elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1358937

201605

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1358937

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3000

1359107.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; MEL

MEL

Captain flying. Dispatched with Number 1 engine driven hydraulic pump inop. Flight had reached 32;000 ft cruise and approximately XA:40 we got master caution; autopilot disengaged and EICAS message HYD Press Eng 1. After reviewing HYD synoptics display and confirming loss of Number 1 HYD system. Appropriate checklist was run without regaining the Number 1 HYD system. The SAT Com was used to contact dispatch; [maintenance] and [company]. Captain made decision to return. Fuel was dumped. In preparation for landing the FO (First Officer); per checklist; selected alternate gear extension switch and it came apart in his hand. He was able to activate the switch. In the alternate mode; we noted flaps not extending equally. We got EICAS flaps drive message. Checklist run. Now limited to flaps 25 landing with high VREF speed. We requested longest runway. The aircraft had to be towed to ramp. The tug broke down halfway to [parking] on taxiway Romeo. A second tug was sent to rescue broken tug and a third sent for aircraft. From stopping on runway to block in on ramp took 1:27 minutes. The aircraft should have had HYD system fixed in [destination] where they had pulled it back into service. It is concerning that [the company] seems to be 'skimping' on maintenance and ultimately safety. Also concerning that while communicating with dispatch and [maintenance]; they were not aware that the engine driven hydraulic pump was MELed (inop).

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B747 flight crew reported loss of Number 1 hydraulic system in cruise after being dispatched with Number 1 engine driven hydraulic pump on MEL. Flight crew returned to departure airport with limited flaps.

1009215

201205

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

CLR

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Powerplant Lubrication System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 5000

1009215

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 3500

1009423.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Approximately 2 1/2 hours into the flight at FL380; ECAM annunciated 'ENG 2 OIL FILTER CLOG.' We completed the appropriate flight manual procedure and consistent with that procedure; we monitored the engine parameters for any changes. After five to ten minutes a slight intermittent vibration was noted. As a precaution we requested a lower altitude from ATC and were given FL310. During the descent the engine N2 vibration was noted at 4.5; and we reviewed the flight manual engine vibration procedure. Although no single ECAM or engine parameter alone required the engine to be operated at reduced thrust; cumulatively; we decided it was the safest course of action. We continued the descent to FL240 and left the number two engine at idle thrust while we continued to assess the engine status and overall situation. We contacted Dispatch to advise them of our situation and verify the suitability of the airport as a diversion airport. Once the decision was made to continue to operating the number two engine two at reduced thrust; the airport was the nearest suitable airport in point of time. We declared an emergency with ATC and advised Dispatch of our intentions. The Lead Flight Attendant was notified and the passengers were informed of the situation and planned landing in the airport. The flight proceeded inbound to the airport with no additional problems until being vectored for the final approach. At approximately 13;000 FT; the number two engine oil quantity dropped to zero. I called for the engine shutdown checklist. While the First Officer was finding the correct Flight Manual procedure; the oil pressure dropped to zero and we shut down the engine using the displayed ECAM procedure. The ECAM procedure and all briefings were completed in a timely manner and were complete prior to intercepting the localizer. We notified ATC of the engine shutdown. The airport weather was few 220 and 10 plus miles visibility wind 210/12. We received a visual approach clearance and a normal single engine approach; landing; and taxi followed.

Through mutual consent; we switched control of the aircraft to the Captain to make the approach and landing. After passing approximately 12;000 FT in the descent; we both observed the oil quantity was now indicating '0' and the Captain observed that the pressure was falling steadily. We both agreed that the engine should be shut down. Again consulting the manual; as I was looking for the shutdown procedure; the condition Engine failure was detected by the ECAM; and the master caution light and associated aural warnings and ECAM messages began to appear. I put aside the book and as the Captain continued to fly towards the airport; I executed the ECAM commands; secured the engine; reviewed the status screens and shutdown checklist items and reported that the ECAM was complete; screens were normal and we continued the descent. All of this was accomplished several miles before we reached the FAF; we were stabilized by the fix and the landing was routine and normal.

A319 flight crew experiences an engine 2 oil filter clogged message at FL380. Several minutes later slight vibration is noted and the crew elects to descend to FL310. During the descent N2 vibration increases to 4.5 units and the crew elects to divert to a suitable airport. Nearing the airport the oil quantity and pressure go to zero and the engine is shut down; a single engine landing ensues.

1610019

201901

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

IMC

0.1

Night

600

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 340

Fatigue

1610019

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Weather

Company Policy

This was day 1 of a 3-day trip. We flew a 9+ hour day; with 3 legs and maintenance delays and issues; landing [past midnight] with a Cat III 600 RVR landing in ZZZ. This is a highly challenging thing to do; after commuting in (I drive 1.5 hours; but I must give myself 3.5 hours for area traffic variability). Few things that we do require the immense attention and perfection of a 600 RVR Head-up Guidance System (HGS) landing; and to think that we're doing this [after midnight] after 3 legs and a commute-in is not safe. I was flat-out; wiped-out after the landing. Additionally; for our short overnight at the hotel (in bed by one hour); which is under construction; the hotel's evacuation alarm was inadvertently activated [a few hours later] by the construction crew; lasting for 15 minutes and requiring me to dress and leave the building. For day 2; I was tired and 'dragging my baggage.'First; we should not be staying at hotels that are under construction. Second; we need to enable autoland in our fleet. I think it is highly risky that we land in 600 feet of visibility; hand-flown; especially after a long and challenging day. The planes have the equipment; yet we are making a decision to not use it. Autoland is a valuable tool; and with all the talk of 'using all available resources;' we are clearly not! This is similar to the old days of not using VNAV; yet flying airplanes that were equipped with it; with the exception; that autoland has major implications to improve safety and reduce risk. The HGS provides so much symbology in AIII mode that it is almost impossible to visually capture the runway environment while being so laser-focused on the guidance cue. If you do not get that guidance cue spot-on in the flare; who knows what will happen in the landing. A 600 RVR landing should be reserved for autoland. I also believe autoland would have enabled a 300 RVR landing (perhaps I'm wrong); and had the RVR dropped to 500 (which it had been in the last hour); we would have immediately diverted; resulting us timing-out and 100 passengers needing hotel rooms and rebooking.

B737 Captain reported concerns that the company policy of hand-flown Cat III approaches is not as safe as autoland.

1324144

201601

1801-2400

SFO.Airport

CA

7000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON NCT

Air Taxi

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

STAR DYAMD2

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1324144

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1324145.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

We [worked] another late night and flight across the country. During our pre-flight planning; we checked all pertinent information of the flight; including all NOTAMs at SFO.We were told to descend via the DYAMD2 arrival into SFO. They were a little late issuing this instruction; which caused a steeper than normal descent. We notified them it would be hard to cross LAANE at FL260. ATC waved the restriction at LAANE and told us to make the crossing restriction at FLOWZ. The rest of the arrival was very busy; as we were being vectored quite a bit. The deviation occurred at ARCHI. The published altitude at ARCHI was 7;000 feet on the chart; which we made.We were told by NORCAL approach that the altitude over ARCHI had been changed to 8;000 feet as indicated in a new FDC NOTAM. The aircraft after us were given formal instructions to cross ARCHI at 8;000 feet. The other pilot and I both immediately recognized our mistake. Upon landing we were given a phone number. I called and discussed the deviation with the approach control supervisor. I explained to her apologetically that we had seen the new NOTAM for the restriction at ARCHI; but had since forgotten about it due to our high workload and fatigue level due to another late night and six hour flight across the country. The supervisor understood. She told me that this was a new NOTAM. She also said we did not create a conflict with any other aircraft in the air. Overall; the conversation was positive.We could have drawn in the revised altitude at ARCHI on our Jeppesen chart after reviewing the NOTAM. That way we would not have forgotten. Also; ATC was issuing ARCHI at 8;000 feet to the pilots on the arrival after us. If this is such a new NOTAM; and the incorrect altitude is published on the Jeppesen chart; maybe ATC could be more pro-active at issuing 8;000 feet over ARCHI to every pilot on the arrival.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

FDC NOTAM was not noticed by aircrew for a change in published altitude on arrival SFO. This is a common repeat item.

1702982

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1702982

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

[While] being refueled; the fuel truck ran into right wing. Felt aircraft shake. Truck hit wing. Looked out window. Made sure orange cone is outside of wing.

EMB-145 First Officer reported fuel truck hit the aircraft's right wing.

1265669

201505

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Rain; Thunderstorm

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

1265669

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Dispatch

Pre-flight

The Dispatcher released Flight; ZZZ-DEN; ZZZ1 alternate (5.0 burn); [and] no dispatch add fuel; CONT/HOLD 1.0 (:12; reduced from standard); FAR reserve 3.6; planned ZFW 117.8. Flight departed XA10Z/XA35Z. The planned departure fuel was 20.1 with an arrival fuel of 10.1. The Dispatcher added the following remark: CAPTAIN**TSRA IMPACT AT ETA HAVE FUELER FUEL TO ATOG. DEN was forecast for TSRA/SHRA and ceilings.I noticed that the departure fuel had not been confirmed (indicating the extra); and I sent an ACARS message asking their actual ZFW. The flight replied 114.6; and I then messaged the crew back and noted that their actual ZFW would have allowed another 3K fuel; and also asked we didn't carry it. There was no response. After about 15 minutes; I sent another message asking for a call at DEN. No response to that message either. The DEN weather cooperated; and the flight landed without incident; with 10.2 FOB.The Captain did call about 30 minutes after arrival; and I asked why we hadn't taken the extra fuel when the actual ZFW had allowed for it. He said that he had seen the note; but had gotten distracted; and only remembered it pushback time. He decided that he was comfortable with the original 20.1 release fuel and elected to depart. His attitude was very apologetic; but with that said; he still made a unilateral decision to depart with less fuel than he could have carried; just as the Captain of [previous] flight had a few days before. It's my position here that the issue is a systemic one; and needs to be addressed. Some takeaways:A generic 'FUEL TO ATOG' remark does not adequately reflect the nature of the continuing payload versus fuel issues to the flight crew community; and what means the Dispatcher must employ to mitigate/resolve these problems.Some crews do not read/react to release remarks on a timely basis.Some crews consider release remarks advisory only; with compliance optional.Echoing my IR/ASAP comments reference Flight [ABC] ZZZ-DEN on (Date); many crews seem to lack a fundamental understanding of FARs 121.533/121.535 vis-??-vis their PIC authority; incorrectly believing that authority to emanate from FAR 91.3. Even the new release remark I mention using for Flight [ABC] is inadequate; since my use of the word 'suggest' lends itself to be interpreted as compliance optional.I am now using the following remark:121.533 CONDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONLOAD MAX FUEL TO XX.X ACTUAL ZFW PERMITTING FOR WX/ATCI reference the FAR 121.533 (Domestic (and would use 121.535 for Flag) to indicate this remark is an instruction; not a suggestion or recommendation; and the 'conditional' is whether the actual ZFW permits the extra fuel; or not.The XX.X is the planned release fuel plus 1.0 to 3.0 additional; to serve as a 'cap' to having a lowered than expected actual ZFW from being over-fueled to the extent that it's too heavy for the next leg in the aircraft's sequence.

After a flights departure time; Dispatcher noticed that the modified fuel on board had not been acknowledged by the crew.

1227342

201412

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

4500

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

1.0

Part 135

None

Passenger

Landing

Other ZZZ

Hydraulic System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 3491; Flight Crew Type 1826

Situational Awareness

1227342

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

I completed an air tour with 5 passengers in a Eurocopter 350. The aircraft was on the ground and I started the shutdown procedures to offload and then upload the next tour. I remember going to lock down the collective with the locking strap and then somehow the HYD switch was disabled and the collective not being secured by the safety strap popped up with the loss of hydraulics. The aircraft drifted to the left and became airborne. I proceeded to fly the aircraft without hydraulics and attempted to hover and land the aircraft immediately. The aircraft continued to fly and gained an altitude of what appeared to me as 50-75 ft. I managed to gain control of the aircraft and landed the aircraft on the adjacent taxiway. The aircraft landed hard and spun around while on the ground. No abnormal noise or damage to the aircraft or rotor system was felt. Once on the ground I remember putting the HYD switch on and hydraulics was restored. I contacted Tower and requested to do shutdown on the taxiway. I shutdown the aircraft normally to off load the passengers and have maintenance inspect the aircraft. During the shutdown; I checked with the passengers and they verbally told me they were not injured and did not need any medical attention. The passengers were off loaded and taken to our operations area. Tower did initiate the crash rescue team to the site; they checked with me and I told them I was okay and that the passengers were okay and at our operations area. I proceeded to do a post flight of the aircraft; I checked the rotors to see if they contacted the ground and found no damage. I did find some damage to the underside of the fuselage and that the protective plastic bubble for the camera was broken and the underside of the fuselage had some scraping with contact from the ground. The aircraft was towed back to our maintenance hangar and inspected by our director of maintenance. A thorough inspection was conducted and the only damage found was cosmetic from the scraping of the underside of the fuselage. A spectrum analysis and test flight was conducted and the aircraft was returned to service.

Eurocopter pilot reported the aircraft did an uncommanded takeoff when he turned the HYD switch off before strapping the collective. He regained control at 50-75 feet AGL and made a hard landing on the taxiway; with some minor damage resulting.

1810741

202105

1201-1800

PHX.Airport

AZ

0.0

Ramp PHX

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1810741

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1810750.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were [on] Aircraft X PHX-ZZZ on Date. We pushed back from gate onto taxiway; started engines and performed the before taxi checklist. The First Officer (FO) called for taxi; and clearance was given to taxi. I looked left and said 'clear left'. The FO looked right and said 'clear right'. As I pushed up the thrust levers to taxi; the FO immediately shouted 'stop'. He noticed three people attempting to walk in front of our aircraft. Apparently they were walking from concourse 2 to concourse 1 thru the ramp area. When he noticed them they were about to walk in front of our right engine. When he got their attention; the three folks changed direction and then walked under our right wing and out of sight behind our aircraft. We notified the Ramp Controller of the individuals and waited until they were well clear of our aircraft and then begun our taxi. Never allow people to walk in or around the ramp taxi area after aircraft have been pushed back onto the taxi lines to start engines and taxi.

After pushback from gate; with both engines running and all pertinent flows and checklists complete; I called PHX ramp for taxi. Ramp cleared us out the south line to [the] spot. At that point; the Captain and I were unable to ensure the aircraft was clear for taxi out. Out the left side of the aircraft; he noticed a ground crew worker telling him not to taxi. Out the right side of the aircraft; I noticed what appeared to be three aircraft cleaners walking in front of the number two engine. To make matters worse; after realizing their mistake they continued to show their propensity to make bad choices by not doing a 180 degree turn but by turning and walking behind the airplane to cross the ramp. A conversation was had with the Ramp Controller. I encourage you to watch the security video to see just how bad this was. They had no clue the danger they were in and this could have been much worse. Something needs to be done. On our end; no causal factors to list. Everything was done in accordance with standard operating procedures. On their end; I can only speculate but lack of common sense seems first and foremost. Accountability on behalf of these three individuals.

Air Carrier Flight Crew reported individuals walking in front of the aircraft as it began taxiing on the ramp.

