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CoAStaL NLP Group 27

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

116 As regards the confidentiality of the evidence, it must be noted that that argument has been relied on for the first time at the stage of the appeal. As it is, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (judgment in Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

62007CJ0514

Kingdom of Sweden v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) and European Commission (C-514/07 P), Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v European Commission (C-528/07 P) and European Commission v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) (C-532/07 P).

126. As it is, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (see Case C-266/97 P VBA v VGB and Others [2000] ECR I‑2135, paragraph 79; and Case C‑167/04 P JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 114; and, to that effect, the order of 21 January 2010 in Case C‑150/09 P Iride and Iride Energia v Commission , paragraphs 73 and 74).

2010-09-21

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

2016-02-18

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

62013CJ0630

Issam Anbouba v Council of the European Union.

46. In that regard, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning the acts at issue, in order to review whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support those acts, is substantiated (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73).

2015-04-21

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62013CJ0605

Issam Anbouba v Council of the European Union.

45. In that regard, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning the acts at issue, in order to review whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support those acts, is substantiated (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73).

2015-04-21

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

49 As regards pleas alleging a manifest error of assessment or a breach of the general principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the question whether a State entity is entitled to invoke them is one that relates to the merits of the case (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 51, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 51).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

51. C’est dès lors à bon droit que le Tribunal a considéré, au point 45 de l’arrêt attaqué, que l’argumentation relative à la possibilité, pour Kala Naft, d’invoquer les protections et les garanties liées aux droits fondamentaux ne concernait pas la recevabilité du recours ni même d’un moyen, mais avait trait au fond du litige.

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

71 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 75).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

71. En particulier, un acte faisant grief est suffisamment motivé dès lors qu’il est intervenu dans un contexte connu de l’intéressé, qui lui permet de comprendre la portée de la mesure prise à son égard (arrêt Conseil/Bamba, précité, point 54).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

46 It must be pointed out that the action brought by Bank Saderat Iran falls within the scope of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 50, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 48).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

50. Ainsi que l’a relevé M. l’avocat général au point 59 de ses conclusions, le recours de Kala Naft s’inscrivait dans le cadre de l’article 275, second alinéa, TFUE. Cette société avait la qualité pour contester, devant le juge de l’Union, son inscription sur la liste figurant dans les actes litigieux, cette inscription la concernant directement et individuellement au sens de l’article 263, quatrième alinéa, TFUE. Son intérêt à agir ne pouvait, de ce fait, être contesté.

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62012CJ0348

Council of the European Union v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran.

73. Par ailleurs, l’effectivité du contrôle juridictionnel garanti par l’article 47 de la Charte exige également que le juge de l’Union s’assure que la décision, qui revêt une portée individuelle pour la personne ou l’entité concernée, repose sur une base factuelle suffisamment solide. Cela implique une vérification des faits allégués dans l’exposé des motifs qui sous-tend ladite décision, de sorte que le contrôle juridictionnel ne soit pas limité à l’appréciation de la vraisemblance abstraite des motifs invoqués, mais porte sur le point de savoir si ces motifs, ou, à tout le moins, l’un d’eux considéré comme suffisant en soi pour soutenir cette même décision, sont étayés (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 119).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

119 As the Court has held, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244, and Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

62005CJ0402

Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

241. The Court of First Instance rightly held in paragraphs 184 to 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat that the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the contested regulation are expressly named in Annex I thereto, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 249 EC or that it is not to be classified as a regulation.

2008-09-03

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

120 It is the individual nature of those acts which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits natural and legal persons to have access to the Courts of the European Union (judgment in Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 57). However, the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the regulation at issue are expressly named, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU or that it is not to be classified as a ‘regulation’ (judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 241).

62005CJ0402

Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

241. The Court of First Instance rightly held in paragraphs 184 to 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat that the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the contested regulation are expressly named in Annex I thereto, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 249 EC or that it is not to be classified as a regulation.

2008-09-03

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

119 As the Court has held, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244, and Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

62005CJ0402

Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

244. As the Court of First Instance quite rightly held in paragraphs 186 and 188 of Yusuf and Al Barakaat , that prohibition is addressed to whoever might actually hold the funds or economic resources in question.

2008-09-03

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

119 As the Court has held, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244, and Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

62005CJ0402

Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

242. In fact, while it is true that the contested regulation imposes restrictive measures on the persons and entities whose names appear in the exhaustive list that constitutes Annex I thereto, a list which is, moreover, regularly amended by the removal or addition of names, so that it is kept in line with the summary list, the fact remains that the persons to whom it is addressed are determined in a general and abstract manner.

2008-09-03

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

119 As the Court has held, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244, and Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

62005CJ0402

Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities.

243. The contested regulation, like Resolution 1390 (2002) which it is designed to put into effect, lays down a prohibition, worded exceptionally broadly, of making available funds and economic resources to those persons or entities (see, to that effect, Möllendorf and Möllendorf-Niehuus , paragraphs 50 to 55).

2008-09-03

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

99 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 110).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

120. To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent European Union authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see, by analogy, ZZ , paragraph 59).

2013-07-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

72 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 76).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

116. Lastly, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the individual concerned (see, to that effect, Al‑Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraph 141), the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circum s tances, not least when the reasons stated for the European Union measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the individual concerned must be subject to restrictive measures (see, to that effect, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al‑Aqsa , paragraphs 140 and 142, and Council v Bamba , paragraphs 49 to 53).

2013-07-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

100 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 111).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

123. If the competent European Union authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them, namely, in this case, the indications contained in the narrative summary of reasons provided by the Sanctions Committee, the observations and exculpatory evidence that may have been produced by the person concerned and the response of the competent European Union authority to those observations. If that material is insufficient to allow a finding that a reason is well founded, the Courts of the European Union shall disregard that reason as a possible basis for the contested decision to list or maintain a listing.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

119. The effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter also requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to list or to maintain the listing of a given person in Annex I to Regulation No 881/2002 (the Kadi judgment, paragraph 336), the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually (see, to that effect, the judgment of 23 April 2013 in Joined Cases C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P Gbagbo and Others v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 56), is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis (see, to that effect, Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraph 68). That entails a verification of the allegations factored in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision (see to that effect, E and F , paragraph 57), with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

72 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 76).

62010CJ0584

European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi.

118. The Courts of the European Union must, further, determine whether the competent European Union authority has complied with the procedural safeguards set out in paragraphs 111 to 114 of this judgment and the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU, as mentioned in paragraph 116 of this judgment, and, in particular, whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific.

2013-07-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

100 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 111).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

68. Si l’autorité compétente de l’Union est dans l’impossibilité d’accéder à la demande du juge de l’Union, il appartient alors à ce dernier de se fonder sur les seuls éléments qui lui ont été communiqués, à savoir, en l’occurrence, la motivation de l’acte attaqué, les observations et les éléments à décharge éventuellement produits par la personne concernée ainsi que la réponse de l’autorité compétente de l’Union à ces observations. Si ces éléments ne permettent pas de constater le bien-fondé d’un motif, le juge de l’Union écarte ce dernier en tant que support de la décision d’inscription ou de maintien de l’inscription en cause (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 123).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

99 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 110).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

65. À cette fin, il incombe au juge de l’Union de procéder à cet examen en demandant, le cas échéant, à l’autorité compétente de l’Union de produire des informations ou des éléments de preuve, confidentiels ou non, pertinents aux fins d’un tel examen (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 120 et jurisprudence citée).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62012CJ0280

Council of the European Union v Fulmen and Fereydoun Mahmoudian.

64. L’effectivité du contrôle juridictionnel garanti par l’article 47 de la Charte exige notamment que le juge de l’Union s’assure que la décision, qui revêt une portée individuelle pour la personne ou l’entité concernée, repose sur une base factuelle suffisamment solide. Cela implique une vérification des faits allégués dans l’exposé des motifs qui sous-tend ladite décision, de sorte que le contrôle juridictionnel ne soit pas limité à l’appréciation de la vraisemblance abstraite des motifs invoqués, mais porte sur le point de savoir si ces motifs, ou, à tout le moins, l’un d’eux considéré comme suffisant en soi pour soutenir cette même décision, sont étayés (voir arrêt Kadi II, point 119).

2013-11-28

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

119 As the Court has held, regulations requiring the funds of designated persons and entities to be frozen resemble both measures of general application, in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making funds and economic resources available to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes, and a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, judgments in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraphs 241 to 244, and Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 56).

62011CJ0478

Laurent Gbagbo (C‑478/11 P), Katinan Justin Koné (C‑479/11 P), Akissi Danièle Boni-Claverie (C‑480/11 P), Alcide Djédjé (C‑481/11 P) and Affi Pascal N’Guessan (C‑482/11 P) v Council of the European Union.

