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The dataset generation failed
Error code: DatasetGenerationError
Exception: TypeError
Message: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
Traceback: Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1869, in _prepare_split_single
writer.write_table(table)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/arrow_writer.py", line 580, in write_table
pa_table = table_cast(pa_table, self._schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2292, in table_cast
return cast_table_to_schema(table, schema)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2245, in cast_table_to_schema
arrays = [
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2246, in <listcomp>
cast_array_to_feature(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1795, in wrapper
return pa.chunked_array([func(chunk, *args, **kwargs) for chunk in array.chunks])
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1795, in <listcomp>
return pa.chunked_array([func(chunk, *args, **kwargs) for chunk in array.chunks])
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 2102, in cast_array_to_feature
return array_cast(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1797, in wrapper
return func(array, *args, **kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/table.py", line 1948, in array_cast
raise TypeError(f"Couldn't cast array of type {_short_str(array.type)} to {_short_str(pa_type)}")
TypeError: Couldn't cast array of type string to null
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1392, in compute_config_parquet_and_info_response
parquet_operations = convert_to_parquet(builder)
File "/src/services/worker/src/worker/job_runners/config/parquet_and_info.py", line 1041, in convert_to_parquet
builder.download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 924, in download_and_prepare
self._download_and_prepare(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 999, in _download_and_prepare
self._prepare_split(split_generator, **prepare_split_kwargs)
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1740, in _prepare_split
for job_id, done, content in self._prepare_split_single(
File "/src/services/worker/.venv/lib/python3.9/site-packages/datasets/builder.py", line 1896, in _prepare_split_single
raise DatasetGenerationError("An error occurred while generating the dataset") from e
datasets.exceptions.DatasetGenerationError: An error occurred while generating the datasetNeed help to make the dataset viewer work? Make sure to review how to configure the dataset viewer, and open a discussion for direct support.
pid
string | docid
string | content
string | page_number
int64 | metadata
dict | error
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AIR FORCE
MULTISERVICE
TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR
NUCLEAR,
BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL ASPECTS
OF CONSEQUENCE
MANAGEMENT
FM 3-11.21
MCRP 3-37.2C
NTTP 3-11.24
AFTTP (I) 3-2.37
DECEMBER 2001
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
MULTISERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES | 1 | {
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1 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective
commands and other commands as appropriate.
PATRICIA L. NILO
Brigadier General, USA
Commandant
US Army Chemical School
EDWARD HANLON, JR.
Lieutenant General, USMC
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat
Development Command
R.G. SPRIGG
Rear Admiral, USN
Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command
LANCE L. SMITH
Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center
This publication is available on the General
Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at www.adtdl.army.mil | 2 | {
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2 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication is designed for use
at the tactical and operational level. It
defines the roles of military units and
staffs involved in planning and executing
integrated military operations other than
war (MOOTW) actions/missions in a
possible nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) environment. This manual
provides multiservice tactics, techniques,
and procedures (MTTP) on the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) role in
consequence-management (CM)
operations. Congress has determined and
the National Command Authority (NCA)
has directed that the military become
more involved in supporting crisis and
CM operations. Acknowledging the
services’ inherent capabilities for
supporting federal, state, and local
governments, the Congress has passed
numerous laws providing for CM support.
These laws also recognize that the
National Guard (NG) may provide the
initial support when military assistance is
required. They also institutionalize
interdepartmental and interagency
coordination/planning, linking it to the
national strategy. The planning and
coordination that takes place does so with
the realization that the potential NBC
environment could be one in which there
is deliberate or accidental employment of
NBC weapons; deliberate or accidental
attacks or contamination with toxic
industrial materials (TIM), including toxic
industrial chemicals (TIC); or deliberate
or accidental attacks or contamination
with radiological materials (see Joint
Publication [JP] 3-11). Additionally, as
coordination and planning is conducted, it
is also understood that DOD assets and
resources could be used to support a
United States Government (USG) CM
response to a nuclear, biological, chemical,
radiological, or high-yield-explosive
incident. Although some of the
procedures contained here may apply to
man-made disasters, nonterrorist
instigated WMD incidents, or nuclear
weapons accidents, this MTTP is most
readily applied to CM in response to a
nuclear, biological, chemical, and
radiological (NBCR) (or a chemical
biological, and radiological−nuclear
[CBR−N]) event.
2. Purpose
This publication provides a
reference for mitigating the NBC aspects
of CM; bridges the gap between service
and joint doctrine; and contains tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) for
planning and executing NBC operations
in MOOTW in support of JP 3-07 and JP
3-07.7. This manual addresses concepts,
principles, and fundamentals, to include
planning, operational considerations, and
training and support functions. It serves
as the foundation for developing
multiservice manuals and refining
existing training support packages
(TSPs), mission training plans (MTPs),
training-center and unit exercises, and
service school curricula. It drives the
examination of organizations and
materiel developments applicable to
military support of CM operations.
Further, the TTP in this manual also
supports Universal Joint Task List Tasks
(UJTL) Strategic National (SN) 8.3.4,
Perform Consequence Management in the
Interagency Area; Strategic Theater (ST)
Task 8.5.4, Coordinate Theater
Consequence Management; and
Operational (OP) Task 5.7.8, Coordinate
Consequence Management in the Joint
Operational Area.
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4 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Development Command (NWDC).
Distribution is according to the military
standard requisitioning and issue
procedures (MILSTRIP) Desk Guide.
Air Force. The US Air Force (USAF) will
validate and incorporate appropriate
procedures according to applicable
governing directives. Distribution is
according to Air Force Instruction (AFI)
33-360.
Coast Guard. The US Coast Guard
(USCG) will validate and refer to
appropriate procedures when applicable.
No material contained herein should
conflict with USCG regulations or other
directives from higher authority,
supersede, or replace any order or
directive issued by higher authority.
5. User Information
a. The US Army Chemical School
developed this publication with the joint
participation of the approving service
commands.
b. This publication reflects
current service and joint doctrine and
command and control (C2) organizations,
facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and
procedures. Changes in service protocol,
appropriately reflected in service and
joint publications, will be incorporated.
c. We encourage recommended
changes for improving this publication.
Key your comments to the specific page
and paragraph and provide a rationale for
each recommendation. Send comments
and recommendation directly to—
3. Application
The audience for this publication is
the combatant command (COCOM); the
joint task force (JTF); functional and
service component staffs in foreign and
domestic locations tasked with planning,
preparing for, and conducting CM and
crisis-management operations. For
foreign operations, this MTTP is subject
to applicable host-nation (HN) laws and
agreements.
4. Implementation Plan
Participating service command
offices of primary responsibility (OPR)
will review this publication, validate the
information, and reference and
incorporate it in service and command
manuals, regulations, and curricula as
follows:
Army. The Army will incorporate this
publication in United States (US) Army
training and doctrinal publications as
directed by the Commander, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). Distribution is according to
Department of the Army (DA) Form 12-
99-R.
Marine Corps. The Marine Corps will
incorporate the procedures in this
publication in US Marine Corps (USMC)
training and doctrinal publications as
directed by the Commanding General, US
Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC). Distribution is
according to the Marine Corps Publication
Distribution System (MCPDS).
Navy. The Navy will incorporate these
procedures in US Navy (USN) training
and doctrinal publications as directed by
the Commander, Navy Warfare
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6 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Army
Commandant
US Army Chemical School
ATTN: ATSN-CM-DD
401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1029
Fort Leonard Wood MO 65473-8926
COMM (573) 596-0131 extension 3-7364
Marine Corps
Commanding General
US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C42 (Director)
3300 Russell Road
Quantico VA 22134-5001
DSN 278-6234 COMM (703) 784-6234
Navy
Commander
Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207
DSN 948-4201 COMM (401) 841-4201
Air Force
HQ Air Force Doctrine Center
ATTN: DJ
216 Sweeney Boulevard Suite 109
Langley AFB VA 23665-2722
DSN 574-8091 COMM (757) 764-8091
E-mail Address: afdc.dj@langley.af.mil
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7 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Coast Guard
2100 Second Street, S.W.
Washington DC 20593-0001
Staff Symbol G-MOR, G-OPD
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not
refer exclusively to men.