1235135

201501

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

500.0

VMC

Daylight

M-20 K (231) / Encore

1.0

None

Test Flight / Demonstration

Initial Climb

None

Class E ZZZ

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Installation

Engine Exhaust System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Other Remote Sensing

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 615

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1235135

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

The exhaust system on our Mooney M20K-305 had been repaired and this was the first flight post maintenance. Shortly after takeoff; climbing through approx. 500 feet AGL; the engine monitor alarm indicated a high and rapidly rising Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT). Suspecting detonation/pre-ignition; power was reduced to minimum needed for level flight and a left turn to enter a downwind for runway 27 was started. At this point I noticed a hot/burning smell. A tight pattern was flown and the aircraft promptly landed. Exiting the aircraft; smoke was seen rising from the engine cowling near the air inlet. This was extinguished with a fire extinguisher and the cowling removed. The inside of the cowling was visibly damaged due to melting/extreme heating from what appeared to be the exhaust manifold. Post inspection revealed that the exhaust system had been improperly assembled. The exhaust manifold from the cylinders was not fully fitted into the slip joint of the exhaust Y-tube transition pipe. It was approximately one inch out of place. This reduced the clearance between the exhaust and cowling causing the melting and smoking. Additionally; because the manifold was out of place; there was a small gap between the cylinder head and the exhaust manifold flanges. Exhaust leaks from this area potentially caused the high CHT indication. In the future; a much more in-depth post maintenance inspection is necessary to prevent a recurrence.

Reporter stated the exhaust manifold was previously sent out for repair after a small hole was noticed in the manifold during an Annual Inspection. When mechanics reinstalled the exhaust manifold they were apparently hoping the attaching nuts would help pull-in and seat the manifold against the engine. But that did not happen. Instead; the small gap that still existed between the exhaust manifold and the engine allowed hot gases to blow near the Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT) sensor causing a high temp indication. The smoke and heat damage to the engine cowling was caused by the same exhaust manifold not being properly fitted into the slip joint of the exhaust Y-tube transition pipe.

A single pilot reports that on the first flight after Maintenance repaired the Exhaust System on their Mooney M20K-305 aircraft; they noticed a hot/burning smell and the engine monitor alarm indicated a high and rapidly rising Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT). Exhaust manifold from cylinders was not fully fitted into the slip joint of the exhaust Y-tube transition pipe causing smoke; extreme heating and melting of an engine cowling.

1743468

202005

1801-2400

AUS.Tower

TX

2500.0

Marginal

Turbulence

Tower AUS

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C AUS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1743468

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Workload

1743470.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Cleared direct to BALLD fix to intercept the localizer at or above 3000 ft. Once at BALLD we were cleared for the approach. I put in 2100 and started down not realizing that SSHOE was a missing fix and was at 2500 ft. We received a low altitude from Tower and the Captain took [the] controls and climbed to 2500 ft. Double check all fixes are in the box when cleared to outermost fixes on approaches.

We were cleared direct to BALLD to intercept the localizer for [Runway] 35R and maintain 3000 ft. until BALLD. Pilot Flying (PF) set in 2100 ft. in the FCU instead of 2500 ft. for the next fix (SSHOE). Pilot Flying continued down to approximately 2100 ft. prior to SSHOE before being alerted by Tower of the altitude deviation. PF did not correct the altitude deviation immediately. Captain took control of the aircraft in order to climb back up to 2500 ft. as published. Soon thereafter; Tower reported wind shear was being reported on the landing runway. Captain initiated a go-around. During the go-around procedure after the flaps were selected to 'zero' we received a momentary flap over-speed warning. After diverting to ZZZ the flaps were inspected by maintenance indicating no mechanical issues. In addition; the post flight report provided no indication of a flap over-speed ECAM.I should have been more cognitive as to what the PF was selecting in the FCU in comparison to our present trajectory on the approach path along with delegating my duties as the Pilot Monitoring. My attention had been going back and forth between configuring the aircraft for landing; monitoring the appropriate approach path; trying to confirm a safe distance from threatening weather; followed by reports from the Tower of possible wind shear on the landing runway. All of these factors made a go-around almost imminent which resulted in an unnecessary self-induced high workload and chain of events that could have been avoided all together with better planning and communication.

A320 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from AUS Tower on approach to Runway 35R.

1128835

201311

1801-2400

MSY.Airport

LA

0.0

VMC

Night

Tower MSY

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1128835

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Airport

Airport

We were told to cross Runway 10 and taxi via E to the gate. As we crossed 10 and transitioned to the yellow line on Taxiway E (an immediate right hand turn); we encountered dimly lit barricades and had to brake the aircraft. Had the First Officer not been alert; there is a real possibility that we may have taxied into the lights. ATIS did advise that work was being done to Taxiway E. But the combination of a dark night and the taxi line heading into the barricades created a potential problem. This morning as we taxied out; we noticed skid marks just before the barricades (not caused by us). It was clear that we were not the only crew to encounter this issue.

The reporter stated that he believes Taxiway E is closed about 50 FT to 100 FT beyond where his aircraft exited Runway 19 onto E. He remembers seeing a NOTAM about Taxiway E and the restriction for aircraft with wingspans greater than 118 FT but he does not remember a taxiway closure NOTAM in the ramp area. He believes the signs; especially night markings; should be more clear and a NOTAM advising flight crews about what they can expect to see exiting Runway 19 should be issued.

An air carrier Captain reported stopping immediately after exiting Runway 19 onto Taxiway E after landing at night; because confusing barricades made it appear that the Taxiway was closed 50 FT to 100 FT after exiting the runway.

1634826

201904

0001-0600

MSP.Airport

MN

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground ZZZ

Corporate

PC-12

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 1050

Situational Awareness

1634826

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was taxiing from overflow parking ramp at [the FBO]. It was nighttime. As I was taxiing out I noticed a van coming directly towards me delivering passengers to a departing aircraft. I had all taxi and landing lights on at the time. It became obvious to me that the driver of the van did not see me. I was unable to move left or right due to parked aircraft; so I came to a complete stop. At that point the driver must have seen me from approximately 100 feet away and turned to his right and cleared my left wing by approximately 6 to 8 feet. He appeared to be driving at approximately 10mph. I then continued my taxi.

PC-12 pilot reported coming to a stop on the ramp to avoid a collision with a van that apparently had not seen him.

1786153

202101

0601-1200

COS.Tower

CO

500.0

VMC

Tower COS

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C COS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 800

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1786153

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overrode Automation

Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

While on visual approach to COS [Runway] 35L; crew both identified a very large building under construction with crane offset between 1.7 to 2 miles from the runway threshold. At approximately 1.5 miles from threshold; received EGPWS (Electronic Ground Proximity Warning) 'Obstacle; Pull Up!' warning. Aircraft was stable and on visual glide path as verified by FMS 3 degree visual glide path indicator and also visually with Runway 35L PAPI. Sink rate at time of incident was 500 ft. per minute. As the building was either directly underneath or just behind aircraft; no other obstacles were noted and aircraft was stable and on glide path; PIC (Pilot-in-Command) decided this was an erroneous warning and elected to continue flight. Landing was uneventful. During debrief; both crew members agreed that the message was erroneous and must be an anomaly caused by the new construction and a go-around at that time would be futile. If the weather was not CAVU (Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited) an immediate go-around would have been performed. There is a current NOTAM (01/037) regarding a crane at this location but the crane was offset from the flight path and at 300 ft. AGL. An issue exists with the EGPWS system and this new building construction that will trigger false warnings and may cause aircraft to go-around unnecessarily.

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving a Ground Proximity alert even though they were on glidepath and flying a stabilized approach to COS airport. The reporter believes the alert was due to construction of a new building underneath the final approach course.

1654321

201906

0601-1200

D01.TRACON

CO

7800.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach; Final Approach

Class B DEN

TRACON D01

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B DEN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Total 16865; Flight Crew Type 118

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1654321

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 500; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were cleared for the approach to fly the ILS 16R procedure. Near the MERYN intersection approach called out traffic on a dog leg to 16L. We were very busy at this point in the approach and I stated to the PM I had traffic behind us approaching 16L which was the logical but wrong assumption. A very short time later we get an immediate and simultaneous TA and RA which I responded to staying within the advisory bars and then noticed; incredulously; a 737 passing on my immediate left estimating less than 500 ft horizontally and 200 ft below us on a southeasterly heading turning towards 16L.To be honest I was shocked at not only the controller putting an aircraft underneath us to runway 16L but I cannot believe [that] Aircraft Y was in the Class B airspace at his altitude and at our position to the runway. Further and to put it bluntly it was a foolish and unsafe maneuver by the crew [of] Aircraft Y to fly underneath us at that altitude to maneuver for 16L. Let alone accept a clearance to do so.Finally if we were spaced the same distance to the runways; why didn't we get 16L (we were coming off the Kipper 5) with Aircraft Y coming from the west 16R? This sequencing made zero sense.Quite frankly the potential for a collision was high confirmed by the fact getting an RA that close to the FAF. I called the TRACON Supervisor upon arrival and explained my concern. He took my number and promised a call back after reviewing the incident. I did not catch Aircraft Y's flight number.

B787 Captain reported an NMAC approaching the final approach fix at DEN.

1751764

202007

1201-1800

GAF.Airport

ND

50.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

CTAF GAF

Personal

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

1.0

None

Training

Landing

Class G ZMP

Small Aircraft

Agriculture

Class G GAF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 160; Flight Crew Type 17

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1751764

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 150; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On short final a crop duster was observed taxiing south on the taxiway adjacent to the runway. No radio calls were made from this aircraft. Around the time our aircraft the reached runway threshold the crop duster lifted off from the taxiway and flew south directly beside us. By the time we had fully realized that the crop duster had taken off on the taxiway we were already at his altitude and made the decision to not go around. We landed the aircraft; cleared the area and then took off. When in the pattern we cleared the area again and couldn't find the aircraft. They never made any radio calls on frequency. Another company aircraft of ours observed the incident in the pattern as well. Both us and the other company aircraft were making radio calls to the CTAF traffic as well as other aircraft that were landing or flying a short approach to Runway 35. I believe that the pilot of the crop duster was upset that the small airport was busy and that they thought they could 'get back' at us by scaring us on final. That or they were rushing themselves and didn't want to wait for our traffic and the traffic in the pattern behind us before taking off. I think the situation could have been solved by the pilot of the crop duster making radio calls throughout the situation. They could've informed us they intended to takeoff opposite direction instead of a taxiway and we could have extended our downwind for them or flown a few 360s to clear up space.

Student pilot at a non towered airport reported an aircraft departed opposite direction to them from a taxiway adjacent to their landing runway.

1453977

201705

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Final Approach

None

Class G ZZZ

Corporate

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 137

Agriculture

Initial Climb

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1453977

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 400; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

As a pilot I landed the airplane at ZZZ and experienced a potential head on collision with an Agriculture airplane. Luckily I saw the other plane. The root cause of this event is the 2 way radio communications. Based on discussions with the ground crew; portable hand-held radios were also not used in the spray planes. Events: Aircraft X approached the airport from the west. The windsock was observed at 3;000 feet MSA altitude with wind blowing east to west; therefore it was decided that the landing would be against the wind on Runway XX. The pilot announced on CTAF that Aircraft X would be landing on Runway XX. This pilot also announced that Aircraft X would enter a 45 degree approach to the downwind left traffic Runway XX. Before turning to left base; I announced the turn and again announced base to final to Runway XX. On final approach the incoming airplane was a yellow spray plane taking off 'downwind' and observed in the windscreen of Aircraft X. The spray plane veered to his right and did not communicate at any time. After landing; pilot inquired with the spray plane ground crew as to whether their yellow spray planes have radio communication; or whether those pilots also carry portable radios; and the answer was no! At a minimum for safety and liability reasons; all aircraft entering and leaving ZZZ should have 2 way radio communications to minimize the possibility of a mid-air collision. It is inherently dangerous to operate an aircraft so carelessly in the following ways:1) To take off downwind which is against other incoming air traffic.2) To takeoff with no announcement; including no communications with other incoming or outgoing air traffic. Conclusion: [Spray plane] Company should not be allowed to operate at ZZZ without maintaining 2 way radio communications. To do otherwise greatly increases the risk of midair collision and opens up ZZZ and their operators to serious questions of liability. These spray plane takeoffs occur several per day during spray season. Your attention to this matter would be appreciated.

C182 pilot reported a NMAC on final approach with a crop duster taking off in the opposite direction.

1089956

201305

1201-1800

HCF.TRACON

HI

VMC

Daylight

Tower HNL

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1089956

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

1089963.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Human Factors

[I was the] Captain [pilot] flying [for] Runway 8R departure. Release and PDC both showed the Molokai Four Departure (MKK4.) The commercially provided SID Routing text reads: 'Turn right/left to heading assigned by Tower....' Initial Climb for 8L/R reads: 'Must complete right turn to assigned heading within 2 NM of departure end of runway (HNL 3.6 DME)' PDC showed filed departure and routing; with this note: 'cleared to destination airport right heading 140; comply with SID altitude restrictions....' Captain thoroughly briefed MKK4 departure with a right turn to 140 within 3.6 HNL and climb to 5;000 feet. HNL was hard tuned in Number 1 VOR for cross check. NADP2 was selected. We departed straight out; accelerated; began clean up and started a right turn at 2.5 miles. After right turn commenced; ATC said turn right to 170; complied. Then ATC said turn to 140; turned back to 140. ATC asked if we were aware we needed to make a right turn after take off. We said 'yes.' We were quite confused at that point. After considering ATC's remark; I believe they expected an immediate right turn after takeoff (this would totally avoid the beach area.)We completely complied with the SID; albeit we flew straight out for a mile or so prior to commencing the turn. We stayed inside the 3.6 mile restriction of HNL VOR. I rarely fly out of HNL. I believe both the SID and the PDC should clearly state; 'Immediate right turn after departure' OR 'on departure; turn right to heading....' That is MUCH different than; 'must complete right turn within 2 NM of departure end of runway (HNL 3.6 DME).' So...semantics are important. What is written is not what they seem to expect. This is a miscommunication between the chart's depiction of the SID; the ATC/PDC phrasing and the pilots understanding of what is being requested. Let's be clear to keep from misunderstanding.

[No additional information was provided in the secondary narrative].

An MD-11 flight crew; cleared via the Molokai SID from PHNL from Runway 8R; was chastised by ATC for not turning right to 140 degrees in a timely fashion despite completing the turn prior to the HNL 3.6 DME as charted.

1749108

202007

0601-1200

SNA.Tower

CA

0.0

100.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Corporate

Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors; SID MUSEL8

Class C SNA

Cowling/Nacelle Fasteners; Latches

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 1100

1749108

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

During standard takeoff following a B737; engine cowl cover came unlatched and popped open. No event. Notified tower; entered right downwind and cleared to land. Returned to airport; landed and verified latched. Subsequent take-off uneventful.

Pilot reported that an engine cowl popped open during takeoff; resulting in a return to the airport.

1301884

201510

1801-2400

EVB.Airport

FL

810.0

VMC

10

Night

1500

Tower EVB

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

GPS

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D EVB

Tower EVB

Personal

Cessna 152

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Final Approach

Class D EVB

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness

1301884

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 50; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was on an instrument flight plan on the RNAV 2 final approach after the final approach fix for Runway 2 EVB with instructions to enter midfield downwind Runway 7 after a Cessna 172 at our 2 o'clock; we reported in sight; at this time the Cessna was still 3 miles away from us. Tower instructed the Cessna to turn for the right downwind Runway 7. [The Cessna] instead of turning to a right downwind turned to a heading that was almost directly towards my aircraft that was still on final for Runway 2. Tower instructed [the Cessna] to turn 30 degrees to the right to rejoin downwind 4 times with no response. At the same time I took controls from my student and initiated a 70 degree right banking turn pitching 20 degrees nose down to avoid being hit by [the Cessna]. Upon recovery from that maneuver; we proceeded to follow [the Cessna] for a base to final for Runway 7. There was another plane still on Runway 7 after landing who was turning off the runway for Taxiway C but was moving slowly due to not being familiar with the airport. Tower then told [the Cessna] to go around; no response; repeated 4 times before [the Cessna] responded almost landing on a runway that was still in use by another aircraft. He then proceeded to turn crosswind halfway down the runway and enter a left downwind for Runway 7. While this is going on; I've told my student to slow down to our approach speed; and start a descent to landing now seeing that the other aircraft is now off the runway. Tower cleared us to full stop Runway 7 3 times; due to [the Cessna] blocking the frequency while he was trying to give us his clearance. Once we were able to accept the full clearance we landed without any other problems; I did however take the controls from my student again to clear the runway quickly before [the Cessna] turned final to avoid any further complications with him.

