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In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_13

There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_14

Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_15

Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_16

On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_17

The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_18

General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_19

In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/bosque-redondo-memorial

s3://commoncrawl/crawl-data/CC-MAIN-2023-06/segments/1674764499646.23/warc/CC-MAIN-20230128153513-20230128183513-00716.warc.gz

en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_20

In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_21

In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

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en

<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_22

In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

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<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_23

Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

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<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_25

The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument.

In 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman and Colonel Samuel Tappan were dispatched to Fort Sumner in the New Mexico Territory to investigate troubling reports about the conditions there and in the neighboring Native American reservation of Bosque Redondo. They were appalled at what they discovered there. For centuries the Navajo people have lived in what is now known as the “Four Corners,” the area around where the U.S. states of Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona meet. Clashes between the encroaching U.S. military and the Navajo began in 1846 and continued for nearly 20 years thereafter. The conflicts finally ended in 1864 when the U.S. military invaded and used scorched-earth tactics, marching from settlement to settlement burning crops and destroying homes and caches of food. Thousands of Navajo began surrendering. The plan was to resettle the Navajo on a new reservation in the New Mexico territory near Fort Sumner, 350 miles away from their traditional homeland. Beginning in the spring of 1864 the forced marches across the territory began, now known as the Long Walk of the Navajo, also called the Long Walk to Bosque Redondo. At least 300 Navajo died during these marches. The 8,500 Navajo that reached Bosque Redondo were surprised to find 500 Mescalero Apache resettled by the government there as well. The Navajo and the Mescalero were traditional enemies and this would only exacerbate tensions in the years to come. Soldiers at Fort Sumner were ordered to be ready for the arrival of 5,000 Native Americans and were unprepared when nearly twice that amount arrived. The water of the Pecos River that flowed through the area was unsafe to drink and carried digestive diseases. There weren’t enough trees in the area to supply everyone with adequate firewood. Because of insects and periodic flooding, crops failed every year. Comanche tribes in the area took advantage of the helpless Navajo struggling on the reservation and raided regularly. On one night in 1865 all the Mescalero Apache who were healthy enough to do so escaped under the cover of darkness, choosing to instead live as fugitives from the pursuing U.S. military than toil in Bosque Redondo any longer. The Navajo called the reservation “Hwéeldi,” meaning “a place of suffering.” Today it is estimated that over 3,000 Native Americans died in the four years that Bosque Redondo operated. General Sherman and Colonel Tappan represented the United States in negotiating a new treaty with the Navajo that would allow them to return to a reservation on their homeland, granting them assistance in the first few years after returning, and recognizing the Navajo as a sovereign nation. In 1869 the military sold Fort Sumner to a cattle baron who converted the buildings into a small town around his ranch. In 1881, notorious outlaw Billy the Kid was killed by Sheriff Pat Garrett here. In 1968, in commemoration of the 100-year anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Bosque Redondo, the area was dedicated as Fort Sumner State Monument. In 2005, a museum detailing the Native American history at Bosque Redondo was opened. Know Before You Go Open from Wednesday through Sunday from 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Admission is free. The Bosque Redondo Memorial is part of the Fort Sumner State Monument. The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

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<urn:uuid:86f7a93f-7a37-485d-9be8-9334e39d0f31>_26

The cemetery with Billy the Kid's grave is adjacent to the memorial at the historic site.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_0

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_1

In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_2

- Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step).

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_3

- Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_4

- Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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https://www.ebannerswap.com/2022/12/

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_6

The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_7

They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_8

The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_9

The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_10

It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_11

These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_14

Inventions are the result of human creativity.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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<urn:uuid:f3368dfb-9adc-458a-8b34-35acc2f7bcaf>_15

When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/.

An invention is a unique or novel device, method or composition. In law, an invention is a creation of the mind which includes a tangible or intangible asset, that satisfies the following criteria: - Novelty: The invention must be new and not known to others through prior use or through public disclosure anywhere in the world before filing the patent application. - Non obviousness: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the art (i.e., it must have inventive step). - Utility: The invention must work safely and effectively when applied according to its intended use. - Technological aspect: The invention must be a product of technology, i.e., it is not an abstract idea but a practical application of science and engineering principles that can be made or used in the form of a device, machine or process. How Inventions Change The World? The invention of the telephone, airplane, and computer have changed the world. They have created new industries and made it possible to do things we couldn’t before as explained in https://www.fashiongonerogue.com/top-inventions-changed-world-fashion-forever/ article. The telephone and airplane make it possible to communicate instantly across distances and travel great distances in a short period of time. The computer has changed the way we work, play, and live. It has made it possible to store vast amounts of information and make calculations more quickly than ever before. These inventions have changed the world and will continue to do so in the future. A good example of this is the internet. It has allowed us to communicate with others instantly, receive information from all over the world, and play games online. Inventions are the result of human creativity. When people observe something in their environment and think about how they might improve it, they are inventing as you can read from https://www.lyricsstory.net/some-ways-in-which-tech-inventors-have-changed-our-lives/. Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

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Inventors often create new ways to solve problems or meet needs.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO!

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_1

Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_2

Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia).

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_3

A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_4

An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello!

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_5

Is a perfect book for your little traveler.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_6

This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.everythingmom.com/activities/kids-books/kids-book-review-how-hippo-says-hello

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en

<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_7

Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.everythingmom.com/activities/kids-books/kids-book-review-how-hippo-says-hello

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en

<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_8

The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.everythingmom.com/activities/kids-books/kids-book-review-how-hippo-says-hello

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en

<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_9

Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents.

