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Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Bijela, Montenegro. 5. On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant's employer "Vektra Boka" AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter "the debtor") to carry out a re‑allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 6. On 15 January 2013 the applicant requested enforcement of the above judgment and the Herceg Novi First Instance Court issued an enforcement order on 31 January 2013. 7. On 12 June 2015 the Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 8. On 28 January 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action. 9. On 22 March 2016 the Commercial Court suspended (obustavio) the enforcement due to the opening of the insolvency proceedings, which decision became final on 11 May 2016. 10. The judgement in question remains unenforced to the present day. 11. On 8 February 2013 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings seeking, on the basis of the above judgment, the removal of competing titles from the Land Register. 12. On 29 July 2015 the Real Estate Directorate terminated (prekinuo) the administrative proceedings because the Commercial Court had commenced insolvency proceeding in respect of the debtor. 13. On 7 September 2015 the applicant submitted an objection against the above decision. This objection was rejected as being out of time by the Real Estate Directorate on 5 October 2015. 14. The administrative proceedings are still pending. 15. On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour. 16. On 22 September 2015 the High Court upheld this judgment on the merits, but quashed it as regards the costs. 17. On 31 October 2016 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court transferred the case to the Commercial Court for further action due to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.

Ruled as violated by court

5. On 1 March 2012 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in favour of the applicant and ordered the applicant's employer "Vektra Boka" AD Herceg Novi (hereinafter "the debtor") to carry out a re‑allocation of plots for the construction of apartments. This judgment became final on 21 December 2012. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.

15. On an unspecified day in 2003, the applicant instituted separate civil proceedings against the debtor, as his former employer, seeking reinstatement and damages. Following three remittals, on 3 March 2014 the Herceg Novi First Instance Court rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour. 18. On 22 February 2017 the Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant regarding the costs. 19. The parties did not inform the Court about when the Commercial Court's decision became final and was served on the applicant.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation. 7. The most important procedural steps were described in the case Association "21 December 1989" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011), and also in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15 and 38 others, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are referred to below. 8. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaint regarding the offence of attempted homicide committed against the applicant was statute-barred. This decision was annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation under file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 9. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken to gather information from domestic authorities: the prosecutor's office contacted 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of the events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, and verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 10. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (see Sidea and Others, cited above, § 11), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.

NOT ruled as violated by court

5. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation.

There is no relevance between fair trial and ongoing criminal investigation.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5. In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6. On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7. On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8. On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10. On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11. On 28 September 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant's action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12. On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant's objection concerning the late appeal.

Ruled as violated by court

9. On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company's insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date.

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the defendant company not appearing at the hearing threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Podgorica. 6. On 6 September 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Commission for Restitution (Komisija za restituciju nepokretnosti) in Berane requesting restitution of the property expropriated from his father in 1969. 7. Following the adoption of a new Restitution Act (Zakon o povraćaju oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenju), on 28 December 2005, the applicant submitted another application to the newly established Commission for Restitution and Compensation in Berane (Komisija za povraćaj oduzetih imovinskih prava i obeštećenja) requesting compensation. 8. In 2008 all the Commissions for Restitution and Compensation were consolidated into three regional Commissions in Bar, Bijelo Polje and Podgorica. Due to the location of the expropriated property, the applicant's request was assigned to the Commission with its seat in Bijelo Polje (hereinafter "the Commission"). 9. On 19 February 2009 the applicant sought opinion from an independent expert regarding the expropriated property. 10. On 21 July 2009 the Commission also requested an assessment report on the expropriated property. The report was submitted to the Commission on 24 July 2009. 11. Due to Commission's inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja). 12. On 23 October 2009 and 5 December 2013 the applicant filed complaints with the Ministry of Finance and the Administrative Court, respectively, about the Appeals Commission's inactivity. 13. On 24 December 2013 the Appeals Commission ordered the Commission to decide on the applicant's request within a period of 30 days. 14. On 13 October 2014 the Commission ruled against the applicant. 15. On 23 December 2014 the Appeals Commission upheld that decision on appeal. 16. The applicant filed and action with the Administrative Court seeking redress. 17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).

Ruled as violated by court

11. Due to Commission's inactivity, on 4 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal (žalba zbog ćutanja uprave) with the Appeals Commission (Komisija za žalbe u postupku za povraćaj imovinskog prava ili obeštećenja). 17. On 17 April 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claim as unfounded. This decision was served on the applicant on 23 April 2015. 18. On 23 June 2015 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. On 24 July 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal for failure to make proper use of other available domestic remedies. According to the Constitutional Court, the applicant should first have made use of an additional request for the judicial review of his case (zahtjev za vanredno preispitivanje sudske odluke).

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants are a family comprising the husband and wife (the first and second applicants) and their child (the third applicant). They were born in 1976, 1978 and 2001 respectively and live in Kayseri. 5. On 9 August 2001, the second applicant was admitted to a State Hospital in Niğde. She gave birth to the third applicant who has irreversible injuries caused by an intervention performed by that hospital's medical staff during labor. 6. In their report of 12 May 2004, the Forensic Medicine Institute concluded that the two members of the medical staff who tended to the labor were equally and solely at fault for the third applicant's injuries. 7. On 1 December 2004, the first and second applicants on their own and on behalf of the third applicant, submitted a claim to the Ministry of Health for compensation arising from the third applicant's injuries. 8. Following the tacit dismissal of the claim by the administrative authorities, the applicants brought an action for damages before the Konya Administrative Court on 2 February 2005. They claimed 30,000 Turkish liras (TRY) in respect of pecuniary damage and TRY 100,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. In the course of the proceedings, the domestic court decided proprio motu to seek an expert report to determine the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants. In his report submitted on 14 June 2006 to the court, the expert assessed the amount of pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants to have been TRY 194,916. 10. On 27 June 2006, the applicants requested to increase the amount of their claim for pecuniary damage in the light of the expert report. 11. On 6 July 2006 the court ruled in favour of the applicants and awarded them the full amount of their initial claims in respect of pecuniary damage, namely TRY 30,000 plus interest running from the date of lodging their claims with the Ministry of Health. It further awarded them a total of TRY 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and interest running from the date of the lawsuit. The applicants' request to increase their claim for pecuniary damage were dismissed by the court which considered itself bound by the initial claim indicated by the applicants when they lodged their case. 12. The applicants' ensuing appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 June 2009 and 28 December 2010 respectively. 13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.

Ruled as violated by court

13. On 22 January 2010, the Ministry of Health paid the applicants a total of TRY 144,144. Approximately TRY 53,830 of that sum represented statutory interest accrued on the principal judgment award.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants were born in 1976 and 1982 and live in Khust and Kharkiv respectively. 6. The first applicant lodged a claim against a social security authority, seeking an increase in the amount of child allowance she was receiving. A first-instance court allowed her claim in part. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the social security authority lodged a further appeal on points of law. 7. On 6 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court ("the HAC"), having examined the appeal, quashed the lower courts' judgments and dismissed the applicant's claim. 8. The second applicant moved from the territory of the Republic of Moldova controlled by the so‑called "Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria" ("MRT") (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, ECHR 2004‑VII) to Ukraine to take up permanent residence. Under domestic law, repatriating Ukrainians were entitled to the tax-free and duty-free import of their foreign-registered vehicles. However, the customs office refused to apply this tax exemption in the applicant's case on the grounds that the car had not been registered by the appropriate authorities of the Republic of Moldova. She challenged this refusal before the administrative courts. A first-instance court allowed her claim and ordered the customs office to clear her car through customs. That judgment was upheld on appeal but the customs office lodged a further appeal on points of law. 9. On 4 April 2013 the HAC allowed the appeal, quashed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the applicant's claim. 10. Both applicants alleged that the HAC, contrary to domestic law (see paragraph 11 below), had not sent them copies of the appeals lodged in their cases or informed them of the pending appeals by any other means, thus depriving them of an opportunity to respond. They alleged that they had only learned of the appeal proceedings when they had been served with the HAC's final decisions quashing the lower courts' decisions in their favour. 11. As worded at the relevant time, Articles 214 and 215 of the 2005 Code of Administrative Justice provided that a HAC judge-rapporteur would decide, having considered an appeal, whether to initiate proceedings to review the lower courts' decisions on points of law. If the judge decided to initiate such proceedings, he or she was required to inform the parties of that decision and serve a copy of the appeal on the opposing party with a time-limit for responding. 12. The relevant provisions of the Code concerning the procedure for serving court documents are summarised in Lazarenko and Others v. Ukraine (nos. 70329/12 and 5 others, § 15, 27 June 2017).

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that HAC not informing the applicants of appeals threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Melitopol. 6. Between 2004 and 2006 the applicant was head of Melitopol City Council's Disadvantaged Persons' Welfare Centre (Центр по обслуговуванню одиноких, непрацездатних та малозабезпечених громадян Управління праці, соціального захисту та житлових субсидій Мелітопольської міської Ради – "the Centre"). On 21 April 2006 she was dismissed as part of a reorganisation of the Centre. Another person was subsequently appointed to a position similar to the one previously occupied by the applicant. 7. In May 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Melitopolskyy Local Court ("the Melitopolskyy Court") seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 24 October 2006 the court rejected the applicant's claim. It found that the Centre had offered the applicant another position but that she had rejected this proposal, and that a more experienced person had been appointed as the head of the Centre. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 7 December 2006 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant lodged a further appeal, and on 22 August 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed these decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that the case was to be considered under the administrative justice procedure since it concerned a public-service dispute. 8. Accordingly, the applicant instituted administrative proceedings before the Melitopolskyy Court, which, on 21 February 2008, again found against her for reasons similar to those listed in its decision of 24 October 2006. The applicant appealed, and on 16 July 2008 the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal quashed this decision and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that it fell to be examined under the civil justice procedure as the applicant was not a public servant. On 2 March 2011 the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine upheld this decision. On 14 April 2011 the same court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Ukraine against the decision of 2 March 2011. 9. On 28 March 2011 the applicant again lodged a civil claim seeking reinstatement, salary arrears and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 4 August 2011 the Melitopolskyy Court refused to examine the merits of the applicant's civil claim as the applicant had sought to have adjourned previous court hearings in respect of her case on numerous occasions without good reason. On 5 October 2011 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the first-instance court.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7. On 9 September 1995 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 8. On the same day the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court prolonged the applicant's detention in police custody for a period of up to 15 days. 9. On 13 September 1995 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed to being a member of an illegal organisation and having been involved in a murder. 10. On 14 September 1995 the applicant participated in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme) with another suspect K.A., organised by the police in the absence of a lawyer. According to a report, drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant and K.A., both of the accused gave the details of the murder which they had committed. 11. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was examined by a doctor from the Istanbul Forensic Institute. A collective medical report was drawn up in respect of the applicant and five other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. 12. On 22 September 1995 the applicant was heard by a public prosecutor and an investigating judge respectively. In his statements to the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements alleging that they had been taken under duress. Following his questioning, the investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. 13. On 9 October 1995 a public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence prescribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 7 December 1995 the applicant was heard by the trial court during the first hearing in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant denied all the charges against him and stated that his statements at the police had been taken under duress. 15. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. Accordingly, the case was transferred to Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 13 September 2007, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's and his co-accused K. A.'s statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to life-imprisonment. 17. On an unknown date the applicant's lawyer appealed against the judgment of 13 September 2007. 18. On 1 December 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the above judgment.

Ruled as violated by court

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant company is a limited liability company incorporated under Moldovan Law. 6. On 24 December 2012 and 21 June 2013 respectively the applicant company initiated two sets of civil proceedings challenging two decisions issued by the State Tax Inspectorate of Străşeni (Inspectoratul Fiscal de Stat Străşeni – "the Inspectorate") under which it had been fined for non‑compliance with the VAT reporting regulations. On 5 September 2013 these two sets of proceedings were joined. 7. On 26 December 2013 the Străşeni District Court upheld the applicant company's claims and overturned the impugned decisions. The representative of the Inspectorate was not present when the judgment was delivered, despite having been duly informed of the date and the time of the hearing. 8. On 5 February 2014 the Inspectorate lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Străşeni District Court. No request for an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging an appeal was made. The applicant company objected to the appeal and argued that it had been lodged outside the thirty‑day time-limit and that the Inspectorate had not requested an extension of the legal time-limit for lodging it. 9. In a decision of 3 September 2014 the Chişinău Court of Appeal calculated the applicable time-limit and found that it had expired on 27 January 2014 and, accordingly, that the Inspectorate had been late in lodging its appeal. It therefore decided to strike the appeal out of its list of cases as time-barred. The Inspectorate lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. It argued that the Chişinău Court of Appeal could not strike out the appeal after having commenced its examination of the merits of the case. 10. On 8 October 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the Chişinău Court of Appeal's strike-out decision of 3 September 2014. Without contesting the Court of Appeal's calculation of the time-limit for lodging the appeal, the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the argument put forward by the Inspectorate and found that the Court of Appeal had breached the rules of procedure by adopting a strike-out decision after having started an examination of the merits of the case. Ultimately, the case was referred back to the Chişinău Court of Appeal for re-examination. 11. On 28 January 2015, after rehearing the case, the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the Inspectorate's appeal, quashed the judgment of the Străşeni District Court of 26 December 2013 and rendered a new judgment whereby the applicant company's action was rejected as ill-founded. 12. On 10 June 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice declared an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant company inadmissible.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budenovsk, the Stavropol Region of the Russian Federation. He is a former military officer. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant sued his former employer military unit. 7. On 3 May 2001 the Military Court of the Pyatigorsk Garrison ("the military court") ordered, inter alia, the head of the respondent military unit to re-calculate the period of the applicant's service, applying the favourable terms of such calculation for the time when the applicant had participated in a military operation. The military court obliged the head of the military unit to issue the relevant orders, to calculate and to pay the applicant some additional payments and field allowance for the periods specified in the judgment. The judgment contained information on the indexes and other parameters that should be applied for the awarded amounts to be calculated. 8. On 14 May 2001 the judgment came into force. 9. In March 2002 the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the Department of the Federal Treasury in Budenovsk. 10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.

Ruled as violated by court

10. On 19 March 2002 the Department of the Federal Treasury returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that the military unit did not have an account there, and the judgment contained no specific amounts awarded to the applicant. 11. On 21 March 2002 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On the same day the enforcement proceedings were initiated. 12. On 19 February 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated and the writ was returned to the applicant without enforcement following his request to withdraw the writ. 13. In 2004-2005 the applicant applied to the domestic courts for clarification of the initial judgment with the view to establish the specific amounts due to him. The applicant's requests were dismissed as being lodged out of time. The courts noted that, in any case, the matter concerning the awarded amounts should have been resolved by way of an additional decision rather than clarification of a final judgment, and informed that an application for an additional decision should have been lodged before the entry into force of the main judgment. 14. It is not disputed between the parties that the judgment of 3 May 2001 remained unenforced in the part concerning the payment to the applicant of the second salary and the field allowances for the periods specified in the judgment. 15. On 24 March 2016, after communication of the present case, the Ministry of Finance of Russia calculated the amount due to the applicant under the judgment of 3 May 2001. According to this calculation, the main debt amounted to 80,220.74 Russian roubles.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, refer to the same context and domestic criminal proceedings as those described in the case Association "21 December 1989" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 6. During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime, on the night of 21/22 December 1989 the applicant's son was killed by gunfire in Bucharest. 7. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened several investigations into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communism demonstrations. A main criminal investigation concerning the use of violence against civilians in Bucharest and other cities was registered with the highest prosecutor's office – the military prosecutors section − under no. 97/P/1990 (current number 11/P/2014). In the main criminal investigation the applicant raised civil claims and asked that the perpetrators of the offence of homicide committed against her son be identified and punished. 8. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of complicity in seriously aggravated homicide and complicity in attempted seriously aggravated homicide, committed against a large number of persons, including the applicant's son, culminated in the committal for trial of public officials, members of the ruling political party, and their subsequent conviction by a final decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 20 April 1992. 9. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in the cases Association "21 December 1989" and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41) and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 10. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office closed the main criminal investigation, finding that the applicant's complaint regarding the offence of homicide committed against her son was statute-barred and that a complaint concerning instigation of homicide was a matter of res judicata following the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 20 April 1992 (see paragraph 8 above). 11. The decision of 14 October 2015 was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).

NOT ruled as violated by court

12. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 12, 3 July 2018).

The applicant received a trial. There is no relevance between fair trial and the ongoing criminal investigation.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract ("the contract") with the Ministry of Finance ("the Ministry") for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5. On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company's protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6. On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency's domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012). 7. The applicant company's claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court's case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company's representative on 31 March 2014. 8. On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9. In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency's domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).

Ruled as violated by court

4. On 30 November 2004 the applicant company signed a contract ("the contract") with the Ministry of Finance ("the Ministry") for an investment loan, expressed in the equivalent of the national currency, with the repayments calculated in euros (во денарска противвредност пресметана во евра). Clause 11 of the contract stipulated that a statutory default interest rate (затезна камата по стапка yтврдена со закон) was to be paid on all overdue repayments, which, according to an annex forming part of the contract, were expressed in euros. 5. On 4 September 2012 a bailiff issued an enforcement order under the terms of the contract. The applicant company's protest and appeal against the enforcement order were dismissed by both the President of the Ohrid Court of First Instance (Основен суд Охрид) and by the Bitola Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Битола), with the final decision being dated 3 April 2013. 6. On 17 May 2013 the applicant company lodged a civil claim against the Ministry seeking an annulment of clause 11 of the contract, claiming that, in accordance with domestic law, interest on the repayment of loans in foreign currencies should be calculated on the basis of that foreign currency's domestic rate (домицилна камата) instead of the statutory default interest rate. In that respect it relied on a judgment by the Supreme Court in which the same provision, contained in an identical contract regarding a State-granted loan to another person, had been annulled (Рев1. бр. 74/2012). 7. The applicant company's claim was dismissed by the Ohrid Court of First Instance and the Bitola Court of Appeal on 7 October and 13 January 2014 respectively, each holding that the loan had been approved in the national currency and therefore the statutory default interest rate applied. Neither court commented as to the Supreme Court's case-law. The final judgment was served on the applicant company's representative on 31 March 2014. 8. On 27 May 2015 insolvency proceedings were opened in respect of the applicant company. 9. In judgments Рев.1 бр. 168/2011 of 8 February 2012, Рев.1 бр.74/2012 of 6 December 2012 and Рев. бр. 202/2012 of 24 October 2013, the Supreme Court held that interest on State-granted loans which were to be repaid in amounts expressed in a foreign currency should be calculated on the basis of that currency's domestic interest rate. The Supreme Court took the stance that the loan repayment instalments were the determinative factor in the cases, and since, in those cases, the instalments had been expressed in a foreign currency, the statutory default interest rate was not applicable. The same stance was taken in two appeal court judgments (ТСЖ бр. 828/08 of 21 May 2008 and ТСЖ 1527/09 of 11 November 2009).

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicants are five Russian nationals. Their personal details are set out in the Appendix. They are members of one family. 7. Since 1981 the applicants have lived in a flat in an apartment block provided to them under a social tenancy agreement by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. The landlord was under obligation to perform a major overhaul of the apartment block, and the applicants had to make regular payments for the major overhaul. They paid the amounts due. The overhaul had never been performed, allegedly since 1935. 8. On the dates listed in the Appendix the Orenburgskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region granted their claims, having noted from expert reports that the apartment block was "64%‒dilapidated" and its state was "unsatisfactory", and that the flat was 64%‒dilapidated. The court found that the applicants' living premises, as well as the common property of the apartment block required a major overhaul. The court ordered the Federal State Institution of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit to perform the major overhaul of the applicants' flat, as well as of the common property of the apartment block and of the "devices situated in the living premises and serving for provision of communal services" in the apartment block, and to pay each applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 9. According to the applicants' observations, on 9 November 2011 the Orenburgskiy District Court awarded the claimants RUB 490,155.43 (approximately 11.681 euros) of compensation of losses. They did not enclose a copy of the judgment or further details as to either the defendant, or the exact list of claimants, the scope of the judgment or its subsequent challenge on appeal by any of the parties. 10. In 2012 Federal State Treasury Department (Управление) of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit became a legal successor of the debtor institution. 11. In 2012 the applicants sued various authorities for penalties for several years of the non-enforcement. By the final judgment of 5 February 2013 the Orenburg Regional Court rejected their claims in full, having found that they were based on an incorrect interpretation of the domestic law and that the applicants had failed to submit a calculation of the penalty. 12. According to the Government, in December 2013 the applicant's house was included in a regional housing overhaul assistance program. The authorities prepared a project and the budget documentation, which were approved by the experts. 13. On 13 April 2015 Ms Konstantinova privatized the flat and acquired a title to it. 14. According to the Government's latest observations of 31 May 2017, the judgments had remained unenforced at the material time.

Ruled as violated by court

8. On the dates listed in the Appendix the Orenburgskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region granted their claims, having noted from expert reports that the apartment block was "64%‒dilapidated" and its state was "unsatisfactory", and that the flat was 64%‒dilapidated. The court found that the applicants' living premises, as well as the common property of the apartment block required a major overhaul. The court ordered the Federal State Institution of the Privolzhsko-Uralskiy Military Circuit to perform the major overhaul of the applicants' flat, as well as of the common property of the apartment block and of the "devices situated in the living premises and serving for provision of communal services" in the apartment block, and to pay each applicant 3,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 12. According to the Government, in December 2013 the applicant's house was included in a regional housing overhaul assistance program. The authorities prepared a project and the budget documentation, which were approved by the experts. 14. According to the Government's latest observations of 31 May 2017, the judgments had remained unenforced at the material time.

There is no relevance between fair trial and enforcement of property overhaul.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant is a professor of law at a private university in Skopje. She holds a doctoral degree in the field of criminal law. 5. On 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice ("the Ministry") in order to be recognised as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination (изедначување со правата на лицата кои положиле правосуден испит). As she did not obtain a decision, she lodged two further requests, on 24 November 2011 and 6 February 2012. 6. On 11 April 2012 the Ministry rejected her request, holding that she did not meet the relevant criteria to obtain such recognition. In particular, the Ministry found that although she was a professor of law at a university, she did not hold a bachelor's degree in law (дипломиран правник на правен факултет). The Ministry further found that the bachelor's degree which she had obtained had been awarded by the Faculty of Security and Social Defence (Факултет за безбедност и општествена самозаштита), and not by a faculty of law, as required. 7. On 10 May 2012 the applicant brought an action with the Administrative Court (Управен суд), challenging the refusal. She argued that as a university professor at a faculty of law she met the relevant criteria. 8. On 30 May 2013 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's action. It held that regardless of her current status, she did not meet the criteria to obtain the desired recognition under domestic law. In particular, it established that the applicant did not hold a bachelor's degree in law, which was a condition for the recognition she sought. 9. On 23 September 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Administrative Court (Виш управен суд). She argued that she met the relevant criteria and that the lower court had failed to properly interpret the procedural and substantive law in the case. 10. On an unspecified date, the Ministry submitted observations to the Higher Administrative Court concerning the applicant's case. The Ministry stated in the observations that the right to obtain recognition as having the same status as a person who had passed the BAR examination was dependent on having a bachelor's degree issued by a faculty of law. The applicant did not possess such a degree and had therefore failed to meet the criteria under domestic law. Those observations were not communicated to the applicant. 11. On 30 January 2014 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, reiterating in full the reasons provided by the Administrative Court. It restated that the recognition sought by the applicant was dependent on her having a bachelor's degree issued by a faculty of law, a condition which she had failed to meet. 12. The decision was served on the applicant on 19 May 2014.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Blagoevgrad. 5. He had been employed by the National Security Service, at the Regional Office of Blagoevgrad, as an agent since 1998. On account of the nature of his duties, he had held a security clearance permitting him access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant's job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to him holding his post. 6. On 20 November 2013, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance allowing access to classified information. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of that revocation, apart from a reference to section 59, in relation with section 40 § 1 f) and h); section 41 c) and d), and section 42 a) and b) of the Classified Information Protection Act (see paragraphs 12 and 13 below). 7. The applicant lodged an appeal against the revocation with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 9 January 2014, upheld the revocation. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 8. On 6 March 2014, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of his employment was the revocation of his security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable precondition for him to be able to perform his duties. 9. The applicant challenged his dismissal at two levels of jurisdiction. He contested the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that he was not able to challenge, in the course of the procedure before the State Commission for Information Security, the facts on which the revocation of the security clearance permit was based. The Director of the National Security Service abused his powers in dismissing the applicant, who was not allowed an opportunity to defend himself. 10. By its judgment of 19 March 2015, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court rejected the applicant's claims, reasoning that the decision of the Director of the National Security Service to revoke the applicant's security clearance was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant's dismissal inevitable because he was no longer able to perform his duties. The court added that the applicant had exhausted the remedy provided by law by challenging the revocation decision, and that the latter had become final; in addition, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any questions related to its lawfulness. 11. On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.

Ruled as violated by court

11. On 11 July 2016, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment, confirming that the decision to revoke the applicant's security clearance was not amenable to judicial review.

The applicant was denied his right to a hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Adana. 6. On 8 March 2002 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation. 7. On 9 March 2002 the applicant's statements were taken by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During the interrogation, the applicant gave a detailed account of her acts within the illegal organisation PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party). 8. On 11 March 2002 the applicant was heard by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant partially retracted her previous statements maintaining that she had given statements to the police under duress. On the same day, upon the order of the investigating judge, the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention. 9. On 18 March 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal terrorist organisation under Article 168 of the former Criminal Code. 10. At a hearing held on 31 May 2002, the applicant gave evidence in person in the presence of her lawyer. She stated that she had left Turkey through her own means and that she went to Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Iran with the help of the people whose names she could not remember anymore. She further stated that she had stayed in camps in Greece and Iran. While she was at the camp in Iran she was not involved in many activities owing to her young age. She further maintained that she had wanted to return to Turkey due to her health condition and for family reasons. She further stated that she had turned back to Turkey through the mountains with the help of people who knew the area well. While the applicant was staying at her elder sister's house, she was arrested by the police. The applicant also claimed that she did not know any of the other accused in the case and that she had not received any training in the camps. Lastly, she stated that she had been called the code name "Ariel" at the camp in Iran. When asked about her statements to the police, the applicant denied them, claiming that they had been taken under duress. When asked about her statements to the public prosecutor, she denied them except for the parts concerning her travel. When asked about her statements to the investigating judge, she denied them claiming once again that the police had put pressure on her. 11. On 16 April 2008, relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 314 § 2 of the new Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced her to six years and three months' imprisonment. 12. On 23 December 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.

Ruled as violated by court

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise her right to defend herself. She did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sanski Most. 6. By a judgment of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 23 May 2005, which became final on 11 September 2007, the Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay the applicant 42,767 convertible marks (BAM)[1] on account of pecuniary damage together with default interest calculated from 23 May 2005 until final payment. 7. On 1 February 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the issuance of the writ of execution in his case, which request he amended on 30 August 2010. 8. On 18 October 2010 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 9. On 15 November 2010 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued the writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 18 March 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance rejected the objections against its decision of 15 November 2010, as well as the applicant's request for the payment of the costs of the enforcement proceedings. 11. On 31 May 2011 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance made certain corrections to its decision of 18 March 2011. 12. On 15 December 2011 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance quashed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 18 March 2011 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 13. On 26 March 2012 the applicant submitted a request for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance. 14. On 12 April 2012 the Banja Luka Court of First Instance partially granted the objection of the Republika Srpska against the writ of execution. 15. On 23 April 2012 the applicant appealed the decision of the Banja Luka Court of First Instance of 12 April 2012. On 11 June, 13 July, and 21 November 2012, and on 15 January 2013 the applicant submitted further requests for the acceleration of the proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance. 16. On 21 January 2013 the Banja Luka Court of Second Instance rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 12 April 2012. 17. On 7 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ruled in favour of the applicant that the enforcement proceedings before the Banja Luka Court of First Instance had not been finalised within a reasonable time. It further ordered the Banja Luka Court of First Instance to urgently expedite the enforcement proceedings in the applicant's case. The Constitutional Court considered this to be sufficient just satisfaction and rejected the applicant's claim for non-pecuniary damage. 18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.

Ruled as violated by court

18. On 8 November 2016 the final decision in question was enforced in cash, regarding the principal amount and the statutory default interests. On 5 July 2017 the costs of the enforcement proceedings and related statutory default interests were also fully paid to the applicant.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, according to the applicant's multiple requests for acceleration, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants are a family. They were born in 1971, 1968, 1992, 1995, and live in Samara. 5. On 26 April 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Samara ("the Oktyabrskiy District Court") ordered, inter alia, the management of the State unitary enterprise "16th Military Plant" ("the company") to provide the applicants with a suitable dwelling, while keeping their names on the list of persons awaiting housing. 6. On 11 May 2004 the judgment came into force. 7. On 28 May 2004 the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for Oktyabrskiy District of Samara opened the enforcement proceedings. 8. On 22 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated as the company had no available residential accommodation. 9. On 1 October 2007, due to the reorganisation of the company (see paragraph 16 below), the enforcement file was sent to the Department of the Bailiffs' Service for the Engelsskiy District of Saratov Region. 10. On 21 April 2008 the bailiffs ruled that it was impossible to enforce the judgment in the part relating to the housing, as the new debtor, FGUP 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 16 below), had no available accommodation. The enforcement proceedings were terminated. 11. On 26 August 2009 the Engelsskiy District Court of Saratov Region, following the bailiffs' application, replaced the debtor in the enforcement proceedings from FGUP 9 TSARZ to OAO 9 TSARZ (see paragraph 17 below). 12. On 14 October 2009 the Oktyabrskiy District Court clarified the judgment of 26 April 2004 stating that the applicants should be provided with an apartment in Samara. 13. Several times in 2004-2011 the parties applied to the Oktyabrskiy District Court for changing the mode of enforcement of the judgment. Each time the courts rejected the applications finding that a payment of the amount representing the cost of an apartment would be equal to modifying the original judgment. 14. The judgment of 26 April 2004 remained unenforced. 15. The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. According to its articles of association, the company's aim was to produce goods and render services for the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as for meeting other public needs and making a profit. 16. Under the Order of the Federal Agency for State Property Management dated 22 September 2005 the company was joined to FGUP 9 TSARZ (FGUP 9 Tsentralnyy Avtomobilnyy Remontnyy Zavod – ФГУП 9 ЦАРЗ or ФГУП 9 Центральный Автомобильный Ремонтный Завод). The reorganisation was completed on 13 February 2007, and the latter company became the universal successor of the company. 17. In accordance with the Decree of the President of Russia of 15 September 2008 and the Decree of the Russian Government of 22 November 2008, FGUP 9 TSARZ was further reorganized into OAO 9 TSARZ, a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant, who was born in 1948, lives in Corjova, a village under the formal control of Moldovan authorities, but where agents of the self‑proclaimed "Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic" ("MRT", see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VII for further details) frequently intervened during the events in question, notably by blocking the participation of the local population in elections held in Moldova. 6. On 3 June 2007 local elections were to be held in Moldova, including in Corjova. The applicant, who is an ambulance driver, submitted his candidature for the position of Mayor of Corjova. 7. On 1 June 2007, at 11 p.m., the applicant's ambulance was stopped by the "MRT" road militia and his documents (Moldovan national identity card and driving licence) were taken away from him without any explanation. 8. On 2 June 2007 the applicant went to the "MRT" militia station located in Dubăsari and asked for the return of his documents. He was then arrested and placed in a detention cell. A few hours later a person came to his cell and, without presenting himself, asked him about his work and his electoral propaganda. The applicant later found out that the visitor had been a judge and that, following that discussion in the cell, the judge adopted a decision, finding him guilty of the administrative offence of unlawful electoral propaganda and sentencing him to 15 days' administrative detention. 9. The applicant submits that he was not allowed to contact his relatives or to find a lawyer, and was not issued with a copy of the court's decision, which prevented any possibility of lodging an effective appeal against the decision of 2 June 2007. 10. During his detention the applicant was placed in a cell which, according to him was damp and cold. Food was given once a day. When the applicant's relatives, alerted by his absence, contacted the local authorities in order to find out about his fate, they were informed of the applicant's detention. However, their requests to transmit food to him were allegedly rejected. 11. On 17 June 2007 the applicant was released from detention and he was issued with a copy of the decision of 2 June 2007. The time-limit for lodging an appeal had already expired by that time. Upon release, he was allegedly coughing and was diagnosed with chronic acute bronchitis. He also claims that his eyesight worsened considerably. 12. In the meantime, on 6 June 2007, the applicant complained to the Moldovan prosecutor's office of his unlawful detention. Based on this complaint, a criminal investigation was initiated on 12 June 2007, the applicant and witnesses were subsequently heard. Three high-ranking "MRT" officers were charged and were declared wanted persons. However, on 4 August 2010 the investigation was suspended due to the fact that the three accused were hiding from it in the "MRT".

