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600 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61969CJ0048 | Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities. | 12 | 12 IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION DID NO MORE THAN SIGN THE NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS WHICH THE MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR PROBLEMS OF COMPETITION HAD PREVIOUSLY APPROVED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD DELEGATED TO HIM . | 1972-07-14 |
601 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61969CJ0048 | Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 14 THE DELEGATION OF SUCH AUTHORITY CONSTITUTES A MEASURE RELATING TO THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE COMMISSION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 27 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED UNDER ARTICLE 16 OF THE TREATY OF 8 APRIL 1965 ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION . | 1972-07-14 |
602 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61972CJ0008 | Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities. | 10 | 10 THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 2 OF REGULATION NO 99/63 OF THE COMMISSION WAS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT WAS SIGNED NOT BY A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION, BUT THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR COMPTITION BY DELEGATION . | 1972-10-17 |
603 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61972CJ0008 | Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities. | 11 | 11 IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION MERELY SIGNED THE NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTIONS WHICH THE MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION RESPONSIBLE FOR COMPETITION MATTERS HAD PREVIOUSLY APPROVED IN THE EXERCISE OF THE POWERS WHICH THE COMMISSION HAD DELEGATED TO HIM . | 1972-10-17 |
604 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61972CJ0008 | Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities. | 13 | 13 SUCH AN AUTHORIZATION CONSTITUTES A MEASURE CONCERNING THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SERVICES OF THE COMMISSION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 27 OF THE PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE ADOPTED UNDER ARTICLE 7 OF THE TREATY OF 8 APRIL 1965 ESTABLISHING A SINGLE COUNCIL AND A SINGLE COMMISSION . | 1972-10-17 |
605 | 61989CJ0200 | FUNOC v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 1990-10-11 | 14 In this submission, the applicant is disregarding the fact that, as the Court recognized in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 10 to 14 and in Case 8/72 Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] ECR 977, paragraphs 10 to 14, delegation of signature is the normal means whereby the Commission exercises its powers . The applicant has not provided any evidence to show that the Community administration failed to comply with the relevant rules in this case . | 61972CJ0008 | Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission of the European Communities. | 14 | 14 THE SUBMISSION BASED, IN OPPOSITION TO THE CONTESTED DECISION, ON AN ALLEGED FORMAL DEFECT IN THE NOTIFICATION OF OBJECTIONS CANNOT THEREFORE BE UPHELD .
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE
( A ) ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET | 1972-10-17 |
606 | 62000CJ0233 | Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. | 114 | 2003-06-26 | 114. Secondly, the purpose of Directive 90/313 is to ensure freedom of access to information on the environment, without the applicant having to prove an interest to justify his request, and to avoid any obstacle to that freedom (see, to that effect, Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany , cited above, paragraphs 47 and 58). | 61997CJ0217 | Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. | 58 | 58 Secondly, the purpose of the directive, which is to guarantee freedom of access to information on the environment and to avoid any obstacles to that freedom, precludes any interpretation which is liable to dissuade those wishing to obtain information from making a request to that effect. | 1999-09-09 |
607 | 62000CJ0235 | Commissioners of Customs & Excise v CSC Financial Services Ltd. | 32 | 2001-12-13 | 32 Lastly, the mere fact that a constituent element is essential for completing an exempt transaction does not warrant the conclusion that the service which that element represents is exempt (paragraph 65 of the judgment in SDC). | 61995CJ0002 | Sparekassernes Datacenter (SDC) v Skatteministeriet. | 65 | 65 However, since point 3 of Article 13B(d) of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted strictly, the mere fact that a constituent element is essential for completing an exempt transaction does not warrant the conclusion that the service which that element represents is exempt. The interpretation put forward by SDC cannot therefore be accepted. | 1997-06-05 |
608 | 62000CJ0242 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 35 | 2002-06-18 | 35 That being so, those decisions should be construed as forming an integral part of the guidelines on regional aid and as having, in themselves, binding force only on condition that they have been accepted by the Member States (see IJssel-Vliet, paragraphs 42 and 43). | 61994CJ0311 | IJssel-Vliet Combinatie BV v Minister van Economische Zaken. | 42 | 42 Furthermore, in Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, paragraph 35, the Court recognized that a "discipline" of the same legal nature as the Guidelines, whose rules were accepted by the Member States, was binding. | 1996-10-15 |
609 | 61989CJ0205 | Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. | 5 | 1991-03-19 | 5 In assessing whether the application is well-founded it must be remembered first that, according to established case-law of the Court (see first the judgment in Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5), the prohibition on measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions laid down in Article 30 of the Treaty covers any trading rules of the Member States which are liable directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, to hinder intra-Community trade. | 61974CJ0008 | Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville. | 5 | 5 ALL TRADING RULES ENACTED BY MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF HINDERING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY, INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS . | 1974-07-11 |
610 | 61989CJ0209 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 10 | 1991-03-21 | 10 In that regard, the Court has already accepted the compatibility with the Treaty rules of fees charged in connection with the completion of customs formalities, on condition that their amount does not exceed the actual cost of the operations in respect of which they are charged (judgment in Case 89/76 Commission v Netherlands [1977] ECR 1355, at paragraph 16). In its judgment in Case C-111/89 (Bakker Hillegom [1990] ECR I-1735, at paragraph 12), the Court pointed out that that condition was satisfied only where there was a direct link between the amount of the fee and the cost of the actual inspection in respect of which the fee was charged. The Court added (in the same judgment, at paragraph 13) that such a link was present where the amount of the fee was calculated on the basis of the duration of the inspection, the number of persons required, the cost of materials, overheads or any other similar factors. | 61989CJ0111 | Staat der Nederlanden v P. Bakker Hillegom BV. | 12 | 12 It must be observed that that condition cannot be considered to have been satisfied unless there is a direct link between the amount of the fee and the actual inspection in respect of which the fee is charged . Without such a link, it would be impossible to ensure that the amount of the fee did not exceed the actual cost of the operation in respect of which it was charged . | 1990-05-02 |
611 | 61989CJ0209 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 10 | 1991-03-21 | 10 In that regard, the Court has already accepted the compatibility with the Treaty rules of fees charged in connection with the completion of customs formalities, on condition that their amount does not exceed the actual cost of the operations in respect of which they are charged (judgment in Case 89/76 Commission v Netherlands [1977] ECR 1355, at paragraph 16). In its judgment in Case C-111/89 (Bakker Hillegom [1990] ECR I-1735, at paragraph 12), the Court pointed out that that condition was satisfied only where there was a direct link between the amount of the fee and the cost of the actual inspection in respect of which the fee was charged. The Court added (in the same judgment, at paragraph 13) that such a link was present where the amount of the fee was calculated on the basis of the duration of the inspection, the number of persons required, the cost of materials, overheads or any other similar factors. | 61976CJ0089 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands. | 16 | 16 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE FEES CHARGED FOR SUCH INSPECTIONS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS CHARGES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO CUSTOMS DUTIES , PROVIDED THAT THEIR AMOUNT DOES NOT EXCEED THE ACTUAL COST OF THE OPERATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH THEY ARE CHARGED .
| 1977-07-12 |
612 | 61989CJ0209 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 6 | 1991-03-21 | 6 As a preliminary point, the Court observes that the alleged failure of the Italian Government to fulfil its obligation has negligible consequences in practice, which the Commission itself did not deny at the hearing. However, as the Court has consistently held (see the judgments in Case 415/85 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 3097, at paragraph 9, and in Case 416/85 Commission v United Kingdom [1988] ECR 3127, at paragraph 9), an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations is objective in nature and the bringing of such an action before the Court is a matter for the Commission in its entire discretion. The Court must therefore consider whether or not the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations as alleged. | 61985CJ0416 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 9 | 9 That argument cannot be upheld . In the context of the balance of powers between the institutions laid down in the Treaty, it is not for the Court to consider what objectives are pursued in an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty . Its role is to decide whether or not the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligation as alleged . As the Court held in its judgment of 10 December 1968 ( Case 7/68 Commission v Italian Republic (( 1968 )) ECR 423 ), an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations, the bringing of which is a matter for the Commission in its entire discretion, is objective in nature .
Substance | 1988-06-21 |
613 | 62000CJ0244 | Van Doren + Q. GmbH v Lifestyle sports + sportswear Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Michael Orth. | 32 | 2003-04-08 | 32. Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive embody a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark and accordingly define the rights of proprietors of trade marks in the Community (Zino Davidoff and Levi Strauss , paragraph 39). | 61999CJ0414 | Zino Davidoff SA v A & G Imports Ltd and Levi Strauss & Co. and Others v Tesco Stores Ltd and Others. | 39 | 39 Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive embody a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark and accordingly define the rights of proprietors of trade marks in the Community (Silhouette, cited above, paragraphs 25 and 29). | 2001-11-20 |
614 | 62000CJ0253 | Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA and Superior Fruiticola SA v Frumar Ltd and Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd. | 28 | 2002-09-17 | 28 The national courts, whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction, must ensure that they take full effect (see, inter alia, Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 16, Case C-213/89 Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 19, and Case C-453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, paragraph 25). | 61977CJ0106 | Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. | 16 | 16THIS CONSEQUENCE ALSO CONCERNS ANY NATIONAL COURT WHOSE TASK IT IS AS AN ORGAN OF A MEMBER STATE TO PROTECT , IN A CASE WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION , THE RIGHTS CONFERRED UPON INDIVIDUALS BY COMMUNITY LAW .
| 1978-03-09 |
615 | 62000CJ0265 | Campina Melkunie BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau. | 34 | 2004-02-12 | 34. By virtue of the Court ' s case-law, the various grounds for refusing registration set out in Article 3 of the Directive must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them (see, inter alia, Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 77, Linde , paragraph 71, and Case C-104/01 Libertel [2003] ECR I-3793, paragraph 51). | 62001CJ0104 | Libertel Groep BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau. | 51 | 51. The various grounds for refusing registration in Article 3 of the Directive must therefore be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them (Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 77). | 2003-05-06 |
616 | 61989CJ0209 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 6 | 1991-03-21 | 6 As a preliminary point, the Court observes that the alleged failure of the Italian Government to fulfil its obligation has negligible consequences in practice, which the Commission itself did not deny at the hearing. However, as the Court has consistently held (see the judgments in Case 415/85 Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 3097, at paragraph 9, and in Case 416/85 Commission v United Kingdom [1988] ECR 3127, at paragraph 9), an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations is objective in nature and the bringing of such an action before the Court is a matter for the Commission in its entire discretion. The Court must therefore consider whether or not the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations as alleged. | 61985CJ0415 | Commission of the European Communities v Ireland. | 9 | 9 That argument cannot be upheld . In the context of the balance of powers between the institutions laid down in the Treaty, it is not for the Court to consider what objectives are pursued in an action brought under Article 169 of the Treaty . Its role is to decide whether or not the Member State in question has failed to fulfil its obligations as alleged . As the Court held in its judgment of 10 December 1968 in Case 7/68 Commission v Italian Republic (( 1968 )) ECR 423, an action against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations, the bringing of which is a matter for the Commission in its entire discretion, is objective in nature .
Substance | 1988-06-21 |
617 | 61989CJ0213 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others. | 20 | 1990-06-19 | 20 The Court has also held that any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law ( judgment of 9 March 1978 in Simmenthal, cited above, paragraphs 22 and 23 ). | 61977CJ0106 | Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. | 22 | 22ACCORDINGLY ANY PROVISION OF A NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM AND ANY LEGISLATIVE , ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL PRACTICE WHICH MIGHT IMPAIR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY LAW BY WITHHOLDING FROM THE NATIONAL COURT HAVING JURISDICTION TO APPLY SUCH LAW THE POWER TO DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY AT THE MOMENT OF ITS APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS WHICH MIGHT PREVENT COMMUNITY RULES FROM HAVING FULL FORCE AND EFFECT ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THOSE REQUIREMENTS WHICH ARE THE VERY ESSENCE OF COMMUNITY LAW .
| 1978-03-09 |
618 | 61989CJ0213 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others. | 20 | 1990-06-19 | 20 The Court has also held that any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law ( judgment of 9 March 1978 in Simmenthal, cited above, paragraphs 22 and 23 ). | 61977CJ0106 | Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. | 23 | 23THIS WOULD BE THE CASE IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN A PROVISION OF COMMUNITY LAW AND A SUBSEQUENT NATIONAL LAW IF THE SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR AN AUTHORITY WITH A DISCRETION OF ITS OWN , OTHER THAN THE COURT CALLED UPON TO APPLY COMMUNITY LAW , EVEN IF SUCH AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE FULL EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY LAW WERE ONLY TEMPORARY .
