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34. Plaintiff brings this claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons similarly situated as Mental Health Professionals who were or are employed by Defendant and who are entitled to payment for all of their overtime wages that , Defendant failed to pay from three years prior to the date of the filing of this lawsuit, through the time of the trial of this case. 35. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the class but believes that the class's membership is more than 1000 persons. 36. Defendant can readily identify the members of the class, who are a certain portion of the current and former employees of Defendant. 38. The email addresses of many of the FLSA collective action Plaintiffs are available from Defendant, and notice should be provided to the FLSA collective action Plaintiffs via email to their last known email addresses as soon as possible. 39. The cellular telephone numbers of the FLSA collective action Plaintiffs are available from Defendant, and notice should be provided to the FLSA collective action Plaintiffs via text message as soon as possible. 40. The proposed FLSA class members are similarly situated in that they have been subject to uniform practices by Defendant which violated the FLSA, including: A. Defendant's uniform failure to compensate employees pursuant to the requirements of the FLSA; and 41. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Original Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. 42. Plaintiff worked for Defendant from 2010 to November of 2018 as a Mental Health Professional in multiple locations, including locations in Marion, Jonesboro and Trumann. 44. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees performed duties such as providing mental health treatment, contacting Defendant's clients, attending meetings, scheduling appointments, filling out relevant paperwork, billing clients, etc. 45. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week throughout their tenure with Defendant. 46. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were classified as hourly employees and regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 47. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff or similarly-situated employees one and one-half times their regular rate for hours in excess of forty (40) in a week. 48. It was Defendant's commonly applied policy to only pay Plaintiff, other Mental Health Professionals for the hours in which they billed Defendant's patients. 49. The work that Plaintiff and the class members performed was not all billable to Defendant's clients; therefore not all of the work was compensated. 50. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the way it paid Plaintiff and other Mental Health Professionals violated the FLSA. VI. 51. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth in this section. A. Individual Allegations under the FLSA 53. Defendant violated Section 778.208 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations by failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees the proper overtime premium. 54. Defendant's conduct and practice, as described above, have been and is willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 55. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for, and Plaintiff seeks, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, pre- judgment interest, civil penalties and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees as provided by the FLSA. B. FLSA § 216(b) Representative Action Allegations 56. Plaintiff brings this collective action on behalf of all Mental Health Professionals employed by Defendant to recover monetary damages owed by Defendant to Plaintiff and members of the Putative Class for all the overtime compensation for all the hours he and they worked in excess of forty (40) each week. 57. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself individually and all other similarly situated employees, former and present, who were and/or are affected by Defendant's willful and intentional violation of the FLSA. 58. In the past three years, Defendant has employed hundreds of Mental Health Professionals. 60. Defendant failed to pay these employees the proper overtime wages. Because these employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff, and because they are owed overtime for the same reasons, the opt-in class is properly defined as: All Mental Health Professionals or Who Worked in More Than Forty (40) Hours in Any Week. 61. This group includes, but is not necessarily limited to, hourly paid workers employed in States where Defendant does business. C. Individual Allegations Under the AMWA 62. Plaintiff asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the AMWA, Arkansas Code Annotated§§ 11-4-203(4). 63. At all relevant times, Defendant was Plaintiff's "employer" within the meaning of the AMWA, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-203(4). 64. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff all overtime wages owed, as required under the AMWA. 65. Defendant's conduct and practices, as described above, were willful, intentional, unreasonable, arbitrary and in bad faith. 66. By reason of the unlawful acts alleged herein, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for monetary damages, liquidated damages, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee provided by the AMWA for all violations which occurred beginning at least three (3) years preceding the filing of Plaintiff's initial complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling. 8. Defendant's failure to pay members of the class proper overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. V.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Kazerouni Law Group, APC 21. FoodState, is a leading producer in the United States of health supplements purported to be created from whole foods. Defendant sells One Daily Multivitamin in varying quantities, including 30, 60, 90, and 180 count, throughout the United States, including in California. 22. It has been recently believed that nutrients, vitamins, and minerals are healthier, more natural and ultimately better for you if they are derived from whole foods through gentle minimal processing and heat-free manufacturing. FoodState calls the process they developed and use the “Slo-Food Process.”5 Defendant markets and promotes its products and processes through many mediums but particularly through their website and YouTube videos. At no time does Defendant mention the use of synthetic or processed nutrients. 23. During the “Class Period” as defined in paragraph 125, Plaintiff was exposed to and saw Defendant’s advertising, marketing, promotional and packaging claims, purchased FoodState’s One Daily Multivitamin in reliance on these claims, and suffered injury in fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s unfair, misleading and unlawful conduct described herein. 24. Plaintiff is a generally health conscious person who often shops at health foods stores and supplement shops. Purity, the natural state of health supplements and accuracy of a product’s labeling is important to Plaintiff. 71. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference the above allegations as if set forth fully herein. 72. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the putative class. 73. The misrepresentations, acts and non-disclosures by Defendant of the material facts detailed above constitute false and misleading advertising and therefore violates Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq. 74. At all times relevant, Defendant’s advertising and promotion regarding One Daily Multivitamin was untrue, misleading and likely to deceive the public and/or has deceived the Plaintiff and California consumers similarly situated by representing that the product contained vitamins and minerals source from only whole foods, not synthetic or processed nutrients and that the product did not contain magnesium stearate when in fact defendant knew and failed to disclose that the product contained synthetic or processed vitamins. Furthermore, Defendant failed to disclosure the presence of magnesium stearate on its labeling and as part of its advertising and marketing. 82. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference the above allegations as set forth fully herein. 83. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and on behalf of the putative class. 87. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference the above allegations as if fully stated herein. 88. “Unfair competition” is defined in Business and Professions Code Section § 17200 as encompassing any one of the five types of business “wrongs,” three of which are at issue here: (1) an “unlawful” business act or practice; (2) an “unfair” business act or practice; and (3) a “fraudulent” business act or practice. The definitions in § 17200 are disjunctive, meaning that each of these five “wrongs” (Plaintiff alleges three of them here) operates independently from the others. 89. Plaintiff and Defendant are both “person[s]” as defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17201. Section 17204 authorizes a private right of action on both an individual and representative basis. a. “Unlawful” Prong 90. Because Defendant has violated California’s False Advertising Law, Business & Professions Code §§ 17500 et seq., as well as California's Health and Safety Code § 110660, Defendant has violated California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., which provides a cause of action for an “unlawful” business act or practice perpetrated on members of the California public. 91. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendant’s legitimate business interest, other than the conduct described herein. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200 ET SEQ. (California’s Unfair Competition Law) CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500 ET SEQ. (California’s False Advertising Law) CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 110660 (California’s Sherman Law)

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24. CSRs are typically paid at a rate of approximately $14.00 to $17.00 per hour. 25. CSRs are employed on a full-time basis (meaning more than 30 hours per week) and on some weeks worked over forty (40) hours in a single week, but in other weeks worked less than forty (40) hours. 26. Prior to being hired, CSRs receive an offer from Defendant that sets forth the requirements of a CSR, the job duties, and the offered rate of pay. 27. Defendant also provides all CSRs with training on how to carry out their day to day job duties, including how to load and log into their computer programs at the beginning of the day, and how to log out at the end of the day. 28. Plaintiffs accepted Defendant’s offer to serve as CSRs with the understanding that their base wage rate would be paid as promised. In the case of Plaintiff Barnes, at $14.00 per hour and Plaintiff Stroman at $17.00 per hour. 29. During their training, CSRs are taught, inter alia, how to open and use Defendant’s computer networks and software programs/applications, how to track their time, the importance of attendance and schedule expectations, and Defendant’s policies related to each topic. 31. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated CSRs are trained or instructed not to clock in until they have loaded all of their essential work-related computer programs, so they can be prepared to take calls the moment they begin their shift. 32. In 2018, Defendant acknowledged it knew CSRs were performing off-the-clock work. As a remedy, they afforded CSRs a ten (10) minute grace period to boot-up and shutdown their computers. 33. However, as discussed herein, the grace period was grossly insufficient to address the amount of off-the-clock work that was occurring every single day. 34. All of Defendant’s CSRs use the same or similar computer networks, software programs, and applications in the course of performing their job responsibilities. These programs and applications are integral and an important part of the CSRs’ work and they cannot perform their jobs without them. 35. In order to perform their job, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are required to boot up and log in to various computer networks, software programs and applications, in order to access information necessary to perform their job functions. This pre-shift process takes substantial time on a daily basis ranging from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes per day, and even longer on days where Defendant’s computer networks and programs are not working properly. 36. However, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are not actually “clocked in” for their shifts until after the computer boot-up and login process is complete, meaning that Plaintiffs and all other CSRs work at least twelve (12) minutes each shift for which they are never compensated. 38. The pre-shift boot-up and login process is an integral and indispensable part of the CSRs’ job responsibilities. 39. Additionally, at the end of the day, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are required to logout of the time keeping system before shutting down their computers, which results in additional unpaid off-the-clock work. 40. Plaintiff are also required to prepare any time adjustment forms after they clock out. These time adjustment forms were primarily used to adjust hours if the CSRs were stuck on the phone during their lunch period. However, the completion of the forms occurred after the CSRs’ scheduled shifts, and after they clocked out, which regularly resulted in additional off-the- clock work at the end of their scheduled shifts. 41. The post-shift work performed after disconnecting from Defendant’s network and logging out of the timekeeping system takes between five (5) to six (6) minutes at the end of each shift. 42. The completion of time adjustment forms results in additional off-the-clock work. 43. The post-shift off-the clock time Plaintiffs and all other CSRs spend logging out shutting down directly benefitted Defendant. 44. The post-shift logout and shutdown process was an integral and indispensable part of the CSRs’ job responsibilities. 45. Defendant provides CSRs with one thirty (30) minute lunch period. 47. Many of the computer programs used by CSRs had an auto-log out feature that would automatically log them out if they were idle for more than ten (10) minutes. That means that CSRs always had to perform some, if not all, of the boot up process when they returned from their lunch break. 48. Despite knowing Plaintiffs and all other CSRs performed work before and after their scheduled shifts, Defendant and its managers failed to make any effort to stop or disallow this pre-, mid, and post-shift work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen. 49. Defendant possesses, controls, and/or has access to information and electronic data indicating the times Plaintiffs and all other CSRs booted up and logged into their computers and logged out and shutdown each day, along with the time they logged into their telephone systems. 50. Defendant possesses, controls, and/or has access to information and electronic data indicating when Plaintiffs and all other CSRs experienced down time due to technical issues. 51. CSRs also performed off-the-clock work when they experienced technical difficulties, which kicked them out of Defendant’s timekeeping system. 52. Despite its ability to track the amount of time Plaintiffs and other CSRs spend in connection with the pre-shift boot-up and login process, the mid-shift boot-up and login process, and post-shift shutdown and logout process, and technical downtime, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and other CSRs for the off-the-clock work they performed each shift. A. Pre-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 54. The pre-shift start-up and login process takes substantial time on a daily basis with said time ranging from twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes per day, or even longer when technical issues arise. 55. Defendant’s CSRs complete this process before each shift; however, they are not actually “clocked in” for their shifts until after they start-up their computer, open the essential programs/applications, enter their credentials (password and username), log into their phone system, and change their status to “available” to take calls. 56. As a result, Plaintiffs and other CSRs spend between twelve (12) to fifteen (15) minutes or more at the beginning of each shift performing off-the-clock (uncompensated) work for Defendant. 57. The unpaid off-the-clock work performed prior to each shift by Plaintiffs and other CSRs directly benefits Defendant and the tasks undertaken in connection with the off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to their job duties and responsibilities as CSRs. B. Mid-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 58. Additionally, CSRs must perform off-the-clock work throughout their shifts as well. 59. When CSRs take meal breaks or are away from their computers for any extended period, the programs often automatically log them out. 60. To access the programs, the CSRs are forced to log back in without being compensated for that time. 62. Technical downtime off-the-clock work also occurs during the CSRs’ scheduled shifts. C. Post-Shift Off-the-Clock Work 63. Pursuant to Defendant’s policies, training, and direction, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs are required to shut down and logout of the computer programs and applications after they log-out of Defendant’s timekeeping system. The post-shift logout and shutdown process takes substantial time on a daily basis with said time ranging from five (5) to six (6) minutes or more per shift. 64. Accordingly, Defendant fails to pay Plaintiffs and all other CSRs for between five (5) to six (6) minutes or more of off-the-clock work performed after each shift. 65. The unpaid post-shift, off-the-clock, work performed by Plaintiffs and all other CSRs after each shift directly benefits Defendant and the tasks undertaken in connection with the post-shift off-the-clock work are integral and indispensable to the CSRs’ job duties and responsibilities. D. Defendant Benefitted from the CSRs’ Off-the-Clock Work 66. At all relevant times, Defendant required and directly benefitted from the off-the- clock work performed by Plaintiffs and all other CSRs in connection with the pre-, mid-, and post- shift activities described above. 67. At all relevant times, Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties, protocols, applications, assignments, and employment conditions of Plaintiffs and all other CSRs. 69. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and all other CSRs were non-exempt hourly employees, subject to the requirements of the FLSA and related state laws. 70. At all relevant times, Defendant used its attendance and adherence policies against Plaintiffs and the CSRs in order to pressure them into performing pre-, mid-, and post-shift work, off-the-clock. 71. Defendant expressly trained and instructed Plaintiffs and all other CSRs to perform these off-the-clock work activities when they were not clocked into Defendant’s timekeeping system. 72. Defendant instructed CSRs to have all work applications and systems fully loaded before they clocked-in, so that they were prepared to take calls the moment they clocked-in at the start of their shift. Similarly, at the end of the shift, Defendant instructed CSRs to clock-out before closing all work applications and systems to make certain they were clocked-out at the moment they stopped taking calls. 73. Similarly, Defendant instructed CSRs to return from lunch early to reload and log- into the computer programs necessary to take calls from Defendant’s customers at the moment they clocked back in after lunch. 74. At all relevant times, Defendant’s policies and practices deprived Plaintiffs and the CSRs of wages owed for the pre-, mid-, and post-shift activities they performed. 75. During the weeks that CSRs did not work over forty (40) hours in a workweek, the outcome of Defendant’s policies and practices is a deprivation of straight time wages, which is usually referred to as “gap time” claims. Gap time is compensable. 77. Defendant is in possession of the payroll and timekeeping records that will illustrate exactly which weeks the Plaintiffs worked over forty hours and exactly which weeks worked under forty hours. 78. Defendant knew or should have known that the time spent by Plaintiffs and other CSRs in connection with the pre-, mid- and post-shift activities is compensable under the law. Indeed, in light of the explicit DOL guidance cited above, there is no conceivable way for Defendant to establish that it acted in good faith. 79. Unpaid straight time wages (for Plaintiffs’ gap time claims) related to the off-the- clock work described herein is owed to Plaintiffs at the rate which they are typically paid for hours worked up to forty (40) hours in a workweek. 80. Unpaid wages related to the off-the-clock work described herein is owed to Plaintiffs at the FLSA mandated overtime premium of one and one-half the Plaintiffs’ regular hourly rate because Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 81. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA on behalf of themselves and on behalf of: All current and former hourly CSRs who worked for Marriott International, Inc. in the United States at any time in the past three years. (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this definition if necessary. 83. Excluded from the proposed FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executives, administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and outside sales persons. 84. Consistent with Defendant’s policies and practice, Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective were not paid for all premium overtime compensation when they worked beyond forty (40) hours in a workweek. 85. All of the work Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective performed was assigned by Defendant, and/or Defendant was aware of all of the work the Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective performed. 86. As part of its regular business practice, Defendant intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA with respect to Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or practice includes, but is not limited to: a. Willfully failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, for all premium overtime wages for hours that they worked off- the-clock in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; b. Willfully failing to pay its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, for other off-the-clock work; and c. Willfully failing to record all of the time that its employees, including Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective, have worked for the benefit of Defendant. 87. Defendant is aware, or should have been aware, that federal law required it to pay Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective members an overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 89. A collective action under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are “similarly situated” to Plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees on behalf of whom Plaintiffs bring this collective action are similarly situated because (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are performing the same or similar job duties; (c) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practices, policy, or plan; and (d) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories. 90. The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed FLSA Collective member are the same and differ only by name, location, and rate of pay. The key issues – the amount of uncompensated pre-shift startup/login time, mid-shift startup/login time, and the amount of post-shift logout/shutdown time owed to each employee – does not vary substantially among the proposed FLSA Collective members. 91. There are many similarly situated current and former CSRs who were underpaid in violation of the FLSA. They would benefit from the issuance of a court-authorized notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join. 92. Plaintiffs estimate the FLSA Collective, including both current and former CSRs over the relevant period, includes thousands of members. The precise number should be readily available from a review of Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. 94. The members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class are so numerous that joinder of all Rule 23 Nationwide Class members in this case would be impractical. Plaintiffs reasonably estimate there are hundreds, if not thousands, of Rule 23 Nationwide Class members. Rule 23 Nationwide Class members should be easy to identify from Defendant’s computer systems and electronic payroll and personnel records. 95. There is a well-defined community of interests among Rule 23 Nationwide Class members and common questions of law and fact predominate in this action over any questions affecting individual members of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether the pre-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on startup and login activities each session is compensable time; b. Whether the mid-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on startup and login activities each session is compensable time; c. Whether the post-shift time Rule 23 Nationwide Class members spend on shutdown and logout activities is compensable time; d. Whether Defendant’s non-payment of wages for all compensable time amounted to a breach of contract; and e. Whether Defendant’s non-payment of wages for all compensable time resulted in an unjust enrichment to Defendant. 97. Plaintiffs will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class and she retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage and hour class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Rule 23 Nationwide Class. 98. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Rule 23 Nationwide Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. 99. This case will be manageable as a Rule 23 Class action. Plaintiffs and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties in this case and Defendant has advanced networked computer and payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in this case to be resolved with relative ease. 100. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3) are satisfied in this case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393; 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) (“[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a class action”). 101. Because Defendant acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Rule 23 Nationwide Class and declaratory relief is appropriate in this case with respect to the Rule 23 Nationwide Class as a whole, class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate.

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(FLSA Overtime Wage Violations Against Defendants – Collective Action) (NYLL Failure to Pay Wages Against Defendants – Class Action) (NYLL Overtime Wage Violations Against Defendants – Class Action) 23. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants have committed the following acts and/or omissions with knowledge that they have been violating federal and state laws and that Plaintiff has been and continues to be economically injured. 46. Pursuant to the FLSA, §§ 207 and 216(b), Plaintiff brings his First cause of action as a collective action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees of Defendants. 47. Defendants’ failure to comply with the FLSA extended beyond the Plaintiff to all other similarly situated employees insofar as Defendants had a policy to not pay their New Jersey union member employees at one and half times the New York City prevailing wage rate for all hours over forty (40) per week for work performed on the New York side of the GWB span. 48. Plaintiff seeks certification of the First cause of action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of himself, individually, and all other similarly situated current and former individuals New Jersey union members employed by Defendants on the Project who have been denied payment of one and half times the New York City prevailing wage rate for all hours over forty (40) per week for work performed on the New York side of the GWB span. 49. Upon information and belief, there are at least sixty (60) current and former New Jersey union member employees of Defendants who have been denied payment of one and half times the New York City prevailing wage rate for all hours over forty (40) per week for work performed on the New York side of the GWB span while working for Defendants. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 61. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff and others similarly situated regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 62. At all relevant times hereto, Defendants have had and operated under a decision, policy and plan, and under common policies, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules of knowingly and willfully failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated one and a half times the statutorily required New York City prevailing wage rate for all hours over forty (40) per week for work performed on the New York side of the GWB span in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. 63. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 65. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 66. New York law prohibits an employer from permitting an employee to work without paying overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any workweek. 67. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Defendants knowingly, willfully, regularly and repeatedly have failed to pay Plaintiff and members of the NYLL Class the required overtime rates, two (2) times their regular rate of pay, for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek and/or eight (8) hours per day. 68. Defendants’ NYLL violations have caused Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiff and the members of the NYLL Class have sustained damages and seeks recovery for unpaid wages in an amount to be determined at trial, attorneys’ fees, costs, liquidated damages and prejudgment interest as provided by NYLL § 663 and supporting regulations, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein.

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(Breach of Contract) (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 10. GEICO's car insurance policy (the "Policy") uses standard language provided by Insurance Services Office, Inc. As part of that standardized language, the Policy specifies that GEICO "will pay for collision loss to the owned auto or non-owned car for the amount of each loss less the applicable deductible." In relevant part, the Policy defines loss as "direct and accidental loss of or damage to * * * an insured auto, including its equipment." 36. Leif realleges paragraphs 1 through 35 of this Complaint. 37. The Policy specifies that GEICO will either pay for all "direct and accidental loss of or damage to * * * an insured auto, including its equipment" after collisions or make the necessary repairs itself, subject only to certain exclusions that are not applicable here. 38. All of GEICO's automobile insurance policies contain the language set forth in paragraph 37 above. The Policy uses the standard form language approved by Insurance Services Office, Inc. 39. GEICO policyholders pay insurance premiums in exchange for coverage under the Policy. 40. The Policy constitutes a valid and enforceable contract between GEICO and policyholders. 41. As a matter of policy and practice, GEICO does not compensate policyholders for pre- and post-repair electronic scans after collisions. This results in policyholders receiving incomplete compensation for their collision losses both for the scans themselves and for further necessary repairs that the scans would reveal. 45. Leif realleges paragraphs 1 through 44 of this Complaint. 46. In every contract there is an implied covenant known as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the benefits of the contract. 47. GEICO's policyholders have a reasonable expectation, rooted in the plain language of the Policy, that GEICO will compensate them in an amount sufficient to obtain complete and safe repairs. However, GEICO's policy of denying pre- and post-repair scans, in direct opposition to manufacturer and industry recommendations, frustrates this reasonable expectation. 8. GEICO sells car insurance, including coverage for collision losses, to drivers in Portland, Oregon, and across the United States. GEICO holds itself out as a low-cost automobile insurer, but endeavors to decrease the sum GEICO must pay its policyholders by refusing to compensate policyholders for necessary and complete repairs. 9. Leif holds a GEICO car insurance policy, including coverage for collision losses, for his 2017 GMC Sierra 3500 pickup truck ("Sierra 3500"). A. Leif's Individual Factual Allegations

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11. Stage 3 has, at all relevant times, paid its Day Rate Workers (including Rodriguez) a day rate for the work they perform. It maintains employment records on them, and can terminate their employment. 12. The Day Rate Workers are only paid for days they work. 13. Stage 3’s Day Rate Workers are non-exempt employees. While the precise job duties of the Day Rate Workers may vary somewhat, any variations do not impact their entitlement to overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 14. An employer can pay non-exempt employees on a day rate basis if the employee receives overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 29 C.F.R. § 778.112. 15. Stage 3 regularly scheduled Rodriguez, and other Day Rate Workers, for 84 hours of work per week. Rodriguez and the Day Rate Workers regularly worked at least 84 hours in a week. 16. Stage 3 knows its Day Rate Workers work more than 40 hours in a week. Stage 3’s records reflect this fact. 17. It is well established that blue collar workers like solids control technicians in general – and these Day Rate Workers in particular – are not exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Stage 3 also knows its Day Rate Workers are not exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions (or the provisions of any similar state overtime laws). 18. Nonetheless, Stage 3 does not pay its Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 20. Stage 3’s day rate policy affects all the Day Rate Workers in a similar manner. Rodriguez and the other Day Rate Workers are similarly situated for the purposes of their overtime claims. 21. The collective action class is therefore properly defined as: All Day Rate Workers employed by Stage 3 since July 3, 2011. 22. By failing to pay Rodriguez and the other Day Rate Workers overtime at one-and- one-half times their regular rates, Stage 3 violated the FLSA’s overtime provisions. 23. Stage 3 owes Rodriguez and the other Day Rate Workers the difference between the rate actually paid and the proper overtime rate. Because Stage 3 knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, its pay practices violated the FLSA, it owes these wages for at least the past three years. 24. Stage 3 also owes Rodriguez and the other Day Rate Workers an amount equal to the unpaid overtime wages as liquidated damages. 25. Rodriguez and the other Day Rate Workers are entitled to recover all reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses incurred in this action. 8. Stage 3 is a closed loop solids control company that provides services to the oil and gas industry.1 9. In each of the past three years, Stage 3’ gross revenues exceeded $500,000.

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14. Named Plaintiff and others who are similarly situated as name plaintiff are not executive, professional or otherwise exempt from the wage and hour laws. In essence, Named plaintiff and others who are similarly situated as Named plaintiff, are food service support personnel whose time is controlled by their employers as wage earners; whose duties are required to be followed by employees according to the employers’ dictates and policies; and Named plaintiff was required to attend weekly meetings in which policy and practice was reviewed and enforced by the employers. 15. Named plaintiff brings this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all collective action plaintiffs who are similarly situated. 16. Specifically, Named plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all persons who worked or work for defendants as “weekly salaried employee” and who were/are subject to defendants’ unlawful compensation practices and policies at any point from six years prior to the filing of this action the present (members of this putative class are referred to as “Collective Action Plaintiffs”). 18. Named plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Collective Action Plaintiffs, because Named plaintiff’s interests are consistent with, and not antagonistic, to those of the Collective Action Plaintiffs. Named plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in the prosecution of claims involving employee wage and hour and other labor and employment disputes. 19. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this collective action that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. The class will be easily identifiable from defendants’ business records, along with their contact information. 20. Similarly-situated employees are known to defendants, are readily identifiable by defendants, and can be located through defendants’ business records. Named plaintiff does not know the exact size of the potential class, as such information is in the exclusive control of defendants; however, on information and belief, the number of potential class members is estimated to be 40 or more. 22. Collective Action Plaintiffs include those who were not paid proper hourly wages, overtime, and lunch hour. Despite the promise of a one-hour lunch break, in reality, plaintiff and others who are similarly situated were expected to work, and in fact worked, during the lunch hour because that was deemed the “busiest period” of the work day. All Collective Action Plaintiffs were required to work far more hours than 40 a week and to effectively surrender their lunch hour due to required peak-time productivity. In all, the Collective Action Plaintiffs routinely worked work days of 13 hours or more, at least five days a week. 24. The foregoing paragraphs are adopted by reference and incorporated. 25. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Named plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and those similarly situated with him (“Class Plaintiffs”). Specifically, Named Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all persons who worked or work for defendants in the past four years and who were not paid lawful compensation for their hours. 26. The class is so numerous that the joinder of all class members is impracticable. Named Plaintiff does not know the exact size of the class, as such information is in the exclusive control of defendants; however, on information and belief, the number of potential class members is estimated to be sufficiently high that individual joinder is not practicable. 27. Named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the putative class members, because each Named Plaintiff, like all Class Plaintiffs, was an employee of defendants and has been damaged as a result of defendants’ violation of the FLSA while defendants-employers have been unjustly enriched through wage theft or knowing miscomputation or other artifice. 29. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class will be easily identifiable from defendants’ business records. Upon information and belief, defendants maintain business records in the form of “Job Assignments” which are maintained on a daily, weekly, monthly and yearly bases, which show the employees’ names, work location, the routes serviced, the revenues associated with each employee’s performance and so forth, and other relevant business information, within defendants’ computer systems and in their books and records. 31. Questions of law and fact that are common to the members of the class predominate over questions that affect only individual members of the class. Among the questions of law and fact that are common to the class are: A. Defendants’ failure to pay proper overtime wages; B. Defendants’ failure to pay lunch hour wages; C. Defendants’ failure to pay spread of hours; D. Defendants’ failure to pay the employer contribution to social security and other benefits; E. Defendants’ failure to keep and provide to each employee proper wage and hour records.

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Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§17500, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant 22. In addition to asserting class claims, Plaintiff assert claims on behalf of class members pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. The purpose of such claims is to obtain injunctive orders regarding the unlawful, unfair, deceptive business practices and false advertising alleged herein, to require the disgorgement of all profits and/or restoration of monies wrongfully obtained through GNC’s unfair and deceptive business practices, as alleged herein. This private attorneys general action is necessary and appropriate because Defendants have engaged in wrongful acts described herein as part of the regular practice of their businesses. 23. Plaintiff brings this action and all claims stated within on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 31. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 32. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are “consumers” as defined by Civil Code § 1761(d) because they purchased products from GNC’s website for personal, family or household purposes. 33. Products purchased by Plaintiff and the Proposed Class during the class period from GNC’s website are “goods” as defined by Cal. Civil Code § 1761(a). 43. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant (Injunctive Relief Only with Reservation) Violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant

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10. Defendant sent EXHIBIT A to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect from her a debt arising from one or more transactions the subject of which were the purchase of personal or household goods and services; a debt within the meaning of l5 U.S.C. g 1692a(5). I https://www.nationalrecovery.com/ 2 11. language: Consistent with l5 U.S.C. S 1692g(a), EXHIBIT A contained the following Unless you notifr this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notif, this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the debt, or any portion thereof, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of the judgment and mail you a copy of such j udgment or verification. If you request of this oflice in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 12. On August 22,2013, pursuant to the notice conveyed in EXHIBIT A, Plaintiff communicated to Defendant a timely dispute as to the validity of the debt, requesting therein, verification of the disputed debts and the name and address of the original creditor. 13. A true and accurate copy of Plaintiffs August 22,2013, dispute letter is attached hereto and further referenced in this Complaint as EXHIBIT B. 14. PlaintifPs dispute and request for verification clearly and unequivocally disputed the debt pursuant to l5 U.S.C. g 1692g(b) and the language contained in EXHIBIT A. 15. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. $ 1692g(b), a debt collector, upon receipt of a timely written dispute, must cease all collection activity until such time as the debt collector obtains verification ofthe debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address ofthe original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or niune and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Guerrero v. MM Acquisitions LLC,4gg F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Diqz v. Residential Credil Solutions, 1nc., No. l2-CV_37g1 (ADSXETB) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 20 t3). J 15 U.S.C. S 168l - The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 16. The purpose of the FCRA is to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this title. 15 U.S.C. $ 1681(b). 17 . Consistent with its purpose, the FCRA allows consumers to direct disputes directly the credit report information furnishers. 15 U.S.C. g 1681s-2(a)(8). 18. Unlike the FDCPA, the FCRA requires a consumer who seeks to dispute the accuracy of information (reported to a credit reporting agency) shall provide a dispute notice directly to such person at the address specified by the person for such notices that - (i) identifies the specific information that is being disputed; (ii) explains the basis for the dispute; and (iii) includes all supporting documentation required by the furnisher to substantiate the basis ofthe dispute. 1s U.S.C. $ l68ls-2(8)(E). 19. If the consumer fails to identiff the specific information that is being disputed, or fails to explain the basis for the dispute, the information fumisher is relieved of any duty to investigate the completeness or accuracy of information. See Palouian v. FIA Card Services, No. 13-CV-0293 (8.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2013). 4 National Recovery Agency's Violations of lhe Fair Debt Collection practices Act 20. In response to Plaintiffs timely dispute pursuant to 15 U.S.C. g 1692g(b), NRS replied on August 27 ,2013 by sending a form letter containing the following paragraph: Our offices are in receipt of your letter of dispute parsa anl to lS U.S.C. S 1681 s-2 of lhe Fair Credit Reporting Act. please be advised we havi reviewed your dispute and find the dispute lacking of any facts or information which would allow us to conduct an investigation. Because your dispute alleges no specific information to form the basis for an investigation, we are unable to investigate the dispute pursuant to 15 U.S.C. $ 1691s-2(a)(8)(F)(i) of the FCRA. (emphasis added) 21. Defendant's August 27, 2014 letter went on to advise that, "your payment should be made directly to this office for prompt credit to this account," and went on to state, ..The purpose of this communication is to collect a debt and any information will be used for that purpose." 22. A true and accurate copy of plaintifls August 27, 20r 3 collection letter is attached hereto and further referenced in this Complaint as EXHIBIT C. 23. EXHIBIT c establishes that NRS "reviewed" plaintifls dispute and therefore knew that Plaintiffs dispute was made pursuant to 15 u.S.c. g 1692g(b), and not 15 u.s.c. $ l68l s-2. 24. The contents of both EXHIBIT A and EXHIBIT c establish that NRS has knowledge of and is familiar with its responsibilities under both the FDCpA and the FCRA. NRS falsely conveys to consumers that a dispute made under 15 u.s.c. $ 1692g(b) is insufficient unless it contains the information required by 15 U.S.c. $ r6g1s-2(g)(E). 5 25. EXHIBIT C, in addition to being an intentionally false, deceptive and misleading representation of Plaintiff s rights, is a communication made in connection with the collection of a debt. 26. This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffbrings this action on behalf of herself and on behalfofall other persons similarly situated. 27 . Upon information and belief, EXHIBIT C is a form letter, regularly and systematically sent to any consumer who communicates a timely dispute to the Defendant, pursuant to l5 U.S.C. $ 1692g(b). 28. This claim is therefore brought on behalf of: (a) all natural persons in the State of New York; (b) to whom Defendant sent a written communication containing language materially similar to that in EXHIBIT C; (c) subsequent to a request for validation pursuant to the FDCPA; (d) which was not retumed as undelivered by the United States Postal Service; (e) during the one year immediately preceding the filing ofthis complaint and ending 2l days thereafter. 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes that there are more than fifty (50) such natural persons to whom Defendant sent a letters materially similar to EXHIBIT C, under the circumstances described herein. 30. The identities ofall class members are readily ascertainable from the Defendant's own records and other records within the Defendant's care, custody, or control. 6 31. Excluded from the Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, director, and employees of the Defendant and their respective families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant's communications, those materially similar to the form attached as EXHIBIT C, violate the FDCPA as enumerated herein. 33. The Plaintiffs claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 34. A class action is superior to other altemative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. The nature of the wrong depends on the whether the letter at issue constih.rtes continued collection activity in the face of a timely dispute. 35. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class defined herein. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attomey have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 36. The named Plaintiff, Jeanette Zirogiannis, should be named a class representative and her counsel, Abraham Kleinman, should be appointed class counsel. 38. Under $ 1692e and e(10) may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 39. EXHIBIT C falsely, deceptively and misleadingly characterizes the consumer's FDCPA dispute as a FCRA dispute then falsely, deceptively and misleadingly informs her that her dispute is therefore invalid. 40. EXHIBIT C instructs the consumer to make a payment, and is therefore a communication made in connection with the collection of a debt. 41. 15 U.S.C. $ 1692k(a) provides that a debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of the FDCPA with respect to any person is liable to such person for up to $1000 in statutory damages, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attomey's fee as determined by the court, and; in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph $ 1692k(aX2XA), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of$500,000 or 1 per centum ofthe net worth of the debt collector. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant for: a. Statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. $ 1692k; b. Attorney's fees and costs ofbringing this action; c. Such other or further reliefas the Court deems proper. 8. On or about Jrur,e 27,2013, Defendant sent, or caused to be sent through the mail a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff at her residence in Babylon, New York. Plaintiff received the letter a reasonable time thereafter. 9. A true and accurate copy of Defendant's June 27,2013 collection letter is attached hereto and further referenced in this Complaint as EXHIBIT A. The Defendant Violated l5 U.S.C. $ 1692e and e(l0) 37 . Plaintiff incorporates all of the foregoing allegations of this complaint, as if fully set forth herein. 7 crediEor Accowrt # NATIONAIJ GRID I.ONG ISI,AND 7O7L08O622

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25. On or about August 14, 2020, Defendant caused a call with a prerecorded message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9590 (the “9590 Number”). 26. Because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone. 27. The following is a transcript of the voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail box: Hey, it’s me. I’m really sorry that I’m calling again, but I forgot to tell that you that I’m going to the new recreational dispensary tomorrow called Doja. They’re in Portage and they are giving out like a free 50-inch TV and like free tacos for an entire year from Taco Bob’s and I really want to get out there. I don’t want to miss it. So you should meet up with me tomorrow like a little before eleven because they are going to be really busy. I think they are on like 4203 East Centre Avenue. If you can’t make it just give me a holler, but otherwise I just wanted to let you know why I’m going to be a little late tomorrow. Alright, talk soon. Bye. 28. The prerecorded call at issue, which was left as a voicemail, was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 30. Defendant’s prerecorded calls constitute telemarketing because they encourage the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling cannabis products. 31. The prerecorded calls Plaintiff received originated from telephone number 269- 459-6462, a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 32. Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 33. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted with a prerecorded call. 34. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9590 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 9590 Number. 35. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16- 2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). 36. Defendant’s unsolicited voice messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the message. 38. Defendant’s voice messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 39. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 40. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. 41. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 44. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 45. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 53. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. 54. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 55. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 56. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 58. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its prerecorded calls to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 59. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporates paragraphs 1-50 as if fully set forth herein. 60. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 61. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Claim for Violation of 14(d) of the 1934 Act Against Defendants) (Claim for Violation of Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act Against Defendants) (Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants and MaxLinear) 27. Exar designs, develops, and markets high performance integrated circuits and system solutions for the industrial, infrastructure, automotive, and audio/video markets. 65. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 66. Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act states, in relevant part, that: It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading . . . in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders[.] 67. Defendants disseminated the misleading Solicitation Statement, which contained statements that, in violation of Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. 68. The Solicitation Statement was prepared, reviewed, and/or disseminated by defendants. 76. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 77. Section 14(d)(4) of the 1934 Act states: Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 83. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 84. The Individual Defendants and MaxLinear acted as controlling persons of Exar within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Exar and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Solicitation Statement filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that plaintiff contends are false and misleading. 85. Each of the Individual Defendants and MaxLinear was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Solicitation Statement alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. Background of the Company and the Proposed Transaction

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23. On August 12, 2013, Plaintiff purchased four (4) cups of Yogurt from the grocery store chain, Albertsons, at a cost of $1.39 per cup. 24. On August 16, 2013, Plaintiff purchased four (4) cups of Yogurt from the grocery store chain, Albertsons, Albertsons, at a cost of $1.39 per cup. 25. On August 19, 2013, Plaintiff purchased five (5) cups of Yogurt from the grocery store chain, Albertsons, Albertsons, at a cost of $1.39 per cup. 26. On August 26, 2013 Plaintiff purchased two (2) cups of Yogurt from the grocery store chain, Albertsons, Albertsons, at a cost of $1.39 per cup. 27. On September 4, 2013 Plaintiff purchased six (6) cups of Yogurt from the grocery store chain, Albertsons, Albertsons, at a cost of $1.00 per cup. 28. Plaintiff purchased all of the subject Yogurt from the grocery store chain Albertsons located at 1800 W. Whittier Boulevard, La Habra, California 90631. 35. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Class”). 36. Plaintiff represents and is a member of the Class, defined as: All persons within the United States who purchased Chobani Greek Yogurt from Defendant with manufacturing code “16-012” and a “Best By” date between September 11, 2013 and October 7, 2013, since one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. 37. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of California sub-class (“”Sub-Class”). 49. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations by reference as if set fully herein. 50. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the actions (and inactions) of Defendant. 51. California Civil Code section 1791.1(a) states in pertinent part, “Implied warranty of merchantability” or “implied warranty that goods are merchantable” means that the consumer goods meet each of the following: (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description. (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. (4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label. 70. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates the above allegations by reference as if set fully herein. 71. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the Sub-Class. Plaintiff and the Sub-Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of such negligence. BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY FOR FOOD NEGLIGENCE

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14. On or about June 15, 2014, Plaintiffs attended a timeshare sales presentation led by agents of Defendant. 15. During the timeshare sales presentation, Defendant's agents offered Plaintiffs the purchase of a timeshare vacation ownership interest in exchange for valuable consideration, as further described in the contract numbered 93-500300, with purchase price of $21,900.00 and an additional amount of $524.06 owed for closing costs. 16. Following the above-referenced timeshare sales presentation, Plaintiffs agreed to and accepted Defendant's offer and thereafter entered into such contract and paid Defendant valuable consideration for same, such being incorporated by reference herein. 17. Accordingly, Plaintiffs possess an ownership interest the described timeshare interest, located within Horry County, South Carolina. 19. Further, such contract states specifically within its Paragraph 15 that it is to be governed by South Carolina law. a. Alternatively, should Florida law apply to said contract, Paragraph 15 is then false, rendering such timeshare purchase contract voidable as being a misrepresentation made to a timeshare purchaser in violation of the Timeshare Act. 20. Plaintiffs allege that their subject contract fails to meet the requirements of the Timeshare Act as follows: a. Fails to include the following specific language required by S.C. Code Section 27-32-40: 28. Defendant has acted (or failed to properly act) on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole in that they have engaged in a routine and systematic course of conduct in selling timeshares to Plaintiffs and Class Members pursuant to form contracts that violate the Timeshare Act. 29. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of members of the proposed Class as all claims are based on the same factual and legal theories. 30. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of Class Members and Plaintiffs have no conflicts with the other members of the Class. 31. Plaintiffs have retained as counsel attorneys that are experienced in timeshare law, class action law, and complex litigation. 33. Plaintiffs re-allege the paragraphs above as if fully restated herein and further state as follows. 34. Defendant and its agents are sellers of a vacation time sharing plan or are in the business of selling interests in a vacation time sharing plan within the definition set forth in S.C. Code § 27-32-10, et seq. 35. The timeshare interest purchased by Plaintiffs, as set forth above, is part of a vacation time sharing plan as defined in S.C. Code § 27-32-10, et seq. 36. The timeshare interest purchased by Plaintiffs, as set forth above, was intended to be part of a vacation time sharing plan as defined in the Timeshare Act, S.C. Code § 27-32-10, et seq. 38. Due to Defendant and its agents’ failure to meet all legal and statutory requirements to engage in the sale of timeshare properties to the public, Defendant violated the Timeshare Act. Violation of the South Carolina Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act

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20. In late 2019, an outbreak of respiratory illness resulting from a novel coronavirus was first identified in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. That illness, now known as COVID-19, has spread across the world. COVID-19 has been designated a pandemic by the World Health Organization, the first pandemic resulting from a coronavirus. As of the date of this Complaint, more than 2.43 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported across the globe, and more than 169,859 persons have died from their illness.6 21. California was one of the first states affected by the pandemic and one of the first to see COVID-19 cases. On January 17, 2020, travel to California was affected when the CDC began health screenings of passengers on direct or connecting flights from Wuhan to the “three U.S. airports that receive most of the travelers from Wuhan, China: San Francisco (SFO), New York (JFK), and Los Angeles (LAX) airports.”7 The third confirmed COVID-19 case in the United States was an Orange County man diagnosed on January 26, 2020. Shortly thereafter, the State Department evacuated 195 U.S. citizens and from Hubei Province, placing them in isolation at the March Air Reserve Base in Riverside, California. Around the same time, new COVID-19 cases emerged in Santa Clara County in and around “Silicon Valley.” On January 31, the CDC confirmed that a Santa Clara man had tested positive for the virus, and an unrelated Santa Clara women tested positive two days later. Around the same time, two additional cases were confirmed just south in San Benito County. By February 12, 2020, eight of the nation’s fourteen confirmed COVID-19 patients were in California, indicating that the virus was clustering in the state.8 77. Plaintiffs bring this proposed action on behalf of themselves and, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2) & 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following class (collectively, the “Class”): All persons who purchased in California any Protected Product on Amazon.com on or after February 4, 2020 at a price 10 percent greater than the price charged on Amazon.com for the same Protected Product (a) on February 2, 2020, or (b) immediately prior to any declaration of a State of Emergency relating to the COVID-19 crisis. 86. Plaintiffs repeat and re-make every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 87. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., proscribes acts of unfair competition, including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” 88. Any violation of California Penal Code § 396 “constitute[s] an unlawful business practice and an act of unfair competition within the meaning of Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code.” Cal. Penal Code § 396(i). 93. Plaintiffs repeat and re-make every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. COMPETITION LAW (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200) ......................................... 42  SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE .......................... 43  THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION UNJUST ENRICHMENT ............................................................... 45  NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE Outbreak of Covid-19 and the Early Impact on California’s Population V.  CLASS ACTON ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................................... 38  VI.  VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200)

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23. The requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) are met with respect to the Class defined below. 36. Waste Management offers a wide range of services including solid waste and recyclable materials collection services for residential, industrial, municipal and commercial customers in 48 states. It serves over 20 million residential customers and over 2 million commercial customers. 37. Waste Management currently has in excess of 48,000 full-time employees. 38. Waste Management requires its employees to provide sensitive PII as a condition of employment. Waste Management’s employees are also required to provide the PII of their dependents. The Data Breach 39. On January 21, 2021, Waste Management detected suspicious activity on its network. 40. Waste Management later determined that between January 21, 2021 and January 23, 2021, an unauthorized actor(s) accessed Waste Management’s network and acquired certain files containing the sensitive PII of Waste Management’s current and former employees. 42. The unauthorized actor(s) were able to gain access to Waste Management’s network as a result of Waste Management’s failure to take necessary and required minimal steps to secure Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ PII. Similarly, Waste Management’s failure to take reasonable steps after detecting suspicious activity on January 21, 2021 allowed the criminal third party actor(s) to maintain access to Waste Management’s network on January 22 and 23, 2021. 43. Despite first detecting “suspicious activity” on January 21, 2021, Waste Management did not begin notifying victims of the breach until May 28, 2021. A copy of a sample notice letter filed with the California Attorney General is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 44. The notice letters offer victims of the breach one free year of credit and identity monitoring services through Experian. Plaintiffs and the Class Have Been Injured and Face Substantial Risk of Future Injury 45. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ stolen personal data represents essentially one-stop shopping for identity thieves. The unauthorized access by the hackers has provided cyber criminals with the tools to perform the most thorough identity theft—they have obtained all the essential PII to mimic the identity of the user. 46. Criminals often trade stolen PII on the “cyber black market” for years following a breach. Cybercriminals can also post stolen PII on the internet, thereby making such information publicly available. 48. According to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), identity theft wreaks havoc on consumers’ finances, credit history, and reputation and can take time, money, and patience to resolve.5 Identity thieves use stolen personal information for a variety of crimes, including credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, and bank and finance fraud.6 49. Identity thieves may commit various types of crimes such as immigration fraud, obtaining a driver’s license or identification card in the victim’s name but with another’s picture, applying and opening credit card accounts, and/or using the victim’s information to obtain a fraudulent tax refund or fraudulent unemployment benefits. The United States government and privacy experts acknowledge that it may take years for identity theft to come to light and be detected. 50. Recently, the FTC has released its updated publication on protecting PII for businesses, which includes instructions on protecting PII, properly disposing of PII, understanding network vulnerabilities, implementing policies to correct security problems, using intrusion detection programs, monitoring data traffic, and having in place a response plan. 85. Plaintiffs bring all claims as Class claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 87. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of the following Subclass of similarly siuated persons: The Employee Subclass All natural persons residing in the United States and currently or formerly employed by Waste Management whose personal information was compromised in the Waste Management Data Breach, which occurred between approximately January 21, 2021 and January 23, 2021. 88. The Nationwide Class and Subclass may be referred to collectively, where appropriate, as the “Class.” 89. Excluded from the Class are Defendant; any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, is a parent or subsidiary, or which is controlled by Defendant; and the affiliates, legal representatives, attorneys, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns of Defendant. Also excluded are the judges and court personnel in this case and any members of their immediate families. 90. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify and/or amend the Class or Subclass definitions, including but not limited to adding additional subclasses, as necessary. 91. Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for Class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of the claims on a Class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. 93. Numerosity. The Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The Nationwide Class includes at least hundreds of thousands of individuals whose personal data was entrusted to Waste Management and compromised in the Waste Management Data Breach. 94. Upon information and belief, the Subclass includes at least hundreds of individuals whose personal data was entrusted to Waste Management and compromised in the Waste Management Data Breach. 95. Commonality. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs and the Class, including the following: • whether Defendant engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged in this Complaint; • whether Defendant’s conduct was unlawful; • whether Defendant failed to implement and maintain reasonable systems and security procedures and practices to protect PII; • whether Defendant unreasonably delayed in notifying those affected of the security breach; • whether Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiffs and Class Members to adequately protect their PII and to provide timely and accurate notice of the Waste Management Data Breach to Plaintiffs and Class Members ; • whether Defendant breached its duties to protect the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to provide adequate data security and failing to provide timely and adequate notice of the Waste Management Data Breach to Plaintiffs and the Class Members; • whether Defendant’s conduct was negligent; • whether Defendant wrongfully or unlawfully failed to inform Plaintiffs and Class Members that it did not ensure that networks and security practices adequate to reasonably protect PII were used when handling Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’