C172 instructor pilot reported an NMAC with another Cessna in the pattern at EVB.

1700991

201911

1201-1800

STL.TRACON

MO

5000.0

TRACON T75

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID JHART6

Class B STL

Altitude Hold/Capture

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Troubleshooting

1700991

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

Captain was Pilot Flying and I was acting as right seat support. ATC completely changed our filed route of flight when we requested our clearance. Captain called Dispatch and informed them of the changes. We took off from Runway 30L on the JHART six departure. The takeoff weight was extremely light at approximately 232;000 pounds. LNAV was armed for takeoff and the VNAV and autopilot was engaged at 1000 ft. After lift off the plane climbed extremely quickly and did not track our course very well. The plane steered right of course. But not a lot. Our first level off was at 5;000 ft. but the plane did not appear to be leveling off quick enough and Captain disengaged the autopilot and flew the plane. I saw the VNAV ALT in the FMA window. The plane was manually leveled off at 5;000 ft. It was an extremely busy time in the cockpit. About that time ATC cleared us to 15;000 ft. and direct JHART. After the clearance was received everything in the cockpit went back to normal and the auto pilot was re-engaged.This is the second time this week this is happened to me in a very light weight takeoff. The 767-300 auto pilot does not appear to be strong enough to handle light weight takeoff. I suggest we remove auto pilot must be used on RNAV one departures from our FCOM. And give the Captain the option to hand fly these departures if it is allowed by the FAA.

B767 Captain reported that an autopilot malfunction during departure resulted in a clearance deviation.

1727327

202002

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Test Flight / Demonstration

Taxi

Small Aircraft

Part 91

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 492; Flight Crew Type 17

1727327

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

My aircraft had just come out of maintenance to correct the problem of slewing to the left. I was going to fly it around the pattern to check the work. After startup; I eased forward out of the parking tie down and turned left onto the taxiway line toward the active runway. I estimate I was perhaps moving at 2-3 mph as I depressed the left rudder and turned left. I straightened the pedals but the aircraft continued turning left and was slowly heading in a circle toward the aircraft parked next to mine. I applied right pedal and brake and emergency brake but to no avail as the aircraft continued slowly towards the other plane. At that point I was almost 180 degrees from my original position. I attempted to shut the engine down but the plane continued to coast into the spinner of the second plane; so that we were almost nose to nose. I sustained prop damage and the other aircraft had spinner damage from my prop; which evidently was still turning when it hit. I estimate the collision speed was perhaps 2 mph. The same maintenance shop had worked on the brakes a couple of weeks ago as well as yesterday on the problem of flying left. I do not know how this problem could have been avoided from the cockpit as the plane simply would not respond. Obviously this was a maintenance error. I hope we find the exact cause.

Pilot reported a slow speed ground collision occurred when he was unable to stop his aircraft from turning left.

1686187

201909

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1686187

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Work Refused

Human Factors

CSA [Customer Service Agent] approached me shortly after arrival in ZZZ with a question about an item a passenger wanted to bring onboard. I went into the boarding area; to view a motorized skateboard. At first I was not to concerned; he indicated that he has had no trouble getting through security and had flown with this skateboard several times. He had flown to ZZZ1-ZZZ on (airline) with this skateboard. I returned to the flight deck; retrieved my iPad and started to research Lithium Ion batteries and found information on restrictions to carrying this skateboard on the plane. He could not remove the battery without specific tools. Long story short; I apologized and told this passenger I would be unable to put this skateboard on the airplane. The reason I'm reporting this is my concern that he was able to get the skateboard on the ZZZ1-ZZZ flight. Get a message out to CSA and crew members to be on the lookout for these kind of items.

B737-900 Captain reported concerns regarding gate agents lack of knowledge of approved Lithium Ion powered devices on passenger aircraft.

1420814

201701

1201-1800

BWI.Airport

MD

600.0

Windshear

Daylight

Tower BWI

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B BWI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170

Situational Awareness

1420814

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather; Human Factors

Weather

Upon arrival to BWI the ATIS indicated strong wind gusts and cross winds. We joined the visual approach to Runway 33L behind a Company aircraft. After receiving landing clearance we heard the aircraft in front of us call go-around for windshear. We decided to continue our Approach. Shortly after that; we received a windshear warning and performed the windshear recovery maneuver. Once we were stable we requested a runway change to Runway 28. We were vectored to follow Company to 28. At this time our fuel on board was 5.7. At our [departure airport] the Captain requested an additional 900 pounds of fuel due to the high winds in BWI. We decided that in the event of a second-go around; we were going to proceed to another airport. I then gathered the weather in [several suitable alternates]. We were then cleared for the visual 28. The Company aircraft ahead of us landed successfully. At approximately 600 AGL we once again encountered windshear and executed a go-around. We leveled off at 2000 ft and made the decision to divert [to an alternate] since the weather conditions at the other airports was similar to BWI. We requested immediate vectors. Our fuel was 5.0. We planned a burn of 2.5 to [the alternate]. We knew that [several other alternates] were additional options in the event our burn calculations were incorrect. We sent Dispatch a message to inform them of our divert plan. The message we received back was 'why? What's up in BWI'; not any information on weather or fuel burn or other options were given. We spoke with the passengers and flight attendants and monitored our minimum fuel situation. We informed Potomac Departure that we were minimum fuel and were given direct to [alternate]. We landed successfully. Still Dispatch only planned on us arriving back to BWI landing with 6.5 in the same weather conditions. We added more fuel to ensure option for arrival in BWI.The Captain and Dispatcher are jointly responsible for the safety of a flight. In this situation Dispatch had minimal situational awareness of not only the weather in BWI; but also; after we executed a second go-around and informed them of the divert; we were planned to land with only 5.7 (the Captain added 900 pounds). It is imperative that Dispatch maintain situational awareness and communicate more effectively to ensure a safe outcome of a flight.

B737 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate after experiencing windshear on two consecutive approaches to BWI.

1266263

201505

1201-1800

IND.TRACON

IN

7500.0

Marginal

Daylight

Tower IND

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Landing

Class C IND

Facility IND.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.25

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1266263

Facility IND.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1266280.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather

I was paged back 15 minutes into eating my lunch due to an aircraft in distress. Aircraft X was stuck on top of overcast; not IFR qualified; and running low on gas. By the time I got in DRE controller had already gotten the basic info and we started trying to find any airports that were VFR. Neither us nor surrounding facilities had one without an overcast layer. IND was reporting the best weather; SCT010 BKN015 OVC020. I was put on position to work only Aircraft X and given a controller who was IFR rated as an assist. We vectored the aircraft for the ILS 32 since it was the closest and we wanted a second chance before fuel ran out. We gave him the approach info and learned the co-pilot had some basic instrument training. The TRACON worked together to keep other aircraft away from him. We got him established on the LOC; slowed and gear down and we brought him to the MVA; continuously soliciting base reports from aicraft operating at IND. At the marker I issued descent to the DH rounded up to 1;300 feet. We helped give small corrections as he drifted back and forth on the LOC. He got the ground and runway in sight out of 1;900 feet and landed without incident.[Recommend] just keep staffing the FAA with dedicated people who come together when it matters.

Aircraft X called IND Approach requesting assistance. Pilot stated they were VFR at 7;500 feet and needed help finding a hole through the clouds. After checking with surrounding facilities; it was determined no VFR weather was present in the area. Pilot-in-command was VFR only. Co-pilot was also VFR only; but had received some IFR training. Aircraft X elected to land at IND; which had the best weather at the time. Reported 60 min fuel and 2 SOB. STN position assumed responsibility for aircraft X. The aircraft was vectored to Runway 32 localizer while above clouds; then advised to configure for descent. Arriving A319 reported ceiling FL021. Aircraft X was able to see the airport on approximately 4nm final and landed safely. Aircraft and Rescue Fire Fighters (ARFF) responded as a precaution.I was Front Line Manager (FLM) at the time; actively monitoring the Departure Radar East (DRE) position. Typical traffic [on this day]; during MVFR weather; requires only one radar position in the Tracon. The DRE controller was moderately busy; but certainly not overworked. However; the sudden presence of a situation required additional resources. Within 5 minutes; I had recalled employees to open 2 other positions; one to work arrivals; and one position to exclusively work the aircraft.In hindsight; my biggest concern is not having the positions de-combined at the time the incident began. However; under most normal circumstances; this would never be necessary. The arrival data position was not busy at all; I may be more likely to use that person to staff a radar position in the future; and have ad combined to a radar function.

IND TRACON Controller and Front Line Manager (FLM) report of a pilot that was not IFR rated had to descend in IFR conditions due to weather. ATC got the aircraft down to decision height where the pilot could see the runway and landed without incident.

1279049

201507

0001-0600

SMO.Airport

CA

1500.0

Marginal

10

Night

1500

Tower SMO

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B LAX

Government

Helicopter

1.0

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 189; Flight Crew Type 166

Confusion; Fatigue

1279049

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Horizontal 500; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Inadvertently entered LAX Bravo airspace on initial approach to SMO. Realizing mistake; I corrected heading; but came too close to a helicopter in vicinity during infraction.Contributing factors1. Long day (nearly 5 hrs.) flying. Early in the AM. PIC tired.2. Low ceiling and marginal VFR conditions at night adding to mental load.3. Handheld moving map crashed and was unable to use. Was attempting to troubleshoot.4. Too hasty correction of heading potentially causing a collision.5. I know the area very well and took that for granted. Was visually following roads instead of flying known headings from avionics. Followed an incorrect freeway; I think; due to being tired. 6. Distracted by talking passenger.After correcting my heading I landed safely at SMO.

C172 pilot arriving SMO at night in marginal VFR conditions; experiences a failure of his moving map display. This results in inadvertent entry into LAX Class B when the wrong freeway is chosen as the route to SMO. When the error is detected the hard turn away results in an airborne conflict with a helicopter.

1573521

201808

1201-1800

90.0

10.0

600.0

VMC

Turbulence; 5

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Banner Tow

Cruise

VFR Route

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 565; Flight Crew Type 470

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1573521

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 0; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was flying with a banner when I saw 2 parasails in the ocean when I was heading southbound. I was at 600 feet keeping them on my right side; right after I passed abeam the first one I made a 180 degree turn to the right to come because I needed to be on time to drop the banner. Right after I landed I was communicated that my banner touched one of the parasails; nobody got hurt; the parasail has minor damage and they were able to land safely. I noticed that the parasails were flying a little bit higher than the usual in that day; I was flying at 600 feet the whole flight and keeping visual separation.

Banner tow pilot reported the banner came into minor contact with a parasail.

1756780

202008

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing

Class B ZZZ

Flap/Slat Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100

1756780

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 2804

Troubleshooting

1756959.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft; Manuals

Manuals

On approach to ZZZ XXL; First Officer called for Landing Checklist. We noticed no illuminated green 'leading edge flaps extended'. We did go-around and got vectors in the area at 3;000 feet while working the problem. I could not find a QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist for the omission of that light. The FO (First Officer) and I exchanged controls. He was also unable to find a QRH checklist for this problem. While being vectored we extended the flaps and could visually see by looking out our windows that the leading edge flaps were indeed extending normally; and that it was an indication problem. The following lights were not illuminating at all. Leading Edge Flap Transit; Leading Edge Flap Extend; and the overhead Leading Edge devices indication lights. After triple checking no checklists would cover our problem; and after we verified the leading edge devices were fully extended; we made a normal flaps 30 uneventful landing. After landing the PSEU (Proximity Switch Electronics Unit) light illuminated.

As the Pilot Flying (PF) I called for flaps 30 and the Before Landing Checklist on the visual approach to XXL into ZZZ. The Captain (Pilot Monitoring) ran the checklist and we discovered that the Leading Edge Flap Extend green light was not illuminated. We executed a go-around to give ourselves more time to assess the situation. At 3;000 feet and after ATC gave us vectors; the Captain proceeded to find the appropriate checklist in the QRH. He could not find any checklist for LE FLAPS EXT green light not illuminated. He then asked if I could look and I transferred aircraft control to the Captain. I looked and didn't find any checklist addressing our exact condition. At that time; I did a push to test on the LE FLAPS EXT (Green light); LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel and all tested good. The Captain called for Flaps 1 and we verified visually by looking out the window that the LE Flaps did in fact deploy and the flap position indicator showed flaps 1; but LE FLAPS EXT (Green light); LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber light) and LE devices annunciator panel did not illuminate. I looked through the QRH again to see if we had missed anything and the closest checklist we could think was the LE FLAPS TRANSIT (Amber Light) but that light was not illuminated; so we elected to not use that checklist. Also searched the non-normal performance data to see if there was an option to select for our condition and there was not. After discussing together and visually confirming the LE flaps deployed; and no roll or yaw was felt in the controls and it correctly showed on the flaps position indicator; we elected to land normally with flaps 30. After landing during roll out; the PSEU illuminated. Maybe a QRH addressing this particular condition. In looking back; I believe that we could have used our commuting pilot in the cabin to visually check the inboard LE Flaps and Trailing Edge flaps were deployed. Also contacted Dispatch and got Maintenance to get another perspective on the indications we were seeing in the cockpit.

B737-700 flight crew could not find checklist for Leading Edge Devices Not Extended.

1703488

201911

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 1842

1703488

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

I was the flying pilot on flight X. We released brakes with 21;300 lbs of fuel and taxied out uneventfully. Taxiing on to the runway fuel quantity was still normal. After departure and climbing out of 10;000 I turned the autopilot on and looked down noticing the left main tank was now indicating approximately 7;700 lbs and we had a fuel imbalance message. We were still operating on center fuel; and the right main tank still indicated 8.7. I started watching the quantity closely and did not notice any drop in left main tank quantity while we burned the remainder of the center fuel. I was uncertain if we had a leak or just an indication problem. We subtracted fuel burned off of the FF (Fuel Flow) meter from what we started with and there was a difference of about 1;000 lbs. I contacted dispatch on ARINC and asked to conference [Maintenance Control] for any history of fuel quantity errors. I was closely monitoring the fuel quantity to see if it was dropping faster than the right main tank; and it had seemed to stabilize; and actually the difference between tanks decreased on the quantity gauge to about 900 lbs. That was short lived though and while I was on the radio with Dispatch it seemed that the fuel quantity in left main started to decrease more quickly again. The difference got to 1;400 lbs. The FO (First Officer) and I had already discussed diversion options; and we both agreed based on our present position that ZZZ seemed the best option. I quickly decided based on the fact that our route of flight was going to take us out over the water after ZZZ1; that it would not be wise to continue on. At that time we requested a divert to ZZZ and began a turn. We alerted ATC and got cleared directly to ZZZ. Upon landing in ZZZ; CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) met the airplane and advised us that they detected a leak; and to shut down. We started the APU; and shut the engines down. They still detected a leak and I turned off all fuel and hydraulic pumps. They no longer detected any leaking fluids; and inspected the fluids that had already leaked out. CFR advised us that the fluid was not a 'hazmat' fuel or hydraulic fluid; and it should be safe to start up and taxi in. After start up they detected another leak; and we shut down and got towed in. I debriefed the Mechanics after the passengers deplaned and gave them the fuel upload slip from [the departure airport]. We did the math and could not account for about 1;200 lbs of fuel.I feel like for the most part we handled the situation well; but I did identify some errors in the way I managed the diversion. I initially handed the aircraft to the FO to have him fly while I notified the flight attendants and passengers what was going on. After that I resumed the flying pilot duties; and that was a mistake. My mind was moving rapidly; and I still had coordinating and communicating left to do. I always brief prior to takeoff that if we have a situation; once things are stabilized that I will hand the aircraft to the FO so I can manage the situation. I should have stuck to that. I noticed that I was trying to do too much; fly and coordinate. As soon as I realized that; I handed the aircraft back to the FO and let him fly the remainder of the flight so I could make decisions and communicate them with everyone that I needed to. Once we did that; things went much more smoothly.

