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CoAStaL NLP Group 31

[ "holding that certain claims could not be a class issue in part because the complaint did not mention the claims", "holding state buy american statute unconstitutional because it interfered with federal foreign affairs power emphasizing its effect on foreign commerce", "holding that kiobel did not bar ats claims against an american citizen in part because this is not a case where a foreign national is being hailed sic into an unfamiliar court to defend himself", "holding that coverage arguably existed under an insurance policy for claims against an employer and employees for an alleged assault and battery of bar patrons and that the insurer had a duty to defend", "holding nlra applied to state bank of indias activities in the united states because most employees are american citizens or american residents and the labor dispute centers on the wages to be paid american residents foreign or natural " ]

[ "recognizing that the hrpp does not permit a broad and freeranging discovery in criminal cases", "holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted", "recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position", "recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position" ]

[ "holding evidence of patients delusion that she was in military and that mail carrier was responsible for her welfare not sufficient to meet required statutory burden", "holding evidence of patients psychotic behavior delusions that she had undergone surgery by satellite and had electronics implanted in her not sufficient to meet required statutory burden", "holding evidence of patients schizophrenia auditory hallucinations paranoia irritability and refusal to take medication not sufficient to meet required statutory burden", "holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "holding evidence of patients delusion that she was pregnant and had sutures in her vagina not sufficient to meet required statutory burden" ]

[ "holding that the bankruptcy courts as compared to state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under the bankruptcy code", "holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court", "holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate", "holding that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over counterclaims asserted by the bankruptcy estate against a creditor where the claim is a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditors proof of claim in the bankruptcy emphasis added", "holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code" ]

[ "holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract", "holding statute of limitations period defined in 28 usc 2244d is subject to equitable tolling", "holding that the ica threeyear limitations period governs and unequivocally supersedes the six year limitations period in 28 usc 2501 in cases involving claims for transportation charges", "holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under 1983", "holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc 1983" ]

[ "holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed", "holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity", "holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint", "holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing", "holding that plaintiffintervenors argument was separate from plaintiffs claim because plaintiff did not challenge pertinent statute as unconstitutional even though complaint alleged that itcs determination was not in accordance with law in a number of respects including the following" ]

[ "holding defendant waived complaint", "holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing", "holding that the firsttofile rule did not bar complaint involving same defendants where firstfiled complaint did not put government on notice of a separate fraudulent scheme", "holding that failure to identify specific dates and contents of mailings was not fatal to complaint where complaint offered detailed description of defendants overall rico scheme", "holding that a defendants failure to attach process to its notice of removal was not fatal and did not require remand" ]

[ "holding that amenability hearings must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment", "holding that the facts did not measure up to the standard expressed for determining procedural due process", "holding that the defendant was denied due process because the procedural rule was not followed in any respect by the trial court", "holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure", "holding that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof violates the due process clause and that due process requires at least a clear and convincing evidence standard" ]

[ "holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged", "holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed", "holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality", "holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause", "holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs status as thirdparty beneficiaries cannot be used as both a sword to reap the benefits and a shield to protect them", "holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status", "holding that a firearm could be used both to protect the defendants spouse and to facilitate the defendants drug trafficking crimes", "holding that beneficiaries of a trust that signed an agreement with the fhlbb were not in privity or have thirdparty beneficiary status because the government did not make any promises expressly intended to benefit them", "recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract" ]

[ "recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit", "holding that pennsylvanias interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed new yorks interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant", "holding accuseds right to fair trial outweighed newsmans interest in protecting sources and privilege must yield", "recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental", "recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiffs need for information outweighed colleges interest in confidentiality" ]

[ "holding that if 506 does not apply to an allowed claim such claim cannot become a secured claim", "holding that the meaning of allowed secured claim in 506a does not determine the meaning of allowed secured claim in 506d", "holding that the words allowed secured claim in 506d refer to a claim that is secured by a lien and allowed under 502", "holding that if claim is not an allowed secured claim pursuant to section 506a by its terms section 1325a5b is inapplicable", "holding that where there was no value in the collateral to secure the claim after application of section 506a creditor did not hold a secured claim and therefore lacked basis for asserting rights under 11 usc 1325a5" ]

[ "holding that the burden however will be on the defendant to satisfy the court that he can secure the services of an attorney only if assets subject to the freeze order are released", "holding that a suspect must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires", "holding that the burden is on the plaintiff", "holding that a silent defendant has the burden to satisfy the plainerror rule", "holding forfeited theories will be reversed on appeal only if the appellant can satisfy the plain error standard" ]

