clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each
and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked
Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a
coordinated fashion.
An example of Russian efforts to shut the mouse of Georgian media is
the story of the Georgian news agency GHN. The first attack against
the agency
s website occurred in August 2008. Another wave of cyber
attacks started on 8 September. As a result, the GHN news agency
website had been paralyzed for 2 weeks. Another Georgian media
website that came under consistent cyber attacks after the end of the
armed conflict is www.apsny.ge
website of the Georgia-Online news
agency. It is interesting to note that Russian efforts to prevent Georgian
Internet media resources from disseminating information continued
even after the war.
4. CYBER BLOCKADE
The Russian assault on Georgian cyberspace was intensely coordinated and directed out of St. Petersburg, inside the territory of the
Russian Federation. The primary orchestrator was the Russian Business
Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade so that all
Georgian Internet traffic was going through Russia, denying Georgia its
internet independence. Computers in Georgia showed that an assault
was clearly taking place, which is presented here as evidence of
Russian sponsored cyber-terrorism:
Two trace routes for the web site mfa.gov.ge, that of the Georgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were showing:
(a) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
(b) From Ukraine - Ge = available & slow; not accessible, cached
(forged page) now only via redirect through Bryansk.ru
Other Georgia government websites such as mod.gov.ge, the
website of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the web site
president.gov.ge, the web site of the Georgian Presidency showed
(c) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
(d) From Ukraine - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey
By examining Internet routes before and after the beginning of the war,
it is clear that they were altered either legally or illegally, blocking
traffic in and out of Georgia. Some of those routers are known to be
under control of the Russian Business Network (RBN). This can be
demonstrated via a comparison of route configuration before and
after the war.
5. SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS
Here we can provide clear evidence of co-ordination and a full list of
targets the cyber-terrorists had selected taken from the Russian hosted
web site stopgeorgia.ru (which also appears as stopgeorgia.info a
redirected page). This site provided the necessary attack tools for the
cyber assault against Georgia for hackers. As we can see the screenshot shows that mostly .ge web sites are listed for priority attacks.
However - also targeted for assault is the US embassy in Tbilisi. This web
site, as seen before, is an open site to attract future FSB cyber warriors.
The following evidence below shows how these sites can be traced
back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in ST. Petersburg and other
cybercriminal locations.
The information site Stopgeorgia.ru which provided information and
tools for independent hackers to attack Georgian sites was hosted
by AS36351 Softlayer of Plano Texas. This is a well known location
that is associated with Atrivo and Intercage malware hosting
connectivity, which is highly disruptive to online service.
The information site Stopgeorgia.info was hosted by AS28753
NETDIRECT in Frankfurt, Germany as well as in AS12578 APOLLO
LATTELEKOM APOLLO in Latvia.
The link back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) was provided by
the clues left in the registration, which reads as:
Sponsoring
Registrar:
EstDomains,
Inc.
Registrant: Domain Manager, Protect Details, Inc, Street1: 29
Kompozitorov St., Saint Petersburg, RU, Phone:+7.8129342271
In summary, 36 important web sites were identified as targets for
hackers, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, Georgian
Parliament, Georgian Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various
news agencies and other media resources, the Central Election
Commission, and many others.
Due to efforts of many IT specialists in Internet hosting routing
companies, normal traffic was mostly resumed after the initial strikes.
Most critical websites were hosted outside of Georgia.
6. PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR
To help to make a final judgment regarding the cyberwar against
Georgia these two declarations from Russian officials can help us to
evaluate how Moscow thinks in regard to online warfare. The Russian
State Duma deputy and member of the Security Committee Deputy
Nikolai Kuryanovich stated in 2006 within a formal Russian
parliamentary letter of appreciation to hackers who had taken down
several Israeli web sites:
"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the
open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with
the aid of information soldiers, that is hackers. This means that a
small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of
the current armed forces."
Should we interpret this declaration as a statement of intent, or merely
a prediction? A few days ago, the Editor of the Russian Online journal
cybersecurity.ru, made a similar statement that provides insight into the
Russian war aims:
Cyber-attacks are part of the information war, making your enemy
shut up is a potent weapon of modern warfare.
Clear examples that such thinking is being applied as guiding principles
of Russian strategy as part of the intense information-war taking place
can be drawn from the second wave of attacks that showed up from
Russian Business Network (RBN) server range. This time the weapon was
a new campaign purporting to come from the BBC that mocked
Georgia's President and spread as a new virus.

a conflict - risk forwarding the responsibility of the attack to each

and every Russian or Russian supporter that ever attacked

Georgian sites using publicly obtainable DDoS attack tools in a

coordinated fashion.

An example of Russian efforts to shut the mouse of Georgian media is

the story of the Georgian news agency GHN. The first attack against

the agency

s website occurred in August 2008. Another wave of cyber

attacks started on 8 September. As a result, the GHN news agency

website had been paralyzed for 2 weeks. Another Georgian media

website that came under consistent cyber attacks after the end of the

armed conflict is www.apsny.ge

website of the Georgia-Online news

agency. It is interesting to note that Russian efforts to prevent Georgian

Internet media resources from disseminating information continued

even after the war.

4. CYBER BLOCKADE

The Russian assault on Georgian cyberspace was intensely coordinated and directed out of St. Petersburg, inside the territory of the

Russian Federation. The primary orchestrator was the Russian Business

Network (RBN) which conducted the cyber-blockade so that all

Georgian Internet traffic was going through Russia, denying Georgia its

internet independence. Computers in Georgia showed that an assault

was clearly taking place, which is presented here as evidence of

Russian sponsored cyber-terrorism:

Two trace routes for the web site mfa.gov.ge, that of the Georgian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were showing:

(a) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey

(b) From Ukraine - Ge = available & slow; not accessible, cached

(forged page) now only via redirect through Bryansk.ru

Other Georgia government websites such as mod.gov.ge, the

website of the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the web site

president.gov.ge, the web site of the Georgian Presidency showed

(c) From US - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey

(d) From Ukraine - Ge = Blocked via TTnet Turkey

By examining Internet routes before and after the beginning of the war,

it is clear that they were altered either legally or illegally, blocking

traffic in and out of Georgia. Some of those routers are known to be

under control of the Russian Business Network (RBN). This can be

demonstrated via a comparison of route configuration before and

after the war.

5. SITES PROVIDING DDOS ATTACK TOOLS

Here we can provide clear evidence of co-ordination and a full list of

targets the cyber-terrorists had selected taken from the Russian hosted

web site stopgeorgia.ru (which also appears as stopgeorgia.info a

redirected page). This site provided the necessary attack tools for the

cyber assault against Georgia for hackers. As we can see the screenshot shows that mostly .ge web sites are listed for priority attacks.

However - also targeted for assault is the US embassy in Tbilisi. This web

site, as seen before, is an open site to attract future FSB cyber warriors.

The following evidence below shows how these sites can be traced

back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) in ST. Petersburg and other

cybercriminal locations.

The information site Stopgeorgia.ru which provided information and

tools for independent hackers to attack Georgian sites was hosted

by AS36351 Softlayer of Plano Texas. This is a well known location

that is associated with Atrivo and Intercage malware hosting

connectivity, which is highly disruptive to online service.

The information site Stopgeorgia.info was hosted by AS28753

NETDIRECT in Frankfurt, Germany as well as in AS12578 APOLLO

LATTELEKOM APOLLO in Latvia.

The link back to the Russian Business Network (RBN) was provided by

the clues left in the registration, which reads as:

Sponsoring

Registrar:

EstDomains,

Inc.

Registrant: Domain Manager, Protect Details, Inc, Street1: 29

Kompozitorov St., Saint Petersburg, RU, Phone:+7.8129342271

In summary, 36 important web sites were identified as targets for

hackers, including the US and UK Embassies in Tbilisi, Georgian

Parliament, Georgian Supreme Court, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, various

news agencies and other media resources, the Central Election

Commission, and many others.

Due to efforts of many IT specialists in Internet hosting routing

companies, normal traffic was mostly resumed after the initial strikes.

Most critical websites were hosted outside of Georgia.

6. PART OF THE INFORMATION WAR

To help to make a final judgment regarding the cyberwar against

Georgia these two declarations from Russian officials can help us to

evaluate how Moscow thinks in regard to online warfare. The Russian

State Duma deputy and member of the Security Committee Deputy

Nikolai Kuryanovich stated in 2006 within a formal Russian

parliamentary letter of appreciation to hackers who had taken down

several Israeli web sites:

"In the very near future many conflicts will not take place on the

open field of battle, but rather in spaces on the Internet, fought with

the aid of information soldiers, that is hackers. This means that a

small force of hackers is stronger than the multi-thousand force of

the current armed forces."

Should we interpret this declaration as a statement of intent, or merely

a prediction? A few days ago, the Editor of the Russian Online journal

cybersecurity.ru, made a similar statement that provides insight into the

Russian war aims:

Cyber-attacks are part of the information war, making your enemy

shut up is a potent weapon of modern warfare.

Clear examples that such thinking is being applied as guiding principles

of Russian strategy as part of the intense information-war taking place

can be drawn from the second wave of attacks that showed up from

Russian Business Network (RBN) server range. This time the weapon was

a new campaign purporting to come from the BBC that mocked

Georgia's President and spread as a new virus.