56. That situation is a consequence of the particular nature of the contested measures, which at the same time resemble both measures of general application in that they impose on a category of addressees determined in a general and abstract manner a prohibition on, inter alia, making available funds and economic resources to persons and entities named in the lists contained in their annexes and also a bundle of individual decisions affecting those persons and entities (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑6351, paragraphs 241 to 244).

2013-04-23

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

120 It is the individual nature of those acts which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits natural and legal persons to have access to the Courts of the European Union (judgment in Gbagbo and Others v Council, C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 57). However, the fact that the persons and entities who are the subject of the restrictive measures imposed by the regulation at issue are expressly named, so that they appear to be directly and individually concerned by it within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, does not mean that that act is not of general application within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 288 TFEU or that it is not to be classified as a ‘regulation’ (judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission, C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 241).

62011CJ0478

Laurent Gbagbo (C‑478/11 P), Katinan Justin Koné (C‑479/11 P), Akissi Danièle Boni-Claverie (C‑480/11 P), Alcide Djédjé (C‑481/11 P) and Affi Pascal N’Guessan (C‑482/11 P) v Council of the European Union.

57. It must, moreover, be recalled that, as regards measures adopted on the basis of provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, such as the contested measures, it is the individual nature of those measures which, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU and the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, permits access to the Courts of the European Union.

2013-04-23

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

99 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 110).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

110 To that end, it is for the Courts of the European Union, in order to carry out that examination, to request the competent EU authority, when necessary, to produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an examination (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 120, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 65).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

109 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Mellat’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; and Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

70 According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgments in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 74).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

74 According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

72 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 76).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

76 As regards restrictive measures, without going so far as to require a detailed response to the comments made by the person concerned, the obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 296 TFEU entails in all circumstances, not least when the reasons stated for the EU measure represent reasons stated by an international body, that that statement of reasons identifies the individual, specific and concrete reasons why the competent authorities consider that the person concerned must be subject to restrictive measures. The Courts of the European Union must, therefore, in particular determine whether the reasons relied on are sufficiently detailed and specific (see, to that effect, judgment in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 116 and 118).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

100 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 111).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

111 If the competent EU authority finds itself unable to comply with the request by the Courts of the European Union, it is then the duty of those Courts to base their decision solely on the material which has been disclosed to them (see judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 123, and Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 68).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

49 As regards pleas alleging a manifest error of assessment or a breach of the general principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the question whether a State entity is entitled to invoke them is one that relates to the merits of the case (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 51, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 51).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

51 As regards pleas alleging a manifest error of assessment or a breach of the general principle of proportionality, it must be noted that the question whether a State entity is entitled to invoke them is one that relates to the merits of the case (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 51).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

71 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 75).

62013CJ0176

Council of the European Union v Bank Mellat.

75 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgment in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71).

2016-02-18

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

102 It must be noted in that regard that that argument has been relied on for the first time at the stage of the appeal. As it is, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (judgment in Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C‑514/07 P, C‑528/07 P and C‑532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, paragraph 126 and the case-law cited).

62007CJ0514

Kingdom of Sweden v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) and European Commission (C-514/07 P), Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) v European Commission (C-528/07 P) and European Commission v Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API) (C-532/07 P).

126. As it is, in accordance with settled case-law, to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea and arguments which it did not raise before the General Court would be to authorise it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued before the General Court (see Case C-266/97 P VBA v VGB and Others [2000] ECR I‑2135, paragraph 79; and Case C‑167/04 P JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8935, paragraph 114; and, to that effect, the order of 21 January 2010 in Case C‑150/09 P Iride and Iride Energia v Commission , paragraphs 73 and 74).

2010-09-21

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62013CJ0630

Issam Anbouba v Council of the European Union.

46. In that regard, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning the acts at issue, in order to review whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support those acts, is substantiated (see, to this effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73).

2015-04-21

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

70 According to a consistent body of case-law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the Courts of the European Union and, secondly, to enable those Courts to review the legality of that act (see judgments in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 74).

62011CJ0417

Council of the European Union v Nadiany Bamba.

49. According to a consistent body of case‑law, the purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which an act adversely affecting an individual is based, which is a corollary of the principle of respect for the rights of the defence, is, first, to provide the person concerned with sufficient information to make it possible to ascertain whether the act is well founded or whether it is vitiated by a defect which may permit its legality to be contested before the European Union judicature and, second, to enable that judicature to review the legality of that act (see Case C‑199/99 P Corus UK v Commission [2003] ECR I‑11177, paragraph 145; Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission , paragraph 462; and Case C‑521/09 P Elf Aquitaine v Commission [2011] ECR I‑8947, paragraph 148).

2012-11-15

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

71 The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment in Council v Bamba, C‑417/11 P, EU:C:2012:718, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). The reasons given for a measure adversely affecting a person are sufficient if that measure was adopted in a context which was known to that person and which enables him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him (judgments in Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 71, and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 75).

62011CJ0417

Council of the European Union v Nadiany Bamba.

53. The statement of reasons required by Article 296 TFEU must, however, be appropriate to the act at issue and the context in which it was adopted. The requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is sufficient must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see, inter alia, Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63; Elf Aquitaine v Commission , paragraph 150; and Al-Aqsa v Council and Netherlands v Al-Aqsa , paragraphs 139 and 140).

2012-11-15

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

43 It asserts that the General Court also erred in law when it found that there was no evidence to show that Bank Saderat Iran does actually constitute a governmental organisation. In this regard, the Council refers to: — the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which the specific factual and legal context must be carefully assessed in order to determine whether an entity is a governmental organisation or entity or a non-governmental one; — the work of the United Nations International Law Commission, and in particular the commentaries relating to Article 2(b) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their property, adopted on 2 December 2004, according to which the concept of ‘agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities’ may include State enterprises or other entities established by the State performing commercial transactions; and — the case-law of the Court of Justice on State aid (judgment in France v Commission, C‑482/99, EU:C:2002:294, paragraph 55).

61999CJ0482

French Republic v Commission of the European Communities.

55 For those reasons, it must be accepted that the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken. In that respect, the Court has already taken into consideration the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking account of the requirements of the public authorities (see, in particular, Van der Kooy, paragraph 37) or the fact that, apart from factors of an organic nature which linked the public undertakings to the State, those undertakings, through the intermediary of which aid had been granted, had to take account of directives issued by a Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE) (Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 11 and 12; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 13 and 14).

2002-05-16

62013CJ0200

Council of the European Union v Bank Saderat Iran.

2016-04-21

98 Regarding the material used to justify Bank Saderat Iran’s listing and the evidence that that listing was well founded, it must be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision, which affects that person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Fulmen and Mahmoudian, C‑280/12 P, EU:C:2013:775, paragraph 64; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council, C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 45; Anbouba v Council, C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 46; Ipatau v Council, C‑535/14 P, EU:C:2015:407, paragraph 42; and Council v Bank Mellat, C‑176/13 P, EU:C:2016:96, paragraph 109).

62014CJ0535

Vadzim Ipatau v Council of the European Union.

42. Regarding the evidence that Mr Ipatau’s listing was well founded, it should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires that, as part of the review of the lawfulness of the grounds which are the basis of the decision to include a person’s name in the list of persons subject to restrictive measures, the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails, in this instance, a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (see, to that effect, judgments in Commission and Others v Kadi , C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119; Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft , C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 73; Anbouba v Council , C‑605/13 P, EU:C:2015:247, paragraph 45; and Anbouba v Council , C‑630/13 P, EU:C:2015:248, paragraph 46).

2015-06-18

62019CJ0581

Frenetikexito – Unipessoal Lda v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira.

2021-03-04

As is clear from settled case-law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of Directive 2006/112 are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives pursued by those exemptions and comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. However, that requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 should be construed in such a way as to deprive them of their intended effect (judgment of 8 October 2020, Finanzamt D, C‑657/19, EU:C:2020:811, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).

62019CJ0657

Finanzamt D v E.

28 As is clear from settled case‑law, the terms used to specify the exemptions in Article 132 of the VAT Directive are to be interpreted strictly. Nevertheless, the interpretation of those terms must be consistent with the objectives underlying the exemptions and must comply with the requirements of the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT. Accordingly, the requirement of strict interpretation does not mean that the terms used to specify the exemptions referred to in Article 132 must be construed in such a way as to deprive the exemptions of their intended effects (judgment of 15 November 2012, Zimmermann, C‑174/11, EU:C:2012:716, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

2020-10-08

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

That being so, the case-law principle recalled in paragraph 31 above applies only on condition that the exclusion of the tenderer was not confirmed by a decision which has become definitive (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C‑333/18, EU:C:2019:675, paragraphs 31 and 32).

62018CJ0333

Lombardi Srl v Comune di Auletta and Others.

32 In the main proceedings, none of the tenderers who have brought an action to have the other party excluded have been definitively excluded from the procurement process. Therefore, that judgment in no way undermines the legal principle referred to in the preceding point.