[ "holding that intent is a separate element and evidence relating to intent is irrelevant to determining whether an object is a criminal instrument", "holding under section 1902a1 specific intent required as an element of section 1501 is the intent to cause the death of an individual", "holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry", "holding defendant must act with specific intent to cause death of another in order to be convicted of attempted murder", "holding intent as an essential element to an invasion of privacy by intrusion and not listing intent as a required element of invasion of privacy by publication" ]

[ "holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment", "holding that eleventh amendment bars federal suits against state courts", "holding the eleventh amendment bars suits in federal court against the state of kansas or one of its agencies", "holding that the eleventh amendment bars retrospective declaratory relief against state officials", "holding that the eleventh amendment bars blyshrl and nychrl claims against a state agency in federal court" ]

[ "holding that the commonlaw standard for negligence says nothing about whether the legislature intended that legal standard to apply to a statutory claim under the rlta", "holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict", "holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard", "holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met", "holding that the standard for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a motion to dismiss" ]

[ "holding that a company providing administrative purchasing and financial services to a hospital was not a hospital and thus could not be held directly liable under emtala", "holding that hospital did not violate emtala by failing to follow a thrombolysis protocol because by its very terms the protocol was not expressly applicable to patients in the er", "holding that emtala applies to any and all patients", "holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed", "holding that because the contract between the hospital and the health insurance company had a hold harmless provision which stated the hospital would not bill or hold insurance subscribers liable for any hospital expenses covered by the subscribers insurance contract and all expenses from the patients treatment for the automobile accident were covered in such contract there was no debt upon which the hospital could assert a lien pursuant to the states hospital lien statute" ]

[ "holding that it is error to grant relief that was not requested noticed nor litigated by any party", "holding because the district court refused to grant plaintiff reinstatement or any other injunctive relief the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other relief", "holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "holding that where the final judgment provided relief that was not requested its entry constituted reversible error", "holding that it is not" ]

[ "recognizing these five factors", "recognizing that an agency may not ignore relevant factors or considerations", "holding that such factors may constitute a substantial burden", "holding that only relevant factors must be considered", "recognizing same factors" ]

[ "holding that the rule requires a district court to balance the releasees interest in confronting an adverse witness against any proffered good cause for denying confrontation prior to admitting hearsay evidence in a revocation hearing and emphasizing that reliability is a critical factor in the balancing test", "holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing", "holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence", "holding that it was reversible error for a district court to fail to applying a balancing test before admitting oral hearsay testimony recounting a third partys allegations of sexual assault by the probationer", "recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis" ]

[ "holding that the defendants conviction for the sale of marijuana in violation of california health safety code 11360a was a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of ussg 2l12", "holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code 192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment", "holding that the position of alltime health officer for a county was not an office within the meaning of section 1467 of the code of 1907", "holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b", "holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983" ]

[ "holding that the party seeking to vacate the award has the burden of providing the court with the evidence to support its arguments", "holding that under the faa 10a arbitration panels refusal to continue hearings to allow witness to testify the only witness with evidence of fraud not found from other sources was fundamental unfairness and misconduct sufficient to vacate the award", "holding in the analogous context of a motion to vacate an arbitration award under 9 usc 12 that pjlaintiffs were required to serve notice through the united states marshal and that because the notice requirement expressly addresses the manner of serving notice of motion to vacate the federal rules of procedure relating to service are inapplicable", "holding that the three month limitation of faa 12 on a motion to vacate an award did not apply to a state court motion to vacate because the procedural aspects of the faa are confined to federal cases", "holding section 10 of faa is procedural and does not preempt state common law" ]

[ "recognizing that the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim itself and that one who asserts a claim has the burden of proof that normally comes with it", "holding that the moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence if the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial", "holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response", "recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial", "holding that to survive a motion for summary judgment a party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial" ]

[ "holding that an insurer has a duty to act with the utmost good faith towards its insured", "holding that parties to contract have an implied obligation to put forth a good faith effort to fulfill the conditions of the contract", "holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously", "holding that if a direct supervisor who had the responsibility to stop harassment knew of and failed to act against it the plaintiff has no further obligation to bring it to the employers attention", "holding that an employers obligation to an employee to act in good faith extends only to the performance of those contractual duties it has chosen to assume" ]

[ "holding that this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses because evidence is weighed by the administrative agency and not by the courts", "holding that ideas procedural requirements can only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff the state will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings", "holding that for the administrative position of the government to be substantially justified it must have a reasonable basis both in law and fact", "holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact 2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision" ]

[ "holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur", "holding that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state law that determines the outcome of the case", "holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes", "holding for 1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises", "holding that state law determines when an interest is perfected when interpreting the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy act" ]

[ "holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason", "recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error", "holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error", "holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error", "holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range" ]

[ "recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts", "holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth", "holding that school boards in alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity", "holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment", "holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity" ]