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10. Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any express written consent prior to making prerecorded collection calls to cellular telephone numbers such as Plaintiff’s. 11. Huntington Bank openly admits on its website that it places prerecorded calls and calls using an automatic telephone dialing system.1 12. Huntington is also open about the fact that it engages in skip-tracing – i.e., that it has employees that do research to try to identify additional phone numbers for clients that are in default on debt in connection with Huntington Bank’s debt collection efforts. In fact, Huntington Bank has employees whose job title is “Skip Tracer.”2 13. Not surprisingly, there are many online complaints about Defendant’s collection calls to consumers who were not Huntington Bank clients when called: • “They call and say they are with Huntington National Bank and no one here has ever had anything to do with Huntington Bank!!”3 • “Rec’d call at 7:36 pm on 3/29/2019, was not home at time, so message was left. Could tell it was a recorded message and no name was given by lady as to who to call back. Son deals with real Huntington Bank, not me, but they keep calling me. I take this message as a threat.”4 • “Huntington Bank left vague voice mail”5 • “constantly calling claiming I have a car loan with them. I don’t own a car at all.”6 1 https://www.huntington.com/Personal/mobile-banking/alert-text-services 2 https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/Huntington-National-Bank-Skip-Tracer-Salaries-E1496_D_KO25,36.htm 3 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-877-477-6855/5 4 https://www.shouldianswer.com/phone-number/8774776855 5 Id. 6 Id. Case: 2:19-cv-01789-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/06/19 Page: 3 of 9 PAGEID #: 3 4 14. On April 13, 2019, Plaintiff received a phone call from Huntington Bank on his cellular phone using phone number 877-477-6855. Plaintiff did not answer this call, but a prerecorded voicemail was left stating the following: “This message is for Kenneth Cousins. Please contact Huntington Bank at 877-477-6855 as soon as possible. Our normal hours of operation are Monday through Thursday 8:00 AM to 11:00 PM, Friday 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM and Saturday 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Again, you can reach us toll free at 877-477-6855. This message is for Kenneth Cousins. Please contact Huntington Bank at 877-477-6855 as soon as possible. Our normal hours of operation are Monday through Thursday 8:00 AM to 11:00 PM, Friday 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM and Saturday 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Again, you can reach us toll free at 877-477-6855.” 15. On April 15, 2019, Plaintiff received a second prerecorded debt collection call from Defendant on his cellular phone, again using phone number 877-477-6855. The call was not answered, but Defendant left exactly the same prerecorded message again on Plaintiff’s voicemail stating: “This message is for Kenneth Cousins. Please contact Huntington Bank at 877-477-6855 as soon as possible. Our normal hours of operation are Monday through Thursday 8:00 AM to 11:00 PM, Friday 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM and Saturday 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Again, you can reach us toll free at 877-477-6855. This message is for Kenneth Cousins. Please contact Huntington Bank at 877-477-6855 as soon as possible. Our normal hours of operation are Monday through Thursday 8:00 AM to 11:00 Case: 2:19-cv-01789-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/06/19 Page: 4 of 9 PAGEID #: 4 5 PM, Friday 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM and Saturday 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM Eastern Standard Time. Again, you can reach us toll free at 877-477-6855.” 16. Huntington Bank shows on its website that 877-477-6855 is a phone number it controls/owns for Loan Payment Assistance: 7 17. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with Huntington Bank or any of its affiliated companies, and has never consented to any contact from Defendant. 18. Simply put, Huntington Bank did not obtain Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place prerecorded collection calls to him on his cell phone number. 19. The unauthorized telephone calls made by Huntington Bank, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed Throndson’s use and enjoyment of his cellular phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phones’ hardware (including the phones’ battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. 20. Seeking redress for these injuries, Throndson, on behalf of himself and Class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited, prerecorded calls to cell phone numbers. 7 https://www.huntington.com/customer-service/contact-us Case: 2:19-cv-01789-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/06/19 Page: 5 of 9 PAGEID #: 5 6 21. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) called, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) using a prerecorded voice message, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it obtained prior express consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to call Plaintiff, or (b) Defendant did not obtain prior express consent. 22. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 23. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 24. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: Case: 2:19-cv-01789-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/06/19 Page: 6 of 9 PAGEID #: 6 7 (a) whether Defendant placed calls using a prerecorded message to Plaintiff and the members of the Class; (b) whether Defendant placed calls using a prerecorded message to Plaintiff and members of the Class without prior express consent to make the calls; (c) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; and (d) whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 25. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest adverse to the Class. 26. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Case: 2:19-cv-01789-MHW-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/06/19 Page: 7 of 9 PAGEID #: 7 8 Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 28. Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted, prerecorded collection calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 29. These collection telephone calls were made en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 30. Defendant’s conduct was negligent or wilful and knowing. 31. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 32. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and knowing, it may treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 9. Under the TCPA, Huntington Bank must have a consumer’s prior express consent prior to placing prerecorded debt collection calls to the consumer’s cellular phone number. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claim Huntington Bank Places Unsolicited, Prerecorded Collection Calls to the Cellular Phone Numbers of Consumers Who are Not Huntington Bank Clients Huntington Bank Repeatedly Called Plaintiff’s Cell Phone Number Using a Prerecorded Message Without Plaintiff’s Consent Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Plaintiff brings this class action on his own behalf, and as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of a class of people defined as follows: All disabled individuals who have been unable to obtain required accessibility information online, or to independently secure an online reservation for an accessible guestroom, by a failure to comply with the ADA and ADAAG upon any online reservation platform on which the Hotel is advertised, including the Website. 11. Excluded from the Class is any person who is an executive, officer, employee, and/or director of the Defendant. 13. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the entire Class. Plaintiff, along with every member of the Class, has suffered civil right violations because of Defendant’s continuing failure to comply with the ADA and ADAAG on its Website and/or other online reservation platforms. 14. Plaintiff can and will adequately protect the interests of all members of the Class and has retained competent counsel experienced in both ADA and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interest that is contrary to the interest of the Class members in this case. 15. A class action is far superior to any other possible method for adjudicating this controversy. Each member of the Class is entitled to injunctive relief, as well as possible statutory damages under New Jersey law. The expense and burden associated with individual litigation of each claim held by each member of the Class would be extraordinarily inefficient for Defendant, members of the Class, and the courts. 16. Common questions of law and fact prevail with respect to all members of the Class and predominate over questions applicable solely to individual Class members. Among such common questions of law and fact is whether Defendant has violated Federal and New Jersey State statutory obligations by failing to comply with the ADA, ADAAG, and NJLAD, such that all physically disabled persons are afforded fair and equal access to any hotel owned or operated by Defendant, and their online reservation systems. 17. Plaintiff knows of no special or unique difficulties that would be encountered in the management of this litigation that might preclude its maintenance as a class action. 19. On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the ADA, explaining that its purpose was to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing such discrimination, invoking the sweep of congressional authority in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities to ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in enforcing the standards set by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) - (4). 20. Pursuant to the mandates of 42 U.S.C. §12134(a), on September 15, 2010, the Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General (“DOJ”), published revised regulations for Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990. Public accommodations, including places of lodging were required to conform to these revised regulations on or before March 15, 2012. 22. In promulgating the new requirements, the Department of Justice made clear that individuals with disabilities should be able to reserve hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible guestrooms. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 24. In addition, hotel rooms that are in full compliance with current standards may differ, and individuals with disabilities must be able to ascertain which features – in new and existing facilities – are included in the hotel’s accessible guest rooms. For example, under certain circumstances, an accessible hotel bathroom may meet accessibility requirements with either a bathtub or a roll in shower. The presence or absence of particular accessible features such as these may mean the difference between a room that is usable by a particular person with a disability and one that is not. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. Accordingly, Defendant is required to set forth specific accessible features and not merely recite that a guestroom is “accessible” or “ADA” or list accessibility features that may (or may not) be offered within a particular room. 25. For hotels in buildings constructed after the effective date of the 1991 Standards, it is sufficient to advise that the hotel itself is fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guestroom, to specify the room type, the type of accessible bathing facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appx. A. 27. The Hotel is a place of public accommodation that owns and/or leases and operates a place of lodging pursuant to the ADA. 28. The Website (and all other online reservation platforms used by the Hotel) allows reservations for the Hotel to be taken online. The Defendant has control over information provided to the public about the Hotel through the Website and/or other online platforms. 29. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff visited the Website to learn about accessible features of the Hotel, and to independently assess whether the Hotel is accessible to him, and whether he could independently reserve an accessible room at the Hotel, in the same manner as those seeking to reserve non-accessible rooms. Upon his respective visit to the website, Plaintiff discovered that the Website does not comply with the ADA and ADAAG. 32. This is not intended to be an exclusive list, and Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the class, brings this action to remediate all violations of the ADAAG found to exist upon the Website, and upon all online reservation platforms used by the Ho Hotel tel. 33. In addition to the list above, upon information and belief, Defendant may not effectively (i) ensure that accessible guest rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type; (ii) reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems; or (iii) guarantee that the specific accessible guest room reserved through its reservations service is held for the reserving customer, regardless of whether a specific room is held in response to reservations made by others. Discovery is required on these issues. 34. Plaintiff will visit the Website again, and members of the Class will visit the Website and online reservation platforms controlled by Defendant again, upon the Defendant’s compliance with the laws and regulations specified herein, in order learn about the accessible (and inaccessible) features, learn about the accessible (and inaccessible) features of guestrooms, assess the extent to which the hotels meet each of their specific accessibility needs, and determine whether they can reserve an accessible guestroom. 36. Modifying the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) to comply with the ADA and ADAAG is accomplishable without undue burden or expense and is readily achievable. But in any event, upon information and belief, the Website has been altered, updated, and edited, after 2010, but not in a manner compliant with 2010 ADAAG standards. 37. Defendant will continue to discriminate against Plaintiff and all other disabled individuals who access the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) unless and until Defendant modifies the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) to set forth all required information, as set forth above. 38. Plaintiff and the Class are without an adequate remedy at law and are suffering irreparable harm, and Plaintiff reasonably anticipates that he and the Class will continue to suffer this harm unless and until Defendant is required to correct the ADA violations found upon the Websites (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), and to maintain the Websites (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), inclusive of the online reservation system, and accompanying policies and procedures, in a manner that is consistent with and compliant with ADA and ADAAG requirements. 40. Plaintiff re-avers the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 41. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination provides: It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an unlawful discrimination: for any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation directly or indirectly to refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or directly or indirectly to publish, circulate, issue, display, post or mail any written or printed communication, notice, or advertisement to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any such place will be refused, withheld from, or denied to any person on account of the race, creed , color, national origin, ancestry, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual orientation, disability . . . 3 42. The Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable) is a gateway to, and a part of, the Hotel, which is a place of public accommodation as defined by the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 43. Plaintiff and the Class have visited the Website (and other online reservation platforms, as applicable), and encountered barriers made illegal by the ADA and ADAAG, and thus by the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

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16. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 17. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wage, overtime pay, spread of hours pay, unlawful retention of tips, and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring and failure to provide a correct wage statement with every payment of wages would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 18. From approximately February 2016 to June 20, 2017, Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a delivery worker for Defendants’ Chinese restaurant King Wok located at 6669 Broadway, Bronx, New York 10471. 19. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for minimum and overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 20. From approximately February 2016 to January 2017, Plaintiff was employed on a part-time basis. He worked one day per week on every Monday. 22. During this period, Plaintiff was paid a fixed daily rate of $70 regardless of the hours worked and he was not paid for all hours worked. 23. From February 10, 2017 to June 20, 2017, Plaintiff was employed on a full-time basis. He worked seven days per week. 24. During this period, Plaintiff worked the following schedule: from Monday through Thursday, Plaintiff worked from 11:00 am to 11:00 pm; On Friday and Saturday, Plaintiff worked from 11:00 am to 12:00 midnight; On Sunday, Plaintiff worked from 12:00 noon to 11:00 pm. Plaintiff was also required to spend about 1 hour per day driving Defendants’ other employees to and from King Wok and their residence in Yonkers, NY. Therefore, Plaintiff worked approximately 92 hours per week. 25. Plaintiff was paid a fixed monthly rate of $2,080 regardless of the hours worked and he was not compensated for all hours worked. 26. On any given work day, except for three short meal breaks, Defendants did not grant Plaintiff any kind of rest period of any length. Plaintiff normally had three meals per day and spent around 5 to 10 minutes for each meal. 27. Since approximately August 2016, King Wok started taking online delivery orders from platforms such as Seamless. 29. Plaintiff delivered about 20 to 30 online orders per work day since approximately August 2016. Plaintiff received $20 to $30 daily from the “tip pool” for online orders. Upon information and belief, the tips for online orders range from $2.30 to about $5.00. Therefore, Defendants retained at least approximately $50 to $75 daily in tips earned by Plaintiff. 30. By unlawfully retaining part or all of the tips earned by Plaintiff, Defendants prevented Plaintiff from retaining all of the tips he should have received in violation of NYLL §196-d. 31. Plaintiff was not required to keep track of his time, nor to his knowledge did the Defendant utilize any tracking device, such as punch cards or sign in sheets, that accurately recorded his actual hours worked. 32. Plaintiff regularly worked more than ten (10) hours in a workday. However, Defendants willfully and intentionally failed to compensate Plaintiff with an additional one hour's pay at the full minimum wage for each day his workday exceeded ten (10) hours, as required spread-of-hours pay under New York law. 33. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff for minimum wage and/or overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 34. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice, at the time of his hiring, in English and in Mandarin (the primary language identified by Plaintiff), of his rate of pay, employer’s regular pay day, and such other information as required by NYLL §195(1). 35. Defendants also did not provide Plaintiff with proper statement of wages with each wage payment, as required by NYLL §195(3). 37. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wages, overtime premium and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiff, and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 38. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal or state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 39. The work days of Plaintiff and Class Members always lasted longer than 10 hours. 40. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and the Class Members New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which they worked over 10 hours. 41. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and Class Members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. 42. Defendants’ unlawfully retained part or all of the gratuities earned by Plaintiff and other Class Members. 43. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiff, and the FLSA Collective. 44. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiff or other similarly situated employees. 46. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of unlawfully retaining and preventing Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees from receiving their amount of tips they were supposed to receive. 47. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at their restaurant locations for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) (the “Collective Action Members”). Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 48. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 50. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 52. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 53. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 54. Plaintiff bring their NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt employees of Defendants at King Wok on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 55. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 57. Plaintiff’ claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay minimum wage, overtime compensation, gratuities violation, and “spread of hours” compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 58. Plaintiff can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 60. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 64. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiff, within the meaning of FLSA. 65. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 66. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 67. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 68. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 69. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by failing to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Action Members at the statutory minimum wage when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 70. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 72. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 73. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 74. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 75. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 76. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 77. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 79. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 80. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 81. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Action Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 82. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 83. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 84. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 86. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 87. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and Part 146 of Title 12 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules, and Regulations of the State of New York. 12 NYCRR §146-1.6 88. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 93. The Defendants failed to furnish with each wage payment a statement listing: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; and net wages; in violation of the NYLL, § 195(3). 94. Due to the Defendants’ violation of the NYLL, § 195(3), the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendants liquidated damages of $250.00 per work day that the violation occurred, up to a maximum of $5,000.00, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL, § 198(1-d). 95. The Defendants’ NYLL violations have caused the Plaintiff irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 96. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 97. NYLL § 196-d bars an employer from retaining “any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be gratuity [.]” 98. New York Labor Law further prohibits an employer or his agent from demanding or accepting, “directly or indirectly, any part of the gratuities received by an employee, or retaining any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be a gratuity for an employee.” N.Y. Labor Law§196-d. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Failure to Provide Wage Statement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Hours Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective]

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13. Defendant Onity (formerly TESA Security Systems) was founded in 1941 as a lock manufacturer. 14. Onity represents that it has “set the standard” for locking devices with installations of more than 3.7 million locks worldwide since 1984. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 ET SEQ. 15. Onity represents that it provides the finest quality in its products. Onity proclaims on its website: “Our products meet International standards, and are designed and built to uncompromising quality approval. From research and development to after- the-sale support, we cover all the stages of providing electronic solutions, to guarantee the finest quality in all our products and services.” 16. Included in the locks defectively designed and sold by Defendant are those produced under the names HT 28 Smart Lock, HT24 Lock, HT RFID, Advanced RFID, Advanced Lock, CodePro, Integra 5 Locking System, and Onity Wireless Lock. 18. In its product brochure, Onity states that its electronic locking products have “the most reliable technology” and the company provides “the most advanced electronic locking systems in the industry today.” 19. Onity purports to guarantee repair or replacement of all of its product parts for any reason. 20. In the “Our Service Commitment” section on its website, Onity states: “No one does this better than Onity! If any Onity product fails to work for any reason, send it to us. We'll either fix the problem or replace it with a new one.” There is no time limitation on this statement. 21. In its product brochure, Onity makes a similar statement. It states: “Onity provides solutions tailor made to each Hotel’s individual needs, including: Guaranteed replacement and repair of system components.” 22. Despite these express representations of being the “most advanced” and the “most reliable” product in the industry today, Onity Locks lack even basic security features and can be opened easily by unauthorized persons due to their defective design. 23. Onity Lock systems are comprised of three main parts. An “encoder” is a device which makes the keycards to be used by the guests. A “portable programmer” is a device which programs the locks with guest code key values, time tables and other guest information. And the “lock” is the actual lock installed on every door. 25. Every Lock’s memory contains data that is used to communicate with the portable Programmer, including the hotel’s sitecode. A sitecode is a 32-bit unique value that identifies and gives access to the hotel room. 26. Onity Locks requires no authentication for reading memory. Thus, any device that emulates the same pulses as a portable programmer can direct the Lock to send data contained in its memory. 27. Normally, one can alleviate the problem of a lock’s memory being readily accessible if the exact location of the sitecode in the memory is found. However, each Onity Lock has its sitecode data at the same address, which allows hackers to uncover the sitecode easily once they read memory from the lock. 28. Once a hacker easily determines a particular lock’s sitecode, the hacker can quickly open a guestroom door by playing this sitecode back to the lock. 29. On July 24, 2012, Cody Brocious, a hacker and software engineer for Mozilla, revealed the Onity Locks’ security flaw described herein at the Black Hat security conference. There, Mr. Brocious demonstrated a hardware hack that allows a simple homemade device, created with readily available and store-bought parts, to read the sitecode out of the Lock’s memory and open the Lock. 31. Following his demonstration at the Black Hat conference, Mr. Brocious posted on his internet blog the detailed schematics for the hacking device. Since then, other hackers have been able to replicate and refine the device, and have posted videos on You Tube explaining the method in detail. Current improvements allow the hacking device to be disguised as a dry erase marker, iPhone cover, or an aluminum wallet, which makes it almost undetectable for most hotels and their security. 32. Shortly after Mr. Brocious’s public demonstration, Onity told the BBC in a statement that “Onity places the highest priority on the safety and security provided by its products and works everyday to develop and supply the latest security technologies to the marketplace,” and that “Onity is prepared to address any potential issues posed by the presentation.” Onity also posted a statement on its website stating that the demonstrated hacking method is “unreliable” and “complex to implement.” This posting has been removed and replaced with just contact information for its customers. 33. Forbes first reported Mr. Brocious’s hacking method on July 23, 2012, the day before the Black Hat conference was held. Shortly thereafter, the story was picked up by other news outlets including CBS, BBC, MSNBC and spread rapidly across the news wires and the internet. 35. According to Forbes, Richard Kindel, a 32 year old call center employee, who was able to assemble his own hacking device using Mr. Brocious’s method, commented on how easy it was to make the device: “The parts list was super simple, so I went to Radio Shack and put it together.” 36. In the same article, another hacker, who goes by the name Mr_Q, claimed that he was able to assemble a similar hacking device using readily available parts for less than $41. Mr_Q told Forbes that the device worked on the first try on five doors at a local hotel. Mr_Q also said that he was worried that the rapid and broad spread of information regarding this method would “allow almost anyone to make one of these devices and start opening doors.” 37. According to a Hotel Online article written by Todd Seiders from Petra Risk Solutions, there have been reported burglaries and thefts by use of these hacking devices in Texas. Similar instances of attempted burglaries that might have been linked to the hacking devices were also reported in Florida. Mr. Seiders concluded the article by emphasizing the need to train and notify the hotel staffs that the burglaries relating to use of these hacking devices are “spreading across the country.” 39. Any applicable statutes of limitations have been tolled by Defendant’s knowing and active concealment and denial of the facts as alleged herein. Defendant has kept Plaintiffs and the Class in ignorance of vital information essential to the pursuit of these claims, without any fault or lack of diligence on their part. Defendant is and was under a continuing duty to disclose the true character, quality, and nature of its locks to Plaintiffs and the Class. Because of its concealment of the true character, quality and nature of its locks, Defendant is estopped from relying on any statute of limitations defense. 42. After news of the Onity Locks’ vulnerabilities were exposed in the media, representatives of Onity visited with representatives of Plaintiffs in October 2012 regarding the defects in the locks and Onity’s “fix” program. Plaintiffs and Defendant discussed the presence of defective locks at each of Plaintiffs’ properties. 43. Onity informed Plaintiffs of the two remedies it was making available – the free mechanical cap “fix” and the replacement circuit boards that Plaintiffs would have to pay for. Onity informed Plaintiffs the replacement circuit boards would cost $11 per lock for a circuit board upgrade to permanently fix the problem. Onity offered a $6 “rebate” on the circuit board fixes for Onity Locks purchased after 2005. 45. The defects in Defendants’ Onity Locks were latent and incapable of detection by Plaintiffs. Thus, Plaintiffs were unaware of any defect in their Onity Locks prior to the hacking issue being reported in a trade journal in 2012. 46. Pursuant to Rules 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendant on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. The Class is defined as follows: All entities in the United States that own the following Onity Locks: HT28 Smart Lock, HT24 Lock, HT RFID, Advanced RFID, Advanced Lock, CodePro, Integra 5 Locking System, and Onity Wireless Lock 47. Excluded from the Class are directors and officers of the Defendant or its affiliates, as well as those individuals with a present loss of property claim from the failure of one of Defendant’s products. 48. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the Class definition if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 49. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. It is estimated that Onity has sold hundreds of thousands of these defective locks in the United States. The precise numbers of members can be ascertained through discovery, which will include Defendant’s sales, warranty service, and other records. 51. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class Members. Plaintiffs and all Class Members have been injured by the same wrongful practices of Defendant. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the Class Members and are based on the same legal theories. 52. Plaintiffs will fully and adequately assert and protect the interests of the Class, and have retained class counsel who are experienced and qualified in prosecuting class actions. Neither Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests contrary to or conflicting with the Class. 54. Plaintiffs do not anticipate any difficulty in the management of this litigation. Any potential difficulties can be easily managed through sub-classing or other methods. 55. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein and further allege as follows. 56. Defendant is a merchant as defined by applicable U.C.C. provisions and sold Onity Locks directly and indirectly to Plaintiffs and the Class. 57. Defendant expressly warranted that its Onity Locks were free from defects at the time of delivery. 58. Defendant expressly warranted that its products have “the most reliable technology.” 59. Defendant expressly warranted that it provides “the most advanced electronic locking systems in the industry today.” 60. Defendant expressly warranted that if “any” of the products fail to work for “any” reason, it would either “fix the problem” or “replace it with a new one.” There is no time limitation on this statement. 62. These express warranties proclaiming advanced technology, reliability, and a guarantee to fix or repair any problems were a part of the basis of the bargain for Plaintiffs and the Class in purchasing the Onity Locks. 63. Defendant breached these warranties. Onity Locks were not “the most reliable” and “the most advanced” products in the industry as Defendant proclaimed. In fact, Defendant’s Onity Locks were defective and failed to protect from even the simplest hacking tool easily assembled by following instructions posted on the internet. 64. Additionally, Defendant has breached its promises to “fix the problem” or “replace it with a new one” and has refused to offer an acceptable cure. The “solutions” offered by Defendant are wholly inconsistent with its warranties. The first option of blocking the DC docket with a mechanical cap will diminish the value of the lock and cause burden to Plaintiffs. The lock would have to be disassembled every time one needs to use the docket for ordinary purposes, including for emergency access to a guestroom. Moreover, physical cover-up does not “fix” the fundamental defect in the Lock system; it only makes it slightly more difficult for the hackers to hack in. The second option, which requires the customers to pay for the replacement of a defective product, does not amount to a “fix” or “replace” as promised; it is equal to selling a new product to defect victims. 66. Any language in Onity’s warranty that may purport to exclude the exact types of defect that affects Plaintiffs’ and the Class Members’ Onity products is unilaterally imposed in a contract of adhesion that is typically provided after the sale, and is therefore unconscionable and causes the entire warranty to fail of its essential purpose. 67. Defendant has been put on notice of the breach of express warranties by Plaintiffs and the Class through notice provided by Plaintiffs and the Class prior to the filing of this Complaint, as described herein. Moreover, Defendant has been on notice at least since July 23, 2012 due to the wide press coverage on this issue. 68. Plaintiffs and the Class are in privity of contract with Defendant as direct purchasers, recipients of express warranties, and/or third party beneficiaries. In addition, Plaintiffs and their agents have entered into written contracts with Defendant for the purchase and/or repair of Onity Locks. 69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches of its express warranties, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages – an economic loss equal to the total purchase price of these unfit products, as well as monies spent and to be spent to fix or alleviate the defect. 71. Defendant is a merchant as defined by applicable U.C.C. provisions and sold Onity Locks directly and indirectly to Plaintiffs and the Class. 72. Defendant impliedly warranted to Plaintiffs and the Class that Onity Locks were fit for the ordinary purpose of locking doors and preventing unauthorized openings. 73. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability because Onity Locks are incapable of preventing unauthorized openings. As discussed above in detail, Onity Locks lack even the basic protective measures and can be compromised by a simple hacking device, allowing unauthorized intruders to enter at will. 74. Defendant’s Onity Locks failed to conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on their label. 75. Plaintiffs and the Class are in privity of contract with Defendant as direct purchasers, recipients of express warranties, and/or third party beneficiaries. In addition, Plaintiffs and their agents have entered into written contracts with Defendant for the purchase and/or repair of Onity Locks. 76. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach of implied warranty, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages, including an economic loss equal to the total purchase price of these unfit products, as well as monies spent and to be spent to fix or alleviate the defect. 77. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein and further allege as follows. 78. The Magnuson-Moss Consumer Products Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C.§§ 2301, et seq., provides a private right of action by purchasers of consumer products against manufacturers or retailers who, inter alia, fail to comply with the terms of an express or implied warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). As demonstrated above, Defendant has failed to comply with the terms of its express and implied warranties with regard to the defective Onity Locks it has sold. 79. Onity Locks are consumer products as that term is defined in § 2301(1) of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 80. Plaintiffs and the members of the Class are consumers, as that term is defined in § 2301(3) of the Magnuson-Moss Act. 82. Plaintiffs and members of the Class notified Defendant of its breach of express warranties prior to the filing of this Complaint, including through attempting to obtain fixes for the defect from Defendant. Moreover, Defendant has been on notice at least since July 2012 due to the wide press coverage on this issue. 83. Defendant was given a reasonable opportunity to cure its failure to comply with express and implied warranties. However, Defendant’s “cures” were inadequate and did not address the defect and injuries complained of herein, either because they did not fix the problem or because Defendant required its customers to pay for them. 84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breaches of the Magnuson- Moss Act, Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages, including economic loss equal to the total purchase price of these unfit products, as well as monies spent and to be spent to fix or alleviate the defects. 85. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein and further allege as follows. 87. Defendant’s misconduct caused Plaintiffs and the Class to purchase Onity Locks to maintain the safety of lodging guests and their property without knowing the locks could be easily picked. 88. The money paid by Plaintiffs and the Class to Defendant for Onity Locks and for fixes for the locks’ defects conferred substantial benefits upon Defendant. Defendant wrongfully accepted and retained these benefits. 89. Under the circumstances described in this Complaint, it would be inequitable and unjust for the Defendant to retain the benefits conferred upon by Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendant should return any ill-gotten gains to Plaintiffs and the Class. 90. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to receive equitable relief in the form of appropriate restitution and disgorgement of all wrongfully obtained earnings, profits, compensation and benefits obtained by Defendant.

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44. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2), the named Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. The proposed Plaintiff Class consists of All unhoused persons who live outside within the City of Seattle, Washington and who keep their belongings on public property. 45. The requirements of Rule 23(a) are met because the members of the proposed Plaintiff Class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable; there are questions of law and fact common to all members of the proposed Plaintiff Class; the claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of those of the proposed class members; and the named Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed Plaintiff Class. A. The City’s Homeless Population Right to Be Secure From Unreasonable Seizures Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 158. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 159. Defendants’ policy, pattern, and/or custom of seizing the individual Plaintiffs’ property without a valid warrant or probable cause is unreasonable and contrary to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Right to Due Process of Law Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 162. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 163. Defendants' policy, pattern, and/or custom of seizing and destroying the individual Plaintiffs’ property without adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to destruction of their property violates the individual Plaintiffs' right to due process of law protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

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15. Ford manufactures and sells trucks, including the Ford F-Series line of trucks. 17. Prior to purchase, Plaintiff viewed the Truck parked on the dealership’s inventory lot. As it sat on the lot prior to purchase, the Truck contained a pre-installed 6- inch lift kit and was fitted with tires that were larger in diameter than those on Stock Trucks. 18. Specifically, the lift kit raised the Truck’s suspension by up to six inches above that found on suspensions of Stock Trucks. The rims and tires on the Truck were increased in diameter as compared to those on Stock Trucks. 19. Prior to purchase, the lift kit and larger tires were covered under a vehicle service agreement Plaintiff purchased through Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, a division of Ford Motor Company. 20. However, the lift kit and larger tires, and the remainder of the vehicles to the extent any work would have been performed under Ford’s manufacturer’s warranty, but which repair might have been attributed to or necessitated by the lift kit or larger tires, were apparently not covered by Ford’s manufacturer’s warranty and which apparently renders Ford’s manufacturer’s warranty inapplicable when repairs might be sought at a dealership or Ford facility other than the specific dealership at which the Lifted Truck was purchased, a fact not routinely disclosed to consumers when purchasing or leasing Lifted Trucks off dealership lots (“Warranty Voiding”). 22. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff at the time of his purchase, the Stock Parts were incompatible with his Truck. The spare tire was too small to replace any of the Truck’s larger-diameter rims/tires, and the jack did not extend sufficiently to raise the Truck to enable someone to safely perform a tire change or other maintenance. 23. None of the documentation that came with the Truck revealed that the Stock Parts were incompatible with the Truck. 24. Plaintiff reasonably expected that when he purchased his Truck, it would come equipped with a compatible spare tire and jack. By not receiving compatible versions of these items, Plaintiff has been injured because he paid too much for his Truck. 25. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26. Plaintiff seeks to represent a Class (the “Nationwide Class”) initially defined as: All persons who purchased or leased Lifted Trucks (as defined herein) in the United States, within the relevant statute(s) of limitations (the “Nationwide Class Period”). 27. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following statewide class (the “Oklahoma Class”) initially defined as: All persons who purchased or leased Lifted Trucks (as defined herein) in Oklahoma, within the relevant statute(s) of limitations (the “Oklahoma Class Period”). 29. The members of the Classes (collectively, the “Class members”) are so numerous and geographically dispersed that individual joinder of all Class members is impracticable. While Plaintiff believes that there are not less than hundreds, if not thousands, of Class members (and there will be many more if Ford’s practices are not stopped), their precise number is unknown to Plaintiff, but may be ascertained from Ford’s books and records and/or determined through discovery. Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, including by mail, email, and/or publication. 30. Plaintiff’s respective claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as he purchased his Truck during the Class Periods and sustained damages as a result of Ford’s conduct. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other Class members. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of other Class members. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. 33. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Since the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for such members to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 34 as if fully set forth herein. 36. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Oklahoma Class (“Class,” for purposes of this Count). 37. Ford’s conduct alleged herein constitutes an “unlawful” practice in violation of the OCPA. See OCPA § 753. Such conduct includes, but is not limited to, manufacturing and selling Lifted Trucks equipped with Stock Parts that were not compatible with those vehicles (and not disclosing same to consumers), and/or by not providing a working jack and spare tire with its Lifted Trucks, as consumers would have reasonably expected (and not disclosing same to consumers), as well as Warranty Voiding. 38. Specifically, Ford’s unlawful conduct constitutes, inter alia, a “deceptive trade practice,” which is defined in the OCPA to include “a misrepresentation, omission or other practice that has deceived or could reasonably be expected to deceive or mislead a person to the detriment of that person.” See OCPA §§ 752(13), 753(20). 39. Ford’s unlawful conduct occurred, and continues to occur, in the conduct of trade or commerce and in the course of Ford’s business. 41. Ford is liable to Plaintiff and the Class for damages in amounts to be proven at trial, including attorneys’ fees and costs. See OCPA § 761.1.1 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 34 as if fully set forth herein. 43. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Oklahoma Class (“Class,” for purposes of this Count). 44. Lifted Trucks are “goods” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2- 105. 45. Plaintiff and the other Class members are “buyers” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-103. 46. Ford (and its dealer-agents and other agents) is and was at all relevant times a “merchant” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-104 with respect to the Lifted Trucks. 48. Ford breached the implied warranty of merchantability because the Lifted Trucks were not in merchantable condition and not fit for the ordinary purpose for which such vehicles are used. Specifically, the Lifted Trucks were equipped with Stock Parts that were not compatible with those vehicles, i.e., a non-compatible spare tire and jack. Upon information and belief, this is a common issue that affects all Lifted Trucks equally. 49. Plaintiff and the other Class members have had sufficient dealings with either Ford or its dealership-agents (or other agents) to establish privity of contract between Ford, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and the other Class members, on the other hand. Notwithstanding, privity is not required in this case because Plaintiff and the other Class members are intended third-party beneficiaries of contracts between Ford and its dealers; the dealers were not intended to be the ultimate consumers of the Lifted Trucks. Alternatively, even absent privity, Plaintiff and the other Class members may maintain a direct action against Ford because they are in the chain of distribution of the Lifted Trucks. 50. As a direct and proximate result of Ford’s breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Plaintiff and the other Class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 51. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 34 and 42 through 50 as if fully set forth herein. 53. Lifted Trucks are “goods” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2- 105. 54. Plaintiff and the other Class members are “buyers” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-103. 55. Ford (and its dealer-agents and other agents) is and was at all relevant times a “merchant” within the meaning of 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-104 with respect to the Lifted Trucks. 56. Under 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-315, a warranty that goods are fit for the particular purpose for which the goods are used is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant of goods of that kind and had reason to know at the time of contracting of the particular purpose for which those goods would be used. 57. Ford breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because, at the time of sale, Ford (or its dealership-agents or other agents) had reason to know that Plaintiff and the Class members would be purchasing or leasing a Lifted Truck that was not a Stock Truck and therefore required a particular, compatible spare tire and jack. Plaintiff and the Class members relied on Ford’s judgment to provide a spare tire and jack suitable for their Lifted Trucks. Ford failed to do so. Upon information and belief, this is a common issue that affects all Lifted Trucks equally. 59. As a direct and proximate result of Ford’s breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Plaintiff and the other Class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 34 as if fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class (“Class,” for purposes of this Count). 62. Lifted Trucks are “goods” within the meaning of Mich. Comp. Laws 70. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class (“Class,” for purposes of this Count). 71. Lifted Trucks are “goods” within the meaning of MCL 440.2105(1). 72. Plaintiff and the other Class members are “buyers” within the meaning of MCL 440.2103(1)(a). 73. Ford (and its dealer-agents and other agents) is and was at all relevant times a “merchant” within the meaning of MCL 440.2104(1) with respect to the Lifted Trucks. 74. Under MCL 440.2315, a warranty that goods are fit for the particular purpose for which the goods are used is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant of goods of that kind and had reason to know at the time of contracting of the particular purpose for which those goods would be used. 75. Ford breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because, at the time of sale, Ford (or its dealership-agents or other agents) had reason to know that Plaintiff and the Class members would be purchasing or leasing a Lifted Truck that was not a Stock Truck and therefore required a particular, compatible spare tire and jack. Plaintiff and the Class members relied on Ford’s judgment to furnish a spare tire and jack suitable for their Lifted Trucks. Ford failed to do so. Upon information and belief, this is a common issue that affects all Lifted Trucks equally. 77. As a direct and proximate result of Ford’s breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, Plaintiff and the other Class members have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. UCC Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2314 (Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class) UCC Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-314 (Brought on Behalf of the Oklahoma Class) UCC Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 12A Okla. Stat. Ann. § 2-315 (Brought on Behalf of the Oklahoma Class) UCC Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.2315 (Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class) Violation of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act Okla. Stat. tit. 15 § 751, et seq. (Brought on Behalf of the Oklahoma Class)

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38. Plaintiff Kevin Robertson is forty-three years old, and resides in Fort Gay, Wayne County, West Virginia. 39. Mr. Robertson has an eighth-grade education and worked for approximately twenty years as a land surveyor. He worked until 2006 at which time he became unable to work due to constantly worsening mood swings and panic attacks that treatment with medications failed to control. Mr. Robertson also suffered from physical injuries. He continues to be disabled. 4. The foundation for the redeterminations that are the subject of this action are the Commissioner’s allegations of fraud or similar fault, which originated during investigations initiated by various committees of the United States Congress, and pursued in conjunction with the Social Security Administration’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The investigations began with the investigation of the Social Security Administration (SSA) itself. 40. Mr. Robertson applied for and was denied disability benefits on April 22, 2010. He appealed the denial of benefits and retained Attorney Eric Conn to represent him on appeal. He was evaluated by Dr. Bradley Adkins in order to provide expert opinion evidence about his mental disability. 41. Mr. Robertson was awarded SSD benefits by ALJ David B. Daugherty in a decision dated December 3, 2010, as a result of physical and mental impairments that rendered him unable to work. SSA did not appeal this decision and it became the final decision of the Commissioner sixty days after the date of the decision. Mr. Robertson began receiving disability benefits after the decision, which have continued to be paid to him because of continuing disability. 42. On or about May 22, 2015, Mr. Robertson received a letter from the SSA suspending his benefits. The letter indicated that his benefits were suspended because “there was reason to believe fraud was involved in certain cases including evidence from Bradley Adkins, Ph.D., Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic Huffnagle, M.D., or David P. Herr, D.O.” A copy of the letter from the SSA is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 15 43. On or about May 22, 2015, Mr. Robertson also received a “Notice of Appeals Council Action,” in which he was advised that the SSA was re-determining his disability case without evidence from Frederic Huffnagle, M.D. He was advised that he had ten days to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council, after which his case would be remanded to an ALJ to await a new hearing and during which time he would receive no Social Security Disability payments. 44. Mr. Robertson appeared before an ALJ for this hearing on October 18, 2015. On December 16, 2015 the ALJ issued a decision – after disregarding evidence deleted from his record – that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish his disability in 2009. 45. Mr. Robertson has appealed this ALJ decision to the Appeals Council, where it is now pending. 46. As a result of the ALJ decision, Mr. Robertson’s benefit payments of approximately $1,100.00 per month were terminated by SSA. This was his sole income. 47. As a direct result of the termination of benefits, Mr. Robertson is unable to afford various basic necessities of life, including the medications necessary to treat his medical impairments. The severity of his condition together with the immediate loss of benefits and inability to pay for his medications have created the imminent threat of irreparable physical and mental harm to the Plaintiff, Kevin Robertson. 48. Plaintiff Jenny Rose is a fifty-five year old married woman living at 119 Saltpetre Road, Fort Gay, Wayne County, West Virginia. 16 49. Ms. Rose worked for approximately thirty years in restaurants as a cook, as a clerk in a convenience store, delivering meals to home-bound individuals, steaming hats at a hat factory, and finally sewing emblems on uniforms for Cintas Corporation. Ms. Rose attended school through the eighth grade, but her educational attainment is significantly less than an eighth-grade level. She has a verbal IQ of 68 and learning disabilities that affect her reading comprehension limitations. She suffers from depression. She also suffers from a variety of physical ailments, including osteoarthritis of the spine, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, sacroiliac disease, bilateral facet arthropathy, carpel tunnel syndrome, fibromyalgia, neuropathy in her lower extremities, and trochanteric bursitis. 50. Ms. Rose stopped working in April 2008 due to increasingly severe orthopedic impairments that prevented her from standing, walking, lifting and carrying; enough to support her previous full-time work. Ms. Rose applied for her disability insurance benefits on January 21, 2010. Her application was denied by SSA and she appealed the denial. Her lawyer died and she retained Attorney Eric Conn to represent her on appeal. She was evaluated by Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., in order to provide expert opinion evidence about the severity of her physical disability. 51. Ms. Rose was awarded SSD benefits on May 5, 2011, by decision of ALJ David B. Daugherty. SSA did not appeal the decision, which became the final decision of the Commissioner sixty days later. Ms. Rose began receiving disability benefits after the decision, which have continued to be paid to her because of continuing disability. 52. On or around May 18, 2015, Ms. Rose received a letter from the SSA indicating that her benefits were at risk because “there was reason to believe fraud was involved in certain cases that included evidence from Bradley Adkins, Ph.D., Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic 17 Huffnagle, M.D., or David P. Herr, D.O.” A copy of the letter from the SSA is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 53. On or about September 22, 2015, Ms. Rose received a “Notice of Appeals Council Order Remanding Case to Administrative Law Judge,” in which she was advised that the SSA was re-determining her disability case without evidence from Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., and/or David P. Herr, D.O. Ms. Rose had submitted medical evidence from Dr. Ammisetty in her original case. She was advised that she had ten days to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council, after which her case would be remanded to an ALJ to await a new hearing. 54. On January 14, 2016 a hearing was held before an ALJ in which Ms. Rose submitted additional evidence of her disability during the relevant time period. The ALJ ordered a review of the newly-submitted evidence and proposed that a later hearing would be convened with a medical expert present to provide expert testimony about her physical impairments in order to assist him in redetermining Ms. Rose’s disability. The hearing has been recently set for April 5, 2016. 55. Ms. Rose cannot afford her necessary medications without the $800.00 per month that she is receiving from Social Security Disability. Due to the severity of her condition, she cannot go without her prescribed medications for an indeterminate period of time while waiting for an appeal of any unfavorable ruling to the Appeals Council and then to this Court. 56. Due to the severity of her condition, the potential loss of benefits and inability to otherwise pay for her medications will create an imminent threat of irreparable physical and mental harm to the Plaintiff, Jenny Rose. 18 57. Plaintiff Kathy Collins is a fifty-three year old single woman living at 1151 West 6th Avenue, Williamson, Mingo County, West Virginia. Ms. Collins worked as a bank teller for over twenty years. She suffers from depression. In 2007 Ms. Collins had a horsing accident and suffered a back injury and developed a seizure disorder. 58. Ms. Collins was awarded SSD benefits on August 6, 2009, by decision of ALJ David B. Daugherty. Ms. Collins disability determination was based in part on evidence submitted by Frederic Huffnagle, M.D. SSA did not appeal the decision, which became the final decision of the Commissioner sixty days later. Ms. Collins began receiving disability benefits after the decision, which have continued to be paid to her because of continuing disability. 59. In or around May 18, 2015, Ms. Collins received a letter from the SSA indicating that her benefits were at risk because “there was reason to believe fraud was involved in certain cases that included evidence from Bradley Adkins, Ph.D., Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D., Frederic Huffnagle, M.D., or David P. Herr, D.O.” The notice explained that Ms. Collins case would be remanded to an ALJ to determine her disability without evidence from Frederic Huffnagle, M.D. She was advised that she had ten days to submit additional evidence to the Appeals Council, after which her case would be remanded to an ALJ to await a new hearing. A copy of the letter from the SSA is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 60. Ms. Collins was unable to obtain additional medical evidence to support her disability as of 2007. One medical professional that had treated Ms. Collins had died. A psychiatrist that had treated Ms. Collins in 2007 had destroyed his records. 19 61. On or around August 25, 2015, Ms. Collins received a “Notice of Hearing,” in which she was advised that the SSA had set a hearing to redetermine her eligibility for Social Security Disability. 62. A hearing was held on September 23, 2015, at which time the ALJ continued the hearing to February 17, 2016. At the February 17, 2016 hearing, the ALJ again continued the hearing for an additional twenty days. 63. Ms. Collins cannot live without the $883.00 per month that she is receiving from Social Security Disability. Due to the severity of her condition, she cannot go without her prescribed medications for an indeterminate period of time while waiting for an appeal of any unfavorable ruling to the Appeals Council and then to this Court. 64. Due to the severity of her condition, the potential loss of benefits will create an imminent threat of irreparable physical and mental harm to the Plaintiff, Kathy Collins. 65. The Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (3) on behalf of themselves and the following Class: All persons who were receiving Social Security Disability (SSD) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits during or prior to May 2015, and whose disability status the SSA has sought to redetermine based on the assertion that evidence was provided by their attorney Eric C. Conn during the persons’ original disability cases by one or all of the following medical witnesses: Bradley Adkins, Ph.D; Srinivas Ammisetty, M.D.; Frederic Huffnagle, M.D.; David Herr, 75. The Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 76. The Social Security Act defines procedures that must be followed in the evaluation of disability in claims made by individuals seeking disability benefits provided for in the Act. 77. The Social Security Act requires that individuals seeking disability benefits be accorded specifically defined due process rights, including the right to appeal the denial of benefits by SSA. The Act also requires that the Commissioner promulgate regulations through rulemaking procedures consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act to ensure respect for these due process rights. The right to appeal includes but is not limited to the right to a new and independent decision regarding entitlement to benefits; the right to appear at a hearing before a new and independent judge who is not bound by previous decisions of SSA; the right to have all relevant issues relating to benefit entitlement considered and decided in the new and independent proceeding; the right to appear at a hearing before the judge in which all relevant issues will be decided; the right to legally sufficient notice of all issues to be considered in the evaluation and re- evaluation of disability; the right to present evidence and be provided with any and all evidence to 24 be relied on in reaching a decision about entitlement to disability; and the right to a written decision provided to the claimant by the judge, in which all of the issues have been discussed, the law is explained, and the evidence of record is appropriately weighed. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 421(d); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929 et seq., 416.1444 et seq. 78. Pursuant to these requirements, SSA has promulgated regulations that prescribe the process used to evaluate disability. After an application for benefits is made to SSA, the evaluation begins with a determination of disability that is in most states provided to SSA through contracts with state agencies called Disability Determination Services (DDS). The state agency will investigate the claim by securing all available medical evidence from a claimant’s health care providers. The state agency will also secure medical source opinions as to the severity of a claimant’s functional impairments from health care providers, independent medical evaluators and staff medical consultants. The State agency will then present a disability determination to SSA, which will approve or deny the claimant’s application based on the determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1601 et seq., 416.901 et seq. 79. Claimants whose claims are denied may request a reconsideration of that decision. The claim is then sent back to the state agency for a reevaluation and new determination. See 20 83. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 84. The Plaintiffs both individually and on behalf of the Class, seek a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Defendant’s actions described herein violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V. 85. Plaintiffs’ claims for Social Security Disability benefits are based on payments Plaintiffs made over the course of their working lives. Plaintiffs therefore have a statutory entitlement to these benefits that are protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 86. For the named Plaintiffs, and for many other recipients, these benefits are their only source of income and typically provide a standard of living below the federal poverty line. 26 87. Defendant has also violated Plaintiffs’ due process rights by failing to follow the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder as outlined above. These obligations include an individual assessment of their status prior to the institution of the redetermination hearings. Defendant failed to make individual determinations of fraud or similar fault existing in the named Plaintiffs’ and putative Class members’ cases. The Defendant also violated their mandate to “immediately” commence redetermination hearings once they have notice of fraud or similar fault. The defendants were on notice of the alleged conduct in 2007 and violated their timeliness obligation by waiting until May 2015 to send out between 1500 to 1800 similar notice letters. As a result the Plaintiffs’ rights have been violated in that the ongoing hearings are obsessively focused on medical records that were generated between 2007 - 2009, and are now missing or destroyed due to the passage of time. 88. Defendant has violated the Plaintiffs’ due process rights and on an ongoing basis is depriving them of an opportunity to be heard by making decisions based on evidence not introduced into the hearings and excluding evidence of their disability without any determination that the particular evidence is untrustworthy. 89. In conducting the mass hearings which commenced in November of 2015, the Defendant knew there would be a representational crisis, in that the majority of the class members would effectively default due to a combination of their disabled status, and the lack of volunteer lawyers available to represent so many in complex legal proceedings. Plaintiffs allege that the hearings, for the reasons alleged above, violate due process. The pursuit of administrative remedies would be futile because the administrative process violates due process and the Administrative Procedures Act, as hereinafter further alleged. 27 9. On May 19, 2011, The Wall Street Journal, published an expose-style article about ALJ Daugherty and Attorney Eric C. Conn. Damian Paletta, Disability-Claim Judge Has Trouble Saying ‘No’: Near Perfect Approval Record; Social-Security Program Strained, The Wall Street Journal (May 19, 2011) available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 90. The Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 91. The redetermination proceedings as alleged are formal adjudications, subject to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) and the Administrative Procedure Act. 92. Official rulemaking under the APA requires notice of the proposed rule, an opportunity for public comment, and publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 93. The Administration’s written policy, the HALLEX manual, states that the agency may “direct” ALJs “to disregard certain evidence,” and further that the “claimant may not appeal the agency’s statutory mandate to disregard evidence based on OIG referrals of information.” See https://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/hallex/I-01/I-1-3-25.html. These rules both (a) directly shape a claimant’s benefits (and hence rights), and (b) because they do not leave any room for ALJ discretion, have the effect of law. However, these HALLEX manual provisions have not been promulgated consistent with the APA’s rulemaking procedures, which include publication and opportunity to comment. 94. The Administration has violated and continues to violate the APA’s procedural protections for formal adjudications. “A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(d). Here, the Plaintiffs and putative Class members are not permitted to cross-examine the fraud allegation made in the OIG report, even though the report limits the factual record. 28 95. The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(e). “When an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.” Id. “A sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Id. § 556(d). The Administration relies on information without submitting it into evidence and without giving the claimant an opportunity to rebut the report’s applicability. 96. An ALJ “may not be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency. An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d). OIG is part of the investigative or prosecuting functions of the Administration agency. Defendant violates § 554(d) when its ALJs accept the OIG’s factual determination of fraud. 97. The APA permits a reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” if it is “not in accordance with law,” or if it is “arbitrary and capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The Defendant routinely ignores regulations that facially apply to these redetermination proceedings. 29 PROMULGATED THEREUNDER STATES CONSTITUTION

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29. On or about January 16, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s text messages with the word “Stop” as shown below, “Stop” was the “opt-out” preference provided by Defendant in its text messages: 30. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing and advertising because they promote Defendant’s business, goods and services. 32. The text messages also include a hyperlink to a landing page website (www.govideodeal.com) which upon information and belief, is owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 34. Plaintiff received the subject text message within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 36. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 37. Plaintiff is the sole user of the 1992 Number. 38. The number used by Defendant (480-977-0116) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 39. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 40. Upon information and belief, the number (480-977-0116) that transmitted the text messages is operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 42. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 43. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 44. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 45. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 46. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 47. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 48. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 49. Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “STOP”) being sent by a consumer. 51. Defendant then created the content of the text messages, selected the telephone numbers to transmit the messages to, and selected a date and time for transmission. 52. In making these selections, Defendant was simply creating a set of instructions that were subsequently executed automatically (i.e. with no human intervention), by the Platform. 53. The Platform automatically executed Defendant’s instructions as follows: (1) The Platform retrieved each telephone number from the list of numbers uploaded by Defendant in the sequential order the numbers were listed by Defendant; (2) The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed by Defendant and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the message content; (3) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed by Defendant to an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers. (4) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet – automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by Defendant. Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile telephone. 55. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 56. The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention: 57. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 58. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 60. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 63. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 70. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 71. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 72. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 74. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 75. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Elizabeth Boriskin, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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21. Defendant is a football gear manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, www.xenith.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. Upon information and belief, because XENITH, LLC.’s Website has never been accessible and because XENITH, LLC. does not have, and has never had, an adequate corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring: a. that XENITH, LLC. retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant”) who shall assist it in improving the accessibility of its Website so the goods and services on them may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities; b. that XENITH, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to ensure that all employees involved in website development and content development be given web accessibility training on a periodic basis, including onsite training to create accessible content at the design and development stages; c. that XENITH, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform an automated accessibility audit on a periodic basis to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; d. that XENITH, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to perform end-user accessibility/usability testing on a periodic basis with said testing to be performed by individuals with various disabilities to evaluate whether its Website may be equally accessed and enjoyed by individuals with vision related disabilities on an ongoing basis; e. that XENITH, LLC. work with the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant to create an accessibility policy that will be posted on its Website, along with an e-mail address and tollfree phone number to report accessibility-related problems; and f. that Plaintiff, their counsel and its experts monitor Defendant’s Website for up to two years after the Mutually Agreed Upon Consultant validates it is free of accessibility errors/violations to ensure it has adopted and implemented adequate accessibility policies. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 61. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard of hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 21. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard of hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard of hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 25. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 26. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. Defendant operates the Website, a news source providing news, videos and other information about video games. It delivers important news and information to hundreds of millions of people across the United States. 29. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 30. The Website allows the user to browse information and videos. It covers a variety of topics such as PS4, Xbox, Nintendo and movies. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 31. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard of hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 32. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely navigating the Website. 34. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard of hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard of hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard of hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the video on the Website. 35. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard of hearing persons. 36. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard of hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard of hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends and family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard of hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the service provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 37. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 39. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 40. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Defendant and the Website. 41. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard of hearing class members. 42. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 45. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 46. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 47. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 48. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard of hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 49. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 63. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 64. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 65. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 66. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 67. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 69. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard of hearing class members. 70. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 74. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 80. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two … shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby…” 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 87. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 89. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of … disability … directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 90. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 92. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a Toys and Games retailer that owns and operates www.playmobil.us (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in December of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.playmobil.us, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 25. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to -8- differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. Such issues were predominant in the section where Plaintiff was attempting, but was unsuccessful, in making a purchase. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. -9- 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to -10- visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website -11- on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website -12- and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. -13- 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). -14- 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class -15- of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). -16- 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -17- 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the -18- products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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10. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): • All New York consumers who received a collection letter from Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to Bank Of America, N.A., that contains the alleged violations arising from Defendant's violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e, et seq. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 12. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “11” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 13. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 15. On or about July 14, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. See Exhibit A. 16. The letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 17. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 18. Said July 14, 2016 Collection Letter provided that the alleged amount due was $3, 002.16 19. Said July 14, 2016 Collection Letter was the first letter sent out by Defendants. 20. Said July 14, 2016 Collection Letter Stated: “Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of the debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing within the thirty day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.” 21. Said October 13, 2015 Collection Letter further stated: “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account in the sum of $3,002.16. The balance owed may increase due to fees, but no further interest will be accrued.” 22. Defendant was attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s purportedly overdue Bank of America, N.A. balance. 23. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff’s alleged account with Bank of America, N.A. was charged-off and is not subject to change, and will never increase due to any terms of the original agreement. 24. Upon information and belief, the amount due and collected by Defendant will never change due to interest, late charges or any other “fees” or charges. 26. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no legal or contractual right to change the amount that Plaintiff allegedly owes to the Creditor. 27. Defendants could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 28. On information and belief, Defendants sent a written communication, in the form annexed hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the state of New York within one year of the date of this Complaint. First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g Validation of Debts 29. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “28” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 31. The written notice must contain the amount of the debt. 32. The written notice must contain the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 34. The written notice must contain a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. 35. The written notice must contain a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 36. A debt collector has the obligation, not just to convey the required information, but also to convey such clearly. 37. A debt collector has the obligation, not just to convey the required information, but also to convey such effectively. 38. A debt collector has the obligation, not just to convey the required information, but also to convey such clearly, so that the least sophisticated consumer will not be uncertain as to his rights. 39. A debt collector has the obligation, not just to convey the required information, but also to convey such effectively, so that the least sophisticated consumer will not be uncertain as to his rights. 40. On or around July 14, 2016, Defendant mailed an initial demand letter to Plaintiff which asserted that the account balance of $3,002.16 was allegedly due and owing. 42. That language overshadows the validation requirement by implying that if immediate payment is not made the amount owed will be greater. 43. That language overshadows the validation requirement by indicating to the least sophisticated consumer that immediate payment is necessary. 44. Defendant has failed to adequately set forth the language required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 45. Defendant has failed to clearly set forth the language required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 46. Defendant’s conduct would likely make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to his rights. 47. Defendant’s conduct would likely make the least sophisticated consumer confused as to his rights. 48. Defendant has violated §1692g as the above-referenced language overshadows the information required to be provided by that Section. Second Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations 49. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “48” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 52. Collection notices are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 53. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 54. Because the collection letter in the instant case was reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading, as described above, it is deceptive within the meaning of the FDCPA. 55. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived by Defendant's conduct. 56. The least sophisticated consumer would likely be deceived in a material way by Defendant's conduct. 57. Defendant has violated § 1692e by using a false, deceptive and misleading representation in its attempt to collect a debt. Third Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations as to Status of Debt 58. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “57” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 59. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 60. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. 62. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. Fourth Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. Validation of Debts 63. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “62” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 64. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: (a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – (1) The amount of the debt; (2) The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; (4) A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 66. As a result of Defendant’s action, Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer could reasonably conclude that she must pay the balance stated in the letter immediately or possibly owe a larger amount, thus leaving her uncertain as to her rights. 67. Furthermore, as a result of Defendant’s action, Plaintiff and the least sophisticated consumer would not know the exact amount due and owing, as required by 15 USC §1692g(a)(1), where the Collection Letter falsely stated that the amount due may be greater than the amount actually stated on the Collection Letter.