B737 Captain reported encountering a fuel anomaly in-flight.

1283863

201508

0601-1200

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

35000.0

VMC

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Oceanic; Direct

Powerplant Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1283863

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1284316.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

At FL350 MACH .80 VMC got EICAS message 'R ENG FUEL FILT' accomplished QRH procedure and contacted dispatch via SATCOM. Captain and dispatch agreed a divert was necessary and a divert was coordinated. Dispatch advised us to land overweight as opposed to dumping fuel. The crew agreed. Landing was normal and uneventful. Due to airport protocol we were instructed to exit the runway and be inspected by [Grounds Crews]. Gear and brakes were inspected with no abnormalities and we taxied to parking with no issues.

I was the [Relief Officer] on this flight. At approximately 2 1/2 hours into the flight we received a 'R ENG FUEL FILT' EICAS message. Referenced the ETOPS Systems Failures section in the QRH which directed a divert. Coordinated with Dispatch/Maintenance Control who also recommended the divert. Coordinated a divert and uneventful landing.[Grounds crew] checked the aircraft for hot brakes at the end of the runway.

B767-300 flight crew experiences an EICAS message 'R ENG FUEL FILT' at FL350 during an oceanic crossing. After checking the QRH and contacting Dispatch a diversion to the nearest suitable alternate is coordinated.

1325775

201601

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other All

Tablet

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Total 8360; Flight Crew Type 6363

1325775

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

The permanent iPad mount installation is unsafe and impractical. The permanent mount interferes with the use of the only available chart holder and does not fit the iPad with the company issued protective cover. Additionally; the mount does not hold the position of the iPad. The friction lock is difficult to tighten and is ineffectual. Even with the friction lock tight; the iPad mount rotates freely. Of more concern is that the permanent iPad mount contacts the outboard armrest during window operation. This brings into question the airworthiness of this installation as the permanent iPad mount could interfere with the operation of an emergency exit. This permanent iPad mount should be removed and its use discontinued. Please certify that the interference between the permanent iPad mount and the emergency exit sliding window is acceptable.

A319 Captain reported concern that the iPad mount used on the aircraft could interfere with the cockpit window operation.

1349914

201604

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Brake System

McDonnell Douglas

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1349914

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; MEL; Procedure

Aircraft

The takeoff was rejected due to the Wheel Not Turning light illuminating between 50 and 60 KIAS. After taxiing clear of the runway; I spoke to the Lead Flight Attendant (FA); and then to the passengers. During this time; the first officer ran the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). At this time; the right inboard brake was over 200 degrees; while the other three were at or below 100 degrees. We returned to the gate. The right inboard brake temperature had continued to climb; eventually settling at about 250-260 degrees. The right outboard was at about 125 degrees. The two left brakes remained at about 100 degrees. We were boarded by a mechanic who asked me the details of the event. He returned several minutes later and informed me that he planned on deferring the Wheel Not Turning light and; potentially; the brake temperature display. I literally thought he was playing a joke on me. It quickly became apparent that he was not. His contention was that I had a failure of two separate indicating systems at exactly the same time; and that both indications were 'unrelated.' He offered no explanation for the heat emanating from the right main - he only stated that the tires 'had no flat spots.' I informed him that I would refuse the aircraft if he took that course of action. He then went on to tell me that the MEL allows him to do this if there are no anti-skid messages. I informed him that I didn't recall seeing any messages; but was also very clear that a pilot is not looking for these during the process of rejecting a takeoff. I ran the anti-skid test at the gate; and the aircraft failed the test: RIGHT OUTBD ANTI-SKID remained illuminated. This was interesting because the LEFT inboard brake was running hot; yet the anti-skid system detected a fault on the RIGHT inboard brake. I asked him for the logbook to enter this new condition as a separate write-up. He informed me that he had the logbook and that he would do it. After following up with the captain who was assigned this aircraft several hours later; it was; in fact; NOT entered in the logbook.When an aircraft has an obvious legitimate issue; the course of action should not be to immediately defer the indicating system(s) in order to simply 'move the aircraft' as quickly as possible. This is one of the most egregious instances of this I have ever seen. This is absolutely unacceptable. In the future; I will also seek out the logbook when a discrepancy occurs and see with my own eyes that it was actually recorded accurately and legally per the FARs.

The reporter stated that this warning light comes on when a MLG wheel is turning 20% less than the other wheels. He also stated that he could actually feel the excessive heat coming off the RH inboard Brake. The reporter stated this issue has also happened on other aircraft of this type; this is not a unique occurrence. The reporter also stated that Maintenance argued with him about the issue and wanted to defer it along with an Anti-skid problem.

MD83 Captain reported the takeoff was rejected due to the Wheel Not Turning light. The right hand brake temperature was over 250 degrees.

1427836

201702

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1427836

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1427835.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Automation Aircraft Other Automation

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

We had a great deal of difficulty establishing contact with Tower. We were finally cleared for the visual. On final we were on speed and had no sink rate warning. We had a hard landing. We didn't realize that we had a tail strike until we were taxiing in. This was indicated by an EICAS message.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767-300ER flight crew reported a hard landing resulted in a tail strike.

1695072

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 782; Flight Crew Type 782

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1695072

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was in trail following a friend to the airport; my first day solo in a tailwheel airplane. We were communicating. He advised that he would land and roll-out to end of runway (grass) and that I should land and we would both back taxi. I was too close in trail. He landed; but then decided to back taxi immediately. I was on the ground rolling out as he began his 180 back taxi turn. I told him to stop over the radio. He was near the center line of runway and there was no room for me pass him. I steered left of center to avoid hitting him and rolled off the runway into shrubs and saplings traveling at less than 20 mph; engine at idle. Prop struck 3/4' to 1' diameter saplings and stopped. There was no visible damage to airplane. I was not injured. Plane was towed with a strap and pickup truck back onto runway and inspected. Again; no visible damage. I preflighted the airplane; started the engine and completed pre-take off check list including longer than usual run up. All indications were normal. I departed and returned the airplane to it home base. In hindsight; if he had a problem landing; I am not sure I had enough room/speed to go around. Lesson learned was don't land unless runway is completely clear regardless of previous arrangements.

Small aircraft pilot landing at non-towered airport reported the traffic they followed back taxied on the runway as they were landing causing them to take evasive action and leave the runway.

1836195

202108

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Direct

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 923; Flight Crew Type 367

Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1836195

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

This occurrence happened after maneuvers. We were practicing normal takeoffs and landings at ZZZ which had a crosswind component of 10 kt. After a first attempt and go-around; we decided to try again. On the second approach in; we proceeded to come in slow; 50 kt.; and I prompted my student to add in power. However; he was frozen and too fixated to notice the low airspeed. I should have promptly issued a go-around and should have taken the controls. However; I was not forceful enough and was not able to take the controls from my student to go around; resulting in a rough landing and a tail strike. We ended up going around and did not feel there was any difference in controls and continued back to ZZZ1.Later after pushing the plane back; we noticed the damaged tail piece and the bent tail strike protection. This could have all been avoided with just a simple go-around. At the slightest feeling of something not going right - for example; not being lined up or being too slow on final - a go-around will ultimately save a bad landing from happening. The student and the instructor should always be communicating and be aware of the situation that is happening. A positive exchange of controls should be practiced frequently so that the exchange can be flawless and can prevent situations where a student may be fixated or task saturated. The reaction to go around was not quick enough and resulted in the tail strike. Task saturation is a real thing; especially if a student pilot is being introduced to a new airport and also uncontrolled airport operations as well. To wrap things up; going around is your best option and positive exchange of controls should be practiced not only when braking; but also while in the air; even in critical phases of flight.

C172 Flight Instructor reported a tail strike during a landing maneuver on a training flight.

1874846

202202

1201-1800

IAH.Tower

TX

500.0

VMC

Tower IAH

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B IAH

Radio Altimeter

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 43; Flight Crew Total 43; Flight Crew Type 43

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

1874846

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft

Approximately 10 to 20 seconds after take off; we noted an amber RA (Radio Altimeter) flag on the Captain's PFD. All other systems and indications were normal; and the First Officer's radio altimeter continued to function normally. The RA flag lasted for approximately 15 seconds; and then all indications and functions returned to normal. We reported the anomaly to Houston; sent a maintenance report; and reported the event to dispatch. The rest of the flight was conducted normally; and without further incident.

An air carrier Captain reported on departure from IAH the Captain's side Radio Altimeter failed for about 15 seconds.

1457869

201706

0601-1200

CLT.Airport

NC

16000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Daylight

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR JONZE1

Class E CLT

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

STAR JONZE1

Class E CLT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1457869

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

We were descending via the JONZE arrival into CLT. We were at the published speed of 250 KIAS. Passing through 16;000 ft; we encountered wake turbulence. The aircraft suddenly and violently rolled right about 20 degrees; followed quickly by a 40 degree bank to the left. The airspeed fluctuated approximately 20 knots during the encounter. As the aircraft rolled left the autopilot disconnected. I turned on the continuous ignition; told the FO 'my flight controls' and assumed manual control of the aircraft. I leveled the aircraft at 16;000 to attempt to stay above the flight path of the preceding traffic that caused the wake encounter. We informed ATC of our encounter and they gave us a new clearance to descend to 9;000. They informed us that we were following an aircraft that was 7.8 miles in front of us. I transferred control back to the FO and he flew a shallower descent to stay above the wake. I called back to the flight attendants to make sure everyone was ok. There were no injuries. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The spacing between us and the aircraft in front of us led to a wake turbulence encounter. We had a quartering tailwind during this leg of the arrival; which made the wake linger in our flight path.

CRJ-700 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence at 16;000 ft on Arrival into CLT that resulted in a 'violent' roll right and left.

1866177

202112

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

22000.0

VMC

30

Daylight

CLR

Government

Large UAS; Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 91

IFR

Observation / Surveillance (UAS)

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

FAA Authorization

N

Large

Fixed Wing

BVLOS

Waypoint Flying

Open Space / Field

Number of UAS 1

Unknown

X

Malfunctioning

Indoor / Ground Control Station (UAS)

Government

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS)

Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 90; Flight Crew Total 3975; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 400; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 150

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1866177

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person UAS Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Human Factors; Software and Automation

Ambiguous

While operating on a preprogramed mission mode at FL 220 and 136 IAS; I uploaded a new mission to adjust our profile for clouds ahead. The new mission was a new altitude of FL 200 and an airspeed of 105 IAS. After the mission was updated; the UAS pitched up to slow down before commencing a descent to the new altitude. Normally at this speed; altitude has priority over airspeed. I was expecting the UAS to descend first while slowing down. I took control of the UAS and quickly initiated a decent to FL 200. Later in the flight; We tried to duplicate the issue. However; we were unsuccessful. The discrepancy was noted and is currently being reviewed by engineering. In the future; I will verify the autopilot preference mode first before initiating a descent or climb regardless of the current IAS. I will also upload one change to the mission at a time and upload the other after the completion of the first.

UAS pilot reported that while the UAS was in cruise flight being flown by the autopilot the flight crew made changes to the flight profile; resulting in an undesirable aircraft state. The pilot saw the error and made a manual correction before there was a loss of aircraft control.

1031089

201208

1201-1800

DCA.Airport

DC

0.0

Ground DCA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Lead Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1031089

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Maintenance

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was taxiing after a high power run up and deviated from ATC taxi instructions. I was taxiing the aircraft and operating the radios as the other Mechanic was uncomfortable using the radios with ATC. The Mechanic did ask before the start of our pushback to taxi while I run the radios; I declined his request as I have never conducted high power runs with this mechanic while he is in control of the aircraft. When we arrived at the 33 block; ATC instructed us to maneuver the aircraft to a different heading than we are accustomed; to direct jet blast away from any taxiways and approach runways. This heading put Taxiway H out of my sight and to the right. When we were done with the high power runs ATC instructed us to taxi via H; cross 22; and hold short 1. When we began our taxi I missed H and proceeded forward onto F and onto Runway 22 about 100 FT and stopped the aircraft realizing my mistake. ATC called us and said to hold our position as we were not on H as instructed. She cleared other aircraft and instructed us to taxi down 22 to B short K. I became a little disoriented as we were now at the intersection of Runway 1 and 22. ATC then began to give us comprehensive taxi instructions. Once we had cleared 22 on B; ATC stated that I needed to review local taxiways before conducting any further taxiing here in DCA. I spoke to the ATC controller the next morning and explained to her my mistake and she said at no time where I stopped the aircraft was there a runway incursion event. When Maintenance is cleared to run on the 33 run block we usually face the aircraft towards Taxiway H so we have some real estate in front of the aircraft as the 33 run block is very shallow. We then are usually directed to taxi back to the ramp via H which is a straight forward taxi; when ATC asked us to face the aircraft on a more westerly heading that put Taxiway H off to our right and F directly in front of us. We were cleared to taxi by ATC on H; cross Runway 22; and hold short of Runway 1. I taxied straight about 100 FT on F onto Runway 22 which we were cleared to cross by ATC instead of a right turn onto H. I immediately noticed there were no hold short lines for Runway 1 as this is an intersecting runway with 1. I at that time noticed my mistake and immediately stopped the aircraft. I being fairly new to DCA and being used to taxiing straight forward out of the 33 block onto H; I taxied straight onto F. I went back through the Run/Taxi; Runway Incursion training program including the test. More importantly I reviewed and more thoroughly comprehend DCA's airport diagram as well. In the future I will always be more aware of my location; verify and comprehend ATC instructions prior to any aircraft movement.

Air Carrier Mechanic reports a taxiway incursion when cleared to taxi at the completion of a high power engine run up in the Runway 33 pad at DCA. The aircraft was aligned on a westerly heading by ATC and resulted in the reporter entering Runway 22 on Taxiway F with a clearance to cross Runway 22 on Taxiway H.

1297606

201509

LBE.Airport

PA

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Ground LBE; Tower LBE

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch; Taxi

None

Class D LBE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 35000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1297606

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

Problem: Supposed 'settlement pond' approximately 200 feet east of Runway 5/23 at LBE. Location is northeast of Taxiway Kilo. Area is filled almost year round with water runoff. Cattail and weed vegetation fills 'pond' area. Area filled with frogs and insects (mainly mosquitos). Extremely large flocks of birds are constantly in this pond area. Size varies from blackbird size to large raptor. With a large corporate jet base; a FAR 121 Air Carrier service (5 to 7 flights per day) and 141 flight school along with Large GA aircraft population a serious safety issue arises. Both Tower and ATIS advise of bird activity. So we know airport is aware of problem on every takeoff no matter size of aircraft; bird flocks or individual birds arise from this area and on most occasions fly toward runway. On recent afternoon on 3 separate takeoffs I fully expected to have collision. Luckily none occurred. I feel this situation is intolerable and an accident waiting to occur. Solution: fill said area eliminating bugs which eliminated food which would eliminate birds in this area. I do not care of EPA and or Penna DNR regulations. Human life is more important than a cattail or bird.

