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CoAStaL NLP Group 28

[ "holding to that effect with respect to rule 64", "recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception", "recognizing exception", "recognizing that when the corporations management or its shareholders are deadlocked with respect to a particular issue courts have realigned such corporations as party plaintiffs", "recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations" ]

[ "holding that motions under rule 60b1 may not be used to evade the time limits of rule 4a in a case with a procedural posture similar to washingtons", "recognizing that as of july 11 1994 contempt proceedings arising from civil actions are no longer governed by rule 333 ala rcrim p and instead are governed by rule 70a", "holding that postjudgment postcollateralrelief request for grandjury transcripts was civil in nature and governed by rule 4a", "holding that the filed rate doctrine barred request for damages but did not preclude request for injunction and civil penalties", "holding that constructively fraudulent transfers are governed by rule 8" ]

[ "holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future", "holding employees not entitled to dismissal pursuant to section 101106f where employees failed to present the trial court with a sufficient record to satisfy their burden", "holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury", "holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability", "holding inter alia that pursuant to hrs 3868 employer entitled to reimbursement from portion of employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor properly allocable to employees tort claim" ]

[ "holding the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over condemnation proceedings", "holding that federal jurisdiction over rico claims is concurrent and not exclusive", "holding that claims under 11 usc 362h must be brought in the bankruptcy court rather than in the district court which only has appellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases", "holding that bankruptcy court has discretion to retain jurisdiction over related case after dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case", "holding that bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over recovery of preferences and fraudulent conveyances" ]

[ "holding that the individual defendant does not have to be in privity of contract with the plaintiff to be held liable under 1981", "holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable", "holding that at a minimum the defendant must have breached some duty created by a labor contract to be liable for a violation under section 301a", "holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend", "holding that question of whether defendant breached duty under applicable safety statutes was not one for experts" ]

[ "holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client", "holding that a public administrator was not entitled to attorneys fees in a claim against the estate of a former guardian where the case was not one where attorneys fees were authorized and there was no evidence to support the award", "holding that attorneys statement in prior litigation that if his client won that case she would make no further claims on estate at issue were not admissions in judicio", "holding that admissions purportedly made by an accused by way of his agents or attorneys in pleadings from a civil case are not admissible in a criminal case unless shown to have been authorized by him", "holding that attorneys acts within scope of his authority are binding on client" ]

[ "holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by not conducting multiple polls of jury where none of the jurors expressed uncertainty or disagreement about the verdict", "holding that trial court abused its discretion in failing to make a proper inquiry of jurors andor failing to strike jurors for cause after jurors explicitly expressed bias", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting such a temporary injunction", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented" ]

[ "recognizing that texas courts narrowly construe the intentional infliction of emotional distress doctrine", "recognizing the same rule in texas courts", "recognizing courts obligation to construe meaning of relatives", "holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3", "recognizing scotts admonition to construe the classbased animus requirement narrowly" ]

[ "holding that potential loss of a contract constitutes irreparable injury", "recognizing that a party suffers irreparable injury when it loses the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with other bidders wjhen a plaintiff shows that it was excluded from the bidding process perhaps solely because of the governments improper conduct the plaintiff has satisfied requirement for irreparable injury", "holding that where the uncontradicted evidence shows that a former employee is working for a direct competitor no finding of irreparable injury is necessary to support a permanent injunction to protect trade secrets because irreparable injury is established as a matter of law", "holding that lost opportunity to compete on level playing field is sufficient to establish irreparable harm", "holding that loss of the opportunity to fairly compete for a contract constitutes irreparable harm" ]

[ "holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation", "holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity", "recognizing that police officer may stop a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot", "holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime", "holding that if a police officer inflicted no constitutional injury on a suspect it is inconceivable that the police commissioners could be liable to the suspect" ]

[ "holding shipments from a distribution point supplied by outofstate shipments made pursuant to preexisting orders were interstate in character", "holding that the halt of shipments of unprocessed milk without processing or commingling did not remove the interstate character of the shipments", "holding that the time appliances were at a distribution center within the state did not break the continuity of interstate movement the subsequent delivery from the distribution center was the last phase in the interstate shipment", "holding that warehouse distributions to companyowned stores constituted interstate commerce since inter alia the company knew at the time oufiofstate shipments to the warehouse commenced that the shipments were bound for its retail stores", "holding that interstate shipments to a warehousedistribution point through to samestate retail outlets retained their interstate character where the warehouse was merely a convenient instrumentality for the division of the shipments coming to it and the continuation of the movement of each part to the retail stores" ]

[ "holding that because the circuit court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the unlawfuldetainer action the district courts unauthorized transfer of the action could not transfer jurisdiction over that action to the circuit court", "holding that the circuit courts have no appellate jurisdiction over a general district courts review of an administrative license suspension in the absence of any statutory authority vesting them with such jurisdiction", "holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts", "holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart", "holding appellate courts have jurisdiction over the district courts orders rejecting as a matter of law qualified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss" ]

[ "holding that despite 1985 amendments minimum jurisdictional amount remains 50000", "holding university owed no duty to family members of a decedent who donated his remains to dispose of the remains in a particular manner", "holding that almendareztorres remains the law after apprendi", "holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional", "holding unconstitutional taketitle provision of the lowlevel radioactive waste policy amendments act of 1985" ]