2019-09-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

That being so, the case-law principle recalled in paragraph 31 above applies only on condition that the exclusion of the tenderer was not confirmed by a decision which has become definitive (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C‑333/18, EU:C:2019:675, paragraphs 31 and 32).

62018CJ0333

Lombardi Srl v Comune di Auletta and Others.

31 The judgment of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich (C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988), cited by the referring court, is not incompatible with such an interpretation. Although it is true that in paragraphs 13 to 16, 31 and 36 of that judgment, the Court held that the tenderer whose bid had been excluded by the contracting authority from a public procurement procedure could be refused access to a review of the decision awarding the public contract, in the case giving rise to that judgment, the decision to exclude that tenderer had been confirmed by a decision that had acquired the force of res judicata before the court hearing the review of the contract award decision gave its decision, so that that tenderer had to be regarded as definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 57).

2019-09-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

Such an interpretation is not invalidated by the judgment of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich (C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988), mentioned by the referring court in that context. Although it is true that it follows from paragraphs 13 to 16, 31 and 36 of that judgment that the tenderer whose bid had been excluded by the contracting authority from a procurement procedure for the award of public contracts could be refused access to a review of the decision awarding the public contract, in the case giving rise to that judgment, which did not concern an application before a national review authority, the decision to exclude that tenderer had been confirmed by a decision which had become definitive before the court hearing the review of the contract award decision delivered its decision, with the result that that tenderer had to be regarded as having been definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C‑333/18, EU:C:2019:675, paragraph 31).

62018CJ0333

Lombardi Srl v Comune di Auletta and Others.

31 The judgment of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich (C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988), cited by the referring court, is not incompatible with such an interpretation. Although it is true that in paragraphs 13 to 16, 31 and 36 of that judgment, the Court held that the tenderer whose bid had been excluded by the contracting authority from a public procurement procedure could be refused access to a review of the decision awarding the public contract, in the case giving rise to that judgment, the decision to exclude that tenderer had been confirmed by a decision that had acquired the force of res judicata before the court hearing the review of the contract award decision gave its decision, so that that tenderer had to be regarded as definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraph 57).

2019-09-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The case-law principle set out in the preceding paragraph, which was developed at a time when Directive 89/665 was in force, can be transposed to the system of judicial protection established by Directive 92/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 50 to 53).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

53 The principle of case-law established by the judgments of 4 July 2013, Fastweb (C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448) and 5 April 2016, PFE (C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199) applies to the situation at issue in the main proceedings.

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

That being so, the case-law principle recalled in paragraph 31 above applies only on condition that the exclusion of the tenderer was not confirmed by a decision which has become definitive (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C‑333/18, EU:C:2019:675, paragraphs 31 and 32).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

58 In the main proceedings, on the other hand, Archus and Gama brought an action against the decision excluding their tender and against the decision awarding the contract, which were adopted simultaneously, and cannot therefore be considered to be definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure. In such a situation, the concept of ‘a particular contract’ within the meaning of Article 1(3) of Directive 93/13 may, where appropriate, apply to the possible initiation of a new public procurement procedure.

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The case-law principle set out in the preceding paragraph, which was developed at a time when Directive 89/665 was in force, can be transposed to the system of judicial protection established by Directive 92/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 50 to 53).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

50 It should be recalled, in that connection, that Article 1(3) of Directive 92/13 provides that Member States must ensure that review procedures are available, under detailed rules which they themselves may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The case-law principle set out in the preceding paragraph, which was developed at a time when Directive 89/665 was in force, can be transposed to the system of judicial protection established by Directive 92/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 50 to 53).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

52 On the one hand, the exclusion of one tenderer may lead to the other being awarded the contract directly in the same procedure. On the other, if all tenderers are excluded and a new public procurement procedure is launched, each of those tenderers may participate in the new procedure and thus obtain the contract indirectly (see judgment of 5 April 2016, PFE, C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199, paragraph 27).

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

That being so, the case-law principle recalled in paragraph 31 above applies only on condition that the exclusion of the tenderer was not confirmed by a decision which has become definitive (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 57 and 58, and of 5 September 2019, Lombardi, C‑333/18, EU:C:2019:675, paragraphs 31 and 32).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

57 Admittedly, the Court ruled in its judgment of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich (C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988, paragraphs 13 to 16, 31 and 36), that a tenderer whose offer had been excluded by the contracting authority from a public procurement procedure could be refused access to a review of the decision awarding the public contract. However, the decision to exclude that tenderer had, in that case, been confirmed by a decision that had the force of res judicata before the court hearing the review of the contract award decision gave its decision, so that that tenderer had to be regarded as definitively excluded from the public procurement procedure at issue.

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The case-law principle set out in the preceding paragraph, which was developed at a time when Directive 89/665 was in force, can be transposed to the system of judicial protection established by Directive 92/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 May 2017, Archus and Gama, C‑131/16, EU:C:2017:358, paragraphs 50 to 53).

62016CJ0131

Archus sp. z o.o. and Gama Jacek Lipik v Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo S.A.

51 When called upon to interpret the equivalent provisions of Article 1(3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p. 33), the Court has previously held that, in a public procurement procedure, tenderers have a legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bids submitted by the other tenderers with a view to obtaining the contract (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 July 2013, Fastweb, C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448, paragraph 33; of 5 April 2016, PFE, C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199, paragraph 27; and of 21 December 2016, Bietergemeinschaft Technische Gebäudebetreuung und Caverion Österreich, C‑355/15, EU:C:2016:988, paragraph 29), whatever the number of participants in the procedure and the number of participants who have instigated review procedures (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 April 2016, PFE, C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199, paragraph 29).

2017-05-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

Tasked with interpreting the provisions of Article 1(3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p.33), the Court has ruled that, in the context of a procurement procedure for the award of public contracts, tenderers whose exclusion is requested have an equivalent legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bids submitted by the other tenderers with a view to obtaining the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 2013, Fastweb, C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448, paragraph 33). In paragraph 27 of the judgment of 5 April 2016, PFE (C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199), the Court held that, on the one hand, the exclusion of one tenderer may lead to another tenderer directly being awarded the contract in the same procedure and, on the other hand, if both tenderers are excluded and a new public procurement procedure is launched, each of those tenderers may participate in the new procedure and thus obtain the contract indirectly. Furthermore, in paragraph 29 of the same judgment, the Court specified that the number of participants in the public procurement procedure concerned as well as the number of participants who have instigated review procedures and the differing legal grounds relied on by those participants are irrelevant to the question of the applicability of the principle of the case-law established by the judgment of 4 July 2013, Fastweb (C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448).

62012CJ0100

Fastweb SpA v Azienda Sanitaria Locale di Alessandria.

33. In the presence of such a finding, a counterclaim filed by the successful tenderer cannot bring about the dismissal of an action for review brought by a tenderer where the validity of the bid submitted by each of the operators is challenged in the course of the same proceedings and on identical grounds. In such a situation, each competitor can claim a legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bid submitted by the other, which may lead to a finding that the contracting authority is unable to select a lawful bid.

2013-07-04

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The objective of effective and rapid judicial protection, in particular by interim measures, pursued by that directive does not therefore authorise the Member States to make the exercise of the right to apply for review conditional on the fact that the public procurement procedure in question has formally reached a particular stage (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 38, and judgment of 5 April 2017, Marina del Mediterráneo and Others, C‑391/15, EU:C:2017:268, paragraph 31).

62003CJ0026

Stadt Halle and RPL Recyclingpark Lochau GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall- und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna.

38. As to the time from which such a possibility of review is open, it must be noted that no such time is formally laid down in Directive 89/665. However, having regard to that directive’s objective of effective and rapid judicial protection, in particular by interlocutory measures, it must be concluded that Article 1(1) of the directive does not authorise Member States to make the possibility of review subject to the fact that the public procurement procedure in question has formally reached a particular stage.

2005-01-11

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

The objective of effective and rapid judicial protection, in particular by interim measures, pursued by that directive does not therefore authorise the Member States to make the exercise of the right to apply for review conditional on the fact that the public procurement procedure in question has formally reached a particular stage (see, by analogy, judgment of 11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau, C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 38, and judgment of 5 April 2017, Marina del Mediterráneo and Others, C‑391/15, EU:C:2017:268, paragraph 31).

62015CJ0391

Marina del Mediterráneo SL and Others v Agencia Pública de Puertos de Andalucía.

31 As the Court has already held, although Directive 89/665 has not formally laid down the time from which the possibility of review, as provided for in Article 1(1), must be open, the objective of that directive, as referred to in the preceding paragraph, does not authorise Member States to make the exercise of the right to apply for review conditional on the fact that the public procurement procedure in question has formally reached a particular stage (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 January 2005, Stadt Halle and RPL Lochau (C‑26/03, EU:C:2005:5, paragraph 38).