Ruled as violated by court

The applicant was not informed of the charge against him, nor allowed to defend himself.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Muğla. 6. On an unspecified date the applicant brought an enforcement order through a bailiff's office against her former husband, G.F., to collect alimony in arrears and accrued interest. 7. On 9 March 2006 G.F. objected to that order by bringing a case against the applicant before the Datça Enforcement Court. He requested that the court declare the enforcement order null and void on the grounds that he had made the payments in question in full. 8. In the first hearing G.F.'s representative requested the court to take out an expert report to determine whether the payments he had made corresponded to the alleged debt. The court adjourned its examination on the question whether an expert report would be sought to a hearing to be held on 10 May 2006. 9. In that hearing, the applicant's representative left it to the court's discretion for an expert to be appointed concerning the determination of the amounts that were already paid. The court therefore ruled for an expert to be appointed and scheduled another hearing for 7 June 2006. 10. In the meantime, but before the hearing of 7 June 2006, the applicant's representative requested that he be excused from that hearing since he had another scheduled court hearing elsewhere. 11. The court held the hearing as scheduled but noted that the applicant's representative was excused. In that hearing, the court noted that the expert report had been submitted in the case-file and read its contents out in the presence of G.F.'s legal representative. The latter asked the court to rule in accordance with the findings in the expert report, which had concluded that all the relevant alimony payments had been made. The court scheduled a hearing for 21 June 2006 holding that the absent party be notified. 12. On 21 June 2006, in its final hearing, the court ruled against the applicant on the basis of the expert report in question. Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at that hearing. There is no indication in the transcript of the hearing that suggests that the court examined whether the applicant's representative had been notified in due time. 13. On 31 July 2006 the applicant's representative lodged an appeal before the Court of Cassation, arguing that the notice for the court hearing of 21 June 2006 had been served on him only on 26 June 2006, resulting in him and her client missing the opportunity to participate in the hearing and submit their observations on the findings of the expert report. He explained in that connection that the expert's calculations had been erroneous and did not correspond to the bank transfer receipts in the case-file. 14. On 5 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 21 June 2006 without responding to the applicant's arguments. 15. The applicant's rectification request against that decision was rejected on 13 March 2007.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the applicant and their lawyer not appearing at the hearings threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The first applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. The second applicant is a privately owned company, founded by the first applicant in 1990, with its registered seat in Ilijaš - Podlugovi, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Directorate") rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 8. On 28 February 2003 the Federal Ministry upheld that decision. 9. On 28 March 2003 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review before the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Supreme Court"). 10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 11. On 22 November 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 21 October 2002 and 28 February 2003 (see paragraphs 7-8 above) on procedural grounds, and remitted the case to the Directorate. 12. On 9 May 2007 the second applicant informed the Supreme Court that the decision of 22 November 2006 had not been enforced yet. 13. On 16 August 2007 the Directorate rejected the second applicant's request. On 30 August 2007 the second applicant appealed. 14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 15. On 12 November 2007 the Federal Ministry upheld the decision of 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above). The decision was served on the second applicant on 18 April 2008. 16. On 30 May 2008 the second applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review with the Supreme Court seeking it to quash the decisions of 16 August 2007 and 12 November 2007 (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). On 31 August 2009 the Supreme Court referred the claim to the Mostar Cantonal Court, as the competent court. 17. On 27 November 2009 the Mostar Cantonal Court rejected the application for judicial review. 18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010. 19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Constitutional Court") complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.

Ruled as violated by court

6. On 19 December 2001 the second applicant requested a licence to build a petrol station on the main highway in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10. On 25 August 2005 and 24 August 2006 the second applicant urged the Supreme Court to expedite the proceedings. 14. On 8 November 2007 the second applicant complained to the Administrative Inspectorate of the Federal Ministry of Justice about the inaction of the administration. 19. On 6 September 2010 the second applicant lodged a constitutional appeal before the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Constitutional Court") complaining, notably, about the length of the above administrative proceedings. 20. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as unfounded. It noted that the relevant proceedings had lasted eight years and five months in total, that seven different decisions had been rendered by the competent authorities and that, therefore, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive.

7. On 21 October 2002 the Federal Road Directorate of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Directorate") rejected the request. The second applicant appealed on 31 October 2002. 18. On 6 January 2010 the applicant submitted a request for an extraordinary review of the decision of 27 November 2009 with the Supreme Court, which request was rejected as unfounded on 12 May 2010. That decision was served on the second applicant on 9 July 2010.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant, S.S. Yeniköy Konut Yapı Kooperatifi, is a housing construction cooperative under Turkish law operating in İzmir. 5. In 1993, a third party cooperative bought a plot of land measuring 12,000 square metres and the title deed of the land was registered in its name. In 1995, construction works started on the land in question. 6. In 2000, the forest administration initiated proceedings before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance for the annulment of the title deed to the land, alleging that it was part of the public forest area. In the meantime, the third party cooperative had merged with the applicant cooperative and the land had been registered in the Land Registry in the name of the latter. 7. On 26 December 2002 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance ordered that 9,322 square metres of the land be registered in the name of the Treasury as it was part of the public forest area. It also ordered that the buildings constructed on this part of the land be demolished. 8. Subsequently, the applicant brought a case before the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and sought pecuniary damages from the Treasury under Article 1007 of the Civil Code which provided for the State's responsibility for any damage resulting from the keeping of the land registry records. 9. On 4 February 2005 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance awarded 138,917,600,000 Turkish Liras (TRL – approximately 81,716 euros (EUR) at the time) to the applicant. 10. On 7 February 2006 the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance on the ground that there was no illegal act or action on the part of the land registry officials that might have had a causal link with the applicant's loss. 11. On 6 July 2006 the applicant submitted a further petition to the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance and indicated that there was a decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation which was in contradiction with the decision of the Fourth Civil Division. In this context, the applicant alleged that its case should be accepted according to that decision of the First Civil Division issued on 7 May 2002 and numbered E.2002/3549 K.2002/5807. 12. On 20 October 2006 the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance followed the decision of the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation and dismissed the applicant's claim. 13. The applicant appealed. Reiterating its allegations and referring to the decision of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation of 7 May 2002, it repeated its compensation request. 14. On 1 May 2007 the applicant's appeal was rejected by the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation. This decision became final. 15. In their decisions, neither the Menderes Civil Court of First Instance nor the Fourth Civil Division of the Court of Cassation expressed any reason about why they had reached a different conclusion from the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Zagreb. 5. On 28 April 2008 the daily newspaper B. published an article under the headline "Mob Lawyer joins the Supervisory Board", describing the applicant as an extortionist. 6. On 27 May 2008 the applicant's representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 7. On 9 July 2008, after the expiry of the deadline envisaged in the relevant provisions of the Media Act (Zakon o medijima) to publish a correction, the applicant brought a civil action against the publisher in the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), claiming non-pecuniary damage. 8. On 10 July 2009 the publisher replied stating in particular that the applicant had failed to submit a power of attorney with his request. 9. At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-à-vis the publisher. 10. On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant's claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request. The relevant part of the decision reads: "In his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ... ... This court does not accept the [applicant]'s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant's] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ... ... Given that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ..." 11. On 19 November 2012 the Šibenik County Court (Županijski sud u Šibeniku) dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision. 12. On 14 March 2013 the Constitutional Court declared a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant inadmissible on the grounds that there was "no constitutional issue" to be examined.

Ruled as violated by court

6. On 27 May 2008 the applicant's representative asked the publisher to publish a correction of that information. The publisher neither replied nor published a correction of the disputed information. 9. At a hearing held on 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court heard evidence from the applicant who said that he had authorised his representative to act on his behalf vis-à-vis the publisher. 10. On 31 January 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court, relying on sections 22(2) and 40(3) of the Media Act, declared the applicant's claim inadmissible. The first-instance court held that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information had not been signed by a duly authorised person because the applicant had not proved that his representative had actually submitted a power of attorney with the request. The relevant part of the decision reads: "In his testimony, the [applicant] stated that he had given power of attorney to his counsel, [Lj.P], authorising her to institute both criminal and civil proceedings for defamation ... He was present during the preparation of a draft of the request for the correction of the disputed information ... ... This court does not accept the [applicant]'s evidence because the [applicant] has no direct knowledge of what was ultimately sent to the defendant ... On the other hand, the [applicant's] statement concerning the granting of a power of attorney is of no relevance for the solution to the specific legal issue ... ... Given that the request for the publication of a correction of the disputed information was not signed by the [applicant], but by his counsel, [Lj.P.], and that it was not accompanied with a power of attorney, the [applicant] has not proved that he had properly requested the publication of a correction of the disputed information ... an action which is, pursuant to section 22(2) of the Media Act, a procedural requirement for bringing a civil action for non-pecuniary damage against the publisher ..."

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants were born in 1968, 1960, 1966, 1962, 1959, 1955 and 1954, respectively, and live in Novi Travnik and Bugojno, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6. By seven judgments of the Travnik Municipal Court and the Bugojno Municipal Court, of 19 January 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2011, 2 February 2009, 1 September 2009 and 9 April 2004, respectively, the applicants' employers, two companies manufacturing weapons and military technology, were ordered to pay them various sums in respect of unpaid work-related benefits together with default interest at the statutory rate and legal costs. The judgments became final on 24 August 2007, 15 May 2008, 19 January 2006, 26 November 2011, 20 August 2009, 13 October 2009 and 13 April 2005, respectively. 7. The applicants' winding-up petitions were rejected on 27 May 2010 and 14 February 2011, respectively, because the Federal Ministry of Energy had refused authorisation (see paragraph 14 below). Consequently, in accordance with the 2003 Insolvency Act, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina became liable for the debts of the applicants' employers (see paragraph 14 below). 8. The Sarajevo Municipal Court issued enforcement orders on 9 November 2011, 21 February 2012, 17 April 2012, 25 April 2012, 5 July 2012, 27 March 2012 and 9 August 2012, respectively, in which the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was designated as a debtor. They were transferred to the competent bank and were listed among the charges in the federal budget. 9. On several occasions thereafter the bank informed the competent courts that the enforcement was not possible because the budgetary funds intended for that purpose had already been spent. 10. The applicants complained of the non-enforcement to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Constitutional Court"). 11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation. 12. On the following dates in 2017 the final judgments in the applicants' favour were fully enforced: (i) on 10 January 2017 in respect of Mr Mujo Zahirović; (ii) on 9 January 2017 in respect of Ms Nedžvija Mandara; (iii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Miralem Mustajbegović; (iv) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Mr Nihad Hrnjica; (v) on 11 January 2017 in respect of Mr Zijad Džugum; (vi) on 17 January 2017 in respect of Ms Đevada Hodžić; and (vii) on 13 April 2017 in respect of Mr Fadil Pandžo. The payments made in the applicants' favour included the reimbursement of the costs sustained for the enforcement procedure.

Ruled as violated by court

11. On 17 March 2015 (decision no. AP 2892/13) the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in the applicants' cases on account of the prolonged non-enforcement of the final judgments in their favour. It ordered the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to take the necessary steps in order to secure the payment of its debt arising from the final judgments within a reasonable time. Although the applicants submitted a claim for non-pecuniary damages, the Constitutional Court did not award any compensation.

There is no relevance between fair trial and enforcement.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant is a Roman Catholic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo. 5. By decision of 9 May 2003, which became final and binding on 4 September 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina ("the Chamber") found that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had discriminated against the applicant in its enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. In order to remedy the situation it ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the relocation of public schools housed in the Archdiocese High School building in Travnik, and to reinstate the applicant in the premises within one year. The Chamber rejected a request by the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6. By an agreement of 21 May 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook to reinstate the applicant in the impugned premises by 1 July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the Travnik Municipal Council adopted the implementing decisions, and also one of the public schools was moved from the premises. 7. On 23 June 2010 the Travnik Municipal Council issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). On 5 October 2011 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 17 October 2011 the Travnik Municipal Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 16 May 2012 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 3 July 2012 the Travnik Municipal Court held that the decisions of the Chamber were not subject to enforcement proceedings. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (28 August 2017), the Travnik Cantonal Court had not yet ruled on the matter. 8. On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fully enforced the decision of 9 May 2003. 9. On 17 February 2017 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the public school remaining in its premises, requesting its relocation, as well as damages for the use of the premises for the period between 1 February 2014 and 1 June 2017. 10. On 14 July 2017 the Municipal Court in Travnik rendered a judgment in the applicant's favour, rewarding in full its claims finally specified in the proceedings, namely 270,360 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for pecuniary damages and 6,713 BAM for costs and expenses. The Municipal Court also ordered the respondent to vacate the applicant's premises within 30 days from receiving the judgment. On 20 December 2017 the Cantonal Court in Novi Travnik upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (20 February 2018), the Central Bosnia Canton submitted a revision petition to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the final judgment in these proceedings. It also appears that the public school has still not been relocated.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Kragujevac. 6. On 14 December 2006 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Kragujevac Clinical Centre requesting damages. In the course of the proceedings eleven hearings were held, whereas five hearings were scheduled, but were not held. 7. On 20 May 2011 the applicant's claim was rejected as unfounded by the Kragujevac Court of First Instance. 8. On 26 December 2011 the Kragujevac Appellate Court ("the Appellate Court") quashed the decision of 20 May 2011 and remitted the case to the first instance court. 9. In the resumed proceedings the applicant sought recusal of the acting judge twice, but both of his motions were rejected. 10. On 4 October 2012, after three held hearings and two hearings which were not held, expert examination and the increase of the applicants claim, the case was transferred to the Kragujevac High Court ("the High Court"). 11. On 20 March 2013, following the applicant's two other recusal requests, one of which was adopted, the High Court rejected the applicant's damages claim as unfounded. The applicant appealed. 12. On 21 August 2014 the Appellate Court rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 20 March 2013. Thereafter, the applicant filed an appeal on points of law, which was rejected by the Supreme Court of Cassation only on 21 December 2016. 13. In the meantime, on 7 February 2013, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court complaining about the length of the pending civil proceedings, seeking non-pecuniary damages in the amount of 3,000 euros and publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court transferred the case-file to the Appellate Court, as a competent court to deal with the length complaints of the pending cases, pursuant to Article 8a of the Law on the Organization of the Courts. However, on 23 September 2014 the Appellate Court established that it no longer had jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's complaint since it found that the civil proceedings had been finished. The applicant's case-file was thus returned to the Constitutional Court. 14. On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court returned the case-file to the Appellate Court, which on 28 November 2014 again found that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. The Appellate Court then transferred the case-file further to the Supreme Court of Cassation, as the competent court. The applicant appealed. 15. On 22 January 2015 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's appeal and upheld the decision of 28 November 2014. It also partially adopted the applicant's complaint concerning the length of the proceedings and awarded him 200 euros for non-pecuniary damage, whereas the rest of claim rejected. 16. On 21 October 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal in regards to the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court established that even though the impugned proceedings had lasted seven years and eight months, they were very complex and the applicant largely contributed to its length, whereas the competent courts acted efficiently.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1979. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. On 17 April 1999 the Fier District Court ("the District Court"), following proceedings in which the applicant did not take part, convicted the applicant and his two co-accused of a number of serious criminal offences. It sentenced the applicant to death in absentia. 7. On 1 June 1999 the Vlora Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal"), following appeals lodged by the two other co-accused, upheld the District Court's decision of 17 April 1999. 8. On 8 May 2001, following appeals lodged by the applicant's co‑accused, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts' decisions. However, it sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 9. On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania from Italy. He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day. 10. On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the District Court for leave to appeal out of time. 11. On 25 January 2007 the District Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 had become res judicata and that, consequently, the applicant could not be tried a second time for the same offence. 12. On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant's appeals, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision. 13. On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010. He also complained about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia. 14. On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, rejected the appeal by a majority. It found that the applicant's complaint against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010 was manifestly ill-founded. As regards his complaint about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia, and the domestic courts' dismissal of his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not complained about the domestic courts' decisions taken in absentia (see paragraphs 6-8 above). It further found that that complaint was in any event time-barred. It also reasoned that in the present case the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 1 of 20 January 2011 was applicable (see Izet Haxhia v. Albania, no. 34783/06, §§ 28-31, 5 November 2013). In addition, it noted that although the appeals before the Supreme Court against the lower courts' decision were lodged by the co‑accused and not the applicant, the Supreme Court had examined and amended the lower courts' decisions of 17 April and 1 June 1999 also in respect of the applicant. 15. On an unspecified date in 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the District Court's decision of 17 April 1999, the Court of Appeal's decision of 1 June 1999 and the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 complaining about his conviction in absentia. 16. On 21 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, considering that the two-year time-limit had started to run as from 8 May 2001. The decision was communicated to the applicant's lawyer on 25 September 2007.

Ruled as violated by court

9. On 1 December 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania from Italy. He was officially informed of his conviction in absentia on the same day. 10. On 8 December 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the District Court for leave to appeal out of time. 11. On 25 January 2007 the District Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision of 8 May 2001 had become res judicata and that, consequently, the applicant could not be tried a second time for the same offence. 12. On 8 June 2007 and 2 July 2010, following the applicant's appeals, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld that decision. 13. On 8 June 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010. He also complained about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia. 14. On 21 September 2011, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full bench, rejected the appeal by a majority. It found that the applicant's complaint against the Supreme Court's decision of 2 July 2010 was manifestly ill-founded. As regards his complaint about the unfairness of the proceedings in absentia, and the domestic courts' dismissal of his application for leave to appeal out of time, the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had not complained about the domestic courts' decisions taken in absentia (see paragraphs 6-8 above). It further found that that complaint was in any event time-barred. It also reasoned that in the present case the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 1 of 20 January 2011 was applicable (see Izet Haxhia v. Albania, no. 34783/06, §§ 28-31, 5 November 2013). In addition, it noted that although the appeals before the Supreme Court against the lower courts' decision were lodged by the co‑accused and not the applicant, the Supreme Court had examined and amended the lower courts' decisions of 17 April and 1 June 1999 also in respect of the applicant. 16. On 21 September 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal as having been lodged out of time, considering that the two-year time-limit had started to run as from 8 May 2001. The decision was communicated to the applicant's lawyer on 25 September 2007.

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the applicant not appearing at the proceedings threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Poltava. 6. On 18 April 2003 the applicant's employer, Grebinkivska District State Administration ("the Administration"), received a statement from the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office dated 17 April 2003 ("the prosecutor's statement"). The document analysed the amount of preventive social work performed by the applicant in connection with minors in 2002 and concluded that the applicant, as the head of the juvenile service department of the Administration, had no knowledge of the relevant law and displayed an irresponsible attitude towards her professional duties. The document contained a demand that the applicant be disciplined. 7. On 21 April 2003 the Administration examined the prosecutor's statement and decided to give the applicant a warning against the use of excessive formalism in her work. On 14 May 2003 the Administration informed the prosecutor's office of the actions taken in consequence of their consideration of the prosecutor's statement. 8. On 10 April 2004 the applicant brought civil defamation proceedings against the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office, Prosecutor Mr B., the Poltava Region prosecutor's office and the State Treasury of Ukraine, alleging that the prosecutor's statement contained untrue information relating to her professional activity and that this negative evaluation of her attitude to work had damaged her honour, dignity and professional reputation. She asked the court to order the Grebinkivskyy District prosecutor's office to retract the prosecutor's statement and to pay her compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 9. On 8 December 2005 the Pyryatynskyy District Court of Poltava Region applied defamation law as contained in the Civil Code of 2003, the Prosecutor's Office Act and the Information Act. It considered the case on its merits and allowed the applicant's claim in part. 10. On 17 July 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal did not challenge the approach of the first-instance court in considering the case under civil law defamation provisions. However, it disagreed with the application of the Civil Code of 2003 and applied the old Civil Code of 1963. It partly allowed the claim and increased the level of compensation awarded to the applicant for non-pecuniary damage. 11. On 20 September 2006 the State Treasury of Ukraine appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court. 12. On 6 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed the above decision of 17 July 2006 and closed the proceedings, finding that the case should not have been examined in civil proceedings. The court indicated that the prosecutor's statement should have been contested either before a superior prosecutor (in accordance with section 22 of the Prosecutor's Act) or before "a court". The Supreme Court also ruled that, according to paragraph 4 of Resolution no. 7 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dated 28 September 1990, entitled "on the application of legislation by the courts regulating defence of honour, dignity and reputation of citizens and organisations" ("the Resolution"), it was not possible to file a civil defamation claim in respect of statements contained in courts' decisions or decisions of various investigative bodies.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1984 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Rubtsovsk, Altai Region. 5. On 2 March 2011 the applicant was arrested. On an unspecified date he was charged with extortion and the murder of Vos. 6. On an unspecified date a trial by jury was opened in the applicant's case in the Altai Regional Court. 7. On an unspecified date the jury returned a guilty verdict against the applicant and three other defendants. By a judgment dated 17 May 2012 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years' imprisonment. 8. On 6 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the verdict on appeal, in view of contradictory conclusions contained in the jury's verdict, and remitted the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration. 9. On 30 January 2013 the jury returned a guilty verdict in respect of the applicant and three other defendants. 10. On 19 February 2013 juror V. made a statement addressed to the trial judge. She alleged that Ch., Vos's mother, had repeatedly talked to the jurors during the adjournments. Ch. had informed the jurors that it was the second trial and that the applicant and other defendants had already been found guilty of her son's murder. Ch. had also advised the jurors to check out the information concerning her son's murder on the Internet. V. had done so and, as a result, had been influenced by this information when finding the defendants guilty. It appears that the trial judge ordered an inquiry in response to V.'s allegations. 11. On 25 February 2013 Ch. submitted a written statement denying V.'s allegations. 12. On 26 February 2013 jury foreperson G. signed a statement in which she indicated that she "had not been aware" of any instances of undue influence on the jury by Ch. 13. On 27 February 2013 the Regional Court sentenced the applicant to nineteen years' imprisonment. 14. On 28 February 2013 the trial judge asked the bailiffs' service to conduct an inquiry in response to the statement made by juror V. 15. On 18 March 2013 the deputy head of the bailiffs' service responded to the trial judge as follows: "It follows from the reports submitted by the bailiffs ... and the bailiffs' group supervisor that on the relevant dates the jurors were supervised by the bailiff ... while they were in the courtroom or in the jurors' room. None of the jurors contacted [the bailiffs' service] as regards the [jurors'] security or interference with the fulfilment of the jury's duties." 16. Following an appeal lodged by the applicant and two other defendants, on 8 August 2013 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant's conviction. As regards the applicant's argument that Ch. had exerted undue influence on the jury, the court stated as follows: "[The court] rejects as unsubstantiated the argument ... that the jury's verdict was ... a result of unlawful influence exerted by Ch. According to the trial record, the jury members were selected in compliance with the requirements set out in [the rules of criminal procedure]. The materials in the case file show that ... Ch. did not exert undue influence on the jurors. [The court] discerns no violations of the rules of criminal procedure, including those alleged by [the defendants], that would justify the quashing of the verdict."

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1960. 6. At the time of the events the applicant was serving in the Turkish Army as a lieutenant-colonel. 7. On 8 May, 10 May and 11 May 2000, the applicant was interrogated by the military prosecutor within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against him for embezzlement. 8. On 16 June 2000 an arrest warrant was issued in respect of the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement. 9. 19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor's Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 10. On the same day, the applicant gave a power of attorney to a lawyer. 11. On 22 June 2000 the applicant's brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant's brother was released. 12. On 26 June 2000 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the General Staff Military Court charging the applicant with embezzlement under Section 131 of Military Criminal Code, involving in trade activities as a soldier under Additional Section 1 of Military Criminal Code and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628 (Law on Disclosure of Assets and Fight Against Bribery and Corruption). The siblings of the applicant, Şükrü Aymelek and Ulviye Toprakkıran were also charged with the same bill of indictment with embezzlement and breaching Article 13 of the Law No. 3628. 13. On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment. 14. On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 15. On 19 September 2002 the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier by the General Staff Military Court, composed of a military officer with no legal background and two military judges. 16. On 6 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the decision of the General Staff Military Court. 17. On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 18. On 17 December 2003 the General Staff Military Court found the applicant guilty for embezzlement and being involved in trade activities as a soldier, but reduced his prison sentence. The applicant appealed. 19. On 2 June 2004 the Military Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 17 December 2003. 20. On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness' written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21. On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant's request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness' statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.

Ruled as violated by court

9. 19 June 2000 the applicant applied to the Military Prosecutor's Office. He was placed in detention on remand on the same day by the General Staff Military Court. 11. On 22 June 2000 the applicant's brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was a lawyer, was also placed in detention on remand. On 10 April 2012 the applicant's brother was released. 14. On 19 September 2001, the applicant submitted a petition with the prison authorities, complaining that he had not been able to see his brother Şükrü Aymelek, who was also detained in remand. The applicant stated that he regretted that his brother was also in prison because of him, and requested to see him. 17. On 2 April 2003 the Military Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 September 2002 on procedural grounds and on the merits. 20. On 13 January 2014 the applicant requested from the Military Court of Cassation to reopen the criminal proceedings alleging that a witness who had not been heard, was ready to give statements before the court. The applicant submitted that witness' written statements to the Military Court of Cassation as well. 21. On 19 February 2014 rejected the applicant's request for reopening of the criminal proceedings, on the grounds that the witness' statements did not have any evidential value, which could warrant a lesser sentence or the acquittal of the applicant.

13. On 29 May 2001 the General Staff Military Prosecutor filed an additional bill of indictment and charged the accused with additional acts related to the crimes already stated in the first bill of indictment.

The applicant was denied his right to have witnesses examined.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. Ms Bazanova ("the first applicant") was born on 4 December 1964 and lives in Serpukhov. 5. On 6 October 2009 the first applicant, deputy head of the municipal administration at the time, was arrested on the charges of abuse of power and bribery. Ts. and K. alleged that they had bribed the first applicant in order to facilitate the purchase of plots of land. 6. On 19 November 2010 the Moscow Regional Court opened the trial in the first applicant's case. 7. On 23 March 2011 K. complained to the court that certain publications about the trial had an adverse effect on his private life. The information disclosed had been damaging to his reputation. His statements had been taken out of context and misconstrued. He also alleged that unknown persons had followed and threatened him in the courthouse. 8. On the same date Ts. lodged a similar complaint with the court. He alleged that the publications in the local newspaper about the trial and his role in it had been damaging to his reputation. 9. On 24 March 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to hold the trial in camera. He relied on the complaints lodged by K. and Ts. The court granted the prosecutor's request and decided to hold the trial in camera in order to protect the interests of the witnesses. 10. On 11 August 2011 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty on two counts of abuse of power and two counts of bribery and sentenced her to 7.5 years' imprisonment and a monetary fine. The first applicant appealed. 11. On 12 October 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the first applicant and her counsel, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the first applicant's conviction in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of Ts.'s attempt to purchase a plot of land) and quashed it in part (one count of abuse of power and one count of bribery in respect of K.'s attempt to purchase a plot of land) remitting the matter for fresh consideration. The court also reduced the first applicant's sentence and the amount of the fine. 12. On 8 October 2013 the Regional Court found the first applicant guilty as charged, as regards charges of abuse of power and bribery in respect of the bribe paid by K., and sentenced her cumulatively to 7 years and 3 months' imprisonment and a monetary fine. The court held a public hearing. It appears that the first applicant did not appeal against the judgment of 8 October 2013. 13. Mr Mukhachev ("the second applicant"), was born on 29 December 1976 and lived, prior to his conviction, in Zheleznodorozhniy, Moscow Region. 14. On 4 August 2009 the second applicant was arrested on the charges of extremism and fraud. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 15. On 31 March 2011 the Savelovskiy District Court of Moscow fixed the trial for 14 April 2011. The court decided to hold the trial in camera in order to ensure security for the parties to the proceedings and their family members. 16. On 30 September 2011 the District Court found the second applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to 9 years' imprisonment. The second applicant appealed. 17. On 14 December 2011, having heard the judge rapporteur, the prosecutor, the second applicant and his counsel and the counsel for the civil party, the Moscow City Court upheld, in substance, the second applicant's conviction on appeal.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the first applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir. 5. On 18 June 1998 the applicant started working for a company owned by İzmir City Council ("the City Council"). On 19 March 2007 he resigned from his job to perform his military service. 6. On 12 April 2007 the applicant was paid 16,985 Turkish liras (TRY ‑ approximately 9,200 euros (EUR)) in respect of severance pay and he signed a release (ibraname) discharging the City Council from all liability. 7. Following his discharge from the military on health grounds shortly after he was enlisted, on 20 April and 31 May 2007 the applicant requested his reinstatement in his previous job. However, his requests were rejected by the City Council. 8. On 28 June 2007 the applicant initiated proceedings before the İzmir Labour Court, seeking reinstatement. He relied on clause 19 of the collective bargaining agreement in force at the company ("the collective agreement"), which provided for the reinstatement of employees who had quit their jobs to perform their military service, provided that they applied within three months of their discharge from the armed forces. 9. On 12 September 2007, in a decision rendered orally in the presence of the parties, the İzmir Labour Court found in favour of the applicant. The Labour Court held that the applicant's discharge from the military shortly after he had been enlisted fell under the provision of the collective agreement, which called for the suspension of the employment contract when an employee was conscripted (silah altına alınma) for reasons other than compulsory military service, such as being recalled to the armed forces in times of war. Therefore it held that the applicant was entitled to be reinstated in accordance with the terms of the collective agreement. The court informed the parties that they could appeal against this decision within the time-limits set out in the applicable procedure. 10. On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant. 11. On 15 October 2007, the registry of the first-instance court forwarded the file to the Court of Cassation for appeal on points of law. 12. On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court's interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant. 13. On 21 July 2008, following an examination based on the case file and without holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the first‑instance court's judgment and found in favour of the City Council. The Court of Cassation found it established that the applicant had resigned from his job to perform his military service and that he had been paid severance pay. It held that a rejection of the applicant's request for reinstatement could not be regarded as the termination of the applicant's employment contract; therefore, the applicant could not technically ask to be reinstated. The Court of Cassation further held that clause 19 of the collective agreement was not directly applicable in the case before it. No appeal was possible against this decision. 14. This decision was served on the applicant on 22 September 2008.

Ruled as violated by court

10. On 18 September 2007 the City Council appealed against the decision and reserved its right to submit additional observations once the reasoned judgment of the first-instance court had been served on it. That appeal was not communicated to the applicant. 12. On 23 October 2007 the City Council submitted its additional observations. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court's interpretation of the collective agreement had been erroneous. These observations were also not communicated to the applicant.

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the applicant not being informed of the appeal threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Moscow. 7. In June 1998 he deposited 5,187.40 United States dollars in a three‑month account with Russian Credit, a private bank. 8. In August 1998 the country suffered a financial crisis, the rouble fell, and the bank defaulted. In December 1998 the applicant accepted the bank's offer to settle and close his account in return for the balance in depreciated roubles. By the time the money reached the applicant in March 1999, the rouble had depreciated further. 9. In October 1999 the bank went into external administration and its debt repayments were frozen pending a restructuring. 10. In May 2000 the bank and its creditors negotiated a group settlement of the pre-October 1999 debt and had it approved by the courts. The settlement discharged the bank from fines, penalties, default interest, and damages arising under legislation, contracts with clients, and court decisions. 11. In December 2001 the applicant sued the bank for the loss caused by the exchange-rate fluctuations between the day he had accepted the bank's offer and the day the money had arrived. The bank objected to that claim on the ground that it had extinguished its obligations by repaying the deposit to the applicant. On 17 April 2002 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow awarded the applicant 77,603.50 Russian roubles (RUB)[1]. 12. In May 2003 the applicant filed a writ of execution with a bailiff. 13. On 17 June 2003, on the application of the bank, the District Court terminated the enforcement of its judgment in view of the group settlement. The District Court said: Considering the nature of the legal relationship at issue, the court takes into account the fact that the enforcement proceedings have been instituted with the purpose of collecting from [Russian Credit] the liabilities that had come into existence before 18 October 1999 inclusive and, under the ... terms of the friendly settlement, are related to [the bank's] restructured liabilities subject to novation on the terms of the friendly settlement approved by a [court decision] that had defined the procedure and terms of the extinction of the liabilities. Pursuant to section 23 § 2 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings, the conclusion of a friendly settlement between a creditor and a debtor constitutes a ground for the termination of the enforcement proceedings, and therefore the [bank's] application shall be granted and the [enforcement proceedings] shall be terminated. 14. In July 2003, in reply to the applicant's query, the bank's external administrator informed the applicant that his deposit had not been on the books and that under the terms of the group settlement his judgment debt could not be paid. 15. On 14 August 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the District Court's decision, finding that the applicant's individual claim was to be settled with the group claim. The City Court said: When terminating the [enforcement] proceedings the [District Court] has referred to the provisions of section 439 of the Code of Civil Procedure and reached the conclusion that the terms of the said friendly settlement regarding the restructuring of the credit obligations of [Russian Credit] extended also to [the applicant]. The [City Court] agrees with the said conclusion of the [District Court] as based on the provisions of the law and confirmed by the circumstances of the present case.

NOT ruled as violated by court

The applicant was able to bring proceedings.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Vodnjan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 9 July 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Pula-Pola Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Puli-Pola) on charges of indecent behaviour. 7. He was tried in summary proceedings (skraćeni postupak). During the proceedings before the first- and the second-instance courts he was represented by a lawyer, M.K. 8. On 11 October 2011 the Pula-Pola Municipal Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment. 9. On 7 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Pula‑Pola County Court (Županijski sud u Puli-Pola), challenging the factual and legal grounds for his conviction and sentence. He did not ask that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 10. On an unspecified date in 2011, the Pula-Pola County Court, acting as the court of appeal, forwarded the applicant's appeal and the Pula-Pola Municipal Court's case file to the Pula‑Pola County State Attorney's Office (Županijsko državno odvjetništvo u Puli-Pola) for their examination and opinion. 11. On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows: "In the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 § 2 in conjunction with Article 192 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses. I consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status." The submission in question was not forwarded to the defence. 12. On 20 January 2012 the Pula-Pola County Court held a session which the parties did not attend. On the same day it dismissed the appeal as unfounded and upheld the first-instance judgment. 13. On 13 March 2012 the applicant, represented by lawyer V.D.L., lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial had been violated because the submission of the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office had not been communicated to the defence. 14. On 14 January 2016 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint as unfounded. It held that the fact that the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office submission of 12 July 2013 had not been forwarded to the applicant had not breached his constitutional rights, having regard to the content of the submission, the fact that he had been tried in summary proceedings and that he had not asked that he or his lawyer be invited to the session of the appeal panel. 15. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 2 February 2016.