[ "holding police officer is a public official", "holding that a subcontractors lack of a license under the act does not bar a claim for indemnity or contribution by the contractor in a suit by the homeowner against the contractor because the public policy embodied in the act and berenter is to protect the public not unlicensed contractors", "holding that the first amendment does not protect the use of racial invective by a public official against a member of the public in a bar", "holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege", "holding that the first amendment does not protect true threats against the president" ]

[ "holding that police officers testimony as to the victims prior inconsistent statements made to him on day of the alleged crime were not admissible as substantive evidence and could not be used to support a finding of guilt", "holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible", "holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt", "holding that an indictment is sufficient as long as it fully and clearly sets out the crime and the elements of the offense even if the evidence consists of proof of other means of committing the same crime", "holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt" ]

[ "holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court", "holding that a district court may not grant summary judgment without giving plaintiff an opportunity to submit materials admissible in a summary judgment proceeding or allowing a hearing on defendants motion", "holding that after removal of diversity case to federal court the federal court may grant summary judgment notwithstanding earlier denial of summary judgment motion by state court", "holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion", "holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable " ]

[ "holding where defendant challenged jury instruction and also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsels failure to object to instruction because we find no error in the instructions defendants claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must also be rejected", "holding appellant made facially sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where he asserted counsel failed to object to jury instructions which improperly combined elements of separate offenses", "holding that failure to object to admissible evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel", "recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "holding that right to appeal claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that counsel failed to convey plea negotiations timely and adequately inform of consequences of pleading guilty to jury for sentencing waived because plea of guilty to jury was independent of and not supported by alleged ineffective assistance of counsel claims" ]

[ "recognizing that while we give respectful consideration to the legislatures understanding of constitutional language we are the final arbiter of the meaning of the iowa constitution", "holding that we must give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutes language", "holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning", "holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent", "recognizing that we must give meaning to all the words in the claims" ]

[ "recognizing aiding and abetting conversion", "recognizing aiding and abetting trespass", "recognizing both aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting conversion", "holding corporate director liable for aiding and abetting violations of exchange act sections 14a 13a and rules 13al and 13a13 because he provided assistance and encouragement to conduct patently in violation of the securities laws", "holding it was not a surprise or unfair to the defendant for the state to pursue a theory of aiding and abetting at trial when the charging document did not refer to aiding and abetting" ]

[ "holding that failure to instruct on trespass as a lesserincluded offense three steps removed from armed burglary of a dwelling was harmless because the jury did not exercise its pardon power by finding defendant guilty of any of the lesserincluded offenses one and two steps removed", "holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary", "holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary", "holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on trespass as a lesser included offense of breaking and entering because appellant failed to advise the court which of the numerous trespass statutes he considered to be lesser included to the offense charged", "holding that the offense of criminal trespass is a lesserincluded offense of all three types of burglary and stating generally that the elements of criminal trespass including notice could be established by proof of the same facts necessary to prove the offense of burglary" ]

[ "holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine", "holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated 65440", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a", "holding that federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear case notwithstanding rookerfeldman doctrine where plaintiff filed federal suit while certiorari petition to new mexico supreme court was pending in similar state court action", "holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated 65440 by commencing another action in a state court" ]

[ "holding that because the crime of rape involved a nonconsensual act there was a substantial risk that physical force may be used in committing the offense", "holding that the term indecent act required no further definition", "holding that a petitioners conviction for indecent assault and battery under massachusetts law constituted a crime of violence because any offense under the state statute was by definition nonconsensual and thus any violation of the statute by its nature presents a substantial risk that force may be used to overcome the victims lack of consent and accomplish the indecent touching", "holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same", "holding that the state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child categorically constituted a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender sentencing guidelines" ]

[ "holding that noncompliance with terms of agreement did not terminate agreement failure to comply with date requirement in termination procedure rendered termination ineffective and letter between nonparty and party could not terminate agreement", "holding that an agreement providing this agreement when signed by author and publisher will cancel and supercede the previous agreements was clearly intended to terminate an earlier agreement", "holding that where one party had received a written agreement and conformed his conduct to that agreement for an extended period of time but failed to sign the agreement he was equitably estopped from denying the validity of the agreement", "holding franchisor could not arbitrarily terminate franchise agreement as it would be a disregard of franchisees interests under the agreement", "holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under 301a of the lmra" ]

[ "holding prior drug deals admissible to prove knowledge of the drug trade", "holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy", "holding that evidence of admitted drug use before the birth of the children missed drug tests after removal of children and a failed drug test between removal and the final hearing established legal sufficiency of evidence to show endangerment under section 1610011e", "holding that evidence of continued drug use after pregnancy may be conduct which endangers a childs wellbeing under section 1610011e", "holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators" ]

[ "recognizing that a sheriff contracting for services with a municipality is clearly different from a municipality transferring or contracting away the authority to supervise and control its police powers to the county government", "holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority", "holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim ", "holding notice of the defect actual or constructive and a failure to act on the part of the municipality to remedy the situation are prerequisites to recovery in an action involving a municipality", "holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim" ]