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8 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | FM 3-11.21
MCRP 3-37.2C
NTTP 3-11.24
AFTTP(I) 3-2.37
FM 3-11.21
MCRP 3-37.2C
NTTP 3-11.24
AFTTP(I) 3-2.37
US Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Monroe, Virginia
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia
Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
12 December 2001
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9 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence
Management
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................... x
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS ............................................................................................ xii
Page
CHAPTER I
CHAPTER II
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER IV
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS OF
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
Background ............................................................................................ I-1
Environment ........................................................................................ I-2
Military Role (Domestic Response) ....................................................... I-7
Military Role (Foreign Response) ...................................................... I-10
Response Measures ............................................................................ I-13
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Background .......................................................................................... II-1
Domestic Operations ........................................................................... II-1
Foreign Operations .............................................................................. II-4
Other Command Considerations ........................................................ II-5
Reporting Requirements ..................................................................... II-7
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Planning and Response Concept......................................................... III-1
Deliberate Planning ........................................................................... III-1
Crisis Action Planning ....................................................................... III-3
Information Management .................................................................. III-6
Toxic Industrial Materials .................................................................. III-8
RESPONSE
Background ......................................................................................... IV-1
Notification ......................................................................................... IV-3
Common Responsibilities ................................................................... IV-3
Immediate Response .......................................................................... IV-4
Critical Response Tasks ..................................................................... IV-4
Initial Response .................................................................................. IV-5
Response-Execution Considerations .................................................. IV-7
CHAPTER V
RECOVERY, TRANSITION, AND REDEVELOPMENT
Background .......................................................................................... V-1
Recovery Operations ............................................................................ V-1
Transition ............................................................................................. V-2
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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10 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | CHAPTER VI
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
Redeployment ...................................................................................... V-3
Documentation ..................................................................................... V-3
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
Overview ............................................................................................. VI-1
Education ............................................................................................ VI-1
Training .............................................................................................. VI-2
Exercises ............................................................................................. VI-3
Simulation and Modeling ................................................................... VI-3
Rules of Engagement........................................................................... VI-3
Public Affairs ...................................................................................... VI-3
CONTAMINATION-AVOIDANCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES
Background ..........................................................................................A-1
Preparedness .......................................................................................A-1
Response Measures .............................................................................A-4
Summary ..............................................................................................A-6
PROTECTION—INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
Individual Protection ...........................................................................B-1
Shelter/Protection In Place .................................................................B-4
Summary …………………………………………………………… ...........B-6
Expedient Actions.................................................................................B-7
DECONTAMINATION TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
Background ...........................................................................................C-1
General .................................................................................................C-1
Decontamination Basic Concepts .......................................................C-1
Decontamination Planning .................................................................C-2
Personnel and Casualty Decontamination-Station Overview............C-2
Contamination-Reduction Considerations (Personnel
Decontamination-Station Operations) ...............................................C-4
Decontamination Procedures (Entry Point) (See Figure C-2)............C-5
Decontamination Procedures (SCBA Removal) (See Figure C-2) ......C-6
Decontamination Procedures (Showers) (See Figure C-2) .................C-6
Decontamination Procedures (Medical Evaluation)
(See Figure C-2) ....................................................................................C-7
Casualty Decontamination .................................................................C-7
Casualty Decontamination (Triage Point) (See Figure C-3) ..............C-8
Casualty Decontamination (Emergency-Treatment Area)
(See Figure C-3) ....................................................................................C-9
Casualty Decontamination (Nonambulatory Decontamination)
(See Figure C-3) ....................................................................................C-9
Casualty Decontamination (Ambulatory Decontamination)
(See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-11
Casualty Decontamination (Clean Treatment Area)
(See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-12
Casualty Decontamination (Patient Disposition Point)
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12 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | APPENDIX D
APPENDIX E
APPENDIX F
APPENDIX G
APPENDIX H
(See Figure C-3) ..................................................................................C-12
Casualty Decontamination (General Patient Decontamination
Considerations) ..................................................................................C-13
DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE RESPONSE AGENCIES
General .................................................................................................D-1
Response Agencies ...............................................................................D-1
TECHNICAL REACH-BACK CAPABILITIES
Background ........................................................................................... E-1
National Response Center (NRC) and Chemical/Biological Hotline
(1-800-424-8802) .................................................................................. E-1
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) ........................................ E-2
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) (301) 295-
0316 or (301) 295-0530; FAX (301) 295-0227 ..................................... E-2
US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) (1-888-USA-RIID) .......................................................... E-3
US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
(1-800-424-8802) .................................................................................. E-3
National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) (202) 324-8186...... E-3
DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE INSTALLATION FORCE-PROTECTION
PLANNING CONSIDERATION
Background .......................................................................................... F-1
AT/FP planning process ....................................................................... F-1
RESPONSE TO TOXIC INDUSTRIAL-MATERIALS EVENTS
Background ..........................................................................................G-1
TIM-Operations Planning ....................................................................G-2
TIM Information-Management Resources .........................................G-3
Protective-Action-Zones (PAZ) Determination ...................................G-4
Vulnerability Mitigation .....................................................................G-6
TIM Precautions ..................................................................................G-7
Risk-Management Summary ..............................................................G-9
FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN FOR A TERRORISM-INCIDENT
RESPONSE
Background ...........................................................................................H-1
Policies .................................................................................................H-2
Situation ...............................................................................................H-3
Concept of Operations .........................................................................H-4
Responsibilities ..................................................................................H-11
Funding Guidelines ...........................................................................H-15
APPENDIX I
FEDERAL RESPONSE-PLAN SUMMARY FOR EMERGENCY-
SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
Background ............................................................................................ I-1
Concept of Operations .......................................................................... I-2
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13 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... References-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................. Glossary-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................................ Index-1
FIGURES
I-1
Tokyo Nerve-Agent Incident....................................................... I-4
I-2 DOD Response to WMD Incident .............................................. I-9
I-3 CM Foreign Response .............................................................. I-11
II-1 JTF-CS C2 Structure ........................................................ II-3
II-2 Notional CM JTF............................................................... II-5
II-3 Components of the ICS .............................................................. II-7
IV-1 Graduated-Response Overview ................................................ IV-2
IV-2 Emergency-Department Treatment of Contaminated
Patients.................................................................................... IV-11
B-1 Level A Protection ......................................................................B-2
B-2 Level B Protection ......................................................................B-3
B-3 Level C Protection ......................................................................B-4
B-4 Level D Protection......................................................................B-4
C-1 Establishing Safety Zones at a Hazardous-Materials
Incident Scene ............................................................................C-3
C-2 Sample Personnel Decontamination-Station Layout ...............C-4
C-3 Sample of a Casualty Decontamination Corridor Layout........ C-8
D-1 CB-RRT Capabilities..................................................................D-3
D-2 CBIRF Organizational Structure ..............................................D-8
D-3 CBIRF Incident Site Organization..........................................D-10
D-4 WMD-CST Organization..........................................................D-12
F-1 AT Planning and Response Elements ....................................... F-2
F-2 AT Planning Considerations (OPLAN Format)........................ F-6
H-1 Relationship Between Crisis Management and CM ................H-2
H-2 Relationship Among Federal Agencies Under PDD-39............H-3
H-3 Multiagency Crisis-Management Structures ...........................H-6
H-4 FBI JOC Structure.....................................................................H-7
H-5 Preincident CM ..........................................................................H-9
H-6 Trans-Incident CM...................................................................H-10
H-7 Postincident CM .......................................................................H-11
H-8 Relationships Among Federal Plans to Implement PDD-39 . H-14
TABLES
II-1
ICS and JTF Staff Counterparts ............................................... II-6
B-1 Protection-In-Place Options.......................................................B-6
G-1 Example Hazard-Response Guide (Mixed Load/Unidentified
Cargo)................................................................................. G-5
I-1 Emergency-Support-Function Designation Matrix ................... I-5
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15 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
for
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Aspects of
Consequence Management (CM)
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Consequence Management
Chapter I introduces the definition and purpose of the NBC aspects of CM. It focuses
on CM actions taken in response to an NBC incident/accident in a domestic or foreign area
that requires the support of US forces. The chapter further outlines that support to civil
authorities would be according to applicable federal emergency plans. It concludes with a
discussion of the military’s role in either a domestic or foreign response.
Command and Control
Chapter II provides a delineation of C² responsibilities for domestic and foreign
operations. It identifies key responsibilities for units such as the Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS) and addresses other command considerations for the Incident Command
System (ICS) supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
Planning Considerations
Chapter III discusses key aspects of CM as it relates to deliberate planning and crisis-
action planning. It discusses other key planning considerations such as information
management (IM) and TIM.
Response
Chapter IV provides guidelines on response actions for a CM incident. The chapter
indicates important common responsibilities for detection, assessment, and contamination-
control considerations. The chapter also outlines critical response tasks during response
execution.
Recovery, Transition, and Redeployment
Chapter V describes key aspects of preparing and executing a mission recovery plan.
The transition addresses factors such as transition of responsibilities and functions to other
organizations. Other key areas addressed in this chapter include requirements for
providing important documentation such as documenting lessons learned and after-
operation follow-up.
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16 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Education and Training
Chapter VI addresses key education and training considerations for support of CM. It
addresses key areas such as exercises and simulation and modeling that are important for
individual and collective training.
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17 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:
Joint
United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center, 116
Lakeview Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23535.
Airland Sea Activity, 114 Andrews Street, Suite 102, Langley, VA 23665.