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1. a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired; 10. On behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff brings this case as a class action asserting claims against Defendant under the JFPA. 11. Defendant’s facsimile transmissions were and are being done in the same or similar manner. That is, Defendant used the same equipment to send a facsimile to Plaintiff as it used to send facsimiles to everyone else. As such, this action is based on the same legal theory, namely liability under the JFPA stemming from the same faxes being sent from the same equipment. This action seeks relief expressly authorized by the JFPA: (i) injunctive relief enjoining Defendant, its employees, agents, representatives, contractors, affiliates, and all persons and entities acting in concert with them, from sending unsolicited advertisements in violation of the JFPA; and (ii) an award of statutory damages in the minimum amount of $500 for each violation of the JFPA, and to have such damages trebled, as provided by § 227(b)(3) of the Act. 12. On or about April 18, 2018, Defendant caused an unsolicited facsimile to be transmitted by telephone facsimile machine to Plaintiff. 13. A copy of the August 18, 2016 facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 14. CIR profited by and received the benefits of marketing of its products and is a responsible party under the JFPA. 15. Defendant created or caused to be made the faxes contained in Exhibit A, which Defendant knew or should have known advertise Defendant’s goods or products (namely its roofing services) that Defendant intended to and did in fact distribute Exhibit A to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Further, Defendant profited from and received the benefits of 5 marketing its products and services by fax and is a responsible party under the JFPA. 16. The fax contained in Exhibit A is part of Defendant’s work or operations to market Defendant’s goods or services that are performed by Defendant and/or on behalf of Defendant. Therefore, Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendant’s work or operations. 17. Plaintiff has never consented or invited or given permission to Defendant to send the faxes and had no prior relationship with Defendant. 18. On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same or substantially similar unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. 19. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners actually desire and consent to receive. 2. a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”; 20. Further, Defendant’s facsimile did not display an opt-out notice as required by 47 C.F.R. 64.1200. Among other things, it did not provide a cost-free mechanism for recipients to opt-out. 21. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following classes of persons: No Consent Class: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent, by Defendant or on Defendant’s behalf an unsolicited telephone facsimile message substantially similar to Exhibit A, (3) from whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to fax the Plaintiff. 6 22. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers, and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definition following appropriate discovery. 23. Numerosity: Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is in the hundreds and potentially in the thousands. 24. Commonality and Predominance: Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of all class members that are central to each class members’ claim. Common material questions of fact and law include, but are not limited to: (a) Whether the Defendant sent an unsolicited fax advertisement; (b) Whether the Defendant’s fax advertised the commercial availability of property, goods, or services; (c) Whether Defendant obtained prior express consent from the recipients to send the faxes; 7 (d) Whether the Defendant faxed advertisements without first obtaining the recipient’s prior permission or invitation; (e) Whether the Defendant sent the faxed advertisements knowingly; (f) Whether the Defendant violated the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. and the regulations promulgated thereunder; (g) Whether the Faxes contained an “opt-out notice” that complies with the requirements of § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and the effect of the failure to comply with such requirements; (h) Whether the Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the future; (i) Whether the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages; and (j) Whether the Court should award treble damages. 25. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the Fax sent by or on behalf of the Defendant advertising goods and services of the Defendant during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendant has acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members. 26. Adequate Representation: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class. Plaintiff is committed to keeping itself apprised of the litigation and to representing the Class Members’ interests. 8 27. Conduct Similar to the Class as a Whole: Class certification is appropriate because the Defendant has acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), et seq. 28. Superiority and Manageability: Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because: (a) Proof of the claims of the Plaintiff will also prove the claims of the class without the need for separate or individualized proceedings; (b) Evidence regarding defenses or any exceptions to liability that the Defendant may assert and prove will come from the Defendant’s records and will not require individualized or separate inquiries or proceedings; (c) The Defendant has acted and is continuing to act pursuant to common policies or practices in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members; (d) The amount likely to be recovered by individual class members does not support individual litigation. A class action will permit a large number of relatively small claims involving virtually identical facts and legal issues to be resolved efficiently in one (1) proceeding based upon common proofs. The common questions cut to the heart of the case and predominate over any supposed individualized issues; and 9 (e) This case is manageable and superior to maintain as a class action in that: i. The Defendant identified persons or entities to receive the fax transmission and it is believed that the Defendant’s computer and business records will enable the Plaintiff to readily identify class members and establish liability and damages; ii. Liability and damages can be established for the Plaintiff and the classes with the same common proofs; iii. Statutory damages are provided for in the statute and are the same for all class members and can be calculated in the same or a similar manner; iv. A class action will result in an orderly and expeditious administration of claims and it will foster economics of time, effort and expense; v. A class action will contribute to uniformity of decisions concerning the Defendant’s practices; and vi. As a practical matter, the claims of the class are likely to go unaddressed absent class certification. 29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 3. a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the 11 ones that receive a faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the Act. The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) in ¶ 31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006). The requirements of (3) above are contained in § 227(b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii). Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly. The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed advertisements. As a result of such requirements, a sender of a faxed advertisement who fails to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements has, by definition, transmitted an unsolicited advertisement under the JFPA. This is because such a sender can neither claim that the recipients of the faxes advertisement gave “prior express permission or invitation” to receive the Faxes nor can the sender claim the exemption from liability contained in § 227(b)(1)(C) of the Act. 30. The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement …” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 31. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the 10 commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 32. The faxes sent by Defendant advertised roofing services by Defendant, were commercial in nature, and are advertisements under the TCPA. 33. Plaintiff and the other class members never gave prior express consent, invitation or permission to receive the faxes. 34. Opt-Out Notice Requirements: The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”). 35. The Faxes. Defendant sent the April 18, 2018 fax via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computer, or other device to the telephone facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class. The Fax constituted an advertisement under the 12 Act. The Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements as explained below. Defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the No Consent Class. 36. Defendant’s Other Violations of the TCPA. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendant has sent via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of members of the No Consent Class faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation (and/or that Defendant is precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). Defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant is continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the future. 37. The JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is appropriate. Id. 13 38. The Defendant knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the Defendant’s goods or services; (b) the faxes constituted an advertisement; and (c) the Fax did not apprise recipients of their legal right to opt-out. 39. The Defendant’s actions caused damages to the Plaintiff and the other class members. Receiving the Defendant’s junk faxes caused the recipients to lose paper and toner consumed in the printing of the Defendant’s faxes. Moreover, the Defendant’s faxes used the Plaintiff's fax machine. The Defendant’s faxes cost the Plaintiff time, as the Plaintiff and its employees wasted their time receiving, reviewing, and routing the Defendant’s unauthorized faxes. That time otherwise would have been spent on the Plaintiff's business activities. The Defendant’s faxes unlawfully invaded the Plaintiff’s and other No Consent Class members’ privacy interests in being left alone. Finally, the injury and property damage sustained by Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class from the sending of Defendant’s advertisements occurred outside of Defendant’s premises. 40. As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class are each entitled to, under section 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 41. Furthermore, in the event the Court finds that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, under section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the No Consent Class. 14 6. This case challenges Defendant’s practice of sending unsolicited fax advertisements. 7. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, 47 USC § 227, et seq. (“JFPA” or the “Act”), and the regulations promulgated under the Act, prohibits a person or entity from faxing or having an agent fax advertisements without the recipient’s prior express consent, invitation, and permission. The JFPA provides a private right of action and provides statutory damages of $500 per violation. 8. Defendant sent a facsimile transmission of an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff and the Classes in violation of the JFPA, on April 18, 2018. (See “CIR Fax” a true and accurate copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The CIR Fax promotes the services and goods of Defendant, specifically its roofing services. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendant has sent, and continues to send, unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA to other persons as well. 9. Unsolicited faxes cause harm to their recipients. A junk fax recipient loses the use of its fax machine, paper, and ink toner. An unsolicited fax wastes the recipient’s time that would have been spent on something else. A junk fax also interferes with, invades, and intrudes upon the recipient’s privacy. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving authorized faxes, prevent their use for authorized outgoing faxes, cause undue wear and tear on the recipients’ fax machines, and require additional labor to attempt to discern the source and purpose of the unsolicited message. 4 Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class)

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11. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the practice of paying fees to real estate brokers in connection with their placing home warranties with home buyers, where the payment to the real estate agent is conditioned upon a successful transaction selling the warranty product, is a violation of Section 8(a) of RESPA, 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). It constitutes the giving of a fee for the referral of services related to a federally related mortgage loan. It does not matter, under HUD's authoritative interpretation, that the home warranty provider claims that the real estate agent performed "some" services in connection with the home warranty. Pursuant to HUD, where "the payments are based on the number of successful transactions," the payment violates Section 8(a) of RESPA as a matter of law. This is so because in such circumstances, the payments are "made pursuant to an agreement or understanding to refer business" to Old Republic, and "not payments for services actually performed." 12. Jerry Lynn Barker sold a home located at 3518 York Street, Birmingham, Alabama 35242. The sale was financed using a federally related mortgage loan from Synovus Mortgage Corp., and closed on May 11, 2009. 13. In connection with the home sale, the buyers, Timothy A. Strickland and April L. Strickland, were represented by a real estate agent from Re/Max Over the Mountain. 15. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalves and on behalf of others similarly situated as a nationwide class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 16. The class which plaintiffs seek to represent is composed of and defined as: All persons in the United States of America who have purchased from the defendant a home warranty in connection with the sale or purchase of a home financed by a federally related mortgage during the applicable statute of limitations period, where any portion of the premium was paid to any real estate agent involved in the transaction, where such payments were conditioned upon the successful completion of the transaction selling the home warranty. Excluded from the class are the defendant, all officers, directors, employees, or agents of the defendant, and any agency or employee of the United States government acting in their official capacity. 7. This case pertains to defendant's uniform, nationwide practice of charging home warranty premiums in connection with the settlement or closing of home mortgage loans in a manner that violates RESPA, specifically Section 8(a), which prohibits, among other things, the giving or accepting of fees in exchange for the referral of any "service involving a federally related mortgage loan" to "any person." 8. Old Republic is in the business of selling home warranties under which homeowners pay a premium (or a premium is paid on the homeowner's behalf) in exchange for services Old Republic provides in the event that certain components of a home require repair or replacement. NATIONWIDE CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiff Karl E. Dover on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, hereby amends his complaint against defendant Old Republic Home Protection Co., Inc. ("defendant" or "Old Republic") adding plaintiff Jerry Lynn Barker, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as follows.

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(Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.) 27. In 2019, United and its affiliated carriers operated more than 1.7 million flights carrying more than 162 million customers.1 28. While operating its business, United actively chose to communicate with its customers through SMS text messages, which are sent to consumers’ cellular telephones through the use of an ATDS. 1 https://ir.united.com/company-information/company-overview 9 of 19 29. An “SMS message” is a text message call directed to a wireless device through the use of the telephone number assigned to said device. 30. The impersonal, repetitive, and generic nature of United’s text messages, combined with the large number of text messages sent by United, demonstrates that United utilizes an ATDS in transmitting its text messages to consumers. 31. The FCC has stated that companies must provide an opt-out mechanism in their text messages. See In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Declaratory Ruling as to Petition of Soundbite Communications, Inc. CG Docket No. 20-278 (November 29, 2012). 32. At all times relevant, United represented that replying to their text message communications with the word “STOP” would prevent consumers from receiving further text messages. 33. Upon information and good belief, no emergency purpose exists that would justify a statutory exemption for United’s text messages sent to Plaintiff after Plaintiff requested that the text messages cease. See St. Clair v. CVS Pharm., Inc., 222 F. Sup. 3d 779 (N.D. CA 2016) (holding that when a customer (or former customer) has explicitly told a company that he/she does not want or need calls, the continued calls can hardly be described as “necessary,” much less involving a 10 of 19 “situation” affecting the customer’s health and safety.); see also Dorfman v. Albertsons, LLC, 2018 WL 9988655 (D. Idaho, Oct. 18, 2018) (“Thus, even in cases where the statutory exception may apply to the calls at the outset, it no longer applies once the recipient of the calls notifies the caller to stop.”). 34. Further, United is not sheltered from liability under the Healthcare Treatment Purposes Exemption because United has not complied with the exemption’s enumerated requirements. See Coleman v. Rite Aid of Ga., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (N.D. Ga. January, 10, 2018) (stating that a defendant could not utilize the Healthcare Treatment Purposes Exemption as a defense because it failed to satisfy the prerequisites to the exception’s operation.) 35. Upon information and good belief, United has a pattern and practice consisting of sending consumers across the United States text messages after they opt-out of United’s text message campaigns.2 36. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the Verizon wireless plan for the cellular telephone number ***-***-7905. 37. Beginning on or about October 15, 2020, Plaintiff received an automated text message from short code 26266 stating: “You’ll now receive SMS 2 https://www.flyertalk.com/forum/united-airlines-mileageplus/2028902-how-do- you-stop-sms-messages-ua.html 11 of 19 flight updates from United when traveling. Reply HELP for help, STOP to opt out. Standard message and data rates may apply. United.com/texts”. 38. Upon information and good belief, the short code 26266 is owned and operated either by United or its agents acting on behalf of United. 39. Immediately upon receiving the aforementioned text message from United, Plaintiff texted the word “STOP” to short code 26266. 40. Plaintiff then received a confirmatory text from United stating: “You’ll no longer receive SMS flight updates from United. Standard message and data rates may apply. United.com/texts” 41. Despite the requested opt-out by Plaintiff and receipt of a confirmatory text from United, Plaintiff continued to receive text messages from United. 42. Frustrated by the situation, Plaintiff continued to send text messages to United at short code 26266 requesting that the text messages cease. 43. Specifically, Plaintiff requested that United stop texting him on October 22, 2020; October 26, 2020; and October 27, 2020; however, United continued to send Plaintiff text messages. 44. United never honored any of Plaintiff’s opt-out requests, nor did Plaintiff request that the text message campaign be reinstated in any way. 12 of 19 45. United’s automated text messages sent to Plaintiff after he requested them to stop caused Plaintiff actual and tangible harm, including without limitation, an invasion of his privacy, the tying up of his cellular telephone line, depletion of his cellular telephone’s battery life, aggravation at receiving further text messages after requesting that they stop, annoyance, intrusion on his seclusion, trespass, and conversion. 46. Further, Plaintiff suffered loss of time as a result of reviewing the text messages and responding back to the text messages in attempts to have the text messages stop. 47. United’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily personal and/or work life. 48. For example, Plaintiff received some of United’s text messages while engaged in important activities, including without limitation, filming content for his business and editing the film content. 49. Plaintiff was disrupted by the text messages sent by United and had to stop what he was doing, and take time to view and respond to them. 50. United’s violations of the TCPA were knowing and willful, as United was aware of the issues concerning the text messages, which resulted in numerous automated text messages being sent to Plaintiff and the putative class after requests for them to cease, but failed to take any corrective action. 13 of 19 51. Moreover, United is fully aware of the TCPA and its requirements because United was previously issued a citation by the FCC for violations of the statute. (See FCC Citation No.: EB-08-TC-6836; December 9, 2008). 52. As authorized by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all other persons or entities similarly situated throughout the United States. 53. Plaintiff proposes to represent a class and sub-class of persons affected by United’s actions, described as follows: (i) All persons within the United States (ii) to whom United, directly or through a third-party, (iii) sent a text message to their cellular telephone (iv) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (v) after said individual opted-out of receiving further text messages, (vi) within the four years preceding the filing of this Complaint, through the date of class certification. 54. Excluded from the class is United, any entities in which United has a controlling interest, United’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned, any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and Plaintiff’s attorneys and any member of their staff and immediate family. 55. The proposed class members are identifiable through United’s records and databases, third-party telephone records, and third-party telephone number databases. 14 of 19 56. The potential class members number in the thousands, at least. Therefore, individual joinder of these persons is impracticable. 57. Plaintiff is a member of the class and/or any subclass. 58. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed class, including but not limited to, the following: a. Whether United used any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make the subject text messages; b. Whether United placed non-emergency calls without obtaining the recipients’ valid prior express consent or, where applicable, prior express written consent; c. Whether United failed to honor individuals opt-out requests; d. Whether United’s violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing; and e. Whether the Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to statutory damages as a result of United’s actions. 59. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same facts and legal theories, and therefore are typical of the claims of class members. 60. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the classes, he will fairly and adequately protect 15 of 19 the interests of the classes, and he is represented by counsel skilled and experienced in class actions, including TCPA class actions. 61. The actions by United complained of herein are generally applicable to the class as a whole and to Plaintiff. 62. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is the superior method for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The only individual question concerns identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by United and/or its agents. 63. The likelihood that individual class members will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to prosecute an individual case, and given the small recoveries available through individual actions. 64. Plaintiff is not aware of any litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by others who meet the criteria for class membership described above. 65. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if set forth herein. 66. It is a violation of the 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an 16 of 19 artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service…” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 67. At all times relevant, United sent text messages to Plaintiff’s and members of the putative class’ cellular telephones. 68. At all times relevant, United utilized an ATDS when sending the aforementioned text messages to Plaintiff’s and members of the putative class’ cellular telephones. 69. At all times relevant, United received opt-out requests from Plaintiff and other members of the putative class, but failed to honor said requests in violation of the TCPA. 70. At all times relevant, no emergency purpose exists that would justify a statutory exemption for United’s text messages sent to consumers after the consumer requests that the text messages cease. 71. After Plaintiff opted-out of receiving text messages from United, any statutory “emergency purpose” exemption that may have existed was no longer applicable. See St. Clair, 222 F. Sup. 3d 779, 780 (N.D. CA 2016). 72. At all times relevant, United’s text messages failed to comply with the requirements of the Healthcare Treatment Purposes Exemption. 17 of 19 73. Accordingly, United cannot seek shelter under the Healthcare Treatment Purposes Exemption. See Coleman, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1344 (N.D. Ga. January, 10, 2018) 74. United’s violations of the TCPA resulted in, among other things, an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy, loss of time addressing the unwanted text messages, and infringement on the right to enjoy the full utility of his cellular device. 75. At all times relevant, United is and was directly and/or vicariously liable for the violations of the TCPA described above. 76. As such, United’s text messages were willful or, at a minimum, negligent. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 77. Should the Court determine that United’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the proposed class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Riordan Pringle, respectfully requests the following relief: a. A declaration that United’s practices described herein violate 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii); b. An award of statutory damages, including treble damages, in the maximum amount allowed by law; 18 of 19 c. An award of costs associated with this litigation; d. An injunction requiring United to cease all text communications in violation of the TCPA as described herein; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

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56. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 57. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of the Defendant and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 58. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 59. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 60. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. -9- 61. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 62. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the -10- absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 63. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 64. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the -11- Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 65. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 66. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 67. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through sixty-six (66) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 68. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 69. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about July 24, 2018; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g(a)(1) for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt, for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by Plaintiff, for failing to accurately state -12- the amount of the debt in the initial communication, for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 70. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 71. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York November 18, 2018 /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Attorneys for the Plaintiff Maxim Maximov, LLP 1701 Avenue P Brooklyn, New York 11229 Office: (718) 395-3459 Facsimile: (718) 408-9570 E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Maxim Maximov_____ Maxim Maximov, Esq. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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17. Plaintiffs bring claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. §216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt front-of-house and back-of-house employees (including delivery persons, servers, runners, bussers, porters, cooks, line-cooks, food preparers and dishwashers) employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (herein, “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 19. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 20. Plaintiffs bring claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt front-of-house and back-of-house employees (including delivery persons, servers, runners, bussers, porters, cooks, line-cooks, food preparers, and dishwashers) employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 22. The proposed Class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown. As the facts on which the calculation of that number is presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. 23. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to Defendants’ same corporate practices of (i) failing to pay proper wages for all hours worked, including their overtime premium at one and one half times the regular rate for all hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek, (ii) deducting an improper meal credit, (iii) failing to provide wage statements per the requirements of the NYLL, and (iv) failing to properly provide wage notices to Class members, at date of hiring and annually, per the requirements of the NYLL. 24. Defendants’ corporate wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiffs and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 26. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of the wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because of losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 30. Plaintiff VICTOR BRAVO: a. In or around March 2019, Plaintiff, VICTOR BRAVO was by Individual Defendants to work as a cook for Defendants at 1556 2nd Avenue New York, 39. Plaintiffs reallege each and every previously mentioned allegation of this Class and Collective Action complaint as fully set forth herein. 40. At all relevant times, Individual Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 41. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 42. At all relevant times, Corporate Defendants had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000. 43. At all relevant times, the Defendants had a policy and practice that failed to pay Collective Plaintiffs their proper wages for all hours, including overtime for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, due to a policy of time-shaving. 45. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 47. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid wages and unpaid overtime, plus an equal amount as liquidated damages. 48. Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 49. Plaintiffs reallege each and every previously mentioned allegation of this Class and Collective Action complaint as fully set forth herein. 50. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and other Class member were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the NYLL, §§2 and 651. 51. Throughout their employment, Plaintiffs and other Class members were not paid their proper wages for all hours worked, including those exceeding forty (40) hours per workweek. 53. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not providing all non-exempt employees proper wage notice, at the date of hiring and annually thereafter, as required under the NYLL. 54. Due to the Defendants’ NYLL violations, Plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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22. Upon information and belief, almost all corn grown in the United States is grown from seeds that have been genetically modified (commonly referred to as genetically modified organisms, or, for short, “GMOs”), and as such, almost all corn and corn-based ingredients in the United States are in fact unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients. 24. As a result, Defendant’s “All Natural” claim, which is uniformly, consistently, and prominently displayed on the front of each individual packaging of the Products, is untrue, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class. 25. Defendant unlawfully markets, advertises, sells, and distributes the Products to Florida purchasers in grocery stores, food chains, mass discounters, mass merchandisers, club stores, convenience stores, drug stores, and/or dollar stores as being “All Natural.” 26. At all material times hereto, Defendant sells the Products at a premium price, above other similar products in the marketplace that do not claim to be “All Natural.” 27. Plaintiff and members of the Class were charged a price premium for the Products, over and above other products that do not claim to be “All Natural.” A. Defendant’s False and Misleading Advertising is Likely to Deceive Reasonable Consumers 28. Defendant’s false and misleading representations and omissions are likely to deceive Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers. 29. Reasonable consumers rely on food label representations and information in making purchase decisions. 30. Defendant’s statement that the Products are “All Natural,” is material to a reasonable consumer’s purchase decision, because reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, care whether food products contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients, especially when a product claims to be “All Natural.” 32. According to Consumers Union, “Eighty-six percent of consumers expect a ‘natural’ label to mean processed foods do not contain any artificial ingredients.” See Notice of the Federal Trade Commission, Comments of Consumers Union on Proposed Guides for Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 CFR § 260, Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/greenguiderevisions/00289-57072.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 33. Defendant markets and advertises the Products as “All Natural,” to increase sales derived from the Products. Defendant is well-aware that claims of food being “All Natural” are material to reasonable consumers. 34. Plaintiff and the other Class members reasonably relied to their detriment on Defendant’s misleading representations and omissions. 35. Plaintiff and the other Class members were among the intended recipients of Defendant’s deceptive representations and omissions. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant made the deceptive representations and omissions regarding the Products with the intent to induce Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ purchase of the Products. 37. Defendant’s representations and omissions are material in that a reasonable person would attach importance to such information and would be induced to act upon such information in making purchase decisions. 39. Upon information and belief, in making the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant knew and intended that consumers would pay a price premium for the Products over comparable products that are not labeled “All Natural,” furthering Defendant’s private interest of increasing sales for the Products, and decreasing the sales of products by Defendant’s competitors that do not claim to be “All Natural.” 41. Had Defendant not made the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Plaintiff and the other Class members would not have been economically injured because Plaintiff and the other Class members would not have purchased the Products. 42. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 43. Plaintiff and the other Class members did not obtain the full value of the advertised Products due to Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions. 44. Plaintiff and the other Class members purchased, purchased more of, or paid more for the Products than they would have done had they known the truth about the Products. B. Plaintiff’s Reliance and Damages 46. All of Defendant’s Products are advertised and sold as “All natural,” in a substantially similar manner, on their front packaging and labeling, despite the fact that the same contain unnatural, artificial, synthetic, and/or genetically modified ingredients. 47. Upon information and belief, all of the unnatural, artificial, synthetic, and/or genetically modified ingredients included in the Products that are at issue herein are substantially similar to each other, in that they are all corn or corn-based substances. 48. The Products purchased by Plaintiff claimed to be “All Natural” on the front packaging, which Plaintiff perceived, read and relied on in making Plaintiff’s purchase. 50. Plaintiff interpreted the “All Natural” claim to mean that the Products did not contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, or genetically modified ingredients. 51. Subsequent to purchasing the Products, Plaintiff discovered that they are not “All Natural” because of the presence of unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients. 52. Plaintiff and members of the Class paid a price premium for the Products because the Products claimed to be “All Natural.” 53. Plaintiff and members of the Class would not have purchased the Products had they known that they contained ingredients that are not “All Natural.” 54. Likewise, if Plaintiff and members of the Class had known the Products contained unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients, they would not have purchased them. 55. As a result, Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered economic damages as a result of purchasing the Products that claim to be “All Natural” because the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients. 56. The Products are valueless, worth less than what Plaintiff and members of the Class paid for them, and/or are not what Plaintiff and members of the Class reasonably intended to receive. 57. Plaintiff and the Class seek damages equal to the aggregate purchase price paid for the Products during the Class Period, and injunctive relief described below. 59. Pursuant to Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this class action and seeks certification of the claims and certain issues in this action on behalf of a Class defined as: All Florida residents who have purchased for personal use one or more of the Products, from January 16, 2009, through and to the date Notice is provided to the Class. 60. Plaintiff respectfully reserves the right to amend the Class definition if further investigation and discovery indicates that the Class definition should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 61. Defendant’s practices and omissions were applied uniformly to all members of the Class, including any subclass, so that the questions of law and fact are common to all members of the Class and any subclass. All members of the Class and any subclass were and are similarly affected by the deceptive advertising for the Products, and the relief sought herein is for the benefit of Plaintiff and members of the Class and any subclass. 62. Based on the annual sales of the Products and the popularity of the Products, it is readily apparent that the number of consumers in both the Class and any subclass is so large as to make joinder impractical, if not impossible. 65. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Plaintiff Class and any subclass. 66. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class action litigation. 67. Certification of this class action is appropriate under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the questions of law or fact common to the respective members of the Class and any subclass predominate over questions of law or fact affecting only individual members. This predominance makes class litigation superior to any other method available for a fair and efficient decree of the claims. 68. Absent a class action, it would be highly unlikely that the representative Plaintiff, or any other members of the Class or any subclass, would be able to protect their own interests because the cost of litigation through individual lawsuits might exceed expected recovery. 69. Certification also is appropriate because Defendant acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to both the Class and any subclass, thereby making appropriate the relief sought on behalf of the Class and any subclass as respective wholes. 70. Further, given the large number of consumers of the Products, allowing individual actions to proceed in lieu of a class action would run the risk of yielding inconsistent and conflicting adjudications. 72. The benefits of proceeding as a class action, including providing a method for obtaining redress for claims that would not be practical to pursue individually, outweigh any difficulties that might be argued with regard to the management of this class action. 73. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered one (1) through seventy two (72) of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 74. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Sections 501.201 to 501.213, Florida Statutes. 75. The express purpose of FDUTPA is to “protect the consuming public...from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” FLA. STAT. § 501.202(2). 76. Section 501.204(1), Florida Statutes declares as unlawful “unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 77. The sale of the Products at issue in this cause was a “consumer transaction” within the scope of FDUTPA. 78. Plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined by Section 501.203, Florida Statutes. 80. Defendant’s unfair and deceptive practices are likely to mislead – and have misled – reasonable consumers, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, and therefore, violate Section 500.04, Florida Statutes. 81. Defendant has violated FDUTPA by engaging in the unfair and deceptive practices described above, which offend public policies and are immoral, unethical, unscrupulous and substantially injurious to consumers. 82. Specifically, Defendant has represented that the Products are “All Natural,” when in fact, the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients, including, but not limited to, White Corn, Corn Oil, and/or Toasted Corn Germ. 83. Plaintiff and Class Members have been aggrieved by Defendant’s unfair and deceptive practices in violation of FDUTPA, in that they purchased and consumed Defendant’s mislabeled Products. 84. Reasonable consumers rely on Defendant to honestly represent the true nature of its ingredients. 85. Defendant has deceived reasonable consumers, like Plaintiff and the Class, into believing the Products were something they were not; specifically that they are “All Natural.” 86. The knowledge required to discern the true nature of the Products is beyond that of the reasonable consumer—namely that the Products do or do not contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients. 87. Plaintiff and the Class suffered damages and are entitled to injunctive relief. 89. Plaintiff seeks all available remedies, damages, and awards as a result of Defendant’s violations of FDUTPA. 90. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs numbered one (1) through seventy two (72) of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein verbatim. 91. Defendant has negligently represented that the Products are “All Natural.” 92. Defendant has represented that the Products are “All Natural,” when in fact, the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients, including, but not limited to, White Corn, Corn Oil, and/or Toasted Corn Germ. 93. Defendant has misrepresented a material fact to the public, including Plaintiff and Class Members, about the Products. 94. The Products are marketed directly to consumers by Defendant, come in sealed packages, and do not change from the time they leave Defendant’s possession until they arrive in stores to be sold to consumers. 96. Defendant has omitted the fact that the Products contain unnatural, synthetic, artificial, and/or genetically modified ingredients in the Products, despite claiming that the Products are “All Natural.” 97. Defendant knew or should have known that these misstatements or omissions would materially affect Plaintiff’s and Class members’ decisions to purchase the Products. 98. Plaintiff and other reasonable consumers, including the Class members, reasonably relied on Defendant’s representations set forth herein, and, in reliance thereon, purchased the Products. FOR VIOLATIONS OF FLORIDA’S DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT, FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201, ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a pet insurance company, and owns and operates the website, www.hartvillepetinsurance.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.hartvillepetinsurance.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse pet insurance for purchase, view quotes, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 36. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 43. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 47. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 51. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 57. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 61. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 66. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 88. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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20. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 21. Plaintiff and similarly-situated staff, including STNAs, work or worked for Defendants during the past three years. 22. These STNAs and similar staff were compensated at two pay rates, one for Medicare, $8.00 per hour (later raised to $8.50 per hour), and other for non-Medicare, $9.00 per hour. 23. During that time, Renaissance refused to pay overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours. 24. For example, during the workweek ending December 22, 2013, Ms. Hunt worked a total of 42 hours (38 hours at the non-Medicare rate of $9.00 per hour and 4 hours at the Medicare rate of $8.00 per hour.) See Ex. 3, Paystubs for Class Period, p. 1. 25. She was short paid in the following manner, because she had 2 hours of overtime: Week Ending December 22, 2013 INCORRECT Pay Calculation CORRECT Pay Calculation Type Hrs Rate Amt Paid Hrs Rate OT 39. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 40. Plaintiff brings Count I below individually and on behalf of all individuals similarly situated, specifically: All persons who work(ed) as STNAs or in positions with similar titles or duties for Defendants at any time in the last three years prior to the filing of this Complaint (the proposed “FLSA Collective”) 41. Members of the proposed FLSA Collective are known to Defendants and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. 42. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are all victims of Defendants’ widespread, repeated, systematic, and consistent illegal policies that have resulted in violations of their rights under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and that have caused significant damage to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 7 43. These individuals would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join by filing their written consent. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 45. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b), Plaintiff brings Count II of this Complaint on behalf of herself and the following persons: All persons who work(ed) as STNAs, or in positions with similar titles or duties for Defendants at any time in the last three years prior to the filing of this Complaint (the “Putative Class”) 46. The persons in the Putative Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Putative Class is impracticable. While the precise number of class members has not been determined at this time, Defendants have employed more than three hundred (300) individuals in positions with similar titles or duties during the statute of limitations period. 47. Plaintiff and the Putative Class have been equally affected by Defendants’ violations of law. 48. There are questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class that predominate over any questions affecting individual members of the Putative Class, including but not limited to the following: a. Whether Defendants violated Federal law for failure to pay all overtime wages at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked over forty hours during a workweek; b. Whether Defendants violated Ohio law for failure to pay all overtime wages at one-and-one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked over forty hours during a workweek; c. The proper measure and calculation of damages; and d. Whether Defendants’ actions were willful or in good faith. 8 49. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the members of the Putative Class. 50. They have been subject to Defendants’ practices and policies described in this Complaint. Further, Plaintiff’s job duties are typical of the Putative Class, as all class members performed in-home care duties for the elderly or infirmed. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Putative Class, and has retained counsel experienced in complex wage and hour class and collective action litigation to prosecute her claims. 52. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class members, and a class action is superior to other methods in order to ensure a fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual plaintiffs often lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate lawsuits in federal court against large corporate defendants to recover lost wages. Class litigation is also superior because it will preclude the need for unduly duplicative litigation resulting in inconsistent judgments pertaining to Defendant’s policies and practices. There do not appear to be any difficulties in managing this class action. 53. Plaintiff intends to move for certification of the Putative Class as soon as practical under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 54. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the FLSA Collective, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 9 55. The FLSA requires covered employers to pay non-exempt employees no less than one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 56. Defendant Renaissance is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 2063(r)(1), and are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, § 203(b), (s)(1). 57. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective qualified as non-exempt covered employees during the relevant time period. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 58. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week for Defendants, but Defendants did not properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all of their overtime hours as required by the FLSA. 59. Defendants did not and have not made a good-faith effort to comply with the FLSA as it relates to the compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 60. Defendants knew Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective worked overtime without proper compensation, and they willfully failed and refused to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective wages at the required overtime rates. See 29 U.S.C. § 255. 61. Defendants’ willful failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime wages for time worked violates the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 62. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and are therefore entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages for up to three years prior to the filing of their claims, liquidated damages or prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. 10 63. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 64. The OMFWSA requires employers to pay their employees for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in an individual workweek at a rate no less than one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay. R.C. § 4111.03. 65. Plaintiff and the Putative Class qualified as Defendants’ employees within during the relevant time period the meaning of the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.14. 66. Plaintiff and the Putative Class regularly worked more than forty (40) hours per week for Defendants, but Defendants did not properly compensate Plaintiff and the Putative Class for all of their overtime hours as required by the OMFWSA. 67. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Putative Class suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and are therefore entitled to recover unpaid back wages for up to two years prior to the filing of their claims, liquidated damages or prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper. FEDERAL OVERTIME (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective STATE OVERTIME (Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA), R.C. § 4111.01, et seq) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Putative Class

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7. The Complaint and the FAC contain vague, ambiguous, and often conflicting allegations both internally and between the two pleadings. 8. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ alleged class is described as “All former and current employees (“Class Members”) employed by Defendants within the State of California within four years of the filing of this Complaint until the entry of judgment after trial” as well as identifying five proposed subclasses. Complaint (Ex. A) at ¶27. The FAC initially describes the putative class similarly (FAC (Ex. B) at ¶1), but also describes the putative class as “All former and current employees (“Class Members”) employed by Defendants within the State of California within four years of the filing of this Complaint until the entry of judgment after trial, that were denied the compensation guaranteed under the California Labor Code, and/or subjected to unlawful treatment with respect to the terms of compensation set forth in their offer letters,” as well as identifying six proposed subclasses. FAC (Ex. B) at ¶37. 9. The alleged size of Plaintiffs’ alleged class and subclasses do not appear to have changed based on the revised class definition. Both the Complaint and the FAC allege that the class contains between 50 and 250 people and each subclass contains “not less than 5 people.” See Complaint (Ex. A) at ¶26, ¶28; FAC (Ex. B) at ¶36, ¶38.

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12. In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices. 39. As a separate and distinct cause of action against all DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS reallege and incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein, excepting those allegations which are inconsistent with this cause of action. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS constitute knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. 41. As a result of DEFENDANTS’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq., PLAINTIFFS and members of the proposed Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every text message sent in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 45. As a separate and distinct cause of action against all DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS reallege and incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, all the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein, excepting those allegations which are inconsistent with this cause of action. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of DEFENDANTS constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq. 47. As a result of DEFENDANTS’ violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq., PLAINTIFFS and members of the proposed Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every text message made in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 48. PLAINTIFFS and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by DEFENDANTS in the future. 49. PLAINTIFFS and members of the proposed Class are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 50. WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS request relief as hereafter provided. A. The TCPA of 1991 KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq.) PLAINTIFFS RAMZI ABED, MICHAEL FLOWERS, LAUREN LEVITT, and CHRISTOPHER MYRICK, individually and on behalf of themselves, all others similarly situated, and the general public, complain and allege on information and belief the following against DEFENDANTS MICHAEL BLOOMBERG 2020, INC., and DOES 1-10: VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq.)

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16. The COBRA amendments to ERISA included certain provisions relating to continuation of health coverage upon termination of employment or another “qualifying event” as defined by the statute. 17. Among other things, COBRA requires the plan sponsor of each group health plan normally employing more than 20 employees on a typical business day during the preceding year to provide “each qualified beneficiary who would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a qualifying event … to elect, within the election period, continuation coverage under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1161. (Emphasis added). 18. Notice is of enormous importance. The COBRA notification requirement exists because employees are not expected to know instinctively of their right to continue their healthcare coverage. 19. Moreover, existing case law makes it ostensibly clear that notice is not only required to be delivered to covered employees but to qualifying beneficiaries, as well. 20. COBRA further requires the administrator of such a group health plan to provide notice to any qualified beneficiary of their continuation of coverage rights under COBRA upon the occurrence of a qualifying event. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). This notice must be “[i]n accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary” of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). 22. To facilitate compliance with these notice obligations, the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has issued a Model COBRA Continuation Coverage Election Notice (“Model Notice”), which is included in the Appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. It is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The DOL website states that the DOL “will consider use of the model election notice, appropriately completed, good faith compliance with the election notice content requirements of COBRA.” 23. In the event that a plan administrator declines to use the Model Notice and fails to meet the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1166 and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, the administrator is subject to statutory penalties of up to $110 per participant or beneficiary per day from the date of such failure. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). In addition, the Court may order such other relief as it deems proper, including but not limited to injunctive relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Such is the case here. Defendant failed to use the Model Notice and failed to meet the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1166 and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4, as set forth below. Defendant’s Notice Is Inadequate and Fails to Comply with COBRA 26. As a result, Plaintiff could not make an informed decision about his health insurance and lost health coverage. Plaintiff’s First Concrete Injury: Informational Injury 27. Furthermore, Defendant’s deficient COBRA notice caused Plaintiff an informational injury when Defendant failed to provide him with information to which he was entitled to by statute, namely a compliant COBRA election notice containing all information required by 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4) and 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). Through ERISA and then COBRA, Congress created a right—the right to receive the required COBRA election notice—and an injury—not receiving a proper election notice with information required by 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4(b)(4) and 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). Defendant injured Plaintiff and the class members he seeks to represent by failing to provide all information in its notice required by COBRA. Plaintiff’s Second Concrete Injury: Loss of Insurance Coverage 29. Plaintiff Dau Pham is former employee of Defendant and was a participant in Defendant’s health plan. 30. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on September 20, 2017. Importantly, he was not terminated for gross misconduct. 31. Following this qualifying event, Defendant mailed Plaintiff the deficient COBRA enrollment notice. 32. Defendant cannot cure its first form’s deficiencies with a “follow up” form. Contrary to Defendant’s multi-form system, the applicable regulation mandates use of a single “notice” rather than the dual “notices” Defendant uses. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606- 4(b)(4)(1) (“The administrator shall furnish to each qualified beneficiary, not later than 14 days after receipt of the notice of qualifying event, a notice meeting the requirements of paragraph (b)(4) of this section.) (Emphasis added). 33. The deficient COBRA notice that Plaintiff received was violative of COBRA’s mandates for the reasons set forth above. 34. Defendant has in place no administrative remedies Plaintiff were required to exhaust prior to bringing suit. 35. Additionally, because no such administrative remedies exist, any attempt to exhaust the same would have been futile. 41. No administrative remedies exist as a prerequisite to Plaintiff’s claims on behalf of the Putative Class. As such, any efforts related to exhausting such non-existent remedies would be futile. 42. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. On information and belief thousands of individuals satisfy the definition of the Class. 43. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The COBRA notice that Defendant sent to Plaintiff was a form notice that was uniformly provided to all Class members. As such, the COBRA notice that Plaintiff received were typical of the COBRA notices that other Class Members received and suffered from the same deficiencies. 44. Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members, he has no interests antagonistic to the class, and has retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation. 45. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class, including but not limited to: a. Whether the Plan is a group health plan within the meaning of 29

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14. Defendant North Star sells final expense insurance to consumers on the telephone.3 15. Defendant North Star uses telemarketing to solicit potential customers for its final expense insurance packages. 16. Defendant North Star calls consumers with a pre-recorded voice message without first obtaining the consumer’s prior express written consent. 17. Defendant North Star uses the name Senior Benefits while placing many of these calls, just as they did in the calls they made to the Plaintiff. 18. A former employee of the Defendant posted a review of their experience while working for the Defendant, stating that their job entailed “Constantly harassing people about ‘senior benefits.” 4 5 1 https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2016/07/22/cutting-robocalls 2 https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff-ftc-bureau-consumer-protection- federal-communications-commission-rules-regulations/160616robocallscomment.pdf 3 https://northstaria.com/about/ 4 https://www.indeed.com/cmp/North-Star-Insurance-Advisors,-LLC/reviews?fcountry=ALL&start=20 5 https://www.indeed.com/cmp/North-Star-Insurance-Advisors,-LLC/reviews?fcountry=ALL&start=20 4 19. Other former employees of the Defendant have also made complaints online about the cold calls that they were required to make on behalf of the Defendant, for instance: 6 7 20. Multiple consumers have posted complaints online about receiving unwanted pre- recorded telemarketing calls from Defendant North Star, including: • “Called in the early evening. Caller ID listed "Carolina Bch, NC." Left part of a robo message asking the listener to listen to a 3-minute pre-recorded message. . . . Another website has identified the number with a senior scam!”8 • “Claims to be ‘Senior Benefits,’ a known scam preying on ‘Seniors.’ Give them NO personal information. They are just thieves.”9 • “They have called everyday now for a month now. I know it is some kind of scam and I don’t know how to stop them from calling”10 • “’SENIOR BENEFITS’ SCAM. Sick of these CRIMINALS PREYING ON THE ELDERLY and INNOCENT!”11 • “I press option #2 to remove me, but they still continue to call me.”12 6 https://www.indeed.com/cmp/North-Star-Insurance-Advisors,-LLC/reviews?fcountry=ALL 7 https://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/North-Star-Insurance-Advisors-Reviews-E1053969_P3.htm 8 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-910-216-2530 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 https://findwhocallsyou.com/9102162530 12 Id. 5 • “Called me a few times.”13 • “I press 2 but Senior Benefits just keeps on calling. These guys need to be stopped!”14 21. In response to these calls, Plaintiff Woods files this lawsuit seeking injunctive relief requiring the Defendant to cease from violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, as well as an award of statutory damages to the members of the Class and costs. 22. On March 25, 2021 at 8:25 AM, Plaintiff Woods received a pre-recorded call to her cell phone from phone number 660-460-4033 by the Defendant. 23. The Plaintiff answered the call and a pre-recorded message began playing. 24. The company name stated in the pre-recorded message was “Senior Benefits.” 25. The pre-recorded message asked Plaintiff to press ‘2’ if she was interested in learning more about final expense insurance. 26. Plaintiff pressed ‘2’ and was transferred to a pre-qualifying agent named April. 27. After answering a couple of questions, Plaintiff asked the agent what company she was speaking with. The agent said that the Plaintiff had contacted Senior Benefits and then proceeded to ask another question. Plaintiff Woods disconnected the call without answering any more questions. 28. Phone number 660-460-4033 is registered to Senior Benefits according to Whitepages.15 29. If one calls 660-460-4033, they will be transferred to speak with a pre-qualifying agent of Defendant North Star. 30. Plaintiff did not provide her consent to North Star to place pre-recorded calls to her cell phone number. 31. The unauthorized solicitation telephone call that Plaintiff received from Defendant, as alleged herein, has harmed Plaintiff Woods in the form of annoyance, nuisance, 13 https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-660-460-4033 14 https://findwhocallsyou.com/6604604033?CallerInfo#Done 15 https://www.whitepages.com/phone/1-660-460-4033?fromPopSearch=true 6 and invasion of privacy, and disturbed the use and enjoyment of her phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. 32. Seeking redress for these injuries, Plaintiff Woods, on behalf of herself and a Class of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA. 33. Plaintiff Woods brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and seeks certification of the following Class: Pre-recorded No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action through trial (1) Defendant (or an agent on Defendant’s behalf) called on their cellular telephone number (2) using a pre-recorded voice message, and (3) for whom the Defendant claims it obtained consent to call the person or the person’s number in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained consent to call Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s number. 34. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which either Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against the Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff Woods anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following appropriate discovery. 35. Numerosity and Typicality: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 36. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: 7 (a) whether the Defendant placed pre-recorded voice message calls to Plaintiff Woods and members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class; (b) whether the calls were made without first obtaining prior express written consent of Plaintiff Woods and members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class; (c) whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; and (d) whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct. 37. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff Woods will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff Woods has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Woods and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff Woods nor her counsel have any interest adverse to the Class. 38. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff Woods. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the prior paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 40. Defendant North Star transmitted unwanted solicitation telephone calls to Plaintiff Woods and the other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class using a pre-recorded voice message. 41. These pre-recorded voice calls were made en masse without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff Woods and the other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class. 42. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff Woods and the other members of the Pre-recorded No Consent Class are each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation. 8 Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff Woods and the Pre-recorded No Consent Class)

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XII. CAUSES OF ACTION ............................................................................................. 20 First Cause of Action ................................................................................................ 20 Second Cause of Action ........................................................................................... 23 Third Cause of Action .............................................................................................. 24 Fourth Cause of Action ............................................................................................. 24

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13. On December 31, 2014, Defendant sent an unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff’s ink-and-paper facsimile machine. The fax advertises the Aeroflow Vista MultiPost Cervical Collar (the “Product”). It states that “in addition to back braces, Aeroflow Healthcare is pleased to announce that we now offer Cervical Collars!” It touts the Product as a treatment method for neck pain. A copy of this facsimile is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A. 14. Exhibits A is exemplary of the junk faxes Defendant sends. 15. Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express invitation or permission to send advertisements to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 16. Defendant’s faxes do not contain opt-out notices that comply with the requirements of the TCPA. 18. Further, Plaintiff also seeks to certify the following sub-class of persons (the “Subclass”) regarding : All persons and entities, residing in the State of Florida, who hold telephone numbers that received a facsimile transmission from Defendant at any time from December 23, 2011, to present (the “Class Period”) that 1) promotes Defendant’s products and 2) lacks an opt-out notice compliant with the requirements of the TCPA. 19. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Class and Sub-Class (collectively, the “Classes”) before the Court determines whether certification is proper. 20. Excluded from the Classes are Defendant, any parent, subsidiary, affiliate, or controlled person of Defendant, as well as the officers, directors, agents, servants, or employees of Defendant and the immediate family members of any such person. Also excluded are any judge who may preside over this case and any attorneys representing Plaintiff or the Classes. 21. Numerosity [Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)]. The Members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent illegal fax advertisements to hundreds if not thousands of other recipients. 23. Typicality [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)]. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all Members of the Classes. Plaintiff received an unsolicited fax advertisement from Defendant during the Class Period. Plaintiff makes the same claims that it makes for the Members of the Classes and seeks the same relief that it seeks for the Members of the Classes. Defendant has acted in the same manner toward Plaintiff and all the Members of the Classes. 27. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 28. The TCPA provides strict liability for sending fax advertisements in a manner that does not comply with the statute. Recipients of fax advertisements have a private right of action to seek an injunction or damages for violations of the TCPA and its implementing regulations. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 30. Unsolicited faxes are illegal if the sender and recipient do not have an “established business relationship.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i). “Established business relationship” is defined as “a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a business or residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or transaction by the business or residential subscriber regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(6). 31. Regardless of whether the sender and recipient have an established business relationship, and regardless of whether the fax is unsolicited, a faxed advertisement is illegal unless it includes an opt-out notice on its first page that complies with the TCPA’s requirements. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv). To comply with the law, an opt- out notice must (1) inform the recipient that the recipient may opt out of receiving future faxes by contacting the sender; (2) provide both a domestic telephone number and a facsimile machine number—one of which must be cost-free—that the recipient may contact to opt out of future faxes; and (3) inform the recipient that the sender’s failure to comply with an opt-out request within thirty days is a violation of law. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D); 47 CFR § 32. Defendant faxed unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff that did not have compliant opt-out notices, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 33. Defendant knew or should have known (a) that Plaintiff had not given express invitation or permission for Defendant to fax advertisements about its products; (b) that Defendant’s faxes did not contain a compliant opt-out notice; and (c) that Exhibit A is an advertisement. 34. Defendant’s actions caused damage to Plaintiff and the Class Members. Defendant’s junk faxes caused Plaintiff and the Class Members to lose paper, toner, and ink consumed in the printing of Defendant’s faxes through Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ fax machines. Defendant’s faxes cost Plaintiff and the Class Members time that otherwise would have been spent on Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ business activities. 35. In addition to statutory damages (and the trebling thereof), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief under the TCPA. 36. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference each of the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 37. Plaintiff and the Members of the Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 38. Defendant is a “person” or “entity” as used in FDUTPA. 39. Pursuant to FDUTPA, unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. 41. Within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and continuing to the present, Defendant violated FDUTPA by engaging in unfair practices against Plaintiff and the Sub-Class. 42. Defendant was engaging in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 43. The practices described herein also offend established public policy regarding the protection of the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises against companies, like Defendant, who engage in unfair methods of competition. 44. Defendant’s conduct, which caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the Sub- Class could have been avoided, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to any consumers or competition. 45. Defendant’s business acts and practices are also unfair because they have caused harm and injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and Sub-Class Members. 46. In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. 64.1200(a)(4)(iii). Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4) Violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.

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12. The products at issue in this case consist of all varieties (e.g., different types of roasts) and sizes (e.g., 11.5 oz., 30.6 oz., etc.) of Maxwell House ground coffee canisters, tins, and bricks which make a specific servings representation on the front label (e.g., “MAKES UP TO 90 6 FL CUPS”). 49. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 above as if fully set forth herein. 50. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Consumer Subclass against Defendant pursuant to California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq. 67. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 above as if fully set forth herein. 68. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass against Defendant. 69. The UCL, Cal. Bus. & Prof Code § 17200, provides, in pertinent part, that “unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .” 70. Under the UCL, a business act or practice is “unlawful” if it violates any established state or federal law. Defendant’s false and misleading advertising of the Products was and continues to be “unlawful” because it violates the CLRA, the FAL, and other applicable laws as described herein. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful business acts and practices, Defendant has unlawfully obtained money from Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass. 74. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 above as if fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass against Defendant. 84. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 above as if fully set forth herein. 85. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass against Defendant. 86. California’s implied warranty of merchantability statute provides that “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Cal. Com. Code § 2314(1). 87. California’s implied warranty of merchantability statute also provides that “[g]oods to be merchantable must be at least such as . . . (f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.” Cal. Com. Code § 2314(2)(f). 92. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 above as if fully set forth herein. 93. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass against Defendant. A. The Products At Issue Breach of Express Warranty (for the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass) Breach of Implied Warranty (for the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass) Intentional Misrepresentation (for the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass) Violation of California’s False Advertising Law California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq (for the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass) Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (for the California Consumer Subclass) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (for the California Subclass and California Consumer Subclass)

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone number (310) 356-0418 confirmed to be Defendant’s number. 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, “The Classes”). 8. Beginning in or around July 12, 2018, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -3928, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its call to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. CORP. d/b/a FUNDMERICA, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b)  As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c)  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5).  Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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10. The WCC houses approximately 230 women inmates. Most of the women have been convicted of, or are being detained for, nonviolent offenses. More than a third have mental health problems. Many have been victims of sexual assault or abuse. 11. Inmates at the WCC who cannot remain in general population because they have mental health issues or need to be held in protective custody, or who commit certain disciplinary infractions, are taken to the Segregation Unit. 12. Multiple officers conduct the move. The Shift Commander leads the team, which includes at least three other officers. If the inmate is initially noncompliant, the team includes at least four officers, wearing riot gear. 13. To begin the move, the officers cuff the inmate’s wrists and shackle her ankles. A female officer puts on gloves and conducts a thorough “pat search” of the inmate’s full body. 14. After leading the inmate into a cell in the Segregation Unit, the officers remove the inmate’s cuffs and shackles. 16. An officer tells the inmate to take off all of her clothes. If the inmate is menstruating, she must remove any tampon or pad she is using and hand it to a guard. 17. Once naked, the inmate is ordered to lean forward and run her fingers through her hair, to remove her dentures if she wears them, to raise both arms, and then to lift her breasts. If she has a large midsection, she must “lift her stomach for visual inspection.” 18. A guard tells the inmate to turn around so that she is facing away from the officers. She is ordered to bend over, spread her buttocks apart with her hands, and cough. She must bend over far enough for guards to be able to see inside her anus and vagina. 19. The inmate is ordered to stand up and face the wall, and to remain facing the wall until the officers exit the cell. 20. During this entire process, an officer with a handheld video camera stands just outside the cell, a few feet away. 21. The officer faces the inmate and records her naked body. 22. This officer is almost always a male. 23. The Shift Commander remains inside the cell throughout the strip search. About half the time, the Shift Commander is a male. 25. Massachusetts regulations governing county correctional facilities require that strip- searches be conducted “in relative privacy with as much dignity as possible … by staff the same sex as the inmate.” 103 C.M.R. 924.06(3). 26. American Correctional Association standards state that “[o]nly staff of the same sex as the offender participate in strip searches.” ACA Adult Community Residential Services (4th ed.) 44. This action is brought pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b) (1) and (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the named Plaintiffs as a class action on behalf of all women taken to the Segregation Unit at WCC whose strip searches were videotaped by a male officer. 45. The named plaintiffs, Debra Baggett and April Marlborough, are members of the class. The class represented by Plaintiffs is so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical. The practice described above has existed for a period going back more than three years before this complaint was filed. On information and belief, it has affected several hundred class members. 46. There are questions of law and fact common to the class of plaintiffs. Central to all the claims is the nature and constitutionality of the practice at the WCC of having male guards view and film female inmates being strip searched upon being brought to the Segregation Unit. 47. The named plaintiffs’ claims or defenses are typical of the claims or defenses of the class of plaintiffs. 49. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the prosecutions of separate actions by the individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the defendants. 50. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members who are not parties or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 51. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because the questions of law and fact common to the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 52. As a direct result of the policy or practice as described above, class members have been subjected to unlawful strip searches, which have caused each member of the class to endure emotional distress, humiliation, and degradation. VI. 9. The Western Massachusetts Regional Women’s Correctional Center in Chicopee opened in October 2007. It is operated by the Hampden County Sheriff’s Department. It houses women detainees and convicted offenders from the four western counties in Massachusetts.

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10. Defendant Spinnaker is a Florida corporation. Upon information and belief, Defendant purchases lists of consumers to call without receiving their consent. 11. Spinnaker has turned to unsolicited telemarketing as a way to increase its customer base as it seeks to generate sales for its vacation ownership business. Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which Defendant recruits new customers. 14. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant was and is fully aware that unsolicited telemarketing calls are being made to consumers’ residential landlines through its own efforts and their agents. 15. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) unsolicited telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients and knowingly continued to call them after requests to stop. In so doing, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but it also intentionally and repeatedly violated the 18. Plaintiff is a nurse who works at night and must sleep during the day without interruption. 19. On February 9, 2010, Plaintiff registered her landline phone number on the do not call registry specifically to avoid telemarketing calls. 21. Plaintiff estimates she has received at least 70 unwanted calls during the past twelve months. For the past several months, she has received as many as four (4) calls per day. 22. When she answered each call, there would be a long pause, and then a voice which identified itself as representing Defendant Spinnaker would tell her that she had a credit for something that she had not used. 23. Each time, Plaintiff told the caller she was not interested, that she was on the do not call registry, and not to call her back again. 24. Plaintiff continued to receive dozens of calls from Defendant despite her previous request that they stop calling her. 25. The calls were annoying and harassing and interrupted her necessary daytime sleep, making it more difficult to do her job at night. 26. Plaintiff called back the phone numbers that kept calling her in an effort to tell them yet again to stop calling her, but each time reached a non-working telephone number, and thus her attempt to further opt-out of their calls was obstructed. 27. Finally, on March 21, 2016, Plaintiff called the listed telephone number for Defendant Spinnaker in an effort to stop the calls. Plaintiff reached the customer service department and spoke to a representative whom she told to stop the calls. The customer service representative said she needed to contact the marketing department, and transferred Plaintiff to that extension. Nobody answered at that extension, and the call was routed to voicemail. Plaintiff left a voicemail requesting the calls stop immediately. 29. Plaintiff does not have a relationship with Defendant, has never provided her telephone number directly to Defendant, or requested that Defendant place calls to her or offer her its services. Simply put, Plaintiff has never provided her prior express consent to Defendant to place calls to her and has no business relationship with Defendant. 30. As a result of Defendant’s repeated intrusive and unwanted telemarketing calls within a 12-month period, Plaintiff suffered actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. 31. At the time it called Plaintiff, Defendant was aware that the above-described telephone calls were and are being made to consumers like Plaintiff who had not consented to receive them and whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 32. Each time it called Plaintiff after the first call in, Defendant was also aware that it had placed more than one telemarketing call to Plaintiff’s number within a 12-month period. 34. Numerosity: The exact sizes of the Classes are unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Classes. Members of the Classes can be easily identified through Defendant’s records. 36. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. 38. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 39. 47 U.S.C. §227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of those regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 40. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 42. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the No Consent-DNC Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. These consumers requested to not receive calls from Defendant as set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3). 44. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the No Consent-DNC Class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a written policy, available on demand, for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them, and by not informing and training its personnel engaged in any aspect of telemarketing in the existence and use of the do-not-call list. 45. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), Plaintiff and each member of the No Consent Do Not Call Class are each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 47. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Stop Do Not Call Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), Plaintiff and each member of the Class is each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 49. Defendants knowingly and/or willfully initiated, or caused to be initiated, telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the No Consent- DNC Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry and who received more than one call within a 12-month period. 50. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 51. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and the No Consent Do Not Call Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 53. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully initiated, or caused to be initiated, telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Stop Do Not Call Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry and who received more than one call within a 12-month period from Defendant after informing Defendant to stop calling them. 54. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 55. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully failed to maintain a written policy, available on demand, for maintaining a list of persons who’ve requested not to be called and for training its personnel involved in any aspect of telemarketing in the existence and use of that list. 56. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiffs and the Stop Do Not Call Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 64.1200. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent-DNC Class) Knowing and/or Willful Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Stop Do Not Call Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent-DNC Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Stop Do Not Call Class)

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34. The crux of the FLSA, PA State Laws, and New Hampshire State Laws is, inter alia, that all employees are entitled to be paid mandated minimum wages for all hours worked. 35. Contrary to these basic protections, Plaintiff and the members of the Classes were deprived of the mandated minimum wage for all hours they worked. 37. As set forth above, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a “server” in both their Montgomery Mall location in Pennsylvania and at their Concord location in New Hampshire. 38. In each location, Plaintiff was paid an hourly cash wage rate from Defendants and earned tips from customers who chose to leave him a gratuity. 39. In Pennsylvania, Defendants paid Plaintiff and hourly wage rate of $2.83. 40. While employed in New Hampshire, Defendants paid Plaintiff and hourly wage rate of $3.26. 41. In Pennsylvania, Plaintiff typically worked 5 shifts per week, working on average 30 hours or more per week. His typical shift lasted around 6 hours, starting at 4 and ending at 10. 42. In New Hampshire, Plaintiff typically worked 5 shifts per week, working on average 30 hours or more per week. His typical shift lasted around 6 hours, starting at 4 and ending at 10. 43. At each location Plaintiff worked he was paid his straight hourly rate of either $2.83 (if working in Pennsylvania) or $3.26 (if working in New Hampshire), irrespective of the number of hours worked or the amount of tips received. 44. Upon information and belief, all “T.G.I. Friday’s” locations are/were operated by Defendants under uniform policies applicable to the members of the Classes. The Tip Credit Provision & Requirements 46. Under applicable law, in certain circumstances, it is permissible for an employer to take a tip credit and pay its employees less than the mandated minimum wage, provided that the employee’s tips received from customers plus the tip credit wage paid by the employer equals at least the applicable minimum wage.1 47. According to the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Fact Sheet #15: Tipped Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (“Fact Sheet #15”): the maximum tip credit that an employer can currently claim under the FLSA is $5.12 per hour (the minimum wage of $7.25 minus the minimum required cash wage of $2.13). 48. Pennsylvania mandates a higher minimum cash wage, requiring employers to pay at least $2.83 per hour. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, the maximum tip credit is $4.42 per hour. 49. New Hampshire requires an even higher minimum cash wage, mandating that employers pay their tip earning employees “not less than 45 percent of the applicable minimum wage.” See 23 R.S.A. § 279:21. 50. As is made plain in Fact Sheet #15, in order to claim a tip credit, the employer must notify its employees of its intention to take the tip credit and must also inform its employees that all tips received by the employee are to be retained by the employee (except for those tips that are part of a valid tip pooling arrangement). 52. An employer bears the burden of showing that it has satisfied the notification requirement of informing its employees that tips are being credited against the employee’s hourly wage.2 If an employer cannot demonstrate its compliance with this notification requirement, no credit can be taken and the employer is liable for the full minimum wage. 53. Further, where a tipped employee earns less in tips than the tip credit claimed, the employer is required to make up the difference. Stated another way, if a tipped employee earns less than $4.42 per hour in tips (the maximum tip credit permissible where the employer pays the employee $2.83 per hour), the employer must raise that tipped employee’s hourly cash component the necessary amount above $2.83 per hour so as to ensure that the employee earns at least $7.25 per hour – the mandated minimum wage. Defendants’ Failure to Notify Tipped Employees 54. As explained above, the DOL has very specific requirements regarding what an employer must notify his/her employee of if that employer intends to claim a tip credit. 55. Rather than comply with the notification requirements set forth in Fact Sheet #15, Defendants chose to simply pay its Tipped Employees between $2.83 and $3.26 per hour. In short, Defendants failed to inform its Tipped Employees of (i) their intention to take the tip credit, and (ii) the amount Defendants intended to claim as a tip credit. 57. Indeed, Plaintiff does not ever recall being notified by Defendants that they intended to take a “tip credit,” nor how much that amount would be. Evincing the magnitude of Defendants’ abject failure to notify Tipped Employees of their intention to take a tip credit, until recently, Plaintiff never heard the term “tip credit.” 58. Defendants also failed to comply with 43 P.S. § 231.34, insofar as they failed to notify employees in writing whenever the tip credit claimed by Defendants changed. Rather, Defendants took the maximum tip credit permissible irrespective of whether its Tipped Employee actually earned sufficient tips to substantiate the tip credit claimed. 59. Finally, Defendants also violated Section 279:26-b of the NHMWL insofar as they mandated that Tipped Employees, including Plaintiff, participate in a tip pooling/tip sharing arrangement. As New Hampshire wage law makes clear, “[t]ips are wages and shall be the property of the employee receiving the tip and shall be retained by the employee, unless the employee voluntarily and without coercion from his or her employer agrees to participate in a tip pooling or tip sharing arrangement.” 23 R.S.A. 279:26-b (emphasis added). 60. Because Plaintiff did not voluntarily participate in a tip pool/tip sharing arrangement, but rather was instructed to as part of Defendants’ employment practices, Defendants’ illegally required Plaintiff to surrender a portion of his tips. 61. Consequently, Plaintiff and other Tipped Employees in New Hampshire were paid less than the applicable minimum wage. 63. The claims under the FLSA may be pursued by those who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The claims brought pursuant to the PA State Laws and NH State Laws may be pursued by all similarly-situated persons who do not opt-out of the PA Class or NH Class pursuant to Rule 23. 64. Upon information and belief, the members of each of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the members of these Classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes there are over 30 individuals in each of the Classes. 65. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Classes as a whole, appropriate. 66. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Classes he seeks to represent. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes work or have worked for Defendants and were subject to the same compensation policies and practices. 68. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes as his interests are aligned with those of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has no interests adverse to the Classes he seeks to represent, and has retained competent and experienced counsel. 69. The class action/collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The damages suffered by individual members of the Classes may be relatively small when compared to the expense and burden of litigation, making it virtually impossible for members of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. 70. Plaintiff and the Classes he seeks to represent have suffered and will continue to suffer irreparable damage from the illegal policy, practice and custom regarding Defendants’ pay practices. 71. Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the FLSA. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) and willful violation of the PMWA and NHMWL. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the FLSA Collective Class, re-alleges and incorporate by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 73. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 75. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiff and each of the FLSA Collective Class Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 76. Pursuant to Defendants’ compensation policies, rather than pay Tipped Employees the federally-mandated minimum wage, Defendants took a tip credit and paid Tipped Employees only the tip-credit wage. 77. Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the FLSA. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 78. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the FLSA Collective Class, are entitled to recover from the Defendants, compensation for unpaid wages; an additional equal amount as liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the PA Class, re-alleges and incorporate by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 80. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiff and each of the PA Class Members within the meaning of the PMWA. 82. Pursuant to Defendants’ compensation policies, rather than pay Tipped Employees the required minimum wage in Pennsylvania, Defendants took a tip credit and paid Tipped Employees only the tip-credit wage. 83. At relevant times in the period encompassed by this Complaint, Defendants had a willful policy and practice of failing to satisfy the notification requirements in order for Defendants to claim the tip credit. 84. As a result of Defendants’ willful practices, Defendants were not entitled to claim the tip credit and pay Plaintiff and the members of the PA Class less than the Pennsylvania minimum wage for all hours worked. 85. Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the PMWA. 86. Due to the Defendants’ violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the PA Class, are entitled to recover from Defendants the amount of unpaid minimum wages, attorneys’ fees and costs. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the NH Class, re-alleges and incorporate by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 88. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ, Plaintiff and each of the NH Class Members within the meaning of the NHMWL. 89. Pursuant to Defendants’ compensation policies, rather than pay Tipped Employees the New Hampshire mandated minimum wage, Defendants improperly took a tip credit and paid Tipped Employees at a rate well below the New Hampshire minimum wage. 91. At relevant times in the period encompassed by this Complaint, Defendants had a willful policy and practice of failing to satisfy the notification requirements in order for Defendants to claim the tip credit. 92. As a result of Defendants’ willful practices, Defendants were not entitled to claim the tip credit and pay Plaintiff and the members of the NH Class less than the New Hampshire minimum wage for all hours worked. 93. Defendants have violated and, continue to violate, the NHMWL. 94. Due to the Defendants’ violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the NH Class, are entitled to recover from Defendants the amount of unpaid minimum wages, attorneys’ fees and costs. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the FLSA Collective Class) NEW HAMPSHIRE MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the NH Class) PENNSYLVANIA MINIMUM WAGE ACT– MINIMUM WAGE VIOLATIONS (On Behalf of the PA Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a women’s shoe company that owns and operates www.zooshoo.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in December of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.zooshoo.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 29. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 59. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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20. Defendant is an online glasses shop, and owns and operates the website, www.opticsplanet.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.opticsplanet.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse glasses and related eyewear products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in February 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse glasses and related eyewear products for purchase and delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 31. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 37. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 58. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 66. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 78. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 84. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 88. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

win

(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 103. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 104. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 105. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 22. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides videos, information, and education on everything related to fashion. The website also allows visitors to subscribe to receive additional videos, lessons and tutorials. It delivers information and subscriptions to tens of millions of people across the United States. 31. The Website allows the user to browse videos and information. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 36. There are well established guidelines for making websites accessible to disabled people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including but not limited to adding closed captioning to video content. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 38. The Website contains multiple videos that lack captioning. The videos “How to Draw, Render, and Illustrate Fashion,” “Ink Drawing Male Fashion Face,” “Drawing Female Hands,” “Drawing Frontal Figure Template,” “Rendering Velvet,” and multiple other videos of the Website do not contain closed captioning. The lack of captioning prevents Plaintiff, deaf, and hard-of-hearing people from understanding the content of those videos, thus preventing them from learning about Defendant’s products and services. 40. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 41. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video “How to Draw, Render, and Illustrate Fashion” on the Website in October 2018 but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 43. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 45. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 48. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 49. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 50. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 52. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 66. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 68. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 70. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 71. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 73. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 75. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 80. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 82. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 83. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 86. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 87. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 88. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 89. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 90. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 92. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 93. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 95. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 97. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 98. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

lose

Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of all Classes and Subclasses as to all Defendants Statutory Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227, et seq.) on behalf of all Classes and Subclasses as to all Defendants. 25. Defendant Sunrise Communications, Inc. is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 26. Defendant AT&T, Inc. is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 27. Sunrise describes itself on its website5 as having “working relationships with the phone, cable, and mobility companies. We provide the following services for our carrier partners: inbound and outbound call center services, traditional and digital marketing, and channel sub-agent partner sales.” Among its customers are “AT&T, Verizon, Century Link, Time Warner Cable, Charter, Comcast, Mediacom, and DirecTV to name a few.” 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 41. Plaintiff proposes the following Class and Subclass definitions, subject to amendment as appropriate: (i) The Class: All persons in the United States and its Territories who, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation, received one or more texts on their cellular telephone advertising the sale of services provided by AT&T, sent via an automated telephone dialing system without providing prior express written consent to receive such texts. (ii) The Sunrise Subclass: All persons in the United States and its Territories who, within four years prior to the commencement of this litigation, received one or more texts on their cellular telephone advertising the sale of AT&T products or services to be provided by or through Sunrise Communications, sent via an automated telephone dialing system without providing prior written express consent to receive such texts. 42. Plaintiff Wieseler-Myers is a member of, and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of, the Class and Subclass. 43. Excluded from the Class and Subclass are Defendants, any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned, and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 44. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class and Subclass, but Plaintiff reasonably believes Class members number, at minimum, in the thousands in each class and subclass. 46. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 47. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 48. Additionally, the disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 49. Further, all members of the Classes and Subclasses can be identified through records maintained by Defendants and/or their telemarketing agents and/or telephone carriers. 50. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. 51. The questions of law and fact, referred to above, involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class and Subclass members. 53. As a person who received non-emergency texts on her cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system without her prior express written consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member who also received such texts. 54. Further, Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 55. Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the other members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. 56. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 58. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 59. As a result of the Defendants’ violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 60. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants’ violation of the TCPA in the future. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 62. The foregoing acts and omissions of the Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 63. As a result of the Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). Sunrise Communications and AT&T

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41. Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3), for themselves and for all others similarly situated, and any subclasses deemed appropriate by this Court. The class consists of all individuals: 1) who are Washington State employees exclusively represented by WFSE as described in paragraph 9 above; 2) from whom the State continues to deduct union dues/fees on behalf of WFSE since the U.S. Supreme Court issued Janus v. AFSCME on June 27, 2018; and 3) who have not clearly and affirmatively consented to dues/fees deductions by waiving the constitutional right to not fund union advocacy on or after June 27, 2018. The class includes everyone who comes within the class definition at any time from three years prior to the commencement of this action until the conclusion of this action. 42. Upon information and belief, there are hundreds, and likely thousands, of class members. Their number is so numerous and in varying locations and jurisdictions across Washington that joinder is impractical.

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26. Jedson is an “integrated engineering, procurement, and construction management (EPCm) company[.]”1 1 https://jedson.com/about/ (last visited December 9, 2019). 4 27. To complete its business objectives, Jedson hires personnel, such as Wiggins, to perform construction management services. 28. Many of these individuals worked for Jedson and were paid under Jedson’s straight time for overtime pay scheme. 29. These straight time for overtime workers make up the proposed Putative Class. 30. For example, Wiggins worked for Jedson as a Construction Manager from approximately September 2016 until February 2017. 31. Throughout his employment, Jedson paid him the same hourly rate for all hours worked, including those in excess of 40 in a single workweek. 32. As a Construction Manager, Wiggins spent his time ensuring that construction projects were completed in accordance with Jedson (or its clients’) specifications. 33. Wiggins did not have any supervisory duties. 34. Wiggins did not hire or fire employees. 35. Wiggins did not exercise discretion and judgment as to matters of significant. 36. Wiggins was a blue-collar worker. 37. Wiggins and the Putative Class Members were required to adhere to Jedson (or its clients’) policies and procedures. 38. At all relevant times, Jedson maintained control, oversight, and direction of Wiggins and the Putative Class Members, including, but not limited to, hiring, firing, disciplining, timekeeping, payroll, and other employment practices. 39. Likewise, Jedson (or its clients) control Wiggins and the Putative Class Members’ work. 40. Jedson paid Wiggins and the Putative Class Members under its straight time for overtime pay scheme. 5 41. Wiggins and the Putative Class Members did not receive a salary. 42. If Wiggins or the Putative Class Members worked fewer than 40 hours in a week, they were only paid for the hours worked. 43. Wiggins and the Putative Class Members regularly worked over 40 hours in a week. 44. In fact, Wiggins routinely worked 72 to 84 hours per week. 45. Wiggins’ schedule is typical of the Putative Class Members. 46. Instead of paying overtime, Jedson paid Wiggins and the Putative Class Members the same hourly rate for the hours he worked over 40 in a work week. 47. Wiggins and the Putative Class Members worked in accordance with the schedule set by Jedson and/or its clients. 48. The hours Wiggins and the Putative Class Members worked are reflected in Jedson’s records. 49. Rather than receiving time and half as required by the FLSA, Wiggins and the Putative Class Members only received “straight time” pay for the hours they worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 50. Jedson’s “straight time for overtime” payment scheme violates the FLSA because it deprives Wiggins and the Putative Class Members of overtime at a rate of 1 ½ their regular rates for the hours they work in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 51. Jedson knew Wiggins and the Putative Class Members worked more than 40 hours a week. 52. Jedson knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the Putative Class Members were entitled to overtime under the FLSA. 53. Nonetheless, Jedson did not pay Wiggins and the Putative Class Members overtime as required by the FLSA. 6 54. Jedson knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the conduct described in this Complaint violated the FLSA. 55. The illegal “straight time for overtime” pay practice that Jedson imposed on Wiggins was likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 56. Dozens of individuals were victimized by Jedson’s pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA. 57. Numerous other individuals who worked with Wiggins indicated they were paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 58. Based on his experiences and tenure with Jedson, Wiggins is aware that Jedson’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 59. The Putative Class Members were all not afforded overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 60. Jedson’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 61. Wiggins’ experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 62. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 63. Wiggins has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Wiggins has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to him under state and/or federal law. 7 64. A collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 65. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries, and Jedson will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA. 66. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Jedson, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 67. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 68. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. 69. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Jedson’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the Putative Class Members was made in good faith; b. Whether Jedson’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and c. Whether Jedson’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all Putative Class Members. 70. Wiggins’ claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. 71. Wiggins and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Jedson’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 72. Wiggins knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective action. 73. Even if the issue of damages were somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. 8 74. Wiggins brings his FLSA claim as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 75. Jedson violated, and is violating, the FLSA by failing to pay Wiggins and the Putative Class Members overtime. 76. Jedson cannot demonstrate Wiggins and the Putative Class Members are exempt from overtime under the administrative exemption. 77. Jedson cannot demonstrate Wiggins and the Putative Class Members are exempt from overtime under the executive exemption. 78. Jedson cannot demonstrate Wiggins and the Putative Class Members are exempt from overtime under the professional exemption. 79. Jedson cannot demonstrate Wiggins and the Putative Class Members are exempt from overtime under the highly compensated exemption. 80. Jedson failed to guarantee the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members a salary. 81. Jedson failed to pay the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members overtime at the rates required by the FLSA. 82. Jedson paid the Plaintiff and Putative Class Members straight time for overtime. 83. Jedson knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard carried out this illegal pattern or practice of failing to pay the Putative Class Members overtime compensation. 84. Jedson’s failure to pay overtime compensation to these employees was neither reasonable, nor was the decision not to pay overtime made in good faith. 85. Accordingly, Wiggins and the Putative Class Members are entitled to overtime wages under the FLSA in an amount equal to 1.5 times their rate of pay, plus liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 9 VIOLATIONS OF THE FLSA

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(5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)) 44. Named plaintiff HFTX brings this action on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated grantees, excluding the grantees named as plaintiffs in already pending actions brought to challenge HHS’s termination of TPPP grants. 46. Excluded from the class are the plaintiffs in the following pending actions: Policy and Research, LLC, v. HHS, No. 18-cv-346-KBJ (D.D.C.), Planned Parenthood of Greater Washington and Northern Idaho v. HHS, No. 2:18-cv-00055 (E.D. Wash.), King County v. Azar, No. 18-cv-00242 (W.D. Wash.), and Healthy Teen Network v. Azar, No. 18-cv-00468 (D. Md.). 47. The class satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(2). 48. The class includes more than 60 members and is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 49. Questions of law and fact are common to the class, including, without limitation, whether HHS’s shortening of the TPPP grant periods violated HHS regulations and the APA. 50. The claims of the named plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class because, among other things, all class members were comparably injured by defendants’ unlawful termination of their grants, as described above. 51. The named plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interest of the class it seeks to represent; it has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in litigation; and because it intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Named plaintiff is represented by counsel who have knowledge and familiarity with the relevant law concerning the TPPP program, the APA, and class actions. 53. The APA authorizes this Court to hold unlawful and set aside final agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”

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(Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Overtime) (Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Minimum Wage) (New York Labor Law – Unpaid Minimum Wage) 18. From the start of Plaintiffs’ employment through March 21, 2020, La Floridita was open for breakfast, lunch and dinner, seven days per week. 20. From March 22, 2020 through April 30, 2020 La Floridita was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 21. Upon reopening on May 1, 2020, La Floridita was open for take-out and delivery of lunch and dinner. The lunch shift was from 11:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and the dinner shift was from 4:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. 22. There is no timeclock used in La Floridita to record the exact hours worked by employees. 23. Employees are paid based on a pre-written schedule, not on the actual hours that they work. For example, Toloza often arrived and began working 10-15 minutes before the start of her shift and had to stay past the end of her shift serving customers. However, she would only be paid for her scheduled shift hours. Diana Toloza 24. Toloza worked as a server at La Floridita. 25. Toloza was regularly scheduled to work five to seven days per week. 26. Toloza’s schedule changed from week to week but from June 2018 through March 21, 2020 she usually worked the breakfast and lunch shifts, from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. or the dinner shift, from approximately 4:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. two to three days per week and then worked double shifts (lunch and dinner shifts) from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. the remainder of the week. In total, Toloza worked about 50 to 76 hours per week. 28. From May 1, 2020 through June 2, 2020, a thirty-minute break was automatically deducted from Toloza’s pay each day, even though she did not take any uninterrupted breaks during her workday. 29. From the start of her employment through March 21, 2020, Toloza was paid in cash at a rate of $7.50 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 per workweek. 30. Starting in May 2020, Toloza was paid by check. 31. From May 1 to 14, 2020, Toloza was paid $15.00 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 in a workweek. 32. From May 15, 2020 to June 1, 2020, Toloza was paid $10.00 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 in a workweek. 33. Toloza’s last day of work was June 2, 2020. She did not receive any compensation for her work on that day. Porfirio Emicente 34. Emicente worked as a food runner at La Floridita. 35. Throughout his employment, Emicente regularly worked double shifts at La Floridita. 36. From the start of his employment in July 2019 to approximately September 2019, Emicente regularly worked from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., five days per week, for a total of about 60 hours per week. 38. Throughout his employment, an hour-long break was automatically deducted from Emicente’s pay even though he only took a break one to two times per week. 39. From July 2019 to September 2019, Emicente was paid in cash at a rate of $7.50 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 per workweek. 40. From September 2019 through March 21, 2020, Emicente was paid in cash at a rate of $10.50 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 per workweek. 41. Starting in May 2020, Emicente was paid by check. 42. From May 1 to 14, 2020, Emicente was paid $15.00 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 in a workweek. 43. From May 15, 2020 to June 2, 2020, Emicente was paid $10.00 per hour for all hours worked, including hours over 40 in a workweek. 44. Other than during a two-week period in May 2020, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other front-of-house workers at La Floridita at least the statutory minimum wage for all hours worked. 45. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other front-of-house workers at La Floridita overtime wages of one and one-half (1 ½) times the statutory minimum wage for hours worked over forty in a workweek. 46. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other front-of-house workers at La Floridita spread-of-hours pay on days that their shifts spanned more than ten hours. 48. Defendants did not provide Plaintiffs and other front-of-house workers at La Floridita with notices informing them of, inter alia, their rates of pay at their time of hire and whenever their rate of pay changed. 49. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA are brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons (i.e., front-of-house workers) who were employed by La Floridita since at least July 2017 and who elect to opt into this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 50. The FLSA Collective consists of approximately thirty similarly situated current and former front-of-house workers, who have been victims of Defendants’ common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by, inter alia, willfully denying them minimum and overtime wages and other pay. 51. As part of its regular business practice, Defendants have intentionally, willfully, and repeatedly harmed Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA and the NYLL. This policy and pattern or practice includes, inter alia, willfully failing to pay employees for all hours worked and failing to pay the statutory minimum wage and overtime wages due for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek since July 2017. 52. Defendants have engaged in their unlawful conduct pursuant to a corporate policy of minimizing labor costs and denying employees compensation. 53. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith and has caused significant damage to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 55. The claims in this Complaint arising out of the NYLL are brought by Plaintiffs under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and a class consisting of all similarly situated non-exempt employees (front-of-house workers including servers, runners, busboys, bartenders), who work or have worked at La Floridita since at least July 30, 2014 (the “Rule 23 Class”). 56. The employees in the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 57. The size of the Rule 23 Class is at least fifty individuals, although the precise number of such employees is unknown. Facts supporting the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants. 58. Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Rule 23 Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole. 60. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class work or have worked for Defendants since at least July 30, 2014. They enjoy the same statutory rights under the NYLL to be paid at the overtime rate for all hours worked over forty in a workweek. Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained similar types of damages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the NYLL. 61. Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have been under-compensated due to Defendants’ common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. 62. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Rule 23 Class. 63. Plaintiffs have retained legal counsel competent and experienced in wage and hour litigation and class action litigation. 64. There is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members. 66. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 67. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. Defendants are employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 206(a), and employed Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 69. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 206(a). 70. Defendants were required to pay to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the applicable federal minimum wage rate. 71. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and members the FLSA Collective the minimum wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 72. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that the practices described in this Complaint were unlawful and have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 74. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL §§ 190, 651(5), 652, and supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, and employed Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class. 76. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and members of the Rule 23 Class the minimum wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL. 77. Defendants have willfully violated the NYLL by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay the Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class minimum hourly wages. 78. As a result of Defendants’ willful violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover their unpaid wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages, and pre-judgment and post- judgment interest. 79. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA. 82. Defendants have willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective overtime wages. 83. Due to Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre- and post-judgment interest.

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(South Carolina Payment of Wages Act) (Individual and Class Action) 15. Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if repeated here verbatim. 16. Defendants own and operate Hudson’s. 18. Carlock was employed by Hudson’s from August of 2016 through March of 2017 as a server. 19. Fabrizio was employed by Hudson’s from August of 2013 through July of 2017 in various positions including bartender and server. 20. Defendants paid Carlock and Fabrizio, and on information and belief all Plaintiffs, a direct, or hourly, wage less than the statutory minimum wage by taking the “Tip Credit” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). Defendants paid Carlock and Fabrizio a direct, or hourly, rate of $2.13 per hour. 21. Hudson’s had a policy that required Carlock and Fabrizio, and on information and belief all Plaintiffs, to remit, from the tips they received, a portion of their tips at the end of each shift into the mandatory Tip Pool. 22. From the Tip Pool, Hudson’s redistributed a portion of all server and bartender sales to an individual who worked in the “back of the house” who performed janitorial duties and rolled silverware. 23. The employee to whom the tips were redistributed was not an employee who “customarily and regularly” received tips. 24. Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if repeated here verbatim. 25. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and 203(s). 27. The business of Defendants was and is an enterprise engaged in commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) and, as such, Defendants are subject to, and covered by, the FLSA. 28. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires employers to pay its nonexempt employees a minimum wage of Seven and 25/100 dollars ($7.25) an hour. 29. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), provides an exception allowing certain employers to take a “Tip Credit” and pay less than the statutory minimum wage to tipped employees, on the condition that any pooling, or sharing, of tips is shared only with other employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. 30. Carlock, Fabrizio, and on information and belief all Plaintiffs, were required by Defendants to pool, or share, their tips with employees, who are not employees who customarily and regularly receive tips, therefore, the Tip Pool is invalidated. 31. When the Tip Pool is invalidated, the employer can no longer enjoy the benefits of the Tip Credit provision, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 32. Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), 206, in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 34. Plaintiffs reallege each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if repeated here verbatim. 35. Pursuant to the terms of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, an employer must pay a nonexempt employee time and a half for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 36. Plaintiffs routinely worked more than forty (40) hours per week. 37. Plaintiffs were paid $3.19 per hour for overtime hours as opposed to the correct Tip Credit overtime wage of $5.76 per hour. 38. Without the benefit of the Tip Credit provision, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees the proper amount for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek or overtime hours worked. 39. Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiffs. 40. As such, Plaintiffs seeks to recover from Defendants the following damages: a. actual damages; b. liquidated damages of an equal amount; and c. reasonable attorneys’ fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. 42. Each Defendant is an “employer” as defined by the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act, S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-10(1). 43. Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the members of the Plaintiffs’ class within the State of South Carolina. 44. Plaintiffs worked for Defendants with the clear understanding and agreement with Defendants that their compensation would be consistent with all applicable laws, including state wage laws. 45. Plaintiffs had an employment agreement with Defendants whereby they would be paid wages for all hours worked. 46. SCPWA § 41-10-10(2) defines wages as “all amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an employee under any employer policy or employment contract.” 47. Money received by Plaintiffs directly as tips, or amounts received from the Tip Pool, were “wages” as defined by SCPWA, § 41-10-10(2). 48. Pursuant to the SCPWA § 41-10-40(C), “[a]n employer shall not withhold or divert any portion of the employee’s wages unless the employer is required or permitted to do so by state or federal law. 49. Defendants illegally deducted amounts from the wages of Plaintiffs without proper authorization. 50. Defendants owe Plaintiffs these tips that were illegally deducted from their wages. Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), 206 (Violation of Tip Credit / Failure to Pay Proper Minimum Wage) Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wage)

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13. Defendant Paul Didelius is the Owner and President of Frontier Rail Corporation, Frontier Rail Group, YCR Corporation, Yakima Central Railway, Western Washington Railroad, Kennewick Terminal Railroad, Oregon Railconnect, Lake Railway, and Cincinnati East Terminal Railroad (“The Short Lines”). 42. Johnson brings this action individually, and as a class representative, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) and 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. 43. The class, comprised of all aggrieved current and past employees of Defendants, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The class consists of approximately 50 or more members. a. There are questions of law or fact common to the class that predominate over questions affecting only individual members. b. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the class. c. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately assert and 45. Johnson re-alleges each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 46. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Johnson brings this action for himself and on behalf of a class - initially defined as follows: All current and past employees of Defendants who have been aggrieved by the Defendants’ failure to pay wages in accordance with the provisions of the FLSA and WMWA. 53. Johnson re-alleges each of the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 54. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES Pg. 7 of 17 GILBERT LAW FIRM, P.S. 421 W. Riverside, Ste 353 Spokane, WA 99201 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (CLASS CLAIM) THE WASHINGTON MINIMUM WAGE ACT, RCW 49.46.050 et. seq. (CLASS CLAIM)

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23. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 24. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of April 25, 2017, there were 83,539,116 shares of Swift class A common stock and 49,741,938 shares of Swift class B common stock outstanding held by hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals and entities scattered throughout the country. 25. Questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, among others: (i) whether defendants violated the 1934 Act; and (ii) whether defendants will irreparably harm plaintiff and the other members of the Class if defendants’ conduct complained of herein continues. 26. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 28. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, and are causing injury to the entire Class. Therefore, final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class is appropriate. 29. Swift is a transportation services company, operating one of the largest fleets of truckload equipment in North America from over 40 terminals near key freight centers and traffic lanes. 30. The Company began operations in 1966 with only one truck, with Moyes and his father and brother as its founders. The founders originally conducted operations under the name of Common Market Distributing, later buying Swift Transportation Co., Inc. (“Swift Transportation”). In the 1980s, Moyes bought out his partners, becoming the sole owner of Swift Transportation. In 1990, Swift Transportation went public on the NASDAQ stock market. 31. During 2016, the Company’s consolidated average operational truck count was 17,548, which along with its intermodal containers covered 2.2 billion miles for shippers throughout North America, contributing to consolidated operating revenue of $4.0 billion and consolidated operating income of $242.0 million. As of December 31, 2016, Swift’s fleet was comprised of 13,937 Company tractors and 4,429 owner-operator tractors, as well as 64,066 trailers, and 9,131 intermodal containers. 33. On September 8, 2016, Swift announced that Moyes would retire from his position as CEO of Swift effective December 31, 2016, but that Moyes would serve as a consultant with the title Founder and Chairman Emeritus and would continue as a member of the Board. The Company and Moyes entered into a letter agreement (the “Agreement”), pursuant to which, commencing January 1, 2017 through December 31, 2019, Moyes would serve as a non-employee consultant for which he will receive compensation of $200,000 per month through December 31, 2019. Moyes also retained and continued to vest in approximately 94,400 outstanding stock options (with exercise prices of $23.30 and $24.84) and he continued to vest in outstanding performance equity awards, as if his employment continued. Also, additional outstanding stock options held by Moyes on September 8, 2016 were immediately vested and he was treated as having a termination of employment effective December 31, 2016. The Process Leading to the Proposed Transaction 34. According to the Registration Statement, Knight and Swift have a “long- standing familiarity with each other’s businesses as the two largest truckload companies in Phoenix, Arizona, with Kevin Knight, Executive Chairman of the board of directors of Knight, and Gary Knight, Vice Chairman of the board of directors of Knight, having previously worked at Swift until 1990.” 36. On September 30, 2016, counsel to Moyes met with Kevin Knight to discuss “potential governance and voting terms” applicable to Moyes that would need to be resolved should a potential transaction be further pursued by Knight and Swift. These discussions between Moyes’s counsel and representatives of Knight continued throughout the process leading to the Proposed Transaction. 37. On November 3, 2016, the Swift Board met and decided not to engage a financial advisor until a proposal was received from Knight, but that the members of the Board would pay themselves additional compensation for evaluating the potential transaction. Although the Registration Statement indicates that the Board members would be compensated “on a per meeting basis,” the Registration Statement also indicates that the Board agreed to pay themselves additional compensation as follows: (i) $500 for one hour or less; (ii) $1,000 for one to four hours; and (iii) $2,500 for four hours or more. The Registration Statement, however, fails to quantify the amount of compensation each Board member received in connection with their consideration of the Proposed Transaction, which already fell squarely within their responsibilities as Board members and therefore did not require or justify additional compensation. 39. On December 1, 2016, the Swift Board met to discuss the Knight’s proposal, and the Board also approved the selection of Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC (“Morgan Stanley”) as its financial advisor in connection with the potential transaction, despite being informed that Morgan Stanley or an affiliate was a lender to each of Moyes and Keith Knight within the past two years. The Registration Statement, however, fails to disclose the timing and compensation Morgan Stanley earned for the lending services to each of Moyes and Keith Knight. 40. On January 27, 2017, counsel to Moyes sent to Knight’s counsel a draft amendment to Moyes’s existing consulting agreement with Swift revised to reflect Moyes would serve as Senior Advisor to the Executive Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the combined company should a potential transaction be pursued by Knight and Swift. 42. On February 28, 2017, the Swift Board met and Moyes informed the Board that he would not support any strategic transaction involving Swift other than a combination with Knight, ostensibly due to his strong, long-standing relationship with the Knights and his ability to continue to serve as a consultant with the attendant lucrative compensation payments. 43. On March 14, 2017, Knight provided Dozer with a revised proposal letter reflecting a 0.675 exchange ratio, as well as the following key governance terms: (i) Swift would remain as the surviving public company, (ii) the combined company would have a single class of shares outstanding, (iii) the combined company’s board would consist of 10 to 15 directors, with two directors to be selected by the Swift Board and two directors to be selected by Moyes in his capacity as a stockholder, and (iv) Moyes and members of his family and the Knights would be subject to obligations to vote in favor of a transaction as well as standstill provisions and transfer restrictions with respect to the combined company and Moyes would have certain governance rights with respect to the combined company. That same day, Moyes met with representatives of Knight regarding potential governance matters that would apply to the combined company. 45. On March 31, 2017, Knight requested that Dozer and Vander Ploeg serve on the combined company board. 46. On April 9, 2017, the Swift Board met and Morgan Stanley provided the Board with its fairness opinion, which was based, in part, on projections that were provided to Morgan Stanley by the Company’s management. Following the presentation, the Board approved the Merger Agreement and the Proposed Transaction, which was publicly announced the next day. The Registration Statement Omits Material Information, Rendering It False and Misleading 47. Defendants filed the Registration Statement with the SEC in connection with the Proposed Transaction. 48. The Registration Statement omits material information with respect to the Proposed Transaction, which renders the Registration Statement false and misleading. 50. The disclosure of projected financial information is material because it provides stockholders with a basis to project the future financial performance of a company, and allows stockholders to better understand the financial analyses performed by the company’s financial advisor in support of its fairness opinion. Moreover, when a banker’s endorsement of the fairness of a transaction is touted to stockholders, the valuation methods used to arrive at that opinion as well as the key inputs and range of ultimate values generated by those analyses must also be fairly disclosed. 51. The omission of this material information renders the Registration Statement false and misleading, including, inter alia, the following sections of the Registration Statement: (i) “Swift Management’s Unaudited Prospective Financial Information” and (ii) “Opinion of Swift’s Financial Advisor.” 53. Further, the Registration Statement fails to disclose whether the Board ever considered creating a special committee of independent directors to consider the Proposed Transaction in light of Moyes’s controlling interest and influence in the Company. 54. This information is necessary for stockholders to understand potential conflicts of interest of the Board, as that information provides illumination concerning motivations that would prevent fiduciaries from acting solely in the best interests of the Company’s stockholders. 55. The omission of this material information renders the Registration Statement false and misleading, including, inter alia, the following sections of the Registration Statement: (i) “Background of the Transaction” and (ii) “Interests of Swift’s Directors and Officers in the Transaction.” 56. The Registration Statement omits material information regarding potential conflicts of interest of Morgan Stanley. Specifically, the Registration Statement states that, in connection with Morgan Stanley’s wealth management business, Morgan Stanley or an affiliate thereof currently is a lender to Moyes and to Keith Knight. The Registration Statement, however, fails to disclose the amount of compensation Morgan Stanley has earned, or is expected to earn, in connection with those services. 57. Full disclosure of investment banker compensation and all potential conflicts is required due to the central role played by investment banks in the evaluation, exploration, selection, and implementation of strategic alternatives. 59. The above-referenced omitted information, if disclosed, would significantly alter the total mix of information available to Swift’s stockholders. 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 61. The Individual Defendants disseminated the false and misleading Registration Statement, which contained statements that, in violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not materially false or misleading. Swift is liable as the issuer of these statements. 62. The Registration Statement was prepared, reviewed, and/or disseminated by the Individual Defendants. By virtue of their positions within the Company, the Individual Defendants were aware of this information and their duty to disclose this information in the Registration Statement. 63. The Individual Defendants were at least negligent in filing the Registration Statement with these materially false and misleading statements. 65. The Registration Statement is an essential link in causing plaintiff and the Company’s stockholders to approve the Proposed Transaction. 66. By reason of the foregoing, defendants violated Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder. 67. Because of the false and misleading statements in the Registration Statement, plaintiff and the Class are threatened with irreparable harm. 68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 70. Each of the Individual Defendants and Knight was provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Registration Statement alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 71. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control and influence the particular transactions giving rise to the violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. The Registration Statement contains the unanimous recommendation of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Transaction. They were thus directly in the making of the Registration Statement. 72. Knight also had direct supervisory control over the composition of the Registration Statement and the information disclosed therein, as well as the information that was omitted and/or misrepresented in the Registration Statement. 73. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants and Knight violated Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. Background of the Company and the Proposed Transaction Claim for Violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder Against the Individual Defendants and Swift Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants and Knight

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19. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of himself and the other public stockholders of Mines Management (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 20. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 21. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of May 13, 2016, there were approximately 31,643,704 shares of Mines Management common stock outstanding, held by hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals and entities scattered throughout the country. 22. Questions of law and fact are common to the Class, including, among others: (i) whether Defendants violated the 1934 Act; and (ii) whether Defendants will irreparably harm Plaintiff and the other members of the Class if Defendants’ conduct complained of herein continues. 23. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 24. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of individual members of the Class who are not parties to the Case 2:16-cv-00256-SMJ Document 1 Filed 07/12/16 26. Mines Management was founded in 1947 and is a U.S.-based mineral exploration and development company engaged in the acquisition, exploration, and development of silver- dominant mineral projects. 27. The Company’s current focus is advancement and development of the Montanore Silver-Copper Deposit, one of the largest silver-copper deposits in the world. 28. The deposit is located in northwestern Montana, approximately forty miles north of the famed Silver Valley of Idaho, within one of the world’s most prolific silver districts. 29. Mines Management acquired the Montanore deposit in 2002 when its partner and operator, Noranda Minerals of Canada, withdrew. 30. On February 12, 2016, Mines Management issued a press release wherein it reported that Records of Decision (“ROD”) approving development of the Montanore Mine Project were issued by the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS”) and the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”). 31. The agencies’ decisions approved the project defined in the preferred alternative as outlined in the Joint Final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) previously announced on December 21, 2015, and provided a path forward for development of the project. 32. MDEQ’s conditioned approval amended the previously-existing state Hard Rock Operating Permit #00150 to conform with provisions of the RODs, and issued the Certificate of Case 2:16-cv-00256-SMJ Document 1 Filed 07/12/16 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 73. The Individual Defendants disseminated the false and misleading Registration Statement, which contained statements that, in violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements therein not materially false or misleading. Mines Management is liable as the issuer of these statements. 74. The Registration Statement was prepared, reviewed, and/or disseminated by the Individual Defendants. By virtue of their positions within the Company, the Individual Case 2:16-cv-00256-SMJ Document 1 Filed 07/12/16 80. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations as if fully set forth herein. 81. The Individual Defendants and Hecla acted as controlling persons of Mines Management within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of Mines Management and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Registration Statement, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. Case 2:16-cv-00256-SMJ Document 1 Filed 07/12/16 A. Background of the Company Claim for Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants and Hecla Claim for Violation of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder Against the Individual Defendants and Mines Management

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17. On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared the 2020 coronavirus global pandemic (“COVID-19”) a national emergency. Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (March 13, 2020), https://www. whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency- concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ (last visited April 30, 2020). 18. This civil rights action challenges the CARES Act on constitutional grounds. The CARES Act denies tax-paying U.S. citizens their rights, privileges, benefits and/or protections embodied in § 2101 of the CARES Act which, as part of its provisions, amends Subchapter B of chapter 65 of subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, by adding a new section 6428, entitled “2020 Recovery Rebates For Individuals” (“Sec. 6428”). S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020). 19. Sec. 6428 is codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6428. 20. The CARES Act was introduced in the Senate on March 19, 2020 by Mitch McConnell (for himself, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Shelby, and Mr. Wicker). S. 3548, 116th Cong. (2020). 57. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the following putative class (the “Class”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: All United States Citizens married to immigrants that file joint taxes wherein the immigrant-spouses file tax returns using an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number who would have otherwise qualified for the Stimulus Check. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class and any potential subclass definitions if further investigation and discovery indicate that the Class and potential subclass definitions should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. Excluded from the Class and potential subclass are any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 58. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members (individually, “Class Member” or collectively, “Class Members”) in one action would be impracticable, given the expected Class size and modest value of individual claims. 59. There are more than 1.2 million Americans that are married to immigrants who lack Social Security numbers. 60. Of the 1.2 million Americans, those who file joint tax returns and are not in the military would meet the above-referenced Class definition. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-68 of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein. 70. Defendants, acting under color of law, have violated rights secured to Plaintiff by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution including the right to due process of law, the right to equal protection under the law, and the penumbra of privacy rights created by the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments that creates a fundamental right to marriage. Specifically, Defendants have failed, as applied to Plaintiff, to treat her as equal to her fellow United States citizens based solely on whom she chose to marry. I. Substantive Due Process 71. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Violation(s) of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff storage and organizational products. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7450 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7450 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number 229-22, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. Short codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a short code. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 35. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 38. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 41. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 48. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 49. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 50. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 51. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 52. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 53. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 54. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-46 as if fully set forth herein. 55. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 56. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 57. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 58. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JARED NEWMAN, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party; c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASS

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10. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs were citizens of the State of California. Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, “persons” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 12. At all times relevant Defendant conducted business in the State of California and in the County of San Diego, within this judicial district. 13. At no time did Plaintiffs ever enter in a business relationship with Defendant. Defendant at all times was messaging Plaintiffs to solicit future business from Plaintiffs. 14. At no time did Plaintiffs expressly consent to receive such messages from Defendant. 15. Between January 2013 and February 2013, Plaintiff Melingonis initiated multiple telephonic communications to various acquaintances of Plaintiff Melingonis; however, Plaintiff Melingonis was only able to leave a voicemail on each occasion. On information and belief, this acquaintance, not Plaintiff Melingonis, had subscribed to Defendant’s service of converting voicemails to text format. 16. Thereafter, Plaintiff Melingonis received the following text messages from txt@youmail.com or 52894, numbers attributed to Defendant. These text messages stated: YouMail TXT Alerts: RE: Voicemail for Kevin (619-822-****) – Help me identify your calls – View http://ymvm.it/W8TTA2RP [REDACTED] YouMail TXT Alerts: RE: Voicemail for Jason ******* (619-665-****) – Get back to you shortly. Thanks for Calling ! – View: http://ymvm.it/h8ZQIGDe 27. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class). 28. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited text messages from Defendant which text message was not made for emergency purposes or with the recipient’s prior express consent within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 30. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using marketing and text messages, thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiffs and the Class members. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 31. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiffs reserve the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 39. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiffs and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 42. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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28. Plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of others similarly situated, seeks class action certification pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 29. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23 (b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the State of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 30. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the City of New York who have been denied equal access to goods and services of the Defendant’s Website. 31. The Class is so numerous, being composed of millions of deaf and hard of hearing individuals, that joinder of all members is impracticable. Additionally, there are questions of law and/or fact common to the Class and the claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the Class claims. 32. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class including: a. Whether the Website is a "public accommodations" under the ADA and New York laws; b. Whether there was a violation under the ADA due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations; and c. Whether there was a violation under New York law due to the barriers that exist on the Defendant’s Website and whether the Plaintiff and the Class were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 33. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class as they both claim that the Defendant violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to have its Website accessible. 34. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members as the Plaintiff and the Class are both deaf or hard of hearing individuals having the same claims. 35. Class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is proper because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds applicable to the Class as a whole, making declaratory and injunctive relief appropriate. 36. Questions of law or fact which affected Class members predominate questions which affected individual Class members and a class action will fairly and efficiently determine this litigation. 37. Counsel for the Plaintiff is experienced representing both Plaintiffs and Defendant in class actions. As such the Class will be properly represented. 38. Judicial economy requires this action be certified as a class action as it will prevent a voluminous amount of individual lawsuits filed by deaf or hard of hearing individuals throughout the United States. 39. Defendant owns, operates, controls and maintains the Website, which provides information and video content on what PathFactory does and what kind of services it offers, all of which is content on the Website that seeks to promote and sell its marketing services. The Defendant also owns and leases numerous physical places of public accommodations which operate in conjunction with its Website such as corporate sales offices, virtual event studios, blog creations production facilities, along with marketing and advertising locations. 40. The Website can be viewed by individuals located in New York State in addition to individuals from all states throughout the United States and can be reached from computers, tablets and cellphones which can access the internet. 41. In order for the deaf and hard of hearing to access video content, a website, including the Defendant’s Website, must have the ability to turn voice content into readable content. Closed captioning is the process by which this is done. Without the use of closed captioning, a deaf or hard of hearing individual would have to have someone present while they are watching a video to interpret and explain the audio content for them. 42. Various recommendations and guidelines exist in order to make websites, including the Defendant’s Website, compliant with the ADA. Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”) is one of those guidelines. WCAG 2.1 Section 1.2.2 states that “Captions are provided for all prerecorded audio content in synchronized media, except when the media is a media alternative for text and is clearly labeled as such”. Additionally, Section 508, an amendment to the United States Workforce Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requires all electronic and information technology be accessible to individuals with disabilities and requires closed captioning for video content. 43. The Website’s numerous videos, which cannot be accessed by deaf and hard of hearing individuals, are in violation of the ADA and New York laws. Videos include most of the Websites videos in addition to the videos the Plaintiff tried to access mentioned herein. 44. The Plaintiff in this matter was on the Defendant’s Website in order to watch videos on the day of August 1, 2020 in addition to subsequent days. The Plaintiff attempted to watch various videos to learn about what PathFactory does and what kind of services it offers, all of which is content on the Website which promote it sales and marketing efforts on www.pathfactory.com including “How PathFactory’s Content Insight & Activation Platform helps B2B marketers”, but was unable to do so due to their lack of closed captioning. Plaintiff and Class members cannot watch videos on the Website and have been prevented from accessing the Website although they would like to and intend to visit the Website in the future and enjoy video content as non-deaf individuals can and do. There are no closed captioning on the videos. The Defendant’s access barriers prevent the Plaintiff from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Website in conjunction with their physical locations and as such denied the Plaintiff equal access. 45. This lack of closed captioning by the Defendant on its Website prevents not only the Plaintiff but also the deaf and hard of hearing located in New York State and nationally from having equal access as non-deaf and non-hard of hearing individuals have, preventing deaf and hard of hearing individuals from enjoying the goods, services and benefits offered by the Website. 46. Defendant has intentionally failed and refused to remove the Website’s barriers of access by failing to use closed captioning thereby denying equal access to the Plaintiff and the Class and discriminates against the Plaintiff and the Class in violation of the ADA and New York laws. 47. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “46” as if fully set forth herein. 48. The Plaintiff is deaf and requires closed captioning to have full and equal access to audio and audiovisual content and has an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities and is therefore an individual with a disability as defined under the 63. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “62” as if fully set forth herein. 64. At all times relevant to this action, the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”), Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law §§ 290 et. seq. covers the actions of the Defendant. 65. Defendant qualifies as a person within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(1). 66. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this action, has a substantial impairment to a major life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(21). The Defendant, at all relevant times to this action, owns and operates a place of accommodation, the Website, within the meaning of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law § 292(9) along with its physical locations which include corporate sales offices, virtual event studios, blog creations production facilities, along with marketing and advertising locations. 67. Pursuant to Article 15 N.Y. Executive Law § 296(2)(a) “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation ... because of the ... disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof." 68. Discrimination includes the refusal to adopt and implement reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures when they are necessary to afford, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law§ 296(2)(a), § 296(2)(c)(i). 69. Defendant’s actions violate Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) by discriminating against the Plaintiff and the Class, including the Subclass by (i) owning and operating the Website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing persons; and (ii) by not removing access barriers to its Website in order to make its videos accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities. This inaccessibility denies the deaf and hard-of-hearing full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that the Defendant makes available to individuals who are not deaf or hard of hearing. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296(2)(c). 70. The Defendant’s discriminatory practice also include "a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii). 71. Well established guidelines exist for making a website accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing and are easily obtainable. The guidelines have been used and followed by government and businesses in making their websites accessible to the deaf and hard of hearing, including but not limited to the use of closed captioning. Incorporating this component by Defendant in its Website would not fundamentally alter the Defendant’s Website or business and would not result in an undue burden. 72. Defendant has intentionally and willfully discriminated against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, Article 15 of the N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) and this discrimination continues to date. 73. Absent relief, Defendant’s discrimination will continue against the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass causing irreparable harm. 74. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each and every discriminatory act in addition to reasonable attorney fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. Article 15 of the N.Y. Exe. Law §§ 297(9), 297(4)(c) et seq. 75. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “74” as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice of this lawsuit upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Persons within N.Y.S. are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner of a place of public accommodation, shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40. 78. No person because of disability, as defined in § 292 (21) of the Executive Law, shall be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law (“CVR”) § 40-c. 79. § 292 of Article 15 of the N.Y. Executive Law deems a disability a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function. As such the Plaintiff is disabled under the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. 80. Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Subclass under CVR § 40 as Defendant’s Website is a public accommodation that does not provide full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges to all persons and discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing due to its lack of closed captioning for the death and hard of hearing. 81. Defendant intentionally and willfully failed to remove the barriers on their Website discriminating against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class preventing access in violation of CVR §40. 82. Defendant has failed to take any steps to halt and corrects their discriminatory conduct and discriminates against and will continue to discriminates against the Plaintiff and the Sub- Class members. 83. Under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 a corporation which violates any of the provisions of §§ 40, 40-a, 40-b or 42 shall be liable for a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby… in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the plaintiff or defendant shall reside. 84. Plaintiff hereby demands compensatory damages of five hundred dollars for the Defendant’s acts of discrimination including civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. 85. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “84” as if fully set forth herein. 86. At all times, the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 et. seq. applied to the conduct of the Defendant as the Defendant owns and operates the Website and are persons under the law. 87. At all times concerning this action the Plaintiff has had a substantial impairment to amajor life activity of hearing and is an individual with a disability under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(16). 88. At all times concerning this action the Defendant’s Website is a place of public accommodation as defined in N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 89. “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of the actual or perceived ……. disability …. of any person to withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations required to make reasonable accommodations to a disabled individual and may not “refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). 90. The willful and intentional non-removal of the Website’s barriers of access for the Plaintiff, the Class and the Subclass by the Defendant discriminates against the deaf and hard of hearing by denying them full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 91. It is discriminatory for the Defendant “not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to …. enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity." N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 92. Defendant’s actions will continue to prevent the Plaintiff, the Class and Subclass from accessing the Website as the remaining public can and the Plaintiff requests injunctive relief. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages for the injuries and loss sustained as a result of the Defendant’s discriminatory conduct in addition to punitive damages and civil penalties and fines for each offense, attorney fees, costs and disbursements of this action. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8), § 8-126(a) and § 8-502(a). 94. The Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs “1” to “93” as if fully set forth herein. 95. The Plaintiff claims that the Website contains barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website. 96. Defendant’s Website fails to comply with applicable laws and the Defendant discriminates against the Plaintiff and Sub-Class under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law§ 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. 97. The Defendant denies these claims. 98. The Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment such that the parties understand and know their respective rights and obligations. CLASS AND SUB-CLASS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York City Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF, THE CLASS AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Human Rights Law THE PLAINTIFF AND THE SUBCLASS Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law

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24. Upon information and belief, the individual identified in the above prerecorded messages is Kirk Watson, is the owner of Watson Auto Group. 25. The prerecorded telemarketing calls were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 26. Defendant’s prerecorded telemarketing calls constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase, sell, or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff one of Defendant’s vehicles. 27. The prerecorded telemarketing calls originated from telephone a telephone number which upon information and belief is owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 28. Plaintiff received the subject prerecorded telemarketing calls within this District and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this District. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded telemarketing calls to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted using an ATDS. 30. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7724 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 7724 Number. 31. Defendant’s prerecorded calls were sent to a cellular telephone with a 682 area code, which means Defendant knew, or should have known, that it was making calls into this District. The 682 area code serves the cities of Arlington, Bedford, Burleson, Cleburne, Euless, Fort Worth, Grapevine, Haltom City, Hurst, Keller, Mansfield, North Richland Hills, Southlake, Watauga. 33. Defendant’s prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted prerecorded calls including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was. 34. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 35. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a prerecorded message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. 36. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, its officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries and assigns, as well as the judge and court staff to whom this case is assigned. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the right to amend the Class definition if discovery of further investigation reveals that the Class should be modified. 39. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 40. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded telemarketing calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 47. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 48. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. 49. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 50. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 51. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 52. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-45 as if fully set forth herein. 54. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Class Action) VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT WAGE STATUTE 1. Awarding pre- and post-judgment interest to Plaintiffs on these damages; and m. Such further relief as this court deems appropriate. 1. Granting judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants and awarding the amount of unpaid overtime wages calculated at the rate of one and one-half (1.5) times Plaintiffs' regular rate multiplied by all hours that Plaintiffs worked in excess of the prescribed number of hours per week for the past three (3) years for the FLSA Class and two (2) years for the State Class; J. Awarding liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime wages found owing to Plaintiffs and awarding Plaintiffs and the class members all other available compensatory damages, including, inter alia, all unpaid wages, lost interest owed, and liquidated damages by Defendants under the FLSA and the Connecticut Wage Statute; k. Awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs in filing this action; 23. Plaintiff Canedy worked as an APRN for Defendants in the APRN/P A neonatal 7 and/or pediatric group from 2003 until on or around, September 30, 2016. Plaintiff Canedy was an hourly employee. Her hourly rate of pay varied depending on what shift she was working because Defendants utilized shift differentials for their hourly employees. See, e.g., Plaintiff Canedy paystubs for the pay period 04/27/2014 through 05/10/2014, 10/11/2015 through 10/24/2015, and 05/08/2016 through 05/21/2016, attached hereto as Exhibit D. 24. Plaintiff Walker worked as a PA for Defendants in the APRN/P A neonatal and/or pediatric group from 2004 until on or around, October 1, 2016. Plaintiff Walker was an hourly employee. Her hourly rate of pay varied depending on what shift she was working because Defendants utilized shift differentials for their hourly employees. See, e.g., Plaintiff Walker paystubs for the pay period 07/06/2014 through 07/19/2014, 02/15/2015 through 02/28/2015, and 08/14/2016 through 08/27/2016, attached hereto as Exhibit E. 25. Plaintiffs and the other similarly situated individuals were, or are, employed by Defendants as hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties of Defendants. 26. Defendant Medical Center is a "not-for-profit children's hospital" offering a "comprehensive array of pediatric services" at multiple hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Units ("NICUs"), and specialty care centers.6 6 http://www.connecticutchildrens.org/resources/about-us/ (last visited May 11, 2017). 8 27. Regardless of formal job title, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs' primary function was to provide skilled care in the various neonatal and pediatric units located within Waterbury Hospital, and on occasion, within Saint Mary's Hospital as assigned and directed to by Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiffs' duties included, but were not limited to, attending high risk deliveries in the Family Birthing Unit; admitting, perf01ming physical exams, developing plans of care, and providing care for infants in the Special Care Nursery and the inpatient level 2 NICU; discussing plans and procedure with patients' families; and providing pediatric consults in the emergency room. 28. Despite Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs regularly working in excess of 40 hours per workweek, Defendants paid their hourly neonatal or pediatric APRNs and PAs their straight hourly rate (plus applicable shift differentials) for their work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek. See, e.g., Exhibit D (noting Plaintiff Canedy worked 104 hours in two-week pay period ending 05/10/2014, 104.50 hours in two-week pay period ending 10/24/2015, and 100.50 hours in two- week pay period ending 05/21/2016 and was paid her straight time hourly rate of pay, plus applicable shift differentials, for all hours); Exhibit E (noting Plaintiff Walker worked 104 hours in two-week pay period ending 11/09/2013, 124.50 hours in two-week pay period ending 02/28/2015, and 112.50 hours in two-week pay period ending 08/27/2016 and was paid her straight 9 time hourly rate of pay, plus applicable shift differentials, for all hours). 29. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs do not satisfy both the duties test and the salary-basis test to be classified under a bona fide exemption for learned professionals, and thus, they are non-exempt workers under the FLSA. 30. Defendants knew or should have known that, under the FLSA, Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs should have been paid overtime "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate" at which they were employed for all compensable time for workweeks in excess of 40 hours. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(l). 31. Defendants knew or should have known that under the Connecticut Wage Statute Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and P As should have been paid ove1iime "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate" at which they were employed for all compensable time for workweeks in excess of 40 hours. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 31-76c. 32. Despite this, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs overtime at one and one- 10 half times their regular rates of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 3 3. In reckless disregard of the FLSA and the Connecticut Wage Statute, Defendants adopted and then adhered to their policy and plan of employing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs to perform work in excess of 40 hours per workweek without premium overtime compensation for those hours. This policy resulted in Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and P As not being paid overtime premiums in violation of the FLSA and the Connecticut Wage Statute. 34. Plaintiff Canedy brings this collective action pursuant to 29 U .S.C. § 2 l 6(b) of the FLSA individually and on behalf of: All cmTent and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties employed by CCMC, Corp., Connecticut Children's Medical Center, and/or Connecticut Children's Specialty Group, Inc., at any time during the last three years, who performed work in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek and were not compensated at the overtime premmm. Plaintiff Canedy reserve the right to amend the putative class definition as necessary. 35. Plaintiff Canedy does not bring this collective action on behalf of any employees 11 correctly classified as exempt from coverage under the FLSA pursuant to the executive, administrative, or professional exemptions, or for those who were paid the legal rate for each hour worked. 36. 29 US.C. § 216(b) Conditional Certification "Similarly Situated" Standard: With respect to the claims set forth in the FLSA action, conditional certification under the FLSA is appropriate because the employees described above are "similarly situated" to Plaintiff Canedy under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The class of employees on behalf of whom Plaintiff Canedy brings this collective action are similarly situated because: (a) they have been or are employed in the same or similar positions; (b) they were or are subject to the same or similar unlawful practices, policy, or plan (namely, Defendants' policy of not paying their hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties for worked performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek at the overtime at a rate of one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay); (c) their claims are based upon the same factual and legal theories; and (d) the employment relationship between Defendants and every putative Class member is exactly the same and differs only by name, location, and rate of pay. 37. Plaintiff Canedy shares the same interests as the putative conditional class and will be entitled to unpaid compensation at a rate of at least minimum wage, overtime compensation, interest, attorneys' fees, and costs owed under the FLSA. 12 38. Plaintiff Canedy's entitlement to premium overtime pay for workweeks in excess of 40 hours would be similar, except for amount, of individuals similarly situated to her and depends on an identical factual question: whether Plaintiff Canedy and the putative conditional class were required by Defendants to perform work in excess of 40 hours per workweek and whether Defendants denied them premium overtime compensation for their work performed in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 39. Defendants' conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 40. Defendants willfully engaged in a pattern of violating the FLSA, as described in this Complaint in ways including, but not limited to, by routinely suffering or permitting Plaintiff Canedy, FLSA Collective action member, Plaintiff Walker, and the putative conditional class to work in excess of 40 hours per week without receiving premium overtime compensation at one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked and instead only paying Plaintiff Canedy, FLSA Collective action member, Plaintiff Walker, and the putative conditional class their straight time hourly rate of pay (plus applicable shift differentials) for hours worked in excess of 40. 13 41. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff Canedy, FLSA Collective action member, Plaintiff Walker, and the putative conditional class, and as such, notice should be sent. 42. Upon information and belief, there are numerous and other similarly situated current and f01mer hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles perfom1ing similar job duties, who performed work in excess of 40 hours per workweek and were not compensated overtime premiums in violation of FLSA and would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this action and the opportunity to join it. The precise number of collective Class members should be readily available from a review of Defendants' personnel, scheduling, time and payroll records, and from input received from the collective class members as part of the notice and "opt-in" process provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 43. Plaintiff Walker brings this class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b )(3) and ( c )( 4) on behalf of a putative Class defined to include: All current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and P As or other job titles performing similar job duties employed by CCMC, Corp., Connecticut Children's Medical Center, and/or Connecticut Children's Specialty Group, Inc., at any time during the last two years, who performed work in excess of 40 hours in any given workweek and were not compensated at the overtime premmm. 14 Plaintiff Walker reserve the right to amend the putative class definition as necessary. 44. Numerosity: The members of the Connecticut Class are so numerous that joinder of all members in the case would be impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. The precise number of Class members should be readily available from a review of Defendants' personnel and payroll records. 45. Commonality/Predominance: There is a well-defined community of interest among Connecticut Class members and common questions of both law and fact predominate in the action over any questions affecting individual members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: a. whether Defendants maintained common policies or practices that required its employees to perform work beyond 40 hours in a workweek; b. whether the Connecticut Wage Statute requires Defendants to pay overtime wages to Plaintiffs and the putative class members for requiring them to perfonn work; c. whether Defendants violated the Connecticut Wage Statute through its pay practices; d. whether Defendants should be required to pay compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and interest for violating the Connecticut Wage Statute; and e. whether Defendants' violations were willful. 15 46. Typicality: Plaintiff Walker's claims are typical of those of Connecticut Class member, Plaintiff Canedy, and the Connecticut Class in that Plaintiff Walker and all other members suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendants' common and systemic payroll policies and practices. Plaintiff Walker's claims arise from Defendants' policies, practices, and course of conduct as all other Connecticut Class members' claims, including, Connecticut Class member, Plaintiff Canedy, and Plaintiff Walker's legal theories are based on the same legal theories as all other Connecticut Class members: whether all Class members were employed by Defendants on an hourly basis without receiving overtime wages owed for that work. 47. Adequacy: Plaintiff Walker will fully and adequately protect the interests of the Connecticut Class and Plaintiff Walker and Connecticut Class member, Plaintiff Canedy, retained national counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of nationwide wage-and-hour class actions. Neither Plaintiff Walker, Connecticut Class member, Plaintiff Canedy, nor their counsel has interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the Connecticut Class. 48. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, because, inter alia, it is economically infeasible for Connecticut Class members to prosecute individual actions of their own given the relatively 16 small amount of damages at stake for each individual along with the fear of reprisal by their employer. 49. The case will be manageable as a class action. Plaintiff Walker, Connecticut Class member, Plaintiff Canedy, and their counsel know of no unusual difficulties in the case and Defendants have payroll systems that will allow the class, wage, and damages issues in the case to be resolved with relative ease. Because the elements of Rule 23(b)(3), or in the alternative ( c )( 4 ), are satisfied in the case, class certification is appropriate. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) ("[b]y its terms [Rule 23] creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue her claim as a class action"). 50. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all previous paragraphs herein. 51. At all relevant times, Defendants were separately and jointly "employers" of Plaintiffs within the meanings of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and were members of, and engaged in, a joint venture, partnership, and common enterprise, and were acting within the course and scope of, and in pursuance of said joint venture, partnership or common enterprise in employing Plaintiffs and other similarly situated 17 current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties. 52. Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(l)(A)-(C). 53. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were each an "employee" of Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(l). 54. Plaintiffs either (1) engaged in commerce; or (2) engaged in the production of goods for commerce; or (3) employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 55. The position of hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs is not exempt from the FLSA. 56. Defendants' other hourly job titles performing similar job duties as hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs are not exempt from the FLSA. 57. At all relevant times, Defendants "suffered or permitted" Plaintiffs to work and thus "employed" her within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 58. The FLSA requires an employer to pay employees the federally mandated overtime premium rate of one and a half times their regular rate of pay for every hour worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 18 59. Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs the federally mandated overtime premium for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek. 60. Upon information and belief, Defendants have corporate policies and practices of evading premium overtime pay for its current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs and Defendants' violations of the FLSA were knowing and willful. 61. By failing to compensate their current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a workweek, Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(l) and 215(a). All similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs or other job titles performing similar job duties are victims of a uniform and company-wide policy which operates to compensate employees at a rate less than the federally mandated overtime wage rate. This uniform policy, in violation of the FLSA, has been, and continues to be, applied to all employees who have worked or are working for Defendants in the same or similar position as Plaintiffs. 62. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), provides that as a remedy for a violation of the Act, an employee is entitled to his or her unpaid overtime wages plus an additional equal amount in liquidated damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 19 63. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate all previous paragraphs herein and further alleges as follows. 64. At all relevant times, Defendants were separately and jointly "employers" of Plaintiffs, covered by the overtime mandates of the Connecticut Wage Statute. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ 3 l-7la(l). 65. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were each an "employee" of Defendants within the meaning ofthe Connecticut Wage Statute. See id. at§ 31-71a(2). 66. The Connecticut Wage Statute requires employees be paid overtime "at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate" at which they were employed for all compensable time for workweeks in excess of 40 hours. Id. § 31-76c. 67. The Connecticut Wage Statute requires each employer to "pay weekly, or once every two weeks, all wages, salary or other compensation due each employee on a regular pay day." Id. at§ 31-7lb(a)(l). 68. When an employer fails to pay an employee in accordance to the Connecticut Wage Statute, employees are entitled to bring a civil action to recover "twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court." Id. 20 § 31-72. 69. Defendants violated the Connecticut Wage Statute by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former hourly neonatal and/or pediatric APRNs and PAs for hours worked in excess of 40 at the premium overtime rate, as described in this Complaint. 70. As a result, Plaintiffs and the Connecticut Class have and will continue to suffer loss of income and other damages. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the Connecticut Class are entitled to recover unpaid wages owed, plus costs, attorneys' fees, and other appropriate relief under the Connecticut Wage Statute at an amount to be proven at trial WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs requests the following relief: a. Certifying this case as a collective action in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) with respect to the FLSA claims set forth above; b. Certifying the Connecticut class in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) or ( c )( 4) with respect to the claims set forth above; c. Designating Named Plaintiff, Plaintiff Canedy, as the Class Representative of the FLSA Collective Class; d. Designating Named Plaintiff, Plaintiff Walker, as the Class Representative of the Rule 23 Connecticut Class; e. Appointing Johnson Becker, PLLC as Interim Lead Class Counsel with respect to Plaintiffs Rule 23 claims and FLSA claims; f. Declaring that Defendants willfully violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and its 21 attendant regulations as set forth above; g. Declaring that Defendants violated its obligations under the FLSA; h. Declaring that Defendants willfully violated the Connecticut Wage Statute; VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

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27. Gen 1 provides an array of security and protection services to its clients in the Denver, Colorado area.2 28. Rader and Gen 1’s other Security Guards are the employees who perform the services Gen 1’s provides to its clientele. 30. Gen 1 pays all its Security Guards at straight-time-for-overtime regardless of the number of hours worked that workweek. 31. Many of Gen 1’s Security Guards also regularly work in excess of 12 hours in a day and/or in excess of 12 consecutive hours. 32. Gen 1 pays all its Security Guards at their straight-time rates for hours worked in excess of 12 hours in a day and/or in excess of 12 consecutively. 33. In January of 2019 Rader began working for Gen 1 in the Denver, Colorado area. 34. As a Security Guard Rader spends his time patrolling the perimeter of Gen 1’s clients’ facilities and checking the identification of those who enter. 35. Gen 1’s records reflect the hours Rader works each workweek and pay period. 36. Gen 1 pays Rader $15.00 per hour. 37. Although he often works more 50 or more hours per workweek, Gen 1 never pays Rader any overtime but, rather, pays him for all hours at his regular hourly rate. 38. Additionally, although he regularly works in excess of 12 hours in a day and/or 12 hours consecutively, Gen 1 never pays Rader more than his straight-time rate for these hours. 39. For example, for the pay period from July 1 through July 15, 2019, Rader worked 119.90 hours and Gen 1 paid him at the same hourly rate for all these hours: 41. Further, on July 3, 2019 Rader worked in excess of 14 hours total: 42. All Gen 1’s Security Guards perform duties like those Rader performs including patrolling the perimeter of client facilities and checking the identification of those who enter. 43. The Security Guards work similar hours and are denied overtime as a result of the same illegal straight-time-for-overtime pay practice. 44. All Gen 1’s Security Guards work in excess of 40 hours each workweek. 45. Many of the Security Guards also regularly work in excess of 12 hours in a day or in excess of 12 hours consecutively. 46. Instead of paying Security Guards overtime, Gen 1 pays them straight-time-for- overtime for all these hours. 63. Numerous employees have been denied overtime by Gen 1’s straight-time-for- overtime plan. 64. From his observations and experience at Gen 1, Rader is aware that the illegal practices or policies of Gen 1 have been imposed on the Security Guards. 66. These employees are similarly situated to Rader in terms of relevant job duties, pay provisions, and employment practices. 67. Gen 1’s failure to pay overtime as required by the FLSA results from a generally applicable, systematic pay plan that is not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Security Guards. 68. Thus, Rader’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the Security Guards. 69. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various Security Guards do not prevent collective treatment. 70. All Security Guards, regardless of their precise job requirements or rates of pay, are entitled to overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 71. Gen 1 employs 12 Hour Guards in Colorado. 72. Gen 1 maintains a physical location in Colorado. 73. Gen 1 is a commercial support service company within the meaning of the CWA and the applicable Colorado Minimum Wage Orders because it is a business or enterprise that is directly or indirectly engaged in providing security and protection services, to other commercial firms through the use of service employees such as Plaintiffs and the other Security Guards. 75. Although Rader does not know the precise number of 12 Hour Guards, Rader believes there are more than 40 individuals that fit into the class. 76. The 12 Hour Guards are so numerous that their individual joinder is impractical. 77. The identities of the members of the 12 Hour Guards are readily discernible from Gen 1’s records. 78. Rader and the 12 Hour Guards have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedy sought, namely back wages plus penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees and the cost of this lawsuit. 79. Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the 12 Hour Guards. 80. These questions predominate over the questions affecting individual class members. 81. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited, to the following: a) Whether Rader and the 12 Hour Guards worked hours in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek; b) Whether Rader and the 12 Hour Guards worked in excess of twelve (12) hours per day or for twelve (12) consecutive hours; c) Whether Rader and the 12 Hour Guards were denied overtime pay at a rate not less than one-and-one-half times their regular rates as prescribed by Colorado Law; 82. These and other common questions of law and fact, which are common to the 12 Hour Guards, predominate over any individual questions affecting only individual members. 84. Rader is an adequate representative of the 12 Hour Guards because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the 12 Hour Guards. 85. Rader has retained competent counsel, highly experienced in complex class action litigation, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. 86. The 12 Hour Guards’ interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Rader and his counsel. 87. A Rule class action for the Colorado state law claims is superior to other available means of fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims of Rader and the 12 Hour Guards. 88. The injuries suffered by each individual class member are relatively small in comparison to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of a complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Gen 1’s conduct. 89. It would be virtually impossible for the 12 Hour Guards to individually redress effectively the wrongs done to them; even if the 12 Hour Guards could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. 90. Individualized litigation presents the possibility for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. 91. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex, legal and factual issues of the case. 92. By contrast, the class action presents far fewer logistical issues and provides the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 94. The operative questions in this case are whether Rader and the 12 Hour Guards were compensated at one-and-one-half times their regular rates for all overtime hours under Colorado law. 95. Therefore, common evidence common will be determinative of the operative questions presented.

win

13. Defendant Pipeline Safety, L.L.C. is a pipeline services company that inspection, safety, and document management services to pipeline companies. 14. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as an NDE (Non-Destructive Examination) Auditor from 2012 until 2016. 15. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in multiple states for multiple clients, including in Louisiana, Ohio, and New York. 16. Plaintiff was responsible for performing visual inspections, non-destructive testing, and X-ray verification of the welds on pipelines owned and operated by Defendant’s customers. 17. Defendant classified Plaintiff as an employee. 18. For his labor, Defendant paid Plaintiff a day rate but did not pay him overtime for his hours in excess of forty per week. In other words, Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as exempt. 19. Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee. 20. Defendant paid dozens of other auditors or inspectors classified as employees throughout the United States on the same day rate compensation system as Plaintiff. 21. Plaintiff and other auditors or inspectors commonly work in excess of 12 hours each day. 23. However, despite working overtime hours, Defendant does not pay its auditors or inspectors overtime because it pays the same flat day rate regardless on the number of hours worked. 24. No exemption in the FLSA shelters Defendant from paying overtime to its auditors or inspectors. 25. Auditors or inspectors like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set number of days to work per week. 26. Auditors or inspectors like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set weekly payment. 27. Auditors or inspectors are paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 28. Plaintiff was paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 29. Plaintiff was not paid time-and-a-half for all hours worked over forty in a given workweek. 30. Plaintiff worked overtime as defined in the FLSA. 31. Other auditors or inspectors employed by Defendant worked overtime as defined in the FLSA. 32. Because auditors or inspectors are paid on a day rate, the executive, administrative, or professional exemptions cannot apply. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.100, 541.200, 541.300. 33. Auditors or inspectors do not supervise other employees or manage a customarily recognized department of Defendant’s company. 34. Auditors or inspectors have no authority to hire or fire other employees. 36. Auditors or inspectors also perform extensive physical labor to perform their inspection work. 37. The primary duty of an auditors or inspectors does not require independent judgment or discretion. Instead, auditors or inspectors are required to carry out their inspections according to detailed step-by-step procedures promulgated by Defendant or Defendant’s customers. 38. The FLSA’s regulations even provide that inspection work is non-exempt work: Ordinary inspection work generally does not meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption. Inspectors normally perform specialized work along standardized lines involving well- established techniques and procedures which may have been catalogued and described in manuals and other sources. Such inspectors rely on techniques and skills acquired by special training or experience. They have some leeway in the performance of their work but only within closely prescribed limits. 29 C.F.R. 541.203(g). 39. Auditors or inspectors are not computer-systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, or other similar employees. 40. Despite these facts, Defendant misclassified its auditors or inspectors as exempt from overtime pay. 41. As a result of Defendant’s pay policies, Plaintiff and other auditors or inspectors were denied overtime pay. 42. Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether Plaintiff and the other auditors or inspectors were entitled to overtime pay under the law. 44. Defendant’s practice of failing to pay Plaintiff time-and-a-half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek violates the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 45. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are paid are applicable to Defendant, Plaintiff, or the FLSA Class Members. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 47. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of Defendant’s misclassification of its employees. 48. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on his personal work experience and through communications with other workers of Defendant. Plaintiff personally worked with other auditors or inspectors under the same compensation structure at multiple job sites for Defendant. 49. Other workers similarly situated to the Plaintiff worked for Defendant throughout the United States, but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rates of pay when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours in a workweek. 50. Although Defendant permitted and/or required FLSA Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendant denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 51. Defendant misclassified and continues to misclassify FLSA Class Members as exempt employees. 53. Plaintiff had the same job duties as other employees of Defendant who had the same job title as Plaintiff and worked for Defendant at any time during the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 54. FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the FLSA. 55. As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of relevant job duties, pay structure, misclassification as exempt employees and/or the denial of overtime pay. 56. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of any FLSA Class Member. 57. Defendant employed at least 20 other auditors or inspectors within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 58. Defendant employed at least 100 other auditors or inspectors within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 59. Defendant employed at least 40 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff who were not paid overtime. 60. Defendant employed at least 50 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff who worked overtime for at least one week during their employment with Defendant and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked. 61. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to his pay, hours, and duties are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Class Members. 63. All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 64. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the FLSA Class Members, the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all FLSA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused harm to all FLSA Class Members. 65. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs for the FLSA Class is properly defined as follows: All current and former auditors or inspectors, and all employees with substantially similar duties, who worked for Defendant at any time during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint to present that were paid a day rate.

win

10. During much of Plaintiff’s employment, he was required to travel out of state to perform his work. 11. As part of Plaintiff’s work assignments, Defendants required he and a work crew consisting of approximately six to eight individuals to report to their shop between 5:00 a.m. – 7:00 a.m. each Monday morning to acquire the necessary tools and equipment, and load the work truck(s), to perform that particular week’s assignments. 12. After the Plaintiff and the work crew finished loading the tools and equipment, they would depart from Defendants’ shop in Anderson, South Carolina, i.e., (“The Shop”) and travel to that week’s work destination in the work truck(s) and begin performing their work. 13. Typically on Fridays, after they completed that week’s assignments, Plaintiff and the work crew would load the tools and equipment back on the work truck(s) and depart back to The Shop. Upon arriving at The Shop, Plaintiff and the work crew were required to unload the tools and equipment from the work truck(s). 14. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the work crew any monies for the travel time going back to The Shop, and the time it took to unload the work truck(s). 15. Plaintiff and the work crew were always required to report back to The Shop after working at the job site in order to return Defendants’ truck(s) and equipment before retrieving their own personal vehicles to drive home. 17. Nor could Plaintiff be classified as an independent contractor; and therefore, is subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) minimum wage and overtime requirements. 18. Plaintiff worked for Defendants on a full time and continuing basis; Plaintiff did not sell or advertise his services to the general public or work as a contractor for anyone other than the above named Defendants. 19. Plaintiff had no control over the manner and method by which they were paid. 20. Defendants retained the right to discharge Plaintiff without cause. 21. Plaintiff had no opportunity for profit and no risk of loss. 22. Plaintiff is clearly not exempt from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime requirements. 40. At all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 41. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 42. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and/or continue to employ each of the Collective Class members within the meaning of FLSA. 43. At all relevant times in the period encompassed by this Complaint, Defendants had and maintained a willful policy and practice of refusing to pay minimum wage for all hours worked. By failing to pay for every hour worked, it is inevitable that during certain weeks of employment Plaintiff would have been denied overtime payments or shorted such payments when he worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 44. Defendants have violated, and continues to violate, the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 45. Due to Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the Collective Class, is entitled to recover from the Defendants compensation for unpaid wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the members of the SC Class, re-alleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs above as if they were set forth again herein. 48. Plaintiff and the SC Class worked for Defendants with the clear understanding and agreement by Defendants that their compensation would be consistent with all applicable laws, including federal and state wage and hour laws. 49. Pursuant to the PWA, “[a]n employer shall not withhold or divert any portion of the employee’s wages unless the employer is required or permitted to do so by state or federal law. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-40(C). 50. Further, “any changes [to] the terms [of wages] must be made in writing at least seven calendar days before they become effective.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-30(A). 51. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the SC Class are entitled to receive all compensation of “wages” due and owing to them. 52. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as set forth above Plaintiff and the members of the SC Class have been deprived of “wage” compensation due and owing which Defendants promised to pay in their commitment to abide by applicable wage and hour laws and in violation of the PWA’s mandate that no wages be withheld or diverted unless required or permitted under applicable law. 53. Defendants have set and withheld wages of the Plaintiff and SC Class members without providing advance notice of such amounts and absent any lawfully sufficient reason for such conduct. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OVERTIME WAGE VIOLATIONS (Collective Class) SOUTH CAROLINA PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT (SC Class)

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15. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 16. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 17. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 18. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 19. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 20. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 21. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 22. Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. 23. As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 24. The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. 25. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 4 26. The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 27. That letter, dated December 15, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 28. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 29. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 30. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 32. The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 33. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. 34. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 35. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 5 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. 37. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 38. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 39. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 40. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 42. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 43. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor. 44. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 45. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 46. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 6 47. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 48. A debt collector has the obligation not just to convey the required information, but also to convey such clearly. 49. Even if a debt collector conveys the required information accurately, the debt collector nonetheless violates the FDCPA if that information is overshadowed or contradicted by other language in the communication. 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) provides that collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 51. A collection activity or communication overshadows or contradicts the validation notice if it would make the “least sophisticated consumer” uncertain or confused as to her rights. 52. Demanding payment during the 30-day validation without explaining that such demand does not override the consumer's right to dispute the debt is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 53. Demanding payment during the 30-day validation without explaining that such demand does not override the consumer's right to request validation of the debt is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 54. Demanding payment during the 30-day validation without explaining that such demand does not override the consumer's right to request the name and address of the original creditor is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 7 55. The Letter, dated December 15, 2020, demands payment by January 5, 2021. 56. The Letter fails to advise that the demand for payment during the validation period does not override the Plaintiff's right to dispute the alleged Debt. 57. The Letter fails to advise that the demand for payment during the validation period does not override the Plaintiff's right to request validation of the alleged Debt. 58. The Letter fails to advise that the demand for payment during the validation period does not override the Plaintiff's right to request the name and address of the original creditor. 59. The least sophisticated consumer, upon reading demand for payment during the validation period, could reasonably interpret the Letter to mean that even if she exercises her validation rights, she must nevertheless pay by the due date. 60. The least sophisticated consumer, upon reading demand for payment during the validation period, and in the absence of any further explanation, could reasonably interpret the Letter to mean that even if she disputes the validity of the alleged Debt, she must nevertheless pay even during the verification process. 61. As a result of the foregoing, the Letter would likely discourage the least sophisticated consumer from exercising her right to dispute the alleged Debt. 62. As a result of the foregoing, the Letter would likely discourage the least sophisticated consumer from exercising her right to request validation of the alleged Debt. 63. As a result of the foregoing, the demand for payment during the validation period would likely make the least sophisticated consumer confused as to her rights. 64. As a result of the foregoing, the demand for payment during the validation period would likely make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights. 8 65. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period overshadows the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the alleged Debt. 66. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period overshadows the disclosure of the consumer's right to request validation of the alleged Debt. 67. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period overshadows the disclosure of the consumer's right to request the name and address of the original creditor. 68. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period is inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the alleged Debt. 69. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period is inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to request validation of the alleged Debt. 70. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) as the demand for payment during the validation period is inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to request the name and address of the original creditor. 71. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 9 73. A debt collection practice can be a “false, deceptive, or misleading” practice in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e even if it does not fall within any of the subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 74. A collection letter violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if, in the eyes of the least sophisticated consumer, it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. 75. A collection letter also violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e if it is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer. 76. The least sophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret the Letter to mean that even if she exercises her validation rights, she must nevertheless pay the debt during the validation period. 77. The least sophisticated consumer, upon reading demand for payment during the validation period , and in the absence of any further explanation, could reasonably interpret the Letter to mean that even if she disputes the validity of the alleged Debt, she must nevertheless pay the debt during the validation period even during the verification process. 78. Because the Letter is open to more than one reasonable interpretation it violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 79. Because the Letter is reasonably susceptible to an inaccurate reading by the least sophisticated consumer it violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 80. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(b), 1692e and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 81. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 10 82. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 83. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 84. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 85. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 86. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 87. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. 11 Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)

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16. GIS furnished consumer reports concerning Plaintiff to Genesis as part of its hiring process. During the FCRA statute-of-limitations period, GIS was a “consumer reporting agency” as defined by the FCRA. 17. During the FCRA statute-of-limitations period, GIS was regularly engaged in the business of assembling, evaluating, and disbursing public-record information concerning consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d), to third parties. 18. At all times relevant hereto, Genesis—to whom GIS sold consumer reports about class members for employment purposes—was a “user” of those consumer reports, as governed by the FCRA. A. Plaintiff’s Acceptance of Offer of Employment With Genesis 20. The July 10, 2014 job offer contained, among other things, a non-compete clause by which Plaintiff agreed not to accept another position. As such, upon accepting the position with Genesis, Plaintiff was precluded from seeking alternative employment. 21. As part of its application procedure, Genesis purchased from GIS a consumer report on Plaintiff on or about July 9, 2014. After viewing the report, Genesis communicated to Plaintiff, by phone on July 25, 2014, that her application had been “flagged” because of a felony in her criminal history. The hiring manager who called Plaintiff indicated that the felony posed a “problem” for her employment. 22. Explaining that the felony entry was incorrect, Plaintiff offered to write a letter to the hiring manager setting out her correct criminal history. 23. On July 26, 2014, Plaintiff received a letter from GIS stating that it had provided Plaintiff’s background report to “Genesis Healthcare CareerStaff Unlimited,” and included as enclosures a copy of Plaintiff’s background report and a summary of her FCRA rights. The report stated that Plaintiff’s “Hire Date” was July 8, 2014. 24. Plaintiff emailed her explanation letter to the hiring manager on July 27, 2014 which the manager confirmed receiving in a July 28, 2014 email to Plaintiff. The hiring manager stated that she would forward Plaintiff’s letter to “Corporate counsel.” 26. Alternatively, assuming that the July 26 letter from GIS was actually a pre- adverse action notice under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) sent on behalf of Genesis, Plaintiff never received the notice from GIS required under 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1) at the time a report containing adverse information is provided to the user, Genesis. 27. On August 1, 2014, three days after Genesis retracted its offer of employment, Plaintiff received a second letter from GIS stating that Genesis would not employ her. However, on information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the hire-versus-fire adverse action actually occurred almost immediately upon the completion of Plaintiff’s report by GIS, as GIS itself was tasked with the “adjudication” of whether or not to disqualify an applicant based on the content of the report using predefined hiring criteria from Genesis. Such process is automated and involves limited, if any, human discretion, and for most similarly situated consumers, no discretion by Genesis. 28. Thus, the date of the “adverse action” against Plaintiff was the date that GIS first created and instantly “adjudicated” her application. GIS stated on Plaintiff’s report that she “Does Not Meet Hiring Criteria,” a conclusion that Genesis accepts and follows without any independent investigation or exercise of discretion. B. Plaintiff’s Criminal History And GIS’s Failure To Correct It 30. In November of 1976, a grand jury in Harris County, Texas, indicted Plaintiff for the felony of intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to a child of less than 15 years of age. The child’s injury arose when Plaintiff’s former husband disciplined the couple’s son with a belt. As the child’s mother, Plaintiff was deemed equally responsible for the incident although she took no part in it. 31. After the indictment, the State moved to reduce the charge to misdemeanor assault, to which Plaintiff pleaded guilty on May 20, 1977. Plaintiff received no punishment other than a $25 fine, and the court’s judgment plainly states—twice—that Plaintiff pleaded guilty to “the offense of assault, a class A misdemeanor.” Nowhere does the judgment state that Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a felony or any crime involving injury to a child. 32. In its report furnished to Genesis, GIS reported (a) a misdemeanor conviction for assault, and (b) a felony conviction for “Assault – Injury to a Child,” both with a disposition date of May 20, 1977. This second entry is inaccurate, as Plaintiff’s sole conviction was for misdemeanor assault, which is not a felony and is not injury to a child. 34. On August 21, 2014, GIS stated in a letter to Plaintiff that its investigation of her dispute was complete, and enclosed an updated copy of her background report with that letter. GIS’s reinvestigation of Plaintiff’s dispute, however, failed to result in an accurate report. 35. Rather than doing the correct thing, removing the second entry of assault altogether, GIS removed the first—and accurate—entry of misdemeanor assault, and reduced the level of the second—and incorrect—entry of assault from a felony to a misdemeanor. GIS also, again incorrectly, categorized this misdemeanor as “Assault – Injury to a Child.” This categorization is simply inaccurate, as Plaintiff plainly explained on her dispute form and can be readily ascertained from the judgment document itself. 36. An online search of Harris County Criminal Records indicates that the charge on which Plaintiff was originally indicted was dismissed, while the misdemeanor assault charge is “completed.” C. Genesis’ Practices and Policies 37. Genesis has created and implemented national, uniform hiring and staffing policies, procedures, and practices under which it operates. Those policies, procedures, and practices cover the use of “background checks” or “consumer reports” to screen potential employees. 39. As a matter of practice, Genesis regularly fails to provide copies of the FTC or CFPB notice of rights to job applicants against whom it takes an adverse action based in whole or part on consumer reports, before taking that adverse action. 40. As a matter of course, Genesis uses the same business process for obtaining and using consumer reports, and for the “adjudication” of employment applications as it did with Plaintiff and members of the Class. 41. As a result of these FCRA violations, Genesis is liable to Plaintiff, and to each Class member, for statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), plus punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2), and attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o. 42. As a result of its own, independent FCRA violations, GIS is liable to Plaintiff for her actual damages resulting from the inaccuracies contained in her GIS report, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. 43. Defendants’ conduct and omissions were willful. Because the FCRA was enacted in 1970, Defendants have had years to become compliant but have failed to do so. 44. Genesis, a nationwide employer, was aware of obligations under the FCRA as they relate to employment because it hired GIS not only to perform its background checks but also to (attempt to) provide Genesis’ adverse-action notices to job applicants. Genesis therefore knew of the requirements imposed upon it by the FCRA, and failed to craft a system that would ensure compliance with those requirements. V. 46. Specifically excluded from this Class are: (a) all federal court judges who preside over this case and their spouses; (b) all persons who elect to exclude themselves from the Class; (c) all persons who have previously executed and delivered to Genesis releases of all their claims for all of their Class claims; and (d) Defendant’s employees, officers, directors, agents, and representatives and their family members. 47. Numerosity. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact size of the Class. Based on information and belief, the Class is comprised of at least thousands of members who are geographically dispersed throughout the country so as to render joinder of all Class members impracticable. The names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through documents maintained by the Defendants, and the Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 49. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class members’ claims. As described above, Defendant Genesis uses common practices and automated systems in committing the conduct that Plaintiff alleges damaged her and the Class. Plaintiff seeks only statutory and punitive damages for her classwide claims and, in addition, Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other members of the Class. Genesis uniformly breached the FCRA by engaging in the conduct described above, and these violations had the same effect on each member of the Class. 50. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, other Class members’ interests. Additionally, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced and competent in complex, commercial, multi-party, consumer, and class-action litigation. Plaintiff’s Counsel have prosecuted complex FCRA class actions across the country. 52. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues raised by Genesis’ conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based upon a single set of proof in just one case. VI.

win

18. On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) announced an outbreak of Ebola in West Africa. After the first confirmed case in March 2014, Ebola spread rapidly throughout Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 20. By fall 2014, doctors were diagnosing hundreds of new cases each week in West Africa. Over the twenty-two months of the epidemic, there were more than 28,000 cases of Ebola in these three countries and more than 11,000 deaths. 2014 Ebola Crisis and Connecticut Response 21. In response to the epidemic, thousands of volunteers from around the world traveled to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to provide critical medical assistance and share other forms of technical expertise. Community organizations, including Plaintiff LCAC, and churches run by Liberian immigrants in the United States, like Plaintiff Bishop Yalaratai’s, raised funds to support humanitarian aid for Liberians confronting the crisis. 22. Despite the considerable number of volunteers and staff traveling to and from these countries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) noted that there were fewer than forty cases outside of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during the crisis. 23. On August 22, 2014, the CDC publicly released guidance for monitoring people potentially exposed to Ebola. For asymptomatic individuals returning from West Africa with “no risk” or “low risk” of exposure, the CDC recommended only self-monitoring or active monitoring for twenty-one days and recommended no movement restrictions or quarantine. 24. Even for individuals in the “high risk” exposure level category—such as those who had had direct, unprotected contact with the bodily fluids of an Ebola patient or a dead body— the CDC only recommended “controlled movement” for twenty-one days so long as such individuals were asymptomatic. Under controlled movement, individuals had to inform public health officials of their intended travel and avoid long-distance public transportation. 26. On October 7, 2014, Defendant Malloy issued an order declaring a public health emergency for the State of Connecticut (hereinafter “Emergency Declaration”). The legal effect of this declaration under state law, as stated in quarantine orders later issued, was to authorize Defendant Mullen, the Connecticut Commissioner of Public Health, to direct the isolation or quarantine of individuals whom she “reasonably believe[d] to have been exposed to, infected with, or otherwise at risk of passing the Ebola virus.” 27. According to the CDC, “isolation” is the separation of individuals who are sick with a contagious disease from those who are not sick. “Quarantine” is the separation of asymptomatic individuals exposed to a contagious disease to see if they become sick. 28. On October 8, 2014, the CDC announced a safety plan, in collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), to protect the United States from an Ebola outbreak. 29. Under the plan, DHS directed persons entering the United States from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to one of five ports of entry where it undertook specialized screenings. Trained staff observed travelers for signs of illness, asked them a series of health and exposure questions, and took their temperatures. CDC quarantine station public health officers evaluated travelers with fever or other symptoms, as well as any travelers whose health questionnaires revealed possible Ebola exposure. 30. When officers determined that passengers required further evaluation or monitoring, federal officers referred those travelers to the appropriate state or local public health authority. Travelers with no symptoms, fever, or a known history of exposure received health information for self-monitoring and were approved to exit the airport. 32. By contrast, the August 22, 2014 CDC guidance, the federal public health recommendations for best practices at the time, stated that states should impose “no movement restrictions” for asymptomatic individuals who had been “in a country in which an EVD [(“Ebola Virus Disease”)] outbreak occurred within the past twenty-one days and ha[d] no exposure.” The overwhelming consensus in the scientific community at the time was, and remains, that asymptomatic individuals cannot transmit Ebola and do not require quarantine. 33. Defendants Mullen and Malloy knew that the “[p]eople under quarantine [we]re not sick and not a risk to public health,” as a DPH spokesman repeatedly stated in October 2014, but nevertheless imposed and maintained their quarantine under the DPH Plan. (Exhibit A). Defendant Mullen approved this statement. 34. Defendants Mullen and Malloy knew that their policy and practice of quarantine was retrograde and ill-suited to contemporary public health challenges. In an email message, DPH epidemiologist Matt Cartter described Connecticut’s legal definition of quarantine as “very 19th century, making 21st century quarantine options difficult to implement.” 36. The Revised DPH Plan also required DPH to conduct an individualized risk assessment for such travelers before deciding whether to take steps beyond active mandatory monitoring. Local health department staff or DPH epidemiologists were to interview travelers about their travel history and potential exposure to Ebola. Epidemiological experts at DPH would assess this information and its quality before making a decision. On information and belief, Defendants failed to reconsider Plaintiffs’ quarantine orders under the Revised DPH Plan, and required Plaintiffs to remain in quarantine for an additional three to twelve days. 37. On November 7, 2015, December 29, 2015, and January 14, 2016, the WHO declared Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia Ebola-free, respectively. 38. According to expert public health opinion, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea remain at high risk of future Ebola outbreaks and this area could potentially face another large outbreak. 39. According to the DPH Ebola Preparedness and Response webpage, last modified January 7, 2016, “Governor Malloy’s declaration on October 7, 2014 of a public health emergency for Connecticut for the duration of the Ebola epidemic in West Africa remains in effect.” 41. Despite the evolution from the DPH Plan to the Revised DPH Plan to current policies, Defendants have maintained a policy, practice, custom, and usage of failing to impose the least restrictive means to prevent Ebola infections; failing to base their decisions in science and evidence rather than politics and fear; failing to give quarantined people timely notice in writing, or ever; failing to affirmatively seek judicial review, where the state would bear the burden to establish the necessity of quarantine by clear and convincing evidence; and failing to provide for the welfare and safety of those subject to quarantine (hereinafter “Defendants’ quarantine policies and practice”). 42. Pursuant to Defendants’ quarantine policies and practice, and regardless of the shift from the DPH Plan to the Revised DPH Plan to current policy, Defendants have repeatedly maintained quarantines of individuals they knew “[we]re not sick and not a risk to public health,” and reserve their right to do so in the future. 43. Because the risk of a future Ebola outbreak in West Africa is high, because Defendants reserve the authority to issue scientifically unjustified and unlawful quarantine orders pursuant to Defendant Malloy’s unrescinded emergency declaration, and because it is highly likely that Defendants will again overreact to a future Ebola outbreak, Plaintiffs and other present and future travelers from Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone are at real and immediate risk of being subject to Defendants’ quarantine policies and practice. Quarantine of Public Health Students Boyko and Skrip 45. Boyko and Skrip left John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York on September 17, 2014 and arrived in Monrovia, Liberia on September 18, 2014. 46. While in Liberia, Boyko and Skrip volunteered with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to create a computerized Ebola-case tracking system. During their stay, they developed a cloud-based Android app that improved contact tracing of Ebola cases in Liberia and provided a computer interface for visualizing this data. 47. Boyko and Skrip did not volunteer in a healthcare capacity and did not treat patients. They did not have contact with any Ebola-symptomatic individuals. 48. While in Liberia, Boyko and Skrip worked in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare’s government building. They ate breakfast and dinner at their hotel and brought food from the hotel to work with them for lunch. They were transported in a private car between the hotel and the government building in order to avoid contact with people with Ebola symptoms. 49. Boyko and Skrip took numerous additional precautions while in Liberia, including observing a “no touching” policy, not using public transportation, frequently cleaning their shoes by stepping on foam blocks soaked in chlorine solution, and frequently washing their hands with sanitizer or chlorine solution. 51. Boyko felt better after approximately two days, at which point Boyko and Skrip began planning their return to Connecticut. As a condition of compensating Boyko and Skrip for a replacement flight, Yale’s travel medical insurance company required Boyko to be tested for Ebola by a medical professional. 52. In the course of revising their travel plans, Boyko and Skrip had numerous communications with Yale faculty and staff. 53. On October 6, 2014, Boyko tested negative for Ebola. He received a handwritten letter confirming the negative test from a United States Army colonel supervising the testing lab. Shortly thereafter, Boyko and Skrip scheduled a return flight to the United States. 54. Before leaving, Boyko and Skrip learned that one person who sometimes spent time at their hotel, a freelance cameraman, later developed symptoms of Ebola. Out of an abundance of caution, Boyko and Skrip spoke with local CDC agents to be sure that they were not at risk as a result. The CDC representatives assured Boyko and Skrip that this was a “no risk” interaction as the cameraman had not become contagious until after the last time they saw him. 55. Early in the morning of October 11, 2014, Boyko and Skrip departed Monrovia, Liberia by plane. Upon arrival at John F. Kennedy International Airport on October 11, 2014, they underwent the CDC entry screening procedures for Ebola. Both Boyko and Skrip were ruled medically fit under those procedures. Officials of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security allowed them both to enter the United States. 57. After returning to New Haven that day, Boyko and Skrip monitored themselves for symptoms of Ebola. As part of their monitoring efforts, Boyko and Skrip took their temperatures twice a day and emailed results to staff at the Yale Health Center. 58. On the morning of October 15, Boyko’s temperature rose to 100.1 degrees Fahrenheit. Boyko informed a member of Yale Health. Although he felt fine, the Yale Health Center and Yale-New Haven Hospital jointly decided to transport him from his home to the hospital. 59. At approximately 11 p.m. on October 15, an ambulance arrived to take Boyko to Yale-New Haven Hospital. 60. On information and belief, Yale Health, Yale-New Haven Hospital, or other Yale officials informed state and city public health officials of Boyko’s hospital admission. 61. After Boyko was admitted to the hospital, doctors took samples of his blood and sent them to the CDC and the Massachusetts State Public Health laboratory for Ebola testing. 62. While in the Medical Intensive Care Unit, Boyko’s fever subsided. 63. On October 16, 2014, the day after Boyko arrived at the hospital, Plaintiff Skrip received a call from the City of New Haven Health Department’s epidemiologist, Amanda Durante. Durante informed Skrip that the City of New Haven would begin “mandatory active monitoring” of Skrip. This meant the City would call twice a day at which time Skrip was required to take and report her temperature. 64. Later that day, October 16, 2014, Boyko’s first U.S. test results returned negative for Ebola. 66. On October 17, the CDC confirmed that Boyko’s blood tested negative for Ebola. 67. Upon receiving the blood test result, doctors at Yale-New Haven Hospital told Boyko that he was healthy, without symptoms, and had no reason to take any kind of further precautions. His doctors removed their protective gear and shook his hand. They joked that Boyko was the only person in New Haven they could definitively say did not have Ebola. 68. Shortly thereafter, on October 17, Defendant Mullen issued a quarantine order, requiring that Boyko be confined in his home for twenty-one days, or up to and including October 30. The order was backdated to October 10 and signed by Defendant Mullen. Defendant Mullen, as authorized by Defendant Malloy, caused the order to be delivered to Yale-New Haven hospital, and upon information and belief, directed medical staff there to serve the order on Boyko. A copy of the order is attached as Exhibit B. 69. The quarantine order did not mention that Boyko had tested negative for Ebola three times. 70. The order stated that an individual who violates his or her quarantine may be subject to sanctions, including imprisonment and fines. 71. Late in the afternoon of October 18, a plainclothes hospital security officer drove Boyko to his apartment in New Haven in an unmarked car. 73. On that joint call, Defendants Malloy and Mullen caused Durante and Defendant Malloy’s staff to state that Skrip was forbidden from leaving her apartment. At the time of her quarantine, Defendants failed to provide or cause others to provide Skrip notice of her rights, information about how to challenge the quarantine, or a written notice of quarantine. 74. Skrip informed Maria Bouffard, the Director of Emergency Management at Yale University, that she had never received a quarantine order. On or around October 22, 2014, five days after Defendant Mullen caused Skrip to be informed orally that she was subject to quarantine, and twelve days after the effective date of the order, someone from the City of New Haven provided a copy of the order to Skrip. A copy of the order is attached as Exhibit C. 75. The order stated that an individual who violates his or her quarantine may be subject to sanctions, including imprisonment and fines. 76. On information and belief, Defendant Mullen, as authorized by Defendant Malloy, through the State’s quarantine order, required the New Haven Police Department (“NHPD”) to enforce the quarantines against Boyko and Skrip. NHPD stationed a police officer outside the apartments of both Boyko and Skrip twenty-four hours per day, during Defendants’ quarantine of them. On information and belief, at least one NHPD officer told Skrip’s neighbors that an individual with Ebola was living in her building. 78. No state or city agency provided assistance to ensure Boyko or Skrip had adequate food, toiletries, and other life necessities. Neither Skrip nor Boyko was able to shop for food or other essentials after returning from Liberia and before being placed under quarantine. 79. Ryan was able to eat only because Bouffard delivered Visa gift cards that enabled him to purchase needed supplies. Under orders from Defendants, NHPD allowed Boyko to step outside to pick up such deliveries, but only if he immediately returned to his apartment. 80. After an NHPD officer confronted a friend who dropped off food and sanitary supplies on Skrip’s fire escape, Skrip was too afraid to order additional food with the Visa gift cards provided by Yale. 81. By their actions, Defendants transformed the homes of Skrip and Boyko into their prisons. Skrip and Boyko were unable to leave and police officers constantly stood watch outside their doors. 82. While in quarantine, Boyko became depressed. He was cut off from family, friends, and colleagues. 83. During quarantine, Boyko was unable to spend time with his young son, of whom Boyko shares custody. Even following Boyko’s quarantine, his former wife had concerns about allowing him to spend time with his son, due to her perception that the State considered Boyko a danger to others. 84. Boyko was also unable to see his girlfriend, who the quarantine order prohibited from entering their shared apartment. 86. Despite implementation of the Revised DPH Plan on October 27, Defendant Mullen did not review or cause the review of the quarantine orders against Boyko or Skrip. On information and belief, Plaintiffs never benefited from any such individualized assessment by Defendant Mullen, local health department staff, or an epidemiologist from DPH. 87. Defendant Mullen, as authorized by Defendant Malloy, originally ordered Boyko quarantined through October 30, 2014. However, Boyko requested to be released a day early given that the state’s power to quarantine, absent a renewed order, is limited to 20 days. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-131b(c). 88. Shortly thereafter, Boyko received an email from state officials forwarded to Boyko by Bouffard saying the quarantine would end at 12:01 a.m. on October 30, 2014. Late in the evening of October 29, 2014, NHPD withdrew their officers stationed outside the homes of Boyko and Skrip, and at 12:01 a.m. on October 30, 2014, Defendants Mullen and Malloy released Boyko and Skrip from quarantine. 89. Even after the quarantine ended, Boyko continued to grapple with the after effects of the isolation and quarantine. 90. Shortly after the quarantine, Boyko and his girlfriend broke up, in significant part due to the stress of the quarantine. His relationship with his former wife has been strained since their custody disagreement during the quarantine. 92. Skrip also grappled with many adverse consequences during and after the quarantine. The quarantine interfered with her graduate research work and her research assistant position at Yale University. The quarantine also prevented performance of her duties as a volunteer co-director for a department of the Haven Free Clinic. The experience of the quarantine strained and continues to strain Skrip’s professional and volunteer relationships. 93. Defendants Malloy and Mullen knew or should have known that their quarantine of Boyko and Skrip was scientifically unjustified and not the least restrictive means to protect public health; that Defendants failed to provide essential supplies to Boyko and Skrip; that Defendants imposed the quarantine orders without a state-initiated judicial probable cause hearing before or immediately after Defendants seized Boyko and Skrip; and that the quarantine of Skrip was instituted without timely notice. 94. Defendants Malloy and Mullen knew or should have known that their quarantine of Boyko and Skrip discriminated against Plaintiffs due to Plaintiffs’ perceived risk of illness by severely diminishing their everyday life activities including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment. 95. Defendant Mullen knew or should have known that her reckless conduct in ordering and carrying out Boyko and Skrip’s quarantines would unlawfully detain and confine them, cause their reasonable apprehension of force, interrupt their ability to perform their work, and inflict emotional distress on them. Quarantine of Mensah-Sieh Family 97. Plaintiff Mensah-Sieh (who is the sister of Nimley-Phillips), her husband Plaintiff Nathaniel Sieh, and their four children Emmanuel Kamara, Victor Sieh, B.D., and S.N., lived in Sinkor, Monrovia in Liberia until October 2014. In Sinkor, Nathaniel Sieh worked in immigration for the government and Mensah-Sieh worked for Global Bank and at St. Joseph’s Catholic Hospital. 98. Prior to the Ebola outbreak, the Mensah-Sieh family applied to the U.S. Diversity Visa Lottery and in June 2013 learned that they would be awarded visas. Plaintiffs were excited by the opportunity to emigrate to the U.S. to improve their lives and career prospects and to provide educational opportunities for their children.

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(FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES DUE AT TERMINATION – RCW 49.48.010) (FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES – RCW 49.46.130) (WILLFUL REFUSAL TO PAY WAGES – RCW 49.52.050) 1. Employment at Les Schwab Tire Centers. ...................................................3 1. Employment at Les Schwab Tire Centers. 15. Les Schwab owns and operates more than 400 retail tire stores, all of which operate under the name “Les Schwab Tire Centers,” throughout the Western United States. Les Schwab owned and operated more than 100 locations in Washington State during the relevant time period. The primary business of Les Schwab Tire Centers is the retail sale of tires. 2. Les Schwab’s misclassification of Assistant Managers and related failure to pay earned overtime wages ........................................4 B. Plaintiff O’Hearn’s Experiences are the Same as Those of Other Assistant Managers ........................................................................................7 C. Defendants’ Failure to Pay Overtime Was Willful ..................................................8 VI. 45. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiff seeks to represent a Class defined as: All persons who are or were employed as Assistant Managers, or in similar positions, by Les Schwab Tire Centers in Washington State and were misclassified as exempt employees and were not paid statutory overtime during the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint and thereafter. Excluded from the Class are Les Schwab, any entity or division in which Les Schwab has a controlling interest, its legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, owners, and successors. 46. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of the Class and/or add classes if discovery and further investigation reveal that the Class should be expanded or otherwise modified. 47. This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf of the Class proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 49.52.050 shall be liable in a civil action for twice the amount of wages withheld and attorneys’ fees and costs. 49.52.070, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recovery of twice such damages, including interest thereon, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. 53. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the prior allegations of this Complaint. 61. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the prior allegations of this Complaint. 62. RCW 49.48.010 provides that “[w]hen any employee shall cease to work for an employer, whether by discharge or by voluntary withdrawal, the wages due him or her on account of his or her employment shall be paid to him or her at the end of the established pay period.” The statute further provides that it shall be unlawful “for any employer to withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages.” 63. By the actions alleged above, Les Schwab violated the provisions of RCW 66. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the prior allegations of this Complaint. 67. RCW 49.52.050 provides that any employer who, “[w]illfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages, shall pay any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract” shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 68. Les Schwab’s violations of RCW 49.46.130, as discussed above, were willful. By its willful violations of RCW 49.46.130, Les Schwab has violated RCW 49.52.050. 69. RCW 49.52.070 provides that any employer who violates the provisions of RCW 70. As a result of the willful, unlawful acts of Les Schwab, Plaintiff and the Class have been deprived of compensation in amounts to be determined at trial and pursuant to RCW A. Background A. Background ..............................................................................................................3 TERMINATION – RCW 49.48.010) ................................................................................12 COUNT III (WILLFUL REFUSAL TO PAY WAGES – RCW 49.52.050) ................................13 VIII. VII. VIOLATIONS ALLEGED ................................................................................................11 COUNT I (FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES – RCW 49.46.130).................................11

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15. 16. The Yahoo Contract incorporates Yahoo's Privacy Policy. j One of the provisions ("Personal-Information Provision") of the Yahoo Contr~t I 27 states, · relevant part: 28 Yahoo! collects personal information when you register with Yahoo! Plaintiff brings this action individually, and as a Class Action pursuant to Federal ' ivil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b )(3) on behalf of all persons and entities who, without prio~ e had their names disclosed when sending emails from their Yahoo Email Addresses~ I Yahoo, its officers, employees, and representatives, and their families (the "Class"), at an~ · g the period beginning four years prior to the commencement of this action and continuin~ 11 until the solution of this action (the "Class Period"). ' 12 The Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Members i~ 13 14 I There are more than 5,000,000 individuals and entities whose claims are similar td ' 15 Plaintiff claims, which are typical of the claims of the other Members of the Class. 16 17 Plaintiff would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. lndeedJ I I interests are, for purposes of this litigation, coincident with the interests of the otheti 18 f the Class. Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the othe~ 19 Members of the Class. 20 A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficien. ! 21 adjudica · n of this controversy. Because the Class is so numerous that joinder of all Members i~ 22 impractic ble, and because the damages suffered by most ofthe individual Members of the Class ard ! 23 too small o render prosecution of the claims asserted herein economically feasible on an individu~ I 24 xpense and burden of individual litigation makes it impractical for Members of the Clas~ I 25 ly address the wrongs complained of herein. Plaintiff knows of no impediments to th~ ! 26 anagement of this action as a class action. I I 27 Common questions oflaw and fact predominate over questions that might affect only 28 Members of the Class. Among the questions oflaw and/or fact common to the Class are: Yahoo provides, to members of the public, an email service in which Yahoo provide' esses with the domain name of yahoo.com ("Yahoo Email Addresses"); e.g.~ I Yahoo requires a person in the United States who wishes to obtain a Yahoo EmaiJ I ! provide Yahoo with certain information, including the following: first name; last namd; I day; country; and postal code. : I Yahoo, through its default settings, knowingly and without prior notice to, or conse~ I o Email Users, adds a User's first and last names in the header of the emails that the Usc.t ' his Yahoo Email Address ("Yahoo Email"), such that the recipients of the Yahoo Email ! I Yahoo's Terms of Service constitute a contract ("Yahoo Contract"). The Yahoo Contract provides that "the parties shall be governed by the laws of the ! State of alifornia without regard to its conflict oflaw provisions and that any and all claims, cauJ 22 of actio or disputes (regardless of theory) arising out of or relating to the [Yahoo Contract], or~ I 23 relations · p between you andY ahoo!, shall be brought exclusively in the courts located in the coun~ 24 of Santa Cl~ California or the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California." I 25 26 [Breach of Contract under California law] 2 . Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs "1 i' through ' 24" inclusive of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 24 I ! 25 26 27 28 The Yahoo Contract constitutes a valid, binding, and enforceable contract. Yahoo's disclosure of its email users' first and last names in the manner descri~ I herein c stitutes a breach of the Yahoo Contract. I As a result ofY ahoo • s breach of contract, Plaintiff and the other Class Members are

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16. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 seeking injunctive and monetary relief for Oracle’s systemic refusal to pay full commissions earned by sales employees. A. Class Definition 17. The proposed Class consists of all commissioned sales employees who have been or will be employed by Oracle in California at any time from the date that is four years before the filing of this Complaint to the present, to whom Oracle issued revised commission agreements which retroactively applied inferior – i.e. less remunerative – numeric terms (including but not limited to higher quotas and lower commission rates) to completed sales. 38. Defendant Oracle committed the following acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 39. The Oracle policies, practices and procedures alleged in this Complaint existed at all relevant times, i.e., going back at least four years from the date of this Complaint, and they are continuous and ongoing. 40. Typically, commission wages constitute a significant portion of Oracle sales employees’ compensation. 41. When Oracle hires sales employees, it offers and the employees accept compensation in the form of base salary and commissions. 42. Oracle provides each sales employee with an Individualized Compensation Plan (“Comp Plan”) containing commission rates, sales targets (i.e., quotas) and other numeric terms, along with written Terms and Conditions of Incentive Compensation (“T&C”). The Comp Plan sets forth the formula by which commissions are to be calculated. 43. Oracle considers the Comp Plan and the T&C to be the commission contract required by California Labor Code Section 2751. 44. The T&C is identical for all Class members. 45. After an employee starts work in a sales position, Oracle issues the commission contract to the employee through a process of electronically distributing and obtaining employee acceptance of the T&C and the Comp Plan. 46. Oracle requires employees to first click “accept” for the T&C, after which Oracle then provides the Comp Plan to the employees. Next, employees are asked to click “accept” for the Comp Plans. Compliance with this acceptance process is required for employees to be eligible to receive commission payments for past and future work. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 78. Plaintiff and Class members earned commission wages within the meaning of California Labor Code Sections 200 and 204.1. 79. Oracle has knowingly, intentionally and willfully failed and refused to pay to Plaintiff and Class members the full and complete amount of the commissions they earned. Oracle has operated under and continues to operate under a common policy and plan of failing and refusing to pay full earned commissions through the operation of its re-plan practices. 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 93. Plaintiff resigned from Oracle and concluded her employment in July 2014. 94. At the time of Plaintiff’s separation, Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff all of the commission wages she had earned and which had been calculated or could be reasonably calculated, as alleged herein and above. 95. Defendant has operated under and continues to operate under a common policy and plan of failing and refusing to timely pay unpaid wages owed to Plaintiff and Class Members whose employment ended, as required by California Labor Code Sections 201 and 202. 97. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 98. Defendant is a “person” as defined under California Business & Professions Code Section 17021. A. Oracle’s Sales Commissions Policies, Practices and Procedures FAILURE TO PAY COMMISSION WAGES IN BREACH OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE AND CONTRACT (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) FAILURE TO PAY WAGES UPON SEPARATION California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) UNFAIR COMPETITION California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Through its own website, through online third party retailers (such as Amazon), and likely through some brick-and-mortar retailers, Slendertone markets and sells an over- the-counter medical device called the “Flex Belt,” an electronic muscle stimulating device, approved by the FDA to rehabilitate muscles through electronic “pulsing” stimulation. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 46. The UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200. 59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 60. Under the FAL, “[i]t is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property or to perform services” to disseminate any statement “which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. 61. As alleged herein, the advertisements, labeling, policies, acts, and practices of Slendertone relating to the Flex Belt misled consumers acting reasonably that use of the Flex Belt will result in weight loss, body contouring, fat loss, well-defined abdominal muscles (i.e. visible “six pack” abs), and/or is a more or equally effective replacement for traditional abdominal exercises. 62. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact as a result of Slendertone’s actions as set forth herein because plaintiff purchased the Flex Belt in reliance on Slendertone’s false and misleading marketing claims. 63. Slendertone’s business practices as alleged herein constitute unfair, deceptive, untrue, and misleading advertising pursuant to the FAL because Slendertone has advertised the Flex Belt in a manner that is untrue and misleading, which Slendertone knew or reasonably should have known. 64. Slendertone profited from its sales of the falsely and deceptively advertised the Flex Belt to unwary consumers. 66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 67. The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 68. Slendertone’s false and misleading labeling and other policies, acts, and practices described herein were designed to, and did, induce the purchase and use of the Flex Belt for personal, family, or household purposes by plaintiff and other Class Members, and violated and continue to violate at least the following sections of the CLRA: a. § 1770(a)(5): representing that goods have characteristics, uses, or benefits which they do not have; b. § 1770(a)(7): representing that goods are of a particular standard, quality, or grade if they are of another; c. § 1770(a)(9): advertising goods with intent not to sell them as advertised; and d. § 1770(a)(16): representing the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not. 69. Slendertone profited from its sales of the falsely, deceptively, and unlawfully advertised the Flex Belt to unwary consumers. 70. Slendertone’s wrongful business practices regarding The Flex Belt constituted, and constitute, a continuing course of conduct in violation of the CLRA. 73. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint as if set forth in full herein. 74. Through the Flex Belt’s advertising, Slendertone made affirmations of fact or promises, or description of goods, that the Flex Belt provides specific benefits which it does not. These representations were “part of the basis of the bargain,” in that plaintiff and the Class purchased the products in reasonable reliance on those statements. Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1). 75. Slendertone breached its express warranties by selling products that do not provide the benefits promised by the advertising claims. 76. That breach actually and proximately caused injury in the form of the lost purchase price that plaintiff and Class members paid for the Flex Belt. 77. Plaintiff notified Slendertone of the breach prior to filing, but Slendertone failed to rectify the breach. 78. As a result, plaintiff seeks, on behalf of herself and other Class Members, actual damages arising as a result of Slendertone’ breaches of express warranty. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code § 2314 Breaches of Express Warranties, Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1) Violations of the False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq. Violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq. Violations of the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.

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25. To compete in the increasingly competitive world of insurance sales, Farm Bureau relies on an army of nearly 2,000 Insurance Agents to sell its insurance policies throughout 14 states. 26. Its Insurance Agents are solicited and managed by agency managers, who Farm Bureau also classifies as independent contractors. 27. To help execute its scheme to defraud against its Insurance Agents, Farm Bureau exploits its agency managers to use their positions of trust in the communities where they live to solicit and ensnare new Insurance Agents in the Farm Bureau enterprise. Without the perpetual growth of new Insurance Agents into the Farm Bureau enterprise, the enterprise would fall apart. The perpetual treadmill of agency growth and expansion is essential to the ongoing success—and fraud perpetrated by—the Farm Bureau enterprise. 29. In the 2000s, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Iowa) began a corporate transformation to camouflage its corporate structure. In a District of Kansas case, the Court in 2008 observed the “confusion” caused by Farm Bureau’s corporate structure, which Farm Bureau itself referred to as an “intricately structured fashion.”7 30. Today, Farm Bureau continues its confusing corporate structure of entities, and further discovery is needed to reveal that structure. 32. Despite earning over $1B in annual revenue on the backs of its Insurance Agents in the field, Farm Bureau refuses to treat the majority of its workforce as employees. Instead, it improperly labels all of its Insurance Agents as “independent contractors” while treating them like employees. Farm Bureau forces all of its Insurance Agents into an exclusive employment relationship where the agents must sell only Farm Bureau products, obey an extensive set of company rules and regulations, and leave all clients with Farm Bureau when the employment relationship ends—all of which Farm Bureau unilaterally dictates in its own discretion. 33. Each Farm Bureau Agent must sign an Agent Agreement (the “Agreement”) as a mandatory condition of employment. 34. The terms of the Agreement between each member of the Class and Farm Bureau are the same in all material respects, and the Agreements for Plaintiff is representative of the Agreements between Farm Bureau and each member of the Class. 36. Although Farm Bureau’s Insurance Agents bring in all the business and generate all the revenue, it is Farm Bureau’s executive officers alone who reward themselves with top-tier employee benefits packages. Indeed, while Farm Bureau’s Insurance Agents cannot participate in the company’s retirement plan, its highly-paid executives provide themselves with two different retirement plans and typically participate in both. 37. By misclassifying its Insurance Agents as independent contractors on paper, while actually controlling them as employees, Farm Bureau has been able to conceal the actual employment relationship it has with its agents and thereby unlawfully deny its Insurance Agents access to the employee protections, rights, and benefit plans they are legally entitled to receive. 38. Farm Bureau is also willfully committing tax fraud by failing to properly pay state employment taxes owed by falsely classifying all of its Insurance Agents as independent contractors. It thereby deprives the fourteen states it does business in of vital revenue. 39. The Department of Labor and several courts have recently shined a light on the misclassification of employees as independent contractors. As a result, when deciding if a person is an employee or an independent contractor, courts have increasingly looked beyond labels and titles and focused instead on two objective factors that cannot be manipulated: the actual degree of control and economic dependence. Farm Bureau flunks both factors by wide margins. 41. It is only after the Agents sign the Agreement and become financially dependent upon Farm Bureau for economic survival that they learn of Farm Bureau’s lengthy lists of rules and requirements (none of which is listed in the Agreement) that all agents must follow or face termination. 42. Once the Insurance Agent realize the true nature of the employment relationship, they face a lose-lose-lose dilemma: (a) stay trapped under the thumb of Farm Bureau and be treated like an employee without any employee rights or benefits; (b) face termination by Farm Bureau, which could strike at any point, and then start over, as Farm Bureau prohibits its agents from contacting any clients obtained during the time with Farm Bureau; or (c) quit and start over, as Farm Bureau prohibits its agents from contacting any clients obtained during the time with Farm Bureau. 43. By purposefully misclassifying its Insurance Agents as “independent contractors,” rather than employees, Farm Bureau has not only unjustly enriched itself (by avoiding the business costs of extending employee benefits to its Insurance Agents), but it has also evaded and continues to evade compliance with state and federal laws governing employee benefits, rights, and protections. 45. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to stop to the systematic fraud perpetuated by Farm Bureau and its executives, who continue to prey on unsuspecting “Agents” by promising them a rewarding and independent insurance career but have no intention of delivering on that promise. 46. The terms of the Agreement between each member of the Class and Farm Bureau are the same in all material respects, and the Agreements for Plaintiffs are representative of the Agreements between Farm Bureau and each member of the Class. 47. Defendant Farm Bureau and its affiliate network lure Insurance Agents into their operations with promises of independence and self-employment, but after Agents sign the Agreement, Defendants force the Agents to obey a morass of rules that control all material aspects of the Agents’ business operations. 48. Agents are labeled as “independent contractors” in the Agreement, but Farm Bureau fails to disclose its extensive collection of written and unwritten policies and procedures that Insurance Agents are required to comply with as a condition of their continued employment. 49. These policies and procedures provide Farm Bureau with almost total control over the Insurance Agents’ business operations. 50. When Insurance Agents do not follow a Farm Bureau policy or procedure, whether disclosed or undisclosed, known or unknown, Insurance Agents are subject to discipline by Farm Bureau, including termination. 52. The Insurance Agents are economically dependent on Farm Bureau for wages, continued employment, advertising materials, required computer equipment and software to access approved insurance brokerages when providing quotes, and obtaining training to comply with the company’s extensive rules and regulations. 54. At all times relevant, Farm Bureau asserted control and dominion over virtually all aspects of Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ businesses. 55. At all times relevant, Farm Bureau and its Agents enjoyed a continuing employment relationship unlimited in time period where both Farm Bureau and its Agents had the right to terminate the employment relationship. 56. At all times relevant, Farm Bureau Insurance Agents were integrated into Farm Bureau’s business of selling insurance. 57. Nonetheless, Defendants misclassified and continue to misclassify Agent- employees as independent contractors. 59. Farm Bureau also hires “agency managers” or “market managers” to recruit and solicit new Insurance Agents. 60. These independent contractors receive “overrides” (a commission based on an underlying sales commission) for each insurance sale made by the Insurance Agents they bring into the Farm Bureau enterprise. Thus, the more Insurance Agents recruited into the Farm Bureau enterprise, the more the agency manager and Farm Bureau make in revenue and overrides. 61. The override paid to the agency manager or market manager is a form of sharing profits between Farm Bureau and the agency manager or market manager, who is an independent contractor. 62. Farm Bureau, however, considers the agency managers and market managers to be independent contractors, not employees. 63. To properly classified employees, Defendants also provide benefit plans that are and were unavailable to Plaintiffs and Class Members due to the misclassification as “independent contractors.” 64. If Plaintiffs and Class Members had been properly recognized as employees during their terms of service, they would have received superior insurance, retirement, disability, and other employee benefits from Defendants. 65. Farm Bureau has for decades maintained that its Insurance Agents, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, are independent contractors—even when agents challenged that designation. 67. Plaintiff brings this action as an individual case and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Class is defined as “all signatories to a Farm Bureau Agent Agreement as ‘the Agent’ or ‘Registered Representative’ during the Class Period,” as further defined and limited below (the “Class”). 68. The “Class Period” is the time period beginning on the date established by the Court’s determination of any applicable statute of limitations, after consideration of any tolling and accrual issues, and ending on the date of entry of judgment. 69. Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and discovery, the Class definition may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or amended complaint. Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendants and their officers, directors, agents, trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, partners, joint-venturers, or entities controlled by Defendants, and their heirs, successors, assigns, or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Defendants and/or their officers and/or directors, or any of them, the Judge assigned to this action, and any member of the Judge’s immediate family. 72. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members in that Plaintiff and each member of the Class is or has been an “agent” pursuant to a Farm Bureau Agent Agreement, and each has suffered and will continue to suffer financial hardship and other damages as a result of Defendants’ misconduct. 73. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiffs have no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Class. 75. Plaintiffs restate and re-allege the above paragraphs as if fully set forth in this cause of action. The Farm Bureau Enterprise (the “FBE”) 76. Plaintiffs, each member of the Class, and each Defendant are “persons,” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3) and 1962(c). 77. For purposes of this claim, the RICO “enterprise” is an association-in-fact enterprise, as the term is defined in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(4) and 1962(c) and Tenth Circuit case law, that consists of the six Defendants: (1) FBL Financial Group, Inc.; (2) Farm Bureau Financial Services; (3) Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Ins. Co.; (4) Farm Bureau Life Insurance; (5) FBL Marketing Services, LLC; and (6) Western Agricultural Insurance Company, plus the Agency Managers, Market Managers, District Sales Managers that Defendants use to recruit other Farm Bureau Insurance Agents by paying them “overrides” for the sales made by the Insurance Agents they solicit and bring on board to Farm Bureau (collectively, the “Farm Bureau Enterprise” or “FBE”). 79. Not all members of the FBE are named as Defendants. Some members of the FBE might have been trapped by the Defendants into participating in the recruiting activities designed to further the FBE. Even so, each member of the FBE participated in the affairs of the enterprise and helped to perpetuate and further the reach of its tentacles into the market for insurance agents looking for a rewarding career. 80. But for the recruiting activities of Farm Bureau’s Agency Managers and Market Managers (which it calls independent contractors), the enterprise-in-fact would have crumbled because it would not have obtained new insurance agents, which was vital to expand Farm Bureau’s operations and revenues, which allowed it to recruit and solicit even more agents, and on and on. 81. The FBE is separate and distinct from the persons that constitute the Enterprise. 82. The companies and individuals in the FBE were associated in fact for the common purpose of enriching themselves at the expense of Plaintiffs and the Class, who were deceived into signing the Agreement to become Farm Bureau Insurance Agents and were forced to work under the thumb of Farm Bureau without being afforded the rights of employees, as described above. 83. At all relevant times, the FBE was engaged in, and its activities affected, interstate commerce. 85. The FBE could not have succeeded if Defendants had not coordinated, worked together in shared interdependence, and shared profits. By doing so, Defendants advanced the goals of the enterprise in fact and not simply their own. 86. The FBE was ongoing and worked together toward a common purpose: to lock Insurance Agents into a situation where they were financially dependent upon Farm Bureau but could not modify the conditions imposed by Farm Bureau, and to enrich the members of the FBE at the expense of the Insurance Agents by refusing to provide all the costs of employment. 87. All of the Defendants and the Agency Mangers in the FBE worked together and cooperatively toward this common purpose. 88. The FBE has operated from at least 2012 to present. 89. The FBE has an ascertainable structure separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which Defendants engage. The Pattern of Racketeering Activity 90. At all relevant times, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the Defendants conducted the affairs of the FBRE through a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), by virtue of the conduct described in this Complaint. 91. The Defendants have conducted the affairs of the FBE and participated in the operation and management thereof. 92. The pattern of racketeering activity consists of ongoing mail and/or wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. 94. In particular, every Insurance Agent was required to sign the Agreement, which purported to allow the Insurance Agent significant control over her insurance sales business. In reality, once the Insurance Agent is signed up and dependent on Farm Bureau for a career (each is an exclusive agent), a different reality unfolded for every Insurance Agent. As explained in the allegations above, Farm Bureau exercised excessive control, prevented each Insurance Agent from running her own business, and inflicted the lose-lose-lose dilemma on each Insurance Agent. 95. Because of the scheme to defraud, each Insurance Agent suffered damage to her property based on the denial of employment rights and benefits, early termination, being forced to quit, and in all circumstances, not earning as much as they would have as employees and not being able to take clients or customers with them once terminated or they had quit. 96. Each time Farm Bureau induced an Insurance Agent to sign the Agreement, the Defendants committed mail and/or wire fraud. 97. It was reasonably foreseeable to the Defendants that the mails and/or wires would be used in furtherance of the scheme, and the mails and/or wires were in fact used to further and execute the scheme: the U.S. mails or the Internet was used to transmit the Agreement to each Insurance Agent and to Farm Bureau, and the commissions obtained by Farm Bureau from the insurance sales by each Plaintiff and Class Member required use of interstate wires. VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)

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10. In July 2018, Simmons experienced chronic and severe pain stemming from a previous Achilles rupture. 11. The previous fall, Simmons was off of work and had surgery to rupture. 12. On July 19, 2019, Dr. Patricia Antero informed Mercedes that do to the nature of the degeneration and previous rupture that Simmons was in pain had difficulty walking and needed a surgical procedure. 13. On August 9, 2019, Southlake Orthopedics advised Mercedes of upcoming appointment for surgical consult with an expected return to work date of September 06, 2018. 14. Mercedes rejected the doctor’s explanation, denied Simmons any short term disability and requested additional information. 17. Mercedes maintains a short term disability plan that allows for continuation of salary for team members because of non-work related medical impairment extending beyond seven days. 18. The terms of the plan make clear that the company’s business needs as determined by company’s supervisor come before the employee’s need and or qualifications for short term disability leave. 19. Simmons was denied a reasonable accommodation of allowing to be off of work under the policy and terminated. 20. Allowing Simmons to be absent from work for definite 90 day period or to work from home would not have been undue hardship on the company. 21. The company has allowed white employee Kathy Norris an accommodation to work for other reasons. 31. Plaintiff is disabled by way of an Achilles injury, which is a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; in particular, his ability to, inter alia, work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. In addition, Plaintiff has a history of having an impairment, which substantially limits one or more of his major life activities, and/or he is perceived by Defendant as a person with a disability as that term is defined under the ADA. Thus, Plaintiff has a disability under the ADA. (42 U.S.C. § 12102). 32. The Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of his disability with respect to the terms and conditions of his employment in violation of the ADA. 34. The Defendant’s discriminatory actions toward Plaintiff were reckless, malicious,and willful and in violation of Plaintiff's statutory rights pursuant to the ADA, as amended. 35. The Defendant Mercedes also discriminated against Simmons because of his race with respect to denial of a reasonable accommodation, and termination of his employment in violation of 42 U.S.C § 2000e, as amended, and 42 U.S.C §1981 and 42 U.S.C.§1981a. 36. Mercedes accommodated white employee Kathy Norris who was allowed to work from home. 37. Mercedes’ decision to terminate Simmons’ employment rather than examine his medical paper work was discriminatory. 38. Simmons has suffered loss of pay and benefits. Furthermore, as a result of the treatment he received from the Defendant, Simmons suffered mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment. The Defendant’s discriminatory actions toward Simmons was reckless, malicious, and willful and in violation of his statutory rights pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. 7. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-6 above with the same force and effect as if fully set out in specific detail herein below. 9. Simmons worked as specialist procuring automotive parts as in the Mercedes Benz’s supply chain.

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 27. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of SI Financial (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants. 29. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, and are causing injury to the entire Class. Therefore, preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole is entirely appropriate. 31. On December 11, 2018, SI Financial and Berkshire jointly issued a press release announcing the Proposed Transaction. The press release stated in part: 53. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 54. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 55. Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides that communications with stockholders in a recommendation statement shall not contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 56. Defendants have issued the Proxy Statement with the intention of soliciting shareholders support for the Proposed Transaction. Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy Statement, which fails to provide critical information regarding, among other things, the financial projections for the Company. 58. The Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the Proxy Statement is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it not misleading. The Defendants undoubtedly reviewed and relied upon the omitted information identified above in connection with their decision to approve and recommend the Proposed Transaction. 59. The Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy Statement, rendering the sections of the Proxy Statement identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. Indeed, the Defendants were required to be particularly attentive to the procedures followed in preparing the Proxy Statement and review it carefully before it was disseminated, to corroborate that there are no material misstatements or omissions. 60. The Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and reviewing the Proxy Statement. The preparation of a registration statement by corporate insiders containing materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence. The Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy Statement or failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy Statement upon reviewing it, which they were required to do carefully as the Company’s directors. Indeed, the Defendants were intricately involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of the Company’s financial projections. 62. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. 63. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 64. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of SI Financial within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of SI Financial, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the Proxy Statement filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 65. Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with, or had unlimited access to, copies of the Proxy Statement and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 67. In addition, as set forth in the Proxy Statement sets forth at length and described herein, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The Proxy Statement purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 68. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 69. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed. 70. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. Background of the Company

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(Violation of USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4318, Against the American Plan) (Violation of ERISA §§ 404(a)(1)(A), (B) and (D) Against the PBAC Defendants) 26. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to the most recent Form 5500 for the year 2012, the number of active participants in the Plan as of December 31, 2012 was 9,365. Upon information and belief, thousands of former and current American Pilots are members of the proposed class. 27. American Airlines currently has domestic and international “hubs” in Queens, New York, Brooklyn, New York, Los Angeles, California, Miami, Florida, Chicago, Illinois, and Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas. American Airlines pilots report for flying duty at pilot domicile bases located in all the “hubs,” and also the focus cities of Boston, Massachusetts, St. Louis, Missouri, and, until 2011, San Francisco, California. Upon information and belief, the members of the Class are geographically dispersed. Commonality 30. Because the pension contributions for periods of the American Pilots’ qualified military service were based on a uniform policy and any recovery will be on behalf of and paid into the Plan, all issues regarding relief are common. Even if the ultimate allocation of recovery into the American Pilots’ individual accounts is considered, the unifying issue concerning the policy is the failure to consider each pilot’s average rate of compensation during the 12 months prior to the period of military leave. As the Fiduciary Defendants acted in a systematic manner with respect to the Plan and the Class, all members of the Class suffered the same type of injury based on a single policy, and resolving the claims of the Class will be based on common legal and factual questions. Typicality 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other members of the proposed Class. Plaintiff challenges a single policy by which the Plan received pension contributions for periods of the American Pilots’ qualified military service without regard to each pilot’s average rate of compensation during the 12 months prior to the period of qualified military service. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of other members of the Class. Plaintiff is aware of no conflict with any other member of the Class. Plaintiff understands his obligations as a class representative, has already undertaken steps to fulfill them, and is prepared to continue to fulfill his duties as class representative. 34. Defendants have no unique defenses against the Plaintiff that would interfere with Plaintiff’s representation of the Class. 35. Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced in federal court class action litigation, including pension and civil rights litigation, and have considerable experience and expertise in the areas of both ERISA and USERRA. Rule 23(b)(1) 36. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the central questions in this litigation are whether the American Plan violated USERRA and whether the Fiduciary Defendants of the Plan breached their duties in connection with calculating the contributions owed to the Plan based on the American Pilots’ periods of qualified military service and the Fiduciary Defendants’ failure to take any action to prevent, cease or remedy such improper contributions. 38. This action is also properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 39. Defendant Plan is alleged to have violated USERRA in a manner as to all members of the Class. The Fiduciary Defendants are alleged to have breached their fiduciary duties in a manner that applied to all members of the Class either by interpreting the Plan in a manner as to all members of the Class or by failing to properly manage the assets of the Plan. As such, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class. As a result, final declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Class as a whole. 41. This action is also properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 42. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual members and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient resolution of this controversy. By resolving the common issues described above in a single class proceeding, each member of the proposed class will receive a determination of whether the American Plan violated USERRA and whether the Fiduciary Defendants of the Plan breached their fiduciary duties, and will receive the remedy that should be provided under USERRA and ERISA. 43. Upon information and belief, there are no other pending lawsuits in which members of the Class have raised similar allegations involving this Plan. 44. This is an appropriate forum for these claims because, among other reasons, jurisdiction and venue are proper, one of the Defendants is located in this District, and, as a result of American Airlines’ significant operations in this District, a substantial part of the Class likely earned their pension benefits in this District, and at least a portion of the Class likely resides in this District. 45. There are no difficulties in managing this case as a class action. 47. As set forth in the preambles of the 2009 Plan Document and the 1997 Plan Document, the American Program consists of two separate Plans: (1) the Fixed Income Plan (or “A Fund”), which is a defined benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(35) that provides a retirement annuity to each American pilot based on the pilot’s credited service, compensation, and the plan formula; and (2) the Variable Income Plan (or “B Fund”), which is a money purchase plan and a defined contribution plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(34). 48. According to the preamble of the 1997 and 2009 Plan Documents, benefits under the Variable Income Plan or B Fund are based on the amount credited to an individual account established for each participant. 50. Section 12.12 of both the 1997 and 2009 Plan Documents provide that “neither the interpretation or the Plan nor its administration shall as such be within the jurisdiction of” of collective bargaining agreement(s) between American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association. The Plan’s Obligations Under USERRA 51. As an employee pension benefit plan, the American Plan was required to comply with USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4318. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 4318(a)(1)(A), the American Plan was required to comply with USERRA § 4318(a)(2), which provides as follows: (A) A person reemployed under this chapter shall be treated as not having incurred a break in service with the employer or employers maintaining the plan by reason of such person’s period or periods of service in the uniformed services. (B) Each period served by a person in the uniformed services shall, upon reemployment under this chapter, be deemed to constitute service with the employer or employers maintaining the plan for the purpose of determining the nonforfeitability of the person’s accrued benefits and for the purpose of determining the accrual of benefits under the plan. 52. For each period of military service, USERRA § 4318(b)(1) provides that the employer is “liable to an employee pension benefit plan for funding any obligation of the plan to provide the benefits described in subsection (a)(2) [of § 4318] and shall allocate the amount of any employer contribution for the person in the same manner and to the same extent the allocation occurs for other employees during the period of service.” 53. As the American Plan is “an employee pension benefit plan described in Section 3(2) of [ERISA],” the American Plan is an employer under USERRA with respect to its “obligation to provide [the pension] benefits described in section 4318” within the meaning of, 91. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. Pursuant to USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(1), an employer reemploying a person after a period of service in the uniformed services is liable to the employee benefit pension plan for funding any obligation of the plan to provide benefits, including those accrued under USERRA § 4318(a)(2)(B). 94. Pursuant to USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4318(b)(3)(B), for purposes of computing an employer’s liability under § 4318(b)(1), the employee’s compensation during the period of uniformed service must be computed “in the case that the determination of [the employee’s rate of compensation] is not reasonably certain, on the basis of the employee’s average rate of compensation during the 12-month period immediately preceding such period (or, if shorter, the period of employment immediately preceding such period).” 95. From 1997 to the present, the compensation of the American Pilots was not and has not been “reasonably certain” during the periods in which they engaged in qualified military service. 96. During all or a portion of the time from 1997 to the present, the policy applied for making pension contributions to the American Pilots for periods of qualified military service was not made based on the employee’s own average rate of compensation during the 12-month period immediately preceding his or her period of military leave. 98. Because the American Plan applied its policy in violation of USERRA, Plaintiff and the Class received pension contributions in their B Fund accounts that were smaller than what they would have received had the American Plan had complied with USERRA. Background on the American Pilots’ Defined Contribution Pension Plan

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10. Doe exercises operational control over Mellow Mushroom; he has the authority to hire, discipline, and fire employees of Mellow Mushroom; he was involved in the decisions to set the wages and pay for Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees; and, therefore, Doe is individually liable to Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees. 12. Mellow Mushroom hired Plaintiff as a server around August 2012. 13. Defendants paid Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated employees, less than the statutory minimum wage by taking the “tip credit” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 14. When Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendants paid him, and all other similarly situated servers, overtime pay at a rate less than Ten and 88/100 dollars ($10.88). 15. Mellow Mushroom required Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated servers, to remit a portion of their tips at the end of each shift into a mandatory tip pool (“Tip Pool”). 16. Mellow Mushroom redistributed a portion of that tip pool to “back of the house” kitchen staff, who are not employees who are “regularly and customarily tipped employees.” 17. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 16 as if repeated here verbatim. 18. As alleged above, Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated employees, were employed by Mellow Mushroom. 19. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Mellow Mushroom engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and 203(s). 21. The business of Mellow Mushroom was and is an enterprise engaged in commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) and, as such, Mellow Mushroom is subject to, and covered by, the FLSA. 22. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires employers to pay its nonexempt employees a minimum wage of Seven and 25/100 dollars ($7.25) an hour. 23. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), provides an exception allowing employers to pay less than the statutory minimum wage to tipped employees, on the condition that the pooling of tips is only amongst those who customarily and regularly receive tips. 24. When the employer shares the Tip Pool with back of the house staff, the Tip Pool is invalidated. 25. When the Tip Pool is invalidated, the employer can no longer enjoy the benefits of the tip credit provision, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 26. Without the benefit of the tip credit provision, Defendants must pay each nonexempt employee the statutory minimum wage of Seven and 25/100 dollars ($7.25) per hour. 27. Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206. 28. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to recover from Defendants the amount of minimum wages due, amount remitted to the illegal tip pool, prejudgment interest, and the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. 30. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 29 as if repeated here verbatim. 31. Pursuant to the terms of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, an employer must pay a nonexempt employee time and a half for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 32. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees were nonexempt employees under the FLSA, and Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees the proper amount for overtime hours worked. 33. Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207. 34. As such, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated employees, seeks to recover the amount of overtime wages due, prejudgment interest, and the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. 8. Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 7 as if repeated here verbatim. 9. Mellow Mushroom owns and operates a restaurant, which has three (3) separate locations, within the Florence-Horry County area. Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 207 (Failure to Pay Proper Overtime Wage) Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), 206 (Violation of Tip Credit / Failure to Pay Proper Minimum Wage)

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(FLSA Overtime Violations - 29 U.S.C § 207) Collective Action (FRCP Rule 23 - Oregon Wage Class Action) 1. There is no conflict between his claims and the Rule 23 Class Members’ claims; 1. This is a collective and class action suit to recover unpaid overtime brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and statutory penalties under Oregon Wage and Hour Laws, ORS Chapter 652 (“Oregon Wage and Hour Laws”). 1. On the First Claim, award Plaintiff and Collective Action Members their actual damages for unpaid overtime in an amount to be determined at trial plus an equal amount as liquidated damages for failure to pay overtime pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §207, or a penalty under ORS 652.150, whichever is greater, but not both; 11. Defendant is subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Oregon Wage and Hour Laws (ORS Chapter 652). 12. Plaintiff Richard Beemer is a resident of Lane County, Oregon. 13. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant as a Route Sales Representative (“RSR”) at Defendant’s Eugene, Oregon facility on or around November 29, 2010. Plaintiff subsequently worked for a period of time as a District Service Supervisor at the same facility. On or around October 4, 2012, Plaintiff resumed working as an RSR. Defendant currently employs Plaintiff as an RSR at Defendant’s Eugene, Oregon facility. 14. Defendant maintains a warehouse in Portland, Oregon, where new and refurbished goods are stored as inventory for fulfillment of future customer needs. Defendant keeps these goods within Oregon until ordered by one of Defendant’s customers in Oregon. 15. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, the majority of the work performed by Plaintiff and Defendant’s other Oregon RSRs consists of picking up dirty uniforms, floor mats and various related items from Defendant’s customers, and delivering clean uniforms, floor mats, and various related items to those same customers. 17. As an RSR, Defendant pays Plaintiff and the other Oregon RSRs on a “percentage-of- volume” basis based on the value of the accounts serviced by each RSR, which varies each workweek. Plaintiff is not paid an hourly rate of pay based on actual hours worked. 18. Defendant tracks and records the hours worked by RSRs, including the number of overtime hours worked each week. 19. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint until on or around June 2015, Defendant automatically reduced the number of hours worked each day by Plaintiff and similarly situated RSRs by 30 minutes for a meal break, regardless of whether or not the RSR was relieved of all duties for 30 continuous minutes. 2. On the Second Claim, award Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class Members their penalty wages calculated according to ORS 652.150 for violations of ORS 652.120 and/or ORS 652.140 in amounts to be determined at trial; 2. Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members were subject to the same payroll practices and company policies, including but not limited to, practices and policies relating to Defendant’s failure to pay overtime to RSRs; 2. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are skilled and experienced, and who will vigorously prosecute the litigation; 2. The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees overtime at one and one- half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Plaintiff alleges that he and others are similarly situated as a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of classifying its Route Sales Representatives (“RSRs”) as exempt from the overtime compensation requirements of the FLSA and failing to pay overtime, and by Defendant’s failure to pay all wages earned when due under Oregon Wage and Hour Laws. 20. It is Defendant’s policy and practice to classify RSRs as exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and Oregon Wage and Hour Laws and to not pay overtime at one and one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 21. At all times material to this Complaint, Plaintiff regularly worked and continues to work hours in excess of forty hours per workweek. Plaintiff’s typical work schedule begins at 5:00 a.m. and continues until Plaintiff has completed his tasks for the day, often between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. five days a week. 22. For example, during the week of August 24, 2014, Plaintiff worked 55.5 hours, not including unpaid meal breaks. Plaintiff was not paid overtime. Plaintiff was not paid one half times his regular rate of pay as overtime compensation for the 15.5 hours worked over 40 during that workweek. 24. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant knew or should have known when Plaintiff was working. 25. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint until on or around June 2015, Defendant knew or should have known when Plaintiff did not receive a full 30-minute meal break. 26. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant knew how much it paid each workweek to Plaintiff. 27. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint until on or around June 2015, Defendant had knowledge that Plaintiff did not receive 30-minute meal breaks because Defendant’s supervisors would periodically accompany Plaintiff on his route. 28. Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals are entitled to be paid compensation for all hours worked, including overtime hours, under the FLSA. 29. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant knew when its RSR employees were working more than forty hours in a workweek. 3. This action seeks compensatory and liquidated damages, attorney fees, taxable costs of court, pre- and post-judgment interest and penalty wages for Defendant’s willful failure to pay wages when due, including the correct amount of overtime wages, and other relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and Oregon Wage and Hour Laws for Plaintiff and for all others similarly situated in the course of their employment with Defendant. 3. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class Members; and, 3. Plaintiff, together with all Rule 23 Class Members, are owed unpaid overtime as a result of the classification of RSRs as exempt from overtime and failure to pay overtime; 3. Award Plaintiff and the FLSA Class and Rule 23 Class Members their reasonable attorney fees and costs; 30. At all material times, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff or other similarly situated individuals overtime pay calculated pursuant to the FLSA, for hours worked in excess of forty per workweek. 31. Plaintiff and similarly situated individuals were all subject to the same company policies, payroll practices, and timekeeping practices of Defendant. 33. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 in that Plaintiff performed services and labor for Defendant for which Defendant failed to pay the correct amount of overtime when due. Plaintiff and all similarly situated individuals are entitled to liquidated damages and penalties for Defendant’s willful failure to pay overtime when due. 34. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of Leiman & Johnson, LLC to represent him individually and on behalf of all similarly situated individuals, and has incurred attorney fees and costs in bringing this action. 35. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 34 above. 36. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff performed duties for the benefit of, and on behalf of, Defendant under employment terms and conditions set by Defendant. 37. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiff and the hereinafter-defined FLSA Class members in accordance with the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 38. At all material times, Defendant classified Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals as exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 4. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated demand a jury trial on all issues that may be tried to a jury. 4. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 Class Members. 4. Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the Rule 23 Class Members and have similar factual circumstances; and 4. Award Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals their pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and 40. Plaintiff brings this collective class action under § 216(b) of the FLSA against Defendant for unpaid overtime compensation, and related penalties and damages on behalf of himself and the following persons: All current and former Route Sales Representatives employed by Defendant UniFirst Corporation in Oregon since July 22, 2012 to the entry of judgment in this case, who worked over 40 hours in any workweek and were not paid overtime at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek (the “Collective Action Members”). 41. Plaintiff brings the FLSA claim for unpaid overtime and liquidated damages as an “opt- in” collective action pursuant to 29 USC § 216(b). The FLSA claims may be pursued by those Collective Action Members who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 USC § 216(b). 42. Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are similarly situated by Defendant’s policy of classifying them as exempt from the FLSA overtime provisions and by Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at one and one-half times the employees’ weekly regular rate of pay. 43. Plaintiff individually, and on behalf of Collective Action Members, seeks relief on a collective basis, alleging the FLSA was violated when he and others were not paid the correct amount of overtime due to them under the FLSA. 44. The number and identity of the other members of the putative Collective Action class may be readily determined from the records of Defendant, and potential opt-in Collective Action Members may be easily and quickly notified of the pendency of this action. Collective Action Members may be notified of the pendency of the action by first-class mail, email, physical and online posting, and other available methods. 46. Defendant violated §207 of the FLSA when it willfully failed to pay overtime to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek during the applicable statutory period. 47. As a result of Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all overtime earned, Plaintiff and Collective Action Members have incurred actual damages and are entitled to liquidated damages or a penalty under ORS 652.150, whichever is greater, but not both. 48. Plaintiff’s and the Collective Action Members’ damages are readily ascertainable from Defendant’s time and payroll records, which are in the custody and control of Defendant. 49. By reason of said intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendant, Plaintiff and Collective Action Members have suffered damages and have also incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 5. Plaintiff has suffered the same or similar injury as the Rule 23 Class Members. d. Adequacy of Plaintiff’s Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class because: 50. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 above. 52. All Rule 23 Class Members who do not opt-out may pursue their Oregon state law claim if that claim is certified for class-wide treatment. 53. Plaintiff’s state law claims satisfy the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) class action prerequisites of numerosity of members, commonality of questions of law and fact, typicality of class claims, and fair and adequate representation of class member interests. a. Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1)): This class action satisfies the numerosity standards. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and therefore alleges that there may be at least twenty-five (25) putative Rule 23 Class Members. As a result, joinder of all Rule 23 Class Members in a single action is impracticable. The precise number of Rule 23 Class Members and their identities and contact information are unknown to Plaintiffs but can be easily ascertained from Defendant’s personnel and payroll records. Rule 23 Class Members may be notified of the pendency of the action by first-class mail, email, physical and online posting, and other available methods. b. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(2)): Questions of law and fact common to all Rule 23 Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. All Rule 23 Class Members were subject to the same payroll practices and misclassification that resulted in the failure to pay all wages earned when due to all Rule 23 Class Members. c. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff’s claims are typical of Rule 23 Class Members’ claims because: 55. The common issues predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the Oregon state law claim. 56. A class action is the superior procedural vehicle for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims asserted herein given that: a. There is minimal interest of members of this class in individually controlling their prosecution of claims under Oregon Wage and Hour Laws; b. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and therefore alleges, that current employees fear retaliation and job loss if they bring individual claims; c. It is desirable to concentrate the litigation of these claims in this forum; and d. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this case as a class action. 57. The presentation of separate actions by individual Rule 23 Class Members creates the risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, and may establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of Rule 23 Class Members to protect their interests. 58. In the absence of a class action, Defendant would be unjustly enriched because it would be able to retain the benefits and fruits of wrongful violations of Oregon Wage and Hour Laws. 6. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant owned an operation that was an enterprise in interstate commerce or in the production of interstate commerce as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and § 203(s). Based upon information and belief, the annual gross sales volume of Defendant’s business was in excess of $500,000 per annum at all times material to this Complaint. 60. Plaintiff’s and the Rule 23 Class Members’ penalty wages are readily ascertainable from Defendant’s time and payroll records, which are in the custody and control of Defendant. 61. At times material and subject to further discovery, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class Members for all wages earned when due, as required by ORS 652.120 and/or ORS 652.140. By failing to pay the correct amount of overtime pay when due, either during employment or upon termination of employment, Defendant has violated ORS 652.120 and/or ORS 652.140, and is liable to Plaintiff and each Oregon Wage Class Member for penalty wages in amounts to be computed according to ORS 652.150. 62. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to pay all wages earned when due to Plaintiff and those Rule 23 Class Members currently employed by Defendant, Defendant has violated ORS 652.120 and is liable to Plaintiff and those Rule 23 Class Members for penalty wages calculated according to ORS 652.150 in an amount to be determined at trial, plus pre-judgment interest in an amount to be determined at trial. 63. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to pay Plaintiff and those Rule 23 Class Members formerly, but no longer, employed by Defendant all wages due within the time allowed following termination of employment, Defendant has violated ORS 652.140 and is liable to those Rule 23 Class Members for penalty wages calculated according to ORS 652.150 in an amount to be determined at trial, plus pre-judgment interest in an amount to be determined at trial. 7. Within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant managed, owned and/or operated a uniform rental company, and regularly exercised the authority to hire and fire employees, and control the finances and operations of such business. By virtue of such control and authority, Defendant was an employer of Plaintiff, and all others similarly situated, as such term is defined by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. 8. Defendant directly or indirectly acted in the interest of an employer towards Plaintiff within the three years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, including without limitation, directly or indirectly controlling all employment terms and conditions of Plaintiff and all similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant. 9. Venue is proper in this District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events giving rise to this Complaint occurred in the District of Oregon. Alan J. Leiman (OSB No. 980746) alan@leimanlaw.com Drew G. Johnson (OSB No. 114289) drew@leimanlaw.com Stacy A. McKerlie (OSB No. 134230) stacy@leimanlaw.com COMPLAINT; OREGON WAGE AND HOUR LAWS Fair Labor Standards Act 29 USC § 201 et seq.; Oregon Wage and Hour Laws (ORS Chapter 652) Defendant has not paid Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members the correct amount of overtime owed. INTRODUCTION PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself, the Collective Action Members, and Rule 23 Class Members respectfully asks the Court to grant the following relief: conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the state law claims form a part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims under Article III of the United States Constitution.

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25. Defendant operates its physical location at 442 East Bennett Avenue, Cripple Creek, Colorado 80813. 26. Defendant offers its Website in connection with its physical location. The goods and services offered by Defendant through its Website include but are not limited to the following: resort location and hours, contact information, and related goods and services available both online and in Defendant’s physical location. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually impaired users, access to Defendant’s Website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s physical location. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s physical location and the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 28. Plaintiff is a visually impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. 30. Due to Defendant’s failure to build its Website in a manner that is compatible with screen reader programs, Plaintiff is and was unable to understand, and thus is denied the benefit of, much of the content and services he wishes to access or use. For example: a. Many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. b. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. c. The Website also contains a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non-existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical location and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical location on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the location to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 34. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. In fact, Plaintiff intends to return to the Website when it is equally accessible for visually-impaired consumers in order to complete his intended transaction, as it is more convenient for Plaintiff to access the Website to make a transaction than to travel to a physical location to make the same transaction. However, as long as the Access Barriers continue to exist on the Website, Plaintiff is prevented from making such a transaction. 35. These barriers, and others, deny Plaintiff full and equal access to all of the services the Website offers, and now deter him from attempting to use the Website and/or visit Defendant physical location. Still, Plaintiff would like to, and intends to, attempt to access Defendant’s Website in the future to research the services the Website offers, or to test the Website for compliance with the ADA. 37. If the Website were accessible, i.e. if Defendant removed the access barriers described above, Plaintiff could independently research the Website’s offerings, including casino location and hours and promotions available at the its physical location. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually impaired people. 39. Though Defendant may have centralized policies regarding the maintenance and operation of its Website, upon and information and belief, Defendant has never had a plan or policy that is reasonably calculated to make its Website fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with vision related disabilities. As a result, the complained of access barriers are permanent in nature and likely to persist. 40. The law requires that Defendant reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s disabilities by removing these existing access barriers. Removal of the barriers identified above is readily achievable and may be carried out without much difficulty or expense. 41. Plaintiff’s above request for injunctive relief is consistent with the work performed by the United States Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, and U.S. Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (the “Access Board”), all of whom have relied upon or mandated that the public-facing pages of website complies with an international compliance standard known as Web Content Accessibility Guidelines version 42. Plaintiff and the Class have been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured by Defendant’s failure to provide its online content and services in a manner that is compatible with screen reader technology. 43. Defendant has long known that screen reader technology is necessary for individuals with visual disabilities to access its online content and services, and that it is legally responsible for providing the same in a manner that is compatible with these auxiliary aids. 44. Indeed, the Disability Rights Section of the DOJ reaffirmed in a 2015 Statement of Interest before the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts that it has been a “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice “that the ADA applies to website of public accommodations.” See National Association of the Deaf v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, No. 3:15-cv-300024-MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest in Opp. To Motion to Dismiss or Stay, Doc. 34, p. 4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“MIT Statement of Interest”); see also National Association of the Deaf. v. Harvard University, No. 3:15-cv-30023- MGM, DOJ Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doc. 33, p.4 (D. Mass. Jun. 25, 2015) (“Harvard Statement of Interest”). 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. While DOJ has rulemaking authority and can bring enforcement actions in court, Congress has not authorized it to provide an adjudicative administrative process to provide Plaintiff with relief. 48. Plaintiff alleges violations of existing and longstanding statutory and regulatory requirements to provide auxiliary aids or services necessary to ensure effective communication, and courts routinely decide these types of matters. 49. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims does not require the Court to unravel intricate, technical facts, but rather involves consideration of facts within the conventional competence of the courts, e.g. (a) whether Defendant offers content and services on its Website, and (b) whether Plaintiff can access the content and services. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, thereby violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 53. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, like Plaintiff, are visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA by failing to remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. 55. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits throughout the United States. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Defendant’s physical location is a public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 61. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 63. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 65. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 66. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 67. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 68. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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11. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined as: All New York consumers for whom Defendant communicated to any person credit information, which is known to be false and/or for whom Defendant failed to communicate to any person that a disputed debt was disputed as set forth herein. The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined. The Class period begins one year prior to the filing of this Action. 12. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: a. Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who were sent debt collection letters and/or notices from the Defendant(s) that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining about a standard conduct that occurred to at least fifty (50) persons. The undersigned has, in accordance with FRCP Rule 5.2, redacted the financial account numbers and/or personal identifiers in said letter. b. Commonality: There are questions of law and fact common to the class members which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: i. Whether the Defendants violated various provisions of the 16. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 17. Sometime prior to August 21, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred one or more financial obligations to SPRINT ("OBLIGATION” or “OBLIGATIONS") for which Defendant reported information to one or more national credit reporting agencies. 18. Plaintiff allegedly incurred the OBLIGATION in connection with personal use. 19. The OBLIGATION arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 20. Plaintiff incurred the OBLIGATIONS by obtaining goods and services which were primarily for personal, family and household purposes. 21. The OBLIGATION did not arise out of a transaction that was for non-personal use. 22. The OBLIGATION did not arise out of a transaction that was for business use. 23. The OBLIGATION is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 24. SPRINT and/or its predecessor is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 25. On or before August 21, 2020, the OBLIGATIONS were referred to ERC for the purpose of collection. 27. The August 21, 2020 letter was sent to Defendant in connection with the collection of the OBLIGATIONS. 28. The August 21, 2020 letter which was sent to the Defendant stated in part: RE: Latisha Cooper Creditor: SPRINT Alleged Amount Due: $1,069.00 Please be advised that I dispute the above debt. 29. After the date of the dispute, Defendant knew or should have known that the credit information concerning the OBLIGATIONS would be communicated to creditors and other persons. 30. The credit information communicated to these creditors and other persons did not indicate that the OBLIGATIONS were disputed. 31. The credit information communicated to these creditors and other persons concerning the OBLIGATIONS was false. 32. Since August 21, 2020, Defendant has communicated to at least one person, credit information which is known or should be known to be false. 33. ERC knew or should have known that its actions violated the FDCPA. 34. Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to ensure compliance with the law. 37. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, repeats and realleges all prior allegations as if set forth at length herein. 38. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA by using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with its attempts to collect debts from Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 39. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the FDCPA in connection with Plaintiff and others similarly situated. 40. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus, Defendant engaged in a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of the debt. 41. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA by falsely representing the character or legal status of the debt. 43. By communicating credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, Defendant made a false representation of the character or legal status of the debt. 44. Section 1692e(8) of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. 45. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by communicating to any person credit information which is known to be false or should be known to be false. 46. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to any person that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 47. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA by failing to communicate to one or more of the credit reporting bureaus that the OBLIGATION was disputed. 48. Section 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 49. By failing to communicate that the OBLIGATION was disputed as described herein, Defendant engaged in a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the debt. 50. Defendants’ conduct as described herein constitutes unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 52. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors. 53. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to have the Defendant abide by its obligations under the FDCPA and those specifically found at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). 54. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have suffered harm as a direct result of the abusive, deceptive and unfair collection practices described herein. 55. Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of the Defendants’ actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. VIOLATIONS

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1. The amount of the debt; 12. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Advanced sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. and in response a consumer called up the Defendant to dispute the validity of the debt; d. and the Defendant denied the dispute request, specifically demanding a reason for the dispute; 14. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 15. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s rejection of the Plaintiffs oral dispute, violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g. 17. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s rejection of the Plaintiffs oral dispute, violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 19. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Some time prior to November 2, 2018, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Synchrony Bank. 23. The Synchrony Bank obligation arose out of transactions to purchase items which were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 24. The alleged Synchrony Bank obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 25. Synchrony Bank is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). 26. Synchrony Bank or a subsequent owner of the debt contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt. 27. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Service, telephone and internet. Phone Call Violation 28. On or about November 2, 2018, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt. 29. When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days of an initial communication notify the consumer in writing of: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty- day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). This is commonly known as “the G-Notice”. 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector; 30. The FDCPA further provides that ‘‘if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty day period . . . that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.’’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 31. Plaintiff called Defendant on or around December 3, 2018, which was still within the 30-day time period of receipt of the letter, to dispute the debt as per the rights outlined in the collection letter he received. 32. When asked the reason for his contacting the Defendant, Plaintiff informed the representative with whom he spoke that he was disputing the validity of the debt, as per his rights as printed on Defendant’s November 2, 2018 letter. 33. Defendant’s representative refused to accept the Plaintiff’s dispute. 34. Defendant’s representative informed Plaintiff that his dispute was invalid, and demanded that Plaintiff must provide a specific reason for his dispute. 35. Defendant’s dispute, made by telephone, meets the criteria set forth by § 1692g(a), as it was made within thirty days of receipt of the notice, and he unequivocally stated that he was disputing the validity of the debt. 36. Furthermore, it well established in the 2nd Circuit that oral disputes are a completely valid method of asserting a consumer’s rights under § 1692g. 37. Advising the Plaintiff that his oral dispute of the debt was invalid unless he stated a specific reason violates the consumers rights as provided for under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 38. Defendant’s demand for reason for the dispute overshadowed Plaintiff’s §1692g right to dispute the debt over the phone, or in general as no reason is required to be given by the Plaintiff to validly exercise his dispute rights under 1692g(a). 39. This false and deceptive tactic of demanding a specific reason before “accepting a dispute as valid” is misleading because it confuses the consumer as to how to exert his dispute and validation rights under FDCPA. 4. A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Defendant intentionally chose to make it difficult for the Plaintiff to dispute the debt, even though he did it in a proper manner. 41. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 42. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 43. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 44. Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector: (a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 45. The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g: a. By demanding a reason for Plaintiff’s dispute and rejecting the Plaintiff’s dispute, despite the fact he validly exercised his dispute rights under the 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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(FLSA Overtime Violations - 29 U.S.C § 207; Collective Action) (Failure to Pay Wages When Due – Violation of Oregon Wage and Hour Laws) 16. Defendants’ Retail Merchandisers perform a variety of tasks related to the management of in-store displays in retail stores on behalf of Defendants’ clients. Merchandiser duties include, but are not limited to, building or reconfiguring product displays, maintaining product displays, taking product inventory, and re-stocking displays. 17. Defendants’ Retail Merchandisers receive daily work assignments, track work activities, and report work progress through emails and an electronic call reporting system used to generate an electronic record known as a “Call Report” using a wireless tablet device provided by Defendants. 18. Defendants’ Retail Merchandisers begin their workday at home by downloading work emails and new Call Reports before traveling to the first retail location to complete specific tasks and assignments. 19. Call Reports contain specific tasks and assignments to be completed by Retail Merchandisers. The Call Report application contains a time-tracking feature that starts when the electronic record is opened and the “start” button is pushed and stops when all of the tasks on the Call Report have been completed or when the Retail Merchandiser ends the Call Report by pressing the “complete” button. In this way, each Call Report contains an accurate record of the actual number hours worked by the Retail Merchandiser on a specific Call Report. 20. Retail Merchandisers are paid a set hourly rate of pay of for each hour worked. 22. Retail Merchandisers complete Call Reports any time they are completing a work assignment. Defendants’ employees review the Call Reports for accuracy and completeness. 23. Retail Merchandiser job performance is evaluated based on timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of Call Reports. 24. Call Reports are an integral component of Defendants’ business operations. 25. Defendants share data generated by Call Reports with their clients to demonstrate performance. 26. Defendants compensate Retail Merchandisers based on the number of hours shown on the Atlas time record submitted by the Retail Merchandisers not based on the actual number of hours worked by the Retail Merchandiser. 27. Defendants disregard the number of hours worked as reflected on Call Reports when computing Retail Merchandiser pay. 28. Defendants’ employee handbook requires that Retail Merchandisers must use “good faith efforts” to avoid overtime, and further requires Retail Merchandisers to seek pre-approval 48 hours in advance of working any hours additional to those scheduled. Retail Merchandisers who report working over 40 hours in a workweek on their Atlas time record without prior authorization are subject to discipline. As a result, Plaintiff and other Retail Merchandisers are deterred from reporting actual hours worked on their Atlas time records in weeks during which they worked more than 40 hours because of fears about discipline and job loss. 30. Plaintiff alleges that in weeks in which the time recording function of the electronic Call Reports show a Retail Merchandiser working more than 40 hours in a workweek, the Retail Merchandiser accrued and was owed overtime compensation even if the employee submitted an Atlas time record with no overtime hours reported. 31. Defendants’ time recording policies and practices result in the denial of overtime pay at one and one-half times the Retail Merchandiser’s regular rate of pay. 32. During her employment, Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Retail Merchandisers the correct amount of overtime earned because Defendants ignored the actual hours worked as shown by the time keeping record of the electronic Call Report record maintained by Defendants. 33. Plaintiff alleges she was underpaid each time she worked more than 40 hours in a workweek and was not paid any additional compensation at one and one-half times her regular rate of pay. 34. For example, during the week of January 24 to 30, 2016 according to Plaintiff’s Call Reports she spent 43 hours and 6 minutes working on assigned tasks for Defendants, however she was only paid for 40 hours that week, with no additional compensation paid for the overtime hours worked. 35. Accordingly, Defendants owe Plaintiff unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, and penalty wages under the FLSA and Oregon Wage and Hour laws. 37. At all times material to this Complaint, Defendants acted, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer with respect to Plaintiff and all others similarly situated. 38. Defendants are subject to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and Oregon Wage and Hour Laws, ORS Chapters 652 and 653. 39. At all material times, Defendants have been joint employers within the meaning of 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) and 29 C.F.R. § 791.2. Defendants directly or indirectly acted in the interest of an employer toward the Plaintiff at all material times, including, without limitation, directly or indirectly controlling all employment terms and conditions of Plaintiff. 40. At all material times, Defendants have been enterprises within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r). 41. At all material times, Defendants have been enterprises in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) because they had employees engaged in commerce. Based upon information and belief, the annual gross sales volume of Defendants was in excess of $500,000 per annum at all times material hereto. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the similarly situated employees worked in interstate commerce so as to fall within the protections of the FLSA. 42. At all material times, Plaintiff was an individual employee who was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as required by 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-207. 44. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 45. At all material times, Plaintiff performed duties for the benefit of, and on behalf of Defendants, under employment terms and conditions set by Defendants. 46. At all material times, Defendants were required to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class members in accordance with the overtime provisions of the FLSA. 47. At all material times, Defendants failed to pay overtime to Plaintiff and the FLSA class even when the time keeping record of the electronic Call Report record showed more than 40 hours worked by a Retail Merchandiser on assigned tasks during a workweek. 48. At all material times, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated Retail Merchandisers the correct amount of overtime pay because Defendants failed to compute overtime pay based the actual hours worked. 49. Plaintiff brings this collective class action under § 216(b) of the FLSA and against Defendants for unpaid overtime compensation, and related penalties and damages on behalf of herself and FLSA Class. 50. Plaintiff brings this FLSA claim for unpaid overtime and liquidated damages as an “opt- in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA claims may be pursued by those FLSA Class members who opt-in to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 52. The number and identity of the other members of the putative FLSA Class may be readily determined from the records of Defendants, and potential opt-in FLSA Class members may be easily and quickly notified of the pendency of this action. 53. Defendants have not paid Plaintiff and FLSA Class members the correct amount of overtime pay for weeks in which they worked in excess of 40 hours in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 54. Plaintiff and similarly situated FLSA Class members have not been paid all of the overtime wages owed to them by Defendants. 55. Records of all hours worked including the time keeping record of the electronic Call Reports and all compensation paid to Plaintiff and similarly situated FLSA Class members are in the possession and control of Defendants. 56. At all material times hereto, Defendants failed to comply with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 in that Plaintiff and others performed services and provided labor for Defendants for which Defendants failed to pay the correct amount of overtime based on an accurate record of actual hours worked as required by the FLSA. 58. Defendants violated §207 of the FLSA when they willfully failed to pay overtime to Plaintiff and FLSA Class members at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek during the applicable statutory period. 59. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Class members all overtime earned at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay resulted from Defendants’ willful act of knowingly adopting a compensation policy that failed to pay Retail Merchandisers for all hours worked when computing an employee’s weekly overtime. Defendants’ policy thus violated the FLSA and resulted in the underpayment of overtime pay to Plaintiff and each FLSA Class Member. Plaintiff and the FLSA Class members are entitled to liquidated damages for Defendants’ willful failure to pay the correct amount of overtime. 60. As joint employers, Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class for the FLSA violations alleged herein. 61. By reason of said intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Class members have suffered damages and have also incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 62. On behalf of herself and other similarly situated Retail Merchandisers who were employed by Defendants in Oregon, Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 above. 64. Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees are owed wages that were earned but not paid when due, whether during employment or upon termination. 65. The wages earned but not paid include, but are not limited to, the underpayment of overtime resulting from Defendants’ failure to pay for all hours worked when computing the overtime wages earned by Plaintiff and those similarly situated employees. 66. Records of hours worked and wages and other compensation paid to Plaintiff and others are in possession and control of Defendants. 67. Defendants’ records show that Defendants failed to pay all wages earned when due to Plaintiff and similarly situated current and former employees. 68. Plaintiff brings a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and the following class of persons: All current and former hourly non-exempt Retail Merchandisers employed by Defendants in Oregon within the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint who were not paid all overtime compensation owed when due (the “Oregon Wage Class”). 69. As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay Plaintiff and the Oregon Wage Class all wages when due, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and each member of Oregon Wage Class for a penalty to be computed in accordance with ORS 652.150. 71. All members of the Oregon Wage Class who do not opt out may pursue the Oregon state law claim if that claim is certified for class-wide treatment. 72. Plaintiff’s state law claim satisfies the Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) class action prerequisites of numerosity of members, commonality of questions of law and fact, typicality of class claims, and fair and adequate representation of class member interests. 73. Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(1)): The Oregon Wage Class satisfies the numerosity standards. The Oregon Wage Class is believed to be in excess of 50 people. As a result, joinder of all Oregon Wage Class members in a single action is impracticable. The precise number of Oregon Wage Class members and their identities and contact information are unknown to Plaintiff but can be easily ascertained from Defendants’ payroll records. Oregon Wage Class members may be notified of the pendency of the action by first-class mail. 74. Commonality (Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(2)): Questions of law and fact common to the Oregon Wage Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. All Oregon Wage Class members were subject to the same payroll practices that resulted in the failure to pay wages when due. All Oregon Wage Class members received paychecks, but did not receive all overtime compensation earned when due. Thus, all Oregon Wage Class Members have been paid incorrectly in the same manner, and all Oregon Wage Class members are owed additional compensation. 76. Common questions of law exist regarding: (a) whether Defendants paid overtime wages when due in accordance with Oregon Wage and Hour Law, ORS Chapters 652; (b) whether such actions were willful and (c) whether former employees are owed penalties under ORS 652. 77. The common issues predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness, and equity to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the Oregon state law claims. 78. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff’s claim is typical of Oregon Wage Class members’ claims because: a. Defendants employed Plaintiff in the same or similar positions as the Oregon Wage Class members; b. Plaintiff and the Oregon Wage Class members were subject to the same payroll policies and were affected in the same manner by those policies; c. Plaintiff, together with all of the Oregon Wage Class members, did not receive all wages when due; d. Plaintiff, together with all of the Oregon Wage Class members, is owed a penalty computed according to ORS 652.150; e. Plaintiff’s claim is based on the same legal and remedial theories as those of the Oregon Wage Class and have similar factual circumstances; and f. Plaintiff has suffered the same or similar injury, as did members of the Oregon Wage Class. 80. A class action is the superior procedural vehicle for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims asserted herein given that: a. There is minimal interest of members of the Oregon Wage Class in individually controlling their prosecution of claims under Oregon Wage and Hour Laws; b. It is desirable to concentrate the litigation of these claims in this forum; and c. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this case as a class action. 81. The presentation of separate actions by individual Oregon Wage Class members creates the risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, and may establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and/or substantially impair or impede the ability of Oregon Wage Class members to protect their interests. 82. In the absence of a class action, Defendants would be unjustly enriched because they would be able to retain the benefits and fruits of wrongful violations of Oregon Wage and Hour Laws. COMPLAINT; OREGON WAGE AND HOUR LAWS Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; Oregon Wage and Hour Laws (ORS Chapter 652)

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10.   Sometime before 2017, Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred certain financial obligations to Defendant. 11.   Plaintiff allegedly fell behind in the payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt. 12.   Thereafter, Plaintiff retained the services of the Law Office of Daniel G. Shay (“DGS”) to assist Plaintiff with resolving Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 13.   In this regard, DGS transmitted a Letter of Representation (“LOR”) to Defendant via U.S. Mail and facsimile on August 29, 2017. 14.   Said LOR indicated that Defendant was to cease all communications with Plaintiff. 15.   Said LOR informed Defendant that Plaintiff was a represented party with regard to Plaintiff’s alleged debt and provided Defendant with DGS’s name and contact information. 16.   The LOR also demanded all future communications with regard to Plaintiffs’ account be sent and directed directly to DGS’s office only. 32.   Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any phone calls from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint without prior express consent. 33.   Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any calls from Defendant or Defendant’s agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 34.   Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 47.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 48.   The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 49.   As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 50.   Plaintiff is also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47  U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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12. Although no comprehensive study focusing on the accuracy of criminal record reports industrywide, several recent studies demonstrate the prevalence of major inaccuracies in criminal background reports. For example, a 2013 study by the National Employment Law Project examined criminal background checks conducted by the FBI. Nat’l Employment Law Project, Wanted: Accurate FBI Background Checks for Employment (July 30, 2013), available at www.nelp.org/publication/wanted-accurate-fbi-background-checks-for-employ-ment/. 13. Although “considered the gold standard” of criminal background checks, the NELP study found that “50 percent of the FBI’s records fail to include information on the final disposition of the case” including “missing information [] frequently beneficial to job seekers.” Id. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) Class Claim 15. Beyond the risks raised by the sheer volume of the information and players involved in the industry, the manner in which many companies prepare criminal history reports increases the risk of inaccuracies. Companies often purchase criminal data in bulk and in static form, or access databases that are infrequently updated. 16. “Despite the importance of the accuracy of criminal background report, evidence indicates that professional background screening companies routinely make mistakes with grave consequences” for applicants. See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Broken Records, available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reprts/broken-records-report.pdf. 17. Online background check companies sell criminal history reports that contain inaccurate information. 18. One “common problem with criminal background reports is false positive matches or mismatched identifications,” resulting in a mismatched report that contains “the criminal history of a person other than the subject of the report.” Id. at 15. 19. A mismatch report is “due in large part to unsophisticated matching criteria.” Id. 20. Unlike “state-maintained databases” that use a “biometric identification system, such as fingerprint data,” to match a person to a record, private companies typically use “non- biometric information, such as name and date of birth.” Id. 22. The problem is significantly magnified where, as here, a company does not require a full match of the first name, last name, and date of birth (rather than year of birth). 23. A search of a website, howmanyofme.com, demonstrates the high risk of inaccuracy created when a consumer reporting agency fails to use a full match of the first name, last name, and date of birth. 24. According to this predictive website—which uses U.S. Census Bureau data to make estimates about the number of people with the same name—there are at least 3,317 people named Terry Brown in the United States. 25. Given the number of people with common names, it is unreasonable to match a record to a person based, upon information and belief, the person’s name and year of birth. B. Facts Regarding the Plaintiff’s Experience. 26. On or around January 24, 2020, Plaintiff applied to rent an apartment at the Seasons at Celebrate Virginia in Fredericksburg, Virginia. 27. As part of the application process, Plaintiff was required to undergo a background report. 29. Plaintiff’s landlord ordered a background report from Corelogic. In requesting the background report, the landlord provided Corelogic with Plaintiff’s first name, last name, full date of birth, address, and last four digits of his social security number. 30. Corelogic provided Plaintiff’s background report to the Seasons at Celebrate Virginia on or around January 24, 2020. 31. Seasons at Celebrate immediately denied his rental application “because a background check indicated [he] had been convicted of a crime.” 32. Plaintiff requested a copy of his report from Corelogic. 33. Upon receipt of his report, Plaintiff learned that Corelogic’s report identified him as a sex offender and contained three felony convictions for statutory rape. 34. None of these felony convictions should have been associated with Plaintiff, who has no criminal history. 35. Corelogic knew or should have known that this information did not belong to Plaintiff because it did not match the date of birth, i.e., January 13, 1976, provided to Seasons at Celebrate Virginia. 36. Instead, Corelogic appears to have matched this information to Plaintiff was born in the same year as the offender, who was born on February 24, 1976, according to his indictment. 37. Despite the objective difference between the Plaintiff and offender’s dates of birth, Corelogic matched the information to Plaintiff’s background report and reported it to his potential landlord—even though the underlying record contained the offender’s date of birth. 39. Corelogic violated the FCRA by using overly broad criteria in response to its customers’ requests for tenant screening reports. 40. Corelogic matched this criminal information to Plaintiff even though the underlying records unequivocally indicated that the offender was born on February 24, 1976; not January 13, 1976, as listed on Plaintiff’s application. 41. Corelogic’s inaccurate reporting could have been easily prevented if it required a date of birth match prior to the publication of its reports—a common procedure adopted by consumer reporting agencies. See Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Broken Records, 15 (2012) (explaining that “mismatched reports” are “due in large part to unsophisticated matching criteria” and that “many private screening companies rely solely on first name, last name, and date of birth.”); E-Backgroundchecks.com, 81 F. Supp. 3d at 1360 (discussing credit reporting agency’s contention that use of first name, last name, and date of birth “is considered industry best- practice.”). 42. Rather than adopting these procedures to ensure maximum accuracy, however, internal documents produced in another case showed that Corelogic designed its matching logic “to continue to maximizing its profits and remain relevant in its market.” Williams, 2016 WL 6277675 at *5. 43. These documents, including an in-depth study of its matching algorithm, further showed that there was no indication that Corelogic’s “internal review into the company’s matching logic was to comply with state or federal law[.]” Id. 45. As part of litigation in this District and Division, Corelogic agreed to a class action settlement whereby it agreed “with respect to search queries designated by wholesale background screening customers for “employment,” [Corelogic] shall not provide any public records that do not match the search query by either Social Security number, a address, or full date of birth.” Witt v. CoreLogic National Background Data, LLC, et al., Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-386 (E.D. Va.), Dkt. 306-1, Class Action Settlement and Release at § 9.1. 46. Despite agreeing to use the full date of birth for employment reports, Corelogic fails to utilize these same procedures for its tenant screening products, such as the report furnished regarding Plaintiff. 47. In addition to the conduct set forth above, Corelogic’s willful conduct is further reflected by, inter alia, the following: a. The FCRA was enacted in 1970; Corelogic has had nearly many years to become compliant; b. Corelogic is a corporation with access to legal advice through its own general counsel’s office and outside employment counsel. Yet, there is no contemporaneous evidence that it determined that its conduct was lawful; c. Corelogic knew or had reason to know that its conduct was inconsistent with FTC guidance, case law, and the plain language of the FCRA; d. Corelogic voluntarily ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless; and e. Corelogic’s violations of the FCRA were repeated and systematic. 49. Plaintiff restates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth at length herein. 50. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action for himself and on behalf of a class defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who were the subject of a report sold by Corelogic; (b) in the five years predating the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the date which the class list is prepared; (c) which included a sex offender record; (d) which did not match the applicant’s date of birth. Plaintiff is a member of this class. 51. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action for himself and on behalf of a subclass defined as follows: All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who were the subject of a report sold by Corelogic; (b) in the five years predating the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the date which the class list is prepared; (c) which included a sex offender record; (d) which did not match the applicant’s date of birth; and (e) Corelogic’s records show the records were subsequently removed based on a dispute from the consumer. Plaintiff is a member of this class. 53. Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions of law and fact exist as to all putative class members, and there are no factual or legal issues that differ between the putative class members. These common questions predominate over the questions affecting only individual class members. The common questions include: (1.) whether Corelogic’s failure to require date of birth matches for sex offender records was a procedure designed to ensure that its reports were as accurate as possible; (2.) whether Corelogic’s conduct constituted a violation of the FCRA; (3.) whether Corelogic’s conduct was willful; and (4.) what is the appropriate level of damages. 54. Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of each putative class member. Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the same causes of action as the other putative class members. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same facts and legal theories as each of the class members’ claims. 55. Adequacy of Representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the putative class because his interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the other putative class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation and intends, with his counsel, to continue to prosecute the action vigorously. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the class members’ interests. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interest that might conflict with his vigorous pursuit of this action. 57. As described above, Corelogic used loose matching criteria and algorithms that placed sex offender data on consumers’ tenant screening reports, even though the dates of birth associated with the sex offenders did not match the applicant’s date of birth. 58. This conduct violated § 1681e(b) of the FCRA because in using this loose matching criteria and algorithms, Corelogic failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information it that it published about consumers to its landlord clients. 59. Plaintiffs and each putative class member suffered real and actual harm and injury. 60. For example, the rights at issue were determined by Congress to be important measures to ensure continued accuracy and completeness in Corelogic’s files and reports. 61. Class members were also falsely painted as sex offenders to their prospective landlord. 63. As a result of these FCRA violations, Equifax is liable for statutory damages from $100.00 to $1,000.00 for Plaintiff and each class member, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the putative class members, moves for class certification and for statutory and punitive damages, as well as his attorney’s fees and costs against the Defendant for the class claim, as well as actual, statutory, and punitive damages and attorney’s fees and costs for his individual claim; for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the legal rate, and such other relief the Court does deem just, equitable, and proper. A. Pervasive Errors in Criminal Background Checks.