[ "holding that even if the prison disciplinary committee failed to follow a state administrative regulation requiring the committee to convene within eight calendar days after commission of prison offense or its discovery the noncompliance did not of itself violate due process", "holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process", "holding that a prison disciplinary committee violated inmates rights to procedural due process by refusing to call their witnesses even though the disciplinary hearing took place in the aftermath of a riot and the resulting disciplinary caseload was ex tremely heavy", "holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity", "holding that due process requires that the findings and actions of a disciplinary prison board be supported by some evidence in the record" ]

[ "holding that a former employee was not entitled to recover a yearend bonus from his former employer where no definite sum of money or percentage of profits was promised and where the employee left the company before the end of the fiscal year in question", "holding that a bonus calculated based on a percentage of the companys profits was a wage under colorados wagepenalty statute because the bonus was vested and determinable as of the date of termination was disproportionately large in comparison to the employees salary and was owed as compensation for services performed by the employee", "holding that the computation of an incentive bonus based on work done was a wage reasoning that wages include not only periodic monetary earnings but also the other benefits to which he is entitled as part of his compensation", "holding under indiana law that profits are not wages and neither is a fraction of profits wages and so a bonus that is based on the performance of a plant rather than on the time or determinable output of the employee is not wages either", "holding that an employers promise to pay a bonus to an employee was not enforceable where the employee was already obligated under a written contract to perform the services in question" ]

[ "holding that the fourth amendment is implicated by the withdrawal of blood to test its alcohol content", "holding that blood alcohol content almost 30 over the limit together with testimony of intoxication at the time of driving was sufficient to convict contrasting a case in which the blood alcohol content was just barely over the limit which was insufficient to convict", "holding a warrantless blood test reasonable due to bloods rapid loss of its alcohol content", "holding that in order to convict a defendant of dui under subsection 3802b the commonwealth cannot rely on the blood serum analysis alone it must introduce evidence of alcohol by weight in terms of whole blood", "holding blood testing for alcohol content a search" ]

[ "holding on the basis of the highly discretionary nature of the decisions hud must make in the course of administering loans it has insured or taken by assignment that judicial review of huds decision to foreclose should be deferential", "holding that strict scrutiny applies", "recognizing scrutiny on statutory grounds stated in 10a and scrutiny for whether the award evinces a manifest disregard of applicable law", "holding that judicial scrutiny of attorney performance must be highly deferential", "holding that regardless of the parties agreement to the contrary district courts must review an arbitrators findings of fact and conclusions of law under the highly deferential standard set forth in 9 usc 10a" ]

[ "holding that pure issue of law is preserved by motion for summary judgment and is reviewable after final judgment", "holding that if there is any issue of fact which remains upon a motion for summary judgment the motion must be denied", "holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "holding that whether a statement is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is an issue that a court can and should rightfully determine upon a motion for summary judgment" ]

[ "holding that a creditor for advances or loans in money made to the owner and applied to the use of a vessel has no privilege allowed him by law because he is not subrogated to the rights of those whose privileged claims have been paid out of the money loaned", "holding that a defendants goodfaith belief that he intended to repay the loans he procured through misrepresentation was not a defense to wire fraud", "holding that under minnesota law refinancing and consolidation of purchase money loans did not destroy their purchase money character for bankruptcy lien avoidance purposes", "holding that 523a8 may apply to nonstudent comakers of educational loans", "holding transfer of usda loans to private lenders did not extinguish a rural water districts indebted on those loans for purposes of 1926b" ]

[ "holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered", "holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made", "holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action", "holding that limitations period begins to run on date notice was received at claimants residence even if claimant did not receive it until a later date", "holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court" ]

[ "holding that more than notice to a defendant is required", "holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state", "holding illegal nationals reconstruction of sign deemed nonconforming under state statute and located along federal highway system where sign was more than 50 percent destroyed by wind", "holding plaintiff entitled to replace ment value of gold leaf professional sign located in the window of his leased law office when defendants intentionally destroyed it", "holding that the validity of releases under the federal employers liability act was a question to be determined by federal rather than state law" ]

[ "holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing", "holding inter alia that common law claims were preempted", "holding inter alia that a creditor may take a security interest in a licensees liquor license", "holding that a tax credit to liquor licensees against taxes owed to the state was an unconstitutional subsidy of the liquor industry", "holding that a county liquor license board had no standing to appeal the reversal of its decision" ]

[ "holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice", "recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal", "holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal", "holding that where counsel has failed to file or perfect an appeal despite the defendants request it is clear that the defendant need not demonstrate that but for the ineffectiveness of counsel such an appeal would have succeeded or even would have merit" ]

[ "holding that routine monitoring and recording of the calls of convicted prisoners does not violate the prisoners fourth amendment rights", "holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells", "holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells", "holding that georgias legitimate interest in creating a permanent identification record of convicted felons for law enforcement purposes outweighs the minor intrusion involved in taking prisoners saliva samples and storing their dna profiles given prisoners reduced expectation of privacy in their identities", "holding that prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the fourth amendments prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells" ]