[ "recognizing possible conflict between the cases", "recognizing conflict between circuits", "recognizing conflict", "recognizing the conflict", "recognizing conflict between interests of the highest order" ]

[ "holding that petitioner must establish that she suffers from a vaccinerelated injury not merely a symptom or manifestation of an unknown injury", "holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act", "holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact 2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision", "holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain" ]

[ "holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence", "recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence", "holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify", "holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense", "holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence" ]

[ "holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine", "holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted", "recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad", "holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity" ]

[ "holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages", "holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted", "holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded", "holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court", "holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted" ]

[ "holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection", "holding that failure to demonstrate a causal connection is fatal to a 1983 cause of action", "holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint", "holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection", "holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two" ]

[ "holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance", "holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest", "holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees", "holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident", "holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer" ]

[ "holding new trial required after judges ex parte communication with jury in response to jury question during deliberations because there was no way of reaching a conclusion about what transpired other than by adopting the judges recollection", "holding that a defendant did not waive his right to be present at an ex parte encounter between the judge and juror because he was not present at the time of the communication and therefore had no opportunity to object when the error was committed", "holding that judges ex parte communication telling a jury it needed to reach a verdict was reversible error without any discussion of harmlessness", "recognizing the hazards of ex parte communication with a deliberating jury", "recognizing that cases holding that proof of venue is jurisdictional are inconsistent with ex parte seymour and have therefore been overruled" ]

[ "holding that admission of a witness prior identification statement where the witness could not remember the basis for the identification did not violate the confrontation clause or fedrevid 802", "holding that the admission of prior testimony that had been subjected to crossexamination violated the confrontation clause because the state did not prove that the witness was unavailable", "holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness", "holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination", "holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause" ]

[ "holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview", "holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "holding that appellants complaint on appeal that the environment was coercive did not change the fact that he was not in custody when he voluntarily went to the police station was told several times he could leave and did leave after the interrogation", "holding that a defendant who voluntarily rode to the station with officers in a police car waited in a lobby with unlocked external doors and was told more than once he was not under arrest was not in custody", "holding that a defendant who was told several times he was not under arrest and who never asked to leave during an interview with investigators was not in custody" ]

[ "holding that prosecutors statements regarding his opinion as to the truthfulness of a defense witness considering the evidence against the defendant did not reach the level of the grossly improper statements which would require the trial court to correct them ex mero motu", "holding that erroneous admission of improper and prejudicial evidence did not require reversal because the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant even without the prejudicial testimony", "holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero motu to prevent closing argument by the prosecutor that the defendant lied during his testimony", "holding that the prosecutors repeated comments that the defendant could have denied knowledge of the drugs or rebutted the trafficking charge by testifying were so prejudicial as to constitute plain error", "holding that the prosecutors argument attacking the integrity of defense counsel was of such gross impropriety as to justify ex mero mo tu correction however in light of the strong and convincing case against the defendant we could not hold that the prosecutrixs improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial as to require a new trial" ]

[ "holding trial court could have found startling event or condition was declarants sustaining an injury or the pain she later experienced", "holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence", "holding that a lower court properly admitted a fouryear olds hearsay statement although she made it 1215 hours after the startling event", "holding that statement must be product of a startling event", "holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective" ]

[ "holding that defense counsels failure to appear at hearing was excusable neglect where secretary accidentally identified the hearing as cancelled", "holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error", "holding that appearance at the scheduled hearing demonstrates actual notice of the hearing", "holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits", "holding that a traffic ticket that required a plaintiff to appear at hearing and answer to charges was not a seizure" ]

[ "holding legislatures intent is determined from plain and common meaning of words used", "holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent", "holding that it is presumed that no change in the commonlaw was intended by the legislatures enactment of a statute on the same subject unless the language employed clearly indicates such an intention", "holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent", "holding that under mcl 5003204 etseq rjescission is insufficiently similar to cancellation to support the conclusion that the legislatures enactment of a statute controlling cancellation of an automobile insurance policy without mentioning rescission demonstrates the legislatures intent to preclude rescission" ]

[ "holding that the district courts failure to enumerate specific issues for review in a coa does not deprive us of appellate jurisdiction", "holding the scope of appellate review of denial of a habeas petition limited to the issues on which coa has been granted", "holding that on appeal from the denial of a 2255 motion appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa", "holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa", "holding that appellate review in a habeas ease is limited to the issues specified in the coa" ]

[ "holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel", "recognizing a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver of constitutional rights by counsel although certain fundamental rights require personal waiver by defendant", "recognizing conditions of release may curtail certain fundamental rights", "holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so", "recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary" ]

