Datasets:

buddhist-nlp

/

tatpa-noisy

like 0

Follow

Dharmamitra 42

syād etadyadyapi nāma satkāryamityevaṃ siddhaṃ /

The following argument might be urged (against the Sāṃkhya) “It may be taken as established that the Effect is existent;

pradhānād evaite kāryabhedāḥ pravartante ityetat tu kathaṃ siddhyatītyāha sukhādyanvitam ityādi /

but how is it proved that all the diverse Products emanate from Primordial Matter itself?”

sukhādyanvitam etac ca vyaktaṃ vyaktaṃ samīkṣyate /

The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 14 above]

prasādatāpadainyādikāryasyehopalabdhitaḥ // tatra pradhānāstitvasādhane pañcāmī vītaprayogāḥ parairuktāḥ / yathoktam bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca / kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya / kāraṇamastyavyaktaṃ iti /

As proofs of the existence of Primordial Matter, the following five affirmative arguments have been set forth by the other philosophers (Sāṅkhyas), detailed as below (in Sāṃkhyakārikā, 15-16) ‘(1) Because the various Products are finite, (2) because they are homogeneous, (3) because activity is due to efficiency (potency), (4) because there is distinction between Cause and Effect, and (5) because there is merging of the entire world (of effects), therefore the Unmanifest (Primordial Matter) exists The meaning of this is as follows:

ayam arthaḥ asti pradhānaṃ bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt /

Primordial Matter exists, because the various Products are finite.

iha loke yasya kartā bhavati tasya parimāṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ /

In this world it has been seen that a thing that has a producer is always finite;

[p.21] yathā kulālaḥ parimitān mṛtpiṇḍātparimitaṃ ghaṭaṃ karoti prasthagrāhiṇamāḍhakagrāhiṇaṃ /

for instance, the Potter takes up earth-clods which are finite and produces the Jar, which again is finite containing a seer or two seers and a half (of water);

idaṃ ca mahadādi vyaktaṃ parimitaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ ekā buddherko 'haṅkāra pañca tanmātrāṇyekādaśendriyāṇI pañcabhūtāni /

the ‘Manifest’ consisting of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, is found to be finite, Cosmic Intelligence being only one, the I-principle being only one, the Rudimentary Substances being only five, the Sense-organs being only eleven, the Gross Substances being only five.

ato 'numānena sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yatparimitaṃ vyaktamutpādayatīti /

Hence, through Inference, we prove it that Primordial Matter does exist, and it produces the Manifests which is finite.

yadi pradhānaṃ na syān niṣparimāṇam idaṃ vyaktaṃ syāt /

If Primordial Matter were not there, then all this Manifest would not be finite (would be without any definite size).

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanāt /

For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must be there Because the various Products are found to be homogeneous.

yajjātisamanvitaṃ hi yadupalabhyate tat tanmayakāraṇasambhūtaṃ /

As a matter of fact, whenever something is found to belong to a certain genus, it is bound to have emanated from a Cause consisting of that Genus;

yathā ghaṭaśarāvādayo bhedā mṛjjātyanvitās te mṛdātmakakāraṇasambhūtaḥ /

for instance, when things like the Jar and the Saucer are found to belong to the Genus ‘Clay’, they are the products of the Cause consisting of Clay.

sukhaduḥkhamohādijātisamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam upalabhyate /

The Manifest in question is found to be homogeneous with permeated by such Genuses (Generic entities) as ‘Pleasure’, ‘Pain’ and ‘Delusion’;

kutaḥ prasādatāpadainyādikāryopalabdheḥ / tathā hi prasādalāghavābhiṣvaṅgoddharṣaprītayaḥ satvasya kāryaṃ /

how? because of its being found to be the product of Composure, Distress and Dejection, Thus Composure, Buoyancy, Attachment, Delight and Affection are the products of the Sattva-Attribute (Harmony);

sukham iti ca sattvamevocyate /

as a matter of fact, Composure (Happiness) is actually spoken of as Sattva (Harmony);

tāpaśoṣabhedas tambhodvegāpadvegā rajasaḥ kāryaṃ / rājaś ca duḥkhaṃ /

similarly Irritation, Emaciation, Piercing Pain, Niunbness, Anxiety, Calamity, and Impetuosity are products of the Rajas-Attribute (Energy);