How Hippo Says Hello by Abigail Samoun, illustrated by Sarah Watts Synopsis from Sterling Books Bonjour, konnichiwa, hola, HELLO! Friendly Hippo takes a trip around the world to seven different countries, and everywhere he goes, he cheerily greets people in their native language. Kids will have fun trying out these simple foreign words, from “namaste” (India) to “privyet” (Russia). A simple word can bring a smile and open possibilities. An Adventure in Eight Languages How Hippo Says Hello! Is a perfect book for your little traveler. This board book follows Hippo as he boards a plane bound for France, Russia, Egypt, India, China, Japan, Argentina and home again. Kids are introduced to a common greeting “Hello” in eight different languages. The image and simple copy informs you which country Hippo is visiting and below the simple one line of copy is the phonetic pronunciation of the word “Hello”. Kids will love saying hello to friends at school as well as strangers they meet with their parents. Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye. .

<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.everythingmom.com/activities/kids-books/kids-book-review-how-hippo-says-hello

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<urn:uuid:ab9ad405-39c3-4871-bce3-cee02fc5cb3d>_10

Your traveling linguist will also enjoy the additional book in the series, How Gater Says Good-bye, providing kids with the word and pronunciation to Good-bye.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_0

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://silodrome.com/sdkfz-2-kettenkrad/

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_1

The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://silodrome.com/sdkfz-2-kettenkrad/

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en

<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_2

The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

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en

<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_3

Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_4

The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_11

The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_12

That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_13

As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_14

Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_15

By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_16

The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_18

It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_19

It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_20

It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_21

If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_22

Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more.

Designated “SdKfz 2” by the German military but more commonly known as the “Kettenkrad”, the tracked motorcycle was used extensively on both the Eastern Front and the North African desert, and it retains the historical distinction of being the fastest tracked vehicle of the Second World War. The Story of the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad The top speed of 50 mph may not sound particularly impressive, but it’s enough to shake your teeth loose even on the smoothest of roads, and the German Wehrmacht recommended the slightly more restrained top speed of 44 mph. The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad was originally designed to fit inside the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft for rapid deployment, though for obvious reasons it was never deployed by parachute. Although it wasn’t light by motorcycle standards, it was a featherweight when compared to other tracked vehicles of the war. The German military used the Kettenkrad as a troop transport – particularly in the treacle-like Russian mud or the thick sands of the Sahara. Other uses included work as a gun tractor, a cable layer, and a runway tug for Luftwaffe aircraft – usually the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter, and occasionally the Arado Ar 234 jet reconnaissance-bomber. This Luftwaffe use was more common at the end of the war when aviation fuel was scarce, the SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad would be used to tow aircraft right to the runway and minimise fuel wastage on taxiways. The designers chose to use the 1478cc inline-4 water-cooled unit from the Opel Olympia car that was in use throughout the German military. This would simplify parts availability and the training required for mechanics, besides which it was a known engine with known capabilities, and it would require no re-tooling to produce. With a power output at a relatively modest 36 bhp, the Opel engine was mated to an automotive 3-speed transmission with a foot clutch and a stick shift, with both high and low range. This gave a total of 6 speeds, and in low range it’s said that the Kettenkrad can climb remarkably steep inclines – even 24° or more in deep sand. The first question most ask about the Kettenkrad is related to steering. That motorcycle front-end looks incapable of much in the way of direction change – but it is surprisingly effective. As you turn the handlebars to an almost locked position the tracks are stopped on the side of the turn, allowing for tight turns even in thick mud and sand – much the same as a normal tank steers. Some Kettenkrads did away with the motorcycle front end entirely – and just steered by track braking. By the time production stopped in 1944 8,345 had been built, and in post-war Germany most of them were scrapped for steel as the country demilitarised. The few surviving examples are highly sought after by collectors, and it’s not known exactly how many have survived to the modern day. The Kettenkrad Shown Here The SdKfz 2 Kettenkrad you see here is a 1944 example from the final year of production, it has little known history, but it is known that it was used by the German Forestry Commission in the years after the war. It was purchased from an owner in Belgium as a restoration project, and it was given a full nut-and-bolt rebuild between 2011 and 2015 – including a full engine rebuild, and a rebuild of the drivetrain including gearbox, differential, and final drive. It’s now accompanied by a number of bills and 250+ images of the restoration process, as well as its original 6-volt electrical system and just 10 hours of running time since the restoration was completed. It’s due to roll across the auction block with Bonhams on the 19th of March with an estimated hammer price of between £60,000 and £80,000. If you’d like to read more about it or register to bid you can click here to view the listing. Articles that Ben has written have been covered on CNN, Popular Mechanics, Smithsonian Magazine, Road & Track Magazine, the official Pinterest blog, the official eBay Motors blog, BuzzFeed, Autoweek Magazine, Wired Magazine, Autoblog, Gear Patrol, Jalopnik, The Verge, and many more. Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

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<urn:uuid:009506c2-58c4-4578-ab17-5440c0ef2dce>_23

Silodrome was founded by Ben back in 2010, in the years since the site has grown to become a world leader in the alternative and vintage motoring sector, with well over a million monthly readers from around the world and many hundreds of thousands of followers on social media.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_1

Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_2

For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_3

Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_4

To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_5

Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_7

Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_8

This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_9

Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic?

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_12

Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_14

A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

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Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_22

On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_23

Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_24

Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_26

Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_27

In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_29

Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>

CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_30

Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-chinese-security-relations-friends-or-foes/

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_31

The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise. We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.

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CC-MAIN-2023-06

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<urn:uuid:db3dadef-95f2-4249-a290-83f8dfe14992>_35

It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region.

The partnership between Russia and China may prove to be a fickle one. Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic? Politics: Harmony and Dispute The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system. In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow. Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang. In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena. On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region. China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests. In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East. Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources. In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East. In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats. Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence. In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains. One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products. Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt. China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia. Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals. Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position. Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West. For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads. In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. 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The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources.