f35 | Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889} | static int Read16(const uint8_t* p) {
return p[0] << 8 | p[1];
}
| static int Read16(const uint8_t* p) {
return p[0] << 8 | p[1];
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-2918 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | static void sample_hbp_handler(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
static void sample_hbp_handler(struct perf_event *bp,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "%s value is changed\n", ksym_name);
dump_stack();
printk(KERN_INFO "Dump stack from sample_hbp_handler\n");
}
| static void sample_hbp_handler(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "%s value is changed\n", ksym_name);
dump_stack();
printk(KERN_INFO "Dump stack from sample_hbp_handler\n");
}
| C | linux | 1 |
CVE-2018-11645 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11645/ | CWE-200 | http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=b60d50b7567369ad856cebe1efb6cd7dd2284219 | b60d50b7567369ad856cebe1efb6cd7dd2284219 | null | lib_file_open_search_with_no_combine(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile,
gx_io_device *iodev, bool starting_arg_file, char *fmode)
{
stream *s;
uint blen1 = blen;
struct stat fstat;
if (gp_file_name_reduce(fname, flen, buffer, &blen1) != gp_combine_success)
goto skip;
if (starting_arg_file || check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_p, buffer, blen1) >= 0) {
if (iodev_os_open_file(iodev, (const char *)buffer, blen1,
(const char *)fmode, &s, (gs_memory_t *)mem) == 0) {
*pclen = blen1;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
return 0;
}
}
else {
/* If we are not allowed to open the file by check_file_permissions_aux()
* and if the file exists, throw an error.......
* Otherwise, keep searching.
*/
if ((*iodev->procs.file_status)(iodev, buffer, &fstat) >= 0) {
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
}
skip:
return 1;
}
| lib_file_open_search_with_no_combine(gs_file_path_ptr lib_path, const gs_memory_t *mem, i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p,
const char *fname, uint flen, char *buffer, int blen, uint *pclen, ref *pfile,
gx_io_device *iodev, bool starting_arg_file, char *fmode)
{
stream *s;
uint blen1 = blen;
struct stat fstat;
if (gp_file_name_reduce(fname, flen, buffer, &blen1) != gp_combine_success)
goto skip;
if (starting_arg_file || check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_p, buffer, blen1) >= 0) {
if (iodev_os_open_file(iodev, (const char *)buffer, blen1,
(const char *)fmode, &s, (gs_memory_t *)mem) == 0) {
*pclen = blen1;
make_stream_file(pfile, s, "r");
return 0;
}
}
else {
/* If we are not allowed to open the file by check_file_permissions_aux()
* and if the file exists, throw an error.......
* Otherwise, keep searching.
*/
if ((*iodev->procs.file_status)(iodev, buffer, &fstat) >= 0) {
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
}
}
skip:
return 1;
}
| C | ghostscript | 0 |
CVE-2018-6158 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6158/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21 | 20b65d00ca3d8696430e22efad7485366f8c3a21 | [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434} | void GCInfoTable::EnsureGCInfoIndex(const GCInfo* gc_info,
size_t* gc_info_index_slot) {
DCHECK(gc_info);
DCHECK(gc_info_index_slot);
// Ensuring a new index involves current index adjustment as well
// as potentially resizing the table, both operations that require
// a lock.
MutexLocker locker(table_mutex_);
if (*gc_info_index_slot)
return;
int index = ++current_index_;
size_t gc_info_index = static_cast<size_t>(index);
CHECK(gc_info_index < GCInfoTable::kMaxIndex);
if (current_index_ >= limit_)
Resize();
table_[gc_info_index] = gc_info;
ReleaseStore(reinterpret_cast<int*>(gc_info_index_slot), index);
}
| void GCInfoTable::EnsureGCInfoIndex(const GCInfo* gc_info,
size_t* gc_info_index_slot) {
DCHECK(gc_info);
DCHECK(gc_info_index_slot);
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(Mutex, mutex, ());
MutexLocker locker(mutex);
if (*gc_info_index_slot)
return;
int index = ++gc_info_index_;
size_t gc_info_index = static_cast<size_t>(index);
CHECK(gc_info_index < GCInfoTable::kMaxIndex);
if (gc_info_index >= gc_info_table_size_)
Resize();
g_gc_info_table[gc_info_index] = gc_info;
ReleaseStore(reinterpret_cast<int*>(gc_info_index_slot), index);
}
| C | Chrome | 1 |
CVE-2017-5122 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5122/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f8675cbb337440a11bf9afb10ea11bae42bb92cb | f8675cbb337440a11bf9afb10ea11bae42bb92cb | cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836} | virtual ~PanelWindowResizerTransientTest() {}
| virtual ~PanelWindowResizerTransientTest() {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5219 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae | Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568} | error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindImageTexture(GLuint unit,
GLuint texture,
GLint level,
GLboolean layered,
GLint layer,
GLenum access,
GLenum format) {
api()->glBindImageTextureEXTFn(
unit,
GetTextureServiceID(api(), texture, resources_, bind_generates_resource_),
level, layered, layer, access, format);
return error::kNoError;
}
| error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindImageTexture(GLuint unit,
GLuint texture,
GLint level,
GLboolean layered,
GLint layer,
GLenum access,
GLenum format) {
api()->glBindImageTextureEXTFn(
unit,
GetTextureServiceID(api(), texture, resources_, bind_generates_resource_),
level, layered, layer, access, format);
return error::kNoError;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3964 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3964/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0c14577c9905bd8161159ec7eaac810c594508d0 | 0c14577c9905bd8161159ec7eaac810c594508d0 | Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | LRESULT OmniboxViewWin::OnGetObject(UINT message,
WPARAM wparam,
LPARAM lparam) {
if (lparam == OBJID_CLIENT) {
return LresultFromObject(IID_IAccessible, wparam,
native_view_host_->GetNativeViewAccessible());
}
return 0;
}
| LRESULT OmniboxViewWin::OnGetObject(UINT message,
WPARAM wparam,
LPARAM lparam) {
if (lparam == OBJID_CLIENT) {
return LresultFromObject(IID_IAccessible, wparam,
native_view_host_->GetNativeViewAccessible());
}
return 0;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-3713 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3713/ | CWE-284 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9842df62004f366b9fed2423e24df10542ee0dc5 | 9842df62004f366b9fed2423e24df10542ee0dc5 | KVM: MTRR: remove MSR 0x2f8
MSR 0x2f8 accessed the 124th Variable Range MTRR ever since MTRR support
was introduced by 9ba075a664df ("KVM: MTRR support").
0x2f8 became harmful when 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the
size of variable MTRRs") shrinked the array of VR MTRRs from 256 to 8,
which made access to index 124 out of bounds. The surrounding code only
WARNs in this situation, thus the guest gained a limited read/write
access to struct kvm_arch_vcpu.
0x2f8 is not a valid VR MTRR MSR, because KVM has/advertises only 16 VR
MTRR MSRs, 0x200-0x20f. Every VR MTRR is set up using two MSRs, 0x2f8
was treated as a PHYSBASE and 0x2f9 would be its PHYSMASK, but 0x2f9 was
not implemented in KVM, therefore 0x2f8 could never do anything useful
and getting rid of it is safe.
This fixes CVE-2016-3713.
Fixes: 910a6aae4e2e ("KVM: MTRR: exactly define the size of variable MTRRs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | static int fixed_mtrr_addr_seg_to_range_index(u64 addr, int seg)
{
struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg;
int index;
mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
index = mtrr_seg->range_start;
index += (addr - mtrr_seg->start) >> mtrr_seg->range_shift;
return index;
}
| static int fixed_mtrr_addr_seg_to_range_index(u64 addr, int seg)
{
struct fixed_mtrr_segment *mtrr_seg;
int index;
mtrr_seg = &fixed_seg_table[seg];
index = mtrr_seg->range_start;
index += (addr - mtrr_seg->start) >> mtrr_seg->range_shift;
return index;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-2878 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2878/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3 | 09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3 | Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void TextIterator::emitCharacter(UChar c, Node* textNode, Node* offsetBaseNode, int textStartOffset, int textEndOffset)
{
m_hasEmitted = true;
m_positionNode = textNode;
m_positionOffsetBaseNode = offsetBaseNode;
m_positionStartOffset = textStartOffset;
m_positionEndOffset = textEndOffset;
m_singleCharacterBuffer = c;
m_textCharacters = &m_singleCharacterBuffer;
m_textLength = 1;
m_lastTextNodeEndedWithCollapsedSpace = false;
m_lastCharacter = c;
}
| void TextIterator::emitCharacter(UChar c, Node* textNode, Node* offsetBaseNode, int textStartOffset, int textEndOffset)
{
m_hasEmitted = true;
m_positionNode = textNode;
m_positionOffsetBaseNode = offsetBaseNode;
m_positionStartOffset = textStartOffset;
m_positionEndOffset = textEndOffset;
m_singleCharacterBuffer = c;
m_textCharacters = &m_singleCharacterBuffer;
m_textLength = 1;
m_lastTextNodeEndedWithCollapsedSpace = false;
m_lastCharacter = c;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5200 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475 | 2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475 | chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114} | AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel::ForMissingResidentKeysSupport(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
return base::WrapUnique(new AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel(
dialog_model,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_ERROR_MISSING_CAPABILITY_TITLE),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_MISSING_RESIDENT_KEYS_DESC)));
}
| AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel::ForMissingResidentKeysSupport(
AuthenticatorRequestDialogModel* dialog_model) {
return base::WrapUnique(new AuthenticatorGenericErrorSheetModel(
dialog_model,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_ERROR_MISSING_CAPABILITY_TITLE),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_MISSING_RESIDENT_KEYS_DESC)));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-2908 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2908/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7edf2c655761e7505950013e62c89e3bd2f7e6dc | 7edf2c655761e7505950013e62c89e3bd2f7e6dc | Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | static String resourceString(const v8::Handle<v8::Function> function)
{
String resourceName;
int lineNumber;
resourceInfo(function, resourceName, lineNumber);
StringBuilder builder;
builder.append(resourceName);
builder.append(':');
builder.appendNumber(lineNumber);
return builder.toString();
}
| static String resourceString(const v8::Handle<v8::Function> function)
{
String resourceName;
int lineNumber;
resourceInfo(function, resourceName, lineNumber);
StringBuilder builder;
builder.append(resourceName);
builder.append(':');
builder.appendNumber(lineNumber);
return builder.toString();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-5143 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5143/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ad103a1564365c95f4ee4f10261f9604f91f686a | ad103a1564365c95f4ee4f10261f9604f91f686a | Security fix: integer overflow on checking image size
Test is left in another CL (codereview.chromiu,.org/11274036) to avoid conflict there. Hope it's fine.
BUG=160926
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11410081
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167882 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | skia::PlatformCanvas* ImageDataPlatformBackend::GetPlatformCanvas() {
return mapped_canvas_.get();
}
| skia::PlatformCanvas* ImageDataPlatformBackend::GetPlatformCanvas() {
return mapped_canvas_.get();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-4930 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/ | CWE-134 | https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | 5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867 | null | check_params()
{
#if defined( HPUX )
char* tmp;
if( !(tmp = param("ARCH")) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "ERROR: %s must know if you are running "
"on an HPPA1 or an HPPA2 CPU.\n",
myDistro->Get() );
fprintf( stderr, "Normally, we look in %s for your model.\n",
"/opt/langtools/lib/sched.models" );
fprintf( stderr, "This file lists all HP models and the "
"corresponding CPU type. However,\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "this file does not exist on your machine "
"or your model (%s)\n", sysapi_uname_arch() );
fprintf( stderr, "was not listed. You should either explicitly "
"set the ARCH parameter\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "in your config source, or install the "
"sched.models file.\n" );
exit( 1 );
} else {
free( tmp );
}
#endif
}
| check_params()
{
#if defined( HPUX )
char* tmp;
if( !(tmp = param("ARCH")) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "ERROR: %s must know if you are running "
"on an HPPA1 or an HPPA2 CPU.\n",
myDistro->Get() );
fprintf( stderr, "Normally, we look in %s for your model.\n",
"/opt/langtools/lib/sched.models" );
fprintf( stderr, "This file lists all HP models and the "
"corresponding CPU type. However,\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "this file does not exist on your machine "
"or your model (%s)\n", sysapi_uname_arch() );
fprintf( stderr, "was not listed. You should either explicitly "
"set the ARCH parameter\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "in your config source, or install the "
"sched.models file.\n" );
exit( 1 );
} else {
free( tmp );
}
#endif
}
| CPP | htcondor | 0 |
CVE-2013-3231 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-3231/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181 | c77a4b9cffb6215a15196ec499490d116dfad181 | llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static inline u8 llc_ui_header_len(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_llc *addr)
{
u8 rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
if (addr->sllc_test || addr->sllc_xid)
rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_I;
return rc;
}
| static inline u8 llc_ui_header_len(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_llc *addr)
{
u8 rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
if (addr->sllc_test || addr->sllc_xid)
rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_I;
return rc;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-5075 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5075/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fea16c8b60ff3d0756d5eb392394963b647bc41a | fea16c8b60ff3d0756d5eb392394963b647bc41a | CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045} | void ContentSecurityPolicy::reportInvalidSandboxFlags(
const String& invalidFlags) {
logToConsole(
"Error while parsing the 'sandbox' Content Security Policy directive: " +
invalidFlags);
}
| void ContentSecurityPolicy::reportInvalidSandboxFlags(
const String& invalidFlags) {
logToConsole(
"Error while parsing the 'sandbox' Content Security Policy directive: " +
invalidFlags);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2 | fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2 | Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | explicit WriteClipboardTask(Clipboard::ObjectMap* objects)
: objects_(objects) {}
| explicit WriteClipboardTask(Clipboard::ObjectMap* objects)
: objects_(objects) {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-2485 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2485/ | CWE-119 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/7cea5cb64b83d690fe02bc210bbdf08f5a87636f | 7cea5cb64b83d690fe02bc210bbdf08f5a87636f | codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
| android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftGSM(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
| android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData, OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftGSM(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2016-2184 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2184/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be | 0f886ca12765d20124bd06291c82951fd49a33be | ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | static int create_std_midi_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
struct usb_host_interface *alts)
{
struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *mshd;
struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *msepd;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming interface header descriptor*/
mshd = (struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *)alts->extra;
if (alts->extralen < 7 ||
mshd->bLength < 7 ||
mshd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE ||
mshd->bDescriptorSubtype != USB_MS_HEADER)
return -ENODEV;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming endpoint descriptor*/
msepd = (struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)alts->endpoint[0].extra;
if (alts->endpoint[0].extralen < 4 ||
msepd->bLength < 4 ||
msepd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT ||
msepd->bDescriptorSubtype != UAC_MS_GENERAL ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack < 1 ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack > 16)
return -ENODEV;
return create_any_midi_quirk(chip, iface, driver, NULL);
}
| static int create_std_midi_quirk(struct snd_usb_audio *chip,
struct usb_interface *iface,
struct usb_driver *driver,
struct usb_host_interface *alts)
{
struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *mshd;
struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *msepd;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming interface header descriptor*/
mshd = (struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *)alts->extra;
if (alts->extralen < 7 ||
mshd->bLength < 7 ||
mshd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE ||
mshd->bDescriptorSubtype != USB_MS_HEADER)
return -ENODEV;
/* must have the MIDIStreaming endpoint descriptor*/
msepd = (struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)alts->endpoint[0].extra;
if (alts->endpoint[0].extralen < 4 ||
msepd->bLength < 4 ||
msepd->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT ||
msepd->bDescriptorSubtype != UAC_MS_GENERAL ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack < 1 ||
msepd->bNumEmbMIDIJack > 16)
return -ENODEV;
return create_any_midi_quirk(chip, iface, driver, NULL);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-16939 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16939/ | CWE-416 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2 | 1137b5e2529a8f5ca8ee709288ecba3e68044df2 | ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> | static int build_acquire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_tmpl *xt, struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
__u32 seq = xfrm_get_acqseq();
struct xfrm_user_acquire *ua;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE, sizeof(*ua), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ua = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&ua->id, &x->id, sizeof(ua->id));
memcpy(&ua->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(ua->saddr));
memcpy(&ua->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(ua->sel));
copy_to_user_policy(xp, &ua->policy, XFRM_POLICY_OUT);
ua->aalgos = xt->aalgos;
ua->ealgos = xt->ealgos;
ua->calgos = xt->calgos;
ua->seq = x->km.seq = seq;
err = copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(x, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_policy_type(xp->type, skb);
if (!err)
err = xfrm_mark_put(skb, &xp->mark);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return err;
}
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
}
| static int build_acquire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_tmpl *xt, struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
__u32 seq = xfrm_get_acqseq();
struct xfrm_user_acquire *ua;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int err;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, 0, 0, XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE, sizeof(*ua), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ua = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&ua->id, &x->id, sizeof(ua->id));
memcpy(&ua->saddr, &x->props.saddr, sizeof(ua->saddr));
memcpy(&ua->sel, &x->sel, sizeof(ua->sel));
copy_to_user_policy(xp, &ua->policy, XFRM_POLICY_OUT);
ua->aalgos = xt->aalgos;
ua->ealgos = xt->ealgos;
ua->calgos = xt->calgos;
ua->seq = x->km.seq = seq;
err = copy_to_user_tmpl(xp, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_state_sec_ctx(x, skb);
if (!err)
err = copy_to_user_policy_type(xp->type, skb);
if (!err)
err = xfrm_mark_put(skb, &xp->mark);
if (err) {
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return err;
}
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-15994 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15994/ | CWE-354 | https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b | c252546ceeb0925eb8a4061315e3ff0a8c55b48b | null | int csum_len_for_type(int cst)
{
switch (cst) {
case CSUM_NONE:
return 1;
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
return 2;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
return MD4_DIGEST_LEN;
case CSUM_MD5:
return MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
}
return 0;
}
| int csum_len_for_type(int cst)
{
switch (cst) {
case CSUM_NONE:
return 1;
case CSUM_MD4_ARCHAIC:
return 2;
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED:
return MD4_DIGEST_LEN;
case CSUM_MD5:
return MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
}
return 0;
}
| C | samba | 0 |
CVE-2017-15423 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15423/ | CWE-310 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2 | a263d1cf62a9c75be6aaafdec88aacfcef1e8fd2 | Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774} | static void Initialize() {
display::win::ScreenWin::SetRequestHDRStatusCallback(
base::Bind(&HDRProxy::RequestHDRStatus));
}
| static void Initialize() {
display::win::ScreenWin::SetRequestHDRStatusCallback(
base::Bind(&HDRProxy::RequestHDRStatus));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5147 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5147/ | CWE-79 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11 | 5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11 | Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942} | LayoutBox* PaintLayerScrollableArea::GetLayoutBox() const {
return layer_ ? layer_->GetLayoutBox() : nullptr;
}
| LayoutBox* PaintLayerScrollableArea::GetLayoutBox() const {
return layer_ ? layer_->GetLayoutBox() : nullptr;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-2895 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b | 3475f5e448ddf5e48888f3d0563245cc46e3c98b | ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool ShelfLayoutManager::IsVisible() const {
return status_->IsVisible() && (state_.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
(state_.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state_.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN));
}
| bool ShelfLayoutManager::IsVisible() const {
return status_->IsVisible() && (state_.visibility_state == VISIBLE ||
(state_.visibility_state == AUTO_HIDE &&
state_.auto_hide_state == AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-3099 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3099/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a | 3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a | [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void WebInspectorProxy::platformDidClose()
{
if (m_inspectorView)
g_signal_handlers_disconnect_by_func(m_inspectorView, reinterpret_cast<void*>(inspectorViewDestroyed), this);
m_client.didClose(this);
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
m_inspectorView = 0;
}
| void WebInspectorProxy::platformDidClose()
{
if (m_inspectorView)
g_signal_handlers_disconnect_by_func(m_inspectorView, reinterpret_cast<void*>(inspectorViewDestroyed), this);
m_client.didClose(this);
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
m_inspectorView = 0;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-17206 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/ | null | https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | 9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8 | ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org> | ofpacts_copy_all(struct ofpbuf *out, const struct ofpbuf *in,
bool (*filter)(const struct ofpact *))
{
const struct ofpact *a;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH (a, in->data, in->size) {
if (filter(a)) {
ofpact_copy(out, a);
}
}
}
| ofpacts_copy_all(struct ofpbuf *out, const struct ofpbuf *in,
bool (*filter)(const struct ofpact *))
{
const struct ofpact *a;
OFPACT_FOR_EACH (a, in->data, in->size) {
if (filter(a)) {
ofpact_copy(out, a);
}
}
}
| C | ovs | 0 |
CVE-2016-0809 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0809/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/broadcom/wlan/+/2c5a4fac8bc8198f6a2635ede776f8de40a0c3e1 | 2c5a4fac8bc8198f6a2635ede776f8de40a0c3e1 | Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
| virtual int handleResponse(WifiEvent& reply) {
struct nlattr **tb = reply.attributes();
struct genlmsghdr *gnlh = reply.header();
struct nlattr *mcgrp = NULL;
int i;
if (!tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS]) {
ALOGI("No multicast groups found");
return NL_SKIP;
} else {
}
for_each_attr(mcgrp, tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS], i) {
struct nlattr *tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX + 1];
nla_parse(tb2, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX, (nlattr *)nla_data(mcgrp),
nla_len(mcgrp), NULL);
if (!tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME] || !tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]) {
continue;
}
char *grpName = (char *)nla_data(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
int grpNameLen = nla_len(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
if (strncmp(grpName, mGroup, grpNameLen) != 0)
continue;
mId = nla_get_u32(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]);
break;
}
return NL_SKIP;
}
| virtual int handleResponse(WifiEvent& reply) {
struct nlattr **tb = reply.attributes();
struct genlmsghdr *gnlh = reply.header();
struct nlattr *mcgrp = NULL;
int i;
if (!tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS]) {
ALOGI("No multicast groups found");
return NL_SKIP;
} else {
}
for_each_attr(mcgrp, tb[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GROUPS], i) {
struct nlattr *tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX + 1];
nla_parse(tb2, CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_MAX, (nlattr *)nla_data(mcgrp),
nla_len(mcgrp), NULL);
if (!tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME] || !tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]) {
continue;
}
char *grpName = (char *)nla_data(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
int grpNameLen = nla_len(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_NAME]);
if (strncmp(grpName, mGroup, grpNameLen) != 0)
continue;
mId = nla_get_u32(tb2[CTRL_ATTR_MCAST_GRP_ID]);
break;
}
return NL_SKIP;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2019-5826 | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4 | eaf2e8bce3855d362e53034bd83f0e3aff8714e4 | [IndexedDB] Fixed force close during pending connection open
During a force close of the database, the connections to that database
are iterated and force closed. The iteration method was not safe to
modification, and if there was a pending connection waiting to open,
that request would execute once all the other connections were
destroyed and create a new connection.
This change changes the iteration method to account for new connections
that are added during the iteration.
R=cmp@chromium.org
Bug: 941746
Change-Id: If1b3137237dc2920ad369d6ac99c963ed9c57d0c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1522330
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chase Phillips <cmp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640604} | void IndexedDBDatabase::AddObjectStore(
IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata object_store,
int64_t new_max_object_store_id) {
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(object_store.id) ==
metadata_.object_stores.end());
if (new_max_object_store_id != IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata::kInvalidId) {
DCHECK_LT(metadata_.max_object_store_id, new_max_object_store_id);
metadata_.max_object_store_id = new_max_object_store_id;
}
metadata_.object_stores[object_store.id] = std::move(object_store);
}
| void IndexedDBDatabase::AddObjectStore(
IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata object_store,
int64_t new_max_object_store_id) {
DCHECK(metadata_.object_stores.find(object_store.id) ==
metadata_.object_stores.end());
if (new_max_object_store_id != IndexedDBObjectStoreMetadata::kInvalidId) {
DCHECK_LT(metadata_.max_object_store_id, new_max_object_store_id);
metadata_.max_object_store_id = new_max_object_store_id;
}
metadata_.object_stores[object_store.id] = std::move(object_store);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-10048 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10048/ | CWE-22 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb | fc6080f1321fd21e86ef916195cc110b05d9effb | Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida | MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *PruneTagFromXMLTree(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
xml_info->next->sibling=xml_info->sibling;
if (xml_info->parent != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (node == xml_info)
xml_info->parent->child=xml_info->ordered;
else
{
while (node->ordered != xml_info)
node=node->ordered;
node->ordered=node->ordered->ordered;
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (strcmp(node->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
{
while (strcmp(node->sibling->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
node=node->sibling;
if (node->sibling != xml_info)
node=node->sibling;
else
node->sibling=(xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) ?
xml_info->next : node->sibling->sibling;
}
while ((node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) &&
(node->next != xml_info))
node=node->next;
if (node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
node->next=node->next->next;
}
}
xml_info->ordered=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->sibling=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->next=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
return(xml_info);
}
| MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *PruneTagFromXMLTree(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
xml_info->next->sibling=xml_info->sibling;
if (xml_info->parent != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (node == xml_info)
xml_info->parent->child=xml_info->ordered;
else
{
while (node->ordered != xml_info)
node=node->ordered;
node->ordered=node->ordered->ordered;
node=xml_info->parent->child;
if (strcmp(node->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
{
while (strcmp(node->sibling->tag,xml_info->tag) != 0)
node=node->sibling;
if (node->sibling != xml_info)
node=node->sibling;
else
node->sibling=(xml_info->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) ?
xml_info->next : node->sibling->sibling;
}
while ((node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL) &&
(node->next != xml_info))
node=node->next;
if (node->next != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
node->next=node->next->next;
}
}
xml_info->ordered=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->sibling=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->next=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
return(xml_info);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2016-6787 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6787/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b | f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b | perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | event_sched_in(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
u64 tstamp = perf_event_time(event);
int ret = 0;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
if (event->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 0;
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE;
event->oncpu = smp_processor_id();
/*
* Unthrottle events, since we scheduled we might have missed several
* ticks already, also for a heavily scheduling task there is little
* guarantee it'll get a tick in a timely manner.
*/
if (unlikely(event->hw.interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS)) {
perf_log_throttle(event, 1);
event->hw.interrupts = 0;
}
/*
* The new state must be visible before we turn it on in the hardware:
*/
smp_wmb();
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
if (event->pmu->add(event, PERF_EF_START)) {
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
event->oncpu = -1;
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
event->tstamp_running += tstamp - event->tstamp_stopped;
perf_set_shadow_time(event, ctx, tstamp);
if (!is_software_event(event))
cpuctx->active_oncpu++;
ctx->nr_active++;
if (event->attr.freq && event->attr.sample_freq)
ctx->nr_freq++;
if (event->attr.exclusive)
cpuctx->exclusive = 1;
if (is_orphaned_child(event))
schedule_orphans_remove(ctx);
out:
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
return ret;
}
| event_sched_in(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
u64 tstamp = perf_event_time(event);
int ret = 0;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
if (event->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 0;
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE;
event->oncpu = smp_processor_id();
/*
* Unthrottle events, since we scheduled we might have missed several
* ticks already, also for a heavily scheduling task there is little
* guarantee it'll get a tick in a timely manner.
*/
if (unlikely(event->hw.interrupts == MAX_INTERRUPTS)) {
perf_log_throttle(event, 1);
event->hw.interrupts = 0;
}
/*
* The new state must be visible before we turn it on in the hardware:
*/
smp_wmb();
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
if (event->pmu->add(event, PERF_EF_START)) {
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE;
event->oncpu = -1;
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
event->tstamp_running += tstamp - event->tstamp_stopped;
perf_set_shadow_time(event, ctx, tstamp);
if (!is_software_event(event))
cpuctx->active_oncpu++;
ctx->nr_active++;
if (event->attr.freq && event->attr.sample_freq)
ctx->nr_freq++;
if (event->attr.exclusive)
cpuctx->exclusive = 1;
if (is_orphaned_child(event))
schedule_orphans_remove(ctx);
out:
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
return ret;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-2550 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2550/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 | 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6 | unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
| void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
}
fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
| C | linux | 1 |
CVE-2016-8577 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8577/ | CWE-399 | https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=e95c9a493a5a8d6f969e86c9f19f80ffe6587e19 | e95c9a493a5a8d6f969e86c9f19f80ffe6587e19 | null | static int v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
{
int err;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsFidState *fidp, head_fid;
head_fid.next = s->fid_list;
for (fidp = s->fid_list; fidp; fidp = fidp->next) {
if (fidp->path.size != path->size) {
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(fidp->path.data, path->data, path->size)) {
/* Mark the fid non reclaimable. */
fidp->flags |= FID_NON_RECLAIMABLE;
/* reopen the file/dir if already closed */
err = v9fs_reopen_fid(pdu, fidp);
if (err < 0) {
return -1;
}
/*
* Go back to head of fid list because
* the list could have got updated when
* switched to the worker thread
*/
if (err == 0) {
fidp = &head_fid;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| static int v9fs_mark_fids_unreclaim(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
{
int err;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsFidState *fidp, head_fid;
head_fid.next = s->fid_list;
for (fidp = s->fid_list; fidp; fidp = fidp->next) {
if (fidp->path.size != path->size) {
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(fidp->path.data, path->data, path->size)) {
/* Mark the fid non reclaimable. */
fidp->flags |= FID_NON_RECLAIMABLE;
/* reopen the file/dir if already closed */
err = v9fs_reopen_fid(pdu, fidp);
if (err < 0) {
return -1;
}
/*
* Go back to head of fid list because
* the list could have got updated when
* switched to the worker thread
*/
if (err == 0) {
fidp = &head_fid;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| C | qemu | 0 |
CVE-2014-9766 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9766/ | CWE-189 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/pixman/commit/?id=857e40f3d2bc2cfb714913e0cd7e6184cf69aca3 | 857e40f3d2bc2cfb714913e0cd7e6184cf69aca3 | null | create_bits_image_internal (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
uint32_t * bits,
int rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
pixman_image_t *image;
/* must be a whole number of uint32_t's
*/
return_val_if_fail (
bits == NULL || (rowstride_bytes % sizeof (uint32_t)) == 0, NULL);
return_val_if_fail (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format) >= PIXMAN_FORMAT_DEPTH (format), NULL);
image = _pixman_image_allocate ();
if (!image)
return NULL;
if (!_pixman_bits_image_init (image, format, width, height, bits,
rowstride_bytes / (int) sizeof (uint32_t),
clear))
{
free (image);
return NULL;
}
return image;
}
| create_bits_image_internal (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
uint32_t * bits,
int rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
pixman_image_t *image;
/* must be a whole number of uint32_t's
*/
return_val_if_fail (
bits == NULL || (rowstride_bytes % sizeof (uint32_t)) == 0, NULL);
return_val_if_fail (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format) >= PIXMAN_FORMAT_DEPTH (format), NULL);
image = _pixman_image_allocate ();
if (!image)
return NULL;
if (!_pixman_bits_image_init (image, format, width, height, bits,
rowstride_bytes / (int) sizeof (uint32_t),
clear))
{
free (image);
return NULL;
}
return image;
}
| C | pixman | 0 |
CVE-2018-6096 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | 36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | std::string last_message() { return last_message_; }
| std::string last_message() { return last_message_; }
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-0895 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0895/ | CWE-22 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/23803a58e481e464a787e4b2c461af9e62f03905 | 23803a58e481e464a787e4b2c461af9e62f03905 | Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool GetInode(const FilePath& path, ino_t* inode) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed(); // For call to stat().
struct stat buffer;
int result = stat(path.value().c_str(), &buffer);
if (result < 0)
return false;
*inode = buffer.st_ino;
return true;
}
| bool GetInode(const FilePath& path, ino_t* inode) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed(); // For call to stat().
struct stat buffer;
int result = stat(path.value().c_str(), &buffer);
if (result < 0)
return false;
*inode = buffer.st_ino;
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-1547 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-1547/ | CWE-311 | https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=7c1709c2da5414f5b6133d00a03fc8c5bf996c7a | 7c1709c2da5414f5b6133d00a03fc8c5bf996c7a | null | int ERR_load_EC_strings(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
if (ERR_func_error_string(EC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_functs);
ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_reasons);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
| int ERR_load_EC_strings(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
if (ERR_func_error_string(EC_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_functs);
ERR_load_strings(0, EC_str_reasons);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
| C | openssl | 0 |
CVE-2013-2870 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2870/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44 | ca8cc70b2de822b939f87effc7c2b83bac280a44 | Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | int SocketStream::DoReadTunnelHeadersComplete(int result) {
DCHECK_EQ(kTunnelProxy, proxy_mode_);
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if (result == 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
tunnel_response_headers_len_ += result;
DCHECK(tunnel_response_headers_len_ <= tunnel_response_headers_capacity_);
int eoh = HttpUtil::LocateEndOfHeaders(
tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), tunnel_response_headers_len_, 0);
if (eoh == -1) {
if (tunnel_response_headers_len_ >= kMaxTunnelResponseHeadersSize) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_RESPONSE_HEADERS_TOO_BIG;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_TUNNEL_HEADERS;
return OK;
}
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> headers;
headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), eoh));
if (headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0)) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
switch (headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
if (is_secure()) {
DCHECK_EQ(eoh, tunnel_response_headers_len_);
next_state_ = STATE_SSL_CONNECT;
} else {
result = DidEstablishConnection();
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if ((eoh < tunnel_response_headers_len_) && delegate_)
delegate_->OnReceivedData(
this, tunnel_response_headers_->headers() + eoh,
tunnel_response_headers_len_ - eoh);
}
return OK;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required.
if (proxy_mode_ != kTunnelProxy)
return ERR_UNEXPECTED_PROXY_AUTH;
result = proxy_auth_controller_->HandleAuthChallenge(
headers, false, true, net_log_);
if (result != OK)
return result;
DCHECK(!proxy_info_.is_empty());
next_state_ = STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED;
if (proxy_auth_controller_->HaveAuth()) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoRestartWithAuth, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
if (delegate_) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoAuthRequired, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
| int SocketStream::DoReadTunnelHeadersComplete(int result) {
DCHECK_EQ(kTunnelProxy, proxy_mode_);
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if (result == 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_CLOSED;
}
tunnel_response_headers_len_ += result;
DCHECK(tunnel_response_headers_len_ <= tunnel_response_headers_capacity_);
int eoh = HttpUtil::LocateEndOfHeaders(
tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), tunnel_response_headers_len_, 0);
if (eoh == -1) {
if (tunnel_response_headers_len_ >= kMaxTunnelResponseHeadersSize) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_RESPONSE_HEADERS_TOO_BIG;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_TUNNEL_HEADERS;
return OK;
}
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> headers;
headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(tunnel_response_headers_->headers(), eoh));
if (headers->GetParsedHttpVersion() < HttpVersion(1, 0)) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
switch (headers->response_code()) {
case 200: // OK
if (is_secure()) {
DCHECK_EQ(eoh, tunnel_response_headers_len_);
next_state_ = STATE_SSL_CONNECT;
} else {
result = DidEstablishConnection();
if (result < 0) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
if ((eoh < tunnel_response_headers_len_) && delegate_)
delegate_->OnReceivedData(
this, tunnel_response_headers_->headers() + eoh,
tunnel_response_headers_len_ - eoh);
}
return OK;
case 407: // Proxy Authentication Required.
if (proxy_mode_ != kTunnelProxy)
return ERR_UNEXPECTED_PROXY_AUTH;
result = proxy_auth_controller_->HandleAuthChallenge(
headers, false, true, net_log_);
if (result != OK)
return result;
DCHECK(!proxy_info_.is_empty());
next_state_ = STATE_AUTH_REQUIRED;
if (proxy_auth_controller_->HaveAuth()) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoRestartWithAuth, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
if (delegate_) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoAuthRequired, this));
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-20843 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20843/ | CWE-611 | https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/pull/262/commits/11f8838bf99ea0a6f0b76f9760c43704d00c4ff6 | 11f8838bf99ea0a6f0b76f9760c43704d00c4ff6 | xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186) | normalizeLines(XML_Char *s)
{
XML_Char *p;
for (;; s++) {
if (*s == XML_T('\0'))
return;
if (*s == 0xD)
break;
}
p = s;
do {
if (*s == 0xD) {
*p++ = 0xA;
if (*++s == 0xA)
s++;
}
else
*p++ = *s++;
} while (*s);
*p = XML_T('\0');
}
| normalizeLines(XML_Char *s)
{
XML_Char *p;
for (;; s++) {
if (*s == XML_T('\0'))
return;
if (*s == 0xD)
break;
}
p = s;
do {
if (*s == 0xD) {
*p++ = 0xA;
if (*++s == 0xA)
s++;
}
else
*p++ = *s++;
} while (*s);
*p = XML_T('\0');
}
| C | libexpat | 0 |
CVE-2011-2840 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc | 2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc | chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void TabStripModel::MoveTabNext() {
int new_index = std::min(active_index() + 1, count() - 1);
MoveTabContentsAt(active_index(), new_index, true);
}
| void TabStripModel::MoveTabNext() {
int new_index = std::min(active_index() + 1, count() - 1);
MoveTabContentsAt(active_index(), new_index, true);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-18241 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18241/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982 | d4fdf8ba0e5808ba9ad6b44337783bd9935e0982 | f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | static void do_write_page(struct f2fs_summary *sum, struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
int type = __get_segment_type(fio);
int err;
reallocate:
allocate_data_block(fio->sbi, fio->page, fio->old_blkaddr,
&fio->new_blkaddr, sum, type, fio, true);
/* writeout dirty page into bdev */
err = f2fs_submit_page_write(fio);
if (err == -EAGAIN) {
fio->old_blkaddr = fio->new_blkaddr;
goto reallocate;
}
}
| static void do_write_page(struct f2fs_summary *sum, struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
int type = __get_segment_type(fio);
int err;
reallocate:
allocate_data_block(fio->sbi, fio->page, fio->old_blkaddr,
&fio->new_blkaddr, sum, type, fio, true);
/* writeout dirty page into bdev */
err = f2fs_submit_page_write(fio);
if (err == -EAGAIN) {
fio->old_blkaddr = fio->new_blkaddr;
goto reallocate;
}
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-18200 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18200/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4 | 638164a2718f337ea224b747cf5977ef143166a4 | f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> | static int f2fs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(root->d_sb);
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, BG_GC)) {
if (test_opt(sbi, FORCE_FG_GC))
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "sync");
else
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "on");
} else {
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "off");
}
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_ROLL_FORWARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_roll_forward");
if (test_opt(sbi, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOHEAP))
seq_puts(seq, ",no_heap");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",heap");
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_XATTR))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_xattr");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sbi, POSIX_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_EXT_IDENTIFY))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_ext_identify");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DATA))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_data");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_data");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DENTRY))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_dentry");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_dentry");
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
seq_puts(seq, ",flush_merge");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOBARRIER))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobarrier");
if (test_opt(sbi, FASTBOOT))
seq_puts(seq, ",fastboot");
if (test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE))
seq_puts(seq, ",extent_cache");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noextent_cache");
if (test_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_flush");
seq_puts(seq, ",mode=");
if (test_opt(sbi, ADAPTIVE))
seq_puts(seq, "adaptive");
else if (test_opt(sbi, LFS))
seq_puts(seq, "lfs");
seq_printf(seq, ",active_logs=%u", sbi->active_logs);
if (F2FS_IO_SIZE_BITS(sbi))
seq_printf(seq, ",io_size=%uKB", F2FS_IO_SIZE_KB(sbi));
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
if (test_opt(sbi, FAULT_INJECTION))
seq_printf(seq, ",fault_injection=%u",
sbi->fault_info.inject_rate);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (test_opt(sbi, QUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",quota");
if (test_opt(sbi, USRQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",usrquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, GRPQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, PRJQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",prjquota");
#endif
f2fs_show_quota_options(seq, sbi->sb);
return 0;
}
| static int f2fs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(root->d_sb);
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, BG_GC)) {
if (test_opt(sbi, FORCE_FG_GC))
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "sync");
else
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "on");
} else {
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "off");
}
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_ROLL_FORWARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_roll_forward");
if (test_opt(sbi, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOHEAP))
seq_puts(seq, ",no_heap");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",heap");
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_XATTR))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_xattr");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sbi, POSIX_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_EXT_IDENTIFY))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_ext_identify");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DATA))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_data");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_data");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DENTRY))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_dentry");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_dentry");
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
seq_puts(seq, ",flush_merge");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOBARRIER))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobarrier");
if (test_opt(sbi, FASTBOOT))
seq_puts(seq, ",fastboot");
if (test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE))
seq_puts(seq, ",extent_cache");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noextent_cache");
if (test_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_flush");
seq_puts(seq, ",mode=");
if (test_opt(sbi, ADAPTIVE))
seq_puts(seq, "adaptive");
else if (test_opt(sbi, LFS))
seq_puts(seq, "lfs");
seq_printf(seq, ",active_logs=%u", sbi->active_logs);
if (F2FS_IO_SIZE_BITS(sbi))
seq_printf(seq, ",io_size=%uKB", F2FS_IO_SIZE_KB(sbi));
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
if (test_opt(sbi, FAULT_INJECTION))
seq_printf(seq, ",fault_injection=%u",
sbi->fault_info.inject_rate);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (test_opt(sbi, QUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",quota");
if (test_opt(sbi, USRQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",usrquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, GRPQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, PRJQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",prjquota");
#endif
f2fs_show_quota_options(seq, sbi->sb);
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2014-3173 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da | ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da | Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocationBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::BindAttribLocationBucket& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DoBindAttribLocation(program, index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
| error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleBindAttribLocationBucket(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::BindAttribLocationBucket& c) {
GLuint program = static_cast<GLuint>(c.program);
GLuint index = static_cast<GLuint>(c.index);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.name_bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string name_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&name_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
DoBindAttribLocation(program, index, name_str.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-8382 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8382/ | CWE-119 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834 | c351b47ce85a3a147cfa801fa9f0149ab4160834 | null | static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(pcre) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_init(&pcre_globals->pcre_cache, 0, NULL, php_free_pcre_cache, 1);
pcre_globals->backtrack_limit = 0;
pcre_globals->recursion_limit = 0;
pcre_globals->error_code = PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR;
}
/* }}} */
| static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(pcre) /* {{{ */
{
zend_hash_init(&pcre_globals->pcre_cache, 0, NULL, php_free_pcre_cache, 1);
pcre_globals->backtrack_limit = 0;
pcre_globals->recursion_limit = 0;
pcre_globals->error_code = PHP_PCRE_NO_ERROR;
}
/* }}} */
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2018-18839 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18839/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/netdata/netdata/commit/92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca | 92327c9ec211bd1616315abcb255861b130b97ca | fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521) | inline uint32_t web_client_api_request_v1_data_google_format(char *name) {
uint32_t hash = simple_hash(name);
int i;
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name ; i++) {
if (unlikely(hash == api_v1_data_google_formats[i].hash && !strcmp(name, api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name))) {
return api_v1_data_google_formats[i].value;
}
}
return DATASOURCE_JSON;
}
| inline uint32_t web_client_api_request_v1_data_google_format(char *name) {
uint32_t hash = simple_hash(name);
int i;
for(i = 0; api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name ; i++) {
if (unlikely(hash == api_v1_data_google_formats[i].hash && !strcmp(name, api_v1_data_google_formats[i].name))) {
return api_v1_data_google_formats[i].value;
}
}
return DATASOURCE_JSON;
}
| C | netdata | 0 |
CVE-2010-2527 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2527/ | CWE-119 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2-demos.git/commit/?id=b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec | b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec | null | grid_status_init( GridStatus st,
FTDemo_Display* display )
{
st->scale = 1.0;
st->x_origin = display->bitmap->width / 4;
st->y_origin = display->bitmap->rows / 4;
st->margin = 0.05;
st->axis_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 0, 0, 0, 255 );
st->grid_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 192, 192, 192, 255 );
st->outline_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 255, 0, 0, 255 );
st->on_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 64, 64, 255, 255 );
st->conic_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 0, 128, 0, 255 );
st->cubic_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 255, 64, 255, 255 );
st->disp_width = display->bitmap->width;
st->disp_height = display->bitmap->rows;
st->disp_bitmap = display->bitmap;
st->do_horz_hints = 1;
st->do_vert_hints = 1;
st->do_blue_hints = 1;
st->do_dots = 1;
st->do_outline = 1;
st->Num = 0;
st->gamma = 1.0;
st->header = "";
}
| grid_status_init( GridStatus st,
FTDemo_Display* display )
{
st->scale = 1.0;
st->x_origin = display->bitmap->width / 4;
st->y_origin = display->bitmap->rows / 4;
st->margin = 0.05;
st->axis_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 0, 0, 0, 255 );
st->grid_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 192, 192, 192, 255 );
st->outline_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 255, 0, 0, 255 );
st->on_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 64, 64, 255, 255 );
st->conic_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 0, 128, 0, 255 );
st->cubic_color = grFindColor( display->bitmap, 255, 64, 255, 255 );
st->disp_width = display->bitmap->width;
st->disp_height = display->bitmap->rows;
st->disp_bitmap = display->bitmap;
st->do_horz_hints = 1;
st->do_vert_hints = 1;
st->do_blue_hints = 1;
st->do_dots = 1;
st->do_outline = 1;
st->Num = 0;
st->gamma = 1.0;
st->header = "";
}
| C | savannah | 0 |
CVE-2013-1826 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1826/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 | 864745d291b5ba80ea0bd0edcbe67273de368836 | xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static int copy_from_user_policy_type(u8 *tp, struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_POLICY_TYPE];
struct xfrm_userpolicy_type *upt;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
if (rt) {
upt = nla_data(rt);
type = upt->type;
}
err = verify_policy_type(type);
if (err)
return err;
*tp = type;
return 0;
}
| static int copy_from_user_policy_type(u8 *tp, struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_POLICY_TYPE];
struct xfrm_userpolicy_type *upt;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
if (rt) {
upt = nla_data(rt);
type = upt->type;
}
err = verify_policy_type(type);
if (err)
return err;
*tp = type;
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-7184 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7184/ | null | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df | f843ee6dd019bcece3e74e76ad9df0155655d0df | xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *p;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
struct km_event c;
int delete;
struct xfrm_mark m;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
delete = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
if (err)
return err;
if (p->index)
xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
else {
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs);
if (err)
return err;
ctx = NULL;
if (rt) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = nla_data(rt);
err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&ctx, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err)
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
ctx, delete, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
}
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (!delete) {
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
resp_skb = xfrm_policy_netlink(skb, xp, p->dir, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
} else {
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
c.data.byid = p->index;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, p->dir, &c);
}
out:
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
if (delete && err == 0)
xfrm_garbage_collect(net);
return err;
}
| static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct xfrm_userpolicy_id *p;
u8 type = XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN;
int err;
struct km_event c;
int delete;
struct xfrm_mark m;
u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
delete = nlh->nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
err = copy_from_user_policy_type(&type, attrs);
if (err)
return err;
err = verify_policy_dir(p->dir);
if (err)
return err;
if (p->index)
xp = xfrm_policy_byid(net, mark, type, p->dir, p->index, delete, &err);
else {
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs);
if (err)
return err;
ctx = NULL;
if (rt) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = nla_data(rt);
err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&ctx, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err)
return err;
}
xp = xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(net, mark, type, p->dir, &p->sel,
ctx, delete, &err);
security_xfrm_policy_free(ctx);
}
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
if (!delete) {
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
resp_skb = xfrm_policy_netlink(skb, xp, p->dir, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb,
NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
} else {
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(xp, err ? 0 : 1, true);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
c.data.byid = p->index;
c.event = nlh->nlmsg_type;
c.seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
c.portid = nlh->nlmsg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, p->dir, &c);
}
out:
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
if (delete && err == 0)
xfrm_garbage_collect(net);
return err;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2017-14604 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 | 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 | mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991 | mark_inode_as_seen (DeepCountState *state,
GFileInfo *info)
{
guint64 inode;
inode = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint64 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_INODE);
if (inode != 0)
{
g_array_append_val (state->seen_deep_count_inodes, inode);
}
}
| mark_inode_as_seen (DeepCountState *state,
GFileInfo *info)
{
guint64 inode;
inode = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint64 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_INODE);
if (inode != 0)
{
g_array_append_val (state->seen_deep_count_inodes, inode);
}
}
| C | nautilus | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9866ebc631655c593a2ac60a3c7cf7d217ccf5d | b9866ebc631655c593a2ac60a3c7cf7d217ccf5d | Use the lock when accessing the buffer object.
BUG=69195
TEST=play Z-Type for hours :)
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6157007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@71211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | scoped_refptr<AudioOutputController> AudioOutputController::CreateLowLatency(
EventHandler* event_handler,
AudioParameters params,
SyncReader* sync_reader) {
DCHECK(sync_reader);
if (!CheckParameters(params))
return NULL;
if (!AudioManager::GetAudioManager())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<AudioOutputController> controller(new AudioOutputController(
event_handler, 0, sync_reader));
controller->message_loop_ =
AudioManager::GetAudioManager()->GetMessageLoop();
controller->message_loop_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(controller.get(), &AudioOutputController::DoCreate,
params));
return controller;
}
| scoped_refptr<AudioOutputController> AudioOutputController::CreateLowLatency(
EventHandler* event_handler,
AudioParameters params,
SyncReader* sync_reader) {
DCHECK(sync_reader);
if (!CheckParameters(params))
return NULL;
if (!AudioManager::GetAudioManager())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<AudioOutputController> controller(new AudioOutputController(
event_handler, 0, sync_reader));
controller->message_loop_ =
AudioManager::GetAudioManager()->GetMessageLoop();
controller->message_loop_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableMethod(controller.get(), &AudioOutputController::DoCreate,
params));
return controller;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5204 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5204/ | CWE-79 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae | e1e67d5d341d82c61cab2c41ff4163f17caf14ae | Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870} | void MetricsWebContentsObserver::RenderProcessGone(
base::TerminationStatus status) {
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION ||
status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING) {
return;
}
if (committed_load_) {
committed_load_->NotifyPageEnd(END_RENDER_PROCESS_GONE,
UserInitiatedInfo::NotUserInitiated(),
base::TimeTicks::Now(), true);
}
committed_load_.reset();
aborted_provisional_loads_.clear();
}
| void MetricsWebContentsObserver::RenderProcessGone(
base::TerminationStatus status) {
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION ||
status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING) {
return;
}
if (committed_load_) {
committed_load_->NotifyPageEnd(END_RENDER_PROCESS_GONE,
UserInitiatedInfo::NotUserInitiated(),
base::TimeTicks::Now(), true);
}
committed_load_.reset();
aborted_provisional_loads_.clear();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2019-5837 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8 | 04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8 | Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719} | bool IsEvictableError(AppCacheUpdateJob::ResultType result,
const blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails& details) {
switch (result) {
case AppCacheUpdateJob::DB_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::DISKCACHE_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::QUOTA_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::NETWORK_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::CANCELLED_ERROR:
return false;
case AppCacheUpdateJob::REDIRECT_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::SERVER_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::SECURITY_ERROR:
return true;
case AppCacheUpdateJob::MANIFEST_ERROR:
return details.reason ==
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_SIGNATURE_ERROR;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
}
| bool IsEvictableError(AppCacheUpdateJob::ResultType result,
const blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails& details) {
switch (result) {
case AppCacheUpdateJob::DB_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::DISKCACHE_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::QUOTA_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::NETWORK_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::CANCELLED_ERROR:
return false;
case AppCacheUpdateJob::REDIRECT_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::SERVER_ERROR:
case AppCacheUpdateJob::SECURITY_ERROR:
return true;
case AppCacheUpdateJob::MANIFEST_ERROR:
return details.reason ==
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_SIGNATURE_ERROR;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-1091 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1091/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> | static int set_dac(struct task_struct *child, struct ppc_hw_breakpoint *bp_info)
{
int byte_enable =
(bp_info->condition_mode >> PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE_SHIFT)
& 0xf;
int condition_mode =
bp_info->condition_mode & PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_MODE;
int slot;
if (byte_enable && (condition_mode == 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (bp_info->addr >= TASK_SIZE)
return -EIO;
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W)) == 0) {
slot = 1;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC1R;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC1W;
child->thread.debug.dac1 = (unsigned long)bp_info->addr;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
if (byte_enable) {
child->thread.debug.dvc1 =
(unsigned long)bp_info->condition_value;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 |=
((byte_enable << DBCR2_DVC1BE_SHIFT) |
(condition_mode << DBCR2_DVC1M_SHIFT));
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
} else if (child->thread.debug.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE) {
/* Both dac1 and dac2 are part of a range */
return -ENOSPC;
#endif
} else if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W)) == 0) {
slot = 2;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC2R;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC2W;
child->thread.debug.dac2 = (unsigned long)bp_info->addr;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
if (byte_enable) {
child->thread.debug.dvc2 =
(unsigned long)bp_info->condition_value;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 |=
((byte_enable << DBCR2_DVC2BE_SHIFT) |
(condition_mode << DBCR2_DVC2M_SHIFT));
}
#endif
} else
return -ENOSPC;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IDM;
child->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
return slot + 4;
}
| static int set_dac(struct task_struct *child, struct ppc_hw_breakpoint *bp_info)
{
int byte_enable =
(bp_info->condition_mode >> PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_BE_SHIFT)
& 0xf;
int condition_mode =
bp_info->condition_mode & PPC_BREAKPOINT_CONDITION_MODE;
int slot;
if (byte_enable && (condition_mode == 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (bp_info->addr >= TASK_SIZE)
return -EIO;
if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC1R | DBCR_DAC1W)) == 0) {
slot = 1;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC1R;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC1W;
child->thread.debug.dac1 = (unsigned long)bp_info->addr;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
if (byte_enable) {
child->thread.debug.dvc1 =
(unsigned long)bp_info->condition_value;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 |=
((byte_enable << DBCR2_DVC1BE_SHIFT) |
(condition_mode << DBCR2_DVC1M_SHIFT));
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DAC_RANGE
} else if (child->thread.debug.dbcr2 & DBCR2_DAC12MODE) {
/* Both dac1 and dac2 are part of a range */
return -ENOSPC;
#endif
} else if ((dbcr_dac(child) & (DBCR_DAC2R | DBCR_DAC2W)) == 0) {
slot = 2;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_READ)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC2R;
if (bp_info->trigger_type & PPC_BREAKPOINT_TRIGGER_WRITE)
dbcr_dac(child) |= DBCR_DAC2W;