[ "holding that the defendant was denied wrongfully his right to crossexamine on the issue of whether the device was designed as a pipe bomb or as a firecracker and that the jury may have found reasonable doubt if that right was not denied", "holding that under 111 the defendants knowledge of the official status of the victim is generally irrelevant", "holding that where the proffered hearsay statement of the victim pertained to a memory of the previous days events and was offered solely for the purpose of proving such events such statement was not admissible under rule 8033", "holding the same where the defendant offered exculpatory and irrelevant interpretations of transactions and events deflected responsibility denied or discounted relevant conduct portrayed himself as a victim of unfair government treatment and generally denied or minimized his culpability at the sentencing hearing", "holding that where the defendant pleaded guilty subsequently denied his guilt and attempted to withdraw his plea and then attempted to minimize the significance of his statements at sentencing by averring that he accepted responsibility for the amount that me and the government have agreed to and offering a statement accepting responsibility were insufficient to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility" ]

[ "holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured", "holding that a sale must be both fair and reasonable in price and made in good faith", "holding that proof must show that both the party rendering the service and the one receiving it expected and understood that compensation would be made", "holding that the opposing party must show substantial harm", "holding to warrant reversal the appellant must show both the error of the ruling and resulting prejudice" ]

[ "holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling", "holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle ", "holding that insurance provisions excluding damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles subject to registration and damage arising out of the use of land motor vehicles if the injury or damage occurs away from the insured premises were ambiguous because together they could be read in four different ways", "holding that a summons directed to the commissioner of motor vehicles was defective process as against a nonresident defendant in an action arising out of operation of a motor vehicle in this state", "recognizing that in 1982 kentucky converted to a new title system for motor vehicles under which the secured creditor must perfect its security interest by noting the lien on the certificate of title to the motor vehicle" ]

[ "holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power to santion attorneys for violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom ", "holding that the issuing court necessarily has the power to enforce a protective order it issued at any point it is in effect even after entry of a final judgment and courts enjoy the inherent power to modify any discovery related orders postjudgment", "recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it", "holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances", "recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals" ]

[ "holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr 3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service", "recognizing cause of action for wrongful death", "holding physician statement that veterans death may or may not have been averted if medical personnel had been able to intubate him a procedure complicated by his serviceconnected injuries insufficient to well ground claim for service connection for veterans cause of death", "holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child", "holding that action for wrongful death may generally not be maintained where death was selfinflicted" ]

[ "holding that the domesticrelations exception prevented the plaintiff from challenging in federal court the constitutionality of the statecourt judges decision to consider certain assets and property when calculating the plaintiffs husbands income for the purposes of determining alimony payments because the plaintiff ultimately wanted this court to enjoin the state court from using property to determine the amount of alimony owed", "holding that fraud creates an exception to the rule", "holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud", "holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred", "holding that the domesticrelations exception barred federal adjudication of a statelaw fraud action because the plaintiff essentially sought a modification of the process in the divorce decree relating to distribution" ]

[ "holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired", "holding that rule 60b1 motion may not be brought after time for appeal has run", "holding that motions for relief from judgment or order brought under federal rule of civil procedure 60b1 provide means for a district court to correct legal errors by the court internal citation omitted", "holding that district court abused its discretion in denying rule 60b1 motion without conducting equitable analysis", "holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied" ]

[ "recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important", "holding that the most critical factor in the analysis of a reasonable fee is the degree of success obtained", "holding that status as a prevailing party does not by itself entitle a plaintiff to attorneys fees rather the most critical factor in determining a fee awards reasonableness is the degree of success obtained emphasis added", "holding that the quantity of relief obtained as compared to what the plaintiff sought to achieve are key elements in determining the degree of success", "holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee " ]

[ "holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman", "holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy", "holding that the prior conspiracy to which honken had pleaded guilty was not the same as the conspiracy underlying the capital offenses", "holding that res judicata barred conspiracy claim against defendant even though defendant had not been a party to the prior action because the civil conspiracy claim should have been adjudicated in a prior action and defendant as an alleged participant in the conspiracy would have been indispensable party to that adjudication", "holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges" ]

[ "holding that attorneys fees would include expenses for computerized legal research and thus not allowing computerized legal research as a separate taxable cost", "holding that computeraided research like any other form of legal research is a component of attorneys fees and cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost in addition to the attorneys fee award", "holding that the costs of computerized research was a component of attorneys fees that cannot be independently taxed as an item of cost", "holding that based on leftwich the law of this circuit is that computerbased legal research must be factored into the attorneys hourly rate hence the cost of the computer time may not be added to the fee award", "holding that the costs of computerized research should be characterized not as taxable costs but as attorneys fees" ]

[ "holding dollar amount is not an essential element", "holding that damage to the property of another is an essential element of the offense of criminal mischief", "recognizing that an essential element of criminal trespass is a showing that entry onto the premises had previously been expressly forbidden", "holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case", "holding that causation is an essential element in failure to warn claim" ]