| 1978-03-09 |
619 | 61989CJ0214 | Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit. | 14 | 1992-03-10 | 14 Accordingly, as the Court has held for similar reasons as regards, in particular, the concept of "matters relating to a contract" and other concepts, referred to in Article 5 of the Convention, which serve as criteria for determining special jurisdiction (see the judgment in Case 34/82 Peters v ZNAV [1983] ECR 987, paragraphs 9 and 10), the concept of "agreement conferring jurisdiction" in Article 17 must be regarded as an independent concept. | 61982CJ0034 | Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging. | 9 | 9 THUS THE CONCEPT OF MATTERS RELATING TO A CONTRACT SERVES AS A CRITERION TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF ONE OF THE RULES OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION AVAILABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF . HAVING REGARD TO THE OBJECTIVES AND THE GENERAL SCHEME OF THE CONVENTION , THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT , IN ORDER TO ENSURE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE THE EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS ARISING OUT OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE CONTRACTING STATES AND THE PERSONS CONCERNED , THAT CONCEPT SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED SIMPLY AS REFERRING TO THE NATIONAL LAW OF ONE OR OTHER OF THE STATES CONCERNED .
| 1983-03-22 |
620 | 62000CJ0265 | Campina Melkunie BV v Benelux-Merkenbureau. | 34 | 2004-02-12 | 34. By virtue of the Court ' s case-law, the various grounds for refusing registration set out in Article 3 of the Directive must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them (see, inter alia, Case C-299/99 Philips [2002] ECR I-5475, paragraph 77, Linde , paragraph 71, and Case C-104/01 Libertel [2003] ECR I-3793, paragraph 51). | 61999CJ0299 | Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd. | 77 | 77 The various grounds for refusal of registration listed in Article 3 of the Directive must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them (see, to that effect, Windsurfing Chiemsee, paragraphs 25 to 27). | 2002-06-18 |
621 | 62000CJ0266 | Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. | 28 | 2001-03-08 | 28 In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC, a directive is binding, as to the results to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed. This obligation entails compliance with the time-limits set by directives (Case 10/76 Commission v Italy [1976] ECR 1359, paragraph 12). | 61976CJ0010 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 12 | 12 THE MANDATORY NATURE OF DIRECTIVES ENTAILS THE OBLIGATION FOR ALL MEMBER STATES TO COMPLY WITH THE TIME-LIMITS CONTAINED THEREIN IN ORDER THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION SHALL BE ACHIEVED UNIFORMLY WITHIN THE WHOLE COMMUNITY .
| 1976-09-22 |
622 | 62000CJ0271 | Gemeente Steenbergen v Luc Baten. | 43 | 2002-11-14 | 43 In view of the link between the Brussels Convention and Community law (see Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 12, and Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, paragraph 24), regard must be had to the substance of that concept in Community law. | 61998CJ0007 | Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski. | 24 | 24 It should be noted in this regard that, since the Convention was concluded on the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty and within the framework which it defines, its provisions are linked to the Treaty (Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 12). | 2000-03-28 |
623 | 61989CJ0214 | Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit. | 14 | 1992-03-10 | 14 Accordingly, as the Court has held for similar reasons as regards, in particular, the concept of "matters relating to a contract" and other concepts, referred to in Article 5 of the Convention, which serve as criteria for determining special jurisdiction (see the judgment in Case 34/82 Peters v ZNAV [1983] ECR 987, paragraphs 9 and 10), the concept of "agreement conferring jurisdiction" in Article 17 must be regarded as an independent concept. | 61982CJ0034 | Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging. | 10 | 10 THEREFORE , AND AS THE COURT RULED ON SIMILAR GROUNDS IN RELATION TO THE WORDS ' ' THE OPERATION OF A BRANCH , AGENCY OR OTHER ESTABLISHMENT ' ' REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 5 ( 5 ) OF THE CONVENTION ( JUDGMENT OF 22 . 11 . 1978 IN CASE 33/78 SOMAFER V SAAR-FERNGAS AG ( 1978 ) ECR 2183 ), THE CONCEPT OF MATTERS RELATING TO A CONTRACT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INDEPENDENT CONCEPT WHICH , FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION , MUST BE INTERPRETED BY REFERENCE CHIEFLY TO THE SYSTEM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE CONVENTION , IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT IT IS FULLY EFFECTIVE .
| 1983-03-22 |
624 | 61989CJ0214 | Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit. | 15 | 1992-03-10 | 15 In that connection, it must be recalled that, when it was requested to interpret the concept of "matters relating to a contract", referred to in Article 5 of the Convention, the Court held that the obligations imposed on a person in his capacity as member of an association were to be considered to be contractual obligations, on the ground that membership of an association created between the members close links of the same kind as those which are created between the parties to a contract (see the judgment in Case 34/82 Peters v ZNAV, referred to above, paragraph 13). | 61982CJ0034 | Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging. | 13 | 13 IN THAT REGARD IT APPEARS THAT MEMBERSHIP OF AN ASSOCIATION CREATES BETWEEN THE MEMBERS CLOSE LINKS OF THE SAME KIND AS THOSE WHICH ARE CREATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE OBLIGATIONS TO WHICH THE NATIONAL COURT REFERS MAY BE REGARDED AS CONTRACTUAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 5 ( 1 ) OF THE CONVENTION .
| 1983-03-22 |
625 | 61989CJ0214 | Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Petereit. | 24 | 1992-03-10 | 24 As the Court held in Case 24/76 Estasis Salotti v Ruewa [1976] ECR 1831, paragraph 7, the purpose of the formal requirements imposed by Article 17 is to ensure that the consensus between the parties is in fact established. | 61976CJ0024 | Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani s.n.c. v Rüwa Polstereimaschinen GmbH. | 7 | 7 THE WAY IN WHICH THAT PROVISION IS TO BE APPLIED MUST BE INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF THE EFFECT OF THE CONFERMENT OF JURISDICTION BY CONSENT , WHICH IS TO EXCLUDE BOTH THE JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 2 AND THE SPECIAL JURISDICTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLES 5 AND 6 OF THE CONVENTION .
IN VIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCES THAT SUCH AN OPTION MAY HAVE ON THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION , THE REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 17 GOVERNING THE VALIDITY OF CLAUSES CONFERRING JURISDICTION MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED .
BY MAKING SUCH VALIDITY SUBJECT TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN ' AGREEMENT ' BETWEEN THE PARTIES , ARTICLE 17 IMPOSES ON THE COURT BEFORE WHICH THE MATTER IS BROUGHT THE DUTY OF EXAMINING , FIRST , WHETHER THE CLAUSE CONFERRING JURISDICTION UPON IT WAS IN FACT THE SUBJECT OF A CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE PARTIES , WHICH MUST BE CLEARLY AND PRECISELY DEMONSTRATED .
THE PURPOSE OF THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 17 IS TO ENSURE THAT THE CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS IN FACT ESTABLISHED .
THE QUESTIONS REFERRED TO THE COURT BY THE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF MUST BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS .
ON THE QUESTION REFERRED BY THE BUNDESGERICHTSHOF | 1976-12-14 |
626 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 8 | 1990-12-11 | 8 It must first be noted that the Community legislation on the additional levy on milk did not originally contain any specific provision for the grant of a reference quantity to producers who had not, pursuant to an undertaking given under Regulation No 1078/77, delivered milk during the reference year adopted by the Member State concerned . However, in its judgments in Case 120/86 Mulder [1988] ECR 2321, paragraph 28, and Case 170/86 von Deetzen [1988] ECR 2355, paragraph 17, the Court declared those provisions invalid for breach of the principle of legitimate expectations in so far as they did not provide for the allocation of such a reference quantity . | 61986CJ0120 | J. Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij. | 28 | 28 IL Y A LIEU, PAR CONSEQUENT, DE REPONDRE A LA DEUXIEME QUESTION QUE LE REGLEMENT N* 857/84 DU CONSEIL, DU 31 MARS 1984, TEL QUE COMPLETE PAR LE REGLEMENT N* 1371/84 DE LA COMMISSION, DU 16 MAI 1984, EST INVALIDE DANS LA MESURE OU IL NE PREVOIT PAS L' ATTRIBUTION D' UNE QUANTITE DE REFERENCE AUX PRODUCTEURS N' AYANT PAS, EN EXECUTION D' UN ENGAGEMENT PRIS AU TITRE DU REGLEMENT N* 1078/77 DU CONSEIL, DU 17 MAI 1977, LIVRE DE LAIT PENDANT L' ANNEE DE REFERENCE RETENUE PAR L' ETAT MEMBRE CONCERNE .
SUR LA TROISIEME QUESTION | 1988-04-28 |
627 | 62000CJ0271 | Gemeente Steenbergen v Luc Baten. | 43 | 2002-11-14 | 43 In view of the link between the Brussels Convention and Community law (see Case C-398/92 Mund & Fester [1994] ECR I-467, paragraph 12, and Case C-7/98 Krombach [2000] ECR I-1935, paragraph 24), regard must be had to the substance of that concept in Community law. | 61992CJ0398 | Mund & Fester v Hatrex Internationaal Transport. | 12 | 12 It is on the basis of that article and within the framework defined by it that the Member States concluded the Brussels Convention. Consequently, the provisions of that Convention relating to jurisdiction and to the simplification of formalities concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments and also the national provisions to which the Convention refers are linked to the EEC Treaty. | 1994-02-10 |
628 | 62000CJ0277 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 46 | 2004-04-29 | 46. After the reunification of Germany that provision was not repealed either by the Treaty on European Union or by the Treaty of Amsterdam (see, inter alia, Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 47). | 61998CJ0156 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 47 | 47 After the reunification of Germany that provision was not repealed either by the Treaty on European Union or by the Treaty of Amsterdam. | 2000-09-19 |
629 | 62000CJ0277 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 51 | 2004-04-29 | 51. By contrast, the idea that Article 87(2)(c) EC permits full compensation for the undeniable economic lack of development suffered by the new Länder disregards both the nature of that provision as a derogation and its context and aims (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 53). | 61998CJ0156 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 53 | 53 By contrast, the conception advanced by the German Government, according to which Article 92(2)(c) of the Treaty permits full compensation for the undeniable economic backwardness suffered by the new Länder, disregards both the nature of that provision as a derogation and its context and aims. | 2000-09-19 |
630 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 8 | 1990-12-11 | 8 It must first be noted that the Community legislation on the additional levy on milk did not originally contain any specific provision for the grant of a reference quantity to producers who had not, pursuant to an undertaking given under Regulation No 1078/77, delivered milk during the reference year adopted by the Member State concerned . However, in its judgments in Case 120/86 Mulder [1988] ECR 2321, paragraph 28, and Case 170/86 von Deetzen [1988] ECR 2355, paragraph 17, the Court declared those provisions invalid for breach of the principle of legitimate expectations in so far as they did not provide for the allocation of such a reference quantity . | 61986CJ0170 | Georg von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas. | 17 | 17 IL Y A LIEU, PAR CONSEQUENT, DE REPONDRE A LA QUESTION POSEE QUE LE REGLEMENT N* 857/84 DU CONSEIL, DU 31 MARS 1984, TEL QUE COMPLETE PAR LE REGLEMENT N* 1371/84 DE LA COMMISSION, DU 16 MAI 1984, EST INVALIDE DANS LA MESURE OU IL NE PREVOIT PAS L' ATTRIBUTION D' UNE QUANTITE DE REFERENCE AUX PRODUCTEURS N' AYANT PAS, EN EXECUTION D' UN ENGAGEMENT PRIS AU TITRE DU REGLEMENT N* 1078/77 DU CONSEIL, DU 17 MAI 1977, LIVRE DE LAIT PENDANT L' ANNEE DE REFERENCE RETENUE PAR L' ETAT MEMBRE CONCERNE . | 1988-04-28 |
631 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 9 | 1990-12-11 | 9 In those judgments, the Court stated, on the one hand, that a producer who had voluntarily ceased production for a certain period could not legitimately expect to resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime ( Mulder, paragraph 23; von Deetzen, paragraph 12 ), but, on the other hand, that where such a producer had been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium he could legitimately expect not to be subject, on the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affected him by very reason of the fact that he had availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions ( Mulder, paragraph 24; von Deetzen, paragraph 13 ). | 61986CJ0120 | J. Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij. | 23 | 23 A CET EGARD, IL CONVIENT D' ADMETTRE, AINSI QUE LE GOUVERNEMENT NEERLANDAIS ET LA COMMISSION L' ONT FAIT OBSERVER AVEC RAISON, QU' UN OPERATEUR AYANT LIBREMENT ARRETE SA PRODUCTION PENDANT UN CERTAIN TEMPS NE PEUT PAS LEGITIMEMENT S' ATTENDRE A POUVOIR REPRENDRE LA PRODUCTION DANS LES MEMES CONDITIONS QUE CELLES QUI PREVALAIENT AUPARAVANT ET A NE PAS ETRE SOUMIS A D' EVENTUELLES REGLES, ENTRE-TEMPS ARRETEES, RELEVANT DE LA POLITIQUE DES MARCHES OU DE LA POLITIQUE DES STRUCTURES . | 1988-04-28 |
632 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 9 | 1990-12-11 | 9 In those judgments, the Court stated, on the one hand, that a producer who had voluntarily ceased production for a certain period could not legitimately expect to resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime ( Mulder, paragraph 23; von Deetzen, paragraph 12 ), but, on the other hand, that where such a producer had been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium he could legitimately expect not to be subject, on the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affected him by very reason of the fact that he had availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions ( Mulder, paragraph 24; von Deetzen, paragraph 13 ). | 61986CJ0120 | J. Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Visserij. | 24 | 24 IL N' EN RESTE PAS MOINS QU' UN TEL OPERATEUR, LORSQU' IL A, COMME EN L' ESPECE, ETE INCITE, PAR UN ACTE DE LA COMMUNAUTE, A SUSPENDRE LA COMMERCIALISATION POUR UNE PERIODE LIMITEE, DANS L' INTERET GENERAL ET CONTRE PAIEMENT D' UNE PRIME, PEUT LEGITIMEMENT S' ATTENDRE A NE PAS ETRE SOUMIS, A LA FIN DE SON ENGAGEMENT, A DES RESTRICTIONS QUI L' AFFECTENT DE MANIERE SPECIFIQUE EN RAISON PRECISEMENT DU FAIT QU' IL AVAIT FAIT USAGE DES POSSIBILITES OFFERTES PAR LA REGLEMENTATION COMMUNAUTAIRE . | 1988-04-28 |