Ruled as violated by court

11. On 7 December 2011 the Pula-Pola County State Attorney's Office returned the case file to Pula-Pola County Court accompanied by a submission which read as follows: "In the criminal case against Slobodan Kliba, accused of the criminal offence referred to in Article 193 § 2 in conjunction with Article 192 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the defence lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Pula Municipal Court No. K-344/10 of 11 October 2011 complaining about errors of facts, alleging that the Criminal Code had been violated and challenging the sanction as well as the decision concerning costs and expenses. I consider the appeal unfounded, therefore I propose that it be dismissed as in my opinion the facts in the criminal proceedings in question were duly established. The Criminal Code was not violated and the sanction inflicted is appropriate, considering the type and seriousness of the criminal offence of which the accused was found guilty. The costs of proceedings were properly estimated and can be borne by the accused, regard being had to his financial status." The submission in question was not forwarded to the defence.

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the defence not being informed of the appeal threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1977. 7. On 25 April 1999 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen persons. On the same day, she underwent a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted no sign of injury on her body. 8. On 26 April 1999 police officers at the Istanbul Security Directorate took statements from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant confessed that she was a member of the illegal organisation and admitted having planned an attack on a shopping centre and having acted as a lookout while other co-accused started a fire by throwing Molotov cocktails at the shopping centre, killing thirteen persons in March 1999. 9. On 27 April 1999 the applicant was required to confront with two other co-accused before the police, in the absence of a lawyer. According to the record of the confrontation she admitted having carried out the attack on the shopping centre with those two and another co-accused. 10. On the same day an identification parade took place at the Istanbul Security Directorate, in the absence of a lawyer, where one of the eyewitnesses of the incident identified the applicant in front of police officers and the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. 11. On the same day the applicant was also required to participate in a reconstruction of the events (yer gösterme). According to the record drafted by police officers and signed by the applicant, the applicant described in detail what steps she had taken before the attack on the shopping centre and indicated how she had acted as a lookout while the other co-accused threw Molotov cocktails in the shopping centre. 12. On 30 April 1999 the applicant was seen by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institution who noted in his report that the applicant bore no traces of ill-treatment. 13. On the same day, the applicant was heard by the Istanbul Public Prosecutor and by the investigating judge, still in the absence of a lawyer. In her statements before both the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied the accusations and maintained that her statements to the police had been given under duress. Subsequently, the investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. 14. On 6 May 1999 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, and charged the applicant with carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 15. The state security courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 16. On 7 May 2007 relying on, inter alia, the applicant's statements to the police, the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced her to life imprisonment for membership of an illegal organisation and the murder of thirteen people. In delivering its judgment, the Assize Court further took into consideration several items of evidence, such as the applicant's statements to the police, public prosecutor and investigating judge, video recordings and written records of the crime scene visits, autopsy reports, eyewitness identifications, and the statements given by some of the accused persons. 17. On 7 May 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first instance court.

Ruled as violated by court

The applicant was denied her right to defend herself.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 5. The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service ("the Service"), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant's employment. 6. On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position. 7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts ("the DEJA") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 12. It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.

Ruled as violated by court

7. On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant's three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8. This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9. On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10. On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11. On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts ("the DEJA") initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 13. On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14. On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant's request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16. On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive an enforcement proceeding hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Toretsk. 5. In December 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Dzerzhynsk Court against the Social Insurance Fund ("the Fund"), seeking damages for injuries caused by a work-related accident. 6. By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7. In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal ("the statement of intent"; заява про апеляційне оскарження). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8. In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant's appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund's appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 9. According to the transcript of the court hearing on 18 March 2008, the applicant's representative stated during the hearing that the applicant had lodged the statement of intent on 25 January 2008 and the appeal itself on 13 February 2008. She also stated that they were not challenging the judgment of 17 January 2008 as regards the application of the law but rather were merely seeking an award of the full amount of damages claimed by the applicant. The applicant's representative also asked the Court of Appeal to reject the Fund's appeal. The applicant submitted that at the hearing his representative had also produced a copy of his appeal and had asked the Court of Appeal to join it to the case file; however, the latter refused to do so. 10. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11. On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant's appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant's argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant's appeal in cassation had been lodged in "April 2007".

Ruled as violated by court

6. By a judgment of 17 January 2008, the above court allowed the claim in part and awarded the applicant certain amounts in damages. The applicant and the Fund both sought to appeal against that judgment. 7. In particular, on 25 January 2008 the applicant lodged through the Dzerzhynsk Court a statement of intent to lodge an appeal ("the statement of intent"; заява про апеляційне оскарження). The copy of the statement of intent submitted to the Court bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp with reference number 1561 showing 25 January 2008 as the date of receipt. On 13 February 2008 the applicant lodged the appeal itself, in which he requested that the appellate court quash the judgment of 17 January 2008 and award him the claimed damages in full. A copy of the appeal bears the Dzerzhynsk Court's stamp, with 13 February 2008 showing as the date of receipt. The applicant stated that no separate procedural decisions had been made about his appeal because it had been mislaid by the court. 8. In a ruling of 18 March 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, rejected it as unsubstantiated and upheld the judgment of 17 January 2008. The ruling did not mention the applicant's appeal, and only stated that at the hearing, which was held on the same day, the applicant and his representative had contested the Fund's appeal and had asked the court to reject it. 10. The applicant appealed in cassation to the Supreme Court of Ukraine. A copy of the appeal in cassation submitted to the Court shows that the applicant had dated it 17 May 2008. In it the applicant stated that he had lodged an appeal against the judgment of 17 January 2008 but that when he had arrived at the appellate hearing on 18 March 2008, it transpired that his appeal had been mislaid and his submissions had therefore not been examined by the Court of Appeal. He thus asked the Supreme Court to quash the ruling of 18 March 2008 and to remit the case for fresh examination. 11. On 27 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to grant leave for the applicant's appeal in cassation. It stated that the Court of Appeal had examined the appeal lodged by the Fund, but that the applicant had not personally appealed against the judgment of 17 January 2008 and for this reason the case could not be reviewed in cassation. It did not address the applicant's argument that he had indeed lodged an appeal, but that it had been mislaid. The decision of the Supreme Court indicated that the applicant's appeal in cassation had been lodged in "April 2007".

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the miscommunication of the applicant's appeal threatens this right.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in Peqin in 1977. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 7. In 1998 the applicant was implicated in the commission of the criminal offence of setting up and being a member of an armed gang and of other criminal offences. 8. On 4 February 1999 the prosecutor charged him with the offences of membership of an armed gang, attempted intentional murder and other crimes. The notification of the prosecutor's charges was acknowledged by the applicant's officially appointed lawyer. 9. It appears that throughout the investigation proceedings the applicant was represented by an officially appointed lawyer. 10. On 12 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court ordered the applicant's arrest. However, the order could not be enforced as the applicant could not be traced. 11. On 19 February 1999 the Elbasan District Court declared the applicant a fugitive from justice after unsuccessful attempts to locate him. The decision stated that it was impossible to find him as it appeared that he had escaped to an unknown destination (këto kërkime nuk kanë bërë të mundur kapjen e të pandehurit pasi ai rezulton të ketë ikur në drejtim të paditur). 12. On an unspecified date the prosecutor decided to commit the applicant for trial. 13. On 28 May 1999 the Supreme Court transferred the case for examination to the Durrës District Court. 14. On 2 June 1999 the applicant's father appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant before the domestic courts. 15. The trial proceedings against the applicant were conducted in absentia and he was represented by a lawyer appointed by his family in accordance with Article 48 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("CCP"). 16. On 15 February 2000 the Durrës District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of establishing and participating in an armed gang and attempted intentional murder. He was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. The decision was based on evidence from documents and witness testimony. 17. The applicant's family-appointed lawyer and the other co-accused appealed against the conviction to the Durrës Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal"). On 19 April 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the applicant's appeal on the grounds that the applicant's family had not given any express authority to the lawyer for such a procedure. However, the Court of Appeal examined the applicant's case as part of its overall examination, having regard to the appeals of the other defendants. It convicted the applicant of the same offences as before and sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment. 18. On 7 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed appeals by the applicant and other co-accused against the Court of Appeal's decision of 19 April 2000. 19. On 16 September 2005 the applicant was arrested by the Czech authorities on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by Albania. 20. On 25 January 2006 the applicant was extradited to Albania. 21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia. 22. On 13 September 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against the conviction in absentia. 23. On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court, sitting in camera, declared the appeal time-barred as the two-year time-limit had started to run on 7 December 2000. The Constitutional Court's reasoning stated that throughout the proceedings the applicant had been represented by a court‑appointed lawyer or a family-appointed lawyer and that accordingly he had had the opportunity to become acquainted with the proceedings brought against him.

Ruled as violated by court

21. On 1 March 2006 the applicant was officially informed of his conviction in absentia.

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance," as he was not in attendance at the proceedings, but his father-appointed and court-appointed lawyers were.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6. On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Three other co‑defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7. On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant's absence. 8. On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant's extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction. 9. On an unspecified date in October 2007 the applicant lodged his appeal. In the first place, he requested that his case be re-examined separately from that of his co-defendants on the grounds that he had not sought the use of the summary procedure. He relied on the Supreme Court's unifying decision no. 2 of 29 January 2003 (see paragraph 16 below). Secondly, he requested that a fresh examination of the evidence be conducted in his presence and that a number of witnesses be questioned. Thirdly, he maintained that the authorities had failed to inform him about the judicial proceedings before the first-instance court. 10. On 17 December 2007 the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction in absentia. The court ruled that the applicant had not put forward new evidence to change the outcome of those proceedings. His request had been directed against the probative value of evidence which had already been examined and decided upon. In upholding the conviction, the court relied on forensic evidence produced in 1997 and 1999 and on witness statements made in 2001 and 2002. The court further stated that the applicant had been duly informed as the authorities had issued a public notice. It finally noted that the summary procedure had been applied equally to all the defendants in accordance with the Supreme Court's unifying decision of 29 January 2003 (see "Relevant domestic case law below"). Separating the cases could not be considered as the district court had not decided on that issue. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision. He complained of a breach of his right to have witnesses questioned and evidence re-examined. He stressed the fact that in his appeal to the Court of Appeal he had asked for evidence to be obtained, including an identification parade, the questioning of a fourth person who had been present at the events, a face-to face confrontation between himself and the other co-defendants and so on. It had not been possible for him to obtain that evidence himself, only the courts or the prosecutor could have done that. The applicant also maintained the other complaints he had raised in his Court of Appeal case. 12. On 5 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that it lacked any grounds of appeal as prescribed by law. 13. On 21 February 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court. 14. On 9 May 2011 the applicant's lawyer was notified of the Constitutional Court's decision that his appeal was inadmissible.

Ruled as violated by court

6. On 9 July 2002, following proceedings in absentia, the Gjirokastër District Court convicted the applicant of attempted armed robbery, negligent homicide and premeditated murder in relation to another criminal offence, and sentenced him to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Three other co‑defendants, whose requests for the use of the summary procedure had been granted, were also found guilty. The applicant was represented by a court-appointed lawyer. 7. On 7 October 2002, following an appeal by the three other defendants, the Gjirokastër Court of Appeal upheld the decision in the applicant's absence. 8. On 10 October 2007, upon the applicant's extradition to Albania, the District Court accepted his application for leave to appeal out of time. The District Court stated in its reasoning that the postal service had noted that the applicant was living in Italy and that as a consequence he had not been aware of his conviction.

While the applicant had a court-appointed lawyer, he appears denied of his rights to be informed of the charges and examine witnesses.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Simferopol. She is a single mother and has a son who at the time of the accident in question was eight years old. 5. On 24 July 1995 the applicant was knocked down by a trolley bus. She suffered an open craniocerebral injury and contusion of the brain. As a result, the applicant received the status of a disabled person with the lowest degree of disability (третя група інвалідності). 6. In January 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Tsentralnyy District Court against the Simferopol Trolley Bus Company, claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to her health caused by the accident. In particular, as pecuniary damage the applicant claimed compensation for medicines, additional nutrition, treatment in a sanatorium, transport expenses, and compensation for loss of earnings. 7. On 25 February 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Court (Litvinyuk v. Ukraine, no. 9724/03) complaining, inter alia, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the lengthy examination of her case by the domestic courts. 8. On 1 February 2007, while the proceedings were still pending before the national courts, the Court delivered a judgment on the applicant's first application (no. 9724/03), finding that the length of the proceedings in her case had been excessive. The Court took into consideration the period after 11 September 1997, when the Convention had come into force in respect of Ukraine. The length of the proceedings within the Court's competence was nine years and twenty two days. 9. The Court, in particular, noted the following: "47. As for the issues that were at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that following the traffic accident the applicant was seriously injured and received a disability degree. Given that the applicant was a single mother and had a child to raise, the compensations for loss of earnings and for expenses sustained as a result of a poor state of her health were of undeniable importance for the applicant. The Court therefore considers that what was at stake for the applicant called for an expeditious decision on her claims." 10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 11. On 13 May 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court partly found for the applicant. On 29 July 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 15 October 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal. 12. On 10 November 2009 the Simferopolskiy District Court left the applicant's case without consideration because she had failed to appear in court without giving plausible reasons on 28 October 2009 and 10 November 2009. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision stating that she had not been aware about the above-mentioned hearings. On 27 January 2010 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea rejected the applicant's appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been duly notified about the date of the hearings. On 5 October 2011 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decisions of the lower courts. A further attempt by the applicant to have the above decisions reviewed in the light of newly discovered circumstances was to no avail.

Ruled as violated by court

10. On 27 March 2007 the Simferopolskiy District Court found against the applicant. On 24 December 2007 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea quashed this decision and remitted the case to a first-instance court for fresh examination. On 23 April 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of the court of appeal.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants were born in 1954, 1952, 1964, 1926, 1952, 1960 and 1956 respectively and live in Donetsk. 6. From the beginning of April 2014 armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic" (the "DPR" and "LPR"). 7. In response, on 14 April 2014 the Government, who consider the armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an "anti-terrorist operation". 8. In June 2014 the armed groups started to seize offices of the National Bank of Ukraine and other regional financial institutions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 9. On 24 July 2014 the Ukrainian postal service Ukrposhta suspended its operations on the territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government, because of frequent attacks on its vehicles and employees by armed groups. 10. On 6 August 2014 the National Bank of Ukraine suspended all financial transactions on the territories outside the control of the Government (see paragraph 20 below). 11. Government forces recaptured some territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside the Government's control since that time. One part of the Donetsk region not under the Government's control is the city of Donetsk. 12. On 2 September 2014, following changes in the law, jurisdiction of the courts in the non-controlled areas was transferred to the relevant courts in the neighbouring regions on the territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 34 to 36 below). 13. On 11 November 2014 all social benefit payments in the settlements of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions that were outside the control of the Government were suspended (see paragraph 26 below) 14. In December 2014 the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court and the Donetsk Regional Administrative Court of Appeal were relocated to the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, territory controlled by the Government (see paragraphs 37 and 38 below). 15. The applicants were registered as recipients of social benefits with different departments of the Pension Fund of Ukraine in Donetsk. Some applicants had been receiving their social benefits until 30 June 2014, others until 31 August 2014. 16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 18. The other applicants did not apply to the relevant social authorities on the territory controlled by the Government for reinstatement of their social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and "DPR" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.

NOT ruled as violated by court

16. On 16 June 2015 the first and second applicants registered themselves with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Krasnoarmiysk District of the Donetsk region (currently the city of Pokrovsk), controlled by the Government. On the same day their social benefits was reinstated, including social benefits due to them for the period 1 July 2014 to 16 June 2015. 17. The sixth applicant was registered with the Labour and Social Security Department of the Obolonskiy District in Kyiv on 9 September 2015. However, she did not apply for reinstatement of her social benefits. 19. According to the Government, the sixth and seventh applicants travelled from Donetsk to the territory controlled by the Government after their social benefits had been suspended. The Government provided a certificate from the State Customs Office stating that the sixth and seventh applicants had entered the territory controlled by the Government on 31 October 2015, through an authorised checkpoint near the frontline between Ukrainian forces and "DPR" armed groups in the town of Zaitseve.

There is no relevance between fair trial and suspension of benefits as mentioned in the fact pattern.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. On 23 December 2004 the applicants and 126 others lodged a claim with the Komárno Land Office, an authority that is now part of the Komárno District Office ("the Land Office"), for restitution of land under the Restoration of Land Ownership Act (Law no. 503/2003 Coll., as amended). 6. On 27 May 2010 the Land Office dismissed the claim on the grounds that all the claimants lacked standing to bring it. 7. On 21 November 2011 the Nitra Regional Court upheld that decision following an administrative-law appeal by the claimants, lodged on their behalf by four individuals. 8. However, following an appeal lodged by the claimants with the Supreme Court, on 29 January 2014 that court quashed the Regional Court's judgment and remitted the case to it on the grounds that the latter had failed to establish the representatives' authority to act on behalf of all the claimants. The proceedings before the Regional Court had been conducted merely in the presence of the designated representatives and the court had failed to summon the claimants in person and to have its judgment served on them. It had thereby breached the claimants' right of access to a court. 9. Accordingly, it became incumbent on the Regional Court to determine anew the claimants' administrative-law appeal against the decision of the Land Office of 27 May 2010. In those proceedings, the court invited the claimants to clarify issues concerning their legal representation with a view to ensuring that they would be represented by a common representative. 10. In a decision of 4 December 2014 the Regional Court issued several rulings. In so far as relevant for the present application, it ruled that the claimants would all be jointly represented by a lawyer who had up until then represented only some of them. 11. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 4 December 2014 following an appeal lodged by the claimants. 12. The proceedings are still pending before the Regional Court. 13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in "Relevant domestic law and practice" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.

Ruled as violated by court

13. Meanwhile, on 21 January 2015 the Constitutional Court had rejected a complaint lodged by the applicants about the length of the proceedings in their claim, in so far as they had taken place before the Land Office and the Regional Court. The Constitutional Court held that the length of the administrative proceedings before the Land Office and of the judicial‑review proceedings held before the Regional Court could not be considered together. Having split the complaint into those two segments, the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint concerning the administrative proceedings on the grounds of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, it noted that the applicants had failed to challenge the alleged inactivity of the Land Office under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (see paragraphs 19 et seq. in "Relevant domestic law and practice" below). As regards the judicial-review proceedings, the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that those proceedings as a whole had lasted some four and a half years. However, the case had been pending on appeal before the Supreme Court for about two years of that period. Although the length of the appellate proceedings had been unsatisfactory, as such it had not been complained of by the applicants, who had limited their compliant to the proceedings before the Regional Court. In addition, the Constitutional Court observed that the proceedings had been procedurally complex on account of the number of claimants. In sum, despite the fact that its judgment had been quashed as flawed, the length of the proceedings before the Regional Court had not been excessive.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Constitutional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1974 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 8 March 1995 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. The applicant's right of access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody according to the now defunct Law no. 3842. On the same day he was examined by a doctor at his own request. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 7. On 16 March 1995 the applicant was taken part in "an identification parade with statements (ifadeli yüzleştirme tutanağı)" with other accused persons and identified, in the absence of a lawyer, certain persons as members of the said organisation and confessed to committing a murder. 8. On 26 March 1995 the applicant further participated in the reconstruction of the events (olay ve yer gösterme) in the course of which he had confessed, in the absence a lawyer, having carried out an arson attack. 9. On 29 March 1995 the applicant was questioned by the police officers in the absence of a lawyer. In his statement, the applicant gave a detailed description about his involvement in Hizbullah. 10. On 5 April 1995 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively, again in the absence of a lawyer. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied his police statements claiming that he had been subjected to torture. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's detention on remand. On the same day and before his statements were taken, he had been examined by a doctor at the request of the police. The doctor noted, in a police document, that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 11. On 12 April 1995 he was examined by a doctor at his own request claiming that he had been subjected to torture while in police custody. The doctor noted that there was no sign of physical violence on the applicant's body. 12. On 2 May 1995 the applicant gave evidence as complainant before the public prosecutor and stated that the had been subjected to various forms of torture, which included beatings, electric shock treatment, blindfolding, hosing with cold water, and being stripped naked. 13. On 23 May 1995 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and several other persons. The applicant was accused of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, proscribed by Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 14. On 19 October 1995 the State Security Court held the first hearing in the case. 15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 16. On 31 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17. On 11 December 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 31 March 2005 in respect of some of the accused, including the applicant, and remitted the case to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 18. On 9 November 2007, the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment again. 19. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the first-instance court's judgment.

Ruled as violated by court

The applicant was denied his right to defend himself.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Bern, Switzerland. At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, he was the editor‑in-chief of Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper published in Turkey. 6. On 6 July 2004 an article written by Mr B.G. entitled "Analysing the Kurdish dynamic correctly" was published in Ülkede Özgür Gündem. In his article, Mr B.G. stated his views on the role of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (an illegal armed organisation), a number of organisations associated with the PKK in regional and international politics and political developments in Turkey. Next to the article a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan shaking hands with a group of armed men was published. 7. On 8 July 2004 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul Assize Court filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating propaganda in favour of the KONGRA-GEL[1] under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) on account of the article published on 6 July 2004. In the indictment, the public prosecutor quoted the following passage from the article: "... Abdullah Öcalan, who has contributed to the essential dynamic of the Kurdish movement and the HPG[2], the PJA[3] and the KONGRA-GEL, organisations which have acted as military, political and ideological leaders and which have represented his leadership,... [must be well understood]". The public prosecutor stated that a photograph of Abdullah Öcalan in which he was standing in a rural area holding a weapon had been published in the newspaper, next to the article. The public prosecutor considered as a result that the applicant had disseminated propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation inciting others to violence or other methods of terrorism. Subsequently, criminal proceedings were launched against the applicant before the Istanbul Assize Court. 8. During the proceedings the applicant maintained that the article in question had been a news article and had not contained propaganda inciting to violence. 9. On 24 May 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant of disseminating propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713 and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and a fine. In its judgment, the Istanbul Assize Court held that the content of the article and the publication of Abdullah Öcalan's photograph amounted to dissemination of propaganda in favour of the PKK/KONGRA-GEL. 10. The applicant appealed. In his appeal petition, referring to a number of the Court's judgments, the applicant claimed that he had not had the intention of disseminating propaganda in favour of a terrorist organisation and that his criminal conviction had been in breach of Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention as he had been exercising his right to impart information. He also noted that the first-instance court had failed to examine the article in its entirety. 11. On 16 May 2006 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation returned the case file to the first-instance court and requested that the latter revise its judgment in the light of the recent legislative amendments. 12. On 28 September 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court once again convicted the applicant under section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, with the same reasoning that it had adopted on 24 May 2005. The court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 1,802 Turkish liras (TRY). 13. The applicant appealed. 14. On 18 November 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 28 September 2006. 15. According to a document dated 15 January 2010, signed by the President of the Istanbul Assize Court and the Istanbul public prosecutor, the applicant was required to pay the fine of TRY 1,802.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants were born in 1931, 1972, 1948, 1965, 1970, and 1964 respectively, and live in Golubovci. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicants intervened, as injured party, in criminal proceedings against X, in the course of which they sought 2.705,70 euros (EUR) as compensation for legal costs. 8. On 14 October 2008 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found X guilty and, inter alia, ordered him to pay the applicants 505.70 euros (EUR) for the costs of legal representation, without specifying what exactly was covered by this amount. 9. On an unspecified date X and the High State Prosecutor appealed. 10. On 30 March 2009 the applicants appealed in respect of costs and expenses. On 6 May 2009 the High Court transmitted the applicants' appeal to the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica. 11. On 22 September 2009 the Court of Appeal ruled on the appeals lodged by the High State Prosecutor and X. The applicants learned of this judgment on 27 May 2010 when checking the case-file at the High Court. It was served on them on 3 October 2013. 12. On 28 May 2010 the applicants complained to the President of the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeal had failed to rule on their appeal. 13. On 7 June 2010 the President of the Supreme Court notified them that she had been informed by the High Court President that the case file had been "at the Court of Appeal in order for it to rule on [their] appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings given that it had not been ruled upon by [its] judgment of 22 September 2009". 14. On 24 October 2011 the applicants requested the President of the High Court to transmit the case file to the Court of Appeal given that they had learnt that the file had been archived in the High Court, contrary to what that court had said to the President of the Supreme Court. 15. On 11 January 2012 the applicants again complained to the President of the Supreme Court. 16. It would appear that the Court of Appeal has not ruled on the applicants' appeal. 17. On 14 March 2011, in the absence of any ruling by the Court of Appeal, the applicants filed a compensation claim against the State. 18. On 17 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica rejected the claim (odbacuje se) finding that the High Court had awarded them the costs, which judgment had become final in the meantime, and that the issue was thus res iudicata. 19. On 7 July 2011 the High Court upheld this judgment. 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 21. On 8 December 2011 the High Court issued a decision ordering its finance department (računovodstvo) to pay the applicants' representative the amount awarded by the High Court on 14 October 2008. This decision became final on 5 January 2012, given that no appeal was lodged against it. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.

Ruled as violated by court

8. On 14 October 2008 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found X guilty and, inter alia, ordered him to pay the applicants 505.70 euros (EUR) for the costs of legal representation, without specifying what exactly was covered by this amount. 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.

13. On 7 June 2010 the President of the Supreme Court notified them that she had been informed by the High Court President that the case file had been "at the Court of Appeal in order for it to rule on [their] appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings given that it had not been ruled upon by [its] judgment of 22 September 2009". 20. On 12 July 2012 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) dismissed the applicants' constitutional appeal, considering that there was no violation of Article 6 as res iudicata was indeed a procedural obstacle which prevented further proceedings. It further held that the applicants' dissatisfaction with the costs awarded in the criminal proceedings did not mean that they could claim them by a regular civil claim (putem redovne građanske tužbe). In any event, the civil proceedings could not serve to correct the final decisions issued in criminal proceedings. 21. On 8 December 2011 the High Court issued a decision ordering its finance department (računovodstvo) to pay the applicants' representative the amount awarded by the High Court on 14 October 2008. This decision became final on 5 January 2012, given that no appeal was lodged against it. 22. On 10 January 2017 the High Court informed the Agent's office that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on the applicants' appeal in respect of costs of criminal proceedings, but that the High Court, after its judgment of 14 October 2008 had become final, had issued a decision on 8 December 2011 ordering that the applicants' representative be paid the sum awarded thereby.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1966 and is detained in Włocławek. 5. Criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning charges of leading an organised criminal gang, assault and extortion have been pending since 29 September 2005 (case no. IV K 59/09, Łódź Regional Court). 6. On 1 October 2009 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. 7. On 2 March 2010 the applicant was indicted before the Łódź Regional Court. The bill of indictment was directed against the applicant and twenty‑two co-accused charged with over 900 offences in total. The applicant was charged on thirty-eight counts with respect to various offences related to stealing cars, dealing in drugs, assaults and burglaries, in the context of an organised criminal gang. 8. At a session on 23 November 2010 the trial court decided to sever the remainder of the case from the proceedings against the applicant, which would be dealt with at a separate trial and joined with other charges brought against him. In consequence, the proceedings against the applicant were to be transferred to another division of the Łódź Regional Court. The decision pertaining to the competence of the court was quashed on 14 December 2010. On 28 December 2010 the trial court extended the applicant's detention on remand. On 4 February 2011 the proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of another trial, but that decision was quashed upon appeal on 16 March 2011. The case was transferred to the relevant division of the court in March 2011, and thereafter the presiding judge scheduled the beginning of the trial for 14 September 2011 and undertook other preparative actions (such as tracing the addresses of some twelve witnesses). During the proceedings the applicant lodged multiple procedural requests which were examined by the trial court. In particular, he asked for adjournments of hearings, asked for new evidence to be admitted, and challenged a judge and a prosecutor. 9. The Łódź Regional Court held about twenty-four hearings in total and on 13 May 2013 convicted the applicant and sentenced him to nine years' imprisonment. 10. The applicant appealed against the judgment. 11. A hearing of the appellate court scheduled for 15 April 2014 was cancelled due to the absence of the applicant's lawyer. 12. On 12 June 2014 the Łódź Court of Appeal allowed the applicant's appeal in part and reduced his sentence to eight years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 13. On 17 December 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal. 14. The applicant lodged two complaints under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints of breaches of the right to have a case examined in an investigation conducted or supervised by a prosecutor, and in judicial proceedings, without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu przygotowawczym prowadzonym lub nadzorowanym przez prokuratora i postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki - "the 2004 Act"). 15. On 7 September 2011 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the first complaint. The court, relying on the Convention principles, ruled that, taking into account the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings had not been excessive. During the period under consideration the trial court had prepared diligently for trial by, for instance, securing the presence of a large number of witnesses who had been summoned from various detention facilities. 16. On 28 November 2012 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's second complaint. The court examined the course of the proceedings and ruled that there had been no delays on the part of the courts. It noted that the trial court had taken many procedural decisions requested by the parties, including the applicant.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Assemini (Italy). 6. By a decision of 4 December 2006 of the Cantonal Prosecutor of the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton (Hercegovačko-neretvanski kanton; one of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the applicant was granted the reimbursement of costs which she had incurred as a witness in the amount of 519 convertible marks (BAM)[1]. 7. On 29 February 2008 the Mostar Municipal Court ("the Municipal Court") rejected the applicant's request for the enforcement of this decision, deeming it unenforceable. 8. On 18 September 2008 the Mostar Cantonal Court ("the Cantonal Court") quashed this decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 9. On 19 November 2008 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). 10. On 19 June 2009 the Municipal Court upheld the objection lodged against this decision. 11. On 1 April 2010 the Cantonal Court quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 12. On 18 February 2011 the Municipal Court partly accepted the objection against the writ of execution specifically as regards the interest on the main debt calculated from 4 January 2007, and the interest on the total costs of the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 2 December 2011 the Cantonal Court upheld this decision. 14. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina dismissed the applicant's request for revision as inadmissible. 15. On 23 December 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina partially accepted the applicant's appeal and thereby found a violation of her right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the non-enforcement of the decision of the Municipal Court of 18 February 2011 (see paragraph 12 above). It also ordered the Hercegovina-Neretva Canton to undertake measures in order to enforce the decision within a reasonable time. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 16. On 21 October 2014 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that the final decision in question had not yet been enforced. 17. On 18 December 2014 the said final decision was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash. 18. By a judgment of the Municipal Court of 3 April 2009, which became final on 16 December 2009, a certain P.M. was ordered to pay the applicant the costs of civil proceedings in the amount of BAM 1,959. 19. On 31 October 2010 the applicant submitted to the Municipal Court a request for the enforcement of this judgment. 20. On 14 September 2011, 4 November 2011 and 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted requests for the acceleration of the enforcement proceedings. 21. On 5 December 2012 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 22. On 13 June 2013 the Municipal Court dismissed the objection lodged against its decision of 5 December 2012, and P.M. subsequently appealed this decision to the Cantonal Court. 23. On 17 September 2013 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina found a violation of the applicant's right to a trial within a reasonable time, due to the duration of the enforcement proceedings before the Municipal Court. It further ordered the Cantonal Court to urgently rule on the appeal lodged by P.M. The Constitutional Court, however, did not award the non-pecuniary damage requested by the applicant. 24. On 16 October 2013 the Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal lodged by P.M. 25. On 11 June 2015 the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution. 26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.

Ruled as violated by court

26. On 4 August 2016 the said final judgment was enforced and the applicant was paid in cash on her bank account in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It appears that the applicant was still living in Italy at that time.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, according to the Constitutional Court.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Riga. 5. On 23 April 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted. 6. On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7. On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 8. On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9. On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.'s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant's defence lawyer was on vacation. 10. On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11. On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant's defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12. On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14. On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15. On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.'s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16. On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 17. On 11 January 2008 the Riga Regional Court started to hear the parties' arguments regarding the merits of the case. On 15 January 2008 it convicted the applicant of attempted bribery and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. 18. On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court's judgment. 19. On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 20. By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant's "reference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic."