child->thread.debug.dac2 = (unsigned long)bp_info->addr;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_DVCS > 0
if (byte_enable) {
child->thread.debug.dvc2 =
(unsigned long)bp_info->condition_value;
child->thread.debug.dbcr2 |=
((byte_enable << DBCR2_DVC2BE_SHIFT) |
(condition_mode << DBCR2_DVC2M_SHIFT));
}
#endif
} else
return -ENOSPC;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 |= DBCR0_IDM;
child->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_DE;
return slot + 4;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-13405 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13405/ | CWE-269 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0fa3ecd87848c9c93c2c828ef4c3a8ca36ce46c7 | 0fa3ecd87848c9c93c2c828ef4c3a8ca36ce46c7 | Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | void __init inode_init(void)
{
/* inode slab cache */
inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("inode_cache",
sizeof(struct inode),
0,
(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
init_once);
/* Hash may have been set up in inode_init_early */
if (!hashdist)
return;
inode_hashtable =
alloc_large_system_hash("Inode-cache",
sizeof(struct hlist_head),
ihash_entries,
14,
HASH_ZERO,
&i_hash_shift,
&i_hash_mask,
0,
0);
}
| void __init inode_init(void)
{
/* inode slab cache */
inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("inode_cache",
sizeof(struct inode),
0,
(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
init_once);
/* Hash may have been set up in inode_init_early */
if (!hashdist)
return;
inode_hashtable =
alloc_large_system_hash("Inode-cache",
sizeof(struct hlist_head),
ihash_entries,
14,
HASH_ZERO,
&i_hash_shift,
&i_hash_mask,
0,
0);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-6096 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | 36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | void DOMWindow::close(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->IsMainFrame())
return;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
Document* active_document = nullptr;
if (incumbent_window) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
active_document = incumbent_window->document();
if (!active_document)
return;
if (!active_document->GetFrame() ||
!active_document->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*GetFrame()))
return;
}
Settings* settings = GetFrame()->GetSettings();
bool allow_scripts_to_close_windows =
settings && settings->GetAllowScriptsToCloseWindows();
if (!page->OpenedByDOM() && GetFrame()->Client()->BackForwardLength() > 1 &&
!allow_scripts_to_close_windows) {
if (active_document) {
active_document->domWindow()->GetFrameConsole()->AddMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
"Scripts may close only the windows that were opened by it."));
}
return;
}
if (!GetFrame()->ShouldClose())
return;
ExecutionContext* execution_context = nullptr;
if (IsLocalDOMWindow()) {
execution_context = blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(this)->GetExecutionContext();
}
probe::breakableLocation(execution_context, "DOMWindow.close");
page->CloseSoon();
window_is_closing_ = true;
}
| void DOMWindow::close(LocalDOMWindow* incumbent_window) {
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->IsMainFrame())
return;
Page* page = GetFrame()->GetPage();
if (!page)
return;
Document* active_document = nullptr;
if (incumbent_window) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
active_document = incumbent_window->document();
if (!active_document)
return;
if (!active_document->GetFrame() ||
!active_document->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*GetFrame()))
return;
}
Settings* settings = GetFrame()->GetSettings();
bool allow_scripts_to_close_windows =
settings && settings->GetAllowScriptsToCloseWindows();
if (!page->OpenedByDOM() && GetFrame()->Client()->BackForwardLength() > 1 &&
!allow_scripts_to_close_windows) {
if (active_document) {
active_document->domWindow()->GetFrameConsole()->AddMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
"Scripts may close only the windows that were opened by it."));
}
return;
}
if (!GetFrame()->ShouldClose())
return;
ExecutionContext* execution_context = nullptr;
if (IsLocalDOMWindow()) {
execution_context = blink::ToLocalDOMWindow(this)->GetExecutionContext();
}
probe::breakableLocation(execution_context, "DOMWindow.close");
page->CloseSoon();
window_is_closing_ = true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2011-4328 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4328/ | CWE-264 | https://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=gnash.git;a=commitdiff;h=fa481c116e65ccf9137c7ddc8abc3cf05dc12f55 | fa481c116e65ccf9137c7ddc8abc3cf05dc12f55 | null | nsPluginInstance::getDocumentProp(const std::string& propname) const
{
std::string rv;
if (!HasScripting()) {
LOG_ONCE( gnash::log_debug("Browser doesn't support scripting") );
return rv;
}
NPObject* windowobj;
NPError err = NPN_GetValue(_instance, NPNVWindowNPObject, &windowobj);
if (err != NPERR_NO_ERROR || !windowobj) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPObject> window_obj(windowobj, NPN_ReleaseObject);
NPIdentifier doc_id = NPN_GetStringIdentifier("document");
NPVariant docvar;
if(! NPN_GetProperty(_instance, windowobj, doc_id, &docvar) ) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPVariant> doc_var(&docvar, NPN_ReleaseVariantValue);
if (!NPVARIANT_IS_OBJECT(docvar)) {
return rv;
}
NPObject* doc_obj = NPVARIANT_TO_OBJECT(docvar);
NPIdentifier prop_id = NPN_GetStringIdentifier(propname.c_str());
NPVariant propvar;
if (!NPN_GetProperty(_instance, doc_obj, prop_id, &propvar)) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPVariant> prop_var(&propvar, NPN_ReleaseVariantValue);
if (!NPVARIANT_IS_STRING(propvar)) {
return rv;
}
const NPString& prop_str = NPVARIANT_TO_STRING(propvar);
rv = NPStringToString(prop_str);
return rv;
}
| nsPluginInstance::getDocumentProp(const std::string& propname) const
{
std::string rv;
if (!HasScripting()) {
LOG_ONCE( gnash::log_debug("Browser doesn't support scripting") );
return rv;
}
NPObject* windowobj;
NPError err = NPN_GetValue(_instance, NPNVWindowNPObject, &windowobj);
if (err != NPERR_NO_ERROR || !windowobj) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPObject> window_obj(windowobj, NPN_ReleaseObject);
NPIdentifier doc_id = NPN_GetStringIdentifier("document");
NPVariant docvar;
if(! NPN_GetProperty(_instance, windowobj, doc_id, &docvar) ) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPVariant> doc_var(&docvar, NPN_ReleaseVariantValue);
if (!NPVARIANT_IS_OBJECT(docvar)) {
return rv;
}
NPObject* doc_obj = NPVARIANT_TO_OBJECT(docvar);
NPIdentifier prop_id = NPN_GetStringIdentifier(propname.c_str());
NPVariant propvar;
if (!NPN_GetProperty(_instance, doc_obj, prop_id, &propvar)) {
return rv;
}
boost::shared_ptr<NPVariant> prop_var(&propvar, NPN_ReleaseVariantValue);
if (!NPVARIANT_IS_STRING(propvar)) {
return rv;
}
const NPString& prop_str = NPVARIANT_TO_STRING(propvar);
rv = NPStringToString(prop_str);
return rv;
}
| CPP | savannah | 0 |
CVE-2011-4112 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | isdn_net_findif(char *name)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = dev->netdev;
while (p) {
if (!strcmp(p->dev->name, name))
return p;
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
}
return (isdn_net_dev *) NULL;
}
| isdn_net_findif(char *name)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = dev->netdev;
while (p) {
if (!strcmp(p->dev->name, name))
return p;
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
}
return (isdn_net_dev *) NULL;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2 | fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2 | Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenChannelToPlugin(const GURL& url,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::wstring& locale,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
plugin_service_->OpenChannelToPlugin(
this, url, mime_type, locale, reply_msg);
}
| void ResourceMessageFilter::OnOpenChannelToPlugin(const GURL& url,
const std::string& mime_type,
const std::wstring& locale,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
plugin_service_->OpenChannelToPlugin(
this, url, mime_type, locale, reply_msg);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-18594 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18594/ | CWE-415 | https://github.com/nmap/nmap/commit/350bbe0597d37ad67abe5fef8fba984707b4e9ad | 350bbe0597d37ad67abe5fef8fba984707b4e9ad | Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails | static int l_read_publickey (lua_State *L) {
FILE *fd;
char c;
const char* publickeyfile = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
luaL_Buffer publickey_data;
fd = fopen(publickeyfile, "r");
if (!fd)
return luaL_error(L, "Error reading file");
luaL_buffinit(L, &publickey_data);
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
continue;
}
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
luaL_addchar(&publickey_data, c);
}
fclose(fd);
lua_getglobal(L, "require");
lua_pushstring(L, "base64");
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
lua_getfield(L, -1, "dec");
luaL_pushresult(&publickey_data);
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
return 1;
}
| static int l_read_publickey (lua_State *L) {
FILE *fd;
char c;
const char* publickeyfile = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
luaL_Buffer publickey_data;
fd = fopen(publickeyfile, "r");
if (!fd)
return luaL_error(L, "Error reading file");
luaL_buffinit(L, &publickey_data);
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
continue;
}
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
luaL_addchar(&publickey_data, c);
}
fclose(fd);
lua_getglobal(L, "require");
lua_pushstring(L, "base64");
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
lua_getfield(L, -1, "dec");
luaL_pushresult(&publickey_data);
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
return 1;
}
| C | nmap | 0 |
CVE-2011-4112 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | 550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162 | net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static void airo_networks_free(struct airo_info *ai)
{
kfree(ai->networks);
ai->networks = NULL;
}
| static void airo_networks_free(struct airo_info *ai)
{
kfree(ai->networks);
ai->networks = NULL;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2019-17541 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-17541/ | null | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/39f226a9c137f547e12afde972eeba7551124493 | 39f226a9c137f547e12afde972eeba7551124493 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641 | static Image *ReadJPEGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*dct_method,
*option;
ErrorManager
error_manager;
Image
*image;
JSAMPLE
*volatile jpeg_pixels;
JSAMPROW
scanline[1];
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
i;
struct jpeg_decompress_struct
jpeg_info;
struct jpeg_error_mgr
jpeg_error;
struct jpeg_progress_mgr
jpeg_progress;
register JSAMPLE
*p;
size_t
units;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a JPEG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 107)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Initialize JPEG parameters.
*/
(void) memset(&error_manager,0,sizeof(error_manager));
(void) memset(&jpeg_info,0,sizeof(jpeg_info));
(void) memset(&jpeg_error,0,sizeof(jpeg_error));
(void) memset(&jpeg_progress,0,sizeof(jpeg_progress));
jpeg_info.err=jpeg_std_error(&jpeg_error);
jpeg_info.err->emit_message=(void (*)(j_common_ptr,int)) JPEGWarningHandler;
jpeg_info.err->error_exit=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGErrorHandler;
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
error_manager.exception=exception;
error_manager.image=image;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (error_manager.profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
error_manager.profile=DestroyStringInfo(error_manager.profile);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
jpeg_info.client_data=(void *) &error_manager;
jpeg_create_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (GetMaxMemoryRequest() != ~0UL)
jpeg_info.mem->max_memory_to_use=(long) GetMaxMemoryRequest();
jpeg_progress.progress_monitor=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGProgressHandler;
jpeg_info.progress=(&jpeg_progress);
JPEGSourceManager(&jpeg_info,image);
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,JPEG_COM,ReadComment);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember("ICC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,ICC_MARKER,ReadICCProfile);
if (IsOptionMember("IPTC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,IPTC_MARKER,ReadIPTCProfile);
for (i=1; i < 16; i++)
if ((i != 2) && (i != 13) && (i != 14))
if (IsOptionMember("APP",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,(int) (JPEG_APP0+i),ReadProfile);
i=(ssize_t) jpeg_read_header(&jpeg_info,TRUE);
if ((image_info->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec601YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec709YCbCrColorspace))
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=0;
if ((jpeg_info.saw_JFIF_marker != 0) && (jpeg_info.X_density != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.Y_density != 1))
{
image->resolution.x=(double) jpeg_info.X_density;
image->resolution.y=(double) jpeg_info.Y_density;
units=(size_t) jpeg_info.density_unit;
}
if (units == 1)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == 2)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:size");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(jpeg_info.out_color_space != JCS_YCbCr))
{
double
scale_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
/*
Scale the image.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->magick_columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->magick_rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
scale_factor=1.0;
if (geometry_info.rho != 0.0)
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_width/geometry_info.rho;
if ((geometry_info.sigma != 0.0) &&
(scale_factor > (jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma)))
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma;
jpeg_info.scale_num=1U;
jpeg_info.scale_denom=(unsigned int) scale_factor;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Scale factor: %.20g",(double) scale_factor);
}
#if (JPEG_LIB_VERSION >= 61) && defined(D_PROGRESSIVE_SUPPORTED)
#if defined(D_LOSSLESS_SUPPORTED)
image->interlace=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_PROGRESSIVE ?
JPEGInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->compression=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_LOSSLESS ?
LosslessJPEGCompression : JPEGCompression;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"12-bit JPEG not supported. Reducing pixel data to 8 bits","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (jpeg_info.data_precision == 16)
jpeg_info.data_precision=12;
#else
image->interlace=jpeg_info.progressive_mode != 0 ? JPEGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#endif
#else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
image->interlace=JPEGInterlace;
#endif
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
/*
Let the JPEG library quantize the image.
*/
jpeg_info.quantize_colors=TRUE;
jpeg_info.desired_number_of_colors=(int) StringToUnsignedLong(option);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:block-smoothing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_block_smoothing=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
dct_method=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:dct-method");
if (dct_method != (const char *) NULL)
switch (*dct_method)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"default") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_DEFAULT;
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"fastest") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FASTEST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"float") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FLOAT;
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"ifast") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_IFAST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"islow") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_ISLOW;
break;
}
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:fancy-upsampling");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_fancy_upsampling=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
image->depth=(size_t) jpeg_info.data_precision;
switch (jpeg_info.out_color_space)
{
case JCS_RGB:
default:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_GRAYSCALE:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_YCbCr:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_CMYK:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
break;
}
}
if (IsITUFaxImage(image) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,StringToUnsignedLong(option),exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if ((jpeg_info.output_components == 1) && (jpeg_info.quantize_colors == 0))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->interlace != NoInterlace)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: progressive");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: nonprogressive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Data precision: %d",
(int) jpeg_info.data_precision);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %dx%d",
(int) jpeg_info.output_width,(int) jpeg_info.output_height);
}
JPEGSetImageQuality(&jpeg_info,image);
JPEGSetImageSamplingFactor(&jpeg_info,image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
jpeg_info.out_color_space);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:colorspace",value,exception);
#if defined(D_ARITH_CODING_SUPPORTED)
if (jpeg_info.arith_code == TRUE)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:coding","arithmetic",exception);
#endif
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) jpeg_start_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if ((jpeg_info.output_components != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.output_components != 3) && (jpeg_info.output_components != 4))
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
memory_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->columns,
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
jpeg_pixels=(JSAMPLE *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(memory_info);
(void) memset(jpeg_pixels,0,image->columns*
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
/*
Convert JPEG pixels to pixel packets.