[ "holding that statement that declarant saw defendant outside was admissible under rule 8081 because the statement explained an event or condition", "holding that testimonial evidence is admissible only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the declarant", "holding in a criminal case that a statement by an unavailable declarant was not admissible as a declaration against his penal interest and was not admissible under rule 804b5 either", "holding that an inculpatory statement by a declarant was not reliable when he viewed the defendant like an older brother providing a motivation to lie the statement was made only to defense investigators and not to prosecutors the declarant was not under oath had not been read his miranda rights and was not represented by counsel and the declarant ultimately recanted his admission", "holding that the admission of testimonial statements against a defendant is unconstitutional when the declarant does not appear at trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination" ]

[ "holding that a motion to intervene to assert the publics first amendment right of access to criminal proceedings is proper", "recognizing that first amendment provides qualified right of access to judicial documents", "holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case", "holding that a disqualification order in a criminal case is not appealable", "holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case" ]

[ "holding that it is improper to exercise general jurisdiction when defendants purchases combined with its sales in the forum yielded 129 of its total income", "holding that mandamus is only available to confine an inferior comt to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so", "holding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion by stating that it did not have the ability to present the transcript to the jury", "holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment", "recognizing the supreme courts longstanding jurisdiction over writs of prohibition and mandamus to courts of inferior jurisdiction" ]

[ "holding that the citizen suit notice requirements cannot be avoided by employing a flexible or pragmatic construction and that plaintiffs suit must be dismissed where plaintiff had not strictly complied with the notice requirements", "holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute", "holding that even though the government had not strictly complied with the statutory requirements the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because they failed to challenge that noncompliance in a prompt fashion", "holding notice provision in rcra and clean water act are virtually identical and citizens notice to violators under either act must strictly comply with statutory notice requirements", "holding that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit under the citizen suit provision of the caa" ]

[ "holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service", "holding that where the plaintiff made no attempt to contact the defendant by telephone or through his known attorneys service by publication was improper", "holding that the plaintiff did not complete service when she made no attempt to serve the defendant within the time required by the arkansas procedural rules", "holding that discretionary review was improper in part because the party made no attempt to demonstrate why his case qualifies as one of these rare cases", "holding that the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the improper juror contact occurred and only if the contact is established must the government demonstrate absence of prejudice" ]

[ "holding that corporation and sole owner of corporation were separate legal entities and corporation was not party to contract signed by owner in individual capacity", "holding that closely held corporation and its sole shareholder are distinct for purposes of federal racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations act", "holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder", "holding shareholder of dissolved corporation could after windup period expired foreclose on mortgage once held by corporation", "holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets" ]

[ "holding that department does not have independent authority to impose device in absence of court order", "recognizing that an order reopening a closed case was simply a mechanical device that did not afford or deny the debtors any affirmative relief", "holding that court lacked jurisdiction on appeal from injunction because the order was simply an interpretation of an earlier order", "recognizing laches as an affirmative defense", "recognizing that a defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford" ]

[ "holding that an inn which was a subentity of the tribe rather than a separate corporate entity enjoyed tribal immunity", "holding that disputes involving questions of interpretation of a tribal constitution and tribal law is not within the jurisdiction of the district court", "holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interpret a tribal constitution or tribal laws", "holding that the tribes housing authority was exempt from the adea a general statute because the tribal entity was not just a business but also functioned as an arm of tribal government by providing housing to tribe members", "holding that a tribal housing authority established by tribal council pursuant to its powers of selfgovernment was a tribal agency rather than a separate corporate entity created by the tribe" ]

[ "recognizing but disapproving reserved jurisdiction approach to pension valuation and distribu tion", "recognizing that some states it should be noted have adopted a hybrid approach", "holding that the clause at issue granted jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction", "holding order in dependency proceeding was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and support issues", "holding order was nonfinal where order reserved jurisdiction to determine integrallyrelated visitation and child support issues" ]

[ "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case", "holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice", "holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion", "holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing", "holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form" ]

[ "holding that minority tolling statute did not apply to extend time provided under corporate survival statute", "holding that tolling statute applicable to those disabled by minority or mental illness continues to operate regardless of guardians appointment", "holding that rule 60b was not applicable to extend the time to file an action to revoke a discharge under grounds of mistake and not addressing equitable tolling", "holding that because purpose of tolling statute is to remedy problem of locating a nonresident defendant before expiration of statute of limitations tolling statute does not apply to adverse possession action because of statutory scheme allowing for service by publication on parties outside state in such actions", "recognizing that the dead mans statute is a survival from an earlier and much broader incompetency statute and characterizing its survival as deplorable" ]

[ "holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture", "holding that despite petitioners inability to establish habeas relief under cat because evidence did not support finding that colombian government would acquiesce to torture by drug cartel petitioner was entitled to relief under statecreated danger exception", "holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief", "holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture", "holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment" ]

[ "holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees", "holding that a district courts combined order and judgment did not satisfy the rule on account of being fifteen pages long and containing detailed legal analysis along with citations in addition to providing for entry of judgment", "holding that a district courts summary judgment order did not meet rule 58s requirements because it was fifteen pages long and it contained detailed legal analysis and reasoning", "holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner", "holding that the rule 12b6 ruling was not a final judgment and did not bind the district court at summary judgment" ]

[ "holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances", "holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal", "holding that article iii courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists", "holding the following claims to be frivolous 6673 infringes upon first amendment right to petition tax court cannot have jurisdiction because it is not an article iii court", "holding that the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to adjudicate common law claims violated article iii without deciding the claims" ]

[ "holding entry of guilty plea waives challenges to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea emphasis added", "holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional", "holding that a complaints reference to a guilty plea does not make the transcript of the plea proffer integral to the complaint", "holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea", "recognizing that a voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea" ]

[ "holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims", "recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule", "holding claimant did not have to segregate fees between fraud and contract claims because both claims were based on the same set of facts and circumstances", "holding that sovereign immunity also applies to cross claims and third party claims", "holding that the public harm requirement applies to fraudulent inducement claims because the fraud claims arise from related contract claims" ]

[ "holding that the measure of damages of converted property is the market value at the time of conversion", "holding that testimony by the owners expert to the value of trees on appropriated property was properly admitted to rebut or impeach testimony by the appropriating agencys expert that the trees had no value in terms of their effect on the propertys market value", "holding that the state is obligated to pay property owners when it regulates private property under its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively deprives the owner of the economically viable use of that property", "holding that a takings claimant must show that the invasion appropriated a benefit to the government at the expense of the property owner at least by preempting the property owners right to enjoy its property for an extended period of time rather than merely by inflicting an injury that reduces the propertys value", "holding that the property owners testimony alone placed the value of the stolen property above the amount necessary to constitute grand larceny" ]

[ "holding when defamatory statement involved issue of public concern that private individual was required to prove actual malice to recover presumed or punitive damages against media defendant", "holding that defendant who placed private figure in a false light was not entitled to heightened protection of actual malice standard and could instead be found liable on showing of negligence", "holding plaintiff failed to present evidence of actual malice because defendants explanation of the mistaken statement shows negligence but no more than that", "holding under federal law that public figure claiming iied based on defamatory nature of speech must prove actual malice", "holding failure to investigate before publishing is not sufficient to prove actual malice" ]

[ "holding that construction that neutralizes any provision of a contract should not be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions", "holding courts may not consider any single provision taken in isolation as controlling but must consider all provisions in context of entire instrument", "holding that in construing an instrument any apparently conflicting expressions should be reconciled if possible so as to give full effect to all provisions contained in the instrument", "holding that statutes must be read so as to give effect to all statutory language", "holding that contracts should be interpreted to give effect to all provisions" ]

[ "holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment", "holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding", "holding that this court has power to direct the entry of summary judgment when it would be just under the circumstances", "holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003", "holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages" ]

[ "holding the jurys finding of a special circumstance with automatic review by the trial judge and the california supreme court sufficiently limits the risk of arbitrariness and capriciousness without comparative proportionality review", "holding the issue of recusal of the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review must be raised in the trial court", "holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions", "holding that it was error for the trial judge to answer a jurys question without giving defendants counsel an opportunity to be heard before the trial judge responded", "holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law" ]

[ "holding that subcontractor could recover damages from general contractor for delay in performance under state law", "holding that a plaintiff may proceed with a claim against the state for breach of contract only where the state implicitly waives its sovereign immunity by expressly entering into a valid contract through an agent of the state expressly authorized by law to enter into such contract", "holding that the united states may bring suit against a state to enforce compliance with federal law", "holding that state liability only accrues as expressly authorized by law", "holding that states may expressly grant indirect purchasers the right to recover under state law" ]

[ "holding that a plaintiff cannot be denied a new trial for failing to establish sufficient proof to meet a standard which at the time of trial did not exist", "holding petitioners failure to present any witnesses or submit the trial record into evidence at hearing led to conclusion that petitioner did not meet his burden of proof for postconviction relief", "holding that where movant alleged the names of uncalled witnesses and them anticipated testimony which would have been relevant mitigation evidence in the penalty phase but did not allege that trial counsel knew of the witnesses or that the witnesses were available to testify at trial the movant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction relief motion because he did not allege facts sufficient to satisfy the standard applicable to his claim", "holding that the district court properly denied petitioners request for an evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling where the petitioner filed several petitions for postconviction relief containing the same arguments presented in his federal habeas petition", "recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial" ]