United States Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet, 1562 Mitscher Street, Suite 250,
Norfolk, VA 23551.
Joint Task Force Civil Support, Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA 23551.
United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 116 Lakeview Parkway,
Suffolk, VA 23535.
United States Special Operations Command, 7701 Tampa Point Boulevard, MacDill AFB,
FL 33621.
United States Forces Command, 1283 Anderson Way SW, Fort McPherson, GA 30330.
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060.
Office of Secretary of Defense, Director, Chemical/Biological Defense Programs, DATSB
NCB (CP/CBD), 3050 Defense Pentagon, Room 3C257, Washington, DC 20301.
Pacific Command, J54319, Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861.
Army
United States Army Chemical School, 401 MANSCEN Loop, Suite 1029, Fort Leonard
Wood, MO 65473.
Unites States Army Medical Department Center and School, 1400 E. Grayson Street, Fort
Sam Houston, TX 78234.
United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027.
Directorate of Military Support, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 400 Army
Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310.
United States Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
21040.
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18 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | United States Army Nuclear Chemical Agency, 7150 Helter Loop, Suite 101, Springfield,
VA 22150.
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013.
Marine Corps
United States Marine Corps NBC Defense School, 1273 Iowa Avenue, Fort Leonard Wood,
MO 65473.
United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, ATTN: C42, 3300 Russell
Road, Quantico, VA 22134-5001.
Navy
Navy Warfare Doctrine Command, 686 Cushing Road, Sims Hall, Newport, RI 02841.
Navy Environmental Health Center, 2510 Walmer Avenue, Norfolk, VA 23513.
Air Force
Air Combat Command, 124 Andrews Street, Suite 102, Langley AFB, VA 23655.
United States Air Force Civil Engineer Support Activity, 14a Barnes Drive, Suite l, Tyndall
AFB, FL 32403.
United States Air Force Doctrine Center, Detachment 1, 216 Sweeney Boulevard, Suite
109, Langley AFB, VA 23665.
Coast Guard
United States Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team, Building 5614, Doughboy Loop, Fort Dix,
NJ 08640.
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19 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter I
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS OF
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
1. Background
a. Consequence management is a comprehensive US counterproliferation strategy
that consists of a set of mutually supporting core capabilities. These core capabilities are
counterforce operations, active and passive defense, and CM operations. As part of this
strategy, CM (in the context of the Federal Response Plan [FRP]) includes measures to
protect public health and safety; restore essential government services; and provide
emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences
of terrorism. Conversely, within the framework of DOD Directive (DODD) 3025.15, CM is
defined as “those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate
problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes.” Such services and activities may
include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting,
information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban
search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. As part of an overall federal
response to CM, DOD assets could be notified by the NCA to provide support to a lead
federal agency (LFA) such as FEMA or the Department of State (DOS) (depending on the
location). Specifically, within the context of this MTTP manual, the discussion will focus on
CM actions taken in response to a terrorist NBC incident/accident.
b. Interagency involvement is one of the fundamental aspects of CM. DOD planners
understand that other federal agencies will likely have the lead role, and there must be an
understanding of their functions and terms of reference (i.e., understanding the civilian
incident command system [ICS] and definitions for terms such as CM). For example, the
definitions for CM will vary depending on the source document (i.e., FRP versus DODD
3025.15).
NOTE: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 defines the LFA as the federal
department or agency assigned lead responsibility to manage and coordinate a
specific function, crisis, or CM.
c. US forces may be required to support civil authorities in domestic or foreign
situations/incidents due to deliberate or unintentional use of NBC weapons or materials.
Commanders must prepare an appropriate response to meet the full spectrum of NBC
incidents, both deliberate and unintentional, to support civilian, HN, or military
installation recovery. Support to civil authorities from DOD would be according to
applicable federal emergency plans and would likely require coordination and cooperation
with agencies, organizations, and individuals outside the military’s chain of command or
direct control. A joint force commander (JFC)/JTF may be in a supporting role to the US
ambassador and his Country Team or to a LFA such as the US FEMA. The JTF’s task
organization will likely be a composite organization of conventional forces (i.e., security,
support elements, etc.) and units with specialized capabilities such as explosive-ordnance-
disposal or other special-response teams.
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21 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (1) Support Role (Foreign). The primary responsibility for managing and
mitigating the effects of a foreign incident resides with a HN government. If the HN
government would request US assistance, DOS serves as the LFA. DOD support could be
part of the US response and would be coordinated through the appropriate chief of mission
(COM) and the country team. DOD assets would be under the command of the applicable
geographic combatant commander, and all US-government support would be coordinated by
the resident COM and the country team.
(2) Support Role (Domestic). As directed in PDD-39, FEMA is the LFA for CM.
DOD support to FEMA (as the LFA for CM) could be to render “technical-operations”
support to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, and dispose of a contaminant or conduct
decontamination operations. For example, decontamination operations may be conducted
by military units to support casualty decontamination or for support of long-term
restoration operations. Additionally, an incident involving an NBC environment would
likely require a response according to a specific federal emergency operations plan
(OPLAN) (FRP, National Contingency Plan [NCP], Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan [FRERP], etc.). These plans designate a LFA to coordinate the federal
response. The type of emergency determines the LFA. In general, an LFA establishes
operational structures and procedures to assemble and work with agencies providing direct
support to the LFA. Appendix I shows the LFA for each of the designated emergency
support functions (ESFs) in the FRP. In only one case (Public Works and Engineering) is
DOD (Army Corps of Engineers) the LFA. In all other ESFs, DOD provides support but
does not lead.
d. For DOD’s support role (domestic or foreign), JFCs conduct planning to meet the
various NBC and radiological threats. The actions of the JFC could include measures to
anticipate, prevent, and resolve a terrorist threat or incident.
2. Environment
a.
Potential Adversaries.
(1) Potential adversaries who might possess NBC capabilities include nation-
state and nonstate groups. Nation-state and some nonstate groups have traditional
territorial and population bases of power. Other nonstate groups rely on the shared
interests and capabilities of members and are relatively unfettered either by geographic
and political boundaries or the international norms of state conduct. Nonstate groups can
also include terrorist (see Figure I-1); guerrilla and criminal organizations; and individuals
with the motivation and resources to hold US interests, forces, allies, designated friends,
and nonstate actors at risk. Nation-states may threaten to use or use NBC capabilities
against nonstate groups within their country. In 1988, shortly after the first Gulf War, Iraq
used chemical weapons against the Kurds, a minority ethnic group in Iraq seeking
autonomy. Shortly after the second Gulf War, Iraq threatened to use chemical weapons
against rebellious Kurds and Shiite Moslems. Only through the threat of US military
intervention was Iraq deterred from carrying out its threat. In the event of a future
incident, the US needs the option to be prepared to conduct foreign CM in a nonpermissive
environment.
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23 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (2) Regional powers may use NBC weapons for coercion or aggression against
US allies or other friendly states. Armed adversaries may also directly or indirectly
threaten US forces, citizens, and other interests. Transnational and nonstate groups with
NBC capabilities may pose similar threats abroad and to the US homeland. States with
these capabilities may succumb to internal turmoil that creates the possibility of NBC or
radiological dispersal device (RDD) events within their territory or smuggling of NBC
materials or weapons to other states or nonstate groups.
(3) Civilian populations, critical infrastructures, and unwarned and
unprotected military forces are especially vulnerable. Joint and multinational operations,
in areas where indigenous friendly forces and populations have less protection than US
forces, are similarly vulnerable. Adversaries may employ NBC weapons to assail these
vulnerabilities and to seek to overcome the advantages of the US operational method—
superior leader development and training, technology, combat doctrine, and high operating
tempo. In so doing, adversaries may believe they can dictate the terms of the conflict to the
disadvantage of the US.
(4) An adversary may have incentives to employ or threaten to employ NBC
weapons, thus seeking to deter US intervention and attempting to gain an early tactical
advantage. During a MOOTW situation, an adversary could employ NBC weapons to
prevent, limit, or reverse US involvement and fracture coalition public support and unity.
Late in a conflict or as a last resort, an adversary could employ or threaten to employ NBC
weapons to avoid defeat and influence the terms of conflict termination.
(5) Adversaries may deliver weapons by conventional delivery means, by
special-operations forces (SOF), or through the use of terrorists. Potential adversary
objectives and targets could include civilian populations and infrastructures, as well as
military forces and facilities, home and abroad. Clandestine attacks could seek to cause
terror among the populace, alter the political objectives of the US and its coalition partners,
and take revenge against US and coalition actions. Adversaries with long-range delivery
means could seek to deny the US forces a sanctuary, hold civilian populations and
infrastructures hostage, and retaliate directly against the US and coalition partners distant
from the area of conflict.