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14. Plaintiff Brian Miller is a resident of the State of Arizona, who after serving time in prison, complied with all aspects of the law, and after repaying his debt to society, had his convictions set aside and expunged from his record in accordance with the laws of the State of Arizona, with the most recent order being issued in 2015. Under the laws of the State of Arizona, all rights he had before his troubles with the law have been restored to him, and he carries forward no disabilities from his prior troubles with the law. 3 36. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 37. Plaintiff is a member of and seeks to certify his claims alleged in his First Claim for Relief on behalf of a class defined as follows: All natural persons with an address in the United States and its Territories about whom, beginning two years prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing 8 50. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by this reference the allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 51. Plaintiff, the Expungement Class Members, and the Administrative Action Class Members are “consumers,” as defined by the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c). 52. At all times pertinent hereto, Defendants RealPage, Inc., and RP On-Site, LLC, are and were defined as a “person” and “consumer reporting agency” (CRA) as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(b) and (f). 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), requires that a consumer reporting agency, “shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 54. As alleged herein, Defendants violated 1681e(b) in its consumer reports issued to its customers by reporting convictions which had been expunged, sealed, or otherwise removed from public dissemination. 55. Also as alleged herein, Defendants violated 1681e(b) by reporting administrative actions by departments of corrections as “felony convictions,” when in fact, such administrative actions were never adjudicated in any Court. 56. The foregoing violations were willful. Defendants acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff, the Expungement Class Members and the Administrative Action Class Members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). In fact, Defendants have been 12 60. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by this reference each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 61. In return for money, Defendants furnished consumer reports on Plaintiff and other Antedated Report Class members, to third-parties for tenant screening purposes. 62. The consumer reports issued by Defendants to its customers included (1) civil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest that, from date of entry, antedate the report by more than seven years or until the governing statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period; and/or (2) any other adverse item of information, other than records of convictions of crimes, which antedates the report by more than seven years. 13 For Violation of the Federal Credit Reporting Act (Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681m) (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Expungement Class, and the Administrative Action Class against All Defendants) For Violation of the Federal Credit Reporting Act Reporting Antedated Charges (Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) and (5)) (On Behalf of the Plaintiff and the Antedated Report Class against all Defendants)

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10. A second distinct revenue-augmenting surcharge FedEx Express charges and collects in certain circumstances is the residential delivery component of the delivery area surcharge. The FedEx Service Guide defines the delivery area surcharge as a per package fee for “shipments destined to select U.S. ZIP codes” that FedEx Express deems more costly and inconvenient to service. A list of these ZIP codes is available at fedex.com. The universe of these area surcharge deliveries is further broken down into two categories: regular and extended. In each instance, the amount of the surcharge is increased if the shipment is a residential delivery. 12. For calendar year 2010, the extended delivery area-commercial surcharge was $1.70. For calendar year 2010, the extended delivery area-residential surcharge was $2.75 (i.e., $1.05 more than commercial). Effective January 3, 2011, FedEx Express unilaterally upped the extended delivery area-commercial surcharge to $1.85. Effective January 3, 2011, FedEx Express unilaterally upped the extended delivery-area residential surcharge to $3.00 (i.e., $1.15 more than commercial). 13. The residential delivery and delivery area surcharges are cumulative. Thus, if a shipment is a residential delivery and is also “destined to select U.S. ZIP codes,” the shipment is subject to both a residential delivery and a delivery area-residential surcharge. 14. FedEx Express employs three methods to classify whether a shipment is a residential delivery or a non-residential delivery: (a) First, FedEx Express deems a shipment to be a residential delivery if the customer identifies it as a delivery to a residential address. (b) Second, FedEx Express checks the recipient’s address against a national database of addresses. This database indicates whether the address is a business address, residential address, or unknown. FedEx Express deems the shipment to be a residential delivery if the address is listed in the database as residential or unknown. (c) Third, FedEx Express deems a shipment to be a residential delivery if its delivery person specifies that the destination is residential address. 16. This methodology inevitably results in FedEx Express charging a significant volume of residential delivery and delivery area-residential surcharges for shipments to non- residential destinations. 17. The database that FedEx Express uses is riddled with errors. The database incorrectly identifies government offices, high-rise office towers, and other similar buildings as residential addresses, even though it is readily apparent to FedEx Express personnel that those buildings are not residential and the imposition of a residential delivery charge constitutes an overcharge. 18. The database also classifies some addresses as unknown. By defaulting all such unknown addresses into the residential category for delivery pricing purposes, FedEx Express imposes a high volume of inaccurate residential delivery and delivery area-residential surcharges in violation of the pricing FedEx Express specifies in its contracts with its customers. 19. FedEx Express delivery persons also provide tracking entries that contain a high and unbalanced error rate in misclassifying shipments to commercial destinations as residential deliveries. For example, entries that state that a package was delivered to “receptionist/front desk,” “shipping/receiving,” “mailroom,” or “guard/security station” all reflect the characteristics of a shipment to a commercial location and characteristics utterly inconsistent with a residential delivery. Yet, even when these entries appear in the tracking information, FedEx Express often imposes unwarranted and improper residential and delivery area-residential surcharges on its customers. 21. For example, on February 26, 2010, Gokare entered into a contract with FedEx Express to ship time-sensitive immigration documents to the United States Citizen and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) processing center in Saint Albans, Vermont. The recipient’s address was listed as: Premium Processing Service USCIS – Vermont Service Center 31. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and members of the following class: All persons who, during the period commencing February 18, 2010 and continuing until resolution of this action, purchased FedEx Express package delivery services in the U.S. domestic market, and who were charged and paid a residential delivery surcharge or a delivery area-residential surcharge (or both), for any delivery that was not destined to a home or private residence. The class excludes Defendant, its affiliates, and class counsel. 32. This class action is brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because issues of law and fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Given the extraordinarily high volume of contract claims generated by Defendant’s repetitive imposition of improper and unwarranted surcharges in which the stakes are generally less than $5 for each contract breached, a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. Indeed, a class action is the only practicable vehicle for securing a remedy for Defendant’s numerous breaches of contracts with its customers. 35. The contract claims of Plaintiff are typical of the contract claims of the class. Plaintiff is a member of the class, and its experience with the Defendant is representative of the experience of class members in general. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is committed to obtaining just relief for all class members and has retained counsel with experience in breach of contract and class action litigation. 37. A class action is manageable because the facts relating to the size of the class, the identity of class members, the systemic and formulaic nature of the Defendant’s conduct in overcharging class members by misapplying residential delivery surcharges to commercial shipments, and the extent of damages inflicted on the class through Defendant’s improper and unwarranted misclassification of commercial shipments as residential deliveries can be readily established through business records maintained for the benefit of the Defendant and its publicly- traded reporting parent company in the control of Defendant. 8. FedEx Express augments its revenue by charging and collecting certain surcharges from its customers. 9. One surcharge contemplated in the pricing terms offered by FedEx Express is a residential delivery charge, which the FedEx Service Guide defines as a per package fee for “a delivery to a home or a private residence.” During calendar year 2010, FedEx Express set its residential delivery surcharge at $2.50. Effective January 3, 2011, FedEx Express unilaterally upped this residential delivery charge to $2.75.

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63. This matter is brought by Plaintiff on behalf of itself and those similarly situated, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3). COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED I.

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33. In December 2019, an initial cluster of nine patients with an unknown cause of viral pneumonia was found to be linked to the Huanan seafood market in Wuhan, China, where many non-aquatic animals such as birds were also on sale. However, one of the patients never visited the market, though he had stayed in a hotel nearby before the onset of the illness.4 35. The first confirmed case of the virus outside China was diagnosed on January 13, 2020 in Bangkok, Thailand with the number of cases exceedingly increasing worldwide. On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the SARS-COv-2 outbreak constituted a public health emergency of international concern, and by February 11, 2020, the virus was named “COVID-19” by the WHO Director-General.7 As of April 15, 2020, the WHO reports a confirmed 1.9 million cases of COVID-19 globally and over 123,000 deaths, with the United States dealing with more than 578,000 confirmed cases and 23,000 deaths - more than any other country.8 37. It has now been discovered by scientists that COVID-19 has several modes of transmission. Pursuant to a “Situation Report” released by the WHO, the virus can be transmitted through symptomatic transmission, pre-symptomatic transmission, or asymptomatic transmission.11 Symptomatic transmission refers to transmission by an individual who is experiencing symptoms associated with the virus who then transfers COVID-19 to another individual. Data from published studies provide evidence that COVID-19 is primarily transmitted from symptomatic people to others who are in close contact through respiratory droplets, by direct contact with infected persons, or by contact with contaminated objects and surfaces.12 39. An individual who does not develop symptoms, an asymptomatic case of COVID- 19, can still transmit the virus to another. Though there are few documented cases reported, it does not exclude the possibility that it has or may occur.15 40. Not only is COVID-19 transmitted via human-to-human, but the WHO and scientific studies have confirmed that the virus can live on contaminated objects or surfaces. According to a study by scientists documented in The New England Journal of Medicine, COVID- 19 was detectable in aerosols for up to three hours, up to four hours on copper, up to 24 hours on cardboard, and up to two to three days on plastic and stainless steel.16 All of these materials are used in the preparation and service of food by restaurants. The results of the study suggest that individuals could get COVID-19 through indirect contact with surfaces or objects used by an infected person, whether they were symptomatic. 44. The secondary exposure of the surface to humans is particularly acute in places where the public gathers typically to socialize, eat, drink, shop, be entertained, and go for recreation. This is why the CDC recommends that in viral outbreaks individuals who are infected stay at home and those who are not sick engage in preventive measures such as constant hand washing and avoiding activities that would bring them into close proximity of people with the virus or surfaces where the virus may reside. However, because these recommendations have proven ineffective to minimize the spread of COVID-19, containment efforts have led to civil authorities issuing orders closing non-essential business establishments, including restaurants, bars, hotels, theaters, personal care salons, gyms, and schools, and mandating social distancing among the population. This has caused the cancelation of sporting events, parades, and concerts, the closure of amusement parks, and substantial travel restrictions. In addition, to conserve medical supplies, orders have been issued prohibiting the performance of non-urgent or non-emergency elective procedures and surgeries, forcing the suspension of operations at many medical, surgical, therapeutic, and dental practices. 46. Hartford’s insurance policies issued to Plaintiffs and the Class Members are “all risk” commercial property polices which cover loss or damage to the covered premises resulting from all risks other than those expressly excluded. 47. Plaintiffs’ Policy, as well as the policies of other Class Members, are standard forms that are used by Hartford for all insureds having applicable coverage. C. Plaintiffs’ Factual Allegations 48. Among the coverages provided by the Policy was business interruption insurance, which, generally, would indemnify Plaintiffs for lost income and profits in the event that their businesses were shut down. 49. SA Plaintiffs’ Property Choice – Special Business Income Coverage Form (Business Interruption), Form PC 00 20 01 13 provided coverage as follows: We will pay up to the Special Business Income Business Income Limit of Insurance stated in the Property Choice Schedule of Premises and Coverages for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain the actual, necessary and reasonable Extra Expense you incur due to the necessary interruption of your business operations during the Period of Restoration due to direct physical loss of or direct physical damage to. property caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss at “Scheduled Premises” where a limit of insurance is shown for Special Business Income. If you are a tenant, this Coverage applies to portion of the building which you rent, lease occupy, and extends to common service areas and access routes to your area. . 50. In addition SA Plaintiff’s Policy contained Property Choice Special Business Income – Additional Coverages, Form PC 26 02 01 13, which provides: This insurance is extended to apply to the actual loss of Business Income you sustain and the actual, necessary and reasonable Extra Expense you incur when access to your “Scheduled Properties” is specifically prohibited by order of a civil authority as the direct result of a Covered Cause of Loss to property in the immediate area of your “Scheduled Premises”. 52. Under the SA Plaintiffs’ Property Choice Special Business Income – Additional Coverages form, Extra Expense is defined as: the actual, necessary and reasonable expenses you incur during the Period of Restoration that you would not have incurred if there had been no direct physical loss of or direct physical damage to property caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss at “Scheduled Premises”. We will pay Extra Expense (other than the expense to repair or replace property) to: a. Avoid or minimize suspension of business and to continue operation at a “Scheduled Premises” or at replacement premises or temporary locations including relocation expenses and costs to equip and operate the replacement location or temporary location. b. Minimize the suspension of business if you cannot continue operations. We will also pay Extra Expenses to repair or replace property, but only to the extent reduces the amount of loss that otherwise would have been payable under the Coverage Form. c. Extra Expense Coverage does not apply to any expense related to any recall of products you manufacture, handle or distribute. 53. In the SA Plaintiff’s Policy defines Causes of Loss in a separate form of the Policy, Property Choice – Covered Causes of Loss and Exclusions Form, Form PC 10 10 01 13. A Covered Cause of Loss “means direct physical loss or direct physical damage that occurs during the Policy period and in the Coverage Territory unless the loss or damage is excluded or limited in this policy.” 54. The interruption of Plaintiffs’ and other class members’ businesses was not caused by any of the exclusions set forth in the applicable Policy. 56. Plaintiffs and all similarly situated Class members have suffered a direct physical loss of and damage to their property because they have been unable to use their property for its intended purpose. 57. The exclusion contained in the Virus and Bacteria endorsement is not applicable because Plaintiffs’, and other class members’, losses were not caused by a “virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease”, Rather, the efficient proximate cause of Plaintiffs’, and other Class Members’ losses, were precautionary measures taken by their respective States to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the future, not because coronavirus was found in or on Plaintiffs’ insured property. 58. Notwithstanding the foregoing, by way of letter dated April 8, 2020, the Hartford denied SA Plaintiffs’ claim for business interruption losses under the Policy because their properties had not suffered any direct physical loss and because the losses were excluded by the bacteria and virus exclusion endorsement, and other exclusions which were not applicable to Plaintiffs’ losses. D. The COVID-19 Pandemic has Affected Policyholders Nationwide. 59. COVID-19 is physically impacting private commercial property in New York and throughout the United States, threatening the survival of thousands of restaurants, retail establishments, and other businesses that have had their business operations suspended or curtailed indefinitely by order of civil authorities. 60. No insurer intends to cover any losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 62. In addition, many state departments of insurance have issued advisories to business owners that COVID-19 is not an insured peril and there will be no coverage for business interruption. This is disinformation being published to discourage business owners from filing claims. 63. For instance, Arkansas Insurance Department Bulletin No. 9-2020 states that “In most BII policies, coverage is triggered when the policyholder sustains physical damage to insured property caused by a covered peril resulting in quantifiable business interruption loss . . . viruses and disease are typically NOT an insured peril unless added by endorsement (emphasis in the original).26 64. The South Carolina Department of Insurance issues “Guidance” on business interruption insurance stating that under the business income policy, there likely is no coverage from losses resulting from a virus.27 66. For instance, the State of Connecticut Insurance Department, Maryland Insurance Administration and the West Virginia Office of the Insurance Commissioner issued nearly identical notices supporting the insurance companies’ reasons for denying business interruption claims, stating that the potential loss costs from such perils [like COVID-19] are so extreme that providing coverage would jeopardize the financial solvency of property insurers.28 67. John F. King, Insurance and Safety Fire Commission for the State of Georgia issued Bulletin 20-EX-3 stating that losses from COVID-19 are excluded losses.29 Vicki Schmidt, Kansas Insurance Department Commission issued a similar Bulletin stating it was her “understanding it is unlikely that a business policy would cover losses related to COVID-19.”30 69. A declaratory judgment determining that the business income loss and extra expense coverage provided in common all-risk commercial property insurance policies applies to the suspension, curtailment, and interruption of business operations resulting from measures put into place by civil authorities is necessary to prevent the Plaintiffs and similarly situated Class members from being denied critical coverage for which they have paid. 70. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. 72. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify, expand, or amend the definitions of the proposed classes following the discovery period and before the Court determines whether class certification is appropriate. 73. Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same claims. Numerosity 74. This action satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). The Class numbers at least in the hundreds and consists of geographically dispersed business entities who are insured for business interruption losses. Hartford sells many insurance policies in the State of New York and most, if not all, other states and therefore joinder of the Class members is impracticable. 75. The identity of Class members is ascertainable, as the names and addresses of all Class members can be identified in Hartford’s or their agent’s books and records. Plaintiffs anticipate providing appropriate notice to the certified Class in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(A) and/or (B), to be approved by the Court after class certification, or pursuant to court order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d). Typicality 77. Plaintiffs are committed to prosecuting the action, will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation, including litigation relating to insurance policies. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with other members of the Class. Plaintiffs anticipate no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. Commonality 79. This action satisfies the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the rights of the Class members. The joinder of individual Class members is impracticable because of the vast number of Class members who have entered into the standard all-risk commercial property insurance policies with the Defendants. 80. Because a declaratory judgment as to the rights and obligations under the uniform all-risk commercial property insurance policies will apply to all Class members, most or all Class Members would have no rational economic interest in individually controlling the prosecution of specific actions. The burden imposed on the judicial system by individual litigation, and to Hartford, by even a small fraction of the Class members, would be enormous. 81. In comparison to piecemeal litigation, class action litigation presents far fewer management difficulties, far better conserves the resources of both the judiciary and the parties, and far more effectively protects the rights of each Class member. The benefits to the legitimate interests of the parties, the Court, and the public resulting from class action litigation substantially outweigh the expenses, burdens, inconsistencies, economic infeasibility, and inefficiencies of individualized litigation. Class adjudication is superior to other alternatives under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)(D). Class treatment will also avoid the substantial risk of inconsistent factual and legal determinations on the many issues in this lawsuit. 83. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-82 as if fully set forth herein. 84. Plaintiffs bring this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the National Class and New York Subclass. 85. Plaintiffs’ Hartford Policy, as well as those of the other Class Members, are contracts under which Hartford was paid premiums in exchange for its promise to pay Plaintiffs’ and the other Class Members’ losses for claims covered by the Policy. 86. Plaintiffs and other Class Members have complied with all applicable provisions of the Policies and/or those provisions have been waived by Hartford or Hartford is estopped from asserting them, and yet Hartford has abrogated its insurance coverage obligations pursuant to the Policies’ clear and unambiguous terms and has wrongfully and illegally refused to provide coverage to which Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled. 87. Hartford has denied claims related to COVID-19 on a uniform and class-wide basis, without individual bases or investigations, so the Court can render declaratory judgment no matter whether members of the Class have filed a claim. 89. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Plaintiffs and the other Class Members seek a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring the following: i. Plaintiffs’ and the other Class Members’ Business Income losses incurred in connection with the Closure Order and the necessary interruption of their businesses stemming from Orders intended to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic are insured losses under their Policies; and ii. Hartford is obligated to pay Plaintiffs and other Class Members for the full amount of the Business Income losses incurred and to be incurred in connection with the Closure Order during the period of restoration and the necessary interruption of their businesses stemming from Orders intended to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic. 90. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1-89 as if fully set forth herein. 91. Plaintiffs bring this Count individually and on behalf of the other members of the National Class and New York Subclass. 92. Plaintiffs’ Hartford Policy, as well as those of the other Class members, are contracts under which Hartford was paid premiums in exchange for its promise to pay Plaintiffs’ and the other Class Members’ losses for claims covered by the Policy. 94. Hartford also agreed to pay for its insureds’ actual loss of Business Income sustained due to the necessary “interruption of [their] operations” during the “Period of Restoration” caused by direct physical loss or damage. 95. “Business Income” under the Policy means the “Net Income (Net Profit or Net Loss before income taxes), including Income and Royalties, that would have been earned or incurred”, as well as “[c]ontinuing normal operating expenses incurred, including Payroll Expenses” 96. The Closure Orders caused direct physical loss and damage to Plaintiffs’ and the other Class Members’ Covered Properties, requiring suspension of operations at the Covered Properties. Losses caused by the Closure Orders thus triggered the Business Income provision of Plaintiffs’ and the other Class Members’ Hartford policies. 97. Plaintiffs and the other Class Members have complied with all applicable provisions of their policies and/or those provisions have been waived by Hartford or Hartford estopped from asserting them, and yet Hartford has abrogated its insurance coverage obligations pursuant to the Policies’ clear and unambiguous terms. 98. By denying coverage for any Business Income losses incurred by Plaintiffs and other Class Members as a result of the Closure Orders and Orders intended to mitigate the COVID- 19 pandemic, Hartford has breached its coverage obligations under the Policies. A. The Global COVID-19 Pandemic BREACH OF CONTRACT – BUSINESS INCOME COVERAGE (Claim Brought on Behalf of the National Class and New York Subclasses) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – BUSINESS INCOME COVERAGE (Claim Brought on Behalf of the National Class and New York Subclass) FELICE CHAMBERS LLC, and FELICE WATER STREET LLC on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. LAFAYETTE RISTORANTE LLC, FELICE GOLD STREET LLC, SA 61ST MANAGEMENT LLC, SA YORK AVE LLC,

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Violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant Violation of California Business & Professions Code §§17500, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant 26. In addition to asserting class claims, Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of class members pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. The purpose of such claims is to obtain injunctive orders regarding the unfair and unlawful business practices which emanated from Defendant’s principal place of business as alleged herein. This private attorneys general action is necessary and appropriate because Defendant has engaged in wrongful acts described herein as part of the regular practice of its business. 27. Plaintiff brings this action and all claims stated within on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 28. The claims and causes of action alleged herein arise under Federal law and California law. 29. Plaintiffs seeks to certify the following Proposed Class: All persons domiciled within the United States who, on or after November 30, 2012, purchased Trans Fat Food manufactured or sold by Pinnacle Foods, Inc. containing partially hydrogenated oil. 35. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 36. Plaintiff and the Proposed Class are “consumers” as defined by Civil Code § 1761(d). 45. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 46. The Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq., prohibits the Defendant from engaging in any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices in connection with the conduct of its business. 47. “Unfair competition” is defined by Business & Professions Code § 17200 as encompassing several types of business “wrongs,” including, but not limited to: (1) an “unlawful” business act or practice, (2) an “unfair” business act or practice, and (3) “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” The definitions in § 17200 are drafted in the disjunctive, meaning that each of these “wrongs” operates independently from the others. 66. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 67. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law at Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. 68. Plaintiff brings this cause of action as an individual, in his capacity as a private attorney general, and on behalf of the Proposed Class. 69. Defendant intended to sell the Trans Fat Food to Plaintiff and the Proposed Class. 70. Defendant disseminated advertising before the public in California that: (a) contained statements that were illegal, untrue or misleading; (b) defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, was illegal, untrue or misleading; (c) concerned the nature, quantity and characteristics of goods intended for sale to California consumers, including Plaintiff and the Proposed Class; and (d) was likely to mislead or deceive a reasonable consumer. 77. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 78. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Proposed Class against Defendant. 79. Defendant, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller, expressly warranted that the Trans Fat Food contained no Trans Fat or the quantity of Trans Fat identified on the package or label. 80. Defendant gave Plaintiff and the Proposed Class a description of the Trans Fat Food that included a representation that the Trans Fat Food contained no Trans Fat or the quantity identified on the package or label. 81. The true facts are that the Trans Fat Food does not contain no Trans Fat, but actually contain harmful quantities of Trans Fat, and therefore does not meet the quality represented by the Defendant and are, in fact, unsafe and unfit for human consumption. 82. The Trans Fat Food is not suitable for sale in the United States because each of the express warranties regarding Trans Fat content is false. 83. Plaintiff took reasonable steps to notify the Defendant that the Trans Fat Food included false representations. 86. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 87. Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class purchased the Trans Fat Food, which set forth a label or container making statements of fact with respect to the quantity Trans Fat contained therein. Defendant breached the implied warranty of merchantability because Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class did not receive goods that conformed to the promises or affirmations of fact on the Defendant’s containers or labels. 88. At the time of purchase, Defendant was in the business of selling the Trans Fat Food as a consumer good to the Plaintiff, the Proposed Class and the general public as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller. Defendant impliedly warranted that the Trans Fat Food contained lawful ingredients, contained no Trans Fat or contained only the amount of Trans Fat indicated on the package or label, and was legal for sale in the United States. Breach of Express Warranty By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant Breach of the Implied Warranty Of Merchantability By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1770, et seq. By Plaintiff and the Proposed Class against Defendant (Injunctive Relief Only with Reservation)

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28. The number of persons in the class makes joinder of the individual class members impractical. 29. There are questions of fact and law common to all class members. Factually, all class members are public employees and union nonmembers who have been forced to pay “fair-share fees” to Education Minnesota as a condition of their employment. Legally, the U.S. Constitution and Minnesota tort law afford the same rights to every member of the class. 30. Ms. Hoekman’s claims are typical of other class members, as each class mem- ber has objected to union membership yet was subject to “fair-share fees” despite their refusal to join Education Minnesota or its affiliates. 31. Ms. Hoekman adequately represents the interests of their fellow class mem- bers, and she has no interests antagonistic to the class. 32. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because separate actions by class members could risk inconsistent adjudications on the underlying legal issues. 33. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an adju- dication determining the constitutionality of compulsory “fair-share fees” will, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of all class members. 35. Ms. York seeks to represent a separate class of union members who would have quit the union but chose to remain because they would have been compelled to pay “fair-share fees” had they resigned. This class includes all individuals who: (1) are or were employed by the State of Minnesota or any of its subunits, including any school district in the State; (2) are or were members of Education Minnesota who would have quit the union had they not been forced to work in an unconstitutional agency shop. The class includes everyone who has ever fallen within this definition, including former or retired teachers or teachers who have moved to other States, and it includes anyone who comes within the class definition at any time before the con- clusion of this action. 36. The number of persons in the class makes joinder of the individual class members impractical. 37. There are questions of fact and law common to all class members. Factually, all class members are reluctant union nonmembers who remained in Education Min- nesota only because they would have been forced to pay “fair-share fees” had they quit. Legally, the U.S. Constitution and Minnesota tort law afford the same rights and remedies to every member of the class. 38. Ms. York’s claims are typical of other class members, as each class member opposes Education Minnesota yet chose to remain in the union on account of the unconstitutional agency-shop arrangement. 39. Ms. York adequately represents the interests of her fellow class members, and she has no interests antagonistic to the class. 41. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because an adju- dication determining the constitutionality of compulsory “fair-share fees” and the ap- propriate remedy for reluctant union members such as Ms. York will, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of all class members. 42. A class action can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(3) because the common questions of law and fact identified in the complaint predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because, among other things, all class members are subjected to the same violation of their constitu- tional rights, but the amount of money involved in each individual’s claim would make it burdensome for class members to maintain separate actions.

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14. In addition to the facts pled above, at various times prior to the filing of the instant complaint, including within one year preceding the filing of this complaint, DEFENDANT contacted PLAINTIFF in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt. 15. On or about 2014, Plaintiff began receiving numerous calls from Defendant. 16. During these telephone calls and recorded in voice messages on November 6, 2014 and November 14, 2014, Defendant informed Plaintiff that that she would be served at her place of residence or at her work in relation to a suit brought against her. 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 21. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 22. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 23. The Class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of The Class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that The Class includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that The Class members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 9. Beginning in or around 2014, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number ending in -0402, in an effort to collect an alleged debt owed from Plaintiff. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C). Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for the following:

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11. This Action is properly maintained as a statewide class action. The Class consists of:  All New Jersey consumers who were sent collection letters and/or notices from the Defendant that contained at least one of the alleged violations arising from the Defendant's violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 13. Sometime prior to June 5, 2012, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Home Depot. 14. The Home Depot obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 15. At sometime prior to June 5, 2012, the Home Depot obligation was assigned to Arches Financial, LLC. 16. At the time the Arches Financial, LLC received assignment of the Home Depot obligation, said obligation was in default. 17. At some time prior to June 5, 2012, Arches Financial, LLC, assigned said obligation to FNCB for the purpose of collection. 18. FNCB contends that the alleged obligation is in default. 19. The alleged obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 20. Plaintiff is at all times relevant to this lawsuit, a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). 21. FCNB collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 23. On or about June 5, 2012, FNCB caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a collection letter addressed to Plaintiff. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A. 24. Said letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by FNCB as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 25. Said letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§1692a(5). 26. Said letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 27. Upon receipt, Plaintiff read said letter. 28. On information and belief, said letter is a computer – generated form letter, that is prepared for FNCB and sent to consumers from whom it is attempting to collect a debt. 29. Said letter stated in part, "Our client ARCHES FINANCIAL, LLC is offering you a settlement of $655.11 in 6 payments over 6 months starting on 06/26/12. (21 days)". 30. Said letter further stated, "Payments may not be more than 30 days apart or this settlement may be cancelled. Please send in the payments along with the payment stub to the address listed on the coupon." 31. Said letter contained six detachable coupons each with the following "DUE DATE" and "PAYMENT AMT." 1 of 6 06/26/12 $109.19 2 of 6 07/26/12 $109.19 3 of 6 08/25/12 $109.19 4 of 6 09/24/12 $109.19 5 of 6 10/24/12 $109.19 6 of 6 11/23/12 $109.19 (Exhibit A). 33. Said letter also states that Plaintiff may pay the alleged debt by credit card, but FNCB charges a transaction fee for doing so: Payment by Credit Cards - Transaction Fees MasterCard and Visa: $5.00 per $150.00 (Exhibit A). 34. Said letter did not state the Transaction Fee should Plaintiff choose to pay the alleged debt with a Discovery Card. 35. The transaction fee sought by FNCB exceeds any service charge FNCB incurs from its credit card processor or vendor. 38. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 37 as if the same were set forth at length. INC.; and JOHN DOES 1-25. Defendant(s). Plaintiff, Lenore John, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) by and through her undersigned attorney, alleges against the above- named Defendant, First National Collection Bureau, Inc. (hereinafter “FNCB”); and John Does 1-25, collectively (“Defendants”) their employees, agents, and successors the following: VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.

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(COMMON LAW CONTRACT AND/OR QUASI-CONTRACT) (FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT) 1. Permitting the Collective Action Plaintiffs to join this case as Plaintiffs. 2. Declaring that the Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act; 3. Declaring that the Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were willful; 4. Granting judgment to Plaintiffs and represented parties for their claims of unpaid wages as secured by the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as an equal amount in liquidated damages; 47. Plaintiff Johnson began employment with Defendant in or about April 2011. Plaintiff Johnson left employment with Defendant in or about June 2014. 48. OTHER NAMED PLAINTIFFS began and ended their employment with Defendant in or about the dates set forth on the chart attached as Exhibit C hereto. 49. Plaintiffs are or were loan originators employed by WATERSTONE to originate mortgage loans. 5. Awarding Plaintiffs, including class and collective represented parties prejudgment interest, and their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and 50. Plaintiffs’ job responsibilities were established by WATERSTONE. 51. Plaintiff and class members regularly worked more than 40 hours per week for Defendant. Plaintiffs regularly work 50 or more hours per week. 52. Prior to August 1, 2010, WATERSTONE treated its mortgage loan originators as exempt from the FLSA. 54. Upon information and belief, WATERSTONE was aware of the change, which was well publicized in the mortgage industry. Nevertheless, WATERSTONE did not begin to record loan originators’ hours of work and did not move to pay some loan originators overtime for hours over 40 in a work week until August 1, 2010, and reclassified all loan originators as non-exempt in April 2011. 55. The recording and tracking of Plaintiff loan originators’ work is administered and monitored by WATERSTONE on computerized time keeping systems. 56. On or about August 1, 2010, WATERSTONE changed its compensation structure, sending each loan originator a new written employment agreement to be executed by the company and the loan originator wherein they were classified as Inside or Outside loan originators. The Outside agreement agreed to pay Outside loan originators commission only. The new Inside employment agreement agreed to pay loan originators under a combination commission and hourly wage structure. 57. WATERSTONE knows that loan originators must work long hours, well over 40 in a week, in order to make commission income exceeding their floor, since they must engage in extensive promotional activities necessary to originating loans, activities such as meeting with realtors and attorneys, attending open houses, networking, etc. They must also engage in extensive loan processing activities to see that the loans they originate are processed through to closing. 58. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and class members were working in excess of 40 hours in a work week. 60. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs were recording their hours of work in rote fashion even though a loan originators’ hours are not routine, since they must answer calls from prospective borrowers at all hours of the day, including in the evening and on weekends. 61. WATERSTONE required loan originators to bear expenses which are for the benefit and convenience of WATERSTONE, such as travel expenses, internet, training, and cell phone expenses, among others. 62. Defendant discouraged Plaintiffs including class members from recording hours of work in excess of 40 in a work week. 63. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to keep accurate time records for all the work Plaintiffs and the class members did on a daily or weekly basis. 64. Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiffs and the class members overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over 40 in a week. 65. Defendant failed to pay the Plaintiffs including the class members compensation equal to or higher than the federal or higher state minimum wage rate for all hours worked in a week. 66. Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs and the class members their wages “free and clear.” 67. WATERSTONE’s contract with loan originators stated that “Commissions are calculated by deducting the Base Pay paid during the current pay period from the aggregate commission calculated pursuant to Addendum A.” 68. WATERSTONE uses a bi-weekly pay period and pays commissions on a monthly basis, if any were earned. 70. Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiffs for their purchase of all work tools and supplies. 71. Beginning in April 2011, WATERSTONE treated all loan originators as FLSA non- exempt hourly workers requiring that it pay loan originators at least the minimum wage for each work week, with overtime at the rate of time and one-half for each hour over 40 worked in a workweek. 72. WATERSTONE promised its loan originators that they would receive a regular hourly rate of at least the minimum wage rate and overtime at the rate of time and one-half. 73. This promise as stated in the prior paragraph was set forth in a written contract given to each loan originator. WATERSTONE admitted this fact in a sworn pleading it filed in its malpractice lawsuit against its former attorneys in this case, Offit Kurman. 3:17-cv-796-jdp, Doc. 17, ¶8-10, stating, “After retaining Defendants as its attorneys, Defendants recommended that, based on an opinion letter from the U.S. Department of Labor, WATERSTONE change its employment agreements so as to treat the LOs as non-exempt under the FLSA in the sense that WATERSTONE voluntarily agreed to pay LOs overtime for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Specifically, it was Attorney Ari Karen (‘Karen’) and/or Attorney Russell Berger (‘Berger’) at the Offit Kurman law firm that provided this legal advice. Based on that advice, Defendants drafted new employment agreements for WATERSTONE’s LOs to execute. The new employment agreements, drafted by Defendants, stated, among other things, that WATERSTONE would pay the employee minimum wage for all hours worked in a given week up to 40 hours, and would pay the employee overtime for all hours worked in a given week in excess of 40 hours.” 75. Defendant’s stated policy was to pay Plaintiffs time and one-half their regular hourly rate for hours worked over 40 in a week. 76. Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs time and one-half their regular hourly rate for hours worked over 40 in a week. 77. Defendant did not pay Plaintiffs minimum wages or overtime in compliance with their promise to do so or in compliance with federal law. 78. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and class members the proper wages required by law was willful. 79. Defendant failed to accurately record Plaintiffs’ start and stop time and daily and weekly hours of work. 80. Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs worked hours over 40 hours in a week and worked hours that they did not report. 81. Upon information and belief, it was Defendant’s willful policy and pattern or practice not to pay its employees, including Named and Other Plaintiffs, the Class Action Members, and the FLSA Collective Members (collectively “Class Members”), for all hours of work at their promised rate of pay, at the regular rate of pay, or pay an overtime premium for all work that exceeded 40 hours in a week, or in the amount agreed to by its employment agreement with loan originators. 83. Defendant was aware or should have been aware that the law required it to pay non-exempt employees, including Plaintiffs and the Class Members, an overtime premium of time and one-half for all work-hours it suffered or permitted in excess of 40 per workweek. Upon information and belief, Defendant applied the same unlawful policies and practices to its loan originators in every state in which it operated. 84. Defendant failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §207 et seq. and its implementing regulations. 85. Defendant’s failure to pay proper wages for each hour worked over 40 per week was willful within the meaning of the FLSA. 86. Defendant failed to pay minimum wages wages to Plaintiffs in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §206 et seq. and its implementing regulations. 87. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs proper minimum wages for each hour worked per week was willful within the meaning of the FLSA. 88. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs proper overtime wages for each hour worked over 40 per week was willful within the meaning of the FLSA. 89. Defendant’s failure to comply with the FLSA overtime and minimum wage protections caused Plaintiffs to suffer loss of wages and interest thereon. 90. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 92. Plaintiffs performed labor for Defendant knowing of and relying upon Defendant’s promise. 93. Defendant failed to pay the promised regular rate and the overtime premium wages for the hours it knew or should have known that Plaintiffs worked in violation of its promise to pay such wages. 94. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime as promised violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the common law doctrines of contract and/or quasi-contract. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court enter an Order:

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15. Defendant Strom, a privately-held corporation, provides staffing in the form of strike and lockout replacement labor for unionized employers at locations throughout the United States. 17. In doing so, these strike-busting agencies and the companies that hire them not only exert downward pressure on working standards, benefits, and conditions for workers in general, but do so on the backs of temporary workers who are uniquely vulnerable to exploitation and limited in their ability to organize or advocate for their rights.2 18. Although there has been a long history of employers hiring replacement workers to oppose union organizing, the scale of worker replacement afforded by strike-busting agencies like Strom takes this anti-union tool to an entirely new level.3 Strike-busting agencies are able to mobilize hundreds or thousands of skilled or semi-skilled workers with little to no notice, lowering the hurdles for employers taking hardline stands against union demands and eliminating any negative implications to a company’s productivity. 19. These features are central to the services Strom offers, which are advertised as calling upon a “30,000+ employee database to identify Strom employees with project-relevant experience,” “eliminate[ing] the lead-time generally associated with the activation of temporary replacement workers”, and ensuring that Strom demonstrates “to union leaders that direct action is being taken to make sure all company obligations are met without exception.” http://www.stromengineering.com/staffing/strike-staffing/ (last accessed June 30, 2017). 21. Strom describes an employer’s motivations during a lockout as follows: Other times, particularly in the United States, a lockout occurs when union membership rejects the company’s final offer at negotiations and offers to return to work under the same conditions of employment as existed under the now-expired contract. In such a case, the lockout is designed to pressure the workers into accepting the terms of the company’s last offer. http://stromengineering.rocket55staging.com/about/resources/ (last accessed June 30, 2017) (emphasis added). 22. Touting its position as “the nation’s most reputable industrial strike staffing company” with over “55 years of experience in labor staffing and 25 years of experience providing strike staffing,” Strom’s promotional statements hint at the larger historical context within which Strom’s activities and those of the companies with whom it contracts should be understood. http://www.stromengineering.com/about/about-strom/ (last accessed June 29, 2017). 24. Meanwhile, the structure of strike-busting agencies’ employment of replacement workers places those workers in a uniquely precarious position that makes it nearly impossible for them to organize and advocate for their own labor rights.5 25. While strike-busting agencies employ thousands of replacement workers, these workers do not work together consistently but are sent from workplace to workplace, isolated from both their replacement and union counterparts and thus limited in their ability to organize and advocate for themselves. 26. Even if they are stationed at one worksite for an extended period, few replacement workers can risk engaging in union activities or other advocacy because they could immediately lose their current job as well as any future assignments by being identified as trouble-makers. As such, the structural ambiguity of temporary employment places logistical limitations on traditional labor protections. 27. With neither job security, the ability to organize, nor ready access to traditional labor protections, replacement workers are extremely vulnerable. They are at the mercy of the strike-busting agencies and companies whose priorities center on ensuring continuity in their own operations, frequently at the expense of the work conditions and basic rights of the replacement workers that make this possible. B. A. BACKGROUND

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26. Since 2008, Defendant Rue La La has maintained a “members-only” private sale website that promises consumers discounted deals on various products and services. 27. To receive the deals offered by Defendant Rue La La, consumers must sign up and provide their email addresses and other personal information to Defendant Rue La La. 28. Close to 7.5 million people reportedly have signed up as members to receive offers from Defendant Rue La La. 29. To arouse consumer interest and create the urgency to buy gift certificates, Defendant Rue La La offers deals for a limited amount of time—usually a 24-48 hour period. This creates a “shopping frenzy” among consumers who feel pressured to purchase gift certificates as quickly as possible. 31. Defendant Rue La La subsequently sends a confirmatory email to purchasers containing the gift certificate to be printed and presented to the merchant upon redemption. 32. The gift certificates may be directly redeemed with the retail businesses who purport to offer the products and services indicated on the gift certificate. 33. Defendants impose illegal expiration dates, among other onerous conditions, on each gift certificate they sell and issue. The expiration dates on gift certificates are frequently just a few months from the date of purchase. 34. Defendants know that after they have driven consumers to purchase gift certificates as quickly as possible, many consumers ultimately will be unable to redeem the gift certificates before the expiration date. 35. Accordingly, consumers often cannot take advantage of and/or use the product or service they paid for before the expiration date unilaterally imposed by Defendants. This results in a very substantial windfall for Defendants. 36. In addition to imposing illegal expiration periods, Defendants impose other deceptive and unfair conditions on consumers. Defendants require consumers to redeem gift certificates in the course of a single transaction. Consumers therefore are forced to redeem their gift certificates all at once and cannot use their gift certificates for multiple transactions or on multiple occasions. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendant Rue La La changed its expiration date policy sometime after July 2012 in an attempt to comply with federal and state laws and differentiate the gift certificates’ paid and promotional values. B. Defendant Rue La La’s Retail Business Partners Agree to Sell Gift Certificates with Illegal Expiration Dates 39. Defendant Rue La La focuses on two markets: (a) the consumers who wish to obtain the advertised products or services by purchasing gift certificates, and (b) the retail businesses who partner with Defendant Rue La La to promote their products and services. These retail businesses are willing to work with Defendant Rue La La and offer their products and services at a discount because Defendant Rue La La promises to promote their products and services to its huge subscription base and guarantees them a specified volume of business. 40. Defendant Rue La La partners with local businesses to promote gift certificates and offer “Rue Local Picks.” 41. All gift certificates were sold and issued with illegal expiration terms in violation of federal and state laws. 42. Defendant Rue La La’s business model, particularly its ability to establish partnerships with retail businesses, depends in large part on its systematic use of illegal expiration dates. 43. Defendant Rue La La knows that its retail partners are not willing to offer their products and services at a discount to consumers through the sale of gift certificates without an agreement to limit the time period for which consumers can redeem the gift certificates. 44. Accordingly, Defendant Rue La La and its retail partners continue to flout the law by imposing illegal expiration dates on the gift certificates sold to consumers. 46. On or about July 5, 2012, Plaintiff purchased one gift certificate from Fitness Together, a personal fitness training center located in Boston, Massachusetts, for private training sessions and made a payment of $59.00 to Rue La La through Rue La La’s website. 47. Plaintiff subsequently received an e-mail from Rue La La confirming her purchase of the Fitness Together gift certificate. The e-mail contained the Fitness Together gift certificate to be printed and presented to the merchant upon redemption. 48. The gift certificate stated that it expired on October 31, 2012. 49. Plaintiff was unable to redeem the gift certificate before the termination of Defendant Rue La La’s expiration period. 50. Plaintiff brings this nationwide class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and the proposed Class members under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 52. Numerosity. The Class comprises, at a minimum, tens of thousands of consumers throughout Massachusetts and the United States. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members of the Class is impracticable. 54. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ common course of conduct in violation of law, as complained of herein. The damages of each Class member were caused directly by Defendants’ illegal conduct as alleged herein. 55. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is an adequate representatives of the Class and has no interests adverse to the interests of absent class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel who have substantial experience and success in the prosecution of complex class action and consumer protection litigation. 57. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if set forth herein. 58. The EFTA, as amended by the CARD Act, under 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1, prohibits the sale or issuance of gift certificates that are subject to expiration dates. 59. Defendants sold and issued and/or agreed to sell and issue offers, which are specifically defined as “gift certificates” under 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(B). 60. 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1(a)(2)(B) defines a gift certificate as “an electronic promise that is (i) redeemable at a single merchant or an affiliated group of merchants that share the same name, mark, or logo; (ii) issued in a specified amount that may not be increased or reloaded; (iii) purchased on a prepaid basis in exchange for payment; and (iv) honored upon presentation by such single merchant or affiliated group of merchants for goods or services.” 62. At all relevant times, Defendants’ gift certificates were sold and issued to consumers through electronic fund transfer systems established, facilitated, and monitored by Defendant Rue La La. 63. Defendant Rue La La’s gift certificates are not exclusively issued in paper form. Defendant Rue La La provides an email to consumers containing the gift certificate to be printed and presented to the merchant upon redemption. 64. Defendants’ gift certificates are marketed and sold to the general public and are not issued as part of any loyalty, award, or promotional program. 65. Defendants violated the EFTA by selling and issuing and/or agreeing to sell and issue gift certificates with expiration dates less than five years from the dates of issuance. 66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful acts and conduct, Plaintiff and Class members were deprived of the use of their money that was charged, collected and retained by Defendants through the sale of gift certificates with illegal expiration dates. 67. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class, seeks injunctive relief, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and the cost of this action. 68. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if set forth herein. 70. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful acts and conduct, Plaintiff and members of the Class were deprived of the use of their money that was charged and collected by Defendants through the sale of Rue La La gift certificates with illegal expiration dates. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class, seeks compensatory damages, including actual and statutory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and the cost of this action, as a result of Defendants’ statutory violations. 71. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff and members of the Class entered into contracts with Defendants for the sale of gift certificates. 73. At no time prior to or after purchase did Defendants require Plaintiff or Class members to “click” to signify their assent to an expiration date, illegal or otherwise. 74. The clause of the contract purporting to set out an “expiration date” is void as a matter of public policy and is unenforceable. 75. Defendants have anticipatorily repudiated the contracts they entered into with Plaintiff and Class members by refusing to honor the contract after a certain date. 76. Defendant Rue La La implies on its website that once an offer reaches its expiration date, it loses its promotional value. 78. Plaintiff and the Class members have complied with their obligations under their contracts with Defendants. 79. Defendants’ contractual breaches have caused Plaintiff and the Class economic injury and other damages. 80. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if set forth herein. 81. Plaintiff asserts this claim in the alternative to her claim of breach of contract, in the event that the Court determines that no contract exists. 82. Defendants have received, and continue to receive, benefits at the expense of Plaintiff and the Class members, because Plaintiff and the Class members remitted to Defendants money in the expectation of the fulfillment of promises that Defendants refused and refuse to fully and faithfully fulfill. 83. Defendants willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly sold and issued and/or agreed to sell and issue gift certificates that included terms containing illegal, unenforceable expiration dates. 84. Defendants refused and refuse to honor their promises after certain dates and instead retain Plaintiff’s and Class members’ money paid for their gift certificates. 86. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to damages in restitution for the money that Defendant has unjustly received and retained in connection with the sale of the gift certificates. A. Defendants Promote, Sell and Issue Gift Certificates With Illegal Expiration Dates Breach of Contract (Against All Defendants) Quasi-Contract/Restitution (Against All Defendants) Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1693l-1, the EFTA, as Amended by the CARD Act (Against All Defendants) Violations of M.G.L. c. 200A §5D (Against All Defendants)

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5.0 Prior to April 30, 2014 VHA had approximately 475 public housing units. 6.0 Plaintiffs seek to maintain this lawsuit as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). They ask the Court to certify a declaratory and injunctive relief class under Fed. R. Civ. P.23(b)(2) and a separate damages class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Class 6.1 Plaintiffs Nancy Ramey and Tami Romero seek to represent a declaratory and injunctive relief class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) defined to include all adult heads of households who: (a) executed a dwelling lease and currently reside in public housing owned and managed by VHA or who will execute a lease and reside in such housing in the future; (b) paid or will pay an income-based or minimum rent; and (c) are or will be responsible for tenant paid utilities. A. Common Facts Regarding the Plaintiffs and Two Proposed Classes

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11. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 10 of this complaint as if fully alleged 6 17. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 10 of this complaint as if fully alleged 25 herein. 26 18. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Rest Periods Class were 27 employees of Defendant covered by Labor Code Section 226.2. 28 19 (By Plaintiff and the Second Rest Periods Class against Defendants) 20 19. Pursuant to Labor Code Section 226.2, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Rest 7 22 FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES OWED FOR REST PERIOD TIME 23 (By Plaintiff and the Rest Periods Class against Defendants) 24 23. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 1 through 10 of this complaint as if fully alleged 21 herein. 22 24. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the other members of the Second Rest Periods Class 23 were employees of Defendant covered by Labor Code Section 226.7 and applicable Wage Orders. 24 25. Pursuant to applicable Wage Orders, Plaintiff and the other members of the Second Rest 25 Periods Class were entitled to rest periods of at least 10 minutes for each four hour period of work. 26 26 FAILIRE TO PAY MINIMUM WAGES 27 (By Plaintiff and the Field Workers Class against Defendants) 28 26. Pursuant to Labor Code Section 226.7, Defendant was required to pay Plaintiffs and 27 other members of the Second Rest Periods Class premium wages, equal to one hour of pay at their 28 regular rate of pay, for each day that a legally required rest period was not provided. 8 4 8. Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated 5 Field Workers (collectively the "Class") as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 6 Civil Procedure. The members of the Class belong to the Field Worker Class, Rest Periods Class, 7 Second Rest Periods Class, Restitution Class, Wage Statement Class and/or Final Wages Class, which 8 are defined as follows: 9 Field Workers Class: All persons who, at any time since the date three years before the filing 10 of the complaint in this action, worked for Defendant in California as a seasonal agricultural worker 11 who performed field work harvesting strawberries. 12 Rest Periods Class: All persons who, at any time since January 1, 2016, worked for 13 Defendant in California as a seasonal agricultural worker who performed field work harvesting 14 strawberries. 15 Second Rest Periods Class: All persons who, at any time since the date three years before the 16 filing of the complaint in this action, worked for Defendant in California as a seasonal agricultural 17 worker who performed field work harvesting strawberries and worked more than six hours but less 18 than seven and one half hours in a workday. 19 Restitution Class: All persons who, at any time since the date four years before the filing of 20 the complaint in this action, worked for Defendant in California as a seasonal agricultural worker who 21 performed field work harvesting strawberries. 22 Wage Statement Class: All persons who, at any time since the date one year before the filing 23 of the complaint in this action, worked for Defendant in California as a seasonal agricultural worker 24 who performed field work harvesting strawberries. 25 Final Wages Class: All persons who worked for Defendant in California as a seasonal 26 agricultural worker who performed field work harvesting strawberries who had a period of 27 employment during any harvesting season end at any time since the date three years before the filing of 28 the complaint in this action. 4

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12. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1-11 as if set forth fully herein. 13. Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of himself and a Class of all persons who were charged a transaction fee for the use of automated teller machine number TRA819364CD00001 located at 4999 Old Orchard Center, Skokie, Illinois 60077. 14. On information and belief, the putative Class consists of hundreds of persons and is so numerous that joinder of all putative Class members, whether otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable. The actual number of putative Class members is in the exclusive control of one or more Defendants. 15. Questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual putative class members, including: (a) Whether, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16, Defendants were ATM operators at all relevant times during that class period that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services to those consumers; and (b) Whether, at all relevant times during the class period, Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c). 16. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the putative Class members, including: (a) Plaintiff and all putative Class members used an ATM operated by Defendants; 4 (b) Defendants failed to provide notice compliant with 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) to Plaintiff and all putative Class members; and (c) One or more Defendants illegally imposed a fee on Plaintiff and all putative Class members for their respective use of the ATM at Issue. 17. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and Plaintiff has hired counsel able and experienced in class action litigation. 18. Questions of law or fact common to the putative class predominate over any questions affecting only individual putative Class members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the full and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. This Court and the parties would enjoy economies in litigating common issues on a class-wide basis instead of a repetitive individual basis. 20. The size of each putative Class member’s actual damages is too small to make individual litigation an economically viable option. 21. No unusual difficulties will likely occur in the management of the Class as all questions of law or fact to be litigated at the liability stage are common to the putative Class and all compensatory relief is concomitant with a liability finding and can be calculated by automated and objective means. 22. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(D)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(a), and on information and belief, Automated Financial, LLC was an ATM operator at all times relevant to this action. 23. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(D)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(a), and on information and belief, MetaBank, doing business as Meta Payment Systems, a division of MetaBank, was an ATM operator at all times relevant to this action. 5 24. According to its website, Automated Financial, LLC “is a full service ATM provider” with a portfolio consisting of “over 4000 ATM sites across the United States.” 25. Automated Financial, LLC lists MetaBank as one of its partners and provides custom branding kits to reinforce branding. 26. The ATM at Issue contains MetaBank branding and tells customers to report operational problems to Automated Financial, LLC and its website, www.atmconnection.com. 27. According to its website, MetaBank’s “knowledgeable ATM team is comprised of experienced industry leaders who value the importance of communication and the benefit of onsite visits.” 28. As ATM operators, Defendants are responsible for compliance with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c). 29. Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) when providing ATM services to Plaintiff and all putative Class members. 30. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(C) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(e), a fee was therefore illegally imposed on Plaintiff and all putative Class members for their respective use of the ATM at Issue. 31. Because, on information and belief, all Defendants acted jointly to effectuate operation of the ATM at Issue, they are jointly and severally liable. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against Automated Financial, LLC and MetaBank, doing business as Meta Payment Systems, a division of MetaBank, jointly and severally, and award the following: 6 A. Actual and statutory damages as set forth in the EFTA and Regulation E; B. Attorneys’ fees and costs of suit; and C. Such other relief as this Court deems proper. Plaintiff Demands A Trial By Jury Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Lance A. Raphael One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys Lance A. Raphael Stacy M. Bardo Allison Krumhorn The Consumer Advocacy Center, P.C. 180 W. Washington St., Ste. 700 Chicago, IL 60602 (312) 782-5808 VIOLATION OF EFTA AND REGULATION E

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