[ "holding that two claimants separate cases who had lost title to property through in rem tax foreclosure which properties were destroyed by fire postforeclosure retained an insurable interest in the property under their insurance contracts the claimants continued to occupy the properties ignorant of the tax foreclosures", "holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit", "holding that property interest in continued expectation of public employment does not include right to actually occupy position", "holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire", "holding that buyers of real property who were in constructive possession of the property had made a down payment and had signed a contract to purchase at the time of the loss had an insurable interest in the property despite a court determination two years after the loss that the agreement to purchase was not binding" ]

[ "holding that defendant has failed to provide any support for the novel argument that plaintiff should be denied fees because in defendants view plaintiffs counsel acted unreasonably in failing to accept defendants settlement offer and that consideration of settlement discussions on a motion for attorneys fees is barred by federal rule of evidence 408", "holding that federal rule of evidence 408 prohibits admission of such evidence for purpose of establishing unreasonableness of plaintiffs counsels request for fees", "holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper", "holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion", "holding that evidence of settlement may be considered under rule 408 when reviewing a motion for sanctions" ]

[ "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing defendants counterclaim after summary judgment was granted as to plaintiffs claim", "holding trial court may make a judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause", "holding that an order not denominated a judgment is not final for purposes of appeal", "holding a judgment of a district court does not become final by appeal within the meaning of the statute providing for registration of such judgments in another district until the case has been disposed of by appeal", "holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence" ]

[ "holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits", "recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree", "holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce", "holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that 523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements", "recognizing a right to contribution" ]

[ "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a tenmonth delay in filing a dismissal motion was reasonable", "holding that a trial court does not lose jurisdiction in a matter by ordering its dismissal before jeopardy has attached unless there is an abuse of discretion in vacating the order of dismissal and reinstating the case for trial", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial based on a 250000 award for a mental distress claim", "holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case" ]

[ "holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department", "holding that the company administering a selfinsurance program for the department of transportation was an agent for the department and was therefore immune from suit", "holding that county and district attorneys are officers within the judicial department", "holding that a state department of transportation employee was subject to patronage dismissal where his duties included serving as a liaison between the director of the department and the general public and other government officials including representing the department at meetings and conferences", "holding that under separation of powers the legislative department makes the laws the executive department carries the laws into effect and the judicial department interprets and declares the laws" ]

[ "holding that 1441c does not allow the remand of claims that are not separate and independent", "holding that claims for pain and suffering are the separate property of a spouse", "holding that removal under section 1441c may only be done by the original defendant", "recognizing that 1441c limits removal to situations in which a federal question is joined with a separate and independent claim of a nonfederal nature", "holding that a loss of consortium is separate and independent from the primary action" ]

[ "holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee", "holding trustee has waived the right to bring a preference objection", "recognizing authority of chapter 13 trustee to recover overpayment but not finding refund appropriate where error was attributable to trustee", "holding on facts similar to those in dmart that the 546a limitation period runs from appointment of chapter 7 trustee after case was converted from chapter 11", "holding in a case where a chapter 11 trustee was appointed after a period during which the debt or had operated as debtor in possession that a chapter 11 trustee has two years from the date of his appointment not from the commencement of the chapter 11 case to bring avoidance actions" ]

[ "holding that the employers failure to interact with the employee does not preclude the employee from losing on summary judgment because the employee must still prove that a reasonable accommodation could have been made", "holding that the decision to reprimand or transfer an employee if rescinded before the employee suffers a tangible harm is not an adverse employment action", "holding that a similar written reprimand provided to an architect of the capitol employee was not materially adverse because it merely criticized his job performance", "holding that scolding an em ployee for absence by introducing the employee by saying this is amy you probably havent met her yet because she is never here may have been offensive to the employee but was merely a petty slight that does not amount to a materially adverse action", "holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga 349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action" ]

[ "holding that acceptance of four bribes over a two and onehalf year period from parents who wanted their children admitted to graduate school appeared to be a sufficient pattern to satisfy the statute", "recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children", "holding that a school board policy prohibiting employees from sending their children to private schools interfered with employees constitutional right to control the education of their children", "holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable", "recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children" ]

[ "holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim", "holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property", "holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim", "holding plaintiffs property interest claim could not be based on a conclusory allegation citing past practices", "holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment" ]

[ "holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error", "holding that despite the advisory nature of the sentencing guidelines they remain the starting point and the initial benchmark of a district courts sentencing analysis the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable guidelines range and keep that range in mind throughout the sentencing process and that failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceemdashincluding an explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range constitutes significant procedural error ", "holding guidelines to be only advisory", "holding that a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court committed no significant procedural error such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range treating the guidelines as mandatory failing to consider the 3553a factors selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence emphasis added", "holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range" ]

[ "holding that to justify a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence 1 the evidence must have been discovered after trial 2 the failure to discover this evidence must not be attributable to a lack of due diligence on the part of the movant 3 the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching 4 the evidence must be material and 5 the evidence must be likely to produce an acquittal if a new trial is granted", "holding defendant not entitled toa hearing on his motion for a new trial where he failed to prove that his new evidence was in fact newly discovered and that its recent discovery was in no way attributable to a previous lack of diligence", "holding that appellant must present some evidence of a subsequent change in competency or some new evidence in a manner analogous to newly discovered evidence in a motion for new trial to complain of a denial of a second competency hearing", "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony", "holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence" ]