2017-04-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

More specifically, a national law which requires, in any event, a tenderer to wait for a decision awarding the contract in question before it may apply for a review of a decision allowing another tenderer to participate in that procurement procedure would infringe the provisions of Directive 92/13 (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 April 2017, Marina del Mediterráneo and Others, C‑391/15, EU:C:2017:268, paragraph 34).

62015CJ0391

Marina del Mediterráneo SL and Others v Agencia Pública de Puertos de Andalucía.

34 As regards, more specifically, a decision such as that at issue in the main proceedings allowing a tenderer to participate in a public procurement procedure, the fact that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings requires, in all cases, a tenderer to wait for a decision awarding the contract in question before it may apply for a review of a decision allowing another tenderer to participate in that procurement procedure infringes the provisions of Directive 89/665.

2017-04-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

Furthermore, as follows from the second recital of Directive 92/13, that directive is intended to strengthen the existing mechanisms, both at national and EU levels, to ensure the effective application of the directives relating to public procurement. To that end, the fourth subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that directive requires Member States ‘to ensure that … decisions taken by the contracting bodies may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible’ (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 April 2017, Marina de Mediterráneo and Others, C‑391/15, EU:C:2017:268, paragraph 30).

62015CJ0391

Marina del Mediterráneo SL and Others v Agencia Pública de Puertos de Andalucía.

30 As regards the time from which review procedures must be available, it is appropriate to recall that, as is apparent from its first and second recitals, Directive 89/665 is intended to strengthen the existing mechanisms, both at national and EU levels, to ensure the effective application of the directives relating to public procurement, in particular at a stage when infringements can still be corrected. To that effect, the third subparagraph of Article 1(1) of that directive requires Member States ‘to ensure that … decisions taken by the contracting authorities may be reviewed effectively and, in particular, as rapidly as possible’ (see judgment of 12 December 2002, Universale-Bau and Others, C‑470/99, EU:C:2002:746, paragraph 74).

2017-04-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

Moreover, in paragraph 29 of the judgment of 5 April 2016, PFE (C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199), the Court noted that the fact that differing pleas have been advanced by the tenderers who were excluded from the procurement procedure at issue is not relevant for the application of the case-law principle recalled in paragraph 31 above.

62013CJ0689

Puligienica Facility Esco SpA (PFE) v Airgest SpA.

29 The number of participants in the public procurement procedure concerned as well as the number of participants who have instigated review procedures and the differing legal grounds relied on by those participants are irrelevant to the question of the applicability of the principle established by the Fastweb (C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448) case-law.

2016-04-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

Tasked with interpreting the provisions of Article 1(3) of Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (OJ 1989 L 395, p.33), the Court has ruled that, in the context of a procurement procedure for the award of public contracts, tenderers whose exclusion is requested have an equivalent legitimate interest in the exclusion of the bids submitted by the other tenderers with a view to obtaining the contract (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 July 2013, Fastweb, C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448, paragraph 33). In paragraph 27 of the judgment of 5 April 2016, PFE (C‑689/13, EU:C:2016:199), the Court held that, on the one hand, the exclusion of one tenderer may lead to another tenderer directly being awarded the contract in the same procedure and, on the other hand, if both tenderers are excluded and a new public procurement procedure is launched, each of those tenderers may participate in the new procedure and thus obtain the contract indirectly. Furthermore, in paragraph 29 of the same judgment, the Court specified that the number of participants in the public procurement procedure concerned as well as the number of participants who have instigated review procedures and the differing legal grounds relied on by those participants are irrelevant to the question of the applicability of the principle of the case-law established by the judgment of 4 July 2013, Fastweb (C‑100/12, EU:C:2013:448).

62013CJ0689

Puligienica Facility Esco SpA (PFE) v Airgest SpA.

27 In such a situation, both of the tenderers have an interest in obtaining a particular contract. On the one hand, the exclusion of one tenderer may lead to the other being awarded the contract directly in the same procedure. On the other, if both tenderers are excluded and a new public procurement procedure is launched, each of those tenderers may participate in the new procedure and thus obtain the contract indirectly.

2016-04-05

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

According to settled case-law, although questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court of Justice to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance, the fact nonetheless remains that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they require in order to resolve the disputes before them. The justification for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute. As is apparent from the actual wording of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it. Furthermore, under Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the referring court must set out precisely the reasons for its uncertainty as to the interpretation of EU law (judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraphs 167 and 168).

62019CJ0924

FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság.

According to a consistent line of decisions, although questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance, the fact nonetheless remains that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them. The justification for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute. As is apparent from the actual words of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it (judgment of 26 March 2020, Miasto Łowicz and Prokurator Generalny zastępowany przez Prokuraturę Krajową (Disciplinary régime concerning judges), C‑558/18 and C‑563/18, EU:C:2020:234, paragraphs 43 to 45 and the case-law cited).

2020-05-14

62019CJ0771

NAMA Symvouloi Michanikoi kai Meletites A.E. – LDK Symvouloi Michanikoi A.E. and Others v Archi Exetasis Prodikastikon Prosfigon (AEPP) and Attiko Metro AE.

2021-03-24

According to settled case-law, although questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court of Justice to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance, the fact nonetheless remains that the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts, by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they require in order to resolve the disputes before them. The justification for a preliminary ruling is not that it enables advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions to be delivered but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute. As is apparent from the actual wording of Article 267 TFEU, the question referred for a preliminary ruling must be ‘necessary’ to enable the referring court to ‘give judgment’ in the case before it. Furthermore, under Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the referring court must set out precisely the reasons for its uncertainty as to the interpretation of EU law (judgment of 14 May 2020, Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, C‑924/19 PPU and C‑925/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:367, paragraphs 167 and 168).

62019CJ0924

FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság.

Furthermore, under Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the referring court must set out precisely the reasons for its uncertainty as to the interpretation of EU law (judgment of 20 December 2017, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi, C‑434/15, EU:C:2017:981, paragraph 28).

2020-05-14

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

62 It is settled case-law that classification as ‘arable land’ and, consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’, for the purposes of those provisions, depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37; of 2 July 2015, Wree, C‑422/13, EU:C:2015:438, paragraph 36; and of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 56).

62013CJ0422

Landesamt für Landwirtschaft, Umwelt und ländliche Räume des Landes Schleswig-Holstein v Dr. med. vet. Uta Wree.

36. Next, the categorisation of the areas at issue as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of Regulation No 1120/2009 depends on the actual use of the land in question, so that an area must be classified as ‘agricultural’ where it is used as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of that provision (see, by analogy, judgment in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim , C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37).

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

64 In addition, it should be borne in mind that, in order to be eligible for the aid in question, the areas at issue in the main proceedings must be agricultural areas, be part of a farmer’s holding and be used for agricultural activities or, where the areas are used as well for non-agricultural activities, predominantly used for agricultural activities (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 54).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

54. Therefore, in order to be eligible for the aid in question, the area at issue in the main proceedings must be an agricultural area, be part of a farmer’s holding and be used for agricultural activities or, where the area is used as well for non-agricultural activities, predominantly used for agricultural activities.

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

54 Regarding Case C‑294/19, it should be noted at the outset that the relevant period relating to the facts in the main proceedings is from 2007 to 2014 and, before 1 January 2009, the applicable regulation during the period from 2007 to that date was Regulation No 1782/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 49 and 50).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

50. Given the period that is relevant for the facts in the main proceedings, namely 2005 to 2009, both regulations are applicable ratione temporis . It should be remembered, however, that there is a discrepancy between the wording of Article 44(2) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and that of Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009.

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

55 Nevertheless, the Court held that the concept of ‘eligible hectare’ as defined in Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009 is the same as that of ‘eligible hectare’ within the meaning of Article 44(2) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and that, therefore, the interpretation of that first provision also applies to the second (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

53. In those circumstances, the first and second questions must be considered in the light of the concept of ‘eligible hectare’ as defined in Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009 for the entire 2005-2009 period.

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

62 It is settled case-law that classification as ‘arable land’ and, consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’, for the purposes of those provisions, depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37; of 2 July 2015, Wree, C‑422/13, EU:C:2015:438, paragraph 36; and of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 56).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

56. In the dispute in the main proceedings, it is common ground that the areas in question were used by Mr Demmer with a view to harvesting grass for the production of feed pellets. It should be clarified in that regard that, as they were being used as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Regulation No 796/2004, which it is for the referring court to ascertain, those areas must be categorised as ‘agricultural’. Classification as ‘permanent pasture’ within the meaning of that provision and, consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’ depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, to that effect, judgment in Landkreis Bad Dürkheim , C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37).

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

54 Regarding Case C‑294/19, it should be noted at the outset that the relevant period relating to the facts in the main proceedings is from 2007 to 2014 and, before 1 January 2009, the applicable regulation during the period from 2007 to that date was Regulation No 1782/2003 (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 49 and 50).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

49. Regulation No 1782/2003 was replaced by Regulation No 73/2009 with effect from 1 January 2009. Under Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009, any agricultural area of the holding that is used for an agricultural activity — or, where the area is used also for non-agricultural activities, predominantly used for agricultural activities — is to be regarded as an eligible hectare.

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

55 Nevertheless, the Court held that the concept of ‘eligible hectare’ as defined in Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009 is the same as that of ‘eligible hectare’ within the meaning of Article 44(2) of Regulation No 1782/2003 and that, therefore, the interpretation of that first provision also applies to the second (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraphs 52 and 53).

62013CJ0684

Johannes Demmer v Fødevareministeriets Klagecenter.

52. However, given that it is not unusual for an agricultural area to be used for both agricultural and non-agricultural activities and there is nothing in the travaux préparatoires for Regulation No 73/2009 to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to alter the definition of ‘eligible area’ as defined in Regulation No 1782/2003, Article 34(2)(a) of Regulation No 73/2009, read in the light of Article 3c of Regulation No 795/2004, must be read as being the result of the Union legislature’s objective of clarifying the concept.

2015-07-02

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

62 It is settled case-law that classification as ‘arable land’ and, consequently, as an ‘agricultural area’, for the purposes of those provisions, depends on the actual use of the land in question (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37; of 2 July 2015, Wree, C‑422/13, EU:C:2015:438, paragraph 36; and of 2 July 2015, Demmer, C‑684/13, EU:C:2015:439, paragraph 56).

62009CJ0061

Landkreis Bad Dürkheim v Aufsichts- und Dienstleistungsdirektion.

37. It follows from the provisions referred to in paragraphs 32 to 36 of the present judgment that classification as ‘arable land’ or ‘permanent pasture’ and, consequently, as ‘agricultural area’, depends on the actual use of the land in question. Thus, an area must be classified as agricultural where is it used as arable land or permanent pasture within the meaning of Article 2 points (1) and (2) of Regulation No 796/2004.

2010-10-14

62019CJ0294

Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea v SC Piscicola Tulcea SA and Ira Invest SRL v Agenţia de Plăţi şi Intervenţie pentru Agricultură - Centrul Judeţean Tulcea.

2021-04-29

63 It follows that an area must be classified as ‘agricultural’ where it is actually used as ‘arable land’ within the meaning of the provisions recalled in paragraph 61 of the present judgment (see, by analogy, judgment of 14 October 2010, Landkreis Bad Dürkheim, C‑61/09, EU:C:2010:606, paragraph 37) and that that classification cannot be called into question on the sole ground that such an area has been used as arable land contrary to national law relating to the classification of land.

62009CJ0061

Landkreis Bad Dürkheim v Aufsichts- und Dienstleistungsdirektion.

37. It follows from the provisions referred to in paragraphs 32 to 36 of the present judgment that classification as ‘arable land’ or ‘permanent pasture’ and, consequently, as ‘agricultural area’, depends on the actual use of the land in question. Thus, an area must be classified as agricultural where is it used as arable land or permanent pasture within the meaning of Article 2 points (1) and (2) of Regulation No 796/2004.

2010-10-14

62019CJ0458

ClientEarth v European Commission.

2021-10-06

133 The appellant also submits that, contrary to what the General Court held, the precautionary principle is not limited to conferring on public authorities the power to adopt a specific measure, but must be applied when those authorities act, as is apparent from, inter alia, the judgments of 9 September 2011, Dow AgroSciences and Others v Commission (T‑475/07, EU:T:2011:445, paragraph 144), and of 25 July 2018, Confédération paysanne and Others (C‑528/16, EU:C:2018:583, paragraph 50).

62016CJ0528

Confédération paysanne and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre de l’agriculture, de l’agroalimentaire et de la forêt.

50 Furthermore, it has been emphasised, in recital 8 of that directive, that the precautionary principle was taken into account in the drafting of the directive and must also be taken into account in its implementation. Emphasis is also placed, in recital 55 of Directive 2001/18, on the need to follow closely the development and use of GMOs.

2018-07-25

62019CJ0458

ClientEarth v European Commission.

2021-10-06

60 In this regard, it must be noted that it follows from the Court’s case-law that, in order to state in the manner required the grounds for conducting the review, a party requesting the internal review of an administrative act under environmental law is required to put forward facts or legal arguments of sufficient substance to give rise to serious doubts as to the assessment made in that act by the EU institution or body (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2019, TestBioTech and Others v Commission, C‑82/17 P, EU:C:2019:719, paragraph 69).

62017CJ0082

TestBioTech eV and Others v European Commission.

69 Accordingly, the General Court was correct in holding, in essence, in paragraphs 67, 83 and 88 of the judgment under appeal, that, in order to state in the manner required the grounds for conducting the review, a party requesting the internal review of an administrative act under environmental law is required to put forward the facts or legal arguments of sufficient substance to give rise to serious doubts as to the assessment made in that act by the EU institution or body.

2019-09-12

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

27 In particular, a difference in treatment, where it leads to less favourable treatment of the income of a resident of a Member State originating in another Member State in comparison with the treatment of income originating in the first Member State, is liable to dissuade such a resident from investing his or her capital in another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 and C‑437/08, EU:C:2011:61, paragraph 80; of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 50; and of 20 September 2018, EV, C‑685/16, EU:C:2018:743, paragraph 63).

62016CJ0685

EV v Finanzamt Lippstadt.

63 Consequently, it must be held that, by submitting the tax deductibility of dividends paid by subsidiaries established in non-member States to stricter conditions than those applying to dividends paid by resident companies, the legislation at issue in the main proceedings is likely to dissuade resident parent companies from investing their capital in subsidiaries established in non-member States. To the extent that the income from capital originating in non-member States receives less favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by resident companies, the shares of companies established in non-member States are less attractive to resident investors than those of resident companies (see, by analogy, judgment of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).

2018-09-20

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

27 In particular, a difference in treatment, where it leads to less favourable treatment of the income of a resident of a Member State originating in another Member State in comparison with the treatment of income originating in the first Member State, is liable to dissuade such a resident from investing his or her capital in another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 and C‑437/08, EU:C:2011:61, paragraph 80; of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 50; and of 20 September 2018, EV, C‑685/16, EU:C:2018:743, paragraph 63).

62008CJ0436

Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel BetriebsgmbH (C-436/08) and Österreichische Salinen AG (C-437/08) v Finanzamt Linz.

80. The difference in treatment to which portfolio dividends are subject has the effect of discouraging companies resident in Austria from investing capital in companies established in other Member States and in non‑member States party to the EEA Agreement. Since, in Austria, dividends received from companies established in other Member States and in non‑member States party to the EEA Agreement receive less favourable tax treatment than dividends received from a company established in Austria, the shares of the former companies are less attractive to investors resident in Austria than shares in companies established in Austria.

2011-02-10

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

56 It should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, a restriction on the free movement of capital is permissible if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, if it is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and if it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2019, X (Controlled companies established in third countries), C‑135/17, EU:C:2019:136, paragraph 70, and of 30 January 2020, Köln-Aktienfonds Deka, C‑156/17, EU:C:2020:51, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0135

X-GmbH v Finanzamt Stuttgart - Körperschaften.

70 According to the Court’s settled case-law, a restriction on the free movement of capital is permissible only if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest and, if that is the case, only if it is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective in question and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 October 2007, ELISA, C‑451/05, EU:C:2007:594, paragraphs 79 and 82; of 23 January 2014, DMC, C‑164/12, EU:C:2014:20, point 44; and of 21 June 2018, Fidelity Funds and Others, C‑480/16, EU:C:2018:480, paragraph 64).

2019-02-26

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

25 According to the Court’s case-law, the Member States must exercise their competence in the area of direct taxation in a manner that is compatible with EU law and, in particular, with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 June 2019, Austria v Germany, C‑591/17, EU:C:2019:504, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0591

Republic of Austria v Federal Republic of Germany.

56 It must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the Member States must exercise their competence in the area of direct taxation in a way that is compatible with EU law and, in particular, with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty (judgments of 21 March 2002, Cura Anlagen, C‑451/99, EU:C:2002:195, paragraph 40, and of 25 July 2018, TTL, C‑553/16, EU:C:2018:604, paragraph 44 and the case-law cited).

2019-06-18

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

56 It should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, a restriction on the free movement of capital is permissible if it is justified by overriding reasons in the public interest, if it is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and if it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2019, X (Controlled companies established in third countries), C‑135/17, EU:C:2019:136, paragraph 70, and of 30 January 2020, Köln-Aktienfonds Deka, C‑156/17, EU:C:2020:51, paragraph 83 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0156

Köln-Aktienfonds Deka v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.

83 Such a restriction is permissible if it is justified only by overriding reasons in the public interest, if it is appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective that it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it (judgment of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 56).