An LBE based pilot described the 'settlement pond' east of Taxiway A between Taxiway K and the Southwest end of the terminal ramp. The pond is a bird feeding area attracting birds which become threats for aircraft departing Runway 5/23.

1108690

201308

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

1400.0

Tower ZZZ

Duchess 76

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Final Approach

None

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1108690

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Training was in progress on LC1; Aircraft X was in the VFR pattern on right down wind and cleared touch and go following a Cessna on final; Aircraft Y was VFR on left downwind and sequenced to follow Aircraft X. Aircraft Y reported BE76 in sight and cleared to land following Aircraft X. The Controller then saw Aircraft Y and Aircraft X in close proximity to each other and issued a left three sixty to Aircraft Y. Aircraft X ask the Controller if he should go around and said 'that was a near miss.' The developmental Controller being trained was behind on his traffic and not keeping up; as the CIC I should have told his trainer he should think about taking over the position.

Tower Controller witnessed a pilot declared NMAC when traffic on a right and left downwind conflicted turning base to follow traffic on final; the reporter indicated the instructor should have taken Local sooner.

1304426

201510

1201-1800

ASE.Airport

CO

Daylight

TRACON ASE

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 15

Initial Approach

Class E ASE

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1304426

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

On the LOC DME 15 approach to ASE; at 0.2 miles prior to the fix XTREM; I called for the altitude alerter to be set to 9700. This is what was indicated on the FMS next to the fix KYACK. About 0.5 miles from XTREM requested the FO increase the descent rate from 1200 FPM to 1800fpm in order to put the descent indicator in the proper position just beyond the fix. We received the Caution Terrain; promptly followed by Caution Obstacle when descending near the fix KYACK. We immediately executed a Go-Around; then followed the published missed and notified ATC that we went missed due to a terrain caution. After completing the missed approach; I realized that when programming the FMS; I had incorrectly entered the altitude at the fix KYACK as 9700; instead of 10300 as published. This error wasn't caught on our FMS cross-check. I called for the altitude to be set; and glanced at the chart; but didn't catch the error. In the future I will maintain a heightened awareness when setting up a complex approach and ask the FO to carefully cross check my work. An extra moments care would have revealed the error if I took an extra second to interpret the profile view of the chart. Also; if I see the need for an unusual descent rate without any contributing factors; I will immediately question if the descent angle or altitude is wrong.

CRJ700 Captain reported entering the wrong step down altitude in the FMC for the LOC DME Runway 15 to ASE. The error was not detected and the approach chart was not consulted during the approach. This resulted in a terrain warning and a go-around.

1624183

201903

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193

Training / Qualification; Distraction

1624183

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Having flown the MAX only a handful of times; I recognize that some things will take some getting used to. However; one thing that is very troublesome to me and my fellow pilots; whom I've spoken with to date; is the magenta MAINT light that pops up/illuminates on the display unit. On both legs I noticed that right at touchdown it illuminates well within our field of view. Twice now; it caught my eye and distracted me/us at a critical time. I understand the meaning and purpose of the light and I cannot believe that the timing for this notification NEEDS to take place right at touchdown. We need to focus on minimizing and mitigating at best the distractions we are already faced with. Need software update to NOT have the Magenta MAINT light illuminate right at touchdown and quite frankly; have it go away earlier than applying takeoff power. It is extremely distracting and a Safety issue in my honest opinion.

B737 Max 8 First Officer reported the illumination of the Maintenance light during landing is distracting.

1774687

202011

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Service

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Fatigue

1774687

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Work Refused

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Was experiencing fatigue; headache and mild nausea; didn't feel well enough to do another two flights after the turn I had already done.Crew was concerned about COVID. Tested my temperature and it was elevated. Crew and I no longer felt it would be safe to keep me on the aircraft.Called in sick on line.

Flight Attendant reported having a headache; elevated temperature; nausea and feeling fatigued during the flight. The crew was concerned it could be COVID-19 symptoms; so the Flight Attendant called in sick for the next flight.

1321799

201512

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

19000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1321799

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

While climbing through about 19;000 feet we received a red pitch trim main Inoperative caution message. We complied with the QRH and determined that the main page trim on the copilot side had become inoperative. We proceeded to continue the fight; at 27;000 outside of Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM) airspace and contacted dispatch and maintenance to advise them of the situation. About 10 minutes later we received a yellow pitch trim FO switch fail message along with multiple trim audible warnings I went to the QRH to determine that that was a notification that the copilots trim switch which had failed. The FO continued to hand fly the plane as the QRH had called for the autopilot not to be use for continued and landed uneventfully.The first notification of the incident was the red warning message followed by the yellow caution message about a minute later.Maintenance believes that this occurred due to the FO trim switch not working properly. Maintenance worked on the airplane the following morning and deferred the FO switched from our trip continued as normal with no further incident from the system.

Crew received a red pitch trim main inoperative caution message and determined that the First Officer's pitch trim became inoperative. A short time later received a yellow pitch trim First Officer switch fail message along with multiple trim audible warnings and determined that was a notification that the copilots trim switch failed.

1360337

201606

0601-1200

RNO.Airport

NV

500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower RNO

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Class C RNO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1360337

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 400

Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1360330.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Dispatch; Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Pre-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Aircraft

Chart Or Publication

After receiving a load plan and finding we had more freight than planned; we received new fuel burn and data from dispatch. I went to the printed takeoff data sheet and determined that runway 16L was required for departure due to runway limits and max power was required. In addition; RNO gound informed us that Company had contacted them confirming that runway 16L was available for our departure; further confirming that the printed data was correct. The issue is that 16L is 2;000 feet shorter than 16R and the data required a 16L departure. We departed 16L as per the data with max power. On departure; we received a 500 feet call off of the radar altimeter when passing over a small mountain at the end of the runway. As we reflected on the data; we thought there may be an issue with the data. It seems as if the runway numbers are transposed on the data sheet. (16L was actually for 16R) I spoke with dispatch and discussed with him my concerns. He agreed it did not make sense as printed and there were no known issues as to why it would be that way. He also said that they have had 'issues like this' and have 'people working on it'. It is great they are working on it; but the crews need to be informed of the potential issue. As we move to pure electronic data; these issues could prove fatal. Other RNO issues. Runway 7-25 is unusable by our aircraft type; yet we have data for it. Also; note to turn on AP at 200 feet is not fleet specific.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A twin engine heavy jet flight crew departed RNO 16L after discussions about the max power takeoff and the aircraft's performance. After takeoff the hill off the end of 16L unexpectedly activated the radio altimeter with an EGPWS alert at 500 feet climbing.

1336896

201603

0601-1200

BTL.Airport

MI

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

3500

Tower BTL

FBO

Cirrus Aircraft Undifferentiated

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 330; Flight Crew Type 275

Situational Awareness

1336896

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Trainee; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 70; Flight Crew Type 70

Situational Awareness

1336903.0

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

Student and instructor were coming back from the practice area. A discussion about runway conditions; the type of landing; and what would be different (application of brakes; letting the airplane coast more than normal on the contaminated runway; what will happen in the event of slippage/stuck brake) on this particular full stop landing took place in the downwind leg of pattern. The student took the landing with the instructor shadowing on the controls. Approach; flare; and touchdown were stable and controlled. The aircraft maintained a straight roll out path on runway centerline for about 2-3 seconds before the nose slowly drifted to the left. The student applied light braking to the right with little success. Instructor took control and applied rudder deflection and greater brake pressure to the right. The aircraft initially responded by correcting to a straight roll out path; then veered left again and departed the runway regardless of rudder/brake pressure applied to the right. Crew notified Tower and performed shutdown. No injuries noted.A thorough weather briefing; indicating runway MU values in the mid-high 20s was obtained prior to launching. ATIS was obtained prior to entering BTL airspace. At the time; runway conditions were thin dry snow over ice with MU values in the mid 20s. The MU values below 40 indicated less than ideal braking; but not impossible landing conditions. The crew believed the contaminated runway to be an acceptable risk. A better understanding of braking action reports; aircraft landing performance on; and different landing procedures for contaminated runways could be gathered and applied to conditions such as these to help determine the likelihood of conducting a safe flight.

Student and instructor were coming back from an instrument practice lesson. Approaching the airport and entering the downwind; the crew briefed the landing and made special note for landing on the contaminated surface and what exactly could happen. It was made clear that the student would have control and the instructor would shadow along for safety. The approach; flare; and touchdown were all controlled and stable. A straight roll-out path remained for about 2-3 seconds after touchdown before the airplane veered left of centerline. Instructor took control to correct; and the roll-out path straightened back up. Airplane again started veering left no matter how much rudder and braking action was applied to the right. The aircraft left the runway surface into the snow at a very slow speed. No injuries were noted.

A Cirrus pilot and instructor reported a loss of control and runway excursion at BTL due to field conditions.

1223246

201412

SJC.Airport

CA

5100.0

VMC

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

STAR JAWWS THREE

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Confusion

1223246

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Procedure

On Jawws 3 arrival into SJC; ATC cleared us to 5100 feet prior to SHRRK. While level at 5100 received GPWS Terrain; Terrain pull up pull up command. at the time we where clear of clouds but heading into clouds again. Clicked off auto pilot and climbed until warning stopped. reported deviation to ATC. ATC stated min vectoring altitude was 5100 feet.

B757 Captain experiences a terrain warning at 5;100 FT approaching SHRRK on the JAWWS 3 arrival to SJC. While VMC at the time of the warning; clouds were ahead and evasive action was taken. ATC advises that 5;100 FT is the MVA for that area.

1680144

201908

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

Cessna 152

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Engine Control

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 152; Flight Crew Type 120

1680144

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Me and my instructor were returning from flight maneuvers and wanted to do a couple of laps in the traffic pattern prior to concluding the flight. The wind conditions were approximately at 13 kts.; gusting 17 kts. There was light turbulence and as a result; I had to use a substantial amount of power to maintain pattern altitude.After a single landing; we were back on downwind; the throttle was at about 70-80% to sustain pattern altitude. However; when I decided to pull power back; I noted that the throttle was stuck. It would go the rest of the way in but no further back; resulting in us being stuck at roughly 2350 rpm (redline is 2550 rpm). I immediately reported the issue to my CFI; who promptly took the flight controls and [made a call] on CTAF. Since we had no control of power; we were forced to cut off the mixture in order to land the plane. However; as we were on final; the engine refused to quit; despite the mixture being at idle cutoff; resulting in us going around.We tried another lap in the pattern again; this time additionally utilizing the fuel shutoff valve; no luck as it would take a couple of minutes for it to take effect. In the spite of the moment; my instructor deployed flaps to slow the plane down about 5kts above Vfe (Flap Extension Speed); there was no resulting damage. On the next lap; my instructor had me hold the mixture at cut-off to ensure complete fuel starvation; but no luck; the engine still kept coming back to life at a high enough rpm to foil the landing attempt.On the last lap; I suggested turning off the mags to kill the engine when abeam our touchdown point. Fortunately; we never had to default to that plan as the throttle valve became unstuck on the final lap and we were able to perform a landing in accordance with the precautionary landing with engine power checklist. I noted a drop of oil pressure on final and the engine began to run rough. After we landed and exited the runway; the engine quit altogether.We tried a restart in hopes that we could try to cautiously taxi the plane back to the ramp; but the engine refused to start. Shortly after; the throttle became stuck again; although this had no effect as the engine was dead. We decided to run the securing checklist on the taxiway and await a tow to the flight schools maintenance hangar. When we got out to assess the plane; my instructor noted a clanking noise when moving the prop.The cause of the incident was identified as a faulty part in the float-chamber that went by the pre-buy inspection of the aircraft unnoticed and over the months; the running of the engine shook the part loose altogether; resulting in an uncontrollable flow of fuel mixture to the carburetor; resulting in a stuck throttle valve and unreliable mixture control. Fortunately; there was enough air to sustain combustion.

C152 student pilot reported encountering a stuck throttle and difficulty shutting down the engine while in the traffic pattern.

1739577

202004

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1739577

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was working on an aircraft located on the pad; Supervisor boarded the aircraft and instructed me; while standing in the entry way; that it was 'okay' to remove the quarantined sticker on the door of Aircraft X and to board as needed; that it was 'okay.' These instruction were given with no documentation saying that the aircraft had sat for the required [time]; and then deep cleaned; putting myself and others at risk of catching the COVID-19 virus.Careful detailed records; documentation and logs generated are necessary to keep track of the condition of the aircraft and the safety of employees.

Technician reported being told the aircraft was 'okay' to board; but received no documentation stating the aircraft was properly sanitized.

1852781

202110

VMC

Daylight

Corporate

A109 All Series

1.0

Part 91

Test Flight / Demonstration

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Situational Awareness

1852781

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Other Person

Other Post-Flight

Human Factors

The First Officer and I ate the Company supplied crew meals out of MMMX. We were later diagnosed by our treating physicians as having Ecoli. Many others have [reported] to being sick after eating the Company supplied crew meals out of MMMX. An email was sent to the Flight Office advising that my First Officer and myself were both sick. I also noted that I suspected it was from the crew meal out of MMMX.

Air carrier Captain reported becoming ill after eating the company supplied crew meal departing MMMX.

1494124

201711

1201-1800

50.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Ultralight

1.0

Part 103

None

Personal

Landing

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 40; Flight Crew Type 40

Situational Awareness

1494124

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

While flying my powered paraglider (FAR Part 103) I heard the engine sputter. I had a parking lot below me and initially turned to land there. As I assessed the situation unfolding; I determined there was limited space to land and since the engine was still working; I aborted the landing but was faced with trees to maneuver around. The right side of my powered paraglider wing just slightly clipped a tree branch - no damage occurred. I continued the climb and landed at an alternate site.I suspect the fuel I was using was several months old and may have been the reason for the engine sputter. I drained it and replaced it with fresh fuel. A subsequent flight for an hour didn't appear to have any issues.

Paraglider pilot reported engine performance issues prompted an unplanned landing that was aborted for another site; however; contact was made with a tree branch.

1806687

202105

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Baron 55/Cochise

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise; Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 7750; Flight Crew Type 420

Distraction; Workload

1806687

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was making a precautionary return to the airport after experiencing a decrease in fuel pressure on my left engine. In the descent phase to ZZZ the left engine began running worse and worse as I descended. I activated low boost on the left engine to keep it running. I was able to keep the engine running until landing by a combination of low and high boost and manipulating the throttle. On roll out; my right engine idle was low and in an attempt to keep it running I hit low boost and pushed the throttle up; but it died anyway. Managing asymmetric thrust and keeping the left engine running so I could clear the active runway and not shut the airport down; took my full attention. I did not turn the little boost off of the right engine until I had cleared the runway and by then the system was pressure charged and porting fuel overboard.In retrospect I should have feathered and secured the left engine and concentrated on landing and clearing the runway. This would have reduced my workload.

BE55 pilot reported a fuel system malfunction inflight.