[ "holding that the hospital knew or should have known of the necessity to control based on a similar prior instance of inappropriate sexual conduct with a minor", "holding that defendant who sets in motion series of events that he knew or should have known would cause others to deprive plaintiff of rights may be liable under 1983", "holding that in certain circumstances where a defendant is convicted of a charge alleging a conspiracy to distribute one drug or another he must be sentenced as if the conviction were only for a conspiracy involving the drug that triggers the lowest statutory sentencing range", "holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities that he knew or should have known or foreseen were involved in the conspiracy", "holding that a cause of action accrues when the claimant knew or reasonably should have known of the wrong" ]

[ "holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute", "holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference", "holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law", "holding that sec interpretation of federal securities law is entitled to deference if it is reasonable" ]

[ "holding that a review of an employees 1989 performance was irrelevant to a determination of whether his performance was satisfactory at the time of his termination in august of 1990", "holding that governmentcaused delay in contractor performance violated implied duty not to hinder performance of other party", "holding that prior positive performance evaluations are not dispositive as to whether the employer was satisfied with the employees performance by the time of the termination", "holding ones satisfactory performance of duties leading to a promotion does establish a plaintiffs qualification for a job", "holding that allegations concerning the plaintiffs satisfactory work performance termination and much younger replacement did not by themselves suffice to plead an age discrimination claim" ]

[ "holding that the summoned party may in an enforcement proceeding challenge the 7609f2 determination that there is a reasonable basis for believing there may be a violation of a revenue law", "holding that the alj erred in rejecting the iq of a claimant whose work history was limited primarily to working for his father", "holding that the alj is not obliged to accept an iq if there is a substantial basis in the record for believing that the claimant was feigning the results", "holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history even when the claimant is represented by counsel", "holding that where there are deficiencies in the record the alj is under an affirmative obligation to develop the relevant medical history" ]

[ "holding that a new york law which required a landlord to permit a cable television company to install its cable facilities on his property was a taking", "holding that new yorks law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to place cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a taking even though the facilities occupied at most only vk cubic feet of the landlords property", "holding that a new york law requiring building owners to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their premises constituted a taking", "holding that a new york state law requiring the owner of an apartment building to allow the installation of cable equipment on the building which amounted to a few wires and a small box on the roof constituted a taking", "holding that new york law granting cable television companies right to place wires across private property worked a taking of private property" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that there is no basis in law to submit the issue of plaintiffs negligence to the jury when there was no evidence that plaintiff incited the dog or voluntarily or unreasonably exposed herself to a known risk", "holding that the basis of liability is negligence and not injury", "holding that there is no cutpa violation when the sole basis of the claim is the defendants negligence and the jury determines that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent", "holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages" ]

[ "holding city waives immunity by entering into contract", "holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract", "holding that federal statutes and regulations can form the basis of a breach of contract claim if expressly incorporated into the contract", "holding that no acts by the outofstate defendant would place her within the florida longarm statute in entering into a contract with a florida resident for an office to be run in mississippi", "holding entering into a contract with a minnesota resident can justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction but only where the dispute involves the contract" ]

[ "holding that the judgment was entered without jurisdiction and was therefore a nullity", "holding that service of subpoena on plaintiffs counsel as opposed to the plaintiff himself renders such service a nullity", "holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction", "holding that if service is inadequate defendant never submitted to courts jurisdiction and underlying judgment is therefore a nullity", "recognizing default judgment must generally be set aside without further showing if defendant never received service of process" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise", "holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise", "holding that requiring plaintiffs to show a substantial burden from nonneutral government actions would make petty harassment of religious institutions and exercise immune from the protection of the first amendment", "holding that laws requiring special use permits did not impose a substantial burden on religious institution" ]

[ "holding that analyzing summary judgment decisions under the standards set forth in mai 3124 is appropriate because a plaintiff has no higher standard to survive summary judgment than is required to submit the claim to a jury", "holding that moran foods found no need to resolve the threshold issue of whether a plaintiff was an applicant under the ecoa because plaintiff failed to submit sufficient evidence of discrimination under the ecoa to survive summary judgment", "holding without discussing the plaintiffs burden of persuasion that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment", "holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove the defendants reasons for not hiring the plaintiff were pretext because the plaintiff failed to submit any evidence other than her own subjective testimony that she was more qualified for the job than the selectee", "holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants" ]

[ "holding court abused its discretion when it excluded psychologists testimony regarding host of identification issues among which was crossracial identification", "holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination", "holding that where the opportunity for positive identification is good and not weakened by prior failure to identify and the witness is positive in his identification even after crossexamination identification need not be received with caution", "holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial", "holding that agents testimony as to witnesss identification was not hearsay" ]

[ "holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement", "holding the party seeking to invalidate an arbitration agreement because of prohibitive arbitration fees bears the burden of proof and the possibility of such party incurring prohibitive costs is too speculative to invalidate an arbitration agreement where the record reveals only that the agreement is silent on the subject of arbitration costs", "holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable", "holding that plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden to show that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because plaintiffs claims of prohibitive costs were too speculative", "holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement as providing that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs" ]