2020-01-30

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

27 In particular, a difference in treatment, where it leads to less favourable treatment of the income of a resident of a Member State originating in another Member State in comparison with the treatment of income originating in the first Member State, is liable to dissuade such a resident from investing his or her capital in another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 February 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 and C‑437/08, EU:C:2011:61, paragraph 80; of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C‑464/14, EU:C:2016:896, paragraph 50; and of 20 September 2018, EV, C‑685/16, EU:C:2018:743, paragraph 63).

62014CJ0464

SECIL - Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimento SA v Fazenda Pública.

50 That difference in treatment is liable to discourage companies resident in Portugal from investing their capital in companies established in non-member States such as the Republic of Tunisia and the Republic of Lebanon. To the extent that the income from capital originating in non-member States receives less favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by companies established in Portugal, the shares of companies established in non-member States are less attractive to investors residing in Portugal than those of companies with their seat in that Member State (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C‑446/04, EU:C:2006:774, paragraph 64, and of 10 February 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel and Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 and C‑437/08, EU:C:2011:61, paragraph 80).

2016-11-24

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

30 The Court has also held that a distinction must, therefore, be made between the differences in treatment authorised under Article 65(1)(a) TFEU and the discrimination prohibited by Article 65(3) TFEU. Before national tax legislation can be regarded as compatible with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, the difference in treatment resulting from that legislation must concern situations which are not objectively comparable or must be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest (judgment of 30 April 2020, Société Générale, C‑565/18, EU:C:2020:318, paragraph 24).

62018CJ0565

Société Générale S.A. v Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Regionale Lombardia Ufficio Contenzioso.

24 La Cour a également jugé qu’il y a lieu, dès lors, de distinguer les différences de traitement permises au titre de l’article 65, paragraphe 1, sous a), TFUE des discriminations interdites par l’article 65, paragraphe 3, TFUE. Or, pour qu’une législation fiscale nationale puisse être considérée comme compatible avec les dispositions du traité relatives à la libre circulation des capitaux, il faut que la différence de traitement qui en résulte concerne des situations qui ne sont pas objectivement comparables ou soit justifiée par une raison impérieuse d’intérêt général (arrêt du 22 novembre 2018, Sofina e.a., C‑575/17, EU:C:2018:943, point 46 et jurisprudence citée).

2020-04-30

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

26 Article 63(1) TFEU generally prohibits restrictions on movements of capital between Member States (judgment of 16 September 2020, Romenergo and Aris Capital, C‑339/19, EU:C:2020:709, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). The measures prohibited by that provision, as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those that are such as to discourage non-residents from making investments in a Member State or to discourage that Member State’s residents from doing so in other States (judgment of 30 April 2020, Société Générale, C‑565/18, EU:C:2020:318, paragraph 22).

62018CJ0565

Société Générale S.A. v Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Regionale Lombardia Ufficio Contenzioso.

22 Ensuite, conformément à la jurisprudence de la Cour, les mesures interdites par l’article 63, paragraphe 1, TFUE, en tant que restrictions aux mouvements de capitaux, comprennent celles qui sont de nature à dissuader les non-résidents de faire des investissements dans un État membre ou à dissuader les résidents dudit État membre d’en faire dans d’autres États (arrêts du 10 février 2011, Haribo Lakritzen Hans Riegel et Österreichische Salinen, C‑436/08 et C‑437/08, EU:C:2011:61, point 50, et du 18 janvier 2018, Jahin, C‑45/17, EU:C:2018:18, point 25 ainsi que jurisprudence citée).

2020-04-30

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

49 Secondly, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the comparability of a cross-border situation with an internal one must be examined having regard to the objective pursued by the national provisions at issue as well as their purpose and content, and that only the relevant distinguishing criteria established by the legislation in question must be taken into account in determining whether the difference in treatment resulting from that legislation reflects an objectively different situation (judgment of 21 June 2018, Fidelity Funds and Others, C‑480/16, EU:C:2018:480, paragraphs 50 and 51 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0480

Fidelity Funds and Others v Skatteministeriet.

51 Moreover, only the relevant distinguishing criteria established by the legislation in question must be taken into account in determining whether the difference in treatment resulting from that legislation reflects an objectively different situation (judgments of 10 May 2012 in Santander Asset Management SGIIC and Others, C‑338/11 to C‑347/11, EU:C:2012:286, paragraph 28, and of 2 June 2016, Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek, C‑252/14, EU:C:2016:402, paragraph 49).

2018-06-21

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

29 In so far as that provision constitutes a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, it must be interpreted strictly. Consequently, it cannot be interpreted as meaning that all tax legislation which draws a distinction between taxpayers on the basis of their place of residence or of the State in which they invest their capital is automatically compatible with the FEU Treaty. Indeed, the derogation in Article 65(1)(a) TFEU is itself limited by Article 65(3) TFEU, which provides that the national provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of that article ‘shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 63 [TFEU]’ (judgment of 21 June 2018, Fidelity Funds and Others, C‑480/16, EU:C:2018:480, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0480

Fidelity Funds and Others v Skatteministeriet.

47 In so far as that provision is a derogation from the fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, it must be interpreted strictly. Accordingly, it cannot be interpreted as meaning that all tax legislation which draws a distinction between taxpayers on the basis of their place of residence or the State in which they invest their capital is automatically compatible with the FEU Treaty. Indeed, the derogation in Article 65(1)(a) TFEU is itself limited by Article 65(3) TFEU, which provides that the national provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article ‘shall not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Article 63 [TFEU]’ (judgment of 10 April 2014, Emerging Markets Series of DFA Investment Trust Company, C‑190/12, EU:C:2014:249, paragraphs 55 and 56 and the case-law cited).

2018-06-21

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

49 Secondly, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the comparability of a cross-border situation with an internal one must be examined having regard to the objective pursued by the national provisions at issue as well as their purpose and content, and that only the relevant distinguishing criteria established by the legislation in question must be taken into account in determining whether the difference in treatment resulting from that legislation reflects an objectively different situation (judgment of 21 June 2018, Fidelity Funds and Others, C‑480/16, EU:C:2018:480, paragraphs 50 and 51 and the case-law cited).

62016CJ0480

Fidelity Funds and Others v Skatteministeriet.

50 In that regard, it is clear from the Court’s case-law that the comparability of a cross-border situation with an internal one must be examined having regard to the aim pursued by the national provisions at issue as well as their purpose and content (judgment of 2 June 2016, Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek, C‑252/14, EU:C:2016:402, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).

2018-06-21

62019CJ0480

Proceedings brought by E.

2021-04-29

26 Article 63(1) TFEU generally prohibits restrictions on movements of capital between Member States (judgment of 16 September 2020, Romenergo and Aris Capital, C‑339/19, EU:C:2020:709, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). The measures prohibited by that provision, as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those that are such as to discourage non-residents from making investments in a Member State or to discourage that Member State’s residents from doing so in other States (judgment of 30 April 2020, Société Générale, C‑565/18, EU:C:2020:318, paragraph 22).

62019CJ0339

SC Romenergo SA and Aris Capital SA v Autoritatea de Supraveghere Financiară.

According to settled case-law of the Court, that provision generally prohibits restrictions on movements of capital between Member States (judgment of 6 March 2018, SEGRO and Horváth, C‑52/16 and C‑113/16, EU:C:2018:157, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).

2020-09-16

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

62017CJ0183

International Management Group v European Commission.

51 As regards, in the first place, the Commission’s arguments referred to in paragraph 45 above based on its claim that the decisions at issue do not have binding legal effects, it is settled case-law that any provision or measure adopted by EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever form they might take, the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, a natural or legal person by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position may be the subject of an action for annulment (judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 37).

2019-01-31

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62018CJ0575

Czech Republic v European Commission.

47 In order to determine whether the contested act produces such effects, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess those effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution which adopted the act (judgment of 20 February 2018, Belgium v Commission, C‑16/16 P, EU:C:2018:79, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).

2020-07-09

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62015CJ0599

Romania v European Commission.

49 In the order under appeal, the General Court ruled on the Commission’s plea of inadmissibility without going to the substance of the case. As explained in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the present judgment, following an examination of the division of powers between the Commission and the Member States regarding the determination of own resources under the provisions of Decision 2007/436 and Regulation No 1150/2000, the General Court concluded, in paragraph 37 of that order that, in the absence of a provision empowering the Commission to adopt a measure requiring a Member State to make own resources available, the letter at issue should be regarded as being for information purposes only and as a simple invitation addressed to Romania.

2017-10-25

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62015CJ0599

Romania v European Commission.

52 The General Court limited itself, in the order under appeal, to an abstract explanation of the obligations and powers of the Member States and the Commission respectively in the area of the Union’s own resources. Since, as is apparent from paragraphs 1 to 7 of the order under appeal, the Commission had sent the letter at issue in the context of that area, the General Court could, without committing errors of law, assess those obligations and powers in the light of the regulations concerning own resources, for the sole purpose of examining the actionable nature of that letter and without prejudice to the substantive question of its applicability to the circumstances of the case and the classification of the amount in question.