633 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 9 | 1990-12-11 | 9 In those judgments, the Court stated, on the one hand, that a producer who had voluntarily ceased production for a certain period could not legitimately expect to resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime ( Mulder, paragraph 23; von Deetzen, paragraph 12 ), but, on the other hand, that where such a producer had been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium he could legitimately expect not to be subject, on the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affected him by very reason of the fact that he had availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions ( Mulder, paragraph 24; von Deetzen, paragraph 13 ). | 61986CJ0170 | Georg von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas. | 12 | 12 A CET EGARD, IL CONVIENT D' ADMETTRE, AINSI QUE LA COMMISSION L' A FAIT OBSERVER AVEC RAISON, QU' UN OPERATEUR AYANT LIBREMENT ARRETE SA PRODUCTION PENDANT UN CERTAIN TEMPS NE PEUT PAS LEGITIMEMENT S' ATTENDRE A POUVOIR REPRENDRE LA PRODUCTION DANS LES MEMES CONDITIONS QUE CELLES QUI PREVALAIENT AUPARAVANT, ET A NE PAS ETRE SOUMIS A D' EVENTUELLES REGLES, ENTRE-TEMPS ARRETEES, RELEVANT DE LA POLITIQUE DES MARCHES OU DE LA POLITIQUE DES STRUCTURES . | 1988-04-28 |
634 | 62000CJ0277 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 52 | 2004-04-29 | 52. The economic disadvantages suffered by the new Länder as a whole were not directly caused by the geographical division of Germany within the meaning of Article 87(2)(c) EC (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 54). | 61998CJ0156 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 54 | 54 The economic disadvantages suffered by the new Länder as a whole have not been directly caused by the geographical division of Germany within the meaning of Article 92(2)(c) of the Treaty. | 2000-09-19 |
635 | 62000CJ0277 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 53 | 2004-04-29 | 53. It follows that the differences in development between the original and the new Länder are explained by causes other than the geographical rift caused by the division of Germany and in particular by the different politico-economic systems set up in each part of Germany (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 55). | 61998CJ0156 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 55 | 55 It follows that the differences in development between the original and the new Länder are explained by causes other than the geographical rift caused by the division of Germany and in particular by the different politico-economic systems set up in each part of Germany. | 2000-09-19 |
636 | 62000CJ0278 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 112 | 2004-04-29 | 112. In that regard, it should be pointed out that, although unsurmountable difficulties may prevent a Member State from complying with its obligations under Community law (see to that effect Case 101/84 Commission v Italy [1985] ECR 2629, paragraph 16), mere apprehension of such difficulties cannot justify the State’s failure to apply that law correctly (see Case C-52/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-4443, paragraph 38, and Case C-265/95 Commissio n v France [1997] ECR I-6959, paragraph 55). | 61995CJ0052 | Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. | 38 | 38 That argument cannot be accepted. Mere apprehension of internal difficulties cannot justify a failure to apply the rules in question. | 1995-12-07 |
637 | 61989CJ0217 | Josef Pastätter v Hauptzollamt Bad Reichenhall. | 9 | 1990-12-11 | 9 In those judgments, the Court stated, on the one hand, that a producer who had voluntarily ceased production for a certain period could not legitimately expect to resume production under the same conditions as those which previously applied and not to be subject to any rules of market or structural policy adopted in the meantime ( Mulder, paragraph 23; von Deetzen, paragraph 12 ), but, on the other hand, that where such a producer had been encouraged by a Community measure to suspend marketing for a limited period in the general interest and against payment of a premium he could legitimately expect not to be subject, on the expiry of his undertaking, to restrictions which specifically affected him by very reason of the fact that he had availed himself of the possibilities offered by the Community provisions ( Mulder, paragraph 24; von Deetzen, paragraph 13 ). | 61986CJ0170 | Georg von Deetzen v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas. | 13 | 13 IL N' EN RESTE PAS MOINS QU' UN TEL OPERATEUR, LORSQU' IL A, COMME EN L' ESPECE, ETE INCITE, PAR UN ACTE DE LA COMMUNAUTE, A SUSPENDRE LA COMMERCIALISATION POUR UNE PERIODE LIMITEE, DANS L' INTERET GENERAL ET CONTRE PAIEMENT D' UNE PRIME, PEUT LEGITIMEMENT S' ATTENDRE A NE PAS ETRE SOUMIS, A LA FIN DE SON ENGAGEMENT, A DES RESTRICTIONS SPECIFIQUES EN RAISON PRECISEMENT DU FAIT QU' IL AVAIT FAIT USAGE DES POSSIBILITES OFFERTES PAR LA REGLEMENTATION COMMUNAUTAIRE . | 1988-04-28 |
638 | 61989CJ0221 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others. | 13 | 1991-07-25 | 13 It must be observed in the first place that, as Community law stands at present, competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels is vested in the Member States. As far as fishing vessels in particular are concerned, the Court held in the judgment in Case 223/86 (Pesca Valentia v Minister for Fisheries and Forestry [1988] ECR 83, at paragraph 13) that the provisions of Council Regulation No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) referred to fishing vessels "flying the flag" of a Member State or "registered" there but left those terms to be defined in the legislation of the Member States. | 61986CJ0223 | Pesca Valentia Limited v Ministry for Fisheries and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney General. | 13 | 13 IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THAT REGULATION DID INTRODUCE RULES INTENDED TO COORDINATE THE STRUCTURAL POLICIES OF THE MEMBER STATES AND TO REQUIRE THE MEMBER STATES TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO AND USE OF STOCKS . IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES, THE REGULATION REQUIRES THE MEMBER STATES TO SEND INFORMATION TO THE COMMISSION ( ARTICLES 5 AND 10 ), PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING COMMUNITY MEASURES ON FISHING ( ARTICLE 4 ) AND A PROCEDURE ( ARTICLE 6 ) ENABLING COMMUNITY MEASURES ON THE COORDINATION OF STRUCTURAL FISHING POLICIES TO BE ADOPTED ( ARTICLE 7 ). HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION THAT, PENDING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SUCH COMMUNITY MEASURES, THE MEMBER STATES MAY APPLY THEIR OWN RULES IN RESPECT OF FISHING IN THE MARITIME WATERS COMING UNDER THEIR SOVEREIGNTY OR WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION ( ARTICLE 2 ) AND DEFINE THEIR STRUCTURAL POLICY FOR THE FISHING INDUSTRY ( ARTICLE 1 ). FURTHERMORE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION REFER TO FISHING VESSELS "FLYING THE FLAG" OF A MEMBER STATE OR "REGISTERED" THERE, LEAVING THESE TERMS TO BE DEFINED IN THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATES . | 1988-01-19 |
639 | 61989CJ0221 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others. | 14 | 1991-07-25 | 14 Nevertheless, powers which are retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see most recently the judgments in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, at paragraph 9, and in Case 127/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333, at paragraph 7). | 61986CJ0057 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 9 | 9 As regards the argument that the repayment of interest is merely monetary in character, it is sufficient to point out that the Court has held ( Case 11/69, supra, and judgment of 9 June 1982 in Case 95/81 Commission v Italy (( 1982 )) ECR 2187 ) that the exercise by the Member States of the powers retained by them in the monetary field do not permit them unilaterally to adopt measures prohibited by the Treaty . | 1988-06-07 |
640 | 61989CJ0221 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others. | 14 | 1991-07-25 | 14 Nevertheless, powers which are retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see most recently the judgments in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, at paragraph 9, and in Case 127/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333, at paragraph 7). | 61987CJ0127 | Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. | 7 | 7 The monetary objective of the contested measure is not such as to justify it . As the Court has consistently held ( see, most recently, the judgment of 7 June 1988 in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission (( 1988 )) ECR 0000 ), the fact that Member States retain certain monetary powers does not entitle them to take unilateral measures prohibited by the Treaty . | 1988-06-21 |
641 | 62000CJ0278 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 62 | 2004-04-29 | 62. For reasons of legal certainty and equality of treatment, the Commission may consider, as a general rule, that it is legitimate to apply the reference rate in force during a certain period to all loans granted during that period (Case C-457/00 Belgium v Commission [2003] ECR I-6931, paragraph 72). | 62000CJ0457 | Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities. | 72 | 72. For reasons of legal certainty and equal treatment, the Commission considers as a general rule that it is legitimate to apply the reference rate in force during a given period to all the loans granted during that period. | 2003-07-03 |
642 | 62000CJ0278 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 81 | 2004-04-29 | 81. Since it constitutes a derogation from the general principle laid down in Article 87(1) EC that State aid is incompatible with the common market Article 87(2)(b) EC must be construed narrowly (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 49, and Case C-301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66). | 61996CJ0301 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 49 | 49. By order of 4 February 1997, the Court stayed the proceedings in the present case pending judgment by the Court of First Instance in Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96. | 2003-09-30 |
643 | 62000CJ0278 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 81 | 2004-04-29 | 81. Since it constitutes a derogation from the general principle laid down in Article 87(1) EC that State aid is incompatible with the common market Article 87(2)(b) EC must be construed narrowly (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 49, and Case C-301/96 Germany v Commission [2003] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 66). | 61996CJ0301 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 66 | 66. However, since it constitutes a derogation from the general principle laid down in Article 92(1) of the Treaty that State aid is incompatible with the common market, Article 92(2)(c) must be interpreted narrowly (Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , paragraph 49). | 2003-09-30 |
644 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 12 | 1991-02-07 | 12 With regard to the doubts expressed by the Sozialgericht as to the compatibility with Community law of national provisions establishing different age limits for retirement, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment of 5 July 1988 in Case 21/87 Borowitz v Bundesversicherungsanstalt fuer Angestellte [1988] ECR 3715, at paragraph 23) that Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security but allows different national schemes to exist. As the Court has further held on several occasions (see in particular the judgment of 15 January 1986 in Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d' allocations familiales [1986] ECR 1, at paragraph 20), Article 51 leaves in being differences between the Member States' social security systems and, consequently, in the rights of persons working in the Member States. It follows that substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States are unaffected by Article 51 of the Treaty. | 61984CJ0041 | Pietro Pinna v Caisse d'allocations familiales de la Savoie. | 20 | 20 AS REGARDS THE DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT BETWEEN WORKERS TO WHOM ARTICLE 73 ( 1 ) APPLIES AND WORKERS SUBJECT TO THE ARRANGEMENTS LAID DOWN IN ARTICLE 73 ( 2 ), IT MUST BE OBSERVED THAT ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR THE COORDINATION , NOT THE HARMONIZATION , OF THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATES . AS A RESULT , ARTICLE 51 LEAVES IN BEING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES ' SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS AND , CONSEQUENTLY , IN THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WORKING IN THE MEMBER STATES . IT FOLLOWS THAT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES , AND HENCE IN THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WORKING IN THE MEMBER STATES , ARE UNAFFECTED BY ARTICLE 51 OF THE TREATY .
| 1986-01-15 |
645 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 12 | 1991-02-07 | 12 With regard to the doubts expressed by the Sozialgericht as to the compatibility with Community law of national provisions establishing different age limits for retirement, it should be noted that the Court has consistently held (see in particular the judgment of 5 July 1988 in Case 21/87 Borowitz v Bundesversicherungsanstalt fuer Angestellte [1988] ECR 3715, at paragraph 23) that Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security but allows different national schemes to exist. As the Court has further held on several occasions (see in particular the judgment of 15 January 1986 in Case 41/84 Pinna v Caisse d' allocations familiales [1986] ECR 1, at paragraph 20), Article 51 leaves in being differences between the Member States' social security systems and, consequently, in the rights of persons working in the Member States. It follows that substantive and procedural differences between the social security systems of individual Member States are unaffected by Article 51 of the Treaty. | 61987CJ0021 | Felix Borowitz v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 23 | 23 The problem raised having been defined in this way, it must be noted that, as the Court has stated on many occasions ( see for example judgment of 12 July 1979 in Case 266/78 Brunori v Landesversicherungsanstalt Rheinprovinz (( 1979 )) ECR 2705; judgment of 12 June 1980 in Case 733/79 Caisse de Compensation des allocations familiales des régions de Charleroi et de Namur v Laterza (( 1980 )) ECR 1915; and judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (( 1980 )) ECR 2205 ), Regulation No 1408/71 does not set up a common scheme of social security but allows different national schemes to exist and its sole objective is to coordinate those national schemes . | 1988-07-05 |
646 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 26 | 1991-02-07 | 26 According to the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgments of 24 October 1975 in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13, 25 February 1986 in Case 254/84 De Jong v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1986] ECR 671, at paragraph 15, and 14 December 1989 in Case C-168/88 Dammer v Securex Kinderbijslagfonds [1989] ECR 4553, at paragraph 21), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the legislation of a single Member State. In its judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 (Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1980] ECR 2205, at paragraph 7), the Court accordingly concluded that the application of Community rules could not bring about a reduction in the benefits awarded by virtue of the legislation of a single Member State. | 61984CJ0254 | G. J. J. De Jong v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank. | 15 | 15 ARTICLE 51 REQUIRES THE COUNCIL TO ADOPT SUCH MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SECURITY AS ARE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS BY SECURING , INTER ALIA , PAYMENT OF BENEFITS FOR PERSONS RESIDENT IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE MEMBER STATES . THE AIM OF ARTICLES 48 TO 51 WOULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF , AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT , WORKERS WERE TO LOSE THE ADVANTAGES IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SECURITY GUARANTEED TO THEM BY THE LAWS OF A SINGLE MEMBER STATE .