[ "holding that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection", "holding under the fourth amendment that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint on the liberty of an adult accused of crime", "holding that pretrial detention resulting from legal process unsupported by probable cause violates the fourth amendment", "holding that the fourth amendment requires a finding of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty", "holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same" ]

[ "recognizing that our decisions consistently supported nondisclosure of names or other information identifying individuals appearing in law enforcement records", "holding that nigcs individual background files are law enforcement records subject to exemption 7c and that in the absence of a waiver disclosure is not required by foia because individuals mentioned in law enforcement investigatory reports have a presumptive privacy interest in keeping their names undisclosed", "holding that names of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are categorically exempt from disclosure unless disclosing such information is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity", "holding that names and address of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of exemption 7c are exempt from disclosure", "holding that records regarding complaints against state police officers which would be exempt from disclosure when unredacted where no longer exempt after the names of state police troopers the names of complainants and all identifying information were redacted" ]

[ "holding that property owner still has relief in the form of the return of his property though condemnation was complete and a highway was constructed across the property", "recognizing that a temporary use of property does not automatically create an expectation of privacy in that property", "holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property", "holding that the constitutional protection of an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her home does not extend to a place of business", "holding that expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individuals home" ]

[ "holding name brand manufacturers may be held liable by consumers of generic drugs for representations made to prescribing physicians under vermont law", "holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable", "holding that brand name manufacturers cannot be held liable for injuries caused by products they did not manufacture under arkansas law", "holding that a brand manufacturer of prescription drugs cannot be held liable for injuries suffered by consumers who ingested only the generic form of a drug under florida law", "holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii" ]

[ "holding that appointment of guardian over incompetent adult does not remove legal disability so as to halt tolling and commence running of statute of limitations", "holding that under michigan law it is wellsettled that an individual with a mental disability is the beneficiary of the tolling statute even where his rights have been capably handled by a guardian or an attorney", "holding that where client was abandoned by attorney due to attorneys mental illness equitable tolling may be appropriate", "holding that where an individual is deprived of liberty or property interests in violation of article of the state declaration of rights he may enforce those rights by a common law action for damages", "holding that new yorks statute tolling statute of limitations during a period when a person is under a disability because of infancy is not terminated by acts of guardian or legal representative in taking steps to pursue claims on infants behalf" ]

[ "holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees", "holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner", "holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege", "holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege", "recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public" ]

[ "holding trial court may not increase bond on grounds not raised by the state without prior notice to defendant", "holding that an issue not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal", "holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal", "holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal", "holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion" ]

[ "holding evidence of one possible burglary before incident at issue insufficient to demonstrate prior criminal activity", "holding that possession of burglary tools is an offense separate from burglary", "holding that a threeyear gap was insufficient to demonstrate staleness where the criminal activity was ongoing", "holding that iowa burglary is not categorical burglary as the elements of iowa burglary law are broader than those of generic burglary", "holding that virginia burglary statute comes within definition of generic burglary" ]

[ "recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations", "holding that 1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa", "holding that section 14704a authorizes private actions for damages to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act", "holding that section 303i2b expressly authorizes a stand alone award of punitive damages", "holding that section 14704a2 authorizes private action for damages and injunctive relief to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act and its implementing regulations" ]

[ "holding that securities fraud claims cannot rest on speculation and conclusory allegations", "holding that summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmovant rests merely upon conclusory allegations improbable inferences and unsupported speculation", "holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment", "holding that summary judgment was appropriate when no reasonable factfinder could have found for the nonmovant", "holding speculation insufficient to avoid summary judgment" ]

[ "holding an interlocutory appeal is allowed from the trial courts written order denying a motion to dismiss under the tcpa", "holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive", "holding that a magistrate judge acting pursuant to 636b1 has no authority to issue a dispositive ruling on a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal under 28 usc 1292b 2000 ", "holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable", "holding that a motion to certify a district court order for interlocutory appeal is dispositive" ]

[ "holding that the family court abused its discretion in changing the primary residential parent and altering the parenting time schedule without making the required findings on the record in a contested custody case brought under the relocation statute ars 25408", "holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact", "holding that the lower courts findings were insufficient as a matter of law and remanding for the court to make the findings required under ars 25403", "holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the best interest of the children require the continuation of primary physical custody with defendant and secondary custody with plaintiff and the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for this court to determine whether the guidelines were followed", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child" ]

[ "holding a visual strip and visual cavity search unreasonable when done beside a police car", "holding that prison officials may conduct visual body cavity searches in a reasonable manner", "holding probable cause to be required for strip and visual body cavity searches", "holding unconstitutional city policy of subjecting all females arrested and detained to strip and visual body cavity searches", "holding unconstitutional blanket jail policy of subjecting all arrestees to strip and visual body cavity searches" ]

[ "holding limited investigative detention of defendant was justified where officer investigated a report that a panhandler at a drugstore had been creating a disturbance potentially implicating a violation of the disorderly conduct statute and defendant matched the description of the suspect", "holding officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to support traffic stop where officer received dispatch that defendant committed disorderly conduct and record check showed parked truck was registered to defendant", "holding investigative detention occurred when officer after initial inquiry exited vehicle and approached defendant because officer chose to escalate the encounter to afford greater investigation which of course is consistent with the purpose of an investigative detention", "holding traffic stop was legal where eyewitness told officer defendant kicked over parking sign and officer observed defendant yelling and gesturing in parking lot officer had at least reasonable grounds to suspect defendant of having committed disorderly conduct", "holding police officers show of authority by announcing he was a police officer and ordering defendant to stop was an investigative seizure implicating fourth amendment protections" ]