[ "holding that lower courts application of a some effort standard was an abuse of discretion", "recognizing that we review the sentence imposed by a district court under the abuse of discretion standard", "holding the district courts conclusion that the attorney should receive no compensation was an abuse of discretion because we are confident that some legitimate time was expended by the attorney", "holding that where an attorney serves as trustee and attorney for the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding the attorney must distinguish time spent in each role", "holding that under the extraordinary circumstances found by the district court it was not an abuse of discretion to order that defendants be permitted to take depositions of the witnesses in the presence of their attorney and the governments counsel" ]

[ "holding that a disclaimer in contract consumers eventually signed was inadequate to overcome deceptive representations in defendants advertisements", "holding that a standard form disclaimer for negligence of thirdparty tour operators which appeared on plaintiffs cruise ticket was valid as a disclaimer", "holding inconspicuous written disclaimer to be unenforceable absent actual knowledge of the disclaimer", "holding that representations in a product bulletin created an express warranty inconsistent with disclaimer contained therein which was thereby inoperable", "holding similar language to be a valid disclaimer" ]

[ "holding that a notice of appeal filed when an appeal bond is required to perfect is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper without first affording an opportunity to correct the defective perfection of appeal", "holding that notice of appeal filed under the wrong docket number is a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and that the court of appeals dismissal was improper", "holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal after an untimely filing of a notice of appeal", "holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed", "holding that prejudice should be presumed where counsel filed notice of appeal but failed to perfect the direct appeal" ]

[ "holding that where a juror did not disclose that she knew someone who had been sexually abused the conviction and sentence must be reversed", "holding that evidence of the same name the fact that the previous conviction occurred in precinct of defendants residence and that although the defendant testified he did not deny that he was the person described in the record of the previous conviction was sufficient to establish identity", "holding that a venire person who knew of the defendants prior conviction of the same offense for which he was being retried could not sit as a juror", "holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction", "holding that where defense turned on defendants credibility there could be no strategic basis for allowing jury to hear defendant had prior conviction for same offense for which he was being tried and concluding counsel rendered ineffective assistance" ]

[ "holding that an injury occurring in a parking lot which was leased but not controlled by an employer was compensable because the employer instructed its employees to park in that lot", "holding landowner had duty to provide security in parking lot to protect its invitees from criminal acts of third parties", "holding that claimant was entitled to workers compensation because he was injured in a parking lot which was leased by his employer", "holding that injury in a parking lot did not occur on a covered situs", "holding that jury could conclude from prior incidents involving breaches of the peace that the assault in the parking lot was a significant foreseeable possibility which defendant had a duty to guard against" ]

[ "holding that the defendant countys two denials of variance permits under the circumstances had to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of the religious institution being able to construct a temple in the future thus imposing a substantial burden on the religious institutions religious exercise", "holding that religious exercise is any exercise of religion whether or not compelled by or central to a system of religious belief and that the use building or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered religious exercise", "holding that exclusion of religious groups from universitys open forum policy violated the first amendment", "holding exempt under ors 307130 which relates to other charitable institutions a building that was used as an office for a religious official and religious court and a printing press for a religious publication", "holding that limitations placed upon the religious activities of two prison groups found to be religious organizations were reasonable under the circumstances" ]

[ "recognizing absolute immunity to suits under 42 usc 1988", "holding that suits under 42 usc 1983 do not override state immunity", "holding that person in 42 usc 1983 does not include states", "recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc 1983 and suits under united states constitution", "holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983" ]

[ "holding that defamation standing alone is not sufficient to establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest citations omitted", "holding that merely declining to rehire a person did not constitute defamation for deprivation of liberty interest purposes absent any charges against the good name or reputation of that person", "holding doma was unconstitutional as a deprivation of liberty of the person protected by the fifth amendment", "holding that members of the city council in their official capacity are not immune from a section 1983 suit against the municipality for deprivation of liberty interest in reputation without due process", "holding that police officers have a qualified privilege against defamation claims for reporting the fact that a person was arrested and the charges for which the person is being held" ]

[ "holding that a prisoners allegations that a corrections officer retaliated against the prisoner for the prisoners report charging the officer with misconduct properly stated a claim for retaliation noting that aji allegation of retaliation should not be ignored simply because the charge was later dismissed ", "recognizing first amendment retaliation right", "recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance", "holding that summary judgment was inappropriate on first amendment claim where prisoner submitted affidavits by other prisoners which inferred that the defendants statements suggested he had filed disciplinary reports against plaintiff in retaliation for eailier litigation", "holding that appellant had submitted sufficient evidence of racebased retaliation to survive summary judgment on his 1981 claim" ]