(6) The threat for foreign and domestic operations is increasingly nonlinear
and unpredictable. In the event that DOD is required to support CM, timely information
and intelligence is critical. Given the case of the Tokyo Subway incident (see Figure I-1)
and other terrorist incidents, procedures must be in place to detect, identify, and mitigate
the effects of these types of weapons. Terrorist threats must be recognized as legitimate
and planned for accordingly. The threat could include conventional explosive devices with
NBC materials.
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25 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | DEATH IN THE SUBWAY
Until last week, Kasumasa Takahashi was just another faceless Japanese
bureaucrat, the deputy stationmaster at Kasumigaseki subway station in
central Tokyo. The blue-suited mandarins of the nation’s key ministries
who poured from the commuter trains every morning were his customers:
Takahashi took their tickets, pointed them up the proper escalators and
kept the sprawling station - where three major subway lines converge - so
clean that the white gloves he wore on the job were seldom soiled.
Then last Monday, suddenly and quietly, the 50-year old career subway
man became a hero. The 8:14 a.m. Chiyoda Line train bound for Yoyogi-
Uehara pulled in on track 5 with an obvious problem. Passengers were
spilling out of its first car with tears streaming, choking, some foaming at
the mouth. Takashashi walked into the car, picked up a foul-smelling, 6-
inch high package wrapped in newspaper and carried it onto the platform.
Drops began leaking from it onto the platform tiles, and Takashashi started
to mop them up with his handkerchief. Then, he collapsed and lost
consciousness. The man whose son and brother were also subway
workers never came out of the coma, and he died later that day in a nearby
hospital.
The poisonous nerve gas that killed Takashashi and nine other Japanese
and injured more than 5,000 was Sarin (GB), invented by the Nazis and
applied with deadly efficiency, suggested Japanese authorities, by
members of Aum Shrinrikyo, an apocalyptic religious sect. In the following
days, gas-masked police, accompanied by a few Japanese military
personnel and several caged canaries used to detect deadly fumes, raided
two dozen sites throughout Japan where sect members lived. They made
several arrests and seized bags and barrels of chemicals - tons of toxic
material in all - which authorities said could be used to make Sarin.
For the rest of the world, the deadly Tokyo attack was yet another shocking
reminder of how vulnerable most societies are to terrorism. The weapon
wasn’t an exotic nuclear device, but a relatively unsophisticated mixture of
chemical agents, most of them readily available. And the alleged
perpetrator was not a distant hostile government closely watched by
intelligence agencies but a shadowy, global and unpredictable religious
band.
SOURCE: Mike Tharp, U.S. New & World Report, April 3, 1995
Figure I-1. Tokyo Nerve-Agent Incident
b. Use of NBC Materials.
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27 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (1) Nuclear-Materials Incident. An adversary could use nuclear materials to
cause blast, thermal, radioactive, and/or electromagnetic effects on personnel or property.
The shock waves and high pressures cause damage; thermal radiation can cause burns and
secondary fires; and ionizing radiation is likely to be the main cause of casualties.
(2) Biological Incident. A biological incident may result from any device or
vector that intentionally uses or carries bacteria, viruses, or toxins to cause mass
casualties. The means of dissemination of these agents encompass four primary methods of
entry into the body: inhalation, ingestion, absorption, and injection. While inhalation and
ingestion are the most common methods of infection, casualties resulting from absorption or
injection are also possible. Many of these agents, such as cholera or anthrax, are easily
adapted for use as a terrorist weapon; only the biological agent and an effective dispersal
system are required. Some dispersal methods, such as using an aerosol spray, can spread
agents over vast areas and affect large numbers of people. Biological agents typically have
a delayed onset of signs or symptoms, aiding migration, hampering identification, and
complicating decontamination. As such, response forces may inadvertently spread the
agent and escalate the incident rather than contain it.
(3) Chemical Incident. Chemical incidents can be caused by any device that
uses nerve, blister, blood, choking, or irritating chemical agents, or TIC, to produce mass
casualties. Chemical agents typically are effective via inhalation, ingestion, or absorption
(injection is also possible but less likely).
c. NBC Materials Incidents/Accidents. Large-scale challenges can arise from
incidents/accidents involving the release of NBC materials. In the following paragraphs are
brief descriptions of incidents that occurred in India, the former Soviet Union, and Iraq.
(1) Bhopal Incident. To illustrate the potential for disaster from an
inadvertent incident associated with a TIC, the Bhopal Indian Incident is a classic study.
On December 3, 1984, over 40 tons of methyl isocynate (MIC) and hydrogen cyanide leaked
from a pesticide plant at the northern end of Bhopal into the surrounding city of one million
people. The leak was caused by a series of operator errors. These chemicals are but two of
the many extremely TIC that are manufactured and stored in facilities across the world.
Bhopal has been called the “Hiroshima of the Chemical Industry.” According to the Bhopal
Peoples Health and Documentation Clinic (BPHDC), 8,000 people were killed in its
immediate aftermath and over 500,000 people suffered from injuries.
(2) Sverdlovsk Incident. In April 1979 at a Soviet military facility about two
and one-half miles from Sverdlovsk, USSR (now Ekaterinburg), an accidental release of
biological material occurred. A few days later, some of the townspeople started developing
fevers, chills, and other symptoms and some were complaining about chest pains. As time
passed, more individuals started displaying these same symptoms and some of the earlier
victims died. Attending medical personnel diagnosed this occurrence as an outbreak of
anthrax. Eventually, 77 cases of anthrax were reported, with 66 deaths resulting. The
autopsies listed anthrax as the cause of death. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin admitted
that the nearby military installation had been part of an offensive biological weapon
program and that an epidemic had been caused by an unintentional release of 1 to 2
kilograms of anthrax spores during the process of uploading artillery shells.
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29 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (3) The Chernobyl Disaster. On April 26, 1986 at 1:23 a.m., local time,
technicians at the Chernobyl Power Plant in Ukraine (former Soviet Union) allowed the
power in the fourth reactor to fall to low levels as part of a controlled experiment, which
went wrong. The reactor overheated causing a meltdown of the core. Two explosions blew
the top off the reactor building releasing clouds of deadly radioactive material in the
atmosphere for over 10 days. The people of Chernobyl were exposed to radioactivity 100
times greater than the Hiroshima bomb. The people of northern Europe were exposed to
clouds of radioactive material being blown northward through the sky. Seventy percent of
the radiation is estimated to have fallen on Belarus. It is estimated that over 15 million
people have been affected by the disaster in some way. More than 600,000 people were
involved with the cleanup—many of whom are now dead or sick. The health impact of the
Chernobyl accident can be classified in terms of acute health effects and of late health
effects; moreover, there are also psychological effects, which can influence health. All the
acute health effects occurred among the personnel of the plant or in those persons brought
in for fire-fighting and immediate clean-up operations. Two deaths were immediately
associated with the accident, one person was killed by the explosion and another suffered a
coronary thrombosis. A third person died early the morning of the accident from thermal
burns. Twenty-eight other persons died later in the treatment centers, bringing the total to
31 deaths in the first weeks after the accident. All symptomatic exposed persons from the
site were placed in hospitals. Of the total 499 persons admitted for observation, 237 of
these were initially diagnosed as suffering from acute radiation syndrome and most of these
were hospitalized in the first 24 hours. The severity and rapidity of onset of their
symptoms depended on their dose. The initial early signs and symptoms of radiation
sickness from high doses included diarrhea, vomiting, fever and erythema. In the highest
exposure group, the first reaction was usually vomiting, occurring within 15 to 30 minutes
of exposure. These patients were desperately ill; fever and intoxication as well as diarrhea
and vomiting were prominent features. Mucous membranes were severely affected—
becoming swollen, dry, and ulcerated—making breathing and swallowing extremely painful
and difficult. Extensive thermal and beta-radiation burns often complicated the illness.
Within the first two weeks, white blood cells and platelets fell dramatically, indicating a
very high dose of radiation. This compromised the production of blood cells in the bone
marrow, making it virtually impossible for the patients to fight infection or to retain the
natural clotting activity of the blood. Almost all the patients with such high doses died (20
of 21) in spite of the intensive specialized medical treatment provided. At lower exposures,
the symptoms, signs and laboratory findings improved. Vomiting began later, platelet and
white blood-cell counts did not drop so precipitously, and the fever and toxemia were less
pronounced. Beta-radiation burns to the skin were a major complicating factor, and
mucous-membrane damage was difficult to treat. However, survival improved markedly at
lower doses, so that no early deaths were noted in the less-exposure group.
(4) Kurdish Incident. In 1988, following the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein
deliberately employed chemical weapons against the Kurdish ethnic group in Iraq. In
September 1988, two congressional staffers from the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee conducted interviews at five refugee camps in southeastern Turkey. The
following is an excerpt of testimony related to the incident: “At 6:00 a.m. on August 25,
1988, eight planes flew over our village. All eight dropped weapons … when they dropped
the bombs, a big sound did not come out -- just a yellowish color and a kind of garlic smell.