2017-10-25

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62015CJ0599

Romania v European Commission.

51 First, it is indeed the case that the General Court based its assessment of the actionable nature of the letter at issue, essentially, on an examination of the powers of the Commission on the basis of the provisions of Decision 2007/436 and of Regulation No 1150/2000. In so doing, contrary to the allegations of Romania, it did not, however, assess the nature of the funds claimed or treat those funds as ‘own resources’.

2017-10-25

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62015CJ0599

Romania v European Commission.

55 Finally, however, it should be pointed out that, as Romania rightly points out, the General Court merely examined the powers of the institution which adopted the measure, without carrying out an analysis of the content of the letter at issue, contrary to the requirements of the case-law referred to in paragraph 48 of the present judgment.

2017-10-25

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

40 In order to determine whether the acts at issue constitute preparatory measures, as the General Court held in the orders under appeal, or whether they are, as the appellants maintain, acts which are open to challenge, for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to look to the actual substance of those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited) and to the intention of those who drafted them, in this case, the ECB (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, C‑521/06 P, EU:C:2008:422, paragraph 42, and of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 52).

62006CJ0521

Athinaïki Techniki AE v Commission of the European Communities.

42. It is apparent from settled case-law concerning the admissibility of actions for annulment that it is necessary to look to the substance of the contested acts, as well as the intention of those who drafted them, to classify those acts. In that regard, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (see, to that effect, IBM v Commission , paragraphs 9 and 10, and Case C-147/96 Netherlands v Commission [2000] ECR I-4723, paragraphs 26 and 27).

2008-07-17

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

42 In so far as the appellants make the intention which they ascribe to the ECB when it adopted the acts at issue one of the central elements of the first ground of appeal, it must also be stated that the Court has emphasised that, while it is clear from the case-law that it is possible to take into consideration a subjective criterion relating to the intention that led the EU institution, body, office or agency which drafted the contested act to adopt it, that subjective criterion can play only a complementary role as compared with the objective criteria referred to in the preceding paragraph and, therefore, cannot be given greater weight than those objective criteria, nor can it affect the assessment of the effects of the resulting contested act (judgment of 21 January 2021, Germany v Esso Raffinage, C‑471/18 P, EU:C:2021:48, paragraph 65).

62018CJ0471

Federal Republic of Germany v Esso Raffinage.

65 Lastly, while it is clear from the Court’s case-law that it is also possible to take into consideration a subjective criterion relating to the intention that led the institution, body, office or agency of the Union which drafted the contested act to adopt it (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, C‑521/06 P, EU:C:2008:422, paragraph 42; and of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 52), it follows from the preceding paragraph that that subjective criterion can play only a complementary role as compared with the objective criteria referred to in that paragraph and, therefore, cannot be given greater weight than those objective criteria, nor can it affect the assessment of the effects of the resulting contested act.

2021-01-21

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

47 While it is, moreover, true that any decision-making act of an EU institution, body, office or agency must comply with the general principles of EU law, which include the principle of proportionality (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 June 2009, Nijemeisland, C‑170/08, EU:C:2009:369, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited), and that, therefore, there are many legally binding acts which contain a proportionality analysis, the presence of such an analysis cannot, reasoning a contrario, be elevated to evidence that an act is binding. It is entirely conceivable that the authority concerned may analyse the proportionality of a measure during an administrative procedure comprising several stages without, however, the substance of an act that is supposed to be an intermediary act being modified as a result.

62008CJ0170

H. J. Nijemeisland v Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit.

41. First, the principle of proportionality is a general principle of Community law that must be observed by the Community legislature and by the national legislatures and courts, in particular with regard to the common agricultural policy. That principle requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued (see Case C‑534/06 Industria Lavorazione Carni Ovine [2008] ECR I‑4129, paragraph 25).

2009-06-11

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

62010CJ0463

Deutsche Post AG and Federal Republic of Germany v European Commission.

50. In that regard, admittedly, intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject-matter of an action for annulment ( IBM v Commission , paragraph 10; Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 42; Case C‑362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2010] ECR I‑669, paragraph 52). However, the intermediate acts thus referred to are first acts which express a provisional opinion of the institution (see, to that effect, IBM v Commission , paragraph 20; Joined Cases C‑133/87 and C‑150/87 Nashua Corporation and Others v Commission and Council [1990] ECR I‑719, paragraphs 8 to 10; Case C‑282/95 P Guérin Automobiles v Commission [1997] ECR I‑1503, paragraph 34; Case C‑147/96 Netherlands v Commission [2000] ECR I‑4723, paragraph 35).

2011-10-13

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

40 In order to determine whether the acts at issue constitute preparatory measures, as the General Court held in the orders under appeal, or whether they are, as the appellants maintain, acts which are open to challenge, for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to look to the actual substance of those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited) and to the intention of those who drafted them, in this case, the ECB (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, C‑521/06 P, EU:C:2008:422, paragraph 42, and of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 52).

62009CJ0322

NDSHT Nya Destination Stockholm Hotell & Teaterpaket AB v European Commission.

46. It follows also from settled case-law concerning the admissibility of actions for annulment that it is necessary to look to the actual substance of the acts challenged in order to classify them (see, in particular, Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9, and Case C‑147/96 Netherlands v Commission [2000] ECR I‑4723, paragraph 27).

2010-11-18

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

46 Yet the presumption for which the appellants seek recognition is incompatible with the requirement that, in the case of any given act, its possibly binding nature must be determined in the light of its substance and the intention of those who drafted it, which accords with the case-law recalled in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the present judgment. In addition, that presumption renders Article 263 TFEU largely meaningless, since its application would lead the Courts of the European Union to proceed on the basis that every act of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union is in the nature of a decision, unless they have expressly indicated that that is not the case in relation to a particular act. Furthermore, by leaving it to those institutions, bodies, offices or agencies themselves to classify their acts as being or not being in the nature of a decision and by presupposing that, unless stated otherwise, those acts are binding and therefore constitute decisions, such a presumption would run counter to the case-law cited in paragraph 39 of the present judgment, according to which it is irrelevant whether or not an act is described by the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies as being a ‘decision’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).

62009CJ0322

NDSHT Nya Destination Stockholm Hotell & Teaterpaket AB v European Commission.

47. By contrast, the form in which an act or decision is adopted is in principle irrelevant to the right to challenge such acts or decisions by way of an action for annulment. It is therefore, in principle, irrelevant for the classification of the act in question whether or not it satisfies certain formal requirements, namely in particular, that it is duly identified by its author and that it mentions the provisions providing the legal basis for it. It is therefore irrelevant that the act may not be described as a ‘decision’ or that it does not refer to Article 4(2), (3) or (4) of Regulation No 659/1999. It is also of no importance that the Member State concerned was not notified of the act at issue by the Commission, infringing Article 25 of that regulation, as such an error is not capable of altering the substance of that act (see Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraphs 43 and 44 and case-law cited).

2010-11-18

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

62009CJ0322

NDSHT Nya Destination Stockholm Hotell & Teaterpaket AB v European Commission.

48. Furthermore, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge for the purposes of Article 230 EC, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (see Athinaïki Techniki v Commission , paragraph 42 and case-law cited).

2010-11-18

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

62003CJ0131

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. and Others v Commission of the European Communities.

54. As regards the first part of that plea in law, as the Court of First Instance rightly pointed out in paragraph 77 of the judgment under appeal, it is settled case-law that only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are acts or decisions which may be the subject of an action for annulment (see, inter alia, IBM v Commission , paragraph 9; Case C-117/91 Bosman v Commission [1991] ECR I-4837, paragraph 13; and Case C-123/03 P Commission v Greencore [2004] ECR I-11647, paragraph 44).

2006-09-12

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

41 In that regard, the Court has stated that examining the substance of an act involves assessing its effects on the basis of objective criteria, such as the content of the act in question, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the EU institution, body, office or agency which adopted it (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 February 2014, Hungary v Commission, C‑31/13 P, EU:C:2014:70, paragraph 55, and of 9 July 2020, Czech Republic v Commission, C‑575/18 P, EU:C:2020:530, paragraph 47), powers which should not be understood in the abstract but should be regarded as factors that inform the specific analysis of the content of that act, which is central and indispensable (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2017, Romania v Commission, C‑599/15 P, EU:C:2017:801, paragraphs 49, 51, 52 and 55).

62013CJ0031

Hungary v European Commission.

55. Those binding legal effects of a measure must be assessed in accordance with objective criteria, such as the contents of that measure (see, to this effect, inter alia Case 60/81 IBM v Commission [1981] ECR 2639, paragraph 9, and Case C‑57/95 France v Commission [1997] ECR I‑1627, paragraph 9), taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted (see, to this effect, inter alia the Order of 13 June 1991 in Case C‑50/90 Sunzest v Commission [1991] ECR I‑2917, paragraph 13, and Case C‑362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2010] ECR I‑669, paragraph 58), and the powers of the institution which adopted the measure (see, to this effect, inter alia Case C‑301/03 Italy v Commission [2005] ECR I‑10217, paragraph 28).