[ "holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate", "holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract", "holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission", "holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine", "holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission" ]

[ "holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage", "holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage", "holding that the employer created an erisa plan when it 1 paid for the employees insurance 2 contracted with the insurance company for coverage and eligibility requirements and 3 collected and remitted the employees dependents premiums", "holding that under bankruptcy code section 507a4 the services were an insurers provision of health insurance coverage for employees during the 180day period immediately before the petition date rather than the earlier labor by the employees on which such coverage was based", "holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed" ]

[ "holding that an officers single use of a taser was reasonable where used to subdue an arrestee who had failed to accede to repeated police commands to stop his retreat into his home", "holding that where the plaintiffs evidence supported a finding that the defendants had applied force to restrain him the jury must determine not only whether the officers were justified in using force at all but if so whether the degree of force actually used was reasonable", "holding that officers had substantial grounds for believing that some degree of force was necessary where suspect was possibly under the influence of drugs acting bizarrely trespassing and refusing repeated commands to drop a pen", "holding that the decision of a police officer to preserve public safety and order through use of commands backed by threat of force or actual use of physical force is a matter of discretion", "holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot" ]

[ "holding that where plaintiff fails to raise issue of timeliness of departments hearing at administrative level the issue is waived on appeal", "holding that by fading to timely raise the issue before the trial court the defendant had waived the right to raise the issue on appeal that the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions", "holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion", "holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal", "holding that there was no good cause to raise an untimely suppression issue where the defendant could have with due diligence discovered the information necessary to timely raise the issue" ]

[ "holding in the context of a non 212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance", "holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations", "holding that direct reliance was not shown where plaintiffs relied on third partys actions which were in turn undertaken in reliance on alleged misrepresentation by defendant", "holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense", "holding suppression of evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant is not required" ]

[ "holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where the petitioners two asylum applications differed significantly regarding past persecution", "holding that the use of a fraudulent document to escape persecution does not undermine a petitioners credibility in asylum proceedings", "holding that omissions in petitioners asylum application which go to the heart of the claim support adverse credibility finding", "holding that an adverse credibility determination is sufficient to deny asylum", "holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where inter alia the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution" ]

[ "holding weeklong suspensions do not violate the flsa", "holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa", "holding that the flsa preempted plaintiffs fraud claim", "holding under flsa", "holding that the flsa does not preempt state law contract provisions that are more generous than the flsa demands" ]

[ "holding that canine sniff not a search under the fourth amendment", "holding that a trained dogs detection of odor in a common corridor of a hotel does not contravene the fourth amendment and that the information developed from such a sniff may properly be used to support a search warrant affidavit", "holding that a canine sniff is a search for purposes of the fourth amendment", "holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest", "holding that the fourth amendment requires that a defendant be allowed an opportunity to challenge the veracity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant" ]

[ "recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "holding that knowing reliance upon the advice of a nonattorney cannot support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding", "holding that ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal proceeding may constitute a denial of due process if and to the extent that the proceeding is thereby rendered fundamentally unfair", "recognizing claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel usually must be raised in collateral proceeding", "holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate" ]

[ "holding failure to raise issue in statement of points does not forfeit it on appeal", "holding statement of points in notice of appeal sufficient", "holding that section 263405i bars this court from considering issues not appearing in a timelyfiled statement of points", "holding failure to file statement of points is no bar to appeal", "holding failure to timely file statement of points does not forfeit issues on appeal" ]

[ "holding due process claim failed because plaintiff failed to explain how confrontation and crossexamination would have changed the outcome of his hearing", "holding that partys failure to specify how his presence would have been of assistance at the hearing precluded the requisite showing of harm", "holding that a violation of a defendants constitutional right to compulsory process requires at a minimum some plausible showing of how the excluded testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense", "holding that petitioners have not established the requisite need of the highest order", "holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different" ]

[ "holding that the equitable tolling doctrine applies to the 90day period provided in 8 cfr 323bl2000 for filing motions to reopen based on new facts", "holding that fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "holding that the fourteenth amendment only applies to state action", "holding that defendant is free to claim protections of 49 cfr 39123l and west virginia common law privilege for former employer reports to prospective employers", "holding that 49 cfr 232103n only applies to unattended equipment left on a grade" ]

[ "holding that the time within which suit may be brought after disallowance of a claim by irs is not controlled by a statute of limitation as generally understood but on conditions under which the united states has consented to be sued", "holding that limitation period begins to run at the time of the breach", "holding that limitations provision of section 1821d14 of firrea is applicable to suit on note brought by fdics assignee preempts state fouryear limitations period and extends limitation period to six years", "holding that an earlier version of 11707 was not intended to operate as a statute of limitation but rather was meant to restrict the freedom of carriers to fix the period within which suit could be brought", "recognizing that under illinois law parties are free to contract for a time period within which a suit may be brought which is less than the general statute of limitation period applicable to written contracts" ]