The people awoke, and some of them fainted. Those who poured water on themselves lived;
those who could not reach water died. I went to the river. Almost 50 women died. Some
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31 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | died who went to help their families. Seventy-five people died.” In the entire area,
thousands of people may have perished. Immediately after the chemical warfare (CW)
attack, 60,000 to 100,000 Kurds fled across the Iraq-Turkish border. Among them was Dr.
Yossef Hamed, a Kurdish physician. The following comment describes his experience:
“People died under my hands. It took us one week to walk here. I think in that time I saw
200 people die from chemical weapons. There are thousands dead . . . At Ismasewa, three
people were suffering from what I believe was nerve gas. They were hallucinating and
could not move in a straight line. They vomited continuously and had severe spasms of the
body.”
d.
Summary. There are critical points to consider in these types of operations. They
can occur in a domestic or foreign area in an operation other than war; may involve
deliberate or inadvertent intent and will likely occur without advance notice; and may in
the case of advertent use in a foreign area, require forced entry.
3. Military Role (Domestic Response)
This section briefly addresses how the federal government might respond in the event
of an incident with DOD assets such as the JTF-CS. The military’s role in domestic support
operations (DSO) and for support of crisis management and CM is also briefly discussed.
a.
Introduction. The military’s role in domestic emergencies is well defined and, by
law, is limited in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment,
but do not replace local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority
and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. The employment of military forces has
a myriad of legal considerations. Commanders prepare for disaster crisis-management and
CM operations by understanding the appropriate laws, policies, and directives that govern
employment of the military. Specifically, there are legal considerations that should be
considered.
(1) Stafford Act (42 USC 5121). The Stafford Act gives the federal government
the authority to respond to disasters and emergencies in order to provide assistance to save
lives and protect public health, safety, and property. This assistance requires
reimbursement to DOD for the incremental costs of providing support. Approval authority
and reporting requirements vary, depending on the duration and type of support requested.
(2) Constitutional Responsibility. The US Constitution allows for the use of
the military to execute or enforce the law when necessary to protect federal or civilian
property and functions. For example, Limited Military Support to Law Enforcement
Agencies (MSLEA) Title 10 USC allows the military to share information and provide
equipment, facilities, and other services to law-enforcement agencies (LEAs); however,
DOD units must comply with the directions found in DODD 3025.15 before providing
support to civil LEAs.
(3) Command Authority. In the event of an emergency or an attack (as
described in DODD 3025.1 and DODD 3025.15), a commander may legally assist civil
authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property
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33 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | damage under immediate serious conditions before a Presidential declaration of a major
disaster or emergency.
b. Federal Response.
(1) When directed to do so, DOD responds to domestic emergencies according to
the FRP and any other supporting plans as tasked by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
Coordinated by FEMA, the FRP is the most important of these plans. Along with DOD, 26
other federal agencies provide support when the FRP is fully implemented. The FRP is an
umbrella plan to guide federal support to state and local governments. It outlines federal,
including DOD, responsibilities and provides the framework for coordinating civil-military
requirements.
(2) Following a Presidential declaration of an emergency/a disaster declaration
under the provisions of the FRP, the President appoints a federal coordinating officer (FCO)
to manage the federal assistance efforts. The defense coordinating officer (DCO) is
appointed by the supporting commander in chief (CINC) and serves as the principal DOD
point of contact (POC) at the Disaster Field Office (DFO) for providing military support.
The commander, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), as the lead operational authority,
may task a US Continental Army (First and Fifth US) to conduct planning and coordination
for disasters and domestic emergencies as well as to appoint DCOs following a disaster
declaration. The DCO supervises the defense coordinating element (DCE) and, at the
discretion of the CINC, the DCO may assume control of all federal military units involved
in the disaster. However, the severity of an incident could warrant the deployment of the
JTF-CS (see paragraph c) to render comprehensive support (see Figure I-2).
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34 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Federal Response Plan
Consequence Mgt
Director
FEMA
FEMA HQ
Emergency
Spt Tm
Federal
NCA
SECDEF
Crisis Mgt
Attorney
General
OSD
E
X
O
R
D
CJCS
JS
USJFCOM
JSOTF
FBI
OSC
Disaster Field Office
SCO
FCO
DCO
JTF-CS
INCIDENT
Incident Cdr
& First
Responders
Local
Units
Responding
Chain of Command
Chain of Command
Coordination
Coordination
State
Governor
EOC
TAG
WMD
CST,
Other
NG &
State
Assets
City Mayor
EOC
Figure I-2. DOD Response to WMD Incident
c.
Joint Task Force-Civil Support. According to the JTF-CS Implementation Plan,
approved September 23, 1999, the SECDEF established the JTF-CS to support LFAs in
responding to WMD threats, incidents, and national security special events (See Figure I-
2). The JTF-CS concept uses a small, permanent staff to execute daily operations involved
in shaping, responding, and preparing for DOD’s crisis management and CM WMD
response. Once the JTF is given an operational tasking to deploy or respond, the small,
permanent staff is augmented with trained staff personnel to perform the necessary
functions required of a deployed JTF headquarters (see Chapter II for more information on
the JTF-CS).
d. Domestic-Support Operations. DSO are generally conducted in three stages:
response, recovery, and restoration. The military’s primary role is in the response stage. As
the operation moves into the final stage (restoration), their role steadily decreases.
Response activities by JTF-CS assets will likely focus on those actions to save lives,
preserve life and safety, protect property, and prevent further damage to the environment
(Response operations are addressed in detail in Chapter IV). Recovery activities begin the
process of reestablishing the infrastructure and services. Restoration is a long-term process
that eventually returns the community/installation to its predisaster state.
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35 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | e. CM Planning in Support of Crisis Management. Joint forces may conduct CM
planning in support of an LFA during crisis-management operations. Normally, these
operations may be conducted in support of the following types of situations:
(1) National Security Special Events. When an event has been designated by
the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury as a “national security special
event,” the LFA’s request for DOD assistance goes to the DOD Executive Secretary and,
upon SECDEF’s approval, joint forces deploy in support of the LFA, as required. During
national security special events, such as the 1996 Atlanta, Georgia, Olympic Games, the
LFA could be conducting routine surveillance and tracking operations while the JTF staff
does generic planning and predictive analysis. If a significant threat is identified, planning
and unit alert postures can be adjusted, as necessary. Since this operation is typically well
forecasted, the C2 relationships within DOD will be established before the event. The JFC
will be prepared to provide C2 of all or any portion of DOD forces deployed in support of the
event except the JSOTF and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
NOTE: For more information on JSOTF operations, duties, and responsibilities,
see JP 3-05.3.
(2) Short-Notice Events. Should a significant threat be identified, joint forces,
when directed by SECDEF, deploy in support of the LFA to plan for CM. The tasks to be
accomplished will focus on detailed planning, predictive analysis, and adjusting alert
postures for CM units should it be needed. During this mission, the LFA (typically the FBI)
will be conducting crisis management operations. Since this operation is typically reactive
in nature, any DOD forces deployed in support of CM planning will normally be assigned
operational control (OPCON) to the JFC, unless exempted by higher authority.
f.
Consequence Management. As with combat operations, planning for CM
requires mission analysis and command-estimate processes to clearly define potential
threats, including NBC weapons and other toxic materials, and associated vulnerabilities.
Further planners (JFC or installation) realize that CM measures could be undertaken for
support of domestic or foreign operations. Overall, the purpose of DOD CM operations is to
minimize the impact of the incident on a specific area of operations. These CM plans are
also visibly and successfully exercised periodically in order to enhance the credibility of US
deterrence on potential adversaries. Commanders understand their responsibility to
coordinate with applicable civilian authorities and agencies to prevent and, if necessary,
mitigate and manage the consequences of deliberate or accidental NBC employment or
similar toxic material incidents. This process is aided in the US as detailed interagency
processes (contained in documents such as the FRP and/or the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan) guide the US Armed Forces in providing MACA to
such events.
4. Military Role (Foreign Response)
For foreign operations, the DOS and the US ambassador coordinate US activities
through the Country Team (see Figure I-3), with US-agency representation (including the
DOD) as required in the specific situation. The military chain-of-command from the NCA
to the JFC remains in effect, even though a non-DOD agency (i.e., the DOS) may have
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37 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | overall lead responsibility for NBC-related CM actions. To support the foreign elements,
response elements such as the JTAC or FEST (composed of specialized personnel) are
available to US force commanders for assistance in conducting CM actions to mitigate and
manage the consequences of an NBC attack or other toxic-material contamination. Foreign
CM operations can be designed around five basic phases: situation assessment and
preparation, immediate assistance, extended operations, disengagement/handover, and
redeployment.
SECDEF
SECDEF
Joint Staff
Joint Staff
USJFCOM
US JFC
NCA
USAID/OFDA
DHHS-PHS
DOE
Recommended USG
Aid Package
DOSDOS
Ambassador
Ambassador
FEST
FEST
CMRT
CMRT
Request for
Assistance
JTAC/Follow-on
Forces
JTF-CM
Assigned Forces
HN
Regional CINC
Regional CINC
Figure I-3. CM Foreign Response
a. Phase 1, Situation Assessment and Preparation. Actions during this phase could
include—
(1) Determining the incident type.
(2) Conducting a mission analysis and the activation of the C2 structure and/or
CM assets for an immediate response.
(3) Determining the availability of combatant command theater and
continental US (CONUS)-based assets.
(4) Determining the adequacy of existing HN plans to resolve WMD incidents
and the status of HN, allied, international, and nongovernmental assets responding to the
incident.
(5) Determining the status and the availability of required movement assets.
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38 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (6) Conducting necessary medical preparation of US forces and perform initial
disease and environmental health threat assessments on deploying forces and the local
civilian population.
(7) Preparing initial public-affairs (PA) guidance and plan formulation.
(8)
Identifying deficiencies in the status of forces agreements (SOFA) that
provide for the protection of US personnel.
(9)
Identifying and preparing the required forces for deployment. Establishing
liaison with HN and allied/coalition assets.
b. Phase 2, Immediate Assistance. Actions during this phase could include—
(1) Deploying the required forces.
(2) Preparing to assume responsibility for the transportation of a recovered
weapon to a point of disposition.
(3) Assisting HN forces in isolating the incident area.
(4) Collecting and analyzing samples.
(5) Determining the downwind/fallout hazard.
(6) Assisting HN forces in evacuating civilians from the incident site and the
surrounding area to facilitate operations.
(7) Providing security for relief personnel and facilities involved in the incident
response.
(8) Providing advice and assistance to local medical authorities. Assist the HN
in monitoring disease/injury trends (epidemiological surveillance) and in performing
disease and environmental health threat assessments.
(9) Assisting HN forces in conducting triage and providing emergency medical
treatment for initial casualties.
(10) Assisting HN forces in providing mortuary support.
(11) Assisting with search-and-rescue (SAR) operations.
(12) Assisting with fire-fighting operations.
(13) Assisting the HN in decontaminating personnel, equipment, and facilities
involved in initial-response operations.
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39 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (14) Assisting HN forces in initiating a public information campaign to provide
necessary information to affected civilians, as well as global and regional media.
(15) Establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate
military operations with the civilian response effort.
c.
Phase 3, Extended CM Operations. Actions during this phase could include—
(1) Continuing to assist the HN in isolating the incident area.
(2) Being prepared to receive additional forces based on the NCA’s decision and
the severity of the incident. The geographic combatant command’s initial response force
will assume control of follow-on DOD forces and deployed military assets.
(3) Assisting the HN in establishing displaced civilian centers (DCCs) with
adequate shelter and food for civilians affected by the incident area.
(4) Assisting HN forces with mortuary affairs and casualty recovery,
classification, and processing.
(5) Assisting in the removal and the disposal of contaminated debris.
(6) Assisting in infrastructure repair.
(7) Assisting the HN with reconstruction efforts to minimize long-term
disruption to the civilian population.
(8) Assisting HN forces in decontaminating US, HN, and allied personnel and
equipment engaged in CM operations.
(9) Continuing to assist the HN with PA and psychological-operations
campaigns.
d. Phase 4, Disengagement and Handover. Based on NCA guidance, hand off
operations to HN forces to complete the CM mission.
e.
Phase 5, Redeployment. CM forces redeploy according to applicable command
guidance.
5. Response Measures
The US military uses the NBC defense principles of contamination avoidance,
protection, and decontamination to support civil authorities during CM operations. These
principles help the military response elements facilitate a standard response to an incident.
a. Contamination Avoidance. Measures such as detection, warning, and
contamination control can be undertaken to support a military response. (See Appendix A
for further information on contamination-avoidance measures). During peacetime, units
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40 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | undertake selected measures (i.e., vulnerability reduction measures, drills and exercises to
support crisis-management and CM preparation, etc.) to maintain readiness. These actions
are generally taken as part of an integrated approach to exercise established
programs/plans. These preparedness actions can take many forms. Possible measures
could include—
(1) Conducting assessments of vulnerabilities that could compromise
preparedness given the potential threat against various targets, military, and/or civilians.
(2) Performing assessments of the threat. Commanders also assess the
criticality of key infrastructures that are essential for functions such as staging and
deploying operations.
(3) Exercising antiterrorism/force-protection (AT/FP) plans to provide a
maximum deterrent effect on potential adversaries. Commanders also coordinate with
civilian authorities and agencies to ensure that applicable measures such as Mutual Aid
Agreements are in place to ensure a fully coordinated response.
(4) Accomplishing key measures to further reduce vulnerability through:
enforcing operational security; maintaining emergency response plans; ensuring that FP
capabilities and redundancy in capability are identified; maintaining NBC defense
equipment; conducting joint and interagency planning (i.e., coordinating with FEMA and
DOS); and conducting assessments to ensure that response elements (active and reserve
components) are properly trained and/or certified for crisis-management or CM operations.
b. Protection. NBC protection conserves capability by providing individual and
collective-protection. Protective measures are further discussed in Appendix B.
(1)
Individual protective measures can include the use of individual protective
equipment (IPE) (protective masks and clothing), medical prophylaxis, pretreatment,
antidotes, or other medical treatments. For example, wearing a properly fitted protective
mask provides respiratory tract protection, and wearing the protective ensemble provides
virtually complete protection against a biological aerosol attack. Some other protective
measures may include the use of field expedients. In summary, essential individual
protective guidance involves two basic elements: adhering to the levels of protection
established at the incident site and respecting the boundaries that establish control zones
to minimize or preclude exposure to contaminants.
(2) Collective protection will likely not be used for support of CM operations
because activities such as the incident command (IC) will be positioned outside the
hazardous areas. Select locations (i.e., high-value C2 facilities) may use collective protective
equipment as a norm, or preincident planning (before a National Security Event) may
result in the use of collective protective equipment. However, IPE will be the primary
means of protection in contaminated areas. Available collective protective equipment does
provide a toxic-free area (TFA) for conducting operations and performing life-support
functions such as eating and resting. Contamination transfer into the TFA could
compromise the health and safety of all occupants and jeopardize their ability to support
the mission. When collective protection is not available, building occupants gain limited
protection by closing all windows and doors; turning off air-handling systems; and moving
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42 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | to closed, inner rooms. With advanced warning, occupants can increase protection by
sealing windows, doors, and openings although the building or space may quickly become
uninhabitable without cooling or ventilation.
c. Decontamination. Decontamination (or decon) operations support the postattack
restoration of forces and operations to a near-normal capability. As forces don NBC
protective equipment, mission degradation will occur. This degradation continues until
forces can resume operations without wearing IPE. Decon can help minimize the time that
forces/response personnel are in protective equipment by reducing, neutralizing, or
destroying NBC hazards on personnel and mission-essential resources. Since decon actions
are labor intense and assets are limited, commanders must prioritize decon requirements
and decontaminate only what is necessary. Commanders may choose to defer
decontamination of some items, and depending on the agent type and weather conditions, to
defer the use of equipment and/or allow natural weathering effects (temperature, wind, and
sunlight) to reduce hazards. Further, the extent and time required for decontamination
depends on the situation, mission, and degree of contamination. Decontamination
measures are further discussed in Appendix C.
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43 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter II
COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. Background
Effective C2 is essential to fully use available assets in accomplishing CM missions. C2
relationships in CM may be tailored to a particular situation whether domestic or foreign.
Unity of effort focuses on the commander’s intent and in maintaining coordination with the
LFA. In summary, an effective C2 system supports the synchronization of military and
civilian-agency operations to ensure an effective and efficient response to CM operations.
2. Domestic Operations
a. The USJFCOM established the JTF-CS as a C2 HQ responsible for the planning
and execution of military support to civil authorities (MSCA) for CM of WMD incidents
within the 48 contiguous states. The principles that guide a JTF-CS operation include the
following:
(1) The JTF-CS will always operate in support of a LFA and will participate as
a follow-on CM force behind first responders and local/state assets.
(2) The JTF-CS will respond when the President issues a federal
emergency/disaster declaration and the NCA approves an execution order (EXORD)
through the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for their assistance.
(3) The JTF-CS will operate within the guidelines of current plans and
procedures used by the LFA, such as the FRP that FEMA uses.
(4) FEMA is the LFA for domestic CM. The FBI is the LFA for domestic crisis
management. Subject to SECDEF’s approval, the JTF-CS may provide support to other
LFAs in certain circumstances.
(5) The JTF-CS does not duplicate the technical response capabilities that
currently exist throughout DOD and the federal government.
(6) The JTF-CS is organized and trained to rapidly tailor the scale and
character of its response to the requirements of the LFA.
(7) The JTF-CS’s relationship to the LFA in a WMD CM mission will parallel
the lines of coordination and cooperation that currently exist for any disaster-response
mission involving a DOD response. The JTF-CS will generally assume OPCON over
designated DOD forces as well as the DCO and his staff.
(8) The JTF-CS establishes effective administrative controls for documenting
approval/disapproval of expenditures from the Disaster Emergency Relief Fund. After
initial-response operations begin, the JTF-CS submits an estimate of the total funding
requirements for the duration of the disaster operations. The JTF-CS responds only to
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45 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | validated requests for assistance (RFA), captures all costs for support provided, and
requests timely and suitable reimbursement from the LFA according to the FRP or other
appropriate authorities.
(9) The technical augmentation cell (TAC) serves as the JTF-CS special staff
for coordinating and managing chemical-biological (CB) defense response support for an
incident. The TAC consists of technical personnel from agencies such as the Chemical-
Biological-Rapid-Response Team (CB-RRT), the Defense Threat-Reduction Agency, and the
USMC Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). This cell provides technical
advice and assessments to the technical response assets to address CM operations at an
incident, as necessary.
b. The JTF-CS will be the USJFCOM standing JTF HQ for all WMD CM within the
US and its territories and possessions. In this role, when directed by the SECDEF through
USCINCJFCOM, the JTF-CS will assume OPCON of allocated DOD forces (less United
States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] elements and USACE assets) responding
to WMD incidents in support of the LFA.
(1) The JTF-CS is organized on a functional basis, as defined in JP 0-2. The
USJFCOM exercises COCOM over the JTF-CS. The USJFCOM organizes the JTF-CS, as
necessary, to perform CM WMD missions and may elect to assign other forces, over which it
exercises COCOM, to the JTF-CS. The SECDEF, through the CJCS, apportions forces (not
currently assigned to the COCOM) to the USJFCOM for CM planning and operations.
(2) When delegated OPCON of DOD forces, the JTF-CS will coordinate with
the USJFCOM to ensure that adequate C2 elements are requested and established to
handle the potentially large numbers of DOD forces provided for CM responses.
Additionally, other task force (TF) HQ could be subordinate to the JTF-CS for planning and
execution of CM operations (see Figure II-1). When the JTF-CS conducts a CM operation,
another TF HQ may be employed, operating either as an integral part of the JTF-CS or as a
separate HQ. As with other designated DOD forces, the commander of the JTF-CS is
designated by the appropriate authority to command this TF.
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47 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Governor
EOC
TAG
CINC
IAJOC
Disaster Field Office
SCO
FCO DCO
All
RFAs
JTF-CS
Commander
Staff
TAC
Reach-back
TACON
TF
Liaison
Base
Support
Installation(s)
Installation(s)
Installation(s)
ARFOR
AFFOR
NAVFOR
MARFOR
TF
LOG
TF
MED
Chain of Command
Chain of Command
Coordination
Coordination
TACON
TACON
DoD
WMD
Labs
Subordinate
TF
As
Needed
Figure II-1. JTF-CS C2 Structure
(3) For CM operations conducted in the 48 contiguous states, the USJFCOM is
the supported combatant commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE
assets. For operations in these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON
of the USJFCOM.
(4) For CM operations conducted in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands,
Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) is the supported combatant
commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE assets. For operations in
these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON of the USCINCSO.
(5) For CM operations conducted in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American Samoa,
or any of the US possessions or the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in the
Pacific area of responsibility, the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) is the supported
combatant commander for all DOD forces except USSOCOM and USACE assets. For
operations in these areas, the JTF-CS, if employed, operates under the OPCON of the
USPACOM.
(6) During an incident, the JTF-CS exercises OPCON over the DCO and the
DCE. The DCO continues to operate in the DFO in close coordination with the FCO, the
senior FEMA authority on the scene.
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48 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (7) As required, the JTF-CS establishes liaison with the state’s adjutant
general and direct liaison with NG assets such as the WMD-CSTs. For example, WMD-
CSTs are Title 32 NG assets employed by the state/territorial governor to assess the size
and the specific nature of the situation. Further, other coordination (see Figure II-1) occurs
through the DFO. This office serves as a focal point for coordination between the state and
defense coordination officers for receipt of actions such as validated RFAs.
(8) Examples of implied operational tasks for the JTF-CS could include
identifying contaminated areas, conducting surveys of and identifying NBC hazards,
supporting medical operations, and providing logistics support.
3. Foreign Operations
a. Based on the size and the nature of a response to a foreign WMD incident, a
geographic combatant commander may designate a JTF to conduct the operation. This
brief section provides an overview of a typical JTF HQ staff. The geographic combatant
commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations (CONOPS) based
upon the direction of the NCA. Input—including requests from the DOS, situational
factors, and the time military forces enter the area—affects the mission statement. The
geographic combatant commander develops a list of requisite capabilities and tasks his
components to identify capable forces. The components establish the force list (e.g.,
personnel, equipment, and supplies) and movement requirements. The geographic
combatant commander approves or disapproves the components’ force lists, establishes the
JTF HQ, assigns approved forces to the JTF, and determines the command relationships.
b. The geographic combatant commander establishes the JTF when the mission has
a specified, limited objective and does not require centralized control of logistics. The
mission assigned to a JTF requires the execution of responsibilities and the close
integration of effort involving two or more services. The JTF is dissolved when the purpose
for which it was created is achieved. JP 3-0 provides general guidance relating to joint
operations and JP 5-00.2 provides information on the JTF. JP 4-0 provides general
guidance for logistics support of joint operations.
c.
The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a
commander, command element, and forces required to execute the mission. The primary
purpose of the JTF HQ is command, control, and administration of the JTF. During
operations, the JTF HQ provides the basis for a unified effort, centralized direction, and
decentralized execution. See Figure II-2 for an example of a JTF staff organization.
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50 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | 4. Other Command Considerations
a. The ICS is a FEMA-supported civilian system used to manage operations at a
domestic incident site. The ICS is commonly used by civilian local and state organizations
that respond to hazardous-material (HAZMAT) (i.e., WMD, etc.) incidents, and its use is
becoming standardized in all civilian emergency operations. The principles of the ICS
include the following:
(1) Modular Organization. DOD personnel must understand how and where
they “plug into” the existing ICS structure when they arrive on scene.
CINC
JTF
Commander
Staff
TAC
DoD
WMD
Labs
Reach-back
TACON
TF
Liaison
Base
Support
Base
Installation(s)
Support
Base
Installation
Support
Installation
ARFOR
AFFOR
NAVFOR
TF
LOG
TF
MED
TF
GEOGRAPHIC
Subordinate
TF
As
Needed
Chain of Command
Chain of Command
Coordination
Coordination
TACON
TACON
Figure II-2. Notional CM JTF
(2)
Integrated Communications. The incident commander should have an
established, integrated communications plan and standing operating procedures to ensure
that information distribution and active frequency management is enforced. An effective
communications plan supports functions such as the conduct of liaison and the coordination
of mitigation plans.
(3) Unity of Command. Responders report to one designated person.
(4) Unified-Command (UC) Structure. All responding agencies must have a
common set of incident objectives and strategy.
(5) Consolidated Incident Action Plans. The incident commander and his
planning section should have a clear view of the future action plan to support the end state
of the operation.
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51 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (6) Use of Common Terminology. Use of common terminology helps to ensure
a coordinated response action and also supports standardization and consistency.
(7) Span of Control. Safety as well as sound management influence and dictate
span-of-control considerations. Within the ICS, the span of control of an individual with
emergency management responsibility should range from three to seven subordinates.
b. The ICS is a modular system that uses common terminology and implements
incident action plans in five component (functional) areas: command, operations, logistics,
planning, and finance/administration (see Figure II-3).
c.
Further, there will generally be a need for the civilian incident commander’s
staff to coordinate with a supporting JTF staff on technical, operational, or logistics issues.
The coordination points between the ICS and a JTF staff could be conducted through staff-
to-staff interaction or could be through a CMOC.
(1) Staff-to-Staff Coordination. As the ICS terms in Figure II-3 imply, Table
II-1 represents what could be the focal points for staff interaction between ICS and JTF
staff organizations (see Appendix A for more information on incident management system
[IMS] command and staff functions and responsibilities).
Table II-1. ICS and JTF Staff Counterparts
ICS
Command
Operations
Logistics
Planning
Communications
Finance
Law Enforcement
JTF
Commander
J3
J4
J3/J5
J6
J4 or J1
J2
(2) Civil-Military Operations Center. The JTF could form a CMOC to
coordinate military actions for support of the LFA. The CMOC is an ad hoc organization
that is normally established by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate JFC to
assist in coordinating with other military forces, other US-government agencies,
international organizations (IOs), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Its specific
size and composition are situation dependent. The CMOC can provide a structure for
establishing coordination and cooperation with primarily nonmilitary groups. For example,
the CMOC could serve as a focal point for interaction with IOs, NGOs, or civil authorities
on topics such as civil defense warning and reporting procedures, response capabilities,
medical assistance, and other actions to mitigate the effects of NBC use or other toxic-
material contamination. If civil-affairs units are available, they could perform many of the
liaison duties. Additionally, during foreign operations, a CMOC could be formed to receive
direct taskings direct from the chief of mission’s country team to support such actions as
receiving validated LFA requests, assigning project numbers, preparing project numbers,
and submitting requests to the JTF operations center.
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53 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | NOTE: See FM 100-23-1/Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP), 7-
16/Naval Doctrine Command Tactical Note (TACNOTE), 3-076.6/Air Combat
Command Publication (ACCP), 50-56/Pacific Air Force Publication (PACAFP), 50-
56/US Air Force Europe Publication (USAFEP), 50-56 for more information on the
CMOC.
OPERATIONS
Reports to the Incident
Commander
Directs Tactical Actions
LOGISTICS
Facilities
Services
Materials
Communications
COMMAND
Has Overall Responsibility
Is In Charge of all Functions
PLANNING
Prepares Action Plan
Maintains Resource and
Situation Reporting
FINANCE
ADMINISTRATION
Tracks Cost
Evaluates Fiscal Considerations,
Personnel Issues
Figure II-3. Components of the ICS
5. Reporting Requirements
a. Reports. Reports will be submitted per JTF guidance as described in the
OPLAN/operation order (OPORD). Additional reporting requirements may include service-
specific reports, but such reports will be routed with the concurrence of the JTF
commander.
b. Unit Records. Unit record keeping and reporting are critical. Unit records
include data on personnel according to applicable theater medical-surveillance directives.
The accuracy of unit record keeping will enable the tracking of a required audit trail to
monitor postincident information for key areas such as long-term health effects on
personnel that were exposed to HAZMAT. Detailed accounts could support multiple
tasking that could occur following an incident (i.e., tracking individual exposure and key
events). As a part of the record keeping, after-action reports (AAR) will also be prepared.
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54 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter III
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. Planning and Response Concept
a. A challenge for commanders conducting CM operations is to adequately protect
personnel, materiel, and equipment from an NBC incident. There is a need for a response
capability to save lives, contain an incident, and recover to a point that permits operations
to resume. Confronting this challenge requires a comprehensive and integrated approach
from threat identification to incident response and recovery. This comprehensive planning
ensures that measures of effectiveness are considered. These measures serve to provide a
tool to help assess when the mission’s established end state is met.
b. No single agency at the local, state, federal, or private level possesses the
capability and expertise to act unilaterally on many complex issues that may arise in
response to threats from NBC accidents or incidents. For example, an act of terrorism,
particularly an NBC event directed against a large population center within the US, may
produce major consequences that could overwhelm the capabilities of local and state
governments. Planning and coordination by local, state, and federal governments must be
proactive and should be accomplished before an incident. Deliberate and crisis action
planning considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2. Deliberate Planning
a. The deliberate planning process provides for the deployment and employment of
apportioned forces and resources that occurs in response to a hypothetical situation.
Deliberate planners rely heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will
exist when the plan is executed. Well-developed and detailed planning becomes
increasingly important when planning for operations in any number of possible locations,
facing any number of unknown threats, and coordinating operations with a wide variety of
emergency-response forces. To improve coordination and integration with civilian
responders, commanders work through the military planning process and maintain
awareness of the current threat. Key planning considerations include the following:
(1) Liaison with Civil Authorities. Commanders identify all response agencies
within their area of operations (AOs) and coordinate preincident planning, exercise, and
training opportunities. All emergency-response teams conduct liaison frequently with their
civilian counterparts.
(2) Coordination with Supporting and Supported Military Organizations.
Response elements need to be aware of the many DOD agencies that they may have contact
with in a response role. Close coordination with reserve-component forces within their
respective states, JTF personnel, and any other active emergency response elements (i.e.,
US Army Technical Escort Unit [TEU]) is required. (See Appendix D for more information
on other units.)
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56 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (3) Operations in an NBC Environment. There are unique characteristics
regarding operations in an NBC environment. When developing plans, response elements
account for the challenges inherent in operating within these environments.
(4) Risk Analysis and Vulnerabilities. A risk analysis is a commander’s tool for
ensuring the safety of his unit while operating in a hazardous or threatening environment.
Risk analysis is not meant to replace sound judgment on the part of a commander. A
detailed analysis of known threats assists the commander in identifying the level of FP.
b. Military units develop deliberate plans to respond to incidents within their
assigned regions. Response plans should be updated regularly and coordinated with the
appropriate response agencies in the region. Plans should focus on both the unanticipated
event (e.g., Chernobyl-type disaster, nation-state weapons use against its own population)
and potential terrorist targets, such as special events, high-profile buildings, medical- and
scientific-research centers, and air- and rail-transportation platforms. Response elements
also should prioritize planning efforts in coordination with the other response agencies
within their region. Planning efforts should be prioritized based on the most likely threats.
The following examples indicate specific items that plans could address.
(1) Vulnerability-analysis considerations.
•
Identify sources for threat information, potential targets, and likely
threat scenarios (i.e., type of agent; likely number of casualties; identification of high-profile
facilities, significant events, and/or adversary’s entry denial capabilities and doctrine).
• Assess possible delivery methods.
• Obtain detailed maps of the area including imagery and blueprints if
available, etc.
NOTE: Standard military mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear is not
effective against some TIM and does not meet civilian requirements for
protection. Standard military detectors do not work against many TIM. For
more information, see Appendix B.
(2) C2 considerations.
• Establish C2 relationships.
• Know the locations of the incident command post (CP) and joint
operations center (JOC).
•
Identify critical support facilities and resources and capabilities that
could assist in CM.
• Maintain coordination with civilian agencies.
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57 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | • Use liaison officers and execute FP requirements (alert means,
evacuation plans, security).
(3) Logistical considerations.
• Ensure that critical resupply requirements are addressed (e.g., self-
contained breathing apparatus [SCBA] refills).
•
Identify primary and alternate transportation routes and staging areas.
• Ensure maintenance support for military-unit commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) items and anticipate resupply requirements for NBC-related consumables.
(4) Coordination considerations.
• Maintain current technical reach-back points of contact.
• Coordinate with civilian authorities to remain aware of applicable
emergency-response plans (FEMA, state, local, etc.).
• Determine augmentation requirements (e.g., liaison, linguist support,
and technical medical expertise).
3. Crisis Action Planning
Crisis action planning involves time-sensitive planning for deploying, employing, and
sustaining of assigned and allocated forces and resources that occur in response to a
situation that may result in actual military operations. For an incident, essential elements
of information (EEIs) may include the following:
a. Damage and Injury Profile. Assess the damage and casualty estimates. NBC
devices or vectors each present unique considerations that impact CM contingency
planning. Planners use available decision support tools to conduct the assessments.
b.
Information Management. Timely collection, analysis, reporting and
dissemination of information are paramount. Establish measures to coordinate IM
activities. Other requirements include IM measures that ensure the following:
(1)
civilian ICS.
Interoperability for reports being submitted to and received from the
(2) Measures that provide for situational awareness to support the commander
and staff (e. g., number of casualties, boundaries of contamination).
c. Containment. Planners receive information where perimeters have been
established from the incident commander. The contaminated site should be clearly marked
to prevent personnel from mistakenly entering. Personnel who have been in contaminated
areas must be identified and requisite actions taken (medical treatment, decontamination,
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58 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | etc.). Site containment also provides for actions to consolidate and confine any
contaminated material (water runoff). Personnel exposed during the incident, subsequent
cloud passage, or postincident entry into the contaminated area are given a high priority in
response actions. This includes responders and other contaminated individuals. Early
definition of the perimeter is important so that potentially contaminated people may be
identified and measures taken to prevent the contamination of additional people. The
potential contamination of critical infrastructure and transportation assets presents a
health problem for both responders and bystanders. Procedures to be considered include
the following:
(1)
Initial monitoring upon arrival to determine preliminary site
characterization and personnel contamination.
(2) Procedures to minimize the spread of contamination.
d. Decontamination. Planners identify and understand the casualty, personnel,
and equipment decontamination requirements and standards. Coordination is required
with local, state, and federal authorities. Resources must be provided that can monitor,
detect, and identify the degree and source of contamination. Subject matter experts (SMEs)
conduct risk assessments to determine options for the conduct of decontamination and
recommend the allocation of necessary resources to support the decontamination process.
Safety is a paramount concern in the decontamination planning process to ensure that first
responders’ exposure is minimized. Control measures are also taken