tamaś ca mohaśabdenocyate /

and Pain is spoken of as ‘Energy’;

eṣāṃ ca mahadādīnāṃ prasādatāpadainyādikāryamupalabhyate /

Depression, Concealment, Despondency, Disgust and Lethargy are the products of the Tamm-Attribute (Inertia);

tasmāt sukhaduḥkhamohānāṃ trayāṇām ete sanniveśaviśeṣā ityavamīyate /

and from this it is inferred that these are only particular phases of ‘Pleasure’, ‘Pain’, and ‘Delusion’ (as representing the three Attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamm, respectively).

te a siddhameṣāṃ prasādādikāryataḥ sukhādyanvitatvaṃ tadanvayāc ca tanmayaprakṛtisambhūtatvam siddhaṃ tat siddhau ca sāmarthyādyāsau prakṛtistat pradhānam iti siddham asti pradhānaṃ bhedānām anvayadarśanād iti /

And from the fact of their being products of ‘Pleasure’, etc. it follows that they are ‘homogeneous’ with ‘Pleasure’, etc.; and from this ‘homogeneity’, it also follows that they have emanated from a Source (Cause) which is constituted of these (Pleasure, etc’,; this having been established, it also follows by implication that this Source or Cause must be Primordial Matter. Thus it is established that Primordial Matter exists by the fact that the diverse products are found to be homogeneous.

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ śaktaiḥ pravṛtteḥ /

For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist: Because activity is clue to efficiency;

iha loke yo yasminnarthe pravartate sa tatra śakto yathā tantuvāyaḥ paṭakaraṇe /

in the ordinary world, when a man takes up an activity, it is only when he has the efficiency (or capacity) for it; for instance, the Weaver taking up the work of cloth-weaving.

ataḥ sādhayāmaḥ / pradhānasyāsti śaktir yayā vyaktamutpādayatīti /

By this we infer that Primordial Matter has the efficiency (or Capacity) by virtue of which it produces the ‘Manifest’;

sā ca śaktir nirāśrayā na sambhavati /

this efficiency (or Capacity) cannot be there without a substratum;

tasmād asti pradhānaṃ yatra śaktir vartata iti / itaścāsti pradhānaṃ kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt /

hence we conclude that there is Primordial Matter wherein the said efficiency subsists. For the following reason also Primordial Matter must exist: Because there is distinction between Cause and Effect.

iha loke kāryakāraṇayor vibhāgo dṛṣṭaḥ tathā hi mṛtpiṇḍaḥ kāraṇaṃ ghaṭaḥ kāryaṃ sa ca mṛtpiṇḍādvibhaktasvabhāvaḥ tathā hi ghaṭo madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇasamarthāḥ na mṛtpiṇḍaḥ /

In this world, it is found that there is distinction between Cause and Effect; e.g, the Clay is the Cause, the Jar is the Effect; and this Effect has a character entirely different from that of the Cause; e.g. the Jar has the capacity to contain Honey, Water and Milk, while Clay has no such capacity.

evam idaṃ mahadādikāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā sādhayāmo 'sti pradhānaṃ yasmān mahadādikāryamutpannam iti /

Similarly seeing the Effect, in the shape of the ‘Manifest’ in question, we infer that there is Primordial Matter out of which is produced the Product in the shape of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest.

itaścāsti pradhānaṃ vaiśvarūpyasyāvibhāgāt /

For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist: Because there is merging of the entire world;

vaiśvarūpyam iti trayo lokā ucyante /

the term ‘Vaiśvarupya’, ‘Entire World’, stands for the three Regions (Heaven, Earth and Nether World);

ete hi pralayakāle kvacid avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /

all these, at the time of Dissolution, merge into something;

tathā hi pañcabhūtāni pañcasi tanmātreṣvavibhāgaṃ gacchanti tanmātrāṇ pañcendriyāṇi cāhaṅkāre ahaṅkāro buddhau buddhiḥ pradhāne tadevaṃ pralayakāle trayo lokā avibhāgaṃ gacchanti /

for instance, the five Gross Substances merge into the Rudimentary Substances, the five Rudimentary Substances and the Sense-organs merge into the I-principle, the I-principle merges into Cosmic Intelligence; thus the whole of the Three Worlds become merged;

avibhāgo nāma avivekaḥ yathā kṣīrāvasthāyama anyatkṣīmanyad dadhīti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ tadvad pralayakāle idaṃ vyaktam idam avyaktam iti viveko na śakyate kartuṃ / [p.22] ato manyāmahe 'sti pradhānaṃ yatra mahadādiliṅgamavibhāgaṃ gacchatīti /

‘merging’ means non-differentiation, as for instance, in the state of Milk, the differentiation is not possible, that Milk is different from Curd; similarly at the time of Universal Dissolution, no such discrimination is possible as that ‘this is Manifest (Product) and that is Unmanifest (Cause) From this we conclude that there is such an entity as Primordial Matter wherein Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (making up the Manifest) become merged, incapable of being distinguished.

tadatrācāryeṇa samanvayādityayam eva heturuktaḥ pariśiṣṭānām upalakṣaṇārthaḥ /

Our Teacher (Śāntarakṣita), however, has mentioned (in the Text) only one reason that of Homogeneity, which is meant to imply the others also.

tatra sukhādītyādiśabdena duḥkhamohayor grahaṇaṃ /

In the Text, in the phrase ‘Pleasure and the rest’, the term ‘the rest’ includes Pain and Delusion;

vyaktam iti mahadādibhūtaparyantaṃ /

the term. ‘Manifest’ stands for all the entities, from Cosmic Intelligence down to the Gross Substances.

spaṣṭamupalabhyata ity arthaḥ /

The phrase ‘is clearly known’ means is distinctly perceived;

katham ity āha prasādetyādi /

how? ‘from the fad. of the Effect, etc. etc.’;

ādiśabdaḥ pratyekamabhisambadhyate /

the term ‘et cetera’ is connected with each member of the compound (Composure, etc., Irritation, etc. and Dejection, etc.).

etaccāsmābhiḥ pūrvam eva vyākhyātaṃ //

This is as we have already explained above.

evaṃ samanvayādityasya hetoḥ siddhimupādarśya pramāṇaṃ racayannāha tata ityādi / tatastanmayasambhūtaṃ tajjāyanvayadarśanāt /

“Thus, the whole (manifest) must be taken as having emanated from something made up of the said (pleasure, etc,), because the said generic character is found present in it, just as in the case of the jar and other things;

kuṭādibhedavat tac ca pradhānam iti kāpilāḥ //

and this something is primordial matter”, so say the followers of Kapila.

tanmayasambhūtam iti /

[see verse 15 above] ‘The whole must, etc.’;

sukhādimayaṃ yatkāraṇaṃ tasmāt sambhūtam ity arthaḥ / ayaṃ ca sādhyanirdeśaḥ / tajjātyanvayadarśanād iti hetuḥ /

i.e. emanated from a Cause which is made up of Pleasure and the restthis sentence states the Conclusion to be proved. The Probans (Reason) in support of the conclusion is stated in the words ‘Because the said generic character is found present in it;

tayā traiguṇyalakṣaṇayā jātyā anugatatvadarśanād ity arthaḥ /

that is, it is all permeated by the generic character of being made up of the Three Attributes;

kuṭādibhedavad iti / ghaṭādibhedavat /

just as in the case of the Jar and other things; i.e. such diverse products as the Jar and the rest.

yac ca tanmayaṃ kāraṇaṃ tatpradhānam iti kāpilāḥ sāṅkhyā varṇayanti // tadatretyādinā pratividhānam ārabhate tadatra sudhiyaḥ prāhus tulyā satve 'pi codanā /

And this Cause made up of the Three Attributes is Primordial Matter; so say the followers of Kapila, i.e. the Sāṃkhyas offer the said explanation. In answer to this, the wise ones hectare that the argument that has been urged (by the sāṃkhya against the doctrine that the effect is non-existent prior to its production) is equally applicable to the doctrine of the existence of the effect.

yat tasyāmuttaraṃ vaḥ syāt tattulyaṃ sudhiyām api //

and the answer that you would have to that argument would equally aptly be the answer of the wise ones also.

tatra yat tāvad uktaṃ pradhānāder amī kāryabhedās tadrūpā eva pravartanta iti tatredaṃ nirūpyate / yadyamī kāryabhedāḥ pradhānasvabhāvā eva tat katham eṣāṃ tataḥ kāryatayā pravṛttir bhavati /

It has been asserted (by the Sāṃkhya) that “The various products emanating from Primordial Matter and other Causes, are of the same essence as those Causes In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following points: If these diverse Effects are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that they emanate from it as its effects? When one thing is non-different from (of the same essence as) another, it cannot be its cause or effect;

nahi yadyasmād avyatiriktaṃ tat tasya kāryaṃ vā yuktaṃ bhinnalakṣaṇatvāt kāryakāraṇayoḥ /

because the Cause and its Effect must be totally different in character from one another.

anyathā hīdaṃ kāryam idaṃ kāraṇaṃ vetyasaṅkīrṇavyavasthā kathaṃ bhavet / tataśca yadbhavadbhir mūlaprakṛteḥ kāraṇatvam eva bhūtendriyalakṣaṇasya ṣoḍaśakasya gaṇasya kāryatvam eva buddhyahaṅkāratanmātrāṇāṃ ca pūrvottarāpekṣayā kāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ ceti vyavasthānaṃ kṛtaṃ tan na syāt / yathoktam mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta /

If it were not so, how could there be any clear conception as to one thing being the ‘Cause’ and another the ‘Effect’? In that case, how could there be any such deduction as that made by you (a) that Primordial Matter -must always be the Cause, (b) that the group of sixteen, consisting of the five Gross Substances and eleven Sense-organs must always be the Effect, and (c) that among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Rudimentary Substances, one is the Effect of what precedes, and the Cause of what follows it? This deduction has been thus formulated (in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 3) “Primordial Matter is never a Product the group of seven consisting of the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest are both Product and Productive the group of sixteen is always Product;

ṣoḍaśakaśca vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ //

the Spirit is neither Product nor Productive In fact (under the Sāṃkhya Doctrine) everything would be equally liable to be the Cause or Effect of everything else.

iti /

this also is mere childish prattle.

sarveṣām eva hi parasparāvyatirekātkāryatvaṃ kāraṇatvaṃ vā prasajyeta / yadvāpekṣikatvātkāryakāraṇabhāvasya rūpāntarasya cāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt sarveṣāṃ puruṣavan na prakṛtitvaṃ nāpi vikṛtitvaṃ syāt /

As a matter of fact, when one thing is not different in nature from another thing, it cannot be contrary to this latter; because ‘contrariness’ consists in difference of nature; otherwise, there would be an end to all notions of ‘difference’; and as a consequence, there would be no grounds for accepting any difference among the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia (which are insentient) on the one hand and the sentient Spirits on the other;

āha ca

and the whole universe would be uniform;

yadeva dadhi tatkṣīraṃ yatkṣīraṃ taddadhīti ca / vadatā rudrilenaiva khyāpitā vindhyavāsitā //

this would involve the contingency of the whole being produced and also destroyed at one and the same time. That all these contingencies would follow would be due to the fact that the notion of all lands of ‘Non-difference’ must share the same fate (of being accepted or rejected).

iti / yaccedaṃ hetumattvādidharmayogi vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktam iti varṇitaṃ tadapi bālapralapitam eva / [p.23] nahi yadyasmādabhinnasvabhāvaṃ tat tadviparītaṃ yuktaṃ rūpāntaratvalakṣaṇatvād vaiparītyasya / anyathā bhedavyavahāroccheda eva syāt /

From this it follows that the ‘Unmanifest’ also, like the ‘Manifest’, should possess the qualities of being ‘with cause’ and the rest (which have been attributed to the ‘Manifest’ only), for the simple reason that the form (essence) of the Unmanifest is not different from that of the ‘Manifest’; or (conversely) the ‘Manifest’ should, like the ‘Unmanifest’, possess the qualities of being ‘without cause’ and the rest, on the ground of its form being not different from the Unmanifest;

sarvam eva viśvamekarūpaṃ syāt /

both these universal affirmative propositions would have to be accepted;

anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

otherwise undesirable contingencies would arise.

kiṃ cānvayavyatirekaniścayasamadhigamyo loke kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ /

Then again, in ordinary worldly experience, the relation of Cause and Effect is always apprehended on the basis of well-ascertained positive and negative concomitance;

na ca pradhānādibhyo mahahādyutpattivyavahāraḥ / nacāpi nityasya kāraṇabhāvo 'sti /

Nor again is any eternalng found to have the nature of a Cause, on the basis of which the fact of the diverse Products being produced out of Primordial Matter (which is eternal) could be admitted.

yena pradhānāt kāryabhedānāmutpattiḥ siddhyet / nityasya kramākramābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt /

And the reason for this lies in the fact that, if an eternal thing is capable of any effective action, any idea of its operations being gradual or non-gradual (simultaneous), would involve self-contradictions.

syād etat nāsmābhirapūrvasvabhāvotpattyā kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'bhīṣṭo yena svarūpābhede sati sa virudhyate yāvatā pradhānaṃ sarpakuṇḍalādivan mahadādirūpeṇa pariṇāmaṃ gacchatteṣāṃ mahadādīnāṃ kāraṇam iti vyapadiśyate teca mahadādayas tatpariṇāmarūpatvāt tatkāryatayā vyapadiśyante /

and it is only such causal relation that would be incompatible with the non-difference in essence (form); what we do assert is that Primordial Matter undergoes modification into the form of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products, just as the Coiled Serpent uncoils itself and becomes modified into the Elongated Serpent, and it is in this sense that it is called the ‘Cause’ of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products; and these; Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, being of the nature of modifications, are called its ‘Effect’ (or Product);

pariṇāmaścaikavastvadhiṣṭhānatvād abhede 'pi na virudhyata iti /

and there is nothing self-contradictory (or incongruous) in such modification, even though there he non-difference (between the original and its modification).”

tadetad asamyak /

This cannot be right;

tathā hi pariṇāmo bhavet pūrvarūpaparityāgād vā bhavedaparityāgād vā / yadyaparityāgāt tadāvasthāsāṅkaryaṃ syāt bṛhattvādyavasthāyām api yuvatvādyavasthopalabdhiprasaṅgāt /

as under such circumstances, there can be no ‘modification’, Because if there were Modification, it could come about either on the abandoning of the original form, or on the non-abandonment of it. If it were to come without the abandoning of the original form, then there would be a commixture of the two forms (original and modified);

atha parityāgāt tadā svabhāvahāniprasaṅgaḥ tataśca pūrvakaṃ svabhāvāntaraṃ niruddhamapūrvaṃ svabhāvāntaramutpannam iti na kasyacit pariṇāmaḥ siddhyet /

If, on the other hand, Modification were to come after the abandoning of the original form, then this would involve the loss of form (of the original); so that it would mean that the previous form has been destroyed and a new and different form has come about;

na tāvad ekadeśena ekasyaikadeśāsambhavāt /

so that it could not be proved that any one thing is the ‘modification’ of another.

nāpi sarvātmanā tadarthāntarotpāde pūrvaināśaprasaṅgāt /

nor could it be in whole, because that would mean the production of an entirely new thing and the consequent destruction of the original.

tasmān na tasyaivānyathātvaṃ yuktaṃ svabhāvāntarotpādanibandhanatvāt tasyeti /

Hence it cannot be right that there is change of the same thing; as it involves the notion of the coming into existence of an entirely different character (and thing’.

athāpi syād vyavasthitasya dharmiṇo dharmāntaranivṛttyā dharmātnaraprādurbhāvaḥ pariṇāmo varṇyate natu svabhāvasyānyathātvād iti /

It might be argued that “What is meant is that while the thing itself remains constant, one property of it disappears and another property appears, and this (variation of the Property) is what is called Modification; and it does not-mean that the very essence of the thing itself becomes different

tadetad asamyak /

This also cannot be right.

tathā hi sa pravartamāno nivartamānaś ca dharmo dharmiṇo 'rthāntarabhūto vā syād anarthāntarabhūto vā / yadyarthāntarabhūtas tadā dharmī tadavastha eveti katham asau pariṇato nāma / nahyarthāntarabhūtayoḥ paṭāśvayorutpādavināśaṃ satyavicalitātmasvarūpasyaghaṭādeḥ pariṇāmo bhavatyatiprasaṅgāt /

Because when the Property appears and disappears, would that Property be something different, or non-different, from the thing itself (in which it appears and disappears)? If it were something different, then the thing itself -remaining exactly the same, how can it he said to be modified? When two such things as Cloth and Horse, which are entirely different from the Jar and otherngs, are produced or destroyed, it is not regarded as a modification of the Jar and other things. If it were so regarded, it would lead to an absurdity.

evaṃ hi puruṣo 'pi pariṇāmī syāt /

It might be argued that “if this line of argument were adopted, then the Spirit also would be ‘modifiable’;

tat sambaddhayor dharmayor utādavināśāt tasya pariṇāmo vyavasthāpyate nānyasyeti cen na / [p.24] sadasatoḥ sambandhābhāvena tat sambandhitvāsiddheḥ /

inasmuch as the properties related to the Spirit actually appear and disappear, which would mean ‘modification’ of the Spirit itself, not of anything else Not so, we reply. As no relationship can subsist either in an entity or a non-entity, there can be nothing that could have any relationship at all.

tathā hi sambandho bhavet sato vā bhaved asato vā /

For instance, if a Relationship existed, it could subsist either in an entity or in a non-entity;

na tāvat satas tasya samadhigatāśeṣasvabhāvasampatter anapekṣatayā kvacid api pāratantryāyogāt / nāpyasatas tasya sarvopākhyāvirahalakṣaṇatayā kvacid apyāśritatvānupapatteḥ /

as a matter of fact however, it cannot subsist in an entity; because the full majesty of its entire nature being already known as independent, it would not be possible for it to be dependent upon anything else (in the shape of a Relationship). Nor could the Relationship subsist in a non-entity, because by its very nature, it is devoid of all characterisation and as such cannot be dependent upon anything;

nahi śaśaviṣāṇādiḥ kvacid āśrito yuktaḥ /

e.g. the ‘Hare’s Horn’ and such non-entities cannot be rightly held to be dependent upon anything.

na cāpi vyatiriktadharmāntarotpādavināśe sati pariṇāmo vyavasthāpyate bhavadbhiḥ /

Further, you do not advocate that there is modification on the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties;

kiṃ tarhi yatrātmabhūtaikasvabhāvānuvṛttiravasthābhedaś ca tatra bhavatāṃ pariṇāmavyavasthā / naca dharmiṇaḥ sakāśād dharmayor vyatireke sati ekasvabhāvānuvṛttir asti /

what then? what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by ‘Modification When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant;

dharmyeva hi tayor eka ātmā sa ca vyatirikta iti nātmabhūtaikasvabhāvānuvṛttiḥ /

as the entity itself is the one ‘essence5 of the Properties; and that, ex hypothesis is entirely different from them;

na cāpi pravartamānanivartamānadharmadvayavyatirikto dharma upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto darśanapatham avatarati kasyacid ityataḥ sa tādṛśo 'sadvyavahāraviṣaya eva viduṣāṃ /

so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person ever become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognisance as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties;

athānarthāntarabhūta iti pakṣas tathāpyekasmād dharmisvarūpād avyatiriktvād vināśotpādavatorddharmayor api dharmisvarūpavadekatvameveti kenāśrayeṇa dharmī pariṇataḥ syād dharmo vā / avasthātuś ca dharmiṇaḥ sakāśād avyatirekāddharmayor evasthātṛsvarūpavan na nivṛttir nāpi prādurbhāvaḥ /

If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the appearing as well as the disappearing, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong, they should, like the Entity itself, be one only; and under the circumstances, on what basis would either the Entity or the Property be ‘modified’? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity which remains constant, there can be no appearance (production) or disappearance (destruction) of these, just as there is none of the constant Entity.

dharmābhyāṃ ca dharmiṇo 'nanyatvād dharmasvarūpasyotpādaḥ pūrvasya ca vināśa iti naikasya kasyacit pariṇāmaḥ sidhyati /

As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist before and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in existence;

tasmān na pariṇāmavaśād api bhavatāṃ kāryakāraṇavyavahāro yukta iti /

From all this it follows that, even on the basis of ‘Modification’, your theory of ‘Cause and Effect’ is not tenable.

etac ca spaṣṭam eva dūṣaṇam iti kṛtvā tadupekṣya yaścāam asatkāryavāde doṣaḥ parair uktas taṃ paścāt pratividhāsyāma iti manyamānastulyadoṣāpādanavyājena satkāryavādam eva tāvaddūṣayate tadatretyādi /

with this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that ‘we shall answer later on the objection that the Sāṃkhya has urged against the theory of the Effect being nôn-existent (before the causal operation)’, he proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent). This is what is done in the text. ‘In answer to this, etc.’

sudhiya iti saugatas te prāhuḥ /

The term ‘sudhiyaḥ’, ‘wise ones’, stands for the Bauddhas;

yeyam asadakaraṇādityādinā pañcadhā codanā kṛtā sā satve 'pi satkāryavādapakṣe 'pi tulyā /

they declare that the fivefold argument that the Sāṃkhya has set forth in the words ‘Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc.’ (Sāṅkhyakārikā, 9), is equally applicable against the theory of the Effect being existent.

tathā hi śakyam idam ittham abhidhātuṃ / na sadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt / śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāranabhāvāc ca satkāryam iti /

For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that ‘Because what is existent cannot be produced, because there is recourse to the Cause, been use all things are not possible, because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause, therefore the Effect is not-existent’;

na satkāryam iti vyavahitena sambandhaḥ /

[the reading ‘Asadakaraṇāt’ of the Sāṅkhyakārikā being altered into ‘Na sadakaraṇāt’] the negative ‘not’ (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase ‘the Effect is existent’ (at the end of the sentence).

kasmāt / sadakaraṇādupādānagrahaṇādityāder hetoḥ /

“Why should the Effect be regarded as not-existent?” Because of all the very same reasons that have been set forth in the Sāṅkhyakārikā Because what is non-existent cannot be produced, etc. etc.

yaścobhayor doṣo na tamekaścodyo yukta bhāvaḥ /

And when an objection is equally applicable to both parties (to a discussion), then it should not be urged by one against the other;

nanu ca katham iyaṃ samatā bhavati / yāvatā tatrāsadakaraṇādityevaṃ codanā anyatra sadakaraṇād iti /

Objection “In what way is there this equality (between the two theories), when the objection as urged by one party is that ‘the Non-existent cannot be produced’, while as urged by the other, it is that ‘the Existent cannot be produced?”

na /

There is no force in this objection;

abhiprāyāparijñānāt /

as it arises from non-comprehension of the seme of what is asserted.

satkāryavādepyakaraṇādīnāṃ tulyatvaṃ /

because the reasons of the ‘non-producibility’ and the rest are equally applicable as against the theory of the Effect being existent.

tasyāṃ ca codanāyāṃ yaduttaraṃ bhavatāṃ satkāryavādināṃ tadasatkāryavādināṃ sudhiyāṃ bauddhānāṃ bhaviṣyati //

The answer that you, upholders of the doctrine of the Effect being existent, would make against these arguments (as against your doctrine) would also be the answer of the wise Bauddhas who uphold the Doctrine of the Effect being nonexistent.

[p.25]

his name was Vindhyavāsin, See Foreword, page LXI.

katham asau tulyetyāha yadītyādi yadi dadhyādayaḥ santi dugdhādyātmasu sarvathā / teṣāṃ satāṃ kimutpādyaṃ hetvādisadṛśātmanāṃ //

If the curd and other effects are already wholly existent in the essence of (their causes) milk and the rest, then, inasmuch as they would be exactly like the cause, etc. in their essence, what of theirs would be there that would have to be produced? (17)

sadakaraṇādityetat samarthanārtham idaṃ /

The argument here set forth is for the purpose of supporting the view that ‘what is already existent cannot be produced’ (an argument aimed against the Sāṃkhya).