[ "holding unequivocally that 1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment", "holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination", "holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee", "holding where corporation had acquired imputed racial identity and was direct target of discrimination it had standing to pursue 1981 claim", "holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under 1981" ]

[ "holding that the decision whether to renew a hap rests entirely with the owner and that an owner has no legal obligation to renew", "holding that this court lacked jurisdiction under 46110 for lack of finality and that the district court also lacked jurisdiction because the orders were not final and thus not ripe for review", "holding that this court lacked preliminary authority to review the district courts jurisdiction because there was no immediately appealable order before the court", "holding that the faas decision not to renew an aircraft examiners authority is nonreviewable", "holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to review the faas decision to not renew a pilot examiner designation" ]

[ "holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award", "holding that prejudgment interest should not be calculated based on a monthbymonth basis", "holding that prejudgment interest may include compound interest", "holding that prejudgment interest may inelude compound interest", "holding that prejudgment interest should not be calculated based on a paycheckbypaycheck basis" ]

[ "holding that a litigant did not waive a claim because it was the appellee in the intermediate appellate court emphasis added", "holding that an application is pending from the time it is first filed emphasis added", "holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added", "holding that the statute incorporated all the rights and obligations of the contract emphasis added", "holding that the plain meaning of the statutory language a claim refutes the defendants argument that plaintiff must allege that the anticompetitive effect gives rise to his claim emphasis added" ]

[ "holding that public policy favors the exclusion of intentional acts as contained in the mjua policy", "holding that because there were motor vehiclerelated acts of negligence and nonmotor vehiclerelated acts of negligence both involved in the same accident concurrent coverage under both the auto policy and the farm policy existed", "holding that there was no coverage because there was no occurrence within the meaning of the policy because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident or an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy", "holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe coumadin and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence", "holding that there was no evidence in the record to support appellants contention that the doctor committed a separate act of negligence by continuing to prescribe reglan and that the doctors alleged failure to correct any previous negligence does not constitute additional acts of negligence punctuation omitted" ]

[ "holding that it was not clearly established that independent contractor claiming denial of public contract because of political affiliation was protected under first amendment", "holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract in retaliation for petition was not protected by first amendment", "holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of lobbying and other political activities not protected by first amendment", "holding that first amendment prohibits government officials from discharging or threatening to discharge lowerlevel public employees based on their political affiliation", "holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment" ]

[ "recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel", "holding that harris defaulted her claim because bowen and argo had at least nine months in which to consider whether the fact that harris had been represented by so many different pretrial attorneys amounted to ineffective assistance", "holding that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be established a defendant must show that but for counsels error the outcome of his proceedings would have been different", "holding that where the record supported the district courts conclusion that statements would not have been suppressed and there had been nothing submitted on appeal to lead to a different conclusion the petitioner had not shown any resulting prejudice from the failure to file a motion to suppress and therefore had not established a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel", "holding that counsels total failure to conduct pretrial discovery constituted ineffective assistance" ]

[ "holding that a summary judgment is a determination on the merits for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes", "holding wjhile the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel may be resolved through a motion for summary judgment the trial court erred when it ventured outside the four corners of the complaint took judicial notice of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and dismissed the complaint with prejudice", "holding that in determining motion to dismiss on basis of res judicata the court could take judicial notice of all of the documents which are part of the record before it as well as the documents contained in the record before the state court without having to convert the motion to one for summary judgment", "holding that a court may not take judicial notice of separate legal proceedings on a motion to dismiss and defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel must be resolved through motion for summary judgment", "holding that res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration award" ]

[ "holding inquiry notice to be appropriate standard under lampf", "recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law", "holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion", "holding that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate where a plaintiff failed to name each of the persons alleged to have violated the appropriate standard of care", "holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion" ]

[ "holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala", "holding that hospital may be held liable for negligence of emergency room physicians under apparent agency doctrine", "holding that physicians as agents of the hospital are indistinguishable from the hospital for immunity purposes under the lgaa", "holding that a general acute care hospital may not delegate its duty to provide physicians for emergency room care because the law imposes a duty on hospital to provide that health care", "holding that a municipality may be held liable as a person under 1983" ]

[ "holding that mountaineering does not implicate the public interest", "holding that reputation alone does not implicate any liberty or property interests sufficient to trigger procedural protections of fourteenth amendment", "holding that the lack of shareholder standing under texas law does not implicate constitutional standing", "holding that allegation that discounts or payments passed from one business to another does not implicate bribery", "holding that mere negligence does not implicate the right to due process" ]

[ "holding that to institute a proper 220 action to investigate fraud the plaintiff must demonstrate a credible basis to find probable wrongdoing", "holding that in the context of a settlement contract the defrauded party may either 1 rescind the settlement or 2 ratify the settlement retain the proceeds and institute an action to recover fraud damages", "holding that the plaintiffshareholders demonstrated a credible basis for its 220 claim tjhrough the testimony of their two trial witnesses and the documents introduced as evidence regarding the actions of the corporations board of directors through evidence of suspicious expense figures", "holding that once probable cause is established officer is not required to investigate further", "holding that knowledge of a credible report from a single credible eyewitness can be sufficient to demonstrate probable cause for a warrantless arrest" ]