2014-02-13

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

40 In order to determine whether the acts at issue constitute preparatory measures, as the General Court held in the orders under appeal, or whether they are, as the appellants maintain, acts which are open to challenge, for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to look to the actual substance of those acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited) and to the intention of those who drafted them, in this case, the ECB (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 July 2008, Athinaïki Techniki v Commission, C‑521/06 P, EU:C:2008:422, paragraph 42, and of 26 January 2010, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑362/08 P, EU:C:2010:40, paragraph 52).

62008CJ0362

Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV v European Commission.

52. It is also apparent from settled case-law concerning the admissibility of actions for annulment that it is necessary to look to the substance of the contested acts, as well as the intention of those who drafted them, to classify those acts. In that regard, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of the Commission upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, which are open to challenge and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the definitive decision, or measures which are mere confirmation of an earlier measure which was not challenged within the prescribed period (see, to that effect, Case C-521/06 P Athinaïki Techniki v Commission [2008] ECR I-5829, paragraph 42).

2010-01-26

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

62015CJ0415

Stichting Woonpunt and Others v European Commission.

44 As regards the fact, on which the General Court relied in paragraphs 58, 74 and 86 of the order under appeal, that in the present case that assessment is set out, not in the decision at issue but in the Article 17 letter, it must however be noted that, according to settled case-law of the Court, intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (judgment of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50).

2017-03-15

62019CJ0551

ABLV Bank AS and Others v European Central Bank.

2021-05-06

39 By contrast, it must be held that the objections to the General Court’s reasoning are unfounded. As the General Court correctly noted, it follows from the case-law that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, a natural or legal person may challenge only measures the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, that person by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal position (see, to that effect, judgments of 11 November 1981, IBM v Commission, 60/81, EU:C:1981:264, paragraph 9; of 12 September 2006, Reynolds Tobacco and Others v Commission, C‑131/03 P, EU:C:2006:541, paragraph 54; and of 31 January 2019, International Management Group v Commission, C‑183/17 P and C‑184/17 P, EU:C:2019:78, paragraph 51). Thus, it is in principle those measures which definitively determine the position of an institution upon the conclusion of an administrative procedure, and which are intended to have legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the complainant, that constitute acts open to challenge, and not intermediate measures whose purpose is to prepare for the final decision, which do not have those effects (judgment of 18 November 2010, NDSHT v Commission, C‑322/09 P, EU:C:2010:701, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited). Consequently, intermediate measures setting out an assessment by the institution and whose aim is to prepare the final decision do not, in principle, constitute acts which may form the subject matter of an action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgments of 13 October 2011, Deutsche Post and Germany v Commission, C‑463/10 P and C‑475/10 P, EU:C:2011:656, paragraph 50, and of 15 March 2017, Stichting Woonpunt and Others v Commission, C‑415/15 P, EU:C:2017:216, paragraph 44).

61981CJ0060

International Business Machines Corporation v Commission of the European Communities.

9 IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE MEASURES IN QUESTION ARE ACTS WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 173 IT IS NECESSARY , THEREFORE , TO LOOK TO THEIR SUBSTANCE . ACCORDING TO THE CONSISTENT CASE-LAW OF THE COURT ANY MEASURE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF WHICH ARE BINDING ON , AND CAPABLE OF AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF , THE APPLICANT BY BRINGING ABOUT A DISTINCT CHANGE IN HIS LEGAL POSITION IS AN ACT OR DECISION WHICH MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF AN ACTION UNDER ARTICLE 173 FOR A DECLARATION THAT IT IS VOID . HOWEVER , THE FORM IN WHICH SUCH ACTS OR DECISIONS ARE CAST IS , IN PRINCIPLE , IMMATERIAL AS REGARDS THE QUESTION WHETHER THEY ARE OPEN TO CHALLENGE UNDER THAT ARTICLE .

1981-11-11

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of which the national court is presumed to be aware (judgment of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑152/17, EU:C:2018:264, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). Moreover, those requirements are set out in the Court’s recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2019 C 380, p. 1).

62017CJ0152

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

21 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, according to the Court’s settled case-law, in the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts, the need to provide an interpretation of EU law which will be of use to the national court means that the national court is bound to observe scrupulously the requirements concerning the content of a request for a preliminary ruling, expressly set out in Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of which the national court is presumed to be aware (judgment of 26 July 2017, Persidera, C‑112/16, EU:C:2017:597, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). Moreover, those requirements are set out in the Court’s recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of preliminary ruling proceedings (OJ 2012 C 338, p. 1).

2018-04-19

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In the present case, it should be stated that, by this request for a preliminary ruling, the referring court has failed to remedy the lacuna established by the Court in paragraph 23 of its judgment of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, (C‑152/17, EU:C:2018:264), in so far as, in breach of Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure, it still fails to state with the requisite precision and clarity the reasons why it considers that the interpretation of Article 3 TEU as well as Article 26 and Article 101(1)(e) TFEU is necessary or useful for the purpose of resolving the dispute in the main proceedings or the relationship between EU law and the national legislation applicable to those proceedings. Neither does the referring court specify the reasons which prompted it to inquire about the interpretation of the other provisions and measures mentioned in the second and third questions referred, including, in particular, the European Social Charter, which the Court, moreover, has no jurisdiction to interpret (see, to that effect, judgment of 5 February 2015, Nisttahuz Poclava, C‑117/14, EU:C:2015:60, paragraph 43), but merely sets out, in essence, the questions of the applicants in the main proceedings in that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 20 above, without giving its own assessment.

62017CJ0152

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

23 It should be noted, in that regard, that the order for reference gives no explanation of the relevance of the interpretation of Article 3(3) TEU or Articles 26, 57, 58 and 101 TFEU for the resolution of the dispute in the main proceedings. The same is true of Article 56 TFEU, in so far as it relates to aspects other than those which are examined by the Court in paragraph 32 above.

2018-04-19

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

Thus, it is essential, as is stated in Article 94(c) of the Rules of Procedure that the request for a preliminary ruling itself contain a statement of the reasons which prompted the referring court or tribunal to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2018, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi, C‑152/17, EU:C:2018:264, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).

62017CJ0152

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

22 Thus, it is essential, as is stated in Article 94(a) and (c) of the Rules of Procedure, that the reference for a preliminary ruling itself contain a summary of the relevant findings of fact, or at least, an account of the facts on which the questions are based, and a statement of the reasons which prompted the national court to inquire about the interpretation or validity of certain provisions of EU law, and the relationship between those provisions and the national legislation applicable to the main proceedings (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 July 2017, Persidera, C‑112/16, EU:C:2017:597, paragraphs 28 and 29 and the case-law cited).

2018-04-19

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

In that regard, it must be recalled that a national court or tribunal of last instance may refrain from referring a question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on grounds of inadmissibility specific to the procedure before that court or tribunal, subject to compliance with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 December 1995, van Schijndel and van Veen, C‑430/93 and C‑431/93, EU:C:1995:441, paragraph 17, and of 15 March 2017, Aquino, C‑3/16, EU:C:2017:209, paragraph 56).

61993CJ0430

Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten.

17 In the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. However, such rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions nor render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (see, in particular, the judgments in Case 33/76 Rewe v Landwirtschaftskammer fuer das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, paragraph 5, Case 45/76 Comet v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043, paragraphs 12 to 16, Case 68/79 Hans Just v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs [1980] ECR 501, paragraph 25, Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595, paragraph 14, Joined Cases 331/85, 376/85 and 378/85 Bianco and Girard v Directeur Général des Douanes des Droits Indirects [1988] ECR 1099, paragraph 12, Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799, paragraph 7, Joined Cases 123/87 and 330/87 Jeunehomme and EGI v Belgian State [1988] ECR 4517, paragraph 17, Case C-96/91 Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-3789, paragraph 12, and Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, paragraph 43).

1995-12-14

62019CJ0561

Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi SpA v Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA.

2021-10-06

The Court has thus held that national procedural rules according to which the subject matter of the dispute is determined by the pleas in law put forward at the point in time at which the action was brought are consistent with the principle of effectiveness in so far as they ensure proper conduct of proceedings by, in particular, protecting them from the delays inherent in examination of new pleas (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 1995, van Schijndel and van Veen, C‑430/93 and C‑431/93, EU:C:1995:441, paragraph 21).

61993CJ0430

Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten.

21 That limitation is justified by the principle that, in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the initiative, the court being able to act of its own motion only in exceptional cases where the public interest requires its intervention. That principle reflects conceptions prevailing in most of the Member States as to the relations between the State and the individual; it safeguards the rights of the defence; and it ensures proper conduct of proceedings by, in particular, protecting them from the delays inherent in examination of new pleas.

1995-12-14