1651408

201906

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174.2; Flight Crew Total 3290.05; Flight Crew Type 3290.05

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1651408

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Staffing; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Departing ZZZ. The Tug Driver reported ready for pushback and incorrectly asked me to release the parking brake in the same sentence. Looking at the ECAM screen; we noticed that the NW STRG DISC message was NOT displayed. I advised the Tug Driver of this and told him that the brakes were still set and that he needed to install the bypass pin. He replied 'O.K.; standby'. A few moments later he again reported ready to push but we still did not observe the NW STRG DISC message. He responded 'O.K.; hang on' and then I asked him whether or not he actually knew what I was referring to. He replied that he actually did not know what that was and that this was only the fourth push back that he had ever done. I asked him to get someone more seasoned out there to assist which he did. This other person got things set correctly and remained standing by for the push back procedure. It appears that the person driving the tug was either not trained; not trained properly; or simply was not at all paying attention while being trained. In any event he should not have been where he was doing the job he was supposed to be doing.

A319 Captain reported the Tug Driver at this location appeared untrained with regard to the pushback duties.

1689479

201910

0601-1200

JFK.Airport

NY

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Training / Qualification; Workload

1689479

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

Human Factors

During preflight preparations at JFK; my company iPad was unable to connect to any information (this has been a randomly recurring problem experienced by many pilots over the past weeks). Therefore I was unable to view the flight plan or the deferred Maintenance items. I was unable to access the logbook or the flight deck until approximately 30 minutes prior to departure; because Maintenance Technicians were in the flight deck changing the ACARS printer. I spent many valuable minutes on the phone with [Company] IT support; which was of no help. While waiting for access to the flight deck; the fueler came up to the galley and gave me the fuel slip and told me about an inoperative fuel quantity indication. I then called JFK Maintenance and only then was I informed that the right main tank fuel quantity indication was blank and was already deferred. When I finally had access to the flight deck and the Airplane Maintenance Log; I noted that the inoperative fuel indicator had been deferred. During my cockpit setup and preflight preparations; I was finally able to review the MEL; and discovered that the aircraft is not to be flown more than 50 NM from land. Our Dispatched route of flight from JFK to ZZZ took us over water from near ZZZ; as much as 150 NM from land. I immediately called Dispatch; who then began working on a new flight plan and release. The Dispatcher had some difficulties getting the new flight plan filed; resulting in further delay to our departure. Prior to pushback; we finally had a legal flight plan release for an over-land routing. With the inoperative right main tank fuel quantity inoperative; the total fuel quantity was also blank; and had to be mentally calculated by the pilots throughout the flight. This is an increased workload; and subject to possible errors. The guessed fuel quantity has to be manually inserted on the PERF INIT page in order to have correct FMS calculations for maximum altitude; final approach speeds; minimum safe maneuver speeds; and perhaps other FMS calculations that the flight crews are not made aware of. The MEL guidance does not clearly specify these issues; and we pilots have not been trained to operate in this degraded mode. We were put in this position by the management decision to fly this airplane for a week with this inoperative fuel quantity indicating system. This presents so many opportunities for errors with critical flight safety implications. Inoperative fuel quantity indications should only be deferred to operate to the next [Company] Maintenance base; not to continue operating many flights all over the country with inadequate guidance and training. Dispatchers must carefully review all MEL restrictions and requirements for every deferred item for every flight.

B737-800 Captain reported operating with deferred fuel quantity indication system resulted in increased workload.

1694738

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge

Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Physiological - Other

1694738

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

Aircraft was boarded and we were about to close the boarding doors. Captain had made an announcement for passengers and flight crew to deplane and take their belongings that he had smelt an odor coming from the lavatory. It wasn't alarming but he wanted everyone to step off the aircraft. Captain had called back to crack the back doors; he didn't know at that point if it was throughout the aircraft in ventilation system. FA C had cracked the back doors L2 R2 for ventilation. I was in mid cabin when originally announced to deplane. I had assisted passengers and moved my way aft to see what was going on. When I approached the aft galley the smell of fuel fumes were overpowering; C FA pointed out the fire extinguishers; just saying; the fire extinguishers are right there if needed; like prepping our heads to think fast & be a step ahead. I stood momentarily and had to move forward the smell of fumes was so overpowering I instinctively had to move forward by aft lavatories. After all passengers deplaned; maintenance came on board and discussed with Captain and FO what the problem was [while I] was standing near vicinity of lavatory. Captain was adamant to step off aircraft and finish discussing the issue in jetway. It was at that point I became aware of the concern. When the Captain and FO had used the forward lavatory they had smelled a chemical smell that had burned their nose; throat; and chest. It had gotten worse after exposure initially. Pilots had heard FA D coughing and asked if he was okay. Smell and reaction was so strong that Captain had compared it to a pepper spray he had experienced in the past. Since others had the same reaction as he did; he decided to deplane. We had initially come in on this aircraft from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and had a slight grounding before next flight was to board. I was in fwd galley between flights when fleet services came on to clean between flights. I saw the man who cleaned lavatory and didn't notice anything at that time. The point I noticed a pressure sensation and burning sensation in my chest was in the jetway after deplaning. There were three passengers who used the lavatory prior to the incident during boarding. I had seen the third passenger come out of the lavatory and return to her seat prior to door closure; she had appeared fine; just excusing herself for she seemed to have felt she was in the way returning to her seat. Flight Crew was quarantined & passenger was located to come to jetway with us. Aircraft was swept by Hazmat. All of crew; besides C FA who wasn't feeling any symptoms; was met in jetway by medics and assessed; as well as passenger & CSA who boarded plane to gather items left behind by passengers. Oxygen was put on Captain; FO; Flight Attendant D; & CSA agent; and [passenger] which helped their symptoms of burning nose; throat; & chest. I had been escorted to the outside ground restroom after breathing in the fresh air my symptoms were relieved. After the aircraft was swept; Captain had advised us all to get checked out at hospital to make sure we were all fine. Ambulance took myself FA B; FA A; FA D; Captain; FO; and CSA agent to be assessed at hospital and then released from hospital; cleared by [company]; and met with in flight supervisors in ZZZ.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported while at gate the Captain ordered all passengers and crew to deplane due to strong chemical odor on board. While assisting in passenger deplaning the entire crew experienced physiological symptoms and subsequently received medical treatment.

1871937

202201

1201-1800

ROA.TRACON

VA

TRACON ROA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C ROA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction

1871937

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

While being vectored on to RNAV 24Y with Roanoke Approach received a 'Terrain Pull Up' EGPWS warning. Aircraft was on a base leg between PROSE and HIBAN south of the final approach course at 4;000 ft. PF (Pilot Flying) complied with company procedures and climbed in response to the warning. Approach Control vectored aircraft back around for the same approach starting at a higher altitude.

Pilot reported receiving a EGPWS warning while flying into ROA.

1232801

201501

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

1000.0

IMC

Rain; Windshear

Night

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Confusion; Distraction

1232801

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Weather during our approach and landing was night; moderate rain; moderate crosswind; and visibility about 2 miles. Disconnected autopilot at about 500 feet; and was lined up well on the runway centerline. Possibly due to fatigue; allowed profile to be less than desired. Was making correction at about the same time as the activation of the GPWS warning; 'Too Low.' I landed the aircraft at after a normal flare. Threshold minimum crossing height is 42 feet for the 747. We debriefed the approach after we landed; and also after block in. It is estimated that we descended through 50 feet just prior to the threshold; and estimate that the actual threshold crossing was about 40 feet; or 2 feet less than minimum. This was a learning experience; and I feel that we should report these occurrences. I will know to guard against this type of 'low on the glidepath' approach and landing in the future.

A fatigued B747 Captain reported crossing the runway threshold low during a night approach in moderated rain and winds.

1126755

201311

1801-2400

DAL.Airport

TX

0.0

Rain; 7

1100

Tower DAL

Corporate

Eclipse 500

Part 91

IFR

Taxi

Tower DAL

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 13L

Descent

Vectors

Class B DAL

Facility DAL.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1126755

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Airport; Human Factors

Airport

I was working Local Control West when an Eclipse 500; taxied out to Runway 13L via Taxiway Alpha. The Eclipse 500 called ready for departure; and I responded with 'roger;' due to an aircraft exiting the runway. I then cleared the Eclipse 500 for takeoff; and I noticed they had passed the new hold short line and were close to the runway where the old short line was located. A B737 was on RADAR vectors for the ILS 13L; 9 NM of DAL on the RADAR base leg; not of my frequency. The runways and taxiways appeared to be wet due to a continuous light rain all morning. I do not believe this hold line is in accordance with published requirements.

DAL Controller described a runway incursion event involving an aircraft taxiing to Runway 13L; the reporter claimed multiple same type occurrences and the existing hold lines are problematic and need adjusting.

1493966

201711

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 4100

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1493966

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

This was our 3rd leg together and my 3rd leg since completing Initial Operating Experience. The weather was VMC and the wind light. We flew the arrival to vectors to a visual approach to 25L; backed up by the ILS. The approach was steep and fast and resulted in a go-around at 500 FT AGL. At 1000 FT AGL; our vertical speed commanded in the FCU was steeper than -1;000 FPM but was immediately recognized and corrected. At approximately 650 FT AGL; in a descent to intercept the glideslope from above; with both autopilots engaged; as the aircraft intercepted the glideslope; the aircraft pitched aggressively towards the ground. As Pilot Flying; I do not feel that I initiated that pitch input. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and recovered the aircraft. The GPWS announced 'terrain; pull up' and the Captain took the aircraft and initiated a go around.Causation: We [had] accepted clearance for the visual approach while 90 degrees off runway heading; in a position too steep and fast for me to make a stable approach. It was clear to me at 1000 FT AGL that the approach was not stable nor salvageable; but we elected to continue to 500 FT AGL. I don't feel like my initial qualification training prepared me well for this dynamic real world of vectors to a visual approach.At this time; I have 30 hours in the aircraft and 43 total hours of civil flying experience. After returning to [the Company] after an extended military leave; I have 30 total hours of flying experience in the last 2.5 years. While on visual approach; I still struggle with the automation to make the aircraft descend to glide slope and intercept the ILS glideslope from above - scenarios not covered in simulator training. We received a traffic call of a 737 to the parallel runway in the same radio call clearing us for a visual approach. Searching for that traffic further delayed initiation of our descent to glideslope. Please consider what caused the alarming pitch down of the aircraft at 650 FT AGL. If it was me; I'd like to know how to not do it again. If it wasn't me; that seems like a problem.

A First Officer piloting an Airbus 320 reported that the aircraft aggressively pitched down when capturing the glideslope from above.

1816752

202106

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

3500.0

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1816752

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X went NORDO on the downwind. There was no reason given as to why the aircraft went silent. They entered into a 3;500 foot MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). I tried to reach the aircraft on emergency frequency and back up radios.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on downwind lost radio contact and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1165199

201404

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

0.0

Daylight

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Medium Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Facility SFO.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.6

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1165199

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Staffing; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Airport

We were landing and departing 28s. It was busy. I told Aircraft Y to turn off of Runway 28 onto non active Runway 19L and hold short of F contact Ground. He turned off of the active runway. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff. As I cleared Aircraft X; Aircraft Z was taxing to runway 28L. Aircraft Z was crossing the ones and blocked my view of Aircraft Y. Aircraft Z had just crossed 19R and was on F. Aircraft X said he was aborting takeoff; due to aircraft on the runway. [Aircraft X] taxied back to Runway 28L. Everything looked good from my angle. Even at this time I don't know if I would have caught it. View blocked by taxing aircraft. Plenty of time for Aircraft Y to exit. Nothing blocking him from moving forward. I think Aircraft Y was concerned about the size of Aircraft Z and held. Never understand why pilots will not fully clear an active runway.I scanned the runway. [I need to] look more closely at the ASDE. I asked my local assist and he said it was really hard to tell. I think it was just one of those weird situations where everyone was at the wrong place at the wrong time. In the future I will advise the aircraft to fully exit the runway. Move up as far as they can to hold short of F. Definitely something that I will not let happen again. With summer and constant 28 I am glad I was able to experience this now. I will be more aware of this pitfall in the future.

Controller working Local position describes incident where he could not see slow moving aircraft exiting runway position because view was blocked by another aircraft; while departing aircraft rejects take-off.

1231548

201501

0601-1200

ZNY.ARTCC

NY

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B747-400

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZNY

Data Transmission and Automatic Calling

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1231548

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1233899.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Ambiguous

We left CVG on an unfamiliar departure and a very southern route that none of us had seen before. We were lighter than planned and climbed up to FL370 right away. After getting into New York airspace; they asked us what we wanted for a crossing altitude and Mach #. We replied FL370 and Mach .83.They asked if we could climb to FL 380; we hemmed and hawed; and said we could do it; but preferred to stay at FL370. They then asked us if we could do it by JOBOC. We said yes at M.840. We then amended the speed request to M.85; said we would do it at M.85 by JOBOC. A deal was done. The previous was on VHF voice. We passed JOBOC AND 4160N. We got a Control-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) request to climb to FL 390. We rejected that request due to aircraft performance' We then got another request to descend to FL370 by 1258Z. There was a second page to the request that said we had a route change. There was a 'LOAD' prompt. We thought we accepted only the altitude change; and activated the 'report level' function. Be aware that we had been negotiating on altitudes only up until this point. They snuck this route change in with no prior notification or warning or an 'advisory' message stating that our original clearance had changed. The 'LOAD' prompt was selected; and the new route populated the CDU. Right away we got an 'insufficient fuel' message. We looked at the new route; and it had us starting two (2) way points BEHIND our current position. We looked at the new route (the first page) and thought it was the same route so we erased the 'new route before we activated it thinking that was an erroneous fluke. As best we can guess; on page 2 of the new route; they had changed the coast in point from LIMRI to ADARA. At 1435Z; somewhere between 5130N and 5220N we received a CPDLC request to contact Shanwick on HF. They asked us our route after 5220N and we replied 'LIMRI' They said that was wrong; we were supposed to be going to ADARA. Then they called back and said we could continue to LIMRI but they would be filing a report. The 'system' caught the error before any deviations were committed.I suggest that ATC not give a route change without an advisory warning. And to not give a route change when the previous request was an altitude change only. All via CPDLC. When getting a voice oceanic clearance; we are required to acknowledge explicitly that we have a different route than our original clearance. This is not so with CPDLC. As a side note; we were requested by the company to accomplish some manual revisions prior to departure which we were NOT able to complete; so; we were trying to finish the revisions in cruise. We received two ACARS queries from the company wanting to know if we had completed the revisions. We were a bit distracted trying to accomplish the company requested non-operational duties; and that may have distracted us to a point where a mistake was made.

Even though no deviation from a clearance actually occurred; if this is how it all happened; which seems to be the most logical; then it appears to me that New York's practice of issuing multiple changes (i.e temporary FL change and a route change more than one thousand miles distant) in one Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) communication is an unsafe practice that lends itself to many misinterpretations and errors.When sending amended or revised CPDLC clearances; send only one (1 item) per message to acknowledge. I.e. altitude; speed; or route/fixes; only one per message; not multiple as this form of communication is very simplistic and doesn't lend well to complex clearances.

Following extensive pre-departure negotiation with ATC; re-flight levels and Mach numbers for an Atlantic crossing the flight crew of a B747-400; was chagrinned and confused when; while enroute and after coasting out; they received a Controller Pilot Data Link Communications(CPDLC) message from ATC reclearing them by a different route which when 'loaded' per the CPDLC prompt started at a waypoint several waypoints behind them. Believing the route change actually continued to reflect their current route they failed to activate the new route which; subsequent to the fixes behind them upon receipt was; in fact; different.