| 1986-02-25 |
647 | 62000CJ0278 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 82 | 2004-04-29 | 82. Consequently, only economic disadvantages directly caused by natural disasters or by exceptional occurrences qualify for compensation as provided for in that provision(see to this effect Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 54, and Case C-301/96 Germany v Commission , cited above, paragraph 72). | 61996CJ0301 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 72 | 72. Consequently, as follows clearly from paragraph 54 of Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission , it is only the economic disadvantages directly caused by the geographical division of Germany which may be compensated for within the meaning of that provision. | 2003-09-30 |
648 | 62000CJ0287 | Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. | 19 | 2002-06-20 | 19 Second, the reasoned opinion must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Commission v Italy, paragraph 12). | 61999CJ0439 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 12 | 12 Second, the reasoned opinion must contain a cogent and detailed exposition of the reasons which led the Commission to the conclusion that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil one of its obligations under the Treaty (see, in particular, Case C-207/96 Commission v Italy [1997] ECR I-6869, paragraph 18). | 2002-01-15 |
649 | 62000CJ0295 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 10 | 2002-02-19 | 10 The freedom laid down by Article 59 of the Treaty precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 17). | 61993CJ0381 | Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. | 17 | 17 In the perspective of a single market and in order to permit the realization of its objectives, that freedom likewise precludes the application of any national legislation which has the effect of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision of services purely within one Member State. | 1994-10-05 |
650 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 26 | 1991-02-07 | 26 According to the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgments of 24 October 1975 in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13, 25 February 1986 in Case 254/84 De Jong v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1986] ECR 671, at paragraph 15, and 14 December 1989 in Case C-168/88 Dammer v Securex Kinderbijslagfonds [1989] ECR 4553, at paragraph 21), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the legislation of a single Member State. In its judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 (Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1980] ECR 2205, at paragraph 7), the Court accordingly concluded that the application of Community rules could not bring about a reduction in the benefits awarded by virtue of the legislation of a single Member State. | 61988CJ0168 | Theo Dammer v VZW Securex Kinderbijslagfonds and Rijksdienst voor Kinderbijslag der Werknemers. | 21 | 21 According to the Court' s previous decisions, in particular its judgment of 21 October 1975 in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS (( 1975 )) ECR 1149, paragraph 13, the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the legislation of a single Member State . In paragraph 7 of its judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 Gravina and Others v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben (( 1980 )) ECR 2205, the Court accordingly concluded that the application of Community rules may not bring about a reduction in the benefits awarded by virtue of such legislation . | 1989-12-14 |
651 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 26 | 1991-02-07 | 26 According to the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgments of 24 October 1975 in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13, 25 February 1986 in Case 254/84 De Jong v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1986] ECR 671, at paragraph 15, and 14 December 1989 in Case C-168/88 Dammer v Securex Kinderbijslagfonds [1989] ECR 4553, at paragraph 21), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the legislation of a single Member State. In its judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 (Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1980] ECR 2205, at paragraph 7), the Court accordingly concluded that the application of Community rules could not bring about a reduction in the benefits awarded by virtue of the legislation of a single Member State. | 61979CJ0807 | Giacomo Gravina and others v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben. | 7 | 7 THE REGULATIONS ON SOCIAL SECURITY FOR MIGRANT WORKERS DID NOT SET UP A COMMON SCHEME OF SOCIAL SECURITY , BUT ALLOWED DIFFERENT SCHEMES TO EXIST , CREATING DIFFERENT CLAIMS ON DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS AGAINST WHICH THE CLAIMANT POSSESSES DIRECT RIGHTS BY VIRTUE EITHER OF NATIONAL LAW ALONE OR OF NATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENTED , WHERE NECESSARY , BY COMMUNITY LAW RELATING , IN PARTICULAR , TO THE LIFTING OF CONDITIONS OF RESIDENCE . IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 6 MARCH 1979 IN CASE 100/78 ROSSI V CAISSE DE COMPENSATION POUR ALLOCATIONS FAMILIALES ( 1979 ) ECR 831 THE COURT STATED , MOREOVER , THAT ' ' THE COMMUNITY RULES COULD NOT , IN THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS EXCEPTION CONSISTENT WITH THE AIMS OF THE TREATY , BE APPLIED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DEPRIVE A MIGRANT WORKER OR HIS DEPENDANTS OF THE BENEFIT OF A PART OF THE LEGISLATION OF A MEMBER STATE ' ' . NOR MAY THOSE RULES BRING ABOUT A REDUCTION IN THE BENEFITS AWARDED BY VIRTUE OF THAT LEGISLATION . REGULATION NO 1408/71 , IN LAYING DOWN RULES FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE VARIOUS NATIONAL LAWS , IS INSPIRED IN FACT BY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE SAID RULES MUST GUARANTEE WORKERS MOVING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY THE ENTIRETY OF BENEFITS ACQUIRED IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES UP TO THE LIMIT OF THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF THOSE BENEFITS .
| 1980-07-09 |
652 | 61989CJ0227 | Ludwig Rönfeldt v Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte. | 26 | 1991-02-07 | 26 According to the case-law of the Court (see in particular the judgments of 24 October 1975 in Case 24/75 Petroni v ONPTS [1975] ECR 1149, at paragraph 13, 25 February 1986 in Case 254/84 De Jong v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1986] ECR 671, at paragraph 15, and 14 December 1989 in Case C-168/88 Dammer v Securex Kinderbijslagfonds [1989] ECR 4553, at paragraph 21), the aim of Articles 48 to 51 of the Treaty would not be attained if, as a consequence of the exercise of their right to freedom of movement, workers were to lose advantages in the field of social security guaranteed to them in any event by the legislation of a single Member State. In its judgment of 9 July 1980 in Case 807/79 (Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1980] ECR 2205, at paragraph 7), the Court accordingly concluded that the application of Community rules could not bring about a reduction in the benefits awarded by virtue of the legislation of a single Member State. | 61975CJ0024 | Teresa and Silvana Petroni v Office national des pensions pour travailleurs salariés (ONPTS), Bruxelles. | 13 | 13 THE AIM OF ARTICLES 48 TO 51 WOULD NOT BE ATTAINED IF, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, WORKERS WERE TO LOSE ADVANTAGES IN THE FIELD OF SOCIAL SECURITY GUARANTEED TO THEM IN ANY EVENT BY THE LAWS OF A SINGLE MEMBER STATE . | 1975-10-21 |
653 | 62000CJ0295 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 11 | 2002-02-19 | 11 Consequently, the provision of maritime transport services between Member States cannot be subject to stricter conditions than those to which analogous provisions of services at domestic level are subject (Commission v France, cited above, paragraph 18). | 61993CJ0381 | Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. | 18 | 18 Consequently, the provision of maritime transport services between Member States cannot be subject to stricter conditions than those to which analogous provisions of services at domestic level are subject. | 1994-10-05 |
654 | 62000CJ0297 | Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. | 15 | 2001-07-03 | 15 It must be observed, at the outset, that there are no grounds for the Court to stay the proceedings (see, in particular, Case C-47/99 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-8999, paragraph 12). | 61999CJ0047 | Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. | 12 | 12 It should be observed at the outset that there are no grounds for the Court to suspend the proceedings. | 1999-12-16 |
655 | 62000CJ0302 | Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. | 15 | 2002-02-27 | 15 The setting of a minimum retail selling price by public authorities inevitably has the effect of limiting the freedom of producers and importers to determine their maximum retail selling prices since, in any event, those prices cannot be lower than the compulsory minimum price (Case C-216/98 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-8921, paragraph 21). | 61998CJ0216 | Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. | 21 | 21 However, the setting of a minimum selling price by public authorities inevitably has the effect of limiting the freedom of producers and importers to determine their maximum retail selling prices since, in any event, such prices cannot be any lower than the compulsory minimum price. | 2000-10-19 |
656 | 61989CJ0228 | Farfalla Flemming und Partner v Hauptzollamt München-West. | 12 | 1990-09-18 | 12 In answering those questions it must be borne in mind at the outset that the distinction between CCT headings cannot be based on qualities which are defined essentially by reference to subjective and indeterminate criteria but must be founded on the objective criteria adopted by the CCT for the purposes both of its effective operation and of legal certainty ( see judgments in Case 23/77 Westfaelischer Kunstverein v Hauptzollamt Muenster [1977] ECR 1985, paragraph 3, and Case C-1/89 Raab [1989] ECR 4423, paragraph 25 ). | 61989CJ0001 | Ingrid Raab v Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof. | 25 | 25 That is the case in particular since, as the Court has pointed out ( see judgment in Case 23/77 Westfaelischer Kunstverein, cited above, paragraph 3 ), the possible artistic merit of an article is defined essentially by reference to subjective and indeterminate criteria, whereas tariff classification must be founded on the objective criteria adopted by the Common Customs Tariff for the purposes both of its effective operation and of legal certainty . | 1989-12-13 |
657 | 61989CJ0228 | Farfalla Flemming und Partner v Hauptzollamt München-West. | 12 | 1990-09-18 | 12 In answering those questions it must be borne in mind at the outset that the distinction between CCT headings cannot be based on qualities which are defined essentially by reference to subjective and indeterminate criteria but must be founded on the objective criteria adopted by the CCT for the purposes both of its effective operation and of legal certainty ( see judgments in Case 23/77 Westfaelischer Kunstverein v Hauptzollamt Muenster [1977] ECR 1985, paragraph 3, and Case C-1/89 Raab [1989] ECR 4423, paragraph 25 ). | 61977CJ0023 | Westfälischer Kunstverein v Hauptzollamt Münster. | 3 | 3 THE ACTION THEREFORE CONCERNS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO HEADINGS IN THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF , ONE OF WHICH , SUBHEADING 49.11 B , FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL CATEGORY ' PRINTED BOOKS , NEWSPAPERS , PICTURES AND OTHER PRODUCTS OF THE PRINTING INDUSTRY ; MANUSCRIPTS , TYPESCRIPTS AND PLANS ' ( CHAPTER 49 ) WHILE THE OTHER , HEADING 99.02 , IS COVERED BY THE CONCEPT OF ' WORKS OF ART , COLLECTORS ' PIECES , AND ANTIQUES ' ( CHAPTER 99 ).
THAT DISTINCTION CANNOT BE BASED ON THE POSSIBLE ARTISTIC MERIT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED ARTICLES , SOMETHING WHICH IS DEFINED ESSENTIALLY BY REFERENCE TO SUBJECTIVE AND INDETERMINATE CRITERIA , BUT MUST BE FOUNDED ON THE OBJECTIVE CRITERIA ADOPTED BY THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF FOR THE PURPOSES BOTH OF ITS EFFECTIVE OPERATION AND OF LEGAL CERTAINTY .
| 1977-10-27 |
658 | 61989CJ0228 | Farfalla Flemming und Partner v Hauptzollamt München-West. | 13 | 1990-09-18 | 13 As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must be sought generally in their objective characteristics and qualities, as defined in the relevant heading of the CCT and in the notes to the sections or chapters ( see for example Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 13, and Case 252/84 Collector Guns v Hauptzollamt Koblenz [1985] ECR 3387, paragraph 10 ). | 61984CJ0200 | Erika Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen. | 13 | 13 AS THE COURT HAS REPEATEDLY HELD , THE DECISIVE CRITERION FOR THE CUSTOMS CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS MUST BE SOUGHT GENERALLY IN THEIR OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITIES , AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT HEADING OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF AND IN THE NOTES TO THE SECTIONS OR CHAPTERS .
| 1985-10-10 |
659 | 61989CJ0228 | Farfalla Flemming und Partner v Hauptzollamt München-West. | 13 | 1990-09-18 | 13 As the Court has held on numerous occasions, the decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods must be sought generally in their objective characteristics and qualities, as defined in the relevant heading of the CCT and in the notes to the sections or chapters ( see for example Case 200/84 Daiber v Hauptzollamt Reutlingen [1985] ECR 3363, paragraph 13, and Case 252/84 Collector Guns v Hauptzollamt Koblenz [1985] ECR 3387, paragraph 10 ). | 61984CJ0252 | Collector Guns GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Koblenz. | 10 | 10 AS THE COURT HAS REPEATEDLY HELD , THE DECISIVE CRITERION FOR THE CUSTOMS CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS MUST BE SOUGHT GENERALLY IN THEIR OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS AND QUALITIES , AS DEFINED IN THE RELEVANT HEADING OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF AND IN THE NOTES TO THE SECTIONS OR CHAPTERS .
| 1985-10-10 |
660 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 13 | 1991-05-07 | 13 It should be recalled at the outset that in accordance with settled case-law, Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 precludes less favourable treatment from being accorded to a social group when it is shown to be made up of a much greater number of persons of one or the other sex, unless the provision in question is "based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex" (judgment in Case C-33/89 Kowalska [1990] ECR I-2591, paragraph 16). | 61989CJ0033 | Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg. | 16 | 16 It must therefore be stated in reply to the first question submitted by the national court that Article 119 of the EEC Treaty is to be interpreted as precluding the application of a clause in a collective wage agreement applying to the national public service under which employers may exclude part-time employees from the payment of a severance grant on termination of their employment when in fact a considerably lower percentage of men than of women work part time, unless the employer shows that the exclusion is based on objectively justified factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex .
The second question | 1990-06-27 |
661 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 36 | 36 Those transitional measures must address difficulties encountered after establishment of the common organization of the market but originating in the state of national markets prior to adoption of the Regulation. | 1996-11-26 |
662 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 38 | 38 When assessing whether transitional measures are necessary, the Commission has a broad discretion, which is to be exercised in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 27 of the Regulation. As the Court held in its order in Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council, cited above, paragraph 47, the Commission, or the Council, as the case may be, are, however, obliged to take action if the difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the common organization of the market so require. | 1996-11-26 |
663 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 43 | 43 The answer to the first question must therefore be that Article 16(3) of the Regulation does not allow the Commission to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence when an exceptionally low quota was allocated to them on the basis of the reference years to be taken into consideration under Article 19(2) of the Regulation.
On the other hand, Article 30 of the Regulation authorizes and, depending on the circumstances, requires the Commission to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence when an exceptionally low quota has been allocated to them on the basis of the reference years to be taken into consideration under Article 19(2) of the Regulation, where those difficulties are inherent in the transition from the national arrangements existing before the entry into force of the Regulation to the common organization of the market and are not caused by a lack of care on the part of the traders concerned.
The second question: validity of Article 19(2) of the Regulation | 1996-11-26 |
664 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 23 | 23 In its order of 9 February 1995 the Hessischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof also referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
1. Does Article 16(3) or Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 (OJ 1993 L 47, p. 1) put the Commission under a duty to deal with cases of hardship arising because operators of category A have difficulties in continuing trading owing to the fact that, on the basis of the reference years to be taken into account under Article 19(2) of that regulation, they are allocated an exceptionally low quota and cannot switch to the market for ACP and Community bananas?
2. Is Article 19(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 invalid in so far as it makes no provision for taking other reference years into account in cases of hardship in the transitional period?
3. In the event that one of the above two questions is answered in the affirmative: on what conditions is the national court authorized to take provisional measures in proceedings for the grant of interim relief until such time as hardship arrangements are introduced or Article 19 of Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 is amplified? | 1996-11-26 |
665 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 27 | 27 As far as Article 16(3) of the Regulation is concerned, the Court has already held in its order of 29 June 1993 in Case C-280/93 R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667, paragraph 44, that that provision requires the institutions to adjust the tariff quota if this proves necessary during a marketing year to take account of exceptional circumstances affecting import conditions in particular. In such a case, the adjustment is to be effected in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 27, that is, it is for the Commission to adopt measures in accordance with the opinion of the Management Committee for Bananas. If the measures adopted are not in accordance with the opinion of that committee, the Council may take a different decision within one month. | 1996-11-26 |
666 | 62000CJ0312 | Commission of the European Communities v Camar Srl and Tico Srl. | 27 | 2002-12-10 | 27. Since the common organisation of the market came into force Camar has repeatedly requested the Commission to increase its third country banana quota by an amount equal to the difference between the traditional quantity of Somalian bananas provided for by Regulation No 404/93 (60 000 tonnes) and the quantities which Camar actually imported or could have imported into the Community, and to issue it with licences corresponding to the difference between those quantities. The applicant cited as precedents here the measures which the Commission had adopted after cyclones Debbie, Iris, Luis and Marilyn.
"
The actions before the Court of First Instance
Case T-79/96
4. In Case T-79/96, Camar Srl (hereinafter "Camar" ) asked the Court of First Instance to declare that, by failing to take, for the 1996 marketing year, the steps which were necessary to enable it to overcome its supply problems resulting from the crisis in Somalia and which it had sought from the Commission in the course of proceedings under the second paragraph of Article 175 of the EC Treaty (now the second paragraph of Article 232 EC) for failure to act, the Commission had infringed Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and Article 40(3) of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 34(2) EC). Camar also sought an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of such failure to act.
5. In support of its action for failure to act, Camar relied upon two grounds alleging, first, infringement of the obligation to take action imposed by Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in order to assist the transition from the various national arrangements to the common organisation of the markets established by that regulation and, secondly, the Commission's obligation to act in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination with regard to operators who had traditionally marketed bananas from certain ACP countries and from certain overseas French departments affected by the tropical storms.
Case T-260/97
6. In Case T-260/97, Camar asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 17 July 1997 (hereinafter "the Decision of 17 July 1997" ), rejecting Camar's request, pursuant to Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, that it determine the licences to be issued to Camar to import bananas from third countries and non-traditional ACP countries as a category B operator for 1997 and subsequent years on the basis of the quantities of bananas which it had marketed during the years 1988 to 1990 until its normal reference quantities were restored. It also asked that the Commission be ordered to pay compensation for the past and future losses it suffered as a result of that decision. In the alternative, it asked that the Council be ordered to pay compensation for failing to adopt special provisions under Regulation No 404/93 to deal with situations such as Camar's.
7. In support of its claims for annulment, Camar relied on several grounds, the first three of which were based on infringement of Article 30 as a result first, of incorrect interpretation of Regulation No 404/93; second, of incorrect appraisal of the facts; and third, misuse of powers.
8. In support of its claims for compensation against the Council, Camar argued that if it appeared that the Commission did not have the necessary powers to resolve the situation, it must be inferred from this that Regulation No 404/93 was to be regarded as unlawful for having allowed the existence of such a legal vacuum.
Case T-117/98
9. In Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico Srl (hereinafter "Tico" ) asked the Court of First Instance to annul the Commission's Decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting their application for adjustment of the tariff quota, as provided for in Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93, for the first two quarters of 1998 to take account of imports from Somalia in 1996, having regard to the reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available as a result of the meteorological phenomenon known as "El Niño" which had damaged banana plantations in Somalia between October 1997 and January 1998. Camar and Tico claimed, in addition, that the Commission should be ordered to compensate them for the losses suffered as a result of that decision.
10. In support of their action for annulment, Camar and Tico put forward four pleas, three of which alleged infringement of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 in that, first, the Commission breached the conditions for application of that article; second, it failed to consider the effects of the exceptional circumstances referred to in that article; and third, it failed to apply the procedure provided for in Article 27 of that regulation.
The contested judgment
The operative part
11. In the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance:
"1. In Case T-79/96, declares that, by failing to take the necessary measures provided for in Article 30 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in bananas with respect to the applicant, the Commission has failed to fulfil its obligations under that article;
2. In Case T-260/97, annuls the Commission's decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application which the applicant submitted on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
3. In Case T-117/98, annuls the Commission's decision of 23 April 1998 rejecting the application which the applicants submitted on the basis of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93;
4. In Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98, dismisses the action for compensation as inadmissible;
5. In Case T-260/97, orders the Commission to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant as a result of the decision of 17 July 1997 rejecting the application submitted by the applicant on the basis of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93;
Orders the parties to inform the Court, within six months of the date on which this judgment is delivered, of the sums to be paid, determined by common accord;
Orders that, in the event of failure to reach agreement, they shall submit their quantified claims to the Court within that period;
6. Orders the Commission to pay the costs in Cases T-79/96 and T-117/98;
7. Orders the Commission to pay 90% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
8. Orders the Council to pay 10% of the costs in Case T-260/97;
9. Orders the Italian Republic and the French Republic to bear their own costs.
"
12. Following an application by the Commission under Article 85 of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance, by order of 6 December 2000, ruled as follows on the costs of the interlocutory proceedings which Camar had brought in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97:
"1. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs, as well as those incurred by Camar in Case T-79/96 R.
2. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R and 90% of those incurred by Camar in the same case.
3. The Council shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
4. Camar shall bear 10% of the costs it incurred in Case T-260/97 R.
5. The Italian Republic and the French Republic shall bear their own costs in Case T-79/96 R.
6. The French Republic shall bear its own costs in Case T-260/97 R.
"
13. Under Article 77(b) of its Rules of Procedure, the Court of First Instance decided, by order of 7 February 2001, to stay proceedings in Case T-260/97 pending the judgment of the Court of Justice disposing of this appeal.
The grounds of judgment in Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97
14. With regard to Cases T-79/96 and T-260/97, the Court of First Instance found, first of all, at paragraph 102 of the contested judgment, that both in its action for declaration of failure to act in Case T-79/96 and in its action for annulment in Case T-260/97, Camar was seeking a declaration that the Commission, by its failure to act in the first case and its express refusal to act in the second, had failed to have regard to its obligation to act under Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93. It decided, therefore, to examine the pleas relating to that article.
15. The Court of First Instance pointed out first of all, at paragraph 138 of the contested judgment, that the Court of Justice had already ruled on the interpretation of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 in Case C-68/95 T. Port [1996] ECR I-6065. Stating, at paragraph 139 of the contested judgment, that it was not disputed that Camar's difficulties were not the result of action it took before Regulation No 404/93 came into force, it held, having regard to paragraphs 36 and 38 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that the conditions for application of Article 30 thereof could be regarded as satisfied in the present case if Camar had encountered difficulties associated with the transition from national arrangements to the Community system and if the intervention of the Commission was required in order to resolve those difficulties.
16. In that regard, the Court of First Instance particularly stated, at paragraph 140 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"As for the supply problems pleaded by the applicant, it should be pointed out first of all that, as regards the possibility of interchanging sources of banana supplies, the Italian arrangements before Regulation No 404/93 came into force were considerably more flexible than the Community system. As the applicant stresses, without being disproved by the Commission, the Italian arrangements allowed unlimited quantities of ACP bananas to be imported free of customs duties. Furthermore, as regards the import of third country bananas, even though the Italian arrangements provided for a quota, operators could obtain such a quota without reference to the quantities and origin of the bananas they had imported in previous years. The common organisation of the market in bananas, on the other hand, which was established by Regulation No 404/93, provides that ACP bananas may enter the Community market free of customs duties only until the traditional quantities or the tariff quota have been used up, and that each operator may obtain import licences only according to the origin of the bananas (Community, traditional ACP countries, third countries and non-traditional ACP countries) and on the basis of the average quantities imported over a reference period. Clearly, the introduction of the common organisation of the market limited the scope for imports which existed under Italian legislation prior to Regulation No 404/93."
17. After having held, at paragraphs 141 and 142 of the contested judgment, that as a result particularly of the system established by Regulation No 404/93, it is difficult for an operator who loses his usual suppliers of Community or traditional ACP bananas to replace them from other suppliers of such bananas, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 143 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... even if the applicant's difficulties in obtaining supplies of bananas were associated with the civil war which occurred in Somalia at the end of 1990, they are a direct consequence of the introduction of the common organisation of the market because the system in fact significantly reduced the scope provided under the previous Italian arrangements for Camar to replace the shortfall in Somalian bananas. Those difficulties thus had very serious consequences for the viability of Camar's economic activity and could have endangered the continuation of that activity. They therefore constituted "difficulties of a sensitive nature" which, for the purposes of Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 as explained in paragraph 38 of the judgment in T. Port , give rise to an obligation on the Commission to take any measures it judges necessary.
"
18. The Court of First Instance considered, at paragraphs 144 to 148 of the contested judgment, whether the measures requested by Camar in response to those difficulties were necessary or if the difficulties could have been overcome in some other way. It held, in that regard, at paragraph 149 of the contested judgment, that the Commission had committed a manifest error of appraisal in considering that Camar was capable of overcoming the difficulties caused by the transition from the Italian national arrangements to the Community system by relying on the operation of the market. It added in the same paragraph that, in point of fact, the only way for Camar to deal with the difficulties it faced would have been for the Commission to adopt transitional measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93.
19. At paragraphs 150 and 151 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance continued as follows:
"150. This conclusion is not invalidated by the Commission's argument that Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgment inT. Port , requires the Commission to take action only where banana importers encounter difficulties which are not just inherent in the transition from the national arrangements to the Community system, but which also threaten their existence.
151. It should also be pointed out that in paragraph 43 of the judgment inT. Port the Court of Justice stated that Article 30 may require the Commission "to lay down rules catering for cases of hardship arising from the fact that importers of third-country bananas or non-traditional ACP bananas meet difficulties threatening their existence" . However, this statement cannot be understood to mean that the Commission is under an obligation to take action only in such cases. Such an interpretation would conflict with the wording of Article 30, which, as has already been stressed, provides that the Commission must take any measures necessary to overcome "difficulties of a sensitive nature" , and it would be incompatible with the principles of sound administration and protection for the right to pursue a professional or trade activity. Furthermore, the reference to the threat to the operator's existence followed from the specific wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling (see judgment in T. Port , paragraph 23).
"
20. At paragraphs 152 and 153 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance upheld, in the light of all those considerations, the first plea in Case T-79/96 and the first to third pleas in Case T-260/97 and, without examining the other pleas raised, declared to be well founded Camar's applications for declarations that, in Case T-79/96, the Commission had unlawfully failed to take the necessary measures as provided for in Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93 and, in Case T-260/97, that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was unlawful.
21. In Case T-260/97, the Court of First Instance also held that the claim for damages against the Commission was well founded. At paragraph 205 of the contested judgment, it recalled its case-law according to which, in the field of administrative action, any infringement of law constitutes illegality which may give rise to liability on the part of the Community. At paragraph 206 of that judgment, it held that the Decision of 17 July 1997 was to be regarded as an administrative act, even if it was based on Article 30 of Regulation No 404/93, which gives the Commission broad discretionary power, and that, therefore, since the decision had been taken in breach of that provision, the first condition required to render the Commission liable was satisfied.
22. After holding that the other conditions in that regard were also satisfied and that, therefore, the liability of the Community was incurred by virtue of the Commission's action, the Court of First Instance stated, at paragraph 212 of the contested judgment, that there was no need to adjudicate on the liability of the Council, which Camar had alleged in the alternative.
The grounds of judgment in Case T-117/98
23. In relation to the admissibility of the claims for annulment in Case T-117/98, the Court of First Instance noted, at paragraph 93 of the contested judgment, that it follows from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, where, as in the present case, a rejection by the Commission relates to the adoption of a regulation, the persons concerned can seek annulment of that decision only if they demonstrate that, although the regulation in question would not have been addressed to them, it would have been of direct and individual concern to them.
24. On the question whether the regulation which the Commission refused to adopt in that case would have been of direct and individual concern to Camar and Tico, the Court of First Instance held, at paragraph 96 of the contested judgment, as follows:
"... that regulation, in whose implementation the national authorities would have had no discretionary power, would have affected the applicants by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons. The purpose of the measures sought from the Commission was to allocate an additional quantity of import licences to those operators who had been victims of the floods in Somalia, in proportion to the damage they had suffered. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that until 1997 Camar was the main importer of Somalian bananas, and that from the fourth quarter of 1997 Tico temporarily took over that position. The reduction in the quantities of Somalian bananas available during the fourth quarter of 1997 and the first quarter of 1998 thus particularly affected the applicants, who would consequently have been the main ones to benefit from the increase in the tariff quota. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to adjust the tariff quota clearly did not affect the applicants in the same way as any other importer of Somalian bananas, but affected them by reason of circumstances in which they were differentiated from all other operators trading on the same market."
25. As a result, at paragraph 97 of the contested judgment, the Court of First Instance declared the claim for annulment in Case T-117/98 admissible.
26. Turning to the substance, the Court of First Instance started by stating, at paragraph 161 of the contested judgment, that, by the first plea in Case T-117/98, Camar and Tico were claiming that during the last quarter of 1997 and the first two quarters of 1998 the conditions for application of Article 16(3) of Regulation No 404/93 were satisfied having regard to the impact which "El Niño" had on production in Somalia.
27. The Court of First Instance noted at paragraph 163 of the contested judgment, that it follows particularly from paragraphs 27 and 31 of the judgment in T. Port , cited above, that two conditions must be satisfied at the same time if Article 16(3) is to be applied: there must be an exceptional circumstance affecting the production of Community bananas or imports of traditional ACP bananas, and there must be a risk of a shortfall in banana supplies to the Community market. | 61995CJ0068 | T. Port GmbH & Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung. | 31 | 31 That interpretation is confirmed by the scheme of the Regulation. The tariff quota established in Article 18(1) of the Regulation is drawn up on the basis of forecasts of production of Community bananas and imports of traditional ACP bananas and forecasts of total consumption of bananas in the Community. Consequently, an adjustment of that quota in the course of a marketing year is required only if production of Community bananas and imports of traditional ACP bananas do not reach the amounts forecast or if actual consumption of bananas in the Community exceeds those forecasts. | 1996-11-26 |
667 | 62000CJ0320 | A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. | 12 | 2002-09-17 | 12 As the Court held in Case 43/75 Defrenne II [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 12, that principle, which is a particular expression of the general principle of equality which prohibits comparable situations from being treated differently unless the difference is objectively justified, forms part of the foundations of the Community (see Case C-381/99 Brunnhofer [2001] ECR I-4961, paragraph 28). | 61975CJ0043 | Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena. | 12 | 12 THIS DOUBLE AIM , WHICH IS AT ONCE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL , SHOWS THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PAY FORMS PART OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY .
| 1976-04-08 |
668 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 14 | 1991-05-07 | 14 It should also be pointed out that the Court has specifically held that a system of benefits providing for supplements not directly based on the sex of the beneficiaries but taking account of their marital status or family situation, in respect of which it emerges that a considerably smaller proportion of women than of men are entitled to such supplements, is contrary to Article 4(1) of the directive if that system of benefits cannot be justified by reasons which exclude discrimination on grounds of sex (judgment in Case 30/85, Teuling v Bedrijfivereniging voor de Chemische Industrie [1987] ECR 2497, paragraph 13). | 61985CJ0030 | J. W. Teuling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Chemische Industrie. | 13 | 13 IN THAT REGARD, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT A SYSTEM OF BENEFITS IN WHICH, AS IN THIS CASE, SUPPLEMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR WHICH ARE NOT DIRECTLY BASED ON THE SEX OF THE BENEFICIARIES BUT TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR MARITAL STATUS OR FAMILY SITUATION AND IN RESPECT OF WHICH IT EMERGES THAT A CONSIDERABLY SMALLER PROPORTION OF WOMEN THAN OF MEN ARE ENTITLED TO SUCH SUPPLEMENTS IS CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 4*(1 ) OF THE DIRECTIVE IF THAT SYSTEM OF BENEFITS CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY REASONS WHICH EXCLUDE DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEX . | 1987-06-11 |
669 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 19 | 1991-05-07 | 19 On the other hand, if the Kingdom of Belgium can show that the means chosen meet a necessary aim of its social policy and that they are suitable and requisite for attaining that aim, the mere fact that the system of allowances favours a much greater number of male workers cannot be regarded as an infringement of the principle of equal treatment (judgment in Case 171/88 Rinner-Kuehn [1989] ECR 2743, paragraph 14). | 61988CJ0171 | Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG. | 14 | 14 . It should, however, be stated that those considerations, in so far as they are only generalizations about certain categories of workers, do not enable criteria which are both objective and unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex to be identified . However, if the Member State can show that the means chosen meet a necessary aim of its social policy and that they are suitable and requisite for attaining that aim, the mere fact that the provision affects a much greater number of female workers than male workers cannot be regarded as constituting an infringement of Article 119 . | 1989-07-13 |
670 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 22 | 1991-05-07 | 22 The aim of the Belgian legislation is to take into consideration the existence of different needs. On the one hand, it recognizes the greater burdens resulting from unemployment for households with only one income and, on the other hand, it takes into account the financial aid which the spouse' s income represents for the unemployed person. Moreover, it seeks to encourage the persons concerned to adapt themselves to their new financial situation by avoiding too sudden a drop in their income during the first year, whilst enabling the unemployed person with dependants to bear the expenses of a household beyond a period of 18 months. Those principles and objectives form part of a social policy which in the current state of Community law is a matter for the Member States which enjoy a reasonable margin of discretion as regards both the nature of the protective measures and the detailed arrangements for their implementation (judgment in Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047, paragraph 27). | 61983CJ0184 | Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse. | 27 | 27 FURTHERMORE , IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THE DIRECTIVE LEAVES MEMBER STATES WITH A DISCRETION AS TO THE SOCIAL MEASURES WHICH THEY ADOPT IN - ORDER TO GUARANTEE , WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK LAID DOWN BY THE DIRECTIVE , THE PROTECTION OF WOMEN IN CONNECTION WITH PREGNANCY AND MATERNITY AND TO OFFSET THE DISADVANTAGES WHICH WOMEN , BY COMPARISON WITH MEN , SUFFER WITH REGARD TO THE RETENTION OF EMPLOYMENT . SUCH MEASURES ARE , AS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS RIGHTLY OBSERVED , CLOSELY LINKED TO THE GENERAL SYSTEM OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES . IT MUST THEREFORE BE CONCLUDED THAT THE MEMBER STATES ENJOY A REASONABLE MARGIN OF DISCRETION AS REGARDS BOTH THE NATURE OF THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND THE DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION .
| 1984-07-12 |
671 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 24 | 1991-05-07 | 24 With regard to a guaranteed minimum subsistence level, the Court has already held that Community law does not preclude a Member State, in controlling its social expenditure, from taking into account the relatively greater needs of beneficiaries who have a dependent spouse or a dependent child or receive only a very small income, in relation to the needs of single persons. In fact, the Court held that Directive 79/7 did not preclude legislation under which the guarantee previously applicable to all workers suffering from an incapacity for work whose income was approximately equal to the statutory minimum wage that their (net) benefits would be at least equal to the (net) statutory minimum wage is restricted to persons having a dependent spouse or child or whose spouse has a very small income (judgment in Teuling cited above, paragraphs 22 and 23). | 61985CJ0030 | J. W. Teuling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Chemische Industrie. | 22 | 22 AS THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT EMPHASIZED, THE LAW OF 29 DECEMBER 1982 EMBODIES A POLICY WHICH SEEKS TO ENSURE, HAVING REGARD TO AVAILABLE RESOURCES, A MINIMUM SUBSISTENCE INCOME FOR ALL WORKERS SUFFERING FROM AN INCAPACITY FOR WORK . IN THAT REGARD, IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT COMMUNITY LAW DOES NOT PREVENT A MEMBER STATE, IN CONTROLLING ITS SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, FROM TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE NEED OF BENEFICIARIES WHO HAVE A DEPENDENT CHILD OR SPOUSE OR WHOSE SPOUSE HAS A VERY SMALL INCOME IS GREATER THAN THAT OF SINGLE PERSONS . | 1987-06-11 |
672 | 62000CJ0322 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands. | 41 | 2003-10-02 | 41. The Directive seeks to create the instruments needed to ensure that waters in the Community are protected against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (Case C-293/97 Standley and Others [1999] ECR I-2603, paragraph 39, and Case C-161/00 Commission v Germany [2002] ECR I-2753, paragraph 42). | 62000CJ0161 | Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. | 42 | 42 Next, it must be remembered that the Directive seeks to create the instruments needed in order to ensure that watercourses in the Community are protected against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources (see Case C-293/97 Standley and Others [1999] ECR I-2603, paragraph 39). | 2002-03-14 |
673 | 62000CJ0325 | Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany. | 22 | 2002-11-05 | 22 The Court has consistently held that Article 30 of the Treaty aims to prohibit all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade (see, in particular, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5). | 61974CJ0008 | Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville. | 5 | 5 ALL TRADING RULES ENACTED BY MEMBER STATES WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF HINDERING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ACTUALLY OR POTENTIALLY, INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEASURES HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS . | 1974-07-11 |
674 | 61989CJ0229 | Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium. | 24 | 1991-05-07 | 24 With regard to a guaranteed minimum subsistence level, the Court has already held that Community law does not preclude a Member State, in controlling its social expenditure, from taking into account the relatively greater needs of beneficiaries who have a dependent spouse or a dependent child or receive only a very small income, in relation to the needs of single persons. In fact, the Court held that Directive 79/7 did not preclude legislation under which the guarantee previously applicable to all workers suffering from an incapacity for work whose income was approximately equal to the statutory minimum wage that their (net) benefits would be at least equal to the (net) statutory minimum wage is restricted to persons having a dependent spouse or child or whose spouse has a very small income (judgment in Teuling cited above, paragraphs 22 and 23). | 61985CJ0030 | J. W. Teuling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Chemische Industrie. | 23 | 23 THE REPLY TO PART ( A ) OF THE SECOND QUESTION MUST THEREFORE BE THAT ARTICLE 4*(1 ) OF DIRECTIVE 79/7 IS TO BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT LEGISLATION UNDER WHICH THE GUARANTEE PREVIOUSLY APPLICABLE TO ALL WORKERS SUFFERING FROM AN INCAPACITY FOR WORK WHOSE INCOME WAS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO THE STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE THAT THEIR ( NET ) BENEFITS WOULD BE AT LEAST EQUAL TO THE ( NET ) STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGE IS RESTRICTED TO PERSONS HAVING A DEPENDENT SPOUSE OR CHILD OR WHOSE SPOUSE HAS A VERY SMALL INCOME IS COMPATIBLE WITH THAT PROVISION .
QUESTIONS 2(B ), 3 AND 4 | 1987-06-11 |
675 | 61989CJ0231 | Krystyna Gmurzynska-Bscher v Oberfinanzdirektion Köln. | 30 | 1990-11-08 | 30 That is particularly important in view of the fact that according to the case-law of the Court the headings of Chapter 97 of the Common Customs Tariff must be given a liberal interpretation ( see the aforementioned judgment of 15 May 1985 in the Onnasch case ), and secondly if the rate of customs duty laid down for the material used were applied to a value for customs purposes fixed on the basis of the work' s artistic nature, the duty payable would be out of all proportion to the cost of that material ( see the judgment in the Onnasch case, paragraph 11 ). | 61984CJ0155 | Reinhard Onnasch v Hauptzollamt Berlin - Packhof. | 11 | 11 SECONDLY , THE COURT CAN ONLY AGREE WITH THE COMMISSION ' S OBSERVATION THAT IF THE RATE OF CUSTOMS DUTY LAID DOWN FOR THE MATERIAL USED WERE APPLIED TO A VALUE FOR CUSTOMS PURPOSES FIXED ON THE BASIS OF THE WORK ' S ARTISTIC NATURE , THE DUTY PAYABLE WOULD BE OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE COST OF THAT MATERIAL .
| 1985-05-15 |
676 | 61989CJ0235 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 16 | 1992-02-18 | 16 Secondly, as the Court has consistently held, Article 36 only admits derogations from the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods within the common market to the extent to which such derogations are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such property (Case C-10/89 CNL-SUCAL v HAG [1990] ECR I-3711, paragraph 12). | 61989CJ0010 | SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG. | 12 | 12 As the Court has consistently held, Article 36 only admits derogations from the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods within the common market to the extent to which such derogations are justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific subject-matter of such property; consequently, the owner of an industrial property right protected by the legislation of a Member State cannot rely on that legislation to prevent the importation or marketing of a product which has been lawfully marketed in another Member State by the owner of the right himself, with his consent, or by a person economically or legally dependent on him ( see, in particular, the judgments in Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon v Metro [1971] ECR 487, in Case 16/74 Centrafarm v Winthrop [1974] ECR 1183 and in Case 19/84 Pharmon v Hoechst [1985] ECR 2281 ). | 1990-10-17 |
677 | 61989CJ0235 | Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. | 17 | 1992-02-18 | 17 In the case of patents, the specific subject-matter of the industrial property is, in particular, the exclusive right for the patent proprietor to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licences to third parties, as well as the right to oppose infringements (Case 434/85 Allen and Hanburys v Generics [1988] ECR 1245, paragraph 11). The specific subject-matter of patents for the product of new plant varieties is similar. | 61985CJ0434 | Allen and Hanburys Ltd v Generics (UK) Ltd. | 11 | 11 IN GENERAL TERMS THE SPECIFIC SUBJECT-MATTER OF INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INCLUDES THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT FOR THE PATENT PROPRIETOR TO USE AN INVENTION WITH A VIEW TO MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS AND PUTTING THEM INTO CIRCULATION FOR THE FIRST TIME, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY THE GRANT OF LICENCES TO THIRD PARTIES, AS WELL AS THE RIGHT TO OPPOSE INFRINGEMENTS ( SEE THE AFOREMENTIONED JUDGMENT IN MERCK ). | 1988-03-03 |
678 | 62000CJ0331 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 111 | 2003-09-18 | 111. It is appropriate to point out that in Case C-247/98 Greece v Commission (paragraphs 18, 19 and 32) and Case C-373/99 Greece v Commission (paragraphs 36 to 39), cited above, which relate to the financial years 1994 and 1995, respectively, the Court already dismissed the arguments put forward by the Hellenic Republic to justify the practice of deductions. | 61999CJ0373 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 38 | 38 Consequently, that argument of the Greek Government cannot be accepted. | 2001-12-06 |
679 | 62000CJ0332 | Kingdom of Belgium v Commission of the European Communities. | 58 | 2002-04-18 | 58 As regards this plea, the Court has ruled that the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations can be invoked as against a Community rule only to the extent to which the Community has itself created a situation which may give rise to a legitimate expectation (Case C-177/90 Kühn [1992] ECR I-35, paragraph 14). | 61990CJ0177 | Ralf-Herbert Kühn v Landwirtschaftskammer Weser-Ems. | 14 | 14 Moreover, the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations may be invoked as against Community rules, only to the extent that the Community itself has previously created a situation which can give rise to a legitimate expectation. | 1992-01-10 |
680 | 62000CJ0333 | Eila Päivikki Maaheimo. | 25 | 2002-11-07 | 25 As the Court stated in paragraph 41 of the decision in Offermanns, above, the expression `to meet family expenses' in Article 1(u)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 which defines `family benefits' is to be interpreted as referring, in particular, to a public contribution to a family's budget to alleviate the financial burdens involved in the maintenance of children. | 61999CJ0085 | Vincent Offermanns and Esther Offermanns. | 41 | 41 It follows that the expression to meet family expenses in Article 1(u)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 is to be interpreted as referring, in particular, to a public contribution to a family's budget to alleviate the financial burdens involved in the maintenance (Unterhalt) of children. | 2001-03-15 |
681 | 62000CJ0351 | Pirkko Niemi. | 43 | 2002-09-12 | 43 As regards the arrangements for funding and managing a pension scheme such as that introduced by Law 280/1966, it is clear from the case-law that these, too, are not conclusive for the purpose of determining whether a regime comes under Article 119 of the Treaty (Beune, paragraph 38, and Griesmar, paragraph 37). | 61993CJ0007 | Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v G. A. Beune. | 38 | 38 Nor does the criterion relating to the arrangements for funding and managing a pension scheme such as the one established by the ABPW make it possible to decide whether the scheme falls within the scope of Article 119. | 1994-09-28 |
682 | 61989CJ0241 | SARPP - Société d'application et de recherches en pharmacologie et phytotherapie SARL v Chambre syndicale des raffineurs et conditionneurs de sucre de France and others. | 16 | 1990-12-12 | 16 That difference gives rise to an important consequence . As the Court pointed out in its judgment in Case 98/86 Ministère public v Mathot [1987] ECR 809, paragraph 11, Directive 79/112 created obligations concerning the labelling of foodstuffs marketed throughout the Community without permitting any distinction to be drawn according to the origin of those foodstuffs, subject only to the condition contained in Article 3(2 ). Consequently, if the provisions of the directive preclude the application of certain national rules on the labelling of foodstuffs, such rules may not be applied either to imported foodstuffs or to national foodstuffs . However, when national rules on advertising are contrary to Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty, the application of those rules is prohibited only in respect of imported products and not national products . | 61986CJ0098 | Criminal proceedings against Arthur Mathot. | 11 | 11 IT IS CORRECT THAT DIRECTIVE 79/112 CREATED OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF FOODSTUFFS MARKETED IN THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY WITHOUT PERMITTING ANY DISTINCTION TO BE DRAWN ACCORDING TO THE ORIGIN OF THOSE FOODSTUFFS, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 3 ( 2 ). NATIONAL RULES WHICH IMPOSE THOSE OBLIGATIONS ONLY ON DOMESTIC PRODUCTS TO THE EXCLUSION OF PRODUCTS IMPORTED FROM OTHER MEMBER STATES THEREFORE DISCRIMINATE AGAINST CERTAIN TRADERS CONTRARY TO COMMUNITY LAW BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIRECTIVE ARE NOT YET APPLIED TO IMPORTED PRODUCTS . HOWEVER, SUCH A SITUATION DOES NOT GIVE THOSE TRADERS THE RIGHT TO SEEK EXEMPTION FROM THE OBLIGATIONS LAID DOWN IN THE DIRECTIVE . IT IS FOR THE COMMISSION TO ENSURE THAT THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES PUT AN END TO THAT SITUATION BY EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL RULES TO ALL THE PRODUCTS COVERED BY THE DIRECTIVE . | 1987-02-18 |
683 | 61989CJ0241 | SARPP - Société d'application et de recherches en pharmacologie et phytotherapie SARL v Chambre syndicale des raffineurs et conditionneurs de sucre de France and others. | 29 | 1990-12-12 | 29 Legislation such as that at issue here which restricts or prohibits certain forms of advertising may, although it does not directly affect imports, be such as to restrict their volume because it affects marketing opportunities for the imported products ( see the judgment in Case 286/81 Oosthoek' s Uitgeversmaatschappij [1982] ECR 4575, paragraph 15 ). The possibility cannot be ruled out that to compel a producer either to modify the form or the content of an advertising campaign depending on the Member States concerned or to discontinue an advertising scheme which he considers to be particularly effective may constitute an obstacle to imports even if the legislation in question applies to domestic products and imported products without distinction . | 61981CJ0286 | Criminal proceedings against Oosthoek's Uitgeversmaatschappij BV. | 15 | 15 LEGISLATION WHICH RESTRICTS OR PROHIBITS CERTAIN FORMS OF ADVERTISING AND CERTAIN MEANS OF SALES PROMOTION MAY , ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT IMPORTS , BE SUCH AS TO RESTRICT THEIR VOLUME BECAUSE IT AFFECTS MARKETING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE IMPORTED PRODUCTS . THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT TO COMPEL A PRODUCER EITHER TO ADOPT ADVERTISING OR SALES PROMOTION SCHEMES WHICH DIFFER FROM ONE MEMBER STATE TO ANOTHER OR TO DISCONTINUE A SCHEME WHICH HE CONSIDERS TO BE PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE MAY CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE TO IMPORTS EVEN IF THE LEGISLATION IN QUESTION APPLIES TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTS AND IMPORTED PRODUCTS WITHOUT DISTINCTION .
| 1982-12-15 |
684 | 61989CJ0246 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 11 | 1991-10-04 | 11 It must be pointed out, in the first place, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-221/89 Factortame II ([1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 13), that, as Community law stands at present, competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels is vested in the Member States. As far as fishing vessels in particular are concerned, the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) refer to fishing vessels "flying the flag" of a Member State or "registered" there but leaves those terms to be defined in the legislation of the Member States (judgments in Factortame II, above, paragraph 13, and in Case 223/86 Pesca Valentia [1988] ECR 83, paragraph 13). | 61986CJ0223 | Pesca Valentia Limited v Ministry for Fisheries and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney General. | 13 | 13 IN THIS CONNECTION IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THAT REGULATION DID INTRODUCE RULES INTENDED TO COORDINATE THE STRUCTURAL POLICIES OF THE MEMBER STATES AND TO REQUIRE THE MEMBER STATES TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NATIONALS OF OTHER MEMBER STATES AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO AND USE OF STOCKS . IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT, IN ORDER TO ATTAIN ITS OBJECTIVES, THE REGULATION REQUIRES THE MEMBER STATES TO SEND INFORMATION TO THE COMMISSION ( ARTICLES 5 AND 10 ), PROVIDES FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF ADOPTING COMMUNITY MEASURES ON FISHING ( ARTICLE 4 ) AND A PROCEDURE ( ARTICLE 6 ) ENABLING COMMUNITY MEASURES ON THE COORDINATION OF STRUCTURAL FISHING POLICIES TO BE ADOPTED ( ARTICLE 7 ). HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION THAT, PENDING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SUCH COMMUNITY MEASURES, THE MEMBER STATES MAY APPLY THEIR OWN RULES IN RESPECT OF FISHING IN THE MARITIME WATERS COMING UNDER THEIR SOVEREIGNTY OR WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTION ( ARTICLE 2 ) AND DEFINE THEIR STRUCTURAL POLICY FOR THE FISHING INDUSTRY ( ARTICLE 1 ). FURTHERMORE IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE REGULATION REFER TO FISHING VESSELS "FLYING THE FLAG" OF A MEMBER STATE OR "REGISTERED" THERE, LEAVING THESE TERMS TO BE DEFINED IN THE LEGISLATION OF THE MEMBER STATES . | 1988-01-19 |
685 | 62000CJ0351 | Pirkko Niemi. | 46 | 2002-09-12 | 46 Admittedly, that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, inasmuch as pensions paid under statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work (Beune, paragraph 44, and Griesmar, paragraph 29). | 61999CJ0366 | Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie and Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l'Etat et de la Décentralisation. | 29 | 29 The Court did, admittedly, accept that that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, inasmuch as pensions paid by statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work (Beune, paragraph 44). | 2001-11-29 |
686 | 62000CJ0351 | Pirkko Niemi. | 46 | 2002-09-12 | 46 Admittedly, that criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive, inasmuch as pensions paid under statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work (Beune, paragraph 44, and Griesmar, paragraph 29). | 61993CJ0007 | Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v G. A. Beune. | 44 | 44 Admittedly, as the Court has recognized ever since Defrenne I, the employment criterion cannot be regarded as exclusive. Thus, as regards the inception and determination of pension rights, the pensions paid by statutory social security schemes may reflect, wholly or in part, pay in respect of work, but nevertheless fall outside the scope of Article 119. | 1994-09-28 |
687 | 61989CJ0246 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 11 | 1991-10-04 | 11 It must be pointed out, in the first place, as the Court held in its judgment in Case C-221/89 Factortame II ([1991] ECR I-3905, paragraph 13), that, as Community law stands at present, competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels is vested in the Member States. As far as fishing vessels in particular are concerned, the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) refer to fishing vessels "flying the flag" of a Member State or "registered" there but leaves those terms to be defined in the legislation of the Member States (judgments in Factortame II, above, paragraph 13, and in Case 223/86 Pesca Valentia [1988] ECR 83, paragraph 13). | 61989CJ0221 | The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others. | 13 | 13 It must be observed in the first place that, as Community law stands at present, competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels is vested in the Member States. As far as fishing vessels in particular are concerned, the Court held in the judgment in Case 223/86 (Pesca Valentia v Minister for Fisheries and Forestry [1988] ECR 83, at paragraph 13) that the provisions of Council Regulation No 101/76 of 19 January 1976 laying down a common structural policy for the fishing industry (Official Journal 1976 L 20, p. 19) referred to fishing vessels "flying the flag" of a Member State or "registered" there but left those terms to be defined in the legislation of the Member States. | 1991-07-25 |
688 | 61989CJ0246 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 12 | 1991-10-04 | 12 Nevertheless, powers retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see most recently the judgments in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, at paragraph 9, and in Case 127/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333, at paragraph 7). | 61986CJ0057 | Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities. | 9 | 9 As regards the argument that the repayment of interest is merely monetary in character, it is sufficient to point out that the Court has held ( Case 11/69, supra, and judgment of 9 June 1982 in Case 95/81 Commission v Italy (( 1982 )) ECR 2187 ) that the exercise by the Member States of the powers retained by them in the monetary field do not permit them unilaterally to adopt measures prohibited by the Treaty . | 1988-06-07 |
689 | 61989CJ0246 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 12 | 1991-10-04 | 12 Nevertheless, powers retained by the Member States must be exercised consistently with Community law (see most recently the judgments in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission [1988] ECR 2855, at paragraph 9, and in Case 127/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1988] ECR 3333, at paragraph 7). | 61987CJ0127 | Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. | 7 | 7 The monetary objective of the contested measure is not such as to justify it . As the Court has consistently held ( see, most recently, the judgment of 7 June 1988 in Case 57/86 Hellenic Republic v Commission (( 1988 )) ECR 0000 ), the fact that Member States retain certain monetary powers does not entitle them to take unilateral measures prohibited by the Treaty . | 1988-06-21 |
690 | 61989CJ0246 | Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. | 17 | 1991-10-04 | 17 It must be borne in mind that the Court has consistently held (see, for example, judgment in Case 305/87 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1989] ECR 1461, paragraph 13) that Article 7 applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination. | 61987CJ0305 | Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. | 13 | 13 Article 7 of the Treaty provides that : "Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited"; it applies independently only to situations governed by Community law in regard to which the Treaty lays down no specific prohibition of discrimination . | 1989-05-30 |
691 | 61989CJ0251 | Nikolaos Athanasopoulos and others v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. | 17 | 1991-06-11 | 17 With regard to the first part of the national court' s first question, it should be pointed out at the outset that, in accordance with consistent case-law, Article 77(2)(b)(i) and Article 78(2)(b)(i) of Regulation No 1408/71 cannot be interpreted in such a way as to deprive a worker, or an orphan of a deceased worker, of more favourable benefits as a result of the substitution of benefits afforded by one Member State for the benefits payable by another Member State. Consequently, if in the cases referred to in those provisions, the amount of benefits paid by the State of residence is lower than that of the benefits granted by the other Member State which is responsible for payment, the worker, or the orphan of the deceased worker, retains the right to the higher amount and is entitled to receive from the competent institution of the latter State a benefit supplement equal to the difference between those two amounts (see judgment in Case 1/88 Baldi v Caisse de Compensation pour Allocations Familiales [1989] ECR 667, and also judgment in Case 807/79 Gravina v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben [1980] ECR 2205, paragraph 8). | 61979CJ0807 | Giacomo Gravina and others v Landesversicherungsanstalt Schwaben. | 8 | 8 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE PRINCIPLES , THEREFORE , THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 78 ( 2 ) OF REGULATION NO 1408/71 MAY NOT BE INTERPRETED IN SUCH A WAY THAT , BY THE SUBSTITUTION OF BENEFITS PROVIDED BY THE NEW STATE OF RESIDENCE FOR THE BENEFITS PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED UNDER THE LEGISLATION OF ANOTHER MEMBER STATE ALONE , THE ORPHANS OF A DECEASED WORKER WHO WAS SUBJECT TO THE LEGISLATION OF MORE THAN ONE MEMBER STATE ARE PREVENTED FROM RECEIVING THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF THOSE BENEFITS . WHERE , THEREFORE , THE RESIDENCE OF THE ORPHANS IS TRANSFERRED TO THE TERRITORY OF A MEMBER STATE WHERE AN ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS IS ACQUIRED BY THEM UNDER THE LEGISLATION OF THAT STATE , IT IS NECESSARY TO COMPARE THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS ACTUALLY RECEIVED WITH THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF THE BENEFITS WHICH THEY WOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE IN THE OTHER MEMBER STATE AND , IF THE AMOUNT OF THE NEW BENEFITS IS LESS THAN THAT OF THE BENEFITS PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED , TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ORPHANS TO BE ENTITLED , AS AGAINST THE COMPETENT INSTITUTION OF THE OTHER MEMBER STATE WHERE THE ENTITLEMENT TO THE GREATER AMOUNT WAS ACQUIRED , TO SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS EQUAL TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO AMOUNTS .
| 1980-07-09 |
692 | 62000CJ0355 | Freskot AE v Elliniko Dimosio. | 55 | 2003-05-22 | 55. The Court has already held that the essential characteristic of remuneration lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service (see Case 263/86 Humbel and Edel [1988] ECR 5365, paragraph 17, and Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, paragraph 15). | 61986CJ0263 | Belgian State v René Humbel and Marie-Thérèse Edel. | 17 | 17 The essential characteristic of remuneration thus lies in the fact that it constitutes consideration for the service in question, and is normally agreed upon between the provider and the recipient of the service . | 1988-09-27 |
693 | 61989CJ0260 | Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others. | 10 | 1991-06-18 | 10 In Case C-155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409, paragraph 14, the Court held that nothing in the Treaty prevents Member States, for considerations of a non-economic nature relating to the public interest, from removing radio and television broadcasts from the field of competition by conferring on one or more establishments an exclusive right to carry them out. | 61973CJ0155 | Giuseppe Sacchi. | 14 | 14 ARTICLE 90 ( 1 ) PERMITS MEMBER STATES INTER ALIA TO GRANT SPECIAL OR EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO UNDERTAKINGS .
NOTHING IN THE TREATY PREVENTS MEMBER STATES, FOR CONSIDERATIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST, OF A NON-ECONOMIC NATURE, FROM REMOVING RADIO AND TELEVISION TRANSMISSIONS, INCLUDING CABLE TRANSMISSIONS, FROM THE FIELD OF COMPETITION BY CONFERRING ON ONE OR MORE ESTABLISHMENTS AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO CONDUCT THEM .
HOWEVER, FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR TASKS THESE ESTABLISHMENTS REMAIN SUBJECT TO THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND, TO THE EXTENT THAT THIS PERFORMANCE COMPRISES ACTIVITIES OF AN ECONOMIC NATURE, FALL UNDER THE PROVISIONS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 90 RELATING TO PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS AND UNDERTAKINGS TO WHICH MEMBER STATES GRANT SPECIAL OR EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS .
THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 86 AND 90 TAKEN TOGETHER LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE FACT THAT AN UNDERTAKING TO WHICH A MEMBER STATE GRANTS EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS HAS A MONOPOLY IS NOT AS SUCH INCOMPATIBLE WITH ARTICLE 86 .
IT IS THEREFORE THE SAME AS REGARDS AN XTENSION OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS FOLLOWING A NEW INTERVENTION BY THIS STATE . | 1974-04-30 |
694 | 61989CJ0260 | Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others. | 31 | 1991-06-18 | 31 In that respect it should be borne in mind that an undertaking which has a statutory monopoly may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case C-311/84 CBEM, COT IPB [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 16) and that the territory of a Member State over which the monopoly extends may constitute a substantial part of the common market (see the judgment in Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 28). | 61981CJ0322 | NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities. | 28 | 28 HENCE THE RELEVANT SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE COMMON MARKET IN THIS CASE IS THE NETHERLANDS AND IT IS AT THE LEVEL OF THE NETHERLANDS MARKET THAT MICHELIN NV ' S POSITION MUST BE ASSESSED .
( 2 ) ASSESSMENT OF MICHELIN NV ' S POSITION IN RELATION TO ITS COMPETITORS | 1983-11-09 |
695 | 61989CJ0260 | Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others. | 31 | 1991-06-18 | 31 In that respect it should be borne in mind that an undertaking which has a statutory monopoly may be regarded as having a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty (see the judgment in Case C-311/84 CBEM, COT IPB [1985] ECR 3261, paragraph 16) and that the territory of a Member State over which the monopoly extends may constitute a substantial part of the common market (see the judgment in Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, paragraph 28). | 61984CJ0311 | Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB). | 16 | 16 WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST QUESTION , IT MUST FIRST OF ALL BE REMEMBERED THAT , ACCORDING TO THE ESTABLISHED CASE-LAW OF THE COURT , MOST RECENTLY CONFIRMED BY THE JUDGMENT OF 9 NOVEMBER 1983 IN CASE 322/81 ( MICHELIN V COMMISSION ( 1983 ) ECR 3461 ), AN UNDERTAKING OCCUPIES A DOMINANT POSITION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 86 WHERE IT ENJOYS A POSITION OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH WHICH ENABLES IT TO HINDER THE MAINTENANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMPETITION ON THE RELEVANT MARKET BY ALLOWING IT TO BEHAVE TO AN APPRECIABLE EXTENT INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS COMPETITORS AND CUSTOMERS AND ULTIMATELY OF CONSUMERS . THE FACT THAT THE ABSENCE OF COMPETITION OR ITS RESTRICTION ON THE RELEVANT MARKET IS BROUGHT ABOUT OR ENCOURAGED BY PROVISIONS LAID DOWN BY LAW IN NO WAY PRECLUDES THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 86 , AS THE COURT HAS HELD , INTER ALIA , IN ITS JUDGMENTS OF 13 NOVEMBER 1975 IN CASE 26/75 ( GENERAL MOTORS V COMMISSION ( 1975 ) ECR 1367 ), 16 NOVEMBER 1977 IN CASE 13/77 ( INNO V ATAB ( 1977 ) ECR 2115 ) AND MOST RECENTLY IN ITS JUDGMENT OF 20 MARCH 1985 IN CASE 41/83 ( ITALY V COMMISSION ( 1985 ) ECR 880 ).
| 1985-10-03 |
696 | 61989CJ0260 | Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others. | 33 | 1991-06-18 | 33 In that regard it should be observed that, according to Article 90(2) of the Treaty, undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest are subject to the rules on competition so long as it is not shown that the application of those rules is incompatible with the performance of their particular task (see in particular, the judgment in Sacchi, cited above, paragraph 15). | 61973CJ0155 | Giuseppe Sacchi. | 15 | 15 MOREOVER, IF CERTAIN MEMBER STATES TREAT UNDERTAKINGS ENTRUSTED WITH THE OPERATION OF TELEVISION, EVEN AS REGARDS THEIR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES, IN PARTICULAR ADVERTISING, AS UNDERTAKINGS ENTRUSTED WITH THE OPERATION OF SERVICES OF GENERAL ECONOMIC INTEREST, THE SAME PROHIBITIONS APPLY, AS REGARDS THEIR BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THE MARKET, BY REASON OF ARTICLE 90 ( 2 ), SO LONG AS IT IS NOT SHOWN THAT THE SAID PROHIBITIONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR TASKS . | 1974-04-30 |
697 | 62000CJ0366 | Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. | 12 | 2002-02-19 | 12 Furthermore, the finding of a failure to fulfil obligations of itself precludes granting the Luxembourg authorities' application to suspend the proceedings pending a hypothetical withdrawal of the action by the Commission (Case C-47/99 Commission v Luxembourg [1999] ECR I-8999, paragraph 12). | 61999CJ0047 | Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. | 12 | 12 It should be observed at the outset that there are no grounds for the Court to suspend the proceedings. | 1999-12-16 |
698 | 62000CJ0378 | Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European Union. | 39 | 2003-01-21 | 39. In that regard, it should be noted that, as a measure of secondary legislation, the second comitology decision, like the first, cannot add to the rules of the Treaty (see Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383, paragraph 42). | 61990CJ0240 | Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Communities. | 42 | 42 That principle is not affected by the aforementioned decision. As a measure of secondary law it cannot add to the rules of the Treaty, which do not require the Council to specify the essential components of the implementing powers delegated to the Commission. | 1992-10-27 |
699 | 62000CJ0385 | F.W.L. de Groot v Staatssecretaris van Financiën. | 106 | 2002-12-12 | 106. Certainly, the Court has held that the need to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system may justify rules that are liable to restrict fundamental freedoms (Case C-204/90 Bachmann [1992] ECR I-249, paragraph 28, and Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305, paragraph 21). | 61990CJ0204 | Hanns-Martin Bachmann v Belgian State. | 28 | 28 In the light of the foregoing, it must be recognized that, in the field of pensions and life assurance, provisions such as those contained in the Belgian legislation at issue are justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the tax system of which they form part, and that such provisions are not, therefore, contrary to Article 48 of the Treaty. | 1992-01-28 |