Ruled as violated by court

6. On 29 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted bribery. 7. On 2 May 2003 the applicant was detained on remand. On 25 July 2003 he was released and police supervision was imposed instead, under which he was obliged not to leave his home district without the authorisation of the investigation authorities, and to report to the local police department twice a week. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 19. On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing, inter alia, that his right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached. In this respect he referred to several provisions of national and international law, including Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

8. On 27 November 2003 a bill of indictment was served on the applicant and his two co-accused (D.E. and V.M.). On 2 December 2003 a judge of the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) accepted the criminal case for trial. The first hearing was scheduled to take place from 1 to 4 August 2005. 9. On 1 August 2005 the hearing was adjourned for an indefinite period owing to D.E.'s poor state of health and the fact that the applicant's defence lawyer was on vacation. 10. On 1 October 2005 the new Criminal Procedure Law entered into force; it introduced new rules concerning, inter alia, conflicts of interest faced by judges. In the light of the new rules, on 22 February 2006 the hearing was adjourned because one of the judges of the Riga Regional Court had had to recuse herself from the trial. 11. On 31 July 2006 the hearing was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicant's defence lawyer were due to go away on holiday. 12. On 13 November 2006 the hearing was adjourned once again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On 15 November 2006 a judge from the Riga Regional Court requested the hospital in which D.E. was being treated to provide information about her state of health. On 20 November 2006 the court was informed that D.E. had been discharged from the hospital and placed under the care of her family doctor. 13. On 27 February 2007 the hearing was adjourned for unspecified reasons. 14. On 26 June 2007 the hearing was adjourned again owing to D.E.'s poor state of health. On the same day the Riga Regional Court ordered that D.E. undergo a medical examination in order for her capacity to participate in the proceedings to be determined. The findings of that examination were delivered less than one month later and indicated that D.E. was able to participate in the proceedings. 15. On 27 September 2007 the Riga Regional Court scheduled the next hearing for 27 December 2007. On 18 October 2007 D.E.'s lawyer requested that that hearing be rescheduled in order to accommodate his taking planned holidays. The court dismissed that request, noting that six hearings had already been adjourned and that further delays in the proceedings could not be allowed. 16. On 27 December 2007 the hearing was adjourned, as the prosecution needed to replace the charge against the applicant with a more lenient one. 18. On 4 February 2008 the applicant submitted an appeal. On 1 December 2008 the appellate court upheld the lower court's judgment. 20. By a final decision of 26 January 2009 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) refused the applicant leave to appeal on points of law, noting, inter alia, that the applicant's "reference to violations of certain laws and international legal provisions was formalistic."

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant company, Virprod-Lux S.R.L., is a company incorporated in Moldova. 6. On 13 April 2000 the Tax Authority seized a building from a State‑owned company, company V., on account of taxes which were due. 7. On 1 October 2000, at the request of the Tax Authority, the building was valued by an estate agency at 352,000 Moldovan lei (MDL). 8. On 29 January 2001 the Department of Privatisation and Administration of State Property sold the building in question to company B. for MDL 360,500 (approximately 29,678 Euros (EUR), following a public auction. 9. On 25 April 2003 the applicant company bought the building from company B. for MDL 628,000 (approximately EUR 22,053). 10. On 29 March 2007 the Prosecutor General's Office initiated court proceedings in which it sought the annulment of both the sale of the building on 29 January 2001 and the subsequent transaction between company B. and the applicant company. It also sought the return of the building to its initial owner, company V. The reason relied upon by the Prosecutor's General's Office was that the valuation of the building conducted by the estate agency had not been carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law. The applicant company opposed the Prosecutor General's action and argued, among other things, that it was time-barred. 11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place. 12. On 11 October 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld an appeal by the Prosecutor General, reversed the judgment of the Economic Court of Appeal, and upheld the action in its entirety. The Supreme Court considered that the Prosecutor General's action concerned a declaration of the absolute nullity of the contracts in question and that therefore, in accordance with Article 217 of the Civil Code, enacted on 12 June 2003, it could not be limited in time. Following this judgment, the transactions of 29 January 2001 and 25 April 2003 were annulled and each party involved was ordered to return to the other parties whatever they received by virtue of those transactions. 13. On 7 December 2007 the applicant company lodged a revision request against the above judgment in which it indicated that it had carried out an expert evaluation of the disputed building by an independent expert who determined its value at MDL 8,550,000 (approximately EUR 511,440) after the improvements made by the applicant company to it. 14. In the meantime, the applicant company did not leave the disputed building because it had its production line there and it needed time and resources to find another suitable building and to move its production line. 15. Since company V. did not need the disputed building, the applicant company proposed to it and the latter accepted to conclude a friendly settlement agreement in accordance with which company V. agreed that the applicant company would retain ownership of the building in exchange for MDL 325,092 (approximately EUR 19,328). 16. On 20 March 2008, within the framework of the review proceedings, the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the parties' request to settle the case. It confirmed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant company and company V., and on that basis it quashed its previous judgment and rejected the Prosecutor General's action. 17. It is unclear from the materials of the case and the parties' submissions whether after the adoption of the judgment of 11 October 2007 by the Supreme Court of Justice, company B. returned to the applicant company the amount received as a result of the transaction of 25 April 2003.

Ruled as violated by court

11. On 21 August 2007 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor General's action as time-barred. The court held, inter alia, that in accordance with the statute of limitations, the Prosecutor General's action could not be initiated more than three years after the events in dispute had taken place.

There is no relevance between fair trial and agreed-upon private settlement.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Kyiv. 6. At the time of the events he was the director of a private company. 7. In August 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of tax evasion and forgery in office. Subsequently, the tax-evasion charge was dropped. 8. On 7 December 2004 the Kyiv Dniprovskyy District Court ("the Dniprovskyy Court") found the applicant guilty of forgery in office. It held that he had entered knowingly false data in the company's tax returns. More specifically, instead of applying a straight-line depreciation method in respect of the company's intangible assets, the applicant calculated their depreciation costs as the difference between the company's gross revenues and expenses. As a result, the documents showed the absence of any profit or loss in the company's activity, whereas in the reality it had had losses. The applicant was sentenced to one year's restriction of liberty (namely detention in a semi-open penal institution by the place of his residence) with a ban on holding administrative posts for one year. The sentence was suspended on probation for one year. The applicant was under an undertaking not to leave the town until the judgment became final. 9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court's judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") stating as follows: "The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005." 11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor's participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant's appeal. It delivered its ruling "having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant's] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal". The issue of the applicant's and his lawyer's absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court's ruling. 13. The applicant appealed on points of law, challenging, among other things, the examination of his case on appeal in his and his lawyer's absence as being in breach of his defence rights. 14. On 23 January 2007 the Supreme Court, in written proceedings, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. Referring to the case-file materials, it noted that the first-instance court had informed the applicant and his lawyer about the scheduled appellate hearing, without further details.

Ruled as violated by court

9. The applicant appealed. He submitted that the activity of the company had been subject to numerous tax inspections, which had not found any violations of the tax legislation. He therefore contended that he had not done anything criminal and that that fact had not received due attention of the first-instance court. Furthermore, the applicant considered that the expert questioned in the trial did not have adequate qualification. Lastly, he argued that the tax police investigator, who had also been questioned, was not impartial and that his statements should not have been relied on. Accordingly, the applicant requested the appellate court to quash the first‑instance court's judgment and to pronounce a new one, acquitting him for the lack of the constituent elements of a crime in his actions. 10. On 10 February 2005 the Dniprovskyy Court sent a letter to the Kyiv City Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") stating as follows: "The [Dniprovskyy Court] is sending you the criminal case regarding [the applicant] convicted under Article 366 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine [forgery in office], for the appellate examination at 10.35 a.m. on 17 March 2005." 11. In addition to the president of the Court of Appeal, the above letter was also addressed to the prosecutor, the applicant and his lawyer. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant and/or his lawyer received it. According to the applicant, they were unaware of its existence. 12. On 17 March 2005, following a hearing held with the prosecutor's participation, but in the absence of both the applicant and his lawyer, the appellate court rejected the applicant's appeal. It delivered its ruling "having heard the report of the judge-rapporteur of the appellate court and the explanations of the prosecutor, the latter considering the judgment lawful and [the applicant's] appeal groundless, having checked the case-file materials and having discussed the arguments advanced in the appeal". The issue of the applicant's and his lawyer's absence from the hearing was not mentioned in the appellate court's ruling.

While it depends on the definition of "defending oneself," it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he and his lawyer were not able to appear at the hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Rotterdam. 6. The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 7. V. made statements to the police admitting his own participation in the supermarket robberies and implicating the applicant in all four crimes. 8. The applicant was tried before the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank). V. was summoned as a witness by the defence. 9. Not being suspected of having taken part in the street mugging, V. could not refuse to give evidence about it; he made a statement to the effect that he had not personally witnessed the robbery but had heard from bystanders that it had been committed by a group that did not include the applicant. 10. V.'s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 11. On 30 August 2006 the Regional Court gave judgment convicting the applicant of all four crimes. It sentenced him to four years' imprisonment and ordered the execution of a suspended two-week sentence of juvenile detention (jeugddetentie) imposed on a previous occasion when the applicant was still a minor. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal (hoger beroep) with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 13. V. was again summoned as a witness by the defence. As relevant to the case before the Court, he kept silence on all four charges, including the street mugging in relation to which he was by this time being prosecuted for perjury. 14. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 4 March 2008 convicting the applicant of all four charges. It sentenced the applicant to six years' imprisonment and, as the Regional Court had done, ordered the execution of the two-week suspended sentence of juvenile detention. 15. The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows: (a) The supermarket manager's report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed; (b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods; (c) V.'s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 16. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). As relevant to the case before the Court, he complained under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention of the use made by the Court of Appeal of V.'s statements to the police to ground his convictions even though V. had refused to answer the questions of the defence under cross-examination. 17. The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.'s evidence was "sole and decisive" in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available. 18. On 5 January 2010 the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant's appeal on points of law. Referring to its own case-law (its judgment of 6 June 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV1633, Netherlands Law Reports (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, "NJ") 2006, no. 332, its judgment in the Vidgen case; see Vidgen v. the Netherlands, no. 29353/06, § 23, 10 July 2012), it found that the applicant had had sufficient opportunity to cross-examine V. or have him cross-examined. The mere fact that V. had refused to give evidence under cross-examination did not mean that use in evidence of his statement to the police was excluded by Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention.

Ruled as violated by court

6. The applicant was charged with having, with an accomplice called V., robbed three supermarkets and with having, with two accomplices, mugged someone in the street outside a discotheque. 10. V.'s statement disculpating the applicant was not believed by the public prosecutor (officier van justitie) and the court. V. was subsequently charged with perjury (meineed). 15. The evidence on which the conviction of the fourth charge was based may be summarised as follows: (a) The supermarket manager's report to the police that his supermarket had been robbed; (b) A statement made to the police by a cashier who had been forced at gunpoint to open her cash register, from which one of the robbers had snatched money and other goods; (c) V.'s confession to the police, in which the applicant was named as co-perpetrator. 17. The Advocate General (advocaat-generaal) submitted an advisory opinion (conclusie) analysing the case-law of the Court, in particular the Chamber judgment Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. the United Kingdom, nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06, 20 January 2009, and expressing the view that V.'s evidence was "sole and decisive" in respect of the fourth charge but not in respect of the first three charges, for which sufficient other evidence was available.

While it depends on the definition of "defending oneself," it appears that V. was denied this right; however, V. is not the person being charged. It depends on whether this counts as "examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Cork. 5. He suffers from severe brain damage. It was asserted on his behalf that his condition was caused by the measles vaccination administered to him in 1988 when he was 15 months old. 6. In November 2002, 14 years after receiving the vaccine, the applicant's mother instituted proceedings on his behalf against four defendants; the local health authority, the State, the Attorney General (collectively described in the domestic proceedings as the State defendants) and the doctor who had administered the vaccination, H. 7. On 5 August 2003, the High Court issued a limited order of discovery addressed to the local health authority seeking all relevant records about the applicant in its possession, as well as information about the vaccine used, about any adverse effects noted at the time with this vaccine, about the manner in which the mother's consent was obtained, and about the health of the other members of the applicant's family. Although the High Court set a time-limit of 8 weeks for discovery, the local health authority only complied with the order in June 2008, that is to say with a delay of over four and a half years. 8. The applicant appealed the scope of the order of discovery of 5 August 2003, leading to the grant of a further limited order of discovery by the High Court on 30 January 2004, addressed to all four defendants. The applicant brought another appeal against the order of discovery of 30 January 2004, but in July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, making only a minor amendment to the order granted by the High Court. 9. The applicant's mother died in December 2007. 10. In June 2008 the applicant's lawyer wrote to the local health authority to complain that the long delays in litigating the case had caused grave prejudice to the case. The applicant's mother had been a vital witness, and with her death essential evidence had been lost. Settlement of the substantive dispute was proposed but not agreed. 11. In May 2008 the applicant's lawyer sought to have the defence of the State defendants set aside. The High Court refused this application on 12 March 2010. 12. The trial involved ten days of hearings. No factual evidence was called on behalf of the applicant, but independent medical witnesses gave evidence, having read the applicant's medical records, and documentary evidence provided by way of discovery was before the court. On the eleventh day of the trial, 19 July 2011, the judge accepted an application by the defendants to strike the case out for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. 13. Regarding the doctor, he noted that the applicant accepted there was insufficient evidence to establish any negligence in the administration of the vaccine. The claim against the doctor H was dismissed. In relation to the State defendants, the judge held that no evidence had been produced that could support the various grounds relied on by the applicant. 14. The proceedings in the High Court terminated on 19 December 2011. The applicant filed a notice of appeal presenting 30 grounds of appeal. Following the establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the applicant's case was transferred to it. Outline written submissions were submitted by H in February 2015 and by the State defendants in September 2015. 15. The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on 10 February 2016, dismissing the appeal. In its conclusions, the Court of Appeal stated that, by taking the case at its highest, the trial judge had adopted the correct approach on the question of striking the case out. The Court of Appeal concluded by remarking on the many legal hurdles the applicant would have had to overcome in order to succeed. It found no basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. 16. The proceedings ended on 10 May 2016 when the Supreme Court declined the applicant's request for leave to appeal.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant is a construction company, which was established in 2003 and has its seat of business in Mersin. 6. In 2005, after having obtained a permit to operate a mine, the applicant opened a mine in a plot of land of 8,700 m² which it owned. 7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 8. On 8 March 2006 the Tarsus Provincial Administration informed the applicant that it had decided to impose the proposed administrative fine pursuant to Article 19 of the Regulation Concerning Group A Mines (A Grubu Madenlerle İlgili Uygulama Yönetmeliği). 9. On 8 February 2006 the applicant company's president, Ü.T., filed a complaint with the Mersin Public Prosecutor's office, stating that one of the auditors in the commission, M.A.L., had told him that the fine had initially been calculated as TRY 500,000 and that he had reduced that amount. Ü.T. claimed that M.A.L. had asked him to pay TRY 10,000 in return and had threatened to have his mine closed if he refused to do so. He indicated that M.A.L. had acted together with a certain F.G., an official at the Provincial Administration. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two. 11. Subsequently, on 16 February 2006 the Mersin Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against M.A.L. and F.G., accusing them of extortion. 12. On 13 May 2011 the Mersin Assize Court found the two officials guilty as charged. The appeal proceedings with regard to that judgment are still pending before the Court of Cassation as of September 2017. 13. In the meantime, on 17 April 2006 the applicant had filed an objection with the Tarsus Magistrates' Court and requested a stay of execution of the fine. It informed the court of the criminal proceedings pending against certain officials involved, in which they were being tried for extortion. By a subsequent petition dated 5 June 2006, the applicant also requested the court to hold an oral hearing, to carry out an on-site examination, and to hear its witnesses in order to better evaluate the credibility of the inspection report the fine was based on. 14. On 13 June 2006, the Tarsus Magistrates' Court rejected the applicant's requests for an oral hearing and on-site examination without indicating any reasons for its decision. Relying on the inspection report drawn up on 31 January 2006, the court rejected the applicant's objection. 15. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that the fine had been unlawfully imposed on it and that the Magistrates' Court had failed to adequately assess the case as it had not held a hearing. It drew the court's attention once again to the criminal proceedings against the officials involved. 16. On 10 July 2006 the Tarsus Assize Court rejected the applicant's objection without holding a hearing. 17. On 7 March 2008 the administration seized the plot of land where the applicant conducted mining activities due to the latter's failure to pay the administrative fine.

Ruled as violated by court

7. During the course of its mining activities, on 31 January 2006 an audit commission under the Mersin Provincial Administration conducted an inspection. Subsequently, the commission drew up a report, proposing that the applicant should be ordered to pay 131,250 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] for quarrying substantial amounts of sand in the neighbouring plots of 5,000 m², outside of its licensed area. 10. In his police statements on 9 February 2006, Ü.T. described his conversations with M.A.L. in detail. He noted, inter alia, that after the inspection of the audit commission, he had conducted another inspection with an official from the Directorate of Land Registration, and had calculated that he had trespassed on the neighbouring plots by only 400 metres. He also explained that he had acted as an undercover agent in line with the directions of the Public Prosecutor to catch the perpetrators in flagrante delicto. Accordingly, the police gave him TRY 10,000 and noted down the serial numbers of the banknotes. He stated that in line with the instructions of M.A.L. and F.G., he had given the money to a third person, who had received it in the name of the other two.

With the rejection, the applicant was denied their right to a hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Sofia. 6. The applicant is a former police officer. Criminal proceedings were brought against him in 1996. 7. By a decision of the competent prosecutor of 6 March 1996, as provided under domestic law at the time, the applicant was placed under house arrest. The period of arrest continued until 3 April 1996, when the applicant was remanded in custody. He was once again placed under house arrest on 1 July 1996 and was released on 30 September 1997. 8. The applicant therefore was deprived of his liberty for one year, six months and twenty-five days. 9. In a final judgment of 27 January 1998 the Sofia Military Court found the applicant guilty of failing to perform his duties and he was given a one‑year suspended prison sentence. 10. In another set of proceedings, in a final judgment of 26 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment. 11. The court also held in the second set of proceedings that the applicant should serve a single sentence for all his offences, which was set at one year in prison. 12. On 1 July 2003 the applicant was once again detained and placed in prison to serve his sentence. He was released on 18 September 2003 by a decision of the competent prosecutor. The prosecutor noted that the period of pre-trial detention should have been deducted from the applicant's sentence, which meant he had already served it. 13. As he had worked in prison the applicant was also entitled to a reduction of his sentence by seventeen days. 14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been "permanently altered", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been "irreparably damaged". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter "the City Court") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been "unjustified" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to "unlawful detention without any valid grounds". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter "the Court of Appeal"), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the "nature of the offences" the applicant had been convicted for, the "regime under which the sentence had been served" and the "socially acceptable criteria for justice". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).

Ruled as violated by court

14. In 2004 the applicant brought a tort action against the prosecution authorities under section 2(6) of the State and Municipalities' Responsibility for Damage Act (see paragraph 21 below). He claimed 20,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for non-pecuniary damage for his detention in 1996-97 to the extent it had exceeded the set term of imprisonment and BGN 40,000 for his imprisonment between 1 July and 18 September 2003. 15. The domestic courts examined witnesses and a court-appointed psychologist who said that the applicant had been traumatised by the experience and suffered from anxiety, that his personality had been "permanently altered", that he had difficulties communicating with others, and that his family ties had been "irreparably damaged". 16. In a judgment of 2 May 2006 the Sofia City Court (hereinafter "the City Court") allowed the claim in part, finding that the applicant had been detained for nine months and twenty-nine days in excess of his sentence and awarding him BGN 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage. It stated that his detention in 1996-97 had been "unjustified" and that his imprisonment in 2003 had amounted to "unlawful detention without any valid grounds". 17. In accordance with the applicable provisions of domestic law, the City Court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 2,040 (the equivalent of 1,040 euros – EUR) in court fees, calculated as a pro rata percentage of the part of his claim that had been dismissed. 18. The judgment was upheld on 18 June 2007 by the Sofia Court of Appeal (hereinafter "the Court of Appeal"), which specified that the prosecution authorities were also liable to pay default interest on the above amount, calculated from 18 September 2003. 19. In a final judgment of 24 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation reduced the award to BGN 3,000 (approximately EUR 1,530), plus default interest. It justified the reduction by referring to the "nature of the offences" the applicant had been convicted for, the "regime under which the sentence had been served" and the "socially acceptable criteria for justice". It did not deal with the matter of court fees and took no separate decision in that regard. 20. The Court has not been informed whether and when the amount above was paid to the applicant. Calculations made with a calculator available on the Internet show that the default interest on BGN 3,000 for the period from 18 September 2003 to 24 April 2009 would be BGN 2,265 (the equivalent of EUR 1,155).

The applicant was not treated as innocent until proven guilty.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. In 1957 several plots of land (agricultural land at the time) were expropriated from the applicants' legal predecessors. The present cases concern restitution proceedings in which the applicants sought that the plots of land, which, at present, form part of a campsite on the shore of Lake Ohrid, be restored to their possession. 6. On 14 August 2001 the applicants instituted restitution proceedings. On 15 September 2003 the Ministry of Finance's Restitution Commission ("the Restitution Commission") granted the applicants' claims and awarded them compensation, the form of which was to be determined by a separate decision. It established that according to an urban plan of 20 March 2002 the land was designated as a public green zone in a tourist area. Relying on an on-site inspection (увид) of 1 September 2002, it further held that the land was developed (уреден простор) with access paths and supporting infrastructure. 7. On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 8. On 31 May 2005 the the Second-Instance Administrative-Procedure Commission in the Area of Denationalisation (Комисија за решавање во управна постапка во втор степен од областа на денационализацијата – "the second-instance commission") dismissed the applicants' appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Restitution Commission. Relying on section 10 of the Restitution Act (see paragraph 15 below), the second-instance commission held that the land in question was of public interest (јавен интерес) and could not be restored to the applicants' possession, but that compensation should be awarded instead. 9. On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants' case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10. On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants' claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 11. On 28 November 2003 the Restitution Commission upheld the applicants' restitution claim and awarded them compensation in State bonds. Relying on an on-site inspection of 13 May 2002 and a certificate of 15 September 2002 issued by the competent Ministry, it established that the plot in question was located within the boundaries of the campsite; that it had been designated as a public green zone and that pedestrian paths and other similar infrastructure were planned for construction. It concluded accordingly that the plot could not be restored to the applicants' possession. 12. An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13. The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission's decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14. On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.

Ruled as violated by court

7. On 4 December 2003 the applicants appealed, arguing that, inter alia, the land was undeveloped and could be restored to their possession. Were the urban plan to be implemented in the future, the land could be expropriated anew. 9. On 21 September 2005 the applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim with the Supreme Court reiterating that the land within the campsite was undeveloped and could therefore be restored to their possession. In submissions lodged subsequently, they further referred to decision no. 44-530/1 of 7 March 2006 in which the second-instance commission had accepted a similar claim and ordered that a neighbouring plot of land located within the same campsite had been restored to possession of the claimants. In that case, the second-instance commission had held, unlike in the applicants' case, that access paths and supporting infrastructure had not been sufficient for the land in question to be regarded as developed. 10. On 7 February 2008 the Administrative Court, which had in the meantime become competent to decide administrative-dispute claims, dismissed the applicants' claim and upheld the findings of the administrative authorities. 12. An appeal by the applicants of 7 April 2004 was dismissed by the second-instance commission on 15 November 2005. The latter held that, inter alia, the findings of the Restitution Commission had been based on section 10 of the Restitution Act. 13. The applicants lodged an administrative-dispute claim in which, alike the applicants in application no. 38024/08, they referred to the second-instance commission's decision no. 44-530/1 and asked the Administrative Court to ensure consistent application of the law. 14. On 21 April 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' claim, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasoning given by the administrative authorities.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicants did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant, Mr Grigoriy Nikolayevich Pleshchinskiy, is a Russian national who was born in 1954 and lives in Solnechnogorsk, Moscow Region. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was kept in Solnechnogorsk Police's temporary detention centre in overcrowded cells from 2 to 10 October 2003; 20 to 24 October 2003; 17 to 21 November 2003; 21 to 28 November 2003; 22 to 29 December 2003; 26 to 30 January 2004; 2 and 3 February 2004; 31 March to 2 April 2004 and then on several occasions between April and 22 July 2004. He had to relieve himself in a bucket in the presence of other detainees and it was very difficult to breathe in the cells. There was no tap or other access to water, no proper light, no table on which to eat food and no area for outdoor activities. In the winter the walls and ceiling were covered with ice or damp. He had no access to a shower. 7. The applicant made numerous journeys in 2003-2004 between Volokolamsk remand centre and the temporary detention centre in Solnechnogorsk, which took three to four hours in an overcrowded van, which was cold in the winter and stuffy in the summer. 8. On 11 July 2005 the applicant sued the State for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly appalling conditions of his detention in the temporary detention centre. 9. On 14 November 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court rejected the applicant's claims. It established that the material conditions of his detention could be explained by insufficient funding. 10. On 22 November and 6 December 2005 the applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 14 November 2005. 11. On 19 December 2005 the applicant was informed that the text of the judgment had been available since 5 December 2005. 12. On an unspecified date the court sent a summons to an appeal hearing which had been scheduled for 30 January 2006. However, the applicant did not receive the summons as it contained an error in the address, which was written as "2, Vishnevskaya Street" instead of "2, Vishnevaya Street". 13. On 30 January 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 14 November 2005 in the applicant's absence. 14. In reply to an enquiry from the applicant about the date of the appeal hearing, he was informed on 1 February 2006 that it had been held on 30 January 2006. 15. In December 1992 the municipality allowed the applicant and his son, a minor at the time, to obtain ownership of the flat in Solnechnogorsk in which they were living by way of privatisation. The applicant obtained a title certificate, which, however, named him as the sole owner. 16. After reaching the age of majority, the son sued the father, asserting his right to the flat and seeking an annulment of the above-mentioned certificate. 17. In support of his claim the plaintiff submitted a copy of the housing register, and certificates from his school and kindergarten. All the documents showed that the plaintiff had been permanently residing in Solnechnogorsk. 18. The applicant sought to prove that at the material time the plaintiff had lived in a flat in another town, Taganrog, and tried to obtain certificates of his moving in and out of the privatised flat. However, the competent authority would not issue them unless they were requested by a judge. However, the judge considered that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff sufficed. 19. On 4 May 2005 the Solnechnogorsk Town Court of the Moscow Region granted the plaintiff's claim. It held that the housing law provided that minors living with a tenant in a flat leased under a social lease agreement enjoyed the same rights as the tenant as of the privatisation date. Accordingly, where flats were privatised without payment, they could become owners of the flat together with the adults. Furthermore, under the privatisation law then in force, a privatisation agreement had to contain a reference to the minors who enjoyed the right to use the premises in question. 20. On 14 June 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 4 May 2005 on appeal.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "defending oneself," it appears that the applicant was denied this right, as he was not able to appear at the hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and, at the time of the last communication from him to the Court, was detained in Torez Correctional Colony. 6. The applicant, represented by a lawyer, stood trial before the Kerch Court on charges of engaging in sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, A. (born in 1999), over the period between March 2006 and April 2007. The applicant denied the charges, asserting that he may have broken A.'s hymen by accident while bathing her. 7. On 27 July 2007 the trial court found the applicant guilty of rape and sentenced him to eleven years' imprisonment. 8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his "internal sexual organs", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time. 9. On 11 September 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's conviction. 10. The applicant lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court. He argued that there had been insufficient evidence of his guilt. The appeal contained the following statement: "The court's conclusion as to my guilt is based only on indirect evidence and on the statement of a minor [A.], made in the course of the pre-trial investigation and who, according to a psychiatric expert's analysis, was suffering from mental retardation" (Вывод суда о моей виновности сделан судом только на основании косвенных доказательств, а так же [sic] на показаниях малолетней [A.], которые она дала на досудебном следствии, и которая, согласно заключению судебно-психиатрической экспертизы, страдает умственной отсталостью). 11. The applicant submitted that the breaking of A.'s hymen was explained by the fact that he had accidentally penetrated her with his finger while bathing her. However, even if such a penetration had been intentional, it would not have constituted the offence of rape. 12. The applicant further complained of the trial court's refusal to order an additional expert examination to determine whether he had any diseases of his "internal sexual organs" which would have prevented him from sustaining an erection and engaging in sexual intercourse. 13. The applicant asked the Supreme Court to reclassify his actions as "abuse of a minor" (розбещення неповнолітніх), a lesser offence than rape, and to impose a non-custodial sentence. 14. On 9 June 2008 the Supreme Court refused to consider the case in cassation and upheld the lower courts' findings. 15. On 27 November 2008 the Court's Registry asked the applicant to provide copies of his appeal, his appeal in cassation and the decision of the Supreme Court in his case, to supplement his application. 16. He accordingly requested those documents from the trial court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. 17. On 19 January 2009 the Court of Appeal advised the applicant that he needed to address his request for the copies to the trial court. 18. On 26 January 2009 the trial court informed the applicant that it was not empowered to send him the requested copies. 19. On 28 January 2009 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that it was not the court's practice to issue copies of appeals in cassation or of its decisions.

NOT ruled as violated by court

8. The judgment was based, in particular, on (i) the victim's statements made at the pre-trial stage; (ii) the statements of a number of witnesses (comprising nannies, a classmate and a psychologist) made during the court hearings, who had reported incriminating statements that A. had made to them. Witness K. had testified that, in the relevant period, she had had sexual relations with the applicant; (iii) the conclusions of experts who had examined the applicant and the victim. The experts had concluded that the victim's hymen had been broken and it was unlikely that that had been caused by unintentional actions; the victim and the applicant both had a fungal infection on their genitalia; the examination of the applicant's genitalia had not revealed any obstacle to his having sexual relations; the victim suffered from a light mental retardation and the applicant did not suffer from any psychiatric illness. According to the applicant, the trial court had refused to order an additional expert examination to determine whether, because of any disease of his "internal sexual organs", he had been unable to engage in normal sexual intercourse at the relevant time.

The applicant was not allowed to obtain an expert witness for him analogous to that against him.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant lives in Kutina. 5. From 1 January 2001 the applicant concluded several consecutive fixed-duration contracts of employment with the company C.N.S. Ltd. concerning the same post. The contracts were for a continuous period which in total amounted to over seven years and seven months. 6. On 5 June 2009 the applicant's employer returned the applicant's employment registration book to him, without any written or oral notification, showing that his employment had been terminated. 7. On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8. On 22 January 2010 the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. 9. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant's claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10. In the fresh proceedings, the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant's action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant's argument, the first‑instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11. On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12. On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first‑instance decision. 13. On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time. 14. On 14 March 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He complained that the courts had wrongly declared his claim inadmissible because it had been of a declaratory nature and as such had not been subject to deadlines. He relied on a decision by the Velika Gorica County Court of 16 January 2013 in the case of a colleague of his, who for the same reasons as the applicant had also sought to have the court recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment. In that decision the Velika Gorica County Court, in accordance with instructions given in the Supreme Court's decision no. Revr-1697/11 of 6 June 2012, had dismissed the defendant's (the employer's) objection that the claim was time-barred. Namely, the Supreme Court had held that the claim had been of a declaratory nature and as such was not subject to deadlines. 15. On 6 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded.

Ruled as violated by court

7. On 20 July 2009 the applicant brought a civil action before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Ivanić Gradu). He asked it to recognise that he had concluded an open-ended contract of employment, given that he had been in continuous employment with his employer for over three years, which was the time-limit for fixed-term employment contracts under the Labour Act. He also asked the Municipal Court to establish that his employment had not been terminated and to order his reinstatement. 8. On 22 January 2010 the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court dismissed the applicant's claim as time-barred. 9. Upon an appeal by the applicant, on 16 February 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court (Županijski sud u Velikoj Gorici) quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It held that the first-instance court should have declared the applicant's claims inadmissible as time-barred, without examining it on the merits. 10. In the fresh proceedings, the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on 6 May 2011 declared the applicant's action inadmissible as having been lodged outside the prescribed time-limit. The first-instance court, relying on section 133 of the Labour Act, held that the applicant and his employer had concluded a fixed-term contract lasting until 31 May 2009 and that the applicant must have known that his contract would end on that day. He had not concluded a new contract of employment with his employer and he had therefore been obliged to lodge an application for the protection of his rights with his employer within the fifteen-day time-limit, starting from 1 June 2009. However, he had failed to do so and consequently his claim had been lodged out of time. Rejecting the applicant's argument, the first‑instance court also held that the defendant company had not been obliged to adopt a formal decision on terminating his employment or to send him any other kind of notification, given that he must have known that his contract would come to an end on 31 May 2009. 11. On 12 May 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Velika Gorica County Court. 12. On 26 July 2011 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the first‑instance decision. 13. On 14 November 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), which was dismissed as ill-founded on 25 September 2012. The Supreme Court also held that the applicant had failed to seek the protection of his rights in respect of his employer within the deadlines prescribed by section 133 of the Labour Act. Accordingly, his claim had been lodged out of time.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1974 and lived, prior to his arrest and conviction, in Moscow. 5. On an unspecified date the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Ch. He was charged with unlawful purchase and possession of firearms and aggravated murder. 6. On 11 July 2006 the investigator questioned Sh., who had witnessed Ch.'s murder. Sh. identified the applicant as the perpetrator. On 27 July 2006 she confirmed her earlier statements in the applicant's presence. On an unspecified date Sh. was admitted to hospital and was unable to attend the trial. 7. On 28 March 2007 the trial by a jury opened in the Moscow City Court. 8. On 10 April 2007 the jury returned a guilty verdict. The twelve jurors held the applicant responsible for the murder by ten votes to two, and for unlawful possession of firearms by nine votes to three. 9. By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Moscow City Court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years' imprisonment. 10. On 18 April 2007 the applicant lodged a statement of appeal in which he alleged, inter alia, that Sh.'s statement had been read out during the trial in contravention of the applicable rules of criminal procedure. On 28 April 2007 he lodged a supplementary statement of appeal "in connection with newly discovered circumstances". He wrote that he had found out that on several occasions the presiding judge had entered the room where the jurors had been deliberating and advised them to declare him guilty. The applicant asked the appellate court to take evidence from the jurors and to quash the conviction. 11. On 14 May 2007 Judge Sht., who had presided over the applicant's trial, refused to amend the minutes of the trial to take note of the applicant's statement that the judge had been present during the jury's deliberations, had advised them as to how to fill out the questionnaire and had made comments about the applicant's character and guilt. 12. On 21 May 2007 the applicant's representative obtained a statement, certified by a notary public from N., a juror. The juror stated that during the trial the presiding Judge Sht. had often visited the deliberations room, that he had spoken of the applicant's guilt as if it had been already established and that he had given them instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire.