1750130

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

13000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1750130

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1750131.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Descending into ZZZ on the XXXXX1 arrival; we were given a crossing restriction of XXXXX at 13000 and 250 knots. Around 14000 and a speed of around 260 knots with the power at idle; we noticed a slight vibration that lasted just a few seconds; while simultaneously the ITT was maxed out in the red reading 998C. Received a Master Warning for L ENG OIL PRESS. [Coordinated] with ZZZ approach; ran the QRH for an inflight engine shutdown suspecting damage because of the vibrations felt and N2 showing 0%. After the securing the left engine dispatch and maintenance were then notified of the situation; and that we would be continuing to ZZZ. The flight attendant and the passengers were then notified of the situation; and that we would have them safely in ZZZ as soon as possible. After getting delayed vectors from approach we proceeded towards the airport for a visual approach to runway XXR. Aircraft was configured for landing in accordance with the QRH. After touching down and exiting the runway no further assistance was needed from ATC or ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting); and completed the flight.

Descending into ZZZ we were cleared to cross XXXXX at 250 knots and 13;000 feet. The flight had been standard up until this point. Approaching XXXXX we heard a pop and vibrations. Looking down at the engine indications we noticed the ITT begin to increase and the oil pressure decrease. The ITT spiked to at least 998 degrees and the oil pressure dropped into the red. At that point we received the L Engine Oil Press master warning. The First Officer was PF (Pilot Flying) and took the radios. We [coordinated] with ATC at which time we requested delayed vectors in order to give us the appropriate time to complete all checklists. We informed dispatch and maintenance via ACARS. I pulled out the immediate action card and then opened the QRH to the applicable page X-XX and then X-XY. We completed the QRH procedures (L ENG Oil Press; In-Flight Engine Shutdown/ Engine Failure; single engine approach and landing). I had also notified the flight attendant of the situation. I explained that it was an emergency and explained the situation in detail. We landed in ZZZ on runway XXR and we were able to taxi to the gate on engine number two. We parked and deplaned at the gate with no other issues. We completed a write up in the maintenance logbook and they were waiting at the gate to take the airplane from us.The cause of the engine failure at this time is unknown. We know that we had a popping sound from the area of the engine and then a vibration. The ITT increased rapidly and the oil pressure decreased rapidly.

CRJ-200 Flight Crew reported inflight shutdown due to suspected engine damage and continued to landing at destination.

995523

201202

0601-1200

ZSU.ARTCC

PR

20000.0

Center ZSU

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class A ZSU

Center ZSU

Hercules (C-130)

3.0

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZSU

Facility ZSU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

995523

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Shortly after I assumed the position I noticed that the previous controller's instruction for a B737 to expedite descent was not working as planned. I issued a turn to the descending B737 aircraft and called traffic with no reply from the B737. We have bad radios in the area; so I watch a second to see if he took the turn. I called a total of three times to the B737 before he took the turn. I had also called traffic to the C130 and the pilot reported traffic in sight. The projected path initially looked close but appeared separation would not be lost. I wanted the turn for extra comfort but as it played out it ended to be right at the minimums for separation as they passed. We have had frequency problems on 135.7 for an extended amount of time; but I'm not sure if I was blocked; pilot was not listening; or it was a blind spot. I believe if the B737 had taken the turn when I initialized it I would have had plenty of space. Proper frequencies would be great. We have been reporting those down for years. Maintenance seems to reset it; someone does a brief frequency check and it's called back up. The expedite descent clearance was not necessary in the first place. I should have just stopped descent vertically as soon as I sat down.

ZSU Controller described a failed attempt to issue a descent clearance noting the frequency utilized has had problems for an extended amount of time.

1283565

201507

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

26000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Taxi

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 135

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1283565

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1283568.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

At FL260 in cruise flight we both suddenly heard and felt a difference in the cabin atmosphere and noise level. We both scanned the instruments and found the Cabin Alt was climbing and the differential pressure was descending. We [responded to the situation] and were given a small descent to FL210 due to traffic. Before we got to FL210 ATC gave us 10;000 ft. We both donned our O2 masks and ran the Quick Reference Checklist. We leveled at 10;000 ft. and contacted our company about our issue and when they got back to us they requested we [divert] to [a nearby airport] instead of continuing to [destination]. [We] landed without further incident.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

CE-560EP flight crew reported loss of pressurization at FL260. Flight descended and diverted.

1425564

201702

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

Daylight

Ramp ATL

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1425564

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 7230

1425576.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Human Factors

During pushback off in KATL; instructions from Ramp Control were 'Push approved tail north.' While under tow; we felt a slight jolt shortly after the start of the pushback. We stopped the pushback and were advised by Tug Driver that we had just struck a Provisioning Truck with the aircraft's left wing. We then got pulled back into the gate and deplaned.

During pushback with the aircraft under tow; a slight jolt was felt and the Tug Driver brought the aircraft to a stop. The Tug Driver then informed me the left wingtip had come into contact with a provisioning truck. The parking brake was set until Ground Personnel assessed the situation and made the decision to tow the aircraft back to the gate. Once at the gate; Passengers were deplaned and the aircraft was taken out of service. No injuries were reported by Passengers or Crew.Observation: After contact was made with the truck; I was surprised to see how far back the truck was parked and how little room there was for error. Since standard push procedures in ATL normally call for a tail north or tail south push; I was surprised a truck would be parked so deep in the push zone even though the truck was parked outside of the Safety Zone. It appears as if the Tug Driver started to turn the tail of the aircraft to the north (per Ramp instructions) too soon.

B737-800 crew reported contact with a truck during pushback at ATL.

1213519

201410

0601-1200

HNL.Airport

HI

150.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower HNL

Military

Helicopter

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Cruise

None

Class B HNL

Tower HNL

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

Final Approach

Class B HNL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Military

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 990

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1213519

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was the PIC for a routine training mission around Oahu. My copilot was at the controls at the beginning of the flight and I contacted HCF approach and requested a patrol of Pearl Harbor. We were cleared into Class B airspace and instructed to hold at Ford Island after the patrol was complete. At the conclusion of the harbor patrol I contacted HCF and informed them we were ready to proceed south out the channel and then westbound along the shoreline. We were told to hold at Ford Island and switched to the HNL tower. HNL tower instructed us to head southbound towards the mouth of the harbor and stay north of 8L. We started southbound in the channel and noted a 747 on final approach to 8L. We informed tower that we had the landing traffic. After reporting that I had the traffic in sight I took the controls. I did not hear back from tower and asked my copilot to report the traffic again and let tower know we were ready to proceed south. I slowed down to about 50 knots at 150 feet and continued down the channel expecting a clearance call down the channel after the 747 landed. Tower reported a 717 at the two o'clock position. I immediately looked south at the one o'clock position for a 717 making the channel approach to 8L and my copilot reported traffic at the three o'clock that looked like it was next in line on final for 8L. I stated that I did not think that traffic was a 717; but could not see it. I based this on my perception that most 717 that come into HNL make the channel approach from offshore. I think that created confusion in the cockpit. As we were trying to clear that up we were cleared to proceed south out of the channel and pass behind the 717. As soon as I heard we were cleared south I started to accelerate and proceed down the channel. Once I heard the rest of the transmission to pass behind the 717 I realized that tower was talking about the traffic reported by my copilot. I believed that I could safely pass in front of the 717 and at this point I was very close to the approach corridor to runway 8L and did not feel safe making any turns in the immediate vicinity as I perceived that would put me too close to the landing traffic. I accelerated to 100 knots and descended to 100 feet AGL to clear the channel as expeditiously as possible. I heard the pilot of the 717 say they had us in sight and they were going to alter course slightly for us. Tower told me to pay better attention to the directions given. I apologized and continued on my flight. A couple of things that I can contribute to this event was my perception that I was going to be cleared between the aircraft landing and the aircraft on long final to 8L as I had in the past. Because I expected this I continued down the channel to put myself in the position to do so with as little impact on ATC as possible. The controller obviously did not have the same plan. There was a delay from the tower and I responded to this delay by slowing down. Expecting a clearance at any time; I continued down the channel. As soon as I heard cleared I acted on my expectation and started moving faster. When the direction was different than what was expected I had already committed myself. Strength of an idea also played into this one. I stated that I did not think that the aircraft reported by my copilot was a 717. I was wrong and this lead to my copilot believing that the traffic we were told to go behind was the earlier 747 that was about to touchdown on 8L.

Military helicopter pilot describes a conflict that develops with a air carrier on approach to HNL; when the reporter anticipates a clearance from the Tower that is not delivered as expected.

1650613

201905

1801-2400

PHL.Airport

PA

4000.0

IMC

Rain; Thunderstorm

Night

TRACON PHL

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B PHL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 10154; Flight Crew Type 3046

Situational Awareness

1650613

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 223; Flight Crew Total 5415

Situational Awareness

1650568.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather

Highly dynamic and fluid scenario with ATC reroutes due to weather with time compression due to weather 20 miles west moving east at 40Kts. Taxiing out ATC stopped us for a reroute through Center airspace. By the time we got the clearance; loaded it into the FMC (Flight Management Computer); coordinated with Dispatch for release 2; and waited further for ATC to taxi us to the runway; the weather was very close to the western edge of [the airport]. An aircraft was cleared for takeoff along our same route; and we all waited for his PIREP (Pilot Report). He reported moderate turbulence. With the information we had; it appeared safe to takeoff. Our clearance was to fly heading 120 after takeoff. From the cockpit it appeared a safe course of action; so we accepted it. Our WSI was not being reliable due to internet problems; the TWIP (Terminal Weather Information for Pilots) we requested came too late; but the PIREP seemed as if it may be just a little bumpy; nothing more than moderate. The problem occurred when we rolled out on the 120 heading; unbeknown to us the weather had passed the airport to the east and south and was a wall of red staring us into the face. The takeoff up to 3800 feet was in the clear; smooth; and uneventful; but above 3800 feet we entered the weather and the moderate turbulence. ATC gave us direct SBY; which would also put us into more weather. Luckily we found a hole somewhere around a 180 heading; which we picked up with ATC's approval. But between the 120 heading and finding the hole; the ride deteriorated considerable. At approximately 6000-8000 feet we entered severe turbulence; which lasted until around 12000 feet; as we finally found the hole. We probably had about two encounters of severe [turbulence] in that period. The parameters ranged with momentary deviations as follows: Pitch from 5-20 degrees nose up; airspeed from 200-250 knots approximately; and roll from +/-15 degrees from commanded (Bank angle warning sounded twice but roll never exceeded 40 by our estimation). We did not think the aircraft was ever uncontrollable or out of control; but the deviations were excessive and the pilot workload was substantial. Fortunately there were no injuries reported and all passengers and flight attendants were in their seats with their seat belts fastened. The FA's (flight attendants) had been briefed to remain in their jump seats until we called them after the climb out when it would be safe. We recommended to ATC; after reporting severe turbulence; not to allow anyone else to takeoff in our direction; as it was no longer safe to do so.

We took off Runway XXL and did an immediate left turn to heading 120 to avoid thunderstorms that were 3-5 miles from airport. Preceding aircraft reported moderate turbulence. I believe FA's (flight attendants) were told to remain seated after takeoff until we contacted them. On climb out we experienced severe turbulence between 5000ft and 10000ft. Pitch fluctuated between 0 to 20 degrees; roll plus or minus 15; airspeed 200-250kts. After we exited the turbulence we told ATC that we would not recommend the route to next aircraft. We advised Dispatch and Maintenance of the event en-route then debriefed Maintenance once at [the destination].

B737 flight crew reported encountering severe weather during climb after takeoff.

1008508

201204

FFZ.Airport

AZ

2000.0

VMC

40

Daylight

25000

Tower FFZ

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class D FFZ

Tower FFZ

FBO

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Final Approach

Class D FFZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 412; Flight Crew Type 42

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1008508

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were returning to land at Falcon Field when we were instructed to enter left traffic for Runway 22R. There were other airplanes arriving for landing; so we were sequenced as number three for landing and were instructed to follow the preceding aircraft on a final approach. The position of the aircraft was provided and I identified the aircraft and advised Tower that I had the traffic in sight. Since I was instructing my student; my attention was divided between the traffic and my student. Soon I realized that we had lost visual contact with the aircraft I was supposed to follow; so I began to scan the area to re-establish visual contact. I identified an aircraft on final; so we continued the approach for landing. We proceeded turning base when we thought that our separation was adequate; only to find ourselves converging with another aircraft on final. I immediately made a sharp left turn to avoid a collision. The other aircraft on final made a call to Tower asking about my airplane and why we were as close we were. Tower seemed to be unaware of the situation or they deemed it non-threatening (this I do not know). I advised Tower that I indeed had made a left turn to avoid the other aircraft. I met with the pilot of the other aircraft on the ground and we discussed the situation. From my perspective; he was not at fault. I told him the situation and that the error on my part (identifying and following the wrong airplane) led to a near miss mid-air collision. In hindsight I should have advised Tower that I had lost visual contact with the other aircraft in the first place. I could have also confirmed the position of the other aircraft to verify we were adequately separated. I am glad that we were continuously vigilant for any traffic conflicts which I believe allowed me to take the controls and maneuver to avoid the collision. A contributing factor that could have led to this mishap would be the fact that I let my guard down in controlled airspace.

Instructor pilot in light aircraft described an NMAC at FFZ when he followed the wrong aircraft to the airport.

1498858

201711

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Oxygen System/Crew

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1498858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

In cruise flight; I went to put on quick donning mask as First Officer was going to leave the flight deck for physiological needs. I pulled the mask out of the box and it came apart in my hands; it was a useless mask had there been an emergency. Where the hose attaches with the microphone to the main rubber face area was broken and dangling. The full mask section was intact but the hose/microphone area was detached and hanging by a wire; no ability to breathe oxygen from the mask. I took the disconnect oxygen point in the box and detached it and microphone wire from the Captain's box and then removed the Second Observer seat oxygen mask and installed it into the Captain's oxygen box and verified operational functionality of O2 and microphone. Maintenance entry made and mask given to the mechanic on landing.Not sure if the mask had been previously shoved in at an angle/forced into the box over many times that stressed the attach point.[Suggest] Physically pulling the mask out prior to departure would have caught this mask but still it's possible to have a good mask and in re-stowing it that it might fail that time and you may not know until the next time the mask is pulled out for use. This is the first time in the Airbus that I have seen a failed oxygen mask.

A300 Captain reported the quick donning oxygen mask 'came apart' when it was removed from the storage compartment for use in cruise flight. Mask was replaced with an observer's mask and flight continued.

1140055

201401

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Troubleshooting; Confusion

1140055

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1140117.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During climbout; passing through about FL250; we received a Fuel Master Caution with associated fuel imbalance pictured on the main fuel tank gauge display. As I recall; when we first noticed the imbalance after receiving the caution; we had about 7;300 LBS in the left main and 6;100 LBS in the right with the right going down quickly. We started with the Fuel Imbalance Alert Checklist in the QRH. As we worked through the possible causes listed in the checklist; we enlisted the help of a Captain that was jumpseating and riding in the back to help us look for visible signs of a fuel leak. As he was looking for that out the passenger windows; we tried the crossfeed valve and it appeared to work correctly; meanwhile; the right tank was going down at a rate of double or a little faster than double of the left tank. The jumpseating Captain then joined us on the flight deck as we decided an extra opinion and help would be beneficial. It was determined that it would be necessary to continue to the Engine Fuel Leak Checklist. By this time we had climbed to and leveled off at FL350. As we looked ahead at the checklist and saw that it mandated an engine shutdown; we declared an emergency with Center and coordinated our return to the departure airport. We were now heading west back when I ran the Engine Fuel Leak Checklist. That checklist then refers to the Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist. I read through every item and every note in all the checklists and conferred with both these Captains to ensure that we weren't missing something or misdiagnosing the problem before we shut down that #2 Engine. All three of us agreed that the fuel was going down on the right side at a rapid rate and it warranted continuing with the Shutdown Checklist. At this time; as I recall; we had about 6;900 in the left tank and about 5;400 in the right. The checklist was run and the right engine was shutdown. We made a long slow controlled descent back into the runway with no further incident. We were greeted by the fire trucks; informed Tower that we needed no further assistance; and proceeded to the gate where we were met by several Maintenance personnel; a Chief Pilot and several other people. After our long descent with the right motor shut down; upon arrival at the gate; the fuel gauges were nearly equal again. We had time on our next deadhead flight to review what we'd done. The question comes to mind that what if it was an issue with the fuel crossfeed valve that we somehow overlooked? We feel that we checked it adequately during the event enough to rule it out; but the possibility exists. We feel that if anything we erred to the side of safety in making an air return. We did have questions about why the engine shutdown was mandated through the series of checklists; but can only assume it is to reduce the chance of fire from not knowing where the fuel leak could be. I felt good about our CRM; teamwork; and the added benefit of having an additional Captain helping back up our decisions.