[ "holding that state attorney general as member of executive department may assert claim of executive privilege", "recognizing privilege", "recognizing privilege under federal rules", "recognizing as a matter of law executive privilege for governor", "recognizing in the context of discussing executive privilege that law enforcement documents disclosing investigative techniques or sources should be minimized" ]

[ "holding that retaliatory discharge based solely on protected speech by ones spouse is actionable under the first amendment", "recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act", "holding that it is clearly established that retaliation against private citizens for exercising their first amendment rights is actionable", "recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge", "holding that retaliatory discharge is a clearly established first amendment violation" ]

[ "holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation", "recognizing that the statute of limitations for a survival action began to run on the date of the decedents injury as though he was bringing his own lawsuit", "holding that limitations period began to run when flooding occurred not when plaintiffs learned city had been on notice of flooding potential and had fraudulent motive", "holding statute of limitations began to run when plaintiffclient learned attorney negligently drafted contract not later when plaintiff lost on merits defending contract in lawsuit", "holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run" ]

[ "holding that texasbased organization was subject to general jurisdiction in florida because it solicited contributions from florida residents using internet websites", "holding that texasbased organization was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in florida even though it did not maintain office or have any employees or agents in florida on a regular basis personal jurisdiction was ultimately exerted because organization solicited contributions from florida residents using local television stations and internet websites", "holding defendant had requisite contacts under section 481932 florida statutes where it solicited consulting and other services from a florida corporation in which a substantial amount of the services sought by defendant were performed in florida", "holding that general jurisdiction existed where defendant directed significant advertisement towards residents of florida targeting the populous florida market solicited donations from floridians and had ongoing relationship with several florida animal aid organization including arrangements under which it regularly transferred animals to them for adoption in florida", "holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree" ]

[ "holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime", "holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney", "holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation", "holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity", "holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation" ]

[ "holding that where the murder and robbery occurred in one county but the plan was hatched in another county and the body was subsequently returned to that other county both counties had jurisdiction to try the appellant", "holding that the grant county prosecutor had a statutory duty to be legal advisor to the county clerk even though she was not embroiled in litigation in which the county was the real party in interest", "recognizing county officers as those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions ", "holding that no contractual obligation was created and county was not required to refrain from amending personnel benefits resolution stating that county never promised the permanence of the disputed benefits ", "holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county" ]

[ "holding that an ordinance passed for the health and comfort of the community that prohibited brickmaking in a designated area was a valid exercise of police power", "holding general statutes 1466 a requiring licensing to engage in operating wrecker for purpose of towing valid exercise of police power", "holding that limiting to two the number of dogs kept per residential unit was not an unreasonable exercise of police power", "holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation", "holding that the exercise of police power was valid where an owner was prohibited from operating a liveiy stable business that was not a nuisance per se" ]

[ "holding that in a proceeding to recover taxes from a nonbankrupt taxpayer the taxpayer has the burden of proving that his taxes complied with the internal revenue code", "holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision", "recognizing that the statute of limitations provision of the aedpa is an affirmative defenses rather than jurisdictional", "holding that interest accruing on an overpayment of taxes attributable to an unused excess profits credit carryback was governed by a specific provision of the internal revenue code rather than by a general provision", "holding that general obligation to pay money under a disputed provision of the tax code was not a taking" ]

[ "holding that a termination of a government contract does not constitute a taking of the plaintiffs property without just compensation or without due process of law", "holding that a purely financial exaction does not constitute a taking", "holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action", "holding that overflights can constitute a taking", "holding that a cause of action for an unconstitutional taking accrues at the time the taking occurs" ]

[ "holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria", "holding that statistical disparity plus other indicia of past discrimination constitute sufficient remedial predicate", "holding in the discrimination context that a plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination", "holding that an anonymous tip must have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and frisk", "holding that a thirtyone month delay could be outweighed by other indicia of reliability" ]

[ "holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c", "holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a", "holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief", "holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina 212c", "holding that iiriras repeal of ina 212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of 212c relief" ]

[ "holding that a presumptive partial disability exists by virtue of the order to suspend compensation the employer can eliminate liability only by offering suitable work", "holding that claims actionable only by virtue of the nlra are preempted", "holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada", "holding that a district court only has jurisdiction to order compliance with compensation orders entered by an administrative law judge alj and reviewed by the benefits review board and to screen for procedural defects but may not otherwise affirm modify suspend or set aside a compensation order based on the substantive merits of the aljs decision", "holding that where the employer discontinues a specially created job the employer must offer another suitable job to the claimant or continue total disability payments" ]

[ "holding that attorneys fees awards are available under 1988 for frivolous actions", "holding that interim awards of attorneys fees are inappropriate where the only relief obtained is a preliminary injunction which may be subsequently overturned on the merits", "holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction", "holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal", "holding that a preliminary injunction reversed on appeal does not support an award of attorneys fees" ]