Ruled as violated by court

The judge's manipulation of the jury goes against the right to a fair trial.

edited by me to remove ambiguity in fact pattern

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Zagreb. He was formerly a lawyer practising in Zagreb. 6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter "the Fund"), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 7. On 16 June 2007 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of corruption involving a number of officials of the Fund and other individuals. 8. Following his arrest, an investigation was opened in the Zagreb County Court (see, for further details, Matanović, cited above, §§ 15-28). 9. On 12 February 2008, upon completion of the investigation, the State Attorney's Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta – hereinafter: "the State Attorney's Office") indicted the applicant and nine other individuals in the Zagreb County Court on charges of bribe-taking, offering bribes, and abuse of power and authority. The applicant was indicted ‒ in his capacity as the lawyer acting for the Vice-President of the Fund ‒ for facilitating the receipt of a bribe of 150,000 euros (EUR) for his client and aiding and abetting the abuse of power and authority by him. 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts. 16. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant's representative on 23 February 2012.

NOT ruled as violated by court

6. In the context of the use of secret surveillance measures in respect of a vice-president of the Croatian Privatisation Fund (Hrvatski fond za privatizaciju, hereinafter "the Fund"), a legal entity established by the State and tasked with carrying out the privatisation of publicly owned property, the authorities intercepted and recorded a number of the applicant's telephone conversations and messages. The secret surveillance was carried out on the basis of orders issued by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). The reasoning of the relevant orders is outlined in the case of Matanović v. Croatia (no. 2742/12, §§ 11‑13, 4 April 2017). 10. During the proceedings the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the secret surveillance orders, arguing that they lacked the requisite reasoning and had been issued contrary to the provisions of the relevant domestic law (see, for further details on the procedural actions taken, Matanović, cited above, §§ 29-63). 11. On 15 May 2009 the Zagreb County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. It examined in detail and dismissed the applicant's arguments regarding the unlawfulness of secret surveillance orders on the grounds that they had been issued by the relevant investigating judge in accordance with the law. The trial court also provided detailed reasoning why it considered that the available evidence provided a reliable basis for the applicant's conviction. When convicting the applicant, the trial court had relied on the secret surveillance recordings, the statement of an informant, who had been questioned at the trial, the statements of other witnesses, and the evidentiary material available in the file. 12. On 24 and 28 September 2009, the applicant both personally and through a lawyer lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment before the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske). In the appeals, the applicant argued that he had been unlawfully monitored and that his conviction had been based on evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of secret surveillance. He also extensively challenged the factual findings and conclusions of the first-instance court. 13. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. 14. On 22 April 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) alleging in particular that he had been placed under unlawful secret surveillance and that the evidence thereby obtained had been used in the criminal proceedings against him. He also extensively elaborated on the alleged deficiencies in the lower courts' factual conclusions. 15. On 21 February 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaints as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. It also stressed that the applicant had actively participated in the proceedings and that there had been no arbitrariness in the findings and decisions of the relevant courts.

It depends on whether the definition of "fair and public trial" covers evidence gathered covertly.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicants, Mr Ömer Yaman (first applicant), Mr Mustafa Ürek (second applicant), and Mr Kerem Bilen (third applicant) were born in 1956, 1967 and 1977 respectively. 7. On 20 June 1999 the applicants were arrested in the course of a military operation in Şırnak. They were subsequently interrogated by the gendarmes in the absence of a lawyer. In their statements, the applicants accepted the charges against them and gave a detailed account of their involvement in the PKK (the Workers' Party of Kurdistan, an illegal organisation). 8. On 23 June 1999 the applicants were brought before the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. The first and second applicants were provided with an interpreter during their interrogation. Before the public prosecutor and the judge, the applicants denied the charges against them. They further stated that they had signed their gendarmerie statements without reading them. Following the questioning, the investigating judge remanded the applicants in custody. 9. On 2 July 1999 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court and accused the applicants of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 10. The proceedings resumed before the Diyarbakır State Security Court and the first and second applicants were authorised to have the assistance of an interpreter. In their defence submissions before the trial court, the applicants retracted the statements they had allegedly made during the preliminary investigation stage. They submitted that the gendarmes had made them sign their statements without reading them. 11. On 7 May 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court found the applicants guilty as charged and convicted them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. It further sentenced the applicants to life imprisonment. In convicting them, the court had regard to the applicants' statements taken by the gendarmes. 12. On 25 March 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that during the trial certain witness statements, which had been taken on commission before other courts, had not been read out to the applicants for comment during the trial. The case was accordingly remitted to the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 13. In the meantime, State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, and therefore, the case against the applicants was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 7 March 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court complied with the decision of the Court of Cassation and witness statements that had been taken on commission were read out to the applicants for their comments. At the end of the trial, the Diyarbakır Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 15. On 17 June 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided that the case file should be remitted to the Diyarbakır Assize Court for examination of whether the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 June 2005 (Law no. 5297) provided more favourable provisions for the applicants. The case was thus once again examined by the Diyarbakır Assize Court in view of the recent legislative changes. 16. On 25 October 2005 the Diyarbakır Assize Court once again convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Court, finding that this provision was more favourable to them than the corresponding provision of the new criminal code. 17. On 30 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on procedural grounds, holding in particular that certain documents which had been relied on by the first-instance court in its judgment were not of an official nature. 18. On 24 April 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court, after obtaining official copies of all the documents in the case file, convicted the applicants under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 19. On 11 December 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "defending oneself," it appears that the applicants were denied this right, as they did not have access to lawyers in custody and were not able to comment upon their statements in court.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Orhei. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. On 16 January 1997 the Orhei mayor's office attested the property right of a number of private individuals over plots of land in the town. Based on that decision, on 3 April 1997 the same office issued the applicant's brother (C.) title to 0.0569 hectares of land. 7. On 13 July 1998 C. died. After his death the applicant took possession of the land and used continuously for her own needs. 8. On 10 September 1999 the territorial cadastre office registered the plot of land as belonging to C. 9. On 31 January 2000 the Orhei mayor's office amended the annex to its decision of 16 January 1997. C. continued to be mentioned as the owner of the relevant plot of land. 10. On 15 July 2005 the Orhei mayor's office lodged a civil court action aimed at annulling the property right of C. and the applicant to the relevant land. It claimed that the title had been issued in error since C. had moved to an apartment provided by the town and was no longer eligible to obtain such land. Following this relocation, the cadastre office was supposed to remove C.'s title from the list, which it had failed to do. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant initiated a court action aimed at extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance. The two court actions were joined by the court on 6 November 2006. 11. On 15 February 2017 the Orhei district court rejected the court action lodged by the mayor's office and accepted that of the applicant. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had raised the issue of expiry of the three-year limitation period and added that under Article 78 of the old Civil Code (see paragraph 15 below), the court had to apply the rules concerning the limitation period regardless of the parties' arguments. It found that the mayor's office had missed the three-year limitation period. However, in the operative part the court omitted to refer to the expiry of the limitation period and found that the court action had been groundless. The court also accepted the applicant's action, extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance since she had taken possession of the relevant land immediately after his death. 12. On 4 October 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal overturned that judgment, accepting the appeal lodged by the mayor's office. It annulled C.'s title to the relevant land, finding that he had obtained it in error and that under the applicable law he could not be the owner of that land. Moreover, the court rejected the applicant's claim for extending the time-limit for accepting her brother's inheritance, finding that she had missed it without a valid reason. 13. On 12 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal. 14. The applicant submitted documents showing that she had paid various taxes for the land in question over the years. 15. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (1964, in force before 12 June 2003) reads as follows: "Article 74. General limitation periods. The general limitation period for defending, by a court action, against the breach of a person's rights (prescripția) is of three years ..." "Article 78. Mandatory application of the limitation period. The competent court ... shall apply the limitation period regardless of the parties' request." "Article 581. Acceptance of inheritance. In order to inherit, the heir must accept the inheritance. ... It shall be considered that the heir has accepted the inheritance if he/she took actual possession or administration of inheritance assets ..." 16. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (in force from 12 June 2003) read as follows: "Article 7. Application of the civil law in time. (1) The civil law has no retroactive effect. It does not modify and does not annul the conditions of creation of a legal situation which previously appeared, nor the conditions of ending of a legal situation which previously ended. ... (6) The provisions of the new law concerning limitation periods ... shall apply to limitation periods which started before the date of entry into force of the new law, but did not end before that date. ... The start, the suspension and the interruption of the limitation period shall be determined under the old law for the period before the entry into force of the new law. ..."

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Sivas. 7. According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant, on 19 November 2002 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Hizbullah following an hour long armed conflict with the police officers during which he had resisted, had thrown a grenade and had fired back at the police officers. 8. On the same day at 1.50 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Silvan State Hospital, in Diyarbakır, by a doctor who observed the following on the applicant's body: 2 cm-long scrape on his lower left chest, handcuff marks on his wrists, a traumatic scrape on the front side of his right leg. The doctor observed no unfitness for work. Also on the same day at 5.45 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by another doctor who made similar findings as those mentioned in the first medical report. 9. On 22 November 2002 the applicant was interviewed by police in the absence of a lawyer in the course of which he had allegedly sustained both physical and psychological ill-treatment. According to the applicant's submissions, he was allegedly forced to sign some documents, as well as a declaration to waive his right to legal assistance. He further maintained that when he had wished to read the documents that he had been made to sign he had been threatened with further ill-treatment. 10. On 23 November 2002 at the end of his police custody, the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by a doctor who noted that there were no new signs of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. According to the applicant, during the examination the police officers intervened and ordered the doctor to write that the applicant had some grazes on his wrists and ankles. 11. On 23 November 2002 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he accepted the accusations against him. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who took his statements in the absence of a lawyer in which he had accepted most of the statements he had given to the police. According to his submissions before the Court, the applicant claimed that he had admitted being a member of the Hizbullah before the public prosecutor and the judge on account of the duress and the intimidation exerted on him by the police. He further claimed that the police officers had threatened him with excessive length of proceedings and had told him that if he had accepted the charges they would help him and release him from detention. 12. On 27 November 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 13. On 19 March 2003 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant gave evidence without a lawyer in which he denied his previous statements and the accusations. He further stated, without providing any details, that he had been subjected to pressure while in police custody and that he had pressurised to sign his police statements without reading them. When asked about his statements before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of the pressure from the police officers. 14. At a hearing held on 18 September 2003 the applicant submitted, without providing any details, that he had been tortured during the preliminary investigation. 15. By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 16. On 22 June 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Relying on the medical report dated 23 November 2002, it also rejected the applicant's contention that he had been tortured while in police custody. 17. On 10 April 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the trial court's judgment.

Ruled as violated by court

The applicant was denied his right to defend himself.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo "pickets" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo "pickets" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8. The applicants decided to hold their own solo "pickets" and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, "CAO"). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11. The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a "picket" involving fifty people. That "picket" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter "PEA"). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14. Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15. On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).

Ruled as violated by court

5. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7. According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo "pickets" (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo "pickets" was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10. At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, "CAO"). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 12. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a "picket" involving fifty people. That "picket" was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter "PEA"). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13. On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 16. The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).

The applicants were denied their rights to defend themselves.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants were born in 1971 and 1976 and are detained in Lipcani. 6. In July 1999 the German police found the corpse of a Moldovan national in a river near Hamburg. The investigation led to a Moldovan national, A.B., who had shared a house with the victim. During questioning by the German police, A.B., who was a suspect, declared that the murder had been committed by the applicants who had beaten up the victim and strangled him. A.B. stated that he had only helped them to carry the victim's dead body and that he had not seen the body being thrown into the river. He knew, however, that a concrete pole had been attached to the victim's body before it immersion. The goal of the murder was allegedly to obtain the victim's five thousand German marks, which he had deposited with a German family. According to A.B., after the murder, the applicants manipulated the German family into believing that the victim had been arrested by police in another part of Germany and that he needed the money. After obtaining the money, one of the applicants wired it to his family in Moldova. 7. During the court proceedings in Moldova, the competent court resorted to international legal assistance by summoning at least seven witnesses who lived in Germany, including A.B. All witnesses were summoned once through the intermediary of the Moldovan Ministry of Justice and the German authorities. However, none of them appeared before the Moldovan court and no reasons for failure to appear were given. The attempts to summon the witness were not repeated. 8. On 29 December 2008 the Botanica District Court acquitted the applicants of murder charges that had been brought against them. The court found that the only piece of evidence presented by the prosecutor in support of the accusation against the applicants was the statements made by A.B. to the German police. Since A.B. himself had been accused by the German police of the victim's murder at the time of his questioning, he had a personal interest in accusing other persons. Moreover, his statements were not totally coherent and consistent. In particular, he had stated to the German police that he had not been present when the victim's body had been thrown into the river. However, somehow he knew that a concrete pole had been attached to the corpse. Lastly, the Moldovan authorities had been unable to bring A.B. to Moldova, and the applicants had not been present during the interview with the German police and had therefore been unable to put questions to A.B. For all the above reasons the evidence was excluded from the file. However, the applicants were found guilty of fraud as a result of the fact that they had manipulated the German family with whom the victim's money had been deposited, and had appropriated the money. 9. On 25 February 2010 the Chişinău Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the prosecutor and reversed the judgment of the lower court in so far as it concerned the murder charges. The court admitted A.B.'s statements given before the German police in evidence and found the applicants guilty of murder. The court found A.B.'s statements to be reliable because they had been made before an investigating judge. The applicants were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. At the same time, the applicants were cleared of the charge of fraud on account of the Statute of Limitations. 10. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Justice in which they argued, inter alia, that the statements made by A.B. before the German authorities and read out during the hearing before the Court of Appeal could not be admitted in evidence unless they had had the opportunity to confront A.B. in a court hearing and address questions to him. Moreover, the applicants submitted that A.B. had a personal interest in accusing them because he was a suspect himself. 11. On 18 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicants' appeal and upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the applicants had not been present during A.B.'s questioning by the German authorities had been as a result of their own actions, because they had left Germany by that time. Two of the sitting judges (S.M. and V.T.) wrote a dissenting opinion in which they expressed the view that the applicants' rights as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been breached by the fact that they had been unable to examine the only prosecution witness, A.B., on whose evidence their convictions had been based.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "obtaining the attendance of witnesses on his behalf," it appears that applicant was not able to do so, as witnesses on his behalf ultimately did not show.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kırıkkale. 6. On 25 September 1998 the applicant was arrested by police officers and taken into custody on suspicion of being a member of an illegal organisation. 7. On 30 September 1998 police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters took a statement from the applicant in the absence of a lawyer, as a result of the restriction stemming from Law no. 3842. He confessed that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about certain activities in which he had participated. 8. On 2 October 1998 a statement was taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor. He confirmed the statement he had made to the police. 9. On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The applicant alleged that he had given the statements under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 10. On 7 October 1998 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with being involved in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 11. On 12 October 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 16 December 1998. 12. On 16 December 1998 the other co-accused, namely G.T., Z.A. and D.P.N.J., gave evidence in person. They did not give any statement in relation to the applicant. 13. On 8 March 1999 the trial court, noting the absence of the accused, decided to adjourn the hearing. 14. At the hearing held on 2 June 1999, the applicant gave evidence in person and stated that he had been forced to sign his previous statements. The applicant retracted those statements while maintaining that he had not been involved in any of the offences attributed to him. At the same hearing, the other co-accused, namely A.B. and B.G. also gave evidence in person. They did not make any statements in respect of the applicant. 15. While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Istanbul State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. Between 18 June 1999 and 2 September 2002, the trial court consisting of three civilian judges held fourteen hearings on the merits. 16. On 4 August 1999, the State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, heard evidence from A.S., Ş.K., H.K., S.K., N.Ç., T.G., Ö.Ö. as witnesses, from M.N. as accused and from K.Ö. as a complainant. Two of them made incriminatory statements in relation to the applicant. When asked his comments concerning those statements, the applicant rejected them, maintaining that he had had no connection with the accusations. 17. On 25 April 2001 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits (esas hakkında mütalaa) and requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. At the same hearing, the applicant's lawyer requested time to submit the applicant's defence submissions. 18. On 29 August 2001 the applicant's lawyer made his defence submissions in relation to the merits of the case. 19. On 27 March 2002 the applicant's lawyer reiterated his previous defence submissions. 20. On 19 June 2002 the applicant's lawyer, again reiterated his previous defence submissions. At the same hearing, the applicant stated that he had agreed to his lawyer's submissions. 21. On 2 September 2002 the applicant and his lawyer presented their closing arguments. On the same day the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment, pursuant to Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. The first-instance court based its decision on several items of evidence, such as the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, documents relating to the organisation which had been found and seized in the course of police operations, and the statements of some co-defendants. 22. On 7 April 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. On 29 May 2003 that decision was deposited with the registry of the Istanbul State Security Court.

Ruled as violated by court

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants were born in 1966, 1971, 1993 and 1996 respectively. The second applicant is the former spouse of the first applicant and the third and the fourth applicants are their children. The first, the third and the fourth applicants live in Lviv. The second applicant had his registered residence in Lviv as at the time when the application was lodged; his current whereabouts are not known. 5. In August 2001 the second applicant, a military officer at the material time, was provided with a two-room flat for himself and his family in an accommodation hall owned by the Lviv Military Academy. Subsequently all four applicants obtained residence registration with the local authority as tenants of that flat. Since 2001 (and as at the time of the observations exchanges between the parties), the household was paying the relevant maintenance charges and other tenancy-related fees, which were calculated on the premise that the flat was occupied by four persons. 6. On 28 November 2003 the second applicant was dismissed from military service on grounds of redundancy. The dismissal order stipulated that he was eligible for priority allocation of social housing from the waiting list managed by the Ministry of Defence. 7. In 2005 the first and the second applicant divorced and the first applicant and her children were placed on the waiting list for social housing managed by the municipal authority. 8. In August 2011 the Lviv garrison military prosecutor instituted eviction proceedings against the applicants. He referred, essentially, to the fact that the accommodation hall belonged to the Military Academy and was designed for the temporary housing of military personnel. Meanwhile, none of the applicants had any connection to the military or the Military Academy, which owned the building. 9. On 15 November 2012 the Frankivskyy District Court in Lviv dismissed the prosecutor's claim. It found that the applicants had lawfully obtained the tenancy in connection with the second applicant's previous military service. Regard being had to the applicable legal provisions concerning the social protection of former military officers and their families, they could not be evicted from the accommodation hall without first being provided with other housing. In addition to that, the fourth applicant had still been a minor at the material time, and further legislation applicable to the protection of minors warranted the protection of her housing rights. 10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order ("ордер"), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society. 12. On 20 November 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicants' cassation appeal. 13. Subsequently, enforcement proceedings were instituted with a view to evicting the applicants. The parties have not informed the Court whether the eviction order has been enforced.

NOT ruled as violated by court

10. Following an appeal by the prosecutor, on 17 September 2013 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and ordered the applicants' eviction. It found that they had settled in the disputed premises without the building owner having taken a formal decision authorising their occupancy and without an occupancy order ("ордер"), having been issued in their favour. Accordingly, the applicants' occupancy was unlawful ab initio. This fact extinguished the applicability of the legal provisions cited by the first-instance court concerning the social protection of retired military officers, their families and minors. 11. The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. They noted, in particular, that the disputed housing had been their only home for more than ten years and that their eviction would render them homeless. They also submitted that their income level was not sufficient for them to acquire housing at their own expense and that they did not have any family members in Lviv who could offer shelter to them. Their residence was duly registered and they had been dutifully paying all the applicable fees connected with their occupancy of the flat. The fact that the building owner had failed to comply with certain formalities connected with regularising their occupancy was not their fault. In addition, evicting them on this basis should have become time-barred in 2004 (three years after they had moved into the flat). Lastly, the applicants referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine (no. 30856/03, judgment of 2 December 2010), and alleged that their eviction would be in breach of the principles established in that judgment, according to which the courts had to assess whether the eviction was necessary in a democratic society.

There is no relevance between fair trial and housing principles.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Batumi. 6. He was a judge at the Khulo District Court. On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Council of Justice initiated disciplinary proceedings against him on the grounds set out in section 2(2)-(a) Act of 22 February 2000 on Disciplinary Proceedings against Judges of Ordinary Courts (hereinafter, "the Disciplinary Proceedings Act" – see paragraphs 16 and 17 below). He was accused in particular of having kept a defendant in a criminal case under his consideration in unlawful detention for the period of fourteen days in September 2004, which fact was qualified as a "manifest breach of the law" within the meaning of the above-mentioned provision of the Disciplinary Proceedings Act. 7. On 18 November 2004 a Panel of the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, "the Panel"), composed of Mr K.K. (the President of the Panel and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr D.S. and Mr I.K., considered the case at an oral hearing. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicant admitted to the act he had been accused of. After examining the circumstances of the case, the Panel found the applicant guilty of the misconduct in question. Describing the mistake at issue as unacceptable, the Panel decided, despite his lack of prior disciplinary sanctions and his good professional reputation, to remove the applicant from judicial office. 8. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Disciplinary Council of Judges (hereinafter, "the Disciplinary Council") on points of fact and law. He questioned the assessment of the circumstances of the case and the application of the legal provisions to the established facts in the decision of 18 November 2004. 9. By a decision of 27 January 2005, the Disciplinary Council unanimously upheld the Panel's decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 10. The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In a judgment of 11 July 2005, the Supreme Court quashed the Disciplinary Council's decision of 27 January 2005 for lack of reasoning and legal assessment of the facts, and remitted the case for re-examination. 11. On 4 August 2005 the Disciplinary Council, composed of six members, including three members, Mr K.K. (President and rapporteur), Mr G.Ch., Mr I.K, who had sat at the first hearing, re-considered the applicant's case; another member of the Disciplinary Council who participated in the examination of the applicant's case was Ms N.K. During the oral hearing, the applicant challenged the above-mentioned three members of the bench – Mr K.K., Mr G.Ch. and Mr I.K – on the ground that they had considered his case when it had come before the Panel on 18 November 2004. The request was dismissed. 12. After re-considering all the factual circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Council found, in its decision of 4 August 2005, that the applicant had committed "a manifest breach of the law" and upheld the Panel's decision of 18 November 2004 in its entirety. 13. In his appeal on points of law, the applicant complained that Mr K.K. had presided over all of the benches of both the Disciplinary Council and the Panel, and three of the members sitting on the Disciplinary Council when it ruled on 4 August 2005 had already dealt with the case at first instance on 18 November 2004. He also complained about his request for their withdrawal being rejected. Finally, the applicant criticised the haste with which the case had been considered by the Disciplinary Council. 14. On 14 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law, finding that the case had been objectively and exhaustively examined by the disciplinary bodies and that the punishment imposed had been appropriate. As for the rest, noting that the Disciplinary Proceedings Act had instituted a system whereby members of the disciplinary panel could also sit on the Disciplinary Council, the Supreme Court concluded that the composition of the benches complained of by the applicant had been perfectly legal. Moreover, in the court's opinion, the fact that the persons concerned had previously participated in the examination of the case was not in itself sufficient to prove that the Disciplinary Council, in its ruling on 4 August 2005, had not been impartial. 15. According to the materials available in the case file, the applicant did not voice, even in remote terms, either before the Panel, the Disciplinary Council or the Supreme Court any complaint about the lack of professional qualifications by any of the individual members of the Disciplinary Council who had participated in the examination of his case.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "independent and impartial tribunal," the appeal courts sharing judges seems to threaten the idea of independence.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7. On 13 February 1999, the applicant was arrested during an operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party), at which time he was found to be in possession of a fake identity card. 8. On 15 February 1999 the applicant was interrogated by police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters in the absence of a lawyer pursuant to Law No. 3842, which at the time of the applicant's arrest provided for a systemic restriction in respect of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 9. The applicant admitted in his statement that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about a number of activities in which he had participated, including armed activities. 10. On 18 February 1999 statements were taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation in question, that he had joined them in a rural area, and that he had afterwards tried to collect money for the organisation in Istanbul. However, he withdrew the statements he had made to the police, maintaining that he had not participated in any other activity for the illegal organisation. He alleged that he had given those statements to the police under duress. 11. On the same day the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge, once again in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The investigating judge ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 12. On 19 March 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation and involvement in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. 13. On 5 June 1999 Diyarbakır State Security Court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Istanbul State Security Court. 14. At a hearing held on 18 February 2000, the applicant stated that he had not been able to see his lawyer to prepare his defence and requested time to do so. The applicant was granted time to prepare his defence. 15. At a hearing held on 1 September 2000, the applicant gave evidence in person and denied all the charges. He stated that he had given his previous statements under duress. 16. At a hearing held on 14 November 2001 the applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation, but had carried out only political activities for the organisation and not armed activities. 17. On 1 July 2003 another set of criminal proceedings brought against the applicant, which had been pending since 1994 and concerning charges related to membership of the PKK and taking part in activities for that illegal organisation, was merged with the one that had been initiated in 1999. 18. The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004 and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19. On 16 September 2004 Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court based its decision, inter alia, on the applicant's statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and other witness statements taken by the police and the public prosecutor. 20. On 3 May 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of 16 September 2004 on the grounds that the details of a number of PKK activities for which the applicant had been held responsible had not been discussed in the decision in depth and that the case file lacked the necessary official reports. 21. The applicant was tried afresh before the Istanbul Assize Court. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The applicant claimed during the trial that his statements during the preliminary investigation had been made under duress. 22. On 1 February 2007 Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty of committing an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and again sentenced him to life imprisonment. 23. On 9 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 1 February 2007.

Ruled as violated by court

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right to defend himself. He did not have access to legal assistance while in custody, but did at the trial.

edited by me to narrow down to one ambiguity

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Piaski. 5. On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 6. The applicant lodged an appeal (zarzuty) within the time-limit. She complained that the payment order had been based on a lease contract which had turned out to be null and void but which she had secured by a blank bill of exchange signed by her. She challenged that basis for the payment order and considered it illegal and unfounded. She further applied for exemption from the court fees. 7. On 13 July 2011 a court officer from the Koszalin Regional Court (referendarz sądowy) decided to partly exempt her from the fees. The court examined in detail the financial situation of the applicant. In particular it noted that in 2010 her company had generated a gross income of PLN 213,000; however, the expenses exceeded this sum by approximately PLN 50,000. As regards the first four months of 2011 the applicant had declared a gross income of PLN 53,600 and expenses of PLN 48,500; therefore she had generated a net income of over PLN 5,000. Moreover the applicant had declared that she had other financial obligations, amounting to PLN 4,000 per month, which she had been paying on time. The court agreed that her financial situation had been difficult and that she had not initiated the current proceedings. However, the situation of a commercial activity which had been generating a very high income, and even higher costs, did not automatically justify a full exemption from court fees. Moreover, the applicant had declared a net income for the first four months of 2011. In an extensively reasoned decision the domestic court concluded that the applicant should be expected to pay one third of the fees due for lodging an appeal against the payment order. 8. The applicant appealed against the decision of the court officer. She reiterated that her business had generated losses and that she had been financially dependent on her family. The applicant stressed that she had not instituted the civil proceedings, so could not prepare for their costs or limit the sum claimed. 9. On 3 August 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court upheld the decision of the court officer. The applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,928 (EUR 500) within seven days. 10. On 22 August 2011 the applicant's lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company's activity as it had been operating at a loss. 11. On 26 August 2011 the court officer of the Koszalin District Court partly allowed the applicant's request and exempted her from the court fees above PLN 1,000 (equivalent to EUR 250). The court took into account the applicant's difficult financial situation but noted that the court fee should not have been regarded as less important than the other financial obligations that the applicant had been able to honour, in the amount of PLN 4,000 monthly. Having examined all the arguments relied on by the applicant, the court considered that the situation did not justify a total exemption from the court fees. The applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12. On 16 September 2011 the applicant was ordered to pay PLN 1,000 within seven days. 13. On 29 September 2011 the applicant lodged a third request for exemption from the court fees. She submitted that her financial situation had not improved and that she had no income whatsoever. Moreover her car broke down which generated further costs. 14. On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15. On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16. On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17. On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.

Ruled as violated by court

5. On 2 May 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court issued a payment order (nakaz zapłaty) against the applicant. It stipulated that she was to pay to the claimant, a certain D.K., the sum of 156,000 Polish zlotys (PLN), equivalent to 36,000 euros (EUR). 10. On 22 August 2011 the applicant's lawyer lodged a second request for exemption from the court fees. The applicant submitted that she had wound up her company's activity as it had been operating at a loss. 14. On 26 October 2011 the Koszalin Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal against the payment order of 2 May 2011 and rejected her third application for full exemption from the court fees as it had been substantially the same as the one lodged before and examined on 26 August 2011. 15. On 10 November 2011 the applicant appealed against the decision of 26 October 2011. She was ordered to pay a court fee of PLN 1,500 for pursuing her appeal. She requested the court to exempt her from that fee. 16. On 22 December 2011 the court partly granted her request. The applicant was ordered to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 1,000. 17. On 30 March 2012 the Szczecin Court of Appeal rejected her appeal against the decision of 26 October 2011 for failure to pay the fee. The decision was delivered to the applicant on 10 April 2012. It appears that around that time the applicant took up employment. During that period the applicant unsuccessfully attempted to have the proceedings stayed.

While it depends on the definition of "entitled to a hearing," it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by her financial inability to appeal.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The facts, as submitted by the parties, are similar to those in the case of Association "21 December 1989" and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). 5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6. In 1990 the military prosecutor's office opened, of its own motion, investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). 7. At the same time, another investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation against a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the committal for trial of senior military and public officials and their subsequent conviction by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. It cannot be seen from the court's decision whether the injured persons, including the applicants, participated in those proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu v. Romania [Committee], nos. 64752/13 and 54607/14, § 7, 3 July 2018). 8. As regards the offence of improper conduct, the military prosecutor's office decided on 27 October 1993 (Ms Nicoleta-Lorena Giurcanu ‑ applicant in application no. 30365/15, hereinafter "the first applicant"), 9 March 1994 (Mr Traian Vasu – applicant in application no. 30392/15, hereinafter "the second applicant") and 27 August 1993 (Ms Luminița Zeleniuc – applicant in application no. 30410/15, hereinafter "the third applicant") not to open a separate investigation of its own motion on the grounds that the offence of improper conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the third applicant on 25 September 2008. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants' injury. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial. 10. The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association "21 December 1989" and Others v. Romania (cited above, §§ 12-41), and Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). 11. On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor's office issued a decision in respect of the offence of instigating illegal deprivation of liberty, concerning all the applicants, by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice's decision of 10 May 1991 (see paragraph 7 above). In addition, the military prosecutor's office closed the main investigation in respect of the offence of instigating improper conduct regarding the second applicant, as it fell under an amnesty law (see paragraph 8 above). No decision was adopted with respect to the injury and assault and battery complained of by the applicants. 12. The decision of 14 October 2015 (see paragraph 11 above) was subsequently annulled by a Prosecutor General's decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing (see Bănuțoiu and Ștefoglu, cited above, § 12).

NOT ruled as violated by court

5. All applicants were ill-treated and injured on the night of 21⁄22 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The applicant in application no. 30392/15 (Vasu v. Romania) suffered injuries that needed twenty-two days of medical care and the other two applicants were beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 9. Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor's office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants' respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard evidence from the applicants, who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and assault and battery, based on their ill-treatment and injuries during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant asked on 29 April 2005 to be joined to these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of the case to be pursued by the military prosecutor's office. The second applicant gave statements as an injured party on 7 January 2000 and 23 November 2004. The third applicant raised civil claims on 25 September 2008 and requested that the persons responsible be identified and committed to stand trial.

It depends on how the statute should apply to cases once combined.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

6. The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tirana. 7. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and two other co-accused on account of premeditated murder. The applicant was subsequently arrested by the authorities. 8. On 21 July 1998 the applicant addressed a letter (kërkesë) to the Kavaja District Court ("the District Court") and the Kavaja district prosecutor ("the district prosecutor"), stating that he had engaged A., a lawyer, to represent him before the district prosecutor during the investigation and during the trial proceedings. It appears that the applicant wrote this letter while he was in detention. 9. On 1 November 1999 the District Court found the applicant not guilty and ordered his release. He had attended the trial and had been defended by A., his chosen lawyer. The two other co-accused were convicted and sentenced. 10. On an unspecified date the two other co-accused and the prosecutor appealed against the District Court's decision of 1 November 1999. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant left Albania. It appears that the applicant was not informed of the appeals of the two other co-accused and the prosecutor, but apparently A. was so informed. 12. On 28 February 2000 the Durrës Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") quashed the District Court's decision and remitted the case for re‑examination. The applicant was represented by A. in his absence. 13. On 21 April 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal lodged by A. against the Durrës Court of Appeal decision of 28 February 2000. 14. On 26 December 2000, during the retrial proceedings, the District Court convicted the applicant in absentia of premeditated murder and sentenced him to twenty-three years' imprisonment. The applicant was represented by lawyer A. (see paragraph 9), the decision stating that A. had been appointed by the court. The two other co-accused appealed. 15. On 10 September 2001 and 14 December 2001 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld the decision of 26 December 2000. The applicant had been represented in those proceedings by a new, court-appointed lawyer. 16. On 14 April 2004 the applicant's mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court's decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 17. On 8 July 2005 the applicant was informed of his conviction in absentia by his family members. He lodged an application for leave to appeal out of time against the decision of 26 December 2000, arguing that he had never been informed of his conviction in absentia as he had been living abroad. The applicant was represented by K. as his counsel. 18. On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor's appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 19. Judge A.H., who had been a member of the District Court's bench that had delivered the judgment of 26 December 2000, also sat in the District Court's bench of 4 November 2005 that dismissed the applicant's application. Judges V.C. and Sh.M., who had been members of the Court of Appeal's bench that on 10 September 2001 had upheld the decision of 26 December 2000, also sat in the Court of Appeal's bench that dismissed his appeal on 29 September 2006. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant, represented by his lawyer, lodged a constitutional complaint in respect of the alleged unfairness of the proceedings in absentia and the lack of impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal. 21. On 16 March 2011 the applicant's lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant's constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant's mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant's claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal

Ruled as violated by court

16. On 14 April 2004 the applicant's mother hired another lawyer, K., to make an application for review. It appears from the Supreme Court's decision of 9 July 2010 (see paragraph 18 below) and the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 21 below) that an application for review was rejected by the Supreme Court. There is no copy of the said Supreme Court decision in the case file. 18. On 4 November 2005, 29 September 2006 and 9 July 2010 respectively, the District Court and the Court of Appeal dismissed, and the Supreme Court rejected, his application. The domestic courts held that the applicant should have known of the proceedings as he had been represented by a lawyer of his own choosing, A., who had been informed of the prosecutor's appeal, and as his mother had appointed a lawyer to make an application for review. They also held that the case had already been examined at all instances and that their decisions were still in effect. 21. On 16 March 2011 the applicant's lawyer was informed of the Constitutional Court's decision of 25 February 2011 to dismiss the applicant's constitutional appeal. The Constitutional Court, noting that A. and the applicant's mother had had knowledge of the trial proceedings, stated that there had been no exceptional circumstances which had prevented the applicant from attending the proceedings in person. It did not examine the applicant's claim about the impartiality of the District Court and the Court of Appeal

It's unclear whether the applicant was able to exercise his right "to defend himself in person or through legal assistance," as he was not in attendance at the proceedings, but his appointed lawyer was.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Osijek. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant's grandmother's death, the applicant's relative, M.J., and the applicant's father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku). 8. On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 9. In the proceedings before the first-instance court, on 5 November 2007 the applicant contested the value of the dispute and suggested that it be set at HRK 300,000. 10. At the hearing held on 23 January 2008 the applicant, inter alia, withdrew her objection to the value of the dispute as indicated by the claimant, and stated that she agreed with it. 11. In its judgment of 25 April 2008 the Zabok Municipal Court accepted M.J.'s claim. 12. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Zlatar County Court (Županijski sud u Zlataru) and on 16 September 2009 the second-instance court dismissed her appeal as ill-founded, upholding the first-instance judgment. 13. On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts' judgments. 14. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.'s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter "the issuance of a clausula intabulandi"). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows: "The claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000. Pursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim. In the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims]. Given that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible." 15. The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), arguing that M.J.'s action had two aspects which could not be separated, and that the Supreme Court's decision finding that the case concerned two separate claims had therefore been arbitrary and had violated her right to a fair hearing, in particular her right of access to the Supreme Court, as guaranteed under Article 29 of the Constitution. 16. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It held that the applicant in her constitutional complaint "did not demonstrate that the Supreme Court had failed to respect the provisions of the Constitution concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, namely that it had applied relevant law in an arbitrary manner" and that therefore "the present case did not raise a constitutional issue." Its decision was served on the applicant's representative on 3 March 2011.

NOT ruled as violated by court

7. On 6 November 2000, in inheritance proceedings following the applicant's grandmother's death, the applicant's relative, M.J., and the applicant's father were declared the beneficiaries in respect of a house, which was not registered in the land register, by a decision of the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku). 8. On 18 October 2007 M.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zabok Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zaboku) asking that court to recognise his ownership of a share of half of an inherited piece of property and to order the applicant to allow him to register his ownership in the land register. He set the value of the dispute (vrijednost predmeta spora) at 110,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). 13. On 24 November 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lower courts' judgments. 14. On 27 May 2010 the Supreme Court declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible ratione valoris. It interpreted M.J.'s civil action as being composed of two separate claims arising from different factual and legal bases - the first one for recognition of ownership, and the second for obtaining an order securing the registration of his ownership in the land register (hereinafter "the issuance of a clausula intabulandi"). The Supreme Court thus halved the value of the dispute and held that the value of each claim did not reach the necessary ratione valoris threshold of HRK 100,001 (approximately 13,300 euros (EUR)) for an appeal on points of law to be admissible. The relevant part of this decision reads as follows: "The claimant in his civil action indicated the value of the dispute as HRK 110,000. Pursuant to section 37(2) of the CPA [(Civil Procedure Act)], if the claims in the civil action arise from a variety of grounds, or different claimants put forward individual claims or individual claims are raised against several defendants, the value of the dispute must be established in accordance with the value of each individual claim. In the instant case the claimant made two non-monetary claims, one concerning property rights - for recognition of ownership -, and a claim under the law on obligations - for the issuance of a clausula intabulandi , namely for obtaining an order securing registration of his ownership in the land register. Therefore, the value of the dispute has to be established in relation to the value of the dispute of each claim. Consequently, the value of the dispute of each claim ... has to be established by dividing the indicated unique value of the dispute by [these] two [claims]. Given that the claimant indicated the [unique] value of the dispute as HRK 110,000, and that this amount should be divided by [the number of the claims], the value of the dispute of each claim does not exceed the amount of 100,000. It follows that an appeal on points of law by the defendant is inadmissible."

While it could be argued, as the applicant did, that she was denied fair trial, the Constitutional Court's rebuttal makes it appear it was not so.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Diyarbakır. 6. On 23 December 2001 the applicant was arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of being a member of Hizbullah, an illegal organisation. During his detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In particular, electric shocks were administered to his testicles. 7. On 25 December 2001 the applicant was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. During his interrogation, he confessed in detail to his involvement in the activities of the illegal organisation and gave detailed information about the organisation and its members. 8. On 26 December 2001 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he denied the statements he had given to the police. 9. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who questioned him in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant again denied his statements to the police. During his questioning, the applicant alleged to the investigating judge that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that his statements had been taken under duress. However, a medical report issued by Bağlar Health Clinic dated the same day stated that there was no sign that he had been subjected to violence. At the end of the hearing, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention. 10. On 9 January 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 11. On 19 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant repeated his allegations of having been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and denied his statements to the police. 12. On 27 January 2004 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office against the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated him. He stated that electric shocks had been administered to his body through his testicles and that his testicles had been squeezed, which had caused serious harm. He attached a medical report dated 20 September 2002 from Fırat University on the state of his testicles. The report stated that the applicant had a dilation of the veins in his left testicle of up to 2.6 mm, which had resulted in a varicocele. 13. State Security Courts were abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004. The case against the applicant was transferred to the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 14. On 25 June 2004 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the police officers on account of a lack of evidence. 15. During the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of the hearings, either on their own motion or at the applicant's request. The courts ordered that he be kept in detention owing to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the contents of the file. 16. On 12 June 2008 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The sentence, however, was reduced to twenty years of imprisonment as the applicant was a minor at the time of the offence. 17. On 18 January 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. 18. On 2 April 2010 the applicant asked the Diyarbakır Assize Court for his release pending trial. On 9 April 2010 the court dismissed his application for release on the grounds of the nature of the offence. 19. On 30 September 2010 the Diyarbakır Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı), pursuant to section 8 of Law no. 6008, which provided that juveniles could not be tried before assize courts, which had special jurisdiction to try a number of aggravated crimes enumerated under Article 250 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the material time. The case was thus referred to the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court. 20. On 2 November 2010 the applicant was released pending trial. 21. On 5 June 2012 the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant's statements to the police, the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code and sentenced him to sixteen years and eight months' imprisonment. 22. On 17 June 2014 the Court of Cassation upheld the Diyarbakır Juvenile Court's judgment.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definitions of "defending oneself" and "presumed innocent until proven guilty," it appears that the applicant was denied his right, as he did not have a lawyer and was kept in detention throughout most of the trial.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bílovice nad Svitavou (the Czech Republic). 6. On 30 December 1992 the applicant's legal predecessor and two others applied to the Bratislava Land Office for the restitution of some plots of land under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. The date on which the applicant subsequently became a party to the proceedings is not specified. 7. On 23 June 1997 the Land Office issued a decision approving an agreement whereby the proceedings would end in relation to part of the property but continue in relation to the remainder. 8. By a decision of the Land Office of 17 May 1999, the proceedings in respect of another part of the property ended. However, on 23 May 2003 the relevant part of the proceedings was reopened. 9. On 12 July 2013 the Land Office stayed the restitution proceedings on the grounds that the parties had failed to furnish it with their consent to process, in the course of the proceedings, their personal data. 10. On 11 September 2015 the Land Office dismissed part of what was left of the applicant's claim. 11. On 19 October 2015 the Land Office stayed the examination of the remainder of the claim, inviting a number of institutions to submit relevant documentation, which they did by the end of 2015. 12. The remainder of the applicant's claim is still pending. 13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 14. On 20 December 2011 the applicant brought an action in the Bratislava Regional Court for acceleration of the proceedings under Article 250t § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the CCP"). 15. On 19 April 2012 the Regional Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the Land Office was short of staff and overburdened with complex and time-consuming restitution claims. It also noted that the Land Office had maintained active correspondence with the applicant and had therefore not caused any undue delays. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service ("the PPS") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 18. On 21 August 2014 the applicant lodged a fresh action with the Regional Court under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP, arguing that the Land Office had failed to abide by the order of 11 April 2013. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 20. On 4 July 2012 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

Ruled as violated by court

13. Following repeated requests for acceleration of the proceedings and complaints, on 18 June 2011 the Bratislava Regional Land Office acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings before the District Land Office. 16. The decision of 19 April 2012 was quashed by the Constitutional Court following the applicant's constitutional complaint (see paragraph 22 below). This led to re-examination of the case by the Regional Court, which decided on 11 April 2013 to allow the action and to order the Land Office to decide on the applicant's claim within sixty days. 17. On 12 November 2013, in response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, the Bratislava II District Office of the Public Prosecution Service ("the PPS") informed him that the PPS had reprimanded the Land Office for unjustified delays in the restitution proceedings. 19. On 27 May 2015 the Regional Court allowed the action, issuing a fresh order to the Land Office to decide on the matter within three months. At the same time, it fined it 1,000 euros (EUR) payable to the account of the Regional Court. 21. The first complaint was directed against the Land Office, in particular at the length of the proceedings on his restitution claim before it. On 23 August 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected that complaint for lack of jurisdiction to examine it. The Constitutional Court noted that under Article 250t § 1 of the CCP examination of delays in proceedings before administrative authorities fell within the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, which excluded the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, as the administrative proceedings were still pending, the applicant should have lodged a fresh complaint about the alleged inactivity of the Land Office with the Regional Court. Even though the applicant had already been unsuccessful in using such a remedy, the Regional Court continued to have jurisdiction over actions of that type. 22. The second complaint was directed against the Regional Court. The applicant contested, inter alia, the fairness of the proceedings leading to its decision of 19 April 2012 (see paragraph 15 above). In a constitutional judgment of 16 January 2013, the Constitutional Court allowed the relevant part of the applicant's complaint and found a violation of his right to a fair hearing. It held, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to take account of relevant aspects of the case and to give adequate reasoning in respect of them. Accordingly, it quashed the Regional Court's decision of 19 April 2012 and remitted the applicant's action of 20 December 2011 to the Regional Court for fresh examination. Moreover, it awarded the applicant EUR 2,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

While it depends on the definition of "fair trial," it appears, according to the Constitutional Court, that the applicants were denied this.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Dubno. 6. The applicant was the principal of a private school in the town of Dubno, in the Rivne Region. 7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 8. According to the applicant, at about 9.00 a.m. on 29 May 2000 officers from Dubno police broke down the front door of the applicant's house. Inside the house, an investigator from the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office ordered the applicant to go to his office for questioning. When the applicant refused, the investigator asked the police officers to ensure her compulsory appearance for questioning. The police officers allegedly beat the applicant, twisted her arms behind her back and forced her out of the house barefoot. They placed her in a police car and took her to the office of the investigator. At about 1 p.m. on 29 May 2000 the applicant was released. 9. On the next day, 30 May 2000, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that there were injuries on her shoulders. 10. On 9 April 2001 the Dubno inter-district prosecutor's office discontinued the investigation into the applicant's criminal case, having regard to the insignificance of her offence. 11. On 2 August 2001 the Dubno Town Court quashed the decision of 9 April 2001 as unfounded and ordered that there be further investigation. 12. On 14 August 2001 the investigation was completed and the case file was referred to the Dubno Town Court for trial. 13. On 30 January 2004 and 13 March 2006 the Dubno Town Court issued judgments in the applicant's case, which were quashed as unfounded by the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal. 14. On 30 January 2007 the Dubno Town Court convicted the applicant of failure to comply with a court decision, and decided that it was appropriate to punish her with a fine. However, ultimately it released the applicant from the punishment, as the statute of limitation had expired. 15. On 17 April 2007 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the judgment of 30 January 2007. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 17. On 2 June 2000 the applicant complained to the Rivne regional prosecutor's office regarding the events of 29 May 2000 (see paragraph 8 above). She was examined by a medical expert, who found that she had sustained five bruises to her shoulders and had injured her left shoulder ligaments. The expert stated that the injuries had been caused by blunt solid objects; they could have been sustained in the circumstances described by the applicant. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.

Ruled as violated by court

7. On 30 March 2000 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant for failure to comply with a court decision ordering the reinstatement of a teacher at the private school. 16. On 13 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal by the applicant on points of law, on the grounds that she had failed to comply with procedural rules when submitting it. 18. On 30 June 2000 the Rivne regional prosecutor's office, having conducted a pre-investigation inquiry, refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers because of the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence. 19. On 20 March 2001, following a complaint by the applicant, the Prosecutor General's Office reversed the decision of 30 June 2000 as unsubstantiated, and ordered an additional inquiry. The applicant was not informed of the decision taken within the additional inquiry. In 2016 the Office of the Government Agent was informed that the file on those inquiries had been destroyed, along with other files relating to the same period, after the expiry of the statutory period for keeping such records. 20. On 29 May 2003 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Dubno Town Court, seeking damages for the violation of the inviolability of her home and her unlawful arrest and ill-treatment on 29 May 2000. 21. On 9 July 2007 the Dubno Town Court found that on 29 May 2000 the applicant had been ill-treated and unlawfully taken from her home to the investigator's office. The court found that the authorities had acted unlawfully and that they had violated her right to the inviolability of her home, right to liberty and right to respect for human dignity. The court awarded the applicant 500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH – approximately 73 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 22. On 26 May 2008 the Lviv Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 9 July 2007. 23. The applicant appealed on points of law, contesting the amount of the award. 24. On 8 May 2009 the Higher Administrative Court found that the appeal had not been prepared in a proper way. That court set a time-limit within which the applicant could rectify shortcomings in her appeal on points of law. 25. On 13 July 2009 the Higher Administrative Court returned the applicant's appeal without examining it on the merits, after finding that she had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for submitting appeals.

While it depends on the definition of "entitled to a hearing," it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by repeated procedural dismissals.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Bečej, where he was employed as a police officer. 6. On 24 January 2003 the Bečej Municipal Court ("the Municipal Court") started judicial investigation proceedings against the applicant for the alleged commission of a number of criminal offences concerning the performance of his duties. 7. On 26 May 2003 the competent directorate of the Ministry of Interior dismissed the applicant from the police force (effective as of 30 May 2003). The decision noted that the criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicant and that Article 45, in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, which was in force at the time of the dismissal, should be applied. According to this provision a police officer could be dismissed, at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior, if he no longer met the requirements for being a police officer, which included the requirement that criminal proceedings of a particular type should not be pending against him. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, but on 30 June 2003 his appeal was rejected and the dismissal thus confirmed. 8. On 23 July 2003 the applicant lodged a claim with the Municipal Court seeking his reinstatement. 9. On 31 October 2003 the Municipal Court partly discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant based on the applicable procedural prescription period. 10. On 12 November 2003 the remainder of the criminal proceedings were discontinued because the public prosecutor had withdrawn the charges. 11. On 30 December 2003 the Municipal Court annulled the decision on the applicant's dismissal of 26 May 2003 by partial judgment, establishing that everyone charged with a criminal offence should be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law, and that a broad interpretation of Article 45 of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991 in regards to the persons who were not found guilty could be only to their detriment. 12. On 17 June 2004 the Novi Sad District Court ("the District Court") upheld this judgment. The applicant's former employer thereafter submitted an appeal on points of law. 13. In the meantime, the applicant was reinstated to his previous post by decision of the Ministry of Interior of 13 January 2005. The decisions of 26 May and 30 June 2003 were also repealed. 14. On 9 March 2005, however, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal on points of law, reversed the judgments of 30 December 2003 and 17 June 2004 and rejected the applicant's claim for reinstatement. It found that the dismissal of 26 May 2006 had been in accordance with the Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2) of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991, and that the mere fact that the criminal proceedings had been pending against the applicant was sufficient reason for the applicant's dismissal. 15. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16. On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 17. On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court concerning the outcome, fairness and the length of the civil proceedings concerning his dismissal, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and the "right to work". 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant's dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant's second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court's view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant's favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his "dismissal as such". 19. Before this on 19 January 2011, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision in the case of Stefanović v. Serbia (UŽ 753/2008), concerning the same legal issue in which it ruled in favour of the appelant in that case (see Milojević and Others v. Serbia, nos. 43519/07 and 2 others, §§ 36-37, 12 January 2016).

Ruled as violated by court

15. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was thus again dismissed from his job, which decision was upheld on 11 August 2005 by the Minister of Interior. 16. On 4 August 2005, the applicant brought another set of the proceedings for the annulment of his second dismissal. However, the Municipal Court, the District Court and the Supreme Court, by their judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May 2007 and 18 December 2007, respectively, all ruled against him and upheld his dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. 18. On 17 February 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. In regards to the court judgments of 31 October 2003, 17 June 2004 and 9 March 2005 the Constitutional Court established that the his complaints were inadmissible ratione temporis given that the Serbian Constitution had come into force on 8 November 2006, i.e. after the first set of the proceedings concerning the applicant's dismissal. On the other hand, with respect to the judgments of 27 October 2005, 10 May and 18 December 2007, the Constitutional Court found that they were not arbitrary, and upheld the legality of the applicant's second dismissal on the basis of Article 45, read in conjunction with Article 34 (1)(2), of the Ministry of Interior Act 1991. In the Constitutional Court's view, the fact that the applicant was ultimately dismissed on 4 July 2005, instead of on 26 May 2003, was only in the applicant's favour, and that fact alone could not affect the legality of his "dismissal as such".

It depends on whether the applicant's dismissal from employment constitutes being treated as guilty before being proven.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Charlotte, North Carolina (the United States of America). 6. The case concerns "non-contentious" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 "wrongfully retained" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Hague Convention"). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: "... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case." 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: "... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision." 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above). 12. The other relevant facts of the case are set out in detail in the Court's judgment in the first Adžić case (see Adžić, cited above, §§ 6-57).

Ruled as violated by court

6. The case concerns "non-contentious" proceedings for the return of the child instituted on 13 October 2011 in which the domestic courts refused to order the return of the applicant's son to the United States after the child's mother (a Croatian national and the applicant's former wife) had in August 2011 "wrongfully retained" him in Croatia within the meaning of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Hague Convention"). 7. Specifically, on 15 March 2012 the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court (Općinski građanski sud u Zagrebu), without holding a single hearing, dismissed the applicant's request for the return of the child. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 2 July 2012 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the Municipal Court's decision and remitted the case. In so deciding it, inter alia, instructed the Municipal Court to hold a hearing. The relevant part of the County Court's decision reads as follows: "... the first-instance court based [its] decision in part on undisputed facts, and in the relevant part on the arguments and evidence submitted by the counterparty ... even though it failed to give an opportunity to the petitioner to comment on them ... [T]herefore, the petitioner's appeal has to be allowed, the first-instance decision quashed and the case remitted ... In the fresh proceedings, the first-instance court shall correct the above error by scheduling a hearing (section 309(5) of the Family Act) at which it shall, together with the parties (sections 297-298 of the Civil Procedure Act), examine the circumstances of the case." 8. In the fresh proceedings the Municipal Court obtained an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry on whether returning the child to the United States would expose him to psychological harm – that is, to a risk envisaged in Article 13 paragraph 1 (b) of the Hague Convention (see paragraph 27 below with further references). On 21 May 2014 that court, without holding a hearing, again dismissed the applicant's request for his son to be returned to the United States. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Zagreb County Court on 22 October 2014. The Municipal Court justified its decision not to hold a hearing in the following way: "... the court did not take evidence by hearing the parties because that would significantly protract the proceedings, bearing in mind that in their testimonies – precisely because they have a personal stake in the outcome of the proceedings and their objectivity is very questionable – the parties mostly want to praise and present themselves in the best light while discrediting the opposing party ... [S]uch testimonies are [therefore] generally not at all suitable [in terms of assisting a court in establishing the facts of a case] and reaching a decision." 9. Those return proceedings (see paragraphs 6-8 above) were already subject to the examination by the Court. In the first Adžić case the Court in the judgment of 12 March 2015 held that the domestic authorities had failed to act expeditiously in the proceedings in question. The Court had accordingly found a violation of the State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Adžić v. Croatia, no. 22643/14, §§ 96-99, 12 March 2015). At the time the Court adopted its judgment, i.e. 17 February 2015, the proceedings were still pending before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) upon a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. 10. In his constitutional complaint the applicant complained of a violation of his right to fair procedure, in particular of a breach of his right to an oral hearing and a breach of the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial principle. More specifically, the applicant submitted that the ordinary courts had not held a single hearing in the case and that the first‑instance court had not informed him of its decision to obtain an opinion from a forensic expert in psychiatry, thus preventing him from objecting to the choice of expert. He further complained that he had not been involved in the expert's assessment, even though he had previously expressed his willingness to make himself available for such an assessment. The applicant also complained that the domestic court's refusal to order the return of his son constituted a violation of his right to respect for family life. 11. By a decision of 28 October 2015 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's constitutional complaint. It served its decision on his representative on 4 December 2015. The Constitutional Court examined only the alleged violation of the applicant's right to fair procedure, because it considered that the alleged violation of his right to family life had been addressed by the Court in the first Adžić case (see paragraph 9 above).

The applicant was denied his right to a hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant company, S.C. Textinc S.A., is a Romanian company whose registered office is in Timişoara. 5. On 12 December 2008 the Timişoara Finance Inspectorate (hereinafter, "the T.F.I.") instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant company on the grounds that it had an outstanding tax liability for the year 2008 amounting to 237,128 Romanian lei (RON). 6. The applicant company, represented by its appointed lawyer, Mr. P. Sălăjan, challenged before the Timişoara District Court the T.F.I.'s decision to open enforcement proceedings. It claimed that it had no outstanding fiscal debts and submitted documentary evidence in this respect. 7. At the first hearing in the proceedings the T.F.I. acknowledged that the applicant company had no outstanding tax liability and that the enforcement proceedings had been instituted in error. Invoking Article 275 of the Romanian Code of the Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "the CCP" – see paragraph 15 below), it also contended that as it had acknowledged its error at the first hearing in the proceedings it should not be ordered to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company. 8. By a judgment of 16 February 2009 the Timişoara District Court allowed the applicant company's challenge concerning the T.F.I.'s decision to open enforcement proceedings and ordered the T.F.I. to pay the applicant RON 9,893; this sum represented respectively the fees of the applicant company's lawyer (9,700 RON), stamp duty and trial tax (193 RON). The court held that although the T.F.I. had acknowledged its error at the first hearing it could not be exonerated from the payment of the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant company, as the challenge proceedings were the result of a mistake on its part. The court further noted that the T.F.I. had started enforcement proceedings against the applicant company for a non-existent debt and that the latter had accordingly had to hire a lawyer and pay the trial fees in order to defend itself. The court also noted that the applicant company had submitted evidence to support its request for the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred. 9. The T.F.I. lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 16 February 2009. It claimed that the first-instance court had not observed the principle of adversarial proceedings and of equality of arms, as it had not had the opportunity to challenge the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer's fees, which in its opinion were too high. 10. By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer's fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer's fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timişoara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 11. The T.F.I. lodged with the Timiş County Court an application for the judgment of 12 August 2009 to be set aside (contestaţie în anulare – see paragraph 14 below) on the grounds that the County Court had not examined all the arguments that it had raised in its appeal on points of law; the T.F.I. referred in particular to the fact that before the Timişoara District Court they were not given the possibility to bring their arguments concerning the amount requested by the applicant company and then awarded in legal costs and expenses by the first-instance court. 12. In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timiş County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court's view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments. 13. The County Court then re-examined the amount paid by the applicant company in lawyer's fees and considered that in relation to the lawyer's input in the case, it was justified to reduce that amount from RON 9700 to RON 700. It also considered that the stamp duty and trial tax in the amount of 193 RON were not to be granted to the applicant company, in so far as this amount could be requested separately from the fiscal authorities, based on the Law no. 146/1997 on stamp duty, as a consequence of the fact that the challenge to the enforcement had been allowed.

Ruled as violated by court

10. By a final judgment of 12 August 2009 the Timiş County Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded. While holding that the lawyer's fees corresponded to his input in the case, the court reiterated that the judge was entitled to increase or to reduce a lawyer's fees, according the specific criteria set out by Article 274 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below). The court thus concluded that the judgment given by the Timişoara District Court was lawful and well-founded; it further awarded the applicant company the amount of 7,596 RON in legal costs in respect of the appeal proceedings. 12. In a final judgment of 19 February 2010 the Timiş County Court, sitting in a different formation from that of 12 August 2009, allowed the request: it set aside the judgment of 12 August 2009 (see paragraph 10 above) and allowed the appeal lodged by the T.F.I. against the judgment of 16 February 2009 (see paragraph 8 above), which it partly amended. The County Court held that the appellate court had not examined the arguments raised by the defendant in their appeal on points of law in relation to the manner in which the first instance court applied Article 274 § 3 of the CCP (see paragraph 15 below); in particular, the first instance court had not allowed the parties to bring their arguments concerning the amount of the legal costs requested by the applicant company. Such an omission was sufficient, in the County Court's view, to justify the quashing of the previous judgments.

It could be argued, depending on the definition of "entitled to hearing," that the ability of judges to set lawyers' fees interferes with this entitlement.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Golasowice. 5. On 1 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court for the purposes of establishing an easement. In particular the applicant sought a decision allowing her to use a strip of land belonging to her neighbours as a roadway allowing her access to her property. The roadway in question, which has been used by her in the past, runs along a causeway (grobla) between fishponds. 6. By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed the applicant's claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 7. On 15 November 2000 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case (file no. III Ca 661/00). 8. At a hearing on 13 March 2001 the court ordered the preparation of an expert opinion. Two experts declined the invitation to prepare an opinion, and the third expert approached by the court eventually prepared it on 17 October 2001. 9. The defendants contested both the expert opinion itself and the fee for drafting it. In March 2002 they requested preparation of another expert opinion. 10. It appears that the next hearing was held on 23 April 2002. The court questioned the expert and appointed another one to assess the value of the plot of land. 11. On 12 November 2002 the court held a viewing of the property. 12. At a hearing on 13 January 2003 the court decided to appoint yet another expert to establish whether the easement would have any impact on the fishponds. The opinion was submitted to the court on 11 April 2003. The expert was questioned at a hearing on 3 July 2003. On 27 January 2004 another expert submitted a complementary opinion, at the request of the court. 13. The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14. On 2 June 2005 the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant's claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 15. On 26 January 2006 (file no. III Ca 1322/05) the Gliwice Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for the second time. 16. At a hearing on 26 June 2006 the court requested preparation of an expert geological opinion. The opinion was submitted one year later, on 22 June 2007. 17. At a hearing on 18 October 2007 the court decided that further defendants should join the proceedings. 18. A viewing of the land took place on 6 November 2007. Afterwards anther expert opinion on road construction was ordered by the court. It was submitted to the court in January 2008 and the parties duly commented on it. 19. At a hearing on 23 July 2008 the court questioned the expert and requested the preparation of another expert opinion on the value of the plot of land. 20. The opinion was submitted to the court on 12 January 2009. 21. The court held a hearing on 25 November 2009 and decided to hold another viewing of the property. Two subsequent viewings scheduled for December 2009 and February 2010 were cancelled due to the weather conditions. 22. A hearing was held on 4 March 2010 and on 30 April 2010 the court held a viewing of the land. 23. Another expert opinion ordered by the court was prepared on 6 August 2010. 24. The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 25. The defendants appealed. 26. On 22 February 2012 the Gliwice Regional Court finally dismissed the appeals. 27. On 9 December 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Gliwice Regional Court under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaint about breach of the right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki – "the 2004 Act"). She stated that she had lodged her claim in 1999 and that her case had still not been examined. She also claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 28. By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant "had not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based." 29. Subsequently, the applicant lodged another complaint under the 2004 Act. She sought a finding that the length of the proceedings had been excessive and claimed PLN 10,000 in compensation. 30. By a decision of 5 April 2006 (file no. III S 7/06) the Gliwice Regional Court dismissed the claim. It analysed in detail the course of the proceedings after September 2004 and held that they had generally been conducted in a correct and timely manner. As regards the period prior to September 2004, the court relied on the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and held that the 2004 Act applied to delays caused by the court's inactivity occurring before that date but only if that delay still continued; what had not been the case in the case under the consideration.

Ruled as violated by court

6. By a decision of 11 July 2000 (file no. I Ns 57/99) the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed the applicant's claim. The other party appealed against this decision. 13. The next hearing was held on 17 June 2004. The court subsequently dealt with an application lodged by the applicant to exempt her from payment of the fees for the expert opinion. 14. On 2 June 2005 the Jastrzębie Zdrój District Court allowed, in essence, the applicant's claim (file no. I Ns 57/99). The other party appealed against the decision. 24. The court held hearings in March 2011. On 31 March 2011 it gave a decision granting the applicant the easement in question. 28. By a decision of 21 December 2004 (file no. III S 36/04) the Gliwice Regional Court rejected the claim on formal grounds, having found that the applicant "had not specified the circumstances on which her complaint had been based."

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year. At the same time, the Regional Court ruled that the length of proceedings was not excessive.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lived until his arrest in the town of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the Sakhalin Region. 5. On 3 April 2003 the applicant was apprehended in a flat with unregistered firearms in his possession. Four tied persons with traces of beatings, including Mr P., were discovered in a cloakroom of the flat. An investigator of the Sakhalin Regional police department drew up an arrest record. 6. On the following day the applicant's detention on remand was authorised. A week later the applicant was charged with a number of crimes, including organisation and leadership of an armed gang, several counts of aggravated kidnapping, extortion, robbery and fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms. 7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 8. On 21 April 2004 the applicant and his lawyers started studying the case file materials comprising nineteen volumes, 200-300 pages long each. On 7 September 2004 the Town Court set a time-limit for studying, affording the applicant additional twenty working days to complete it. On 29 December 2004 the case was referred to the Regional Court for trial. 9. On 6 April 2006 the Regional Court, by a jury verdict, found the applicant and six of his accomplices guilty as charged. On 12 May 2006 the Regional Court, relying on the jury verdict, sentenced the applicant to twenty-one years' imprisonment. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant. 13. The applicant's lawyer appealed against the judgment of the Regional Court, complaining, among other matters, about the decision to read out pre-trial statements by Mr L., Mr P. and Mr K. On 14 November 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of the Regional Court, noting that it had correctly considered that reasons for the witnesses' absence had been extraordinary and that it had lawfully read out their pre-trial statements.

Ruled as violated by court

7. The applicant's detention was further extended by the Yuzhno‑Sakhalinsk Town Court and the Sakhalin Regional Court on thirteen occasions up until his conviction. When extending the applicant's detention, the domestic courts referred to the particular gravity and quantity of the charges against him; complexity of the criminal investigation and difficulties of jury trial; the applicant's liability to abscond, re-offend and interfere with the course of justice, given his personality and criminal record; significant volume of evidence presented by the defence during the trial. The courts also kept track of the course of the investigation and assessed investigative and operative measures planned by the prosecution, including arrests of the applicant's accomplices (which were still at liberty or had absconded in breach of the measure of restraint imposed on them and had been put on the wanted persons' list), complex expert examinations requiring participation of the applicant and the victims and examination of the case-file by the applicant and his accomplices. The applicant's requests for release on bail, as well as his appeal complaints against the detention orders, were to no avail. 10. The applicant was found guilty, in particular, of an aggravated fraud, robbery, kidnapping and extortion in respect of Mr L., a businessman from the Moscow Region. The jury found that in May 2001 the applicant had approached Mr L. under the pretence of being a car salesman. The applicant had promised Mr L. to sell him a car for approximately 600,000 Russian roubles (RUB). However, after Mr L. had transferred the money to an account indicated by the applicant, the latter had disappeared. In October 2002 the applicant contacted Mr L., told him that he had just returned from Japan with his car and invited him to come to Sakhalin for it. On his arrival at the airport of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on 13 October 2002 Mr L. was met by Mr K., one of the applicant's accomplices, and taken to the applicant's country house where he was held until 6 November 2002, being subjected to beatings and extortion by the applicant and his gang. 11. Neither Mr K., nor Mr L. were heard in open court. Mr K. had been found dead in a remand prison cell before the trial commenced. As for Mr L., residing in the Moscow Region, the trial court attempted to secure his presence on several occasions by summoning him and ordering his escort to the court. In reply he informed the trial court about being unable to travel to Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in view of his spinal disease and a medical contraindication to air travel. He submitted a number of documents in support, as well as a written notice in which he confirmed his pre-trial statements. Having regard to these circumstances, the trial court allowed the prosecution's request to read out Mr L. and Mr K.'s statements incriminating the applicant, despite the latter's objections. 12. The jury further established that in September and December 2002 and in March 2003 the applicant had organised an armed robbery and kidnapping of eight other victims, including Mr P. and had extorted a large sum of money in exchange for their freedom. Mr P. also was not heard in court as he was allegedly on vacation in Ukraine. Disregarding the applicant's objections, the Regional Court read out Mr P.'s pre-trial statements against the applicant.

While it depends on the definitions of "adequate time and facilities" and "examining witnesses," it does not appear the applicant and their lawyer received adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence, nor that they were able to examine the witnesses whose statements were read out.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants were born in 1935, 1945 and 1956 respectively and live in Ploieşti. 5. In 1975 a group of engineers patented an invention concerning a method for separating hydrocarbon. The first applicant is one of the inventors. The second and third applicants are heirs of the other members of the group. 6. On 26 January 1995 the applicants lodged an action for compensation against company R., a privately-owned former State company which had used the 1975 invention between 1985 and 1988 (for details about those proceedings, see Farcaş and Others v. Romania, no. 67020/01, §§ 7-22, 10 November 2005). 7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 10. Meanwhile, on 31 March 2004 company R. had sought its judicial reorganisation under a procedure provided for by Law no. 64/1995 on judicial reorganisation and bankruptcy. 11. On 28 April 2004 the Bacău County Court allowed the application, started the reorganisation proceedings and nominated a judicial administrator. The applicants' claims were accepted by the County Court and recorded in the register of claims compiled by the judicial administrator in conformity with the provisions of the applicable law (tabloul creditorilor, hereinafter "the register of claims"). 12. The applicants lodged an objection to the register of claims, asking to be recognised as priority creditors (creditori privilegiaţi). Eleven other creditors also lodged objections against the records in the register of claims. 13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan. 14. On 11 October 2007 the Braşov County Court held a hearing on the objections to the register of claims lodged by the applicants. The first applicant was present at the hearing to represent both himself and the other applicants. The County Court gave the parties until 18 October 2007 to submit written observations. On that date, in the applicants' absence, it adjourned delivery of the judgment to 1 November 2007. The County Court gave its judgment on 1 November 2007; it found against the applicants. 15. On 23 January 2008, in accordance with the rules on notification in relation to court documents in insolvency proceedings (see paragraph 20 below), the judgment of 1 November 2007 was published in the Bulletin of Insolvency Proceedings (Buletinul Procedurilor de Insolvenţă, "the Bulletin"). 16. On an unspecified date the applicants enquired about the judgment's date of delivery and asked the County Court to provide them with a copy of the judgment, which was sent to them on 31 January 2008; they received it on 4 February 2008. On 13 February 2008 they lodged an appeal by post. 17. Before the Braşov Court of Appeal, the applicants argued that, as they had not had access to the Bulletin, they had not been able to know on which date the judgment had been published. 18. In a final decision of 17 April 2008 the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument and concluded that the appeal had been made out of time, as it had been lodged more than ten days after 23 January 2008, the date on which the Braşov County Court's judgment had been published (see paragraph 15 above). Relying on the Constitutional Court's decision no. 1137 of 4 December 2007 (see paragraph 21 below), the Court of Appeal considered that the notification procedure via the Bulletin had offered sufficient safeguards to the participants in the proceedings, and had been justified by the nature of the insolvency procedure. 19. On 21 June 2010 the County Court closed the insolvency proceedings and noted that company R. had complied with all the obligations set out in the reorganisation plan (see paragraph 13 above), and thus it no longer had any debts.

Ruled as violated by court

7. In a decision of 24 June 2002 the Braşov County Court allowed in part the action lodged by the applicants against company R., and ordered the latter to pay to the first applicant 2,284,679,617 Romanian lei (ROL), an amount representing compensation for the use, between 1985 and 1988, of the invention patented in 1975. The second and third applicants appealed, and in a decision of 8 November 2002 the Braşov Court of Appeal also awarded them compensation – ROL 2,230,620,676 to the second applicant and ROL 1,669,759,157 to the third applicant. 8. On 10 March 2004 the applicants and company R. signed an agreement for the payment of the compensation awarded by the court. Between 2 and 21 April 2004 the company paid about 20% of the amounts granted. 9. On 5 May 2005 the High Court of Cassation and Justice took note of the terms of the agreement of 10 March 2004 and concluded that company R. had withdrawn its appeal on points of law against the decision of 8 November 2002 (see paragraph 7 above), which thus became final. 13. Meanwhile, on 24 November 2004 the judicial administrator had submitted a reorganisation plan to a vote by the creditors. It was proposed that the priority claims (creanţe privilegiate) be paid in full, and the remaining unsecured non-priority claims (creanţe chirografare) be paid at a rate of 20% of their value. In an interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Bacău County Court validated the plan after examining the objections raised by the unsecured creditors (creditori chirografari). In 2006 company R. paid its debts in accordance with the plan.

It's arguable, as the applicants and the County Court represent both sides of, whether this counts as "public judgment."

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Istanbul. 6. On 2 October 2004 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court issued a search warrant allowing the gendarmerie to conduct searches of public places and suspected persons in a designated area. 7. Late at night on the same day, the gendarmerie carried out a search at the Sancak Hotel, which is owned by the applicant. The records drawn up afterwards noted that during the course of the search, a certain M.Ş. had approached the plain-clothes officers outside the hotel and told them that he had a girl inside. It was then established that M.Ş. trafficked women. He and a woman in the hotel were both taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 8. The search records, which were prepared a few hours after the search and signed by the hotel's manager, showed that five women of foreign nationalities had been staying at the hotel with some men and that they had all been taken to the gendarmerie headquarters. 9. On 3 October 2004 the gendarmerie questioned several men as suspects and five women as victims. They all confirmed that they had been staying at the hotel for prostitution purposes. Some of the women were asked whether they knew of any complicity between the traffickers and the management of Sancak Hotel, to which they responded in the negative. 10. On the same day the applicant was arrested and taken into the custody of the gendarmerie on suspicion of facilitating prostitution. 11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 18. On 24 May 2006 an official letter was sent to the applicant. It was indicated on the envelope that the applicant was invited to a hearing concerning his case, which would be held on 10 July 2006. The envelope did not show any confirmation that the letter had been served on him. 19. The applicant's lawyer stated that he had received a copy of the final decision at the registry of the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court on 11 July 2006. In support of his claim, he submitted a copy of the Assize Court's decision, on which a lawyer working at his office had noted that he had been served with the copy in person on that date. That document was later stamped and certified as an authentic copy by the registry of the domestic court. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.

NOT ruled as violated by court

11. On 4 October 2004 the applicant gave statements to the gendarmerie. He denied having provided premises for prostitution. He argued that he did not allow procurers into his hotel and had never seen M.Ş. before. 12. On the same day, the gendarmerie also questioned the hotel's manager, who stated that both he and the applicant were very strict about keeping procurers out of their hotel. 13. On 30 May 2005 the Büyükçekmece Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant and three other persons. He accused them of failure to obey an order from an official authority under Article 526 § 1 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765) in force at the time, on the ground that they had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels. 14. On 1 June 2005 the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326) and the new Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271) entered into force. 15. On 10 June 2005 the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court assessed the case without holding a hearing. Establishing that the accused had provided premises for prostitution in their hotels, it held that the applicant had failed to obey the orders of an official authority as charged and should be punished accordingly. It then sentenced him to an administrative fine of 100 Turkish liras (TRY)[1] pursuant to Section 32 of the Misdemeanours Act (Law no. 5326). 16. The applicant objected to that decision, arguing that his defence rights had been restricted in that the court had sentenced him to the fine solely on the basis of the statements taken previously by the police, and without hearing him in person. He maintained that he accepted clients into his hotel in compliance with the relevant regulation and that he could not be expected to refuse to offer accommodation to foreign nationals or to question their motives for staying there. 17. On 3 February 2006 after examining the case on the basis of the case file, the Bakırköy Assize Court upheld the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That decision was final. 20. Following communication of the present application, on 21 December 2009 a public prosecutor prepared an assessment report, summarising the events in the case. He concluded that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. 21. On 2 January 2014 both the applicant and the Government were asked under Rule 54 § 2 (c) of the Rules of Court to provide the Court with a document indicating the notification date of the final decision by 16 January 2014 at the latest. The parties did not respond to that request. 22. On 3 November 2017 the Government were once again asked to provide documents regarding the commencement of the six-month time‑limit, in particular the content of the envelope from the Büyükçekmece Magistrates' Court dated 24 May 2006 and the document in support of the public prosecutor's claim that the final decision had been served on the applicant on 26 May 2006. On 30 November 2017 the Government informed the Court that they could not find the requested documents.

It's unclear whether this counts as being "entitled to a fair and public hearing."

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. On 4 September 2000 the President of Russia appointed Ms G. to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court for a period of three years. 5. On 21 May 2004 the State Council of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace of Lesozavodskiy Judicial District of Syktyvkar for three years. On 31 May 2007 the Council extended her appointment for another seven years. 6. On 16 January 2008 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms G.'s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status effective as of 1 April 2008. 7. On 19 November 2009 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. as acting justice of the peace for Kutuzovskiy district in Syktyvkar as of 23 November 2009 pending the appointment of a permanent justice. According to the Government, Ms G. served as justice of the peace until 8 February 2010. 8. On 8 April 2010 the acting President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace in Vylgort as of 16 April 2010 for a period of one year. 9. On 5, 9 and 29 May and 4 June 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for (1) driving a vehicle without a registration plate, (2) driving without a driving licence, (3) refusal to take a breath test and (4) driving under the influence. 10. On 4 and 22 June and 6 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty on seven counts of road traffic offences and sentenced him to administrative detention and a fine. 11. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the five judgments of 4 June 2010, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 12. On 24 and 30 June 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic dismissed the applicant's appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 13. The applicant did not appeal against the judgments of 22 June and 6 July 2010 in view of the futility of his previous appeals. 14. On 24 December 2009 Justice of the Peace G. dismissed the applicant's claims against the social-security authorities for interest payments and non-pecuniary damage. 15. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered her case had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 16. On 23 April 2010 the Syktyvkar Town Court upheld the judgment of 24 December 2009 on appeal. The Town Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 17. On 9 May and 13 July 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for refusal to take a breath test and driving under the influence respectively. 18. On 13 July 2010 Justice of the Peace G. found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to administrative detention. 19. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against the two judgments, arguing, inter alia, that the justice of the peace who had considered his cases had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 20. On 6 August 2010 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court upheld the judgments on appeal. The District Court discerned no irregularities as regards the appointment of Ms G. to the office of justice of the peace. 21. On 26 May 1990 Ms Ch. was elected to the office of judge of the Syktyvkar Town Court. 22. On 22 December 1999 the Judicial Qualifications Board granted Ms Ch.'s application for resignation and terminated her judicial status. 23. On 26 August 2010 the President of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic appointed Ms Ch. as acting justice of the peace in Vylgort for a period of up to one year. 24. On 11 January 2011 the President of the Supreme Court relieved Ms Ch. of her duties of office of acting justice of the peace. 25. On 21 September 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police for leaving the scene of a road traffic accident and refusal to take a breath test. 26. On 15 October 2010 justice of the peace Ch. delivered two judgments, finding the applicant in violation of road traffic rules and sentenced him to administrative detention. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to the office in contravention of the applicable laws. 27. On 17 November the Syktyvdinskiy District Court of the Komi Republic upheld both judgments of 15 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.'s appointment to the office of justice of the peace. 28. On 7 October 2010 Justice of the Peace Ch. allowed an action lodged by Yu. against the applicant and reduced the amount of monthly maintenance Yu. had to pay as child support for the parties' minor daughter. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that Ms Ch. had been appointed to her office in contravention of the applicable laws. 29. On 8 December 2010 the District Court upheld the judgment of 7 October 2010 on appeal. The court discerned no irregularity as regards Ms Ch.'s appointment to the office of justice of the peace.

Ruled as violated by court

While one could argue, as the applicant did, that the judge was appointed against the idea of an "independent and impartial tribunal established by law," it appears from the multiple court decisions that it was not so.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Oradea. 6. On 29 November 2000 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor County Court ("the prosecutor's office") discontinued the criminal proceedings which it had opened against the applicant on 24 November 2000 for bribe taking. 7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 8. On 5 February and 11 June 2001, respectively, the prosecutor's office reopened the criminal proceedings against the applicant for bribe taking and opened criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office. 9. On 29 July 2002 the State Agency for Capitalisation of Banking Assets (Autoritate Pentru Valorificarea Activelor Bancare – "AVAB") joined the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a civil party. It sought the recovery of 27,863,805,105 Romanian lei (ROL) (approximately 1,758,753 US dollars (USD)), the damage that it had allegedly incurred as a result of the applicant's abuse of office. 10. On 16 August 2002 the prosecutor's office ordered the seizure of the applicant's movable and immovable assets up to the value of the damage allegedly incurred by AVAB. The order was enforced by the Bihor Police Department on 19 December 2002 by seizing part of the immovable properties owned jointly by the applicant and his wife, in particular four plots of intra muros agricultural land, a home and annexes. 11. On 29 August 2002 the prosecutor's office indicted the applicant for bribe taking and for abuse of office and sent his case for trial. 12. Between 7 October 2002 and 6 February 2006 the Bihor County Court ("the County Court") adjourned the proceedings twenty-four times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, and for deliberations. Also, at a hearing on 10 February 2003, the court dismissed the applicant's challenge against the order of 16 August 2002 on the grounds that the measure was temporary and had been enforced correctly. This decision was upheld by the Oradea Court of Appeal ("the Court of Appeal") on 11 March 2003 following an appeal by the applicant. 13. On 13 February 2006 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits and acquitted him of abuse of office. However, it held that the applicant had to pay AVAB the damages it claimed because AVAB had suffered damage as a result of his actions. Consequently, the court maintained the measure imposed on the applicant's assets. It also convicted the applicant of bribe taking and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment, suspended. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case. 17. On 8 April 2010 the County Court examined the applicant's case on the merits, acquitted him of abuse of office and dismissed AVAB's civil claim. Consequently, it lifted the seizure measure from his assets. The court convicted the applicant, however, of receiving bribes and gave him a suspended sentence of three years' imprisonment. 18. The applicant and AVAB appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal. 19. Between 21 September and 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases, to summon them, and for the court to deliberate. On 23 November 2010 the court dismissed the appeals of the parties and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 20. The applicant and AVAB appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment to the High Court of Cassation and Justice ("the Court of Cassation"). 21. Between 23 February and 20 April 2011 the Court of Cassation adjourned the proceedings once to allow the applicant to prepare his case. 22. By a final judgment of 4 May 2011 the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant's appeal on points of fact and law in part. It held that he was guilty of bribe taking, but his criminal liability for that offence had become time-barred. The court upheld the remaining parts of the judgments delivered by the lower courts. 23. On 4 March 2012, once the applicant had submitted certified copies of all the courts' judgments, the Bihor Land and Immovable Property Register removed the annotation concerning the seizure measure imposed on his immovable property from the above-mentioned register, which had prevented him from freely disposing of it.

Ruled as violated by court

7. On 10 January 2001 the prosecutor's office attached to the Bihor Court of Appeal quashed the above-mentioned decision of its own motion and ordered that the proceedings against the applicant be reopened. 15. Between 20 June and 11 July 2006 the Court of Appeal adjourned the proceedings twice to allow the parties to prepare their cases. On 19 September 2006 the court quashed the judgment of 13 February 2006 and referred the case back to the first-instance court for re-examination on procedural grounds. 16. Between 30 November 2006 and 1 April 2010 the County Court adjourned the proceedings thirty-two times to allow the parties to prepare their defence, for the court-assigned expert to produce two expert reports, and for the court to summon the parties and the witnesses, to hear evidence, for deliberations, and to allow the judges to exercise their right to strike. Also, at a hearing on 4 June 2007 the court adjourned the examination of the applicant's request for the measure imposed on his assets to be lifted pending the court's determination of the case.

The repeated adjourning of courts puts the "reasonable time" and "adequate time and facilities for the preparation of defence" clauses in tension.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicants, Ms Bozhana Boyanova Uzunova and Mr Ferad Ismail Seid, were born in 1978 and 1955 respectively, and live in Kardzhali. 5. The applicants co-owned a plot of land of 15,276 square metres near the town of Kapitan Andreevo. 6. On 30 November 2007 the Council of Ministers decided to expropriate 6,218 square metres of the applicants' plot with a view to building a motorway. The decision allowed preliminary enforcement of the expropriation and stated that the owners were to be given BGN 13,023 (the equivalent of approximately EUR 6,657) in compensation. The decision recorded as owner of the expropriated plot the person from whom the applicants had bought the property. 7. The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of the expropriation decision before the Supreme Administrative Court. In a final judgment of 3 April 2009 that court declared the decision null and void as it had failed to specify the actual owners of the plot to whom compensation was due, and referred the case back to the administrative authorities. The Road Infrastructure Agency requested re-opening of the judicial review proceedings on the ground that it had not been able to take part in them as an interested third party even though its participation was mandatory under the State Property Act 1996 as investor in the construction of the motorway. In a judgment of 12 October 2009 a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the request, quashed the judgment of 3 April 2009 and remitted the case to be re-examined by a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. 8. In a final judgment of 28 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court found that compensation was due to the applicants as owners of the plot at issue and that it had to be increased to BGN 59,817 (the equivalent of EUR 30,577), in accordance with the conclusions of an expert report obtained in the course of the proceedings. The court also awarded the applicants BGN 600 in costs, to be paid by the Council of Ministers. 9. On 13 January 2011 the applicants invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. In its response of 21 February 2011, the Agency informed the applicants that due to some changes in the layout of the motorway, a new decision for expropriation of the affected property was being prepared. 10. On 5 July 2011 the Council of Ministers issued a new decision for expropriation, in accordance with which 5,215 square metres of the applicants' plot were to be expropriated against compensation in the amount of BGN 1,794 (the equivalent of EUR 917). The applicants brought judicial review proceedings in respect of this decision. In a judgment of 26 June 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the decision of 5 July 2011 null and void as it had failed to take account of the binding character of the judgment of 28 December 2010, the latter having determined the dispute between the parties with final effect. In March 2012 the Ministry of Finance unsuccessfully sought reopening of the proceedings ending with the judgment of 28 December 2010 before the Supreme Administrative Court. 11. On 4 July 2012 the applicants once again invited the Road Infrastructure Agency to pay the compensation due to them. They subsequently wrote to the agency again on 15 October 2012, to the Council of Ministers on 14 October 2013 submitting also a writ of enforcement in respect of the sum due, and to the regional governor on 21 February 2014. 12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010. 13. On 10 December 2014, 20 January 2015 and 23 March 2015 respectively, the applicants wrote to various authorities, without success, seeking the payment of interest on the above amount for the period of over three years when it had remained unenforced. 14. In the meantime, on 22 November 2013 the applicants brought proceedings before the Sofia Administrative Court in relation to the lack of enforcement of the final judicial decision of 28 December 2010. In particular, they claimed they had incurred pecuniary damage as a result of the lack of enforcement; they also claimed interest on the amount determined in the said judgment for the period of its non-enforcement. On 18 December 2013 the court dismissed their claim as inadmissible. It found, on the one hand, that the applicants had not indicated an individual administrative act as the subject of their judicial review proceedings. If, on the other hand, the applicants' claim was about the lack of enforcement of a final judicial decision, the court held that the competent body in that connection was the bailiff and the relevant procedure was under chapter XVII of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 ("the 2006 Code"). 15. The applicants appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging a breach of Article 203 of the 2006 Code and a breach of section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (the "SMRDA"), and challenging the lower court's decision as being unreasoned. In a final decision of 13 February 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lower court's decision.

Ruled as violated by court

12. On 26 February 2015, at the time of submitting their observations on the admissibility and merits in this case, the Government informed the Court that on 15 May 2014 the Road Infrastructure Agency had paid to each applicant BGN 29,908.50, or altogether BGN 59,817 pursuant to the final judgment in their favour of 28 December 2010.

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicants did not receive their first hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Glendale, California, the United States of America. 5. The applicant worked in the British Council's Armenia office (hereinafter "the British Council") as a project manager on a full-time, permanent contract starting from 25 November 2002. 6. In the course of her employment the applicant had two children, born on 27 March 2008 and 7 May 2010. The applicant spent her maternity leave in the United States and regularly sent requests to extend that leave every six months for the duration of her absence. In particular, she sent such requests in March and September 2009 as regards her first child and then in April and September 2010 as regards her second child. It appears that the applicant's maternity leave was extended, based on those requests. In March 2011 her leave was further extended until 1 September 2011. 7. According to the applicant, on 19 August 2011 she requested another extension of her maternity leave. She handed an envelope with her written request to that effect to her friend H.K., who was to return to Armenia on 17 August 2011 after a visit to the United States. Upon arrival, H.K. gave the envelope to R.O., a driver, who then handed it to A.K., a security guard at the British Council. 8. On 30 September 2011 the applicant received notice of termination of her employment contract prior to its term. The notice referred to the change in volume and conditions of work at the British Council, as well as the need to reduce the number of staff. In addition, the notice stated the following: "... [your] employment contract shall be terminated based on [the relevant provisions] of the Labour Code of the Republic of Armenia. We also inform you that your employment contract shall be terminated ... considering the fact that you did not return to work after the completion of your unpaid maternity leave, which was to end on 1 September 2011, as indicated in your letter sent to us by fax on 17 March 2011. The employment contract shall be considered terminated as of 1 December 2011." 9. It appears that the applicant sent emails to the management of the British Council in relation to the early termination of her employment. 10. On 30 November 2011 Ar.M., a lawyer and a representative of Prudence, a law firm which provided legal services to the British Council, replied to the applicant on behalf of that body. In particular, the email stated that the termination of the applicant's employment had been in full compliance with domestic law and the terms and conditions of the British Council. 11. By an order of 1 December 2011, issued by the director of the British Council, the applicant's employment contract was terminated. 12. On 30 December 2011 the applicant brought a claim against the British Council before the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, contesting the order of 1 December 2011 and seeking reinstatement. 13. By a decision of 11 January 2012, Judge A.M. of the District Court took over the examination of the applicant's case and scheduled the preparatory hearing. 14. According to a power of attorney executed by a notary public in London on 12 January 2012, the British Council authorised, inter alia, Ar.M. and K.B., another lawyer with Prudence, to represent jointly or separately its interests before courts of all instances in Armenia. 15. On 16 January 2012 the British Council was notified by the District Court of its taking over of the examination of the case and the judge appointed. 16. On 31 January 2012 K.B. applied to the District Court to represent the British Council before the said court, also asking the court to postpone the hearings. On 1 February 2012 Ar.M. informed the District Court that he would not be representing the interests of the British Council in the instant case. It appears that during the whole trial before the District Court, K.B. alone represented the British Council. 17. On 14 February 2012, in its reply to the applicant's claim signed by K.B., the British Council denied that the applicant had submitted a request to extend her maternity leave for another six months as of 1 September 2011. 18. On 9 July 2012 Judge A.M. rejected the applicant's claim, finding that her dismissal had been lawful. 19. After the proceedings before the District Court, it was discovered that Judge A.M. and the lawyer Ar.M. were twin brothers. Furthermore, the law firm Prudence, of which Ar.M. and K.P. were senior associates, had been founded by D.M., A.M.'s and Ar.M.'s elder sister, and was managed by her husband, E.M. 20. On 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal arguing, inter alia, that Judge A.M. had lacked impartiality when deciding her case owing to his close family ties to the legal representatives of her opponent in the proceedings. The Government claimed that no such issue had been raised, nor had any evidence to support such a claim been provided. 21. On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant's arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court. 22. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in her previous appeal. 23. On 28 November 2012 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit.

Ruled as violated by court

21. On 28 September 2012 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's judgment. In doing so, the Court of Appeal did not address the applicant's arguments regarding the alleged lack of impartiality of Judge A.M. in the proceedings before the District Court.

Although the government denied the claims, it appears that, as the applicant argued, the familial relationship between the involved judges and lawyers threatens "an independent and impartial tribunal."

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Katowice. 6. The applicant is a former activist of an anti-communist opposition group, who was interned in 1982. 7. He observed the trial against three high-ranking members of the communist-era Military Council of National Salvation who had ordered the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. 8. The trial in question, which lasted from 2007 until 2015, attracted a lot of public attention in Poland. 9. On 12 January 2012 the main defendant, General C.K. was convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment. This penalty was reduced by half under the Amnesty Act and its execution was suspended for five years in view of the defendant's old age and poor health. Another defendant was acquitted and another had her case discontinued. On 15 June 2015 the appellate court upheld the first-instance judgment. 10. The applicant was in the courtroom when on 12 January 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) was to deliver its judgment in the case described above. 11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: "This is a mockery of justice!" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 12. The judges left the courtroom. 13. Some other members of the audience shouted "Disgrace!" and "Court before the court!" (Hańba and Sąd pod sąd). They were all holding up photos of victims of the communist regime. 14. The applicant was forcibly removed from the courtroom. 15. Shortly afterwards, he returned and continued shouting out similar statements joint by other members of the audience. In view of the audience's refusal to leave the courtroom, the judge who was presiding over the trial decided to announce the judgment from a different room. 16. At 3 p.m. the trial was resumed in a new room, with the public comprising only journalists. Here, in the applicant's absence, the Warsaw Regional Court imposed on him a disciplinary custodial penalty of fourteen days for contempt of court ("for the breach of the solemn nature, serenity and the course of court proceedings, to the degree making the announcement of the judgment impossible"). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect. 18. The applicant submitted that he had not been served with that decision or informed of it. 19. On the day of the trial in question, that is 12 January 2012, a warrant was issued ordering the applicant's placement in a penal facility with a view to his serving the penalty. On 13 January 2012 a warrant to this effect was sent to Katowice police station together with a copy of the court's decision imposing the disciplinary punishment. 20. On 19 January 2012 the applicant was served with a warrant and then arrested so that he could be committed to Warsaw Remand Centre to serve the penalty in a closed regime. 21. On 22 January 2012 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against the decision imposing the custodial penalty. He argued that his one-minute statement had not disturbed the court to such an extent as to make it impossible to announce the judgment. He also submitted that if the presiding judge had told him to return to his seat, he would have complied. Since only a copy of the first page of the applicant's appeal has been submitted to the Court, it is unclear whether the applicant had also raised the argument of the lack of impartiality of the judges who had punished him for contempt of court. 22. On 30 January 2012 this appeal was registered with the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 23. On 31 January 2012 the applicant's appeal was transferred to the Warsaw Regional Court for comment. 24. On 1 February 2012 the appeal together with the Regional Court's comments was received by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. The appellate hearing was scheduled for 23 February 2012. 25. On 2 February 2012 – the fourteenth day of the applicant's detention – the Prison Board of the Warsaw Remand Centre decided that the applicant should be detained under a semi-open regime (with the possibility to leave his cell during the day). 26. Following that decision, the applicant was transferred for several hours to a remand centre with a semi-open regime. 27. He was released later that day. 28. On an unspecified date, the appellate hearing was rescheduled because of the judge's illness for 22 March 2012. 29. On 22 March 2012 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, finding that the applicant's disrespectful behaviour had interfered with the solemn nature of court proceedings and with the court's dignity, and had disrupted the proceedings. His action had provoked the audience to shout similar slogans. It had been premeditated as the applicant had known that the announcement of the judgment had been scheduled for live media broadcast. The court also considered that the applicant's behaviour could not be explained by an emotional disagreement with the court's ruling because at the time of the incident the applicant had been unaware of the outcome of the trial. The applicant had wished to disturb the order of the proceedings irrespective of their result. In the domestic court's view, imposing a more lenient penalty would have sanctioned unaccountability and would have lacked a deterrent effect.

Ruled as violated by court

11. At 1.30 p.m., after the judges had arrived in the courtroom, the applicant jumped behind the judge's table and shouted: "This is a mockery of justice!" (Tutaj trwa kpina z wymiaru sprawiedliwości). 17. On 12 January 2012 a written decision, in the form of an extract from the court minutes as described in the preceding paragraph, was issued to that effect.

It's arguable whether the applicant was informed promptly of the charge, as he says he did not receive the writ, but was also able to appeal quickly.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The first applicant (Mr Ryklin) was born in 1958. The second applicant (Mr Sharov) was born in 1956. Both applicants are human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners. They both live in Moscow. 6. On 21 April 2015 the applicants, with three others, sent written notification to the Moscow Mayor's office of their intention to hold a demonstration with some 15,000 participants from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. on 6 May 2015 in Bolotnaya Square. After the expiry of the statutory period for the authority's reply, on 28 April 2015 the applicants wrote a letter to the Mayor's office stating that they considered the event of 6 May 2015 to have been approved by the Mayor. 7. On 27 April 2015 the Regional Security and Anti-Corruption Department of Moscow telephoned the applicants and suggested that the event be held on Marshal Vasilevskiy Street. On 30 April 2015 the Department repeated this proposal in a letter. The event organisers were also warned that if they rejected this proposal they would not be allowed to hold a public event at all. 8. According to the applicants, they informed all possible participants in the demonstration about its cancellation by way of posting information on the internet and via various mass-media outlets. 9. At around 7.05 p.m. both the applicants arrived in Bolotnaya Square, where they saw a gathering of some fifty people standing quietly, without any banners. According to the applicants, each positioned himself at a distance from other people with a political banner. The applicants considered that each of them was staging a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. A few minutes later the applicants were arrested and taken to a police van. 10. According to the Government, on 6 May 2015 the applicants, acting in a group of fifty people, organised and held a public assembly without prior notification being given to the authorities. The applicants called upon others to shout the slogans "Freedom to political prisoners", "Death to fascists" and others; the second applicant held a banner stating that all "Bolotnaya participants" were innocent. The applicants did not respond to the multiple demands by the police that they cease their actions, and at 7.35 p.m. they were taken to the Yakimanka district police station. 11. According to the records of transfer to the police station (протоколы доставления) and the administrative arrest records, the first applicant was brought to the police station at 7.40 p.m. on 6 May 2015 and placed under administrative arrest at the same time. The second applicant was brought to the police station at 7.25 p.m. and placed under administrative arrest at 7.40 p.m. The records of the transfer contained an indication that both applicants were taken to the police station for an administrative offence record to be drawn up. 12. According to the Government, the term of the applicants' retention in the police station was extended to forty-eight hours. On 6 May 2015 at 10.15 p.m. the first applicant was transported to the police station in Zamoskvorechye District of Moscow. On 7 May 2015 at 4 p.m. he was taken to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The second applicant was taken to that same court on 7 May 2015 at 4.10 p.m. 13. At the police stations both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without notifying the authorities in advance, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter "the CAO"). In particular, they called upon others to shout political slogans; the second applicant had a banner. 14. On 7 May 2015 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court convicted the first applicant under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court found that the first applicant, with the second applicant, had organised and held a group public event in the form of a "meeting" with about fifty participants, without notifying the authorities in advance. It dismissed the applicant's argument that he had staged a solo demonstration, after considering it as a line of defence. The court also refused to admit in evidence a video recording of the events in Bolotnaya Square, because it was "undated and did not contain the entire chronology of events preceding [the applicant's] arrest". 15. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court heard the case against the second applicant. The court reiterated the description of the administrative offence imputed to the first applicant, found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO, and sentenced him to ten days' detention. The court dismissed the evidence of two eyewitnesses who stated that the second applicant had been standing alone on the bridge with a banner. It also refused to admit in evidence video recordings and photographs showing the second applicant, because neither of them contained "information about the address". 16. Both the applicants appealed, insisting that they had staged solo demonstrations. On 13 May 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgments. Referring to the statutory definition of a "meeting" (the presence of people in a specific place in order to publicly express their opinions, essentially on social and political issues), the appellate court considered that some fifty people had been present in Bolotnaya Square, including the applicants, who had called on others to shout political slogans.

Ruled as violated by court

The applicants were treated guilty before any guilt was proven.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Grimăncăuți. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7. The applicant is a farmer who grows and sells potatoes. On 5 February 2008 he and his brother went to the Varnița village, in the vicinity of the city of Bender/Tighina. The latter is controlled by the authorities of the self-proclaimed "Moldovan Republic of Transdiestria" ("the MRT"), while Varnița itself is under Moldovan control. 8. Having sold potatoes for some time in various places in Varnița, with authorisation from the local administration, on 5 February 2008 at around 2.30 p.m. the applicant was approached by plain clothed officers of the "MRT" customs authority. The latter asked for documents for the merchandise, including evidence of payment of taxes for importing merchandise into the "MRT". The applicant explained that he had all the relevant documents and had paid taxes to the Moldovan local authorities in Varnița. Shortly thereafter two more officers from the "MRT" security and customs authorities arrived in a car. When the applicant's brother announced that he had called the Moldovan police, the applicant was attacked by the "MRT" officers, forced into their car and driven away. The Moldovan police arrived after the impugned event. 9. Later in the evening, the applicant's car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the "MRT" customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere. 10. On 6 February 2008 the Bender city court (an "MRT" court) found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence of resistance to the customs officers. The applicant explained that he considered having been arrested on Moldovan territory (Varnița village) and not having seen any signs warning that he was about to cross into the territory under the "MRT" control. The court sentenced him to three days' detention. According to the applicant, the hearing took place in Russian, a language which he understood only to a limited degree, and in the absence of a translator. He was refused the right to be assisted by a lawyer when preparing for the hearing, and a court-appointed lawyer was only present at the court hearing, not assisting him in any manner. The applicant was given neither a copy of the record of his arrest prior to its examination by the court, nor a copy of the court decision of 6 February 2008. 11. The decision was enforced immediately and the applicant served all three days until the evening of 8 February 2008, when he was released. He could recover his car and merchandise at 11 p.m. on the same day. 12. On 15 February 2008 the applicant lodged a summary appeal against the decision of the first-instance court, noting that he would submit a full appeal once he received a copy of the decision of 6 February 2008. At his request, on 17 March 2008 he obtained a copy of that decision. 13. On 18 March 2008 the "MRT" Supreme Court quashed the lower court's decision because of the failure to specify the exact place where the offence had been committed. The case was sent for re-examination by the lower court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. On 25 April 2008 the "MRT" Supreme Court accepted an extraordinary appeal lodged by the president of that court's chair and decided that the case was to be re-examined by that court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. 14. On 27 May 2008 the applicant received by fax a letter dated 12 May 2008 summoning him to the hearing of the "MRT" Supreme Court on 27 May 2008 at 10 a.m. Because of this late summoning he could not appear at the hearing. On the same day the court rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision of 6 February 2008, finding that he had been arrested on the territory of the city of Bender after refusing to abide by orders of the "MRT" customs authority. 15. On 6 February 2008 the applicant's brother made a criminal complaint in the applicant's name to various Moldovan authorities, including the Prosecutor General's Office, about the applicant's unlawful arrest by officers from the "MRT". He asked for the criminal prosecution of those responsible. 16. On 7 February 2008 the applicant's brother sent a complaint about the applicant's abduction by the "MRT" authorities to the embassies of several countries in Moldova, including that of the Russian Federation. On 11 February 2008 the applicant sent letters to various embassies, including that of the Russian Federation, thanking them for their intervention into the case by bringing the matter before the Joint Control Commission.[1] Following this alleged intervention the applicant's car and merchandise were returned to him. 17. On 28 February 2008 the Moldovan police station in Bender started a criminal investigation into the applicant's abduction by "MRT" officers. Several witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been forcibly taken away in a car from near a bar in Varnița village and that two of the "MRT" officers were identified. In view of the Moldovan prosecuting authorities' inability to effectively prosecute persons on the territory controlled of the "MRT", on 28 August 2008, the investigation was suspended. On 30 May 2013 the investigation was resumed and was pending by the time of the last submissions made to the Court (December 2013). The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in that regard.

Ruled as violated by court

9. Later in the evening, the applicant's car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the "MRT" customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere.

The applicant was denied his right to an interpreter, a lawyer for defence, and to be informed promptly of charges against him.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The first applicant (Ms Makarova) was born in 1989 and lived in Moscow. The second applicant (Ms Astakhova) was born in 1985 and lives in Mytishchi, Moscow Region. The third applicant (Ms Fokht‑Babushkina) was born in 1994 and lives in Moscow. 6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 9. All of the applicants decided to hold solo demonstrations on 19 December 2012. According to them, at around 9 a.m. they positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 10. According to the first applicant, she was arrested by the police several minutes later and taken to a police van. There were no orders from police officers to stop the demonstration and leave the area. According to the second and third applicants, after their solo demonstrations they left the area, showing their posters to journalists at their request. At that point, they were arrested by the police and taken to the Tverskoy district police station. 11. According to the Government, at 10 a.m. on 19 December 2012 all of the applicants took part in a group "picket" (пикет) held without prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant had a poster reading "I am looking for an American who will adopt me", the second and the third applicants had posters reading "Orphans are guilty for the death of Mr Magnitskiy? Do not disgrace yourself". The applicants did not react to the lawful demands of the police to stop participating in the event and continued "picketing", attracting the attention of passers-by. At 10.30 a.m. they were arrested and taken to the Tverskoy district police station for the purpose of compiling an administrative-offence record. At 1.20 p.m. on that day the applicants were released. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, "the CAO"). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event ("picket") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.

Ruled as violated by court

6. On 14 December 2012 the State Duma, the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia, adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited the adoption of children of Russian nationality by citizens of the United States of America. 7. On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading of the draft law was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 8. According to the first applicant, she had read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo demonstrations (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo demonstrations was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 12. At the police station the applicants were charged with participating in a group public event held without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, "the CAO"). The administrative-offence record in respect of the first applicant and the police officers' reports in respect of all the applicants indicated that the offence had been committed at 10 a.m. It was also stated that they had taken part in a non-notified group public event and had refused to end it when requested to do so by the police. 13. On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of circuit no. 369 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced her to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB; about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The court found it established, on the basis of the administrative-offence record, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicant that the latter had taken part in a public event ("picket") which had involved fifty people and had been held without prior notification of the authorities. On 14 February 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant did not attend the appeal hearing, even though she had been duly summoned to it. 14. On 31 January 2013 in two separate proceedings the same justice of the peace convicted the second and the third applicants under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced each of them to fines of RUB 20,000. The court relied on the administrative offence records, the police officers' reports and oral testimony by a police officer who had arrested the applicants. On 21 February and 21 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments in respect of the third and second applicants respectively. Both applicants were absent from the appeal hearings, though the third applicant's lawyer did participate. In the third applicant's case the appellate court examined some documents and interviewed a police officer in a detailed manner before affording the defence counsel an opportunity to cross-examine him; the appeal judge then asked a number of follow-up questions. In its appeal decision the appellate court considered that the third applicant's guilt had been proved by the adverse evidence, such as the administrative-offence record, the escort procedure record and testimonies. 15. On 1 and 5 July 2013 the Moscow City Court examined supervisory review complaints lodged by the second and third applicants. The court reclassified the charges against the applicants as falling under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO, namely breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant. Their fines were reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 232 at the time) each.

While it depends on the definition of "fair and public trial," it appears that the first applicant not appearing at the hearings threatens this right. However, they were called to the hearing.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Wrocław. 6. The applicant was detained in Wrocław Remand Centre during various periods between 1991 and 2014, including from 24 June 2009 to 2 October 2010. He was released from detention on 8 July 2017. 7. The applicant submitted that during his detention in Wrocław Remand Centre he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m 8. According to documents from the domestic proceedings and the Government's submissions, the applicant was held in overcrowded cells between 29 July and 26 August 2009 (a period of approximately one month). 9. On 5 April 2011 the applicant brought a civil claim before the Wrocław Regional Court against the State Treasury for infringement of his personal rights and for compensation on account of his detention in overcrowded cells in Wrocław Remand Centre. He claimed 20,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation. His case was transferred to the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court in Wrocław (hereinafter "the court") and registered under the reference number IX C 295/11. 10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: "At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies." 12. On 5 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court dismissed the applicant's civil claim. The court found that the applicant's cells had indeed been overcrowded for approximately one month, but that he had failed to demonstrate that the actions of the defendant had been unlawful. 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled "application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: "A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment." 16. On 12 November 2012 the applicant received the reasoning of the court's judgment of 5 October 2012. 17. On 21 December 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a request for leave to appeal out of time against the judgment of 5 October 2012, as well as two copies of a letter entitled "appeal". On 1 February 2013 the court dismissed the applicant's request for leave to appeal, and explained that he had already lodged his appeal on 10 October 2012, which was within the relevant time-limit. The court underlined that the applicant's appeal of 10 October 2012 did not comply with the formal requirements. 18. Therefore, on 6 February 2013 the court issued an order and instructed the applicant to comply with the formal requirements of his appeal by submitting a copy thereof within seven days of the service of the court order. The order was served on 14 February 2013. 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof. 21. On 30 March 2013 the applicant appealed against that decision. When ordered, he rectified the formal requirements of his interlocutory appeal by submitting a copy of it and stating the amount of his claim. On 21 June 2013 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory appeal, holding that the applicant, who had started a civil action and knew that he was deprived of his liberty, could justifiably be expected to keep copies of all letters he sent to the court, especially since he had been informed on 28 August 2012 that all letters to the court should be submitted in two copies. Additionally, after the judgment had been issued the applicant was informed about the means and procedure of submitting appeals.

NOT ruled as violated by court

10. On 6 May 2011 the court exempted the applicant from the court fees and dismissed his application for legal aid. The court held that the applicant was able to formulate his claims in a clear and understandable manner. Hence, the legal aid was not necessary. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 11. In the course of the judicial proceedings the applicant lodged several applications and requests with the court, including a letter of 8 August 2012. The court, by an order of 28 August 2012, instructed the applicant that to comply with formal requirements he should submit an additional copy of that letter. The order further stated: "At the same time the court informs [you] that all pleadings (pisma) should be submitted in two copies." 13. On 10 October 2012 the applicant lodged with the court a letter entitled "application: refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court of 5 October 2012" which the court treated as an appeal. That pleading was submitted in one copy. 14. On an unspecified date the applicant applied for legal aid. On 26 October 2012 the Wrocław‑Śródmieście District Court rejected the applicant's request on the same grounds as previously (see paragraph 10 above). 15. On 29 October 2012 the applicant was served with the judgment and information about the time and manner of the right to appeal, in the following terms: "A party who disagrees with the judgment has a right to request the written reasoning of the judgment within seven days of the service of that judgment and later to appeal to the second-instance court via the court that issued the judgment, within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment. If the party does not ask for the reasoned judgment, the appeal is to be submitted directly within 21 days of the service of the judgment. Article 369 § 1: The appeal shall be submitted to the court that issued the judgment within two weeks, calculated from the service of the reasoned judgment." 19. On 15 February 2013 the applicant submitted a letter in which he informed the court that he was unable to comply with the order because he did not have the text of his appeal that he could copy or rewrite and he did not remember the exact wording of his pleadings. He added that he had not been aware that he should have submitted his appeal in two copies. 20. On 19 March 2013 the court rejected the applicant's appeal for failure to submit an exact copy thereof.

It depends on whether "the interests of justice" require legal aid for the applicant, as the applicant and the courts argued both sides of.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. 5. On 27 August 2002 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the Administration of the Mirninskiy Ulus of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic ("the Administration"), a private person S., her husband B., and a private company A. claiming a title to a flat, damages, and S.'s eviction from the flat. 6. On 18 September 2002 the Mirninskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic ("the District Court") refused to consider his action, because there already had been a decision of 6 February 2001 taken by the District Court concerning the same dispute. 7. On 13 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic overruled the refusal and remitted the case for a new examination, as the action included a new co-defendant, and, therefore, it could not be said that the dispute was among the same parties. 8. On 15 January 2003 the District Court ordered eviction of S. and her family from the flat and dismissed the claim against the Administration. 9. On 3 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic quashed the judgment on appeal and returned the case for a fresh examination, as the lower court had failed to address issues related S.'s property rights. 10. On 29 July 2003 the District Court ordered an expert examination of the flat in order to determine its market value. 11. On 14 August 2003 the court proceedings resumed. 12. In the meantime, the applicant amended his claims and sought to obtain compensation for his belongings allegedly stolen in 1999, non‑pecuniary damage, legal costs, travel expenses and reimbursement of the rent he had to pay after his eviction from the disputed flat back in 1999. 13. On 29 August 2003 the District Court examined the case, ordered the Administration to pay the applicant 800,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the flat's market value and dismissed the remainder of the claims. In particular, the claim for compensation for the allegedly stolen property was dismissed as unfounded. 14. On 20 October 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) and entered into force. 15. On 11 June 2004, upon the applicant's request, the bailiffs initiated the enforcement proceedings. 16. On 27 August 2004 the District Court granted the Administration's request for suspension of the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003 until 15 January 2005 due to financial difficulties encountered by the debtor. 17. On 15 November 2004 the applicant's appeal against the above decision was dismissed. 18. On 18 March 2005 the monetary award in accordance with the judgment of 29 August 2003 was paid to the applicant. 19. On 29 September 2005, upon the applicant's extraordinary appeal, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) quashed the judgment of 29 August 2003 and the decision of 20 October 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium found that the courts had incorrectly applied the material law to various aspects of the case, and had failed to join the appropriate financial body as co-defendant. 20. It appears that the amounts paid to the applicant under the quashed judgment of 29 August 2003 have not been reclaimed. 21. On 15 November 2005 the District Court suspended the proceedings, due to B.'s illness and asked the applicant to clarify his claims. 22. On 21 December 2005 the applicant submitted the amended claims. 23. On 16 February 2006 the District Court joined, at the defendant's request, the Ministry of Finance as co-defendant in the proceedings and suspended the examination of the case on account of B.'s poor state of health. 24. On 14 February 2007 the case was assigned to a different judge of the District Court, for the sake of the court's impartiality. 25. On 21 March 2007 the District Court dismissed the applicant's action. 26. On 4 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the judgment on appeal except for the parts concerning the eviction of S. and B., reimbursement of the rent, payments for utility services, a commission fee, and recovering of the cost of the apartment. The decision in those parts was remitted for a fresh examination due to failure by the lower court to assess certain evidence and misapplication of the material law. 27. On 27 August 2007 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending S.'s return from vacation. 28. On 26 October 2007 the court ordered the applicant to clarify his claims and scheduled a new hearing on 23 November 2007. 29. On 23 November 2007 the court issued a special writ ordering the bailiffs to obtain clarifications of the claims from the applicant. 30. It appears that at some point the applicant provided the required information. 31. On 30 April 2008 the District Court dismissed the action as unfounded. The court explained that the applicant had other remedies to use under the civil law in order to protect his property rights. In particular, he could claim that an equivalent apartment or a compensation be provided to him. 32. By the final judgment of 13 August 2008 the Supreme Court of Sakha (Yakutiya) upheld the lower court's findings on appeal. 33. In the meantime, the applicant sued the Administration for statutory interest for the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2003. 34. On 7 February 2007 the District Court discontinued the proceedings as the judgment of 29 August 2003 had been quashed and a new decision in the case had not yet been adopted.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears, with the multiple closings and reopenings, that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

7. The applicants are Syrian nationals. Their initials, dates of birth, application numbers and the other details of their cases are set out in the Appendix. At the time of lodging their applications the applicants were detained at detention centres for foreign nationals run by the Federal Migration Service (hereinafter "the FMS") in different towns in Russia. 8. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 9. On various dates between 2012 and 2016 the applicants came to Russia on various visas and did not leave when the period of their stay had expired. They were apprehended by the police and/or officers of the FMS in various regions in Russia for breaching the applicable immigration regulations, and placed in detention centres for foreigners (see the Appendix for the applicants' dates of detention and details of the relevant proceedings). The domestic courts in the respective regions examined their cases and found the applicants guilty of breaching various immigration regulations. Some of the applicants lodged appeals, but they were rejected by the domestic courts, whereas other applicants eventually had their expulsion orders quashed by the appeal courts. One of the applicants did not appeal against his expulsion order (see the Appendix for the details of individual cases) 10. All the applicants sought to obtain refugee status and/or temporary asylum in Russia. Some of the applicants voluntarily withdrew their requests and others' requests were rejected, first by the FMS and then by the domestic courts which examined the appeals against the FMS's refusals. Only Y.A.'s request for temporary asylum was granted (see the Appendix for details). 11. According to the information provided by their lawyers, while the proceedings before the Court were ongoing, six of the applicants (M.S.A., R.K., H.R., B.Z., S.W. and A.A.) left Russia of their own volition on various dates to go to third countries, where they settled (see the Appendix for details). 12. Between 24 January 2014 and 10 June 2014 M.S.A. and R.K. were detained in a detention centre for foreign nationals run by the FMS in Krasnoye Selo, in the Leningrad Region. 13. According to their submissions, the centre was based in an eight-storey building with windows covered with grills; five of the storeys were designed to accommodate 176 people in total. Each storey comprised around ten to eleven cells. The centre was severely overcrowded during the whole period of the applicants' detention. In particular, according to a report of the Human Rights Ombudsman in Saint Petersburg, on 26 February 2014 the centre accommodated 400 foreign nationals. 14. Both applicants were detained in cell no. 511, located on the fifth storey, which measured around 9 square metres and was designed to accommodate six people. All places in the cell were occupied during the whole period of their detention. Thus, each detainee had no more than 1.5 square metres of personal space, despite the statutory requirement that each detainee in a detention centre for foreign nationals have at least 4.5 square metres of personal space. The cell was furnished with three bunk beds and two bedside tables. There was no dining table in the cell. 15. The food was of poor quality, with no fruit or vegetables, and included pork, which the applicants could not eat for religious reasons. No alternative food was offered instead of pork, so they were deprived of any meal when pork was served. There were no kitchen and dining facilities in the centre. Food was delivered to the centre in containers and served cold in the cells. Detainees were forced to eat on their beds because there were no tables in the cells. This shortage in food was exacerbated by arbitrary restrictions on the contents of food parcels delivered from outside. Detainees were not allowed to receive fermented milk products, home‑cooked food, fruit or vegetables. 16. Detainees had no free access to drinking water or devices to boil tap water. The cell where M.S.A. and R.K. were detained was only lit by one light bulb, and the detainees were not allowed to switch on the light after 10 p.m. 17. The applicants and other inmates could move around on that storey to get to sanitary facilities, but they were not allowed to leave the storey or enter other detainees' cells. At the two ends of the common corridor there were bathrooms, each equipped with three lavatories, two washbasins and two showers. The storey was under the control of a dozen "chosen" inmates who, with the tacit consent of the centre's administration, dictated their rules to others and created an atmosphere of fear, violence and extortion. One of the bathrooms was for their exclusive use. The other seventy to eighty inmates had to use the other bathroom. 18. Outdoor exercise was sporadic and lasted around 15-20 minutes. In winter, the applicants did not go outside, as they did not possess winter clothes. In the period April-May 2014 they were able to enjoy outdoor exercise only four times. Outdoor exercise took place in a closed yard measuring around 50 metres in length and 10 metres in width. There was gravel on the ground, and there were no benches, plants or sports equipment. 19. The facility did not offer any activities, and no library was available. 20. During the administrative hearing concerning his removal from Russia on 26 February 2016, H.R. was not represented by a lawyer. 21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.

NOT ruled as violated by court

21. According to the lawyer representing B.Z., H.D. and S.W., on 25 March 2015 he was not allowed to meet with them in the detention centre.

It's arguable whether the applicants were able to defend themselves, as some had lawyers but were not able to meet with them.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

4. The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Martin. In 2006 she was recognised as "severely disabled" with 60% "functional impairment" pursuant to the relevant national laws. Her monthly disabled person's allowance payments in 2010, 2011 and 2012 were 325.40 euros (EUR), EUR 336.20 and EUR 346.30, respectively. 5. Prior to the above, in 2004, the applicant had lodged a claim with the Martin District Land Office (Obvodný pozemkový úrad) for restitution of a suite of real property consisting of several plots which came under special legislation provisions on restitution. 6. On 20 December 2011 she lodged an action against the Land Office with the Žilina Regional Court, sitting as an administrative tribunal, seeking an order for acceleration of the restitution proceedings. 7. This type of action required mandatory legal representation. Accordingly, the action was submitted through a lawyer. The applicant also sought an order for costs. The latter claim was calculated under the applicable national rules as pertaining to two "acts of legal assistance" (úkon právnej služby), in particular a first consultation with a lawyer, and the formulation of the action. EUR 130 was claimed in respect of one such act along with an associated lump sum for overheads; the whole claim came to some EUR 260. 8. On 2 January, 29 February and 23 March 2012 the applicant made further submissions. In the former two, she proactively informed the court that the Land Office had taken decisions in respect of her restitution claim on 23 December 2011 and 12 January 2012 and contended that these decisions did not determine her claim in relation to all the plots concerned and that they had been taken with the aim of creating a false impression that there had been no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The latter submission was made in response to a request by the court to specify the plots in respect of which the applicant's restitution claim was still outstanding. 9. In the submission of 23 March 2012 the applicant reiterated her claim in respect of legal costs, amending its scope as pertaining to five acts of legal assistance, including the three submissions mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 10. On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant's claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance. There is no reference in the Regional Court's decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant's claim, in the courts' reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision. The Regional Court's decision was not amenable to appeal. 11. On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant's action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants' case was "challengeable under the criteria of lawfulness". However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant's case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.

Ruled as violated by court

10. On 10 April 2012 the Regional Court granted the action and made an order for costs. As to the latter ruling, it summarised the applicant's claim as pertaining to three acts of legal assistance (the first consultation with a lawyer, the formulation of the action, and the formulation of the submission of 2 January 2012). It found that the applicant had correctly calculated the value of the act of legal assistance and that the undertaking by her lawyer of those acts had been justified. Accordingly, it allowed the claim in respect of those three acts of legal assistance. There is no reference in the Regional Court's decision to the remaining two acts of legal assistance in the summary of the applicant's claim, in the courts' reasoning, or in the operative part of its decision. The Regional Court's decision was not amenable to appeal. 11. On 18 May 2012 the applicant challenged the ruling on costs before the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, she complained that the Regional Court had failed to provide any reasons for not allowing her claim for costs with respect to the remaining two acts of legal assistance. As she had been fully successful in the case, she normally should have been compensated in respect of the costs of all justified acts of legal assistance received. A reduction of the award could only have been based on exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in determining the issue of legal costs, the Regional Court had made no use of that provision and, in any event, no such circumstances pertained, in particular because the case concerned unjustified delays in proceedings before a public authority lasting more than seven years; her efforts to ensure an out-of-court solution had been futile and had left her with no alternative to asserting her rights in the Regional Court; legal representation before that court was mandatory, the applicant was disabled, and she was living on the allowance specified above. 12. On 14 June 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it was essentially aimed at the fact that the Regional Court had provided no explanation for deciding on and granting compensation in respect of three acts of legal assistance only. It observed that, as such, the complaint concerned a decision on costs rather than on the merits of the applicant's action. It referred to its established case-law to the effect that decisions on costs could violate fundamental rights and freedoms only exceptionally, in particular if there were an extremely serious interference with such rights and freedoms. It was true that the decision contested in the applicants' case was "challengeable under the criteria of lawfulness". However, it was necessary to take into account that the value of the remaining two acts of legal assistance was only some EUR 270. This was less than three times the statutory minimum wage, the limit that was otherwise applicable to admissibility of appeals on points of law. If the amount at stake was this negligible, the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court could only be engaged in very exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been established in the applicant's case. Accordingly, her complaint was rejected as manifestly ill-founded. The decision was served on 3 August 2012 and no appeal lay against it.

It depends on whether "the interests of justice" require covered legal assistance for the applicant, as the applicant and the courts argued both sides of.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Palaio Faliro. 6. She has worked as a kindergarten teacher for the Greek Ministry of Education since 1983. On 23 August 2005, following her participation in a selection procedure, she was appointed educational coordinator of the Hellenic Republic at the General Consulate of Greece in Chicago for a period of two years. On 14 August 2007 the Ministers of Education and Foreign Affairs issued a decision informing all educational coordinators abroad of the end of their term of service. On the same date, the Minister of Education issued a decision informing the educational coordinators that they were to remain in their posts until the completion of the next selection procedure. The applicant's name was omitted from the second ministerial decision and the post of educational coordinator in Chicago remained vacant. She applied to have the decision annulled, which the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal agreed to do as the applicant had been omitted from the decision without any specific reasoning (decision no. 1363/2008). The applicant was therefore allowed to occupy the position until the successful completion of the next selection procedure. 7. In the meantime, a call for applications for educational coordinators for the next two-year period was published on 27 November 2007. The applicant submitted an application. On 23 July 2008 the coordinators selection committee published a ranking of candidates in which the applicant, having received 48.00 points, was placed 13th among those who had chosen French as their foreign language. On 22 August 2008 the Official Gazette (Εφημερίδα της Κυβερνήσεως) published a decision by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Education to appoint the candidates who had been selected. The applicant was not included. That decision was revoked and replaced with a ministerial decision dated 29 August 2008 including the same content. 8. On 24 September 2008 the applicant lodged an application for annulment of the ministerial decisions of 22 and 29 August 2008 on appointing the selected educational coordinators with the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal in so far as she had been omitted. The applicant complained that the ranking had not been published in the Official Gazette, as required by law, and that she had been erroneously awarded fewer points than she should have had. 9. On 16 July 2009 the applicant's legal representative requested that the court accelerate proceedings, arguing that an educational coordinator's term of appointment lasted two years and that the contested administrative act would soon expire. The hearing was scheduled to take place on 13 November 2009, but was adjourned to 5 March 2010. 10. On 3 February 2010 the applicant submitted additional grounds of annulment. The 5 March 2010 hearing was adjourned to 4 June 2010 as the Ministry had not provided the court with its submissions regarding the additional grounds for annulment. On 27 May 2010 the applicant sent a memorandum to the Court, requesting that the case be heard speedily, adding that an eventual discontinuation of the trial would violate her rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Nevertheless, the hearing was again adjourned owing to the Ministry's failure to provide submissions. Adjournments took place on 4 June, 17 September and on 8 October 2010. On 26 October 2010, the Ministry sent its observations to the court, and a hearing took place on 10 December 2010, when the two-year term for educational coordinators and the contested ministerial decision had already expired. 11. On 13 December 2010 the applicant submitted a memorandum requesting that the examination of her application for annulment be continued despite the expiry of the administrative act, arguing that she had special locus standi to continue to pursue the annulment process. In particular, she argued that if the contested act was annulled she would be credited with two more years of experience, which would improve her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure. 12. On 16 March 2011 the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal published decision no. 508/2011 rejecting the applicant's arguments. As regards her first reason for continuing the proceedings, it held that she had already been awarded the maximum number of points allowed by law for experience abroad. As regards her chances of being selected as a deputy coordinator of education in a future selection procedure, the domestic court held that that was not a lawful reason to continue the procedure in court, because it concerned an uncertain, future administrative procedure. Based on the above and on domestic law, the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal held that there was no need to adjudicate, on the grounds that the contested act was no longer in force (decision). As regards the applicant's arguments that the eventual rejection of her application would violate Article 20 of the Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the domestic court held that the provision of Article 32 § 2 of Presidential decree no. 18/1989 served the legal aim of avoiding any unnecessary trials. The individual who had lodged the application was no longer in need of judicial protection as the contested act no longer had any unfavourable consequences. Having also regard to the possibility provided for by law to continue the trial if the individual could prove that he or she still suffered from unfavourable consequences that could be removed only by the annulment of the contested act, the right to judicial protection remained intact.

Ruled as violated by court

While it depends on the definition of "reasonable time," it appears that the applicant did not receive a hearing within a reasonable time, as it took more than a year.

Article 6 Right to a fair trial 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.

5. The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market. 6. By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter "the Board") decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter "the Fund"). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank's management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7. On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank's loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY). 8. On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. 9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter "the Agency") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 10. On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank's legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 12. On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants' claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board's implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants' cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final. 13. Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board's decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants' requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts' decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board's decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank's shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank's shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.

Ruled as violated by court

9. On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter "the Agency") before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board's decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 11. On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 14. Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank's equities had been transferred to the Fund's account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants' requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.

While it depends on the definition of "entitled to a hearing," it appears that the applicant's right was threatened by repeated procedural dismissals.

Article 7 No punishment without law 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.

6. The applicant was born in 1961 and is detained at the Corradino Correctional Facility, Paola. 7. On 25 June 2004 the police searched the applicant's residence and found a quantity of cannabis plants, a canopy, foil and two electric lamps on the roof. 8. The police informed the applicant that he was being charged by the Attorney General, before the Criminal Court, with (i) cultivation and (ii) aggravated possession (not for his exclusive use) of cannabis. 9. A court-appointed expert found that the weight of the dried cannabis leaves found amounted to 3,416.20 grams, from which 6,832 cannabis ‘reefers' could be made or 11,382 ‘sticks of cannabis'. 10. During the trial by jury the applicant, who suffered from chronic depression and severe back pain, admitted the first charge. 11. By a judgment of 5 March 2008 the applicant was found guilty of both charges (the verdict was unanimous in relation to the first charge, and seven votes to two in relation to the second charge) and was sentenced to a term of twelve years' imprisonment and a fine of 25,000 euros (EUR) by the Criminal Court. The fine was to be converted into a further eighteen months' imprisonment if it remained unpaid. In determining the punishment, the Criminal Court noted that, according to the law, if, having considered the age of an accused, his previous conduct, the quantity and quality of the drug in question, as well as all other circumstances, or if the jury's verdict was not unanimous, it considered that the punishment of life imprisonment would not be adequate, it could sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment of between four and thirty years and a fine of between approximately EUR 3,330 and EUR 116,500. In the present case, it considered the conduct of the applicant, the fact that there was agreement that the second charge would be absorbed by the first charge for the purposes of punishment, and the punishments handed down in similar cases. 12. By a judgment of 12 March 2009 the Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed the first-instance judgment. 13. On 9 November 2010, the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Article 6 § 1 about, inter alia, the discretion of the Attorney General as public prosecutor to decide in which court to try an accused. 14. On 10 October 2012 the case was adjourned for judgment. On 11 February 2013 (following the judgment of the Court in Camilleri v. Malta, no. 42931/10, 22 January 2013) the applicant asked to add a complaint under Article 7 in connection with the discretion of the Attorney General. 15. By a decree of 12 February 2013 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the request to suspend the determination of the case and to allow the applicant to add a complaint under Article 7 of the Convention, given that the stage of collection of evidence and pleadings (dibattiment) had come to an end. 16. By a judgment of 21 March 2013, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional competence, rejected the applicant's claims. Having rejected all other complaints by the applicant, it considered that it was not necessary to determine the complaint concerning the discretion of the Attorney General (under Article 6). 17. By a judgment of 9 December 2013 the Constitutional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant and confirmed the first‑instance judgment. As to the complaint about the Attorney General's discretion, the Constitutional Court considered that the Court had found a violation of Article 7 in that connection (giving no remedy), but had not determined the matter under Article 6. In the Constitutional Court's view, such a finding which related to the lack of foreseeability of the law could not cast doubt on the fairness of the proceedings in general which would paralyse the entire judicial system. Furthermore, local case‑law had previously established that such a discretion did not breach an applicant's fair trial rights. The Constitutional Court also noted that there was no reason to alter the first-instance court's discretion regarding not allowing the addition of the complaint under Article 7, at a time when the collection of evidence had closed.

Ruled as violated by court

It depends on whether cannabis cultivation and aggravated possession are considered "criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations."

Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Timişoara. 5. On 20 February 2003 the applicant, a bank manager at that time, was placed in pre-trial detention by the Bucharest Anti-Corruption Department of the Prosecutor's Office, on a charge of taking a bribe in order to favourably influence the acceptance of a loan requested by M.G. 6. By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice ("the High Court") convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7. The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security ("Law no. 51/1991") for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8. The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.

Ruled as violated by court

6. By a final judgment delivered on 13 April 2012 the High Court of Cassation and Justice ("the High Court") convicted the applicant of taking a bribe. Among the evidence which led to his conviction was the transcript of a phone conversation between the applicant and M.G. on 16 September 2002. 7. The conversation had been intercepted on the basis of a warrant issued by the prosecutor under the provisions of Law no. 51/1991 on national security ("Law no. 51/1991") for the period between 13 August and 12 November 2002. 8. The applicant complained before the domestic courts about the lawfulness of the interception of his phone conversation and the accuracy of the transcript. He alleged that the Court had held that Law no. 51/1991 did not afford the guarantees required under Article 8 of the Convention. However, the High Court merely replied that the impugned interception had been lawful and within the scope of Law no. 51/1991.

The phone call is private correspondence, but its usage prevented crime, upheld morals, and upheld economic well-being. It depends on whether that usage was necessary for democratic interests.

Article 8 Right to respect for private and family life 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

4. The applicant was born in 1992 and lives in Bukhara, Uzbekistan. 5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6. The applicant was born in Uzbekistan. In 2003 his father, mother, brother and sister moved to Vladivostok in Russia and subsequently acquired Russian nationality, while he continued to live with his grandfather in Bukhara, visiting them in the summer months. After his grandfather had died and the applicant had finished the secondary school, in June 2011 he joined his family in Russia. 7. The applicant took a mandatory blood test with a view to obtaining a health certificate to support his application for a temporary residence permit. He was found to be HIV-positive. 8. On 23 September 2011 the Consumer Protection Authority declared the applicant's presence in Russian undesirable (the "exclusion order") on the ground that he was HIV-positive. 9. By judgment of 19 December 2011, the Sovetskiy District Court in Vladivostok rejected the applicant's challenge to the exclusion order, finding that it was issued in full compliance with Russian law. 10. On 13 February 2012 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 11. On 22 February 2012 the applicant left Russia to comply with the exclusion order.

Ruled as violated by court

One could argue the applicant has a right to his family life in Russia. One could also argue that the HIV exclusion order is necessary for health protection.