The reporter stated that no mechanical faults were found and in the final analysis Maintenance assumed that for an unknown reason the fuel crossfeed valve did not close completely which allowed the right tank to feed both engines. The reporter stated however that the crew operated the crossfeed valve several times during troubleshooting and it appeared to operate normally with the light either OFF; BRIGHT OR DIM when in the commanded position.

During step climb to cruise; Master Caution illuminated and a fuel imbalance alert was identified: left 7;300 LBS; right 6;100 LBS. I asked deadheading Captain to assist with a visual inspection of the #2 Engine and wing area to determine if there was an external fuel leak. None found. Captain then joined crew in cockpit. First Officer referred to QRH for Fuel Imbalance Alert Checklist; as directed; and we began to address the fuel problem. After going through that checklist; the fuel imbalance increased to: left 6;900 LBS; right 5;400 LBS. A fuel audit showed approximately the correct fuel for our position; however; the bulk of the fuel was coming from the right main tank. The cross feed and fuel pump operations all indicated they were functioning normally.We proceeded with the Engine Fuel Leak Checklist because of the increasing imbalance. We requested return to the departure station; declared an emergency; shutdown #2 Engine; per the QRH; and landed.

A B737-700 FUEL MASTER CAUTION alerted when the right tank fuel quantity decreased more quickly than the left tank and after completing the Fuel Leak Checklist the crew shutdown the right engine; declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. A faulty crossfeed valve was suspected.

1449454

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

30000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Fractional

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class A ZZZ

1.0

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1449454

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

I was Pilot Not Flying. One passenger onboard; he was very helpful during event. During descent around FL300; both crew members smelled a strong burnt electrical smell. We never saw smoke but passenger came up immediately and said 'did you see that puff of smoke?' and pointed to outlet or lower pedestal area of cockpit (near parking brake; etc.). Something similar had just happened to another crew and tail yesterday (their outlet fried); so I unplugged my charger immediately; turned off the interior master and turned off the wifi. Passenger said it smelled like when a hairdryer burns itself. Notified ATC of the odor and we got an early descent on the arrival. Couldn't identify the source of the smell; no visible smoke and the smell had dissipated; so we considered it could have been a blown fuse or wire somewhere. Once everything was briefed; I checked on the passenger. Smell was much less pungent in the cabin. Told him we are descending early and that if the smell came back; we would drop the masks and get down quick. Reminded him about the fire extinguisher. On about a 5-mile final; the smell returned so we turned off the cockpit pack which helped. We had to leave the plane with a mechanic and quickly go get another plane ready for a different live leg; but it sounds like it turned out it was a bad pack and not anything electrical in the cockpit. Now I know that depending on how a pack goes bad; a fried pack can sure look and smell like an electrical issue; and not just the typical pack smell of dirty sock.

C750 pilot reported a burnt electrical smell during descent. Initially they thought it was the Flight Deck 120 Volt outlet; but they later found out that it was a bad pack.

1816084

202106

13500.0

VMC

Center ZLA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Descent; Initial Approach

STAR ZZZZZ

Class E ZLA

Other unknown

Sail Plane

1.0

Other unknown

Cruise

Class E ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 837; Flight Crew Type 837

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1816084

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77; Flight Crew Total 315; Flight Crew Type 315

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1816226.0

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 100

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Ambiguous

Descending in to SNA on DSNEE 4 arrival between CARZZ and KADYN somewhere between 13;000-15;000 ft. we had a near miss with a glider. I was flying; never saw it. We got a primary target only; no mode C; 30 seconds or less from when the CA actually saw the glider; he guesses maybe 100 ft. vertically and 500 ft. laterally. The glider was right on the arrival path. It startled him; and even though I never saw it his reaction startled me. Great CRM; professionalism; training for us to get our focus back and not get distracted and become an unstable approach statistic in to the challenging SNA; especially after having hot brakes climbing out of ZZZ1 and having to lower the gear; it felt like a true multiple threat simulator session! Great scenario for an IOE.

Operating flight from ZZZ1 to SNA. Cleared to descend via the DSNEE 4 Arrival. Between CARZZ and KADYN Intersections at approximately 13;500 ft.; we received a 'Traffic; Traffic' TA with only a primary yellow circle popping up as a target with no altitude or trend information. The TA occurred about 20 seconds prior to us and the target converged. Center called 'traffic at 12 o'clock; altitude and type unknown'. The weather was VFR; but it was hazy. We scanned the immediate area above and below and did not see it.Then I looked to my left and I saw a white colored glider passing less than 500 ft. laterally and within 100 ft. vertically. I did not pick it up until it was at our 8 o'clock position and as we were descending on the arrival. We must have NEARLY HIT HIM! He was heading southeast bound.This occurrence made the hair stand up on my neck and it really shook me up. Just as I reported the near mid-air; ATC gave us a frequency change to Approach. I was so taken-aback by what had just happened; I had to ask Center to repeat the frequency. Just as I was trying to re-establish contact with Approach; I heard Approach calling us on Guard; which I thought was strange as we had only been off of Approach for less than 30 seconds. There seemed to be either a late hand-off from Center and they were looking for us; or they saw the near miss and were trying to call us. I mentioned that we had just missed a glider and we were trying to regain our composure but we had switched over in a fairly timely manner.After a busy; but uneventful approach and landing to 20R at SNA; during the taxi-in to Gate XX; SNA Ground alerted us that Approach was requesting that we call them once we parked.I called and spoke to a Supervisor. His first question was am I going to file a NASA report. I stated that I would. He took my name and number in the event that this occurrence needed further investigation. That glider was sailing on the main ridge-line just prior to entering the area. HE HAD NO MODE C transponder at an altitude that should have required him to have it. The glider was sailing on the direct arrival path of the STAR; and we are lucky that we hadn't arrived at our point of convergence 10 seconds sooner. When I saw him he was about 100 ft. higher than us at 8 o'clock as we were descending.

Flight crew reported a NMAC with a glider while they were on a STAR inbound to SNA.

1490562

201710

0601-1200

PBI.Airport

FL

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

2800

Ground PBI

Corporate

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Tower PBI

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

Takeoff / Launch

Class C PBI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 140

1490562

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Vertical 100

Y

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

Position at PBI FBO. Requested taxi. Ground said taxi to 10L via E; hold for a Cirrus from right to left; follow him; hold short of 14. Acquired Cirrus visually; confirmed Captain had it in sight; and he started taxi. As we approached 14/32; ATC cleared us across 32; and to continue via F and L to 10L. Crossed 14 and as we turned up F; Captain asked; 'confirm F and L all the way?' I replied 'affirmative.' As we approached F2 I looked to my left to verify the Cirrus was proceeding on R; and looked to my right to verify no other traffic was approaching on L. I looked back to my left; and saw motion. Said 'Captain; there is an airplane!' He looked and saw it also. Two of our passengers saw it also. The aircraft (Aircraft Y) had taken off on the short parallel runway and passed over us at an estimated height of 100 feet or less. There was no opportunity to take evasive action. As we turned onto L; I called Ground Control and advised them what had happened. Ground replied 'sorry about that.' We continued on L; called tower; were given 'Line up and wait 10L; traffic landing 14; traffic on a six mile final 10L.' Traffic cleared; we were cleared for takeoff; and departed.Factors were: busy airport; all 3 runways in use (parallel and intersecting.) Parallel runways are separated by approximately 700 feet or less; and the short parallel (10R) departs over active taxiways and nearly directly over [the] ramp on the south side of the airport. Coordination between tower and ground was obviously compromised. From the position we were at on taxiway F; distance to departure end of 10R is approximately 4500 feet. It is difficult to see if an aircraft is on the runway; let alone in the takeoff roll. Layout of taxiways in the vicinity of taxiways F; L and N is a charted 'hotspot; requiring increased vigilance.'

Corporate Jet First Officer reported while taxiing out at PBI a GA aircraft flew over their aircraft that had departed from the short parallel runway.

1289162

201508

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pneumatic Ducting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1289162

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft

During cruise at FL340 we received a L BLEED DUCT warning. The First Officer was already flying; so I transferred control of the radios to him; told him to request a lower altitude; and ran the QRH. I ensured the Right bleed was selected per the procedure; however; I looked at the ECS (Environmental Control System) page and saw the right bleed valve had closed and the associated R ENG BLEED caution message had appeared. I double checked the procedure; and confirmed with my First Officer that we had completed it correctly. The cabin altitude had started climbing and I made the decision to make an emergency landing at a nearby airport. We donned our masks and complied with the emergency descent procedure. Once we reached 10;000 feet; we removed our masks. We noticed an acrid smell that burned the back of my throat (and persisted even after we had secured the airplane). We briefed for the visual approach and landing. The L BLEED DUCT warning message was still present and as a precaution I requested the emergency vehicles follow us to the ramp. Since we would land overweight I performed the landing. My First Officer noted our descent rate at touchdown of 200 feet per minute. As we taxied clear of the runway; the warning message finally went out. As we approached the gate; one of our flight attendants called and reported a thick haze and bad smell in the cabin. As a precaution; we elected to do an expedited deplaning just short of the terminal. The fire department was present and confirmed the odor. Later; while talking to a ramp agent; she also asked about the odor; that it made her lightheaded and burned her throat. In debriefing; the flight attendants reported that a passenger pulled roughly on a mask which caused the panel to fall on his face; and resulted in a bloody nose.L BLEED DUCT warning message; followed by L ENG BLEED caution message; which resulted in both bleed valves closing and a lack of pressurization.Emergencies happen. In debriefing with my crew; we felt we worked well as a team; and handled the situation with a successful outcome. The passengers were shaken; but remained calm and appreciative.

CRJ-700 Captain reported receiving a L BLEED DUCT warning followed by a R ENG BLEED caution. Captain decided to divert to nearest suitable airport.

1496564

201603

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1496564

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1496676.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Weather

Weather

At cruise; FL380; we experienced severe turbulence and were unable to maintain airspeed or altitude. We requested a descent to FL360 and then FL340. During this descent the airspeed loss caused the stick shaker to momentarily activate. At the time the weather radar showed clear of all convective activity.Even though the radar showed us clear of convective activity; I could have been more vigilant for signs of turbulence and avoided them.

We encountered a patch of severe turbulence in an embedded storm. However very little was showing on the radar and there were no prior reports of anything more than moderate chop. Our speed slowly began dropping off; I increased power and requested a descent to FL360. We leveled off there but still could not maintain speed; I requested to descend again to FL340 and increased to takeoff power. At some point in the descent we got the stick shaker very briefly.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported a momentary stick shaker due to turbulence descending from FL360 to FL340.

987601

201201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

987601

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Pre-flight

Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were filed for and received clearance to fly the UKW1 arrival into DFW. The fuel planning was only from UKW direct to DFW with none of the other fixes that are on the UKW1 figured into the fuel planning. The fuel planning on the release from UKW to DFW was 255 LBS the actual burn from UKW to the airport was 550 LBS. The wind was 10 KTS out of the north; so they were landing north; but no flight planning or fuel planning was given for that. The burn on the release was 5;100 LBS but the actual burn was 6;022 LBS from the down wind; and the step downs given by ATC that are never accounted for by Dispatch. If we would have taken off at min fuel; we would have landed with 1;362 LBS of fuel. The way that the reserve fuel is figured is not accurate; the 2;284 LBS that was given for reserve on this flight would not have been 45 minutes of flying.

ERJ170 Captain reports the flight planning software used by his company does not consider the entire arrival route and normal delays at large busy airports. The reporter routinely adds extra fuel for these flights.

1284013

201507

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Poor Lighting

Dusk

12000

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 243; Flight Crew Type 243

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1284013

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Other Person

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Personal VFR flight in a rented C172S aircraft; departed at approximately XA:30; no flight plan filed. Flight service called via phone prior to departure. No adverse weather; TFRs or unexpected NOTAMs (other than gusty winds) were reported. Departure runway aligned well with current gusty winds. Flight route direct and estimated time enroute 35 minutes. Originally lined up for a RWY 22 landing but after discussion via CTAF with other aircraft executing practice landings on the field the agreement was reached that winds favored 31. Landed runway 31; full stop and parked for on-field dinner for approximately 1 hour. Departure at approximately XC:20 under VFR without flight plan. Tuned in ATIS frequency 128.3 approximately 15 miles Northwest of ZZZ on COM2. Was expecting to hear tower recorded ATIS message but heard standard automated recorded AWOS message reporting standard weather and runway and construction NOTAM. Message reporting winds 260@7; visibility 10; skies clear; Temp 26; Dewpoint 8; alt 2994. Statement that CTAF is 120.5 when tower is closed. Tower normally closes at XE00; but assumption was made that tower closed early due to very light traffic in the area. Monitored CTAF/Tower frequency 120.5 from 15 miles Northwest of ZZZ to approximately 6.5 miles Northwest of ZZZ. Made call on CTAF reporting 6 miles North; no response on CTAF. Proceeded South to enter left downwind. Announced entering left downwind on CTAF 120.5; no response on CTAF. At this time PIC noticed flashing lights on airport boundary from emergency responder vehicles. Situation was near airport boundary; and a non-factor for the runway. (Approximately 70-80 yards from runway) Announced left base and final on CTAF; no response. Sun very low on horizon on final at approximately 3 o'clock position but general visibility to start of runway environment not significantly impacted. Landed without issue and turned to taxi off at taxiway C. (right turn) Upon turning noticed a black SUV parked next to runway about 500 feet beyond taxiway C. (not on runway) Also noticed SUV with flashing lights crossing grass area from airport boundary. Taxied to ramp and parked with SUV with flashing lights following.After parking person identified themselves as the airport administrator and claimed that I had landed at a closed airport and was not cleared to land. He also informed that there was an aircraft accident on the field approximately 1 hour prior. I explained that I was on CTAF/tower frequency; reporting position and intention from 6 miles North to landing. He claimed that he has been communicating via handheld radio; but stated that CTAF was 121.5; then stated that it was 121.7; neither of which is correct. He also claimed that tower was flashing light gun signals. No light gun signals seen; perhaps due to sun angle. Unknown why light gun signals were being used instead of communication on CTAF; or if there really were light gun signals sent. He also stated that there was a vehicle on runway at the time of landing; which was not seen. (nor was a vehicle seen on the runway in approach photos taken by passenger in aircraft).

C172 pilot reports departing on a flight to a nearby airport. Upon return; when the ATIS is tuned AWOS is heard; indicating that the Tower may be closed. The CTAF/Tower frequency is used for position reports with no response from anyone. During landing; vehicles with flashing lights are noted; but none are on the runway. After parking the reporter is informed by an airport administrator that he has landed at a closed airport.