*/
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
if (memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
if (jpeg_info.quantize_colors != 0)
{
image->colors=(size_t) jpeg_info.actual_number_of_colors;
if (jpeg_info.out_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].blue=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[1][i]);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[2][i]);
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
}
scanline[0]=(JSAMPROW) jpeg_pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
if (jpeg_read_scanlines(&jpeg_info,scanline,1) != 1)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"SkipToSyncByte","`%s'",image->filename);
continue;
}
p=jpeg_pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
{
unsigned short
scale;
scale=65535/(unsigned short) GetQuantumRange((size_t)
jpeg_info.data_precision);
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p));
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) GETJSAMPLE(*p);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_abort_decompress(&jpeg_info);
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
error_manager.finished=MagickTrue;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) == 0)
(void) jpeg_finish_decompress(&jpeg_info);
}
/*
Free jpeg resources.
*/
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| static Image *ReadJPEGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*dct_method,
*option;
ErrorManager
error_manager;
Image
*image;
JSAMPLE
*volatile jpeg_pixels;
JSAMPROW
scanline[1];
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
i;
struct jpeg_decompress_struct
jpeg_info;
struct jpeg_error_mgr
jpeg_error;
struct jpeg_progress_mgr
jpeg_progress;
register JSAMPLE
*p;
size_t
units;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a JPEG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 107)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Initialize JPEG parameters.
*/
(void) memset(&error_manager,0,sizeof(error_manager));
(void) memset(&jpeg_info,0,sizeof(jpeg_info));
(void) memset(&jpeg_error,0,sizeof(jpeg_error));
(void) memset(&jpeg_progress,0,sizeof(jpeg_progress));
jpeg_info.err=jpeg_std_error(&jpeg_error);
jpeg_info.err->emit_message=(void (*)(j_common_ptr,int)) JPEGWarningHandler;
jpeg_info.err->error_exit=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGErrorHandler;
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
error_manager.exception=exception;
error_manager.image=image;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (error_manager.profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
error_manager.profile=DestroyStringInfo(error_manager.profile);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
jpeg_info.client_data=(void *) &error_manager;
jpeg_create_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (GetMaxMemoryRequest() != ~0UL)
jpeg_info.mem->max_memory_to_use=(long) GetMaxMemoryRequest();
jpeg_progress.progress_monitor=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGProgressHandler;
jpeg_info.progress=(&jpeg_progress);
JPEGSourceManager(&jpeg_info,image);
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,JPEG_COM,ReadComment);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember("ICC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,ICC_MARKER,ReadICCProfile);
if (IsOptionMember("IPTC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,IPTC_MARKER,ReadIPTCProfile);
for (i=1; i < 16; i++)
if ((i != 2) && (i != 13) && (i != 14))
if (IsOptionMember("APP",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,(int) (JPEG_APP0+i),ReadProfile);
i=(ssize_t) jpeg_read_header(&jpeg_info,TRUE);
if ((image_info->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec601YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec709YCbCrColorspace))
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=0;
if ((jpeg_info.saw_JFIF_marker != 0) && (jpeg_info.X_density != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.Y_density != 1))
{
image->resolution.x=(double) jpeg_info.X_density;
image->resolution.y=(double) jpeg_info.Y_density;
units=(size_t) jpeg_info.density_unit;
}
if (units == 1)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == 2)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:size");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(jpeg_info.out_color_space != JCS_YCbCr))
{
double
scale_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
/*
Scale the image.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->magick_columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->magick_rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
scale_factor=1.0;
if (geometry_info.rho != 0.0)
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_width/geometry_info.rho;
if ((geometry_info.sigma != 0.0) &&
(scale_factor > (jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma)))
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma;
jpeg_info.scale_num=1U;
jpeg_info.scale_denom=(unsigned int) scale_factor;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Scale factor: %.20g",(double) scale_factor);
}
#if (JPEG_LIB_VERSION >= 61) && defined(D_PROGRESSIVE_SUPPORTED)
#if defined(D_LOSSLESS_SUPPORTED)
image->interlace=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_PROGRESSIVE ?
JPEGInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->compression=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_LOSSLESS ?
LosslessJPEGCompression : JPEGCompression;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"12-bit JPEG not supported. Reducing pixel data to 8 bits","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (jpeg_info.data_precision == 16)
jpeg_info.data_precision=12;
#else
image->interlace=jpeg_info.progressive_mode != 0 ? JPEGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#endif
#else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
image->interlace=JPEGInterlace;
#endif
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
/*
Let the JPEG library quantize the image.
*/
jpeg_info.quantize_colors=TRUE;
jpeg_info.desired_number_of_colors=(int) StringToUnsignedLong(option);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:block-smoothing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_block_smoothing=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
dct_method=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:dct-method");
if (dct_method != (const char *) NULL)
switch (*dct_method)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"default") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_DEFAULT;
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"fastest") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FASTEST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"float") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FLOAT;
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"ifast") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_IFAST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"islow") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_ISLOW;
break;
}
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:fancy-upsampling");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_fancy_upsampling=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
image->depth=(size_t) jpeg_info.data_precision;
switch (jpeg_info.out_color_space)
{
case JCS_RGB:
default:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_GRAYSCALE:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_YCbCr:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_CMYK:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
break;
}
}
if (IsITUFaxImage(image) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,StringToUnsignedLong(option),exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if ((jpeg_info.output_components == 1) && (jpeg_info.quantize_colors == 0))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->interlace != NoInterlace)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: progressive");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: nonprogressive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Data precision: %d",
(int) jpeg_info.data_precision);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %dx%d",
(int) jpeg_info.output_width,(int) jpeg_info.output_height);
}
JPEGSetImageQuality(&jpeg_info,image);
JPEGSetImageSamplingFactor(&jpeg_info,image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
jpeg_info.out_color_space);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:colorspace",value,exception);
#if defined(D_ARITH_CODING_SUPPORTED)
if (jpeg_info.arith_code == TRUE)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:coding","arithmetic",exception);
#endif
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) jpeg_start_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if ((jpeg_info.output_components != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.output_components != 3) && (jpeg_info.output_components != 4))
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
memory_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->columns,
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
jpeg_pixels=(JSAMPLE *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(memory_info);
(void) memset(jpeg_pixels,0,image->columns*
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
/*
Convert JPEG pixels to pixel packets.
*/
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
if (memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
if (jpeg_info.quantize_colors != 0)
{
image->colors=(size_t) jpeg_info.actual_number_of_colors;
if (jpeg_info.out_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].blue=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[1][i]);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[2][i]);
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
}
scanline[0]=(JSAMPROW) jpeg_pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
if (jpeg_read_scanlines(&jpeg_info,scanline,1) != 1)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"SkipToSyncByte","`%s'",image->filename);
continue;
}
p=jpeg_pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
{
unsigned short
scale;
scale=65535/(unsigned short) GetQuantumRange((size_t)
jpeg_info.data_precision);
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p));
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) GETJSAMPLE(*p);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_abort_decompress(&jpeg_info);
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
error_manager.finished=MagickTrue;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) == 0)
(void) jpeg_finish_decompress(&jpeg_info);
}
/*
Free jpeg resources.
*/
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
CVE-2012-2875 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb | 1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb | Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void RootWindow::ReleaseCapture(Window* window) {
if (capture_window_ != window)
return;
SetCapture(NULL);
}
| void RootWindow::ReleaseCapture(Window* window) {
if (capture_window_ != window)
return;
SetCapture(NULL);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5158 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5158/ | CWE-190 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a310d99a741f9ba5e4e537c5ec49d3adbe5876f | 6a310d99a741f9ba5e4e537c5ec49d3adbe5876f | Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890} | bool IsNewNode(const AXNode* node) {
return new_nodes.find(node) != new_nodes.end();
}
| bool IsNewNode(const AXNode* node) {
return new_nodes.find(node) != new_nodes.end();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-10066 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6 | null | static MagickBooleanType IsEMF(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 48)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick+40,"\040\105\115\106\000\000\001\000",8) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
| static MagickBooleanType IsEMF(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 48)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick+40,"\040\105\115\106\000\000\001\000",8) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
| C | ImageMagick | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b | 961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b | Extract generation logic from the accessory controller into a separate one
This change adds a controller that is responsible for mediating
communication between ChromePasswordManagerClient and
PasswordAccessoryController for password generation. It is also
responsible for managing the modal dialog used to present the generated
password.
In the future it will make it easier to add manual generation to the
password accessory.
Bug: 845458
Change-Id: I0adbb2de9b9f5012745ae3963154f7d3247b3051
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1448181
Commit-Queue: Ioana Pandele <ioanap@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Friedrich [CET] <fhorschig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629542} | void ChromePasswordManagerClient::LogPasswordReuseDetectedEvent() {
safe_browsing::PasswordProtectionService* pps =
GetPasswordProtectionService();
if (pps) {
pps->MaybeLogPasswordReuseDetectedEvent(web_contents());
}
}
| void ChromePasswordManagerClient::LogPasswordReuseDetectedEvent() {
safe_browsing::PasswordProtectionService* pps =
GetPasswordProtectionService();
if (pps) {
pps->MaybeLogPasswordReuseDetectedEvent(web_contents());
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2015-6575 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6575/ | CWE-189 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/cf1581c66c2ad8c5b1aaca2e43e350cf5974f46d | cf1581c66c2ad8c5b1aaca2e43e350cf5974f46d | Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
| status_t SampleTable::getMaxSampleSize(size_t *max_size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
*max_size = 0;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumSampleSizes; ++i) {
size_t sample_size;
status_t err = getSampleSize_l(i, &sample_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (sample_size > *max_size) {
*max_size = sample_size;
}
}
return OK;
}
| status_t SampleTable::getMaxSampleSize(size_t *max_size) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
*max_size = 0;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumSampleSizes; ++i) {
size_t sample_size;
status_t err = getSampleSize_l(i, &sample_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (sample_size > *max_size) {
*max_size = sample_size;
}
}
return OK;
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2018-6096 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/ | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | 36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51 | If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790} | void HandleChromeDebugURL(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(IsRendererDebugURL(url) && !url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme));
if (url == kChromeUIBadCastCrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally crashing (with bad cast)"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
internal::BadCastCrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == kChromeUICrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally crashing (with null pointer dereference)"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
internal::CrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == kChromeUIDumpURL) {
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
} else if (url == kChromeUIKillURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally issuing kill signal to current process"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
base::Process::Current().Terminate(1, false);
} else if (url == kChromeUIHangURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally hanging ourselves with sleep infinite loop"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
for (;;) {
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1));
}
} else if (url == kChromeUIShorthangURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally sleeping renderer for 20 seconds"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(20));
} else if (url == kChromeUIMemoryExhaustURL) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "Intentionally exhausting renderer memory because user navigated to "
<< url.spec();
ExhaustMemory();
} else if (url == kChromeUICheckCrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally causing CHECK because user navigated to "
<< url.spec();
CHECK(false);
}
#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(SYZYASAN)
MaybeTriggerAsanError(url);
#endif // ADDRESS_SANITIZER || SYZYASAN
}
| void HandleChromeDebugURL(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(IsRendererDebugURL(url) && !url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme));
if (url == kChromeUIBadCastCrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally crashing (with bad cast)"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
internal::BadCastCrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == kChromeUICrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally crashing (with null pointer dereference)"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
internal::CrashIntentionally();
} else if (url == kChromeUIDumpURL) {
base::debug::DumpWithoutCrashing();
} else if (url == kChromeUIKillURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally issuing kill signal to current process"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
base::Process::Current().Terminate(1, false);
} else if (url == kChromeUIHangURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally hanging ourselves with sleep infinite loop"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
for (;;) {
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(1));
}
} else if (url == kChromeUIShorthangURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally sleeping renderer for 20 seconds"
<< " because user navigated to " << url.spec();
base::PlatformThread::Sleep(base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(20));
} else if (url == kChromeUIMemoryExhaustURL) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "Intentionally exhausting renderer memory because user navigated to "
<< url.spec();
ExhaustMemory();
} else if (url == kChromeUICheckCrashURL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Intentionally causing CHECK because user navigated to "
<< url.spec();
CHECK(false);
}
#if defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(SYZYASAN)
MaybeTriggerAsanError(url);
#endif // ADDRESS_SANITIZER || SYZYASAN
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-2874 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2874/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e | c0da7c1c6e9ffe5006e146b6426f987238d4bf2e | DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(content::WebContents* contents) {
DevToolsWindow* window =
DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedRenderViewHost(
contents->GetRenderViewHost());
if (!window || window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_)
return false;
window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_ = true;
if (!DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(window->web_contents())) {
window->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
}
return true;
}
| bool DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(content::WebContents* contents) {
DevToolsWindow* window =
DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedRenderViewHost(
contents->GetRenderViewHost());
if (!window || window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_)
return false;
window->intercepted_page_beforeunload_ = true;
if (!DevToolsWindow::InterceptPageBeforeUnload(window->web_contents())) {
window->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
}
return true;
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-13006 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) | GF_Err trak_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackBox *p;
p = (GF_TrackBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->Header) {
gf_isom_box_dump(p->Header, trace);
} else if (p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<!--INVALID FILE: Missing Track Header-->\n");
}
if (p->References) gf_isom_box_dump(p->References, trace);
if (p->meta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->meta, trace);
if (p->editBox) gf_isom_box_dump(p->editBox, trace);
if (p->Media) gf_isom_box_dump(p->Media, trace);
if (p->groups) gf_isom_box_dump(p->groups, trace);
if (p->udta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->udta, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
| GF_Err trak_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackBox *p;
p = (GF_TrackBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->Header) {
gf_isom_box_dump(p->Header, trace);
} else if (p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<!--INVALID FILE: Missing Track Header-->\n");
}
if (p->References) gf_isom_box_dump(p->References, trace);
if (p->meta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->meta, trace);
if (p->editBox) gf_isom_box_dump(p->editBox, trace);
if (p->Media) gf_isom_box_dump(p->Media, trace);
if (p->groups) gf_isom_box_dump(p->groups, trace);
if (p->udta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->udta, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
| C | gpac | 0 |
CVE-2013-4130 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4130/ | CWE-399 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | 53488f0275d6c8a121af49f7ac817d09ce68090d | null | uint32_t red_channel_sum_pipes_size(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
uint32_t sum = 0;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
sum += rcc->pipe_size;
}
return sum;
}
| uint32_t red_channel_sum_pipes_size(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RedChannelClient *rcc;
uint32_t sum = 0;
RING_FOREACH(link, &channel->clients) {
rcc = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link);
sum += rcc->pipe_size;
}
return sum;
}
| C | spice | 0 |
CVE-2016-1618 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1618/ | CWE-310 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d | 0d151e09e13a704e9738ea913d117df7282e6c7d | Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229} | void BlinkMediaTestSuite::Initialize() {
base::TestSuite::Initialize();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ui::gl::android::RegisterJni(env);
media::RegisterJni(env);
#endif
media::InitializeMediaLibrary();
#ifdef V8_USE_EXTERNAL_STARTUP_DATA
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Snapshot();
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Natives();
#endif
scoped_ptr<base::MessageLoop> message_loop;
if (!base::MessageLoop::current())
message_loop.reset(new base::MessageLoop());
blink::initialize(blink_platform_support_.get());
}
| void BlinkMediaTestSuite::Initialize() {
base::TestSuite::Initialize();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ui::gl::android::RegisterJni(env);
media::RegisterJni(env);
#endif
media::InitializeMediaLibrary();
#ifdef V8_USE_EXTERNAL_STARTUP_DATA
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Snapshot();
gin::V8Initializer::LoadV8Natives();
#endif
scoped_ptr<base::MessageLoop> message_loop;
if (!base::MessageLoop::current())
message_loop.reset(new base::MessageLoop());
blink::initialize(blink_platform_support_.get());
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-5060 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5060/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/08cb718ba7c3961c1006176c9faba0a5841ec792 | 08cb718ba7c3961c1006176c9faba0a5841ec792 | Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226} | bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
bool is_tld_ascii,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length)),
is_tld_ascii))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
| bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length))))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
| C | Chrome | 1 |
CVE-2018-19044 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19044/ | CWE-59 | https://github.com/acassen/keepalived/commit/04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306 | 04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306 | When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk> | vrrp_dont_track_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->dont_track_primary = true;
}
| vrrp_dont_track_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->dont_track_primary = true;
}
| C | keepalived | 0 |
CVE-2012-5155 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5155/ | CWE-264 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d7717faeaef5b72434632c95c78bee4883e2573 | 0d7717faeaef5b72434632c95c78bee4883e2573 | Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | virtual ~FullscreenTestBrowserWindow() {}
| virtual ~FullscreenTestBrowserWindow() {}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-5696 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5696/ | CWE-200 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 | 75ff39ccc1bd5d3c455b6822ab09e533c551f758 | tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
const __be32 *ptr = (const __be32 *)(th + 1);
if (*ptr == htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16)
| (TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP)) {
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 1;
++ptr;
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval = ntohl(*ptr);
++ptr;
if (*ptr)
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = ntohl(*ptr) - tp->tsoffset;
else
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
| static bool tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
const __be32 *ptr = (const __be32 *)(th + 1);
if (*ptr == htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16)
| (TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP)) {
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 1;
++ptr;
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval = ntohl(*ptr);
++ptr;
if (*ptr)
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = ntohl(*ptr) - tp->tsoffset;
else
tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsecr = 0;
return true;
}
return false;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2018-20067 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/ | CWE-254 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044 | Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823} | void WebContentsImpl::CollapseSelection() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->CollapseSelection();
}
| void WebContentsImpl::CollapseSelection() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->CollapseSelection();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f | 610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f | Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
R=kinuko@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool db_disabled() const { return db_disabled_; }
| bool db_disabled() const { return db_disabled_; }
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965 | 7cb8e1ae121cf6b14aa0a59cc708de630c0ef965 | Move variations prefs into the variations component
These prefs are used by variations code that is targeted for componentization.
BUG=382865
TBR=thakis
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1265423003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#343661} | void MasterPreferences::InitializeFromCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(installer::switches::kInstallerData)) {
base::FilePath prefs_path(cmd_line.GetSwitchValuePath(
installer::switches::kInstallerData));
InitializeFromFilePath(prefs_path);
} else {
master_dictionary_.reset(new base::DictionaryValue());
}
DCHECK(master_dictionary_.get());
static const struct CmdLineSwitchToDistributionSwitch {
const char* cmd_line_switch;
const char* distribution_switch;
} translate_switches[] = {
{ installer::switches::kAutoLaunchChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kAutoLaunchChrome },
{ installer::switches::kChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kChrome },
{ installer::switches::kDisableLogging,
installer::master_preferences::kDisableLogging },
{ installer::switches::kMsi,
installer::master_preferences::kMsi },
{ installer::switches::kMultiInstall,
installer::master_preferences::kMultiInstall },
{ installer::switches::kDoNotRegisterForUpdateLaunch,
installer::master_preferences::kDoNotRegisterForUpdateLaunch },
{ installer::switches::kDoNotLaunchChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kDoNotLaunchChrome },
{ installer::switches::kMakeChromeDefault,
installer::master_preferences::kMakeChromeDefault },
{ installer::switches::kSystemLevel,
installer::master_preferences::kSystemLevel },
{ installer::switches::kVerboseLogging,
installer::master_preferences::kVerboseLogging },
};
std::string name(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(translate_switches); ++i) {
if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(translate_switches[i].cmd_line_switch)) {
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(translate_switches[i].distribution_switch);
master_dictionary_->SetBoolean(name, true);
}
}
std::wstring str_value(cmd_line.GetSwitchValueNative(
installer::switches::kLogFile));
if (!str_value.empty()) {
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(installer::master_preferences::kLogFile);
master_dictionary_->SetString(name, str_value);
}
scoped_ptr<base::Environment> env(base::Environment::Create());
if (env != NULL) {
std::string is_machine_var;
env->GetVar(env_vars::kGoogleUpdateIsMachineEnvVar, &is_machine_var);
if (!is_machine_var.empty() && is_machine_var[0] == '1') {
VLOG(1) << "Taking system-level from environment.";
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(installer::master_preferences::kSystemLevel);
master_dictionary_->SetBoolean(name, true);
}
}
master_dictionary_->GetDictionary(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict,
&distribution_);
InitializeProductFlags();
#endif
}
| void MasterPreferences::InitializeFromCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& cmd_line) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(installer::switches::kInstallerData)) {
base::FilePath prefs_path(cmd_line.GetSwitchValuePath(
installer::switches::kInstallerData));
InitializeFromFilePath(prefs_path);
} else {
master_dictionary_.reset(new base::DictionaryValue());
}
DCHECK(master_dictionary_.get());
static const struct CmdLineSwitchToDistributionSwitch {
const char* cmd_line_switch;
const char* distribution_switch;
} translate_switches[] = {
{ installer::switches::kAutoLaunchChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kAutoLaunchChrome },
{ installer::switches::kChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kChrome },
{ installer::switches::kDisableLogging,
installer::master_preferences::kDisableLogging },
{ installer::switches::kMsi,
installer::master_preferences::kMsi },
{ installer::switches::kMultiInstall,
installer::master_preferences::kMultiInstall },
{ installer::switches::kDoNotRegisterForUpdateLaunch,
installer::master_preferences::kDoNotRegisterForUpdateLaunch },
{ installer::switches::kDoNotLaunchChrome,
installer::master_preferences::kDoNotLaunchChrome },
{ installer::switches::kMakeChromeDefault,
installer::master_preferences::kMakeChromeDefault },
{ installer::switches::kSystemLevel,
installer::master_preferences::kSystemLevel },
{ installer::switches::kVerboseLogging,
installer::master_preferences::kVerboseLogging },
};
std::string name(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
for (int i = 0; i < arraysize(translate_switches); ++i) {
if (cmd_line.HasSwitch(translate_switches[i].cmd_line_switch)) {
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(translate_switches[i].distribution_switch);
master_dictionary_->SetBoolean(name, true);
}
}
std::wstring str_value(cmd_line.GetSwitchValueNative(
installer::switches::kLogFile));
if (!str_value.empty()) {
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(installer::master_preferences::kLogFile);
master_dictionary_->SetString(name, str_value);
}
scoped_ptr<base::Environment> env(base::Environment::Create());
if (env != NULL) {
std::string is_machine_var;
env->GetVar(env_vars::kGoogleUpdateIsMachineEnvVar, &is_machine_var);
if (!is_machine_var.empty() && is_machine_var[0] == '1') {
VLOG(1) << "Taking system-level from environment.";
name.assign(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict);
name.append(".").append(installer::master_preferences::kSystemLevel);
master_dictionary_->SetBoolean(name, true);
}
}
master_dictionary_->GetDictionary(installer::master_preferences::kDistroDict,
&distribution_);
InitializeProductFlags();
#endif
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2012-6712 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-6712/ | CWE-119 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4 | 2da424b0773cea3db47e1e81db71eeebde8269d4 | iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> | static u8 iwlagn_key_sta_id(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
struct iwl_vif_priv *vif_priv = (void *)vif->drv_priv;
u8 sta_id = IWL_INVALID_STATION;
if (sta)
sta_id = iwl_sta_id(sta);
/*
* The device expects GTKs for station interfaces to be
* installed as GTKs for the AP station. If we have no
* station ID, then use the ap_sta_id in that case.
*/
if (!sta && vif && vif_priv->ctx) {
switch (vif->type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
sta_id = vif_priv->ctx->ap_sta_id;
break;
default:
/*
* In all other cases, the key will be
* used either for TX only or is bound
* to a station already.
*/
break;
}
}
return sta_id;
}
| static u8 iwlagn_key_sta_id(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
struct iwl_vif_priv *vif_priv = (void *)vif->drv_priv;
u8 sta_id = IWL_INVALID_STATION;
if (sta)
sta_id = iwl_sta_id(sta);
/*
* The device expects GTKs for station interfaces to be
* installed as GTKs for the AP station. If we have no
* station ID, then use the ap_sta_id in that case.
*/
if (!sta && vif && vif_priv->ctx) {
switch (vif->type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
sta_id = vif_priv->ctx->ap_sta_id;
break;
default:
/*
* In all other cases, the key will be
* used either for TX only or is bound
* to a station already.
*/
break;
}
}
return sta_id;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-2902 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2902/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c | 87a082c5137a63dedb3fe5b1f48f75dcd1fd780c | Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | bool LayerTreeHost::ScheduleMicroBenchmark(
const std::string& benchmark_name,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> value,
const MicroBenchmark::DoneCallback& callback) {
return micro_benchmark_controller_.ScheduleRun(
benchmark_name, value.Pass(), callback);
}
| bool LayerTreeHost::ScheduleMicroBenchmark(
const std::string& benchmark_name,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> value,
const MicroBenchmark::DoneCallback& callback) {
return micro_benchmark_controller_.ScheduleRun(
benchmark_name, value.Pass(), callback);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2013-1848 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1848/ | CWE-20 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc | 8d0c2d10dd72c5292eda7a06231056a4c972e4cc | ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> | void ext3_error(struct super_block *sb, const char *function,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT3-fs error (device %s): %s: %pV\n",
sb->s_id, function, &vaf);
va_end(args);
ext3_handle_error(sb);
}
| void ext3_error(struct super_block *sb, const char *function,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT3-fs error (device %s): %s: %pV\n",
sb->s_id, function, &vaf);
va_end(args);
ext3_handle_error(sb);
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2011-2918 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> | static inline bool kernel_ip(unsigned long ip)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
return ip > PAGE_OFFSET;
#else
return (long)ip < 0;
#endif
}
| static inline bool kernel_ip(unsigned long ip)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
return ip > PAGE_OFFSET;
#else
return (long)ip < 0;
#endif
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2016-2449 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2449/ | CWE-264 | https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353 | Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
| void Camera3Device::sProcessCaptureResult(const camera3_callback_ops *cb,
const camera3_capture_result *result) {
Camera3Device *d =
const_cast<Camera3Device*>(static_cast<const Camera3Device*>(cb));
d->processCaptureResult(result);
}
| void Camera3Device::sProcessCaptureResult(const camera3_callback_ops *cb,
const camera3_capture_result *result) {
Camera3Device *d =
const_cast<Camera3Device*>(static_cast<const Camera3Device*>(cb));
d->processCaptureResult(result);
}
| C | Android | 0 |
CVE-2018-1066 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1066/ | CWE-476 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb | cabfb3680f78981d26c078a26e5c748531257ebb | CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> | SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req;
struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = NULL;
unsigned char *ntlmssp_blob = NULL;
bool use_spnego = false; /* else use raw ntlmssp */
u16 blob_length = 0;
rc = SMB2_sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
req = (struct smb2_sess_setup_req *) sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
req->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&ntlmssp_blob, &blob_length, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "build_ntlmssp_auth_blob failed %d\n", rc);
goto out;
}
if (use_spnego) {
/* BB eventually need to add this */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "spnego not supported for SMB2 yet\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = ntlmssp_blob;
sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = blob_length;
rc = SMB2_sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
rsp = (struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
ses->Suid = rsp->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId;
ses->session_flags = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SessionFlags);
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "SMB3 encryption not supported yet\n");
rc = SMB2_sess_establish_session(sess_data);
out:
kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
SMB2_sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
sess_data->result = rc;
sess_data->func = NULL;
}
| SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req;
struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = NULL;
unsigned char *ntlmssp_blob = NULL;
bool use_spnego = false; /* else use raw ntlmssp */
u16 blob_length = 0;
rc = SMB2_sess_alloc_buffer(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
req = (struct smb2_sess_setup_req *) sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
req->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId = ses->Suid;
rc = build_ntlmssp_auth_blob(&ntlmssp_blob, &blob_length, ses,
sess_data->nls_cp);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "build_ntlmssp_auth_blob failed %d\n", rc);
goto out;
}
if (use_spnego) {
/* BB eventually need to add this */
cifs_dbg(VFS, "spnego not supported for SMB2 yet\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
sess_data->iov[1].iov_base = ntlmssp_blob;
sess_data->iov[1].iov_len = blob_length;
rc = SMB2_sess_sendreceive(sess_data);
if (rc)
goto out;
rsp = (struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *)sess_data->iov[0].iov_base;
ses->Suid = rsp->hdr.sync_hdr.SessionId;
ses->session_flags = le16_to_cpu(rsp->SessionFlags);
if (ses->session_flags & SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_ENCRYPT_DATA)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "SMB3 encryption not supported yet\n");
rc = SMB2_sess_establish_session(sess_data);
out:
kfree(ntlmssp_blob);
SMB2_sess_free_buffer(sess_data);
kfree(ses->ntlmssp);
ses->ntlmssp = NULL;
sess_data->result = rc;
sess_data->func = NULL;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2019-14284 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14284/ | CWE-369 | https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3554aeb991214cbfafd17d55e2bfddb50282e32 | f3554aeb991214cbfafd17d55e2bfddb50282e32 | floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | static int raw_cmd_copyin(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd **rcmd)
{
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr;
int ret;
int i;
*rcmd = NULL;
loop:
ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
*rcmd = ptr;
ret = copy_from_user(ptr, param, sizeof(*ptr));
ptr->next = NULL;
ptr->buffer_length = 0;
ptr->kernel_data = NULL;
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if (ptr->cmd_count > 33)
/* the command may now also take up the space
* initially intended for the reply & the
* reply count. Needed for long 82078 commands
* such as RESTORE, which takes ... 17 command
* bytes. Murphy's law #137: When you reserve
* 16 bytes for a structure, you'll one day
* discover that you really need 17...
*/
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
ptr->reply[i] = 0;
ptr->resultcode = 0;
if (ptr->flags & (FD_RAW_READ | FD_RAW_WRITE)) {
if (ptr->length <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ptr->kernel_data = (char *)fd_dma_mem_alloc(ptr->length);
fallback_on_nodma_alloc(&ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (!ptr->kernel_data)
return -ENOMEM;
ptr->buffer_length = ptr->length;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_WRITE) {
ret = fd_copyin(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_MORE) {
rcmd = &(ptr->next);
ptr->rate &= 0x43;
goto loop;
}
return 0;
}
| static int raw_cmd_copyin(int cmd, void __user *param,
struct floppy_raw_cmd **rcmd)
{
struct floppy_raw_cmd *ptr;
int ret;
int i;
*rcmd = NULL;
loop:
ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ptr)
return -ENOMEM;
*rcmd = ptr;
ret = copy_from_user(ptr, param, sizeof(*ptr));
ptr->next = NULL;
ptr->buffer_length = 0;
ptr->kernel_data = NULL;
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
param += sizeof(struct floppy_raw_cmd);
if (ptr->cmd_count > 33)
/* the command may now also take up the space
* initially intended for the reply & the
* reply count. Needed for long 82078 commands
* such as RESTORE, which takes ... 17 command
* bytes. Murphy's law #137: When you reserve
* 16 bytes for a structure, you'll one day
* discover that you really need 17...
*/
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
ptr->reply[i] = 0;
ptr->resultcode = 0;
if (ptr->flags & (FD_RAW_READ | FD_RAW_WRITE)) {
if (ptr->length <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
ptr->kernel_data = (char *)fd_dma_mem_alloc(ptr->length);
fallback_on_nodma_alloc(&ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (!ptr->kernel_data)
return -ENOMEM;
ptr->buffer_length = ptr->length;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_WRITE) {
ret = fd_copyin(ptr->data, ptr->kernel_data, ptr->length);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (ptr->flags & FD_RAW_MORE) {
rcmd = &(ptr->next);
ptr->rate &= 0x43;
goto loop;
}
return 0;
}
| C | linux | 0 |
CVE-2013-0839 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/ | CWE-399 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178 | dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178 | Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void GDataFileSystem::OnGetCacheFilePathCompleteForCloseFile(
const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& local_cache_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::PlatformFileInfo* file_info = new base::PlatformFileInfo;
bool* get_file_info_result = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetFileInfoOnBlockingPool,
local_cache_path,
base::Unretained(file_info),
base::Unretained(get_file_info_result)),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetModifiedFileInfoCompleteForCloseFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
base::Owned(file_info),
base::Owned(get_file_info_result),
callback));
}
| void GDataFileSystem::OnGetCacheFilePathCompleteForCloseFile(
const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const FilePath& local_cache_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
base::PlatformFileInfo* file_info = new base::PlatformFileInfo;
bool* get_file_info_result = new bool(false);
util::PostBlockingPoolSequencedTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
blocking_task_runner_,
base::Bind(&GetFileInfoOnBlockingPool,
local_cache_path,
base::Unretained(file_info),
base::Unretained(get_file_info_result)),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetModifiedFileInfoCompleteForCloseFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
base::Owned(file_info),
base::Owned(get_file_info_result),
callback));
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9 | 3b7ff00418c0e7593d42e5648ba39397e23fe2f9 | sync: ensure sync init path doesn't block on CheckTime
The call to RequestEarlyExit (which calls Abort) only happens if the SyncBackendHost has received the initialization callback from the SyncManager. But during init, the SyncManager could make a call to CheckTime, meaning that call would never be aborted. This patch makes sure to cover that case.
BUG=93829
TEST=None at the moment :(
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7862011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100543 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void SyncBackendHost::Core::SaveChanges() {
sync_manager_->SaveChanges();
}
| void SyncBackendHost::Core::SaveChanges() {
sync_manager_->SaveChanges();
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244 | 1da0daecc540238cb473f0d6322da51d3a544244 | Change VideoDecoder::ReadCB to take const scoped_refptr<VideoFrame>&.
BUG=none
TEST=media_unittests, media layout tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10559074
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143192 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void VideoRendererBase::Initialize(const scoped_refptr<VideoDecoder>& decoder,
const PipelineStatusCB& status_cb,
const StatisticsCB& statistics_cb,
const TimeCB& time_cb) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
DCHECK(decoder);
DCHECK(!status_cb.is_null());
DCHECK(!statistics_cb.is_null());
DCHECK(!time_cb.is_null());
DCHECK_EQ(kUninitialized, state_);
decoder_ = decoder;
statistics_cb_ = statistics_cb;
time_cb_ = time_cb;
host()->SetNaturalVideoSize(decoder_->natural_size());
state_ = kFlushed;
set_opaque_cb_.Run(!decoder->HasAlpha());
set_opaque_cb_.Reset();
if (!base::PlatformThread::Create(0, this, &thread_)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Video thread creation failed";
state_ = kError;
status_cb.Run(PIPELINE_ERROR_INITIALIZATION_FAILED);
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
::SetThreadPriority(thread_, THREAD_PRIORITY_ABOVE_NORMAL);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
status_cb.Run(PIPELINE_OK);
}
| void VideoRendererBase::Initialize(const scoped_refptr<VideoDecoder>& decoder,
const PipelineStatusCB& status_cb,
const StatisticsCB& statistics_cb,
const TimeCB& time_cb) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
DCHECK(decoder);
DCHECK(!status_cb.is_null());
DCHECK(!statistics_cb.is_null());
DCHECK(!time_cb.is_null());
DCHECK_EQ(kUninitialized, state_);
decoder_ = decoder;
statistics_cb_ = statistics_cb;
time_cb_ = time_cb;
host()->SetNaturalVideoSize(decoder_->natural_size());
state_ = kFlushed;
set_opaque_cb_.Run(!decoder->HasAlpha());
set_opaque_cb_.Reset();
if (!base::PlatformThread::Create(0, this, &thread_)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Video thread creation failed";
state_ = kError;
status_cb.Run(PIPELINE_ERROR_INITIALIZATION_FAILED);
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
::SetThreadPriority(thread_, THREAD_PRIORITY_ABOVE_NORMAL);
#endif // defined(OS_WIN)
status_cb.Run(PIPELINE_OK);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2016-10749 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10749/ | CWE-125 | https://github.com/DaveGamble/cJSON/commit/94df772485c92866ca417d92137747b2e3b0a917 | 94df772485c92866ca417d92137747b2e3b0a917 | fix buffer overflow (#30) | static cJSON *cJSON_New_Item(void)
{
cJSON* node = (cJSON*)cJSON_malloc(sizeof(cJSON));
if (node) memset(node,0,sizeof(cJSON));
return node;
}
| static cJSON *cJSON_New_Item(void)
{
cJSON* node = (cJSON*)cJSON_malloc(sizeof(cJSON));
if (node) memset(node,0,sizeof(cJSON));
return node;
}
| C | cJSON | 0 |
CVE-2019-12904 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-12904/ | CWE-310 | https://github.com/gpg/libgcrypt/commit/a4c561aab1014c3630bc88faf6f5246fee16b020 | a4c561aab1014c3630bc88faf6f5246fee16b020 | GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi> | is_tag_length_valid(size_t taglen)
{
switch (taglen)
{
/* Allowed tag lengths from NIST SP 800-38D. */
case 128 / 8: /* GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN */
case 120 / 8:
case 112 / 8:
case 104 / 8:
case 96 / 8:
case 64 / 8:
case 32 / 8:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
| is_tag_length_valid(size_t taglen)
{
switch (taglen)
{
/* Allowed tag lengths from NIST SP 800-38D. */
case 128 / 8: /* GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN */
case 120 / 8:
case 112 / 8:
case 104 / 8:
case 96 / 8:
case 64 / 8:
case 32 / 8:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
| C | libgcrypt | 0 |
CVE-2010-1149 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/ | CWE-200 | https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4 | 0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4 | null | daemon_linux_md_start (Daemon *daemon,
GPtrArray *components,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
gchar **components_as_strv;
guint n;
components_as_strv = g_new0 (gchar *, components->len + 1);
for (n = 0; n < components->len; n++)
components_as_strv[n] = g_strdup (components->pdata[n]);
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-md",
"LinuxMdStart",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_md_start_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
components_as_strv,
g_strfreev,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
| daemon_linux_md_start (Daemon *daemon,
GPtrArray *components,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
gchar **components_as_strv;
guint n;
components_as_strv = g_new0 (gchar *, components->len + 1);
for (n = 0; n < components->len; n++)
components_as_strv[n] = g_strdup (components->pdata[n]);
daemon_local_check_auth (daemon,
NULL,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.linux-md",
"LinuxMdStart",
TRUE,
daemon_linux_md_start_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
components_as_strv,
g_strfreev,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
return TRUE;
}
| C | udisks | 0 |
CVE-2013-6420 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6420/ | CWE-119 | https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=c1224573c773b6845e83505f717fbf820fc18415 | c1224573c773b6845e83505f717fbf820fc18415 | null | PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_public)
{
zval **cert;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Z", &cert) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_RESOURCE;
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(cert, 1, NULL, 1, &Z_LVAL_P(return_value) TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_public)
{
zval **cert;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Z", &cert) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_RESOURCE;
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(cert, 1, NULL, 1, &Z_LVAL_P(return_value) TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| C | php | 0 |
CVE-2012-5149 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5149/ | CWE-189 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac | 503bea2643350c6378de5f7a268b85cf2480e1ac | Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | void AudioRendererHost::OnAssociateStreamWithProducer(int stream_id,
int render_view_id) {
DVLOG(1) << "AudioRendererHost@" << this
<< "::OnAssociateStreamWithProducer(stream_id=" << stream_id
<< ", render_view_id=" << render_view_id << ")";
}
| void AudioRendererHost::OnAssociateStreamWithProducer(int stream_id,
int render_view_id) {
DVLOG(1) << "AudioRendererHost@" << this
<< "::OnAssociateStreamWithProducer(stream_id=" << stream_id
<< ", render_view_id=" << render_view_id << ")";
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2018-18352 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18352/ | CWE-732 | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | a9cbaa7a40e2b2723cfc2f266c42f4980038a949 | Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258} | EncryptionMode DetermineEncryptionMode(
const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme) {
switch (encryption_scheme.mode()) {
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_UNENCRYPTED:
return EncryptionMode::kUnencrypted;
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR:
return EncryptionMode::kCenc;
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CBC:
return EncryptionMode::kCbcs;
}
}
| EncryptionMode DetermineEncryptionMode(
const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme) {
switch (encryption_scheme.mode()) {
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_UNENCRYPTED:
return EncryptionMode::kUnencrypted;
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CTR:
return EncryptionMode::kCenc;
case EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_AES_CBC:
return EncryptionMode::kCbcs;
}
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |
CVE-2017-2616 | https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-2616/ | CWE-362 | https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891 | dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891 | su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com> | export_pamenv (void)
{
char **env;
/* This is a copy but don't care to free as we exec later anyways. */
env = pam_getenvlist (pamh);
while (env && *env)
{
if (putenv (*env) != 0)
err (EXIT_FAILURE, NULL);
env++;
}
}
| export_pamenv (void)
{
char **env;
/* This is a copy but don't care to free as we exec later anyways. */
env = pam_getenvlist (pamh);
while (env && *env)
{
if (putenv (*env) != 0)
err (EXIT_FAILURE, NULL);
env++;
}
}
| C | util-linux | 0 |
null | null | null | https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06 | 5c9d37f8055700c36b4c9006b0d4d81f4f961a06 | 2010-07-26 Tony Gentilcore <tonyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed by Darin Fisher.
Move DocumentLoadTiming struct to a new file
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=42917
Also makes DocumentLoadTiming Noncopyable.
No new tests because no new functionality.
* GNUmakefile.am:
* WebCore.gypi:
* WebCore.vcproj/WebCore.vcproj:
* WebCore.xcodeproj/project.pbxproj:
* loader/DocumentLoadTiming.h: Added.
(WebCore::DocumentLoadTiming::DocumentLoadTiming):
* loader/DocumentLoader.h:
* loader/FrameLoader.cpp:
* loader/FrameLoaderTypes.h:
* loader/MainResourceLoader.cpp:
* page/Timing.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@64051 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | void MainResourceLoader::addData(const char* data, int length, bool allAtOnce)
{
ResourceLoader::addData(data, length, allAtOnce);
frameLoader()->receivedData(data, length);
}
| void MainResourceLoader::addData(const char* data, int length, bool allAtOnce)
{
ResourceLoader::addData(data, length, allAtOnce);
frameLoader()->receivedData(data, length);
}
| C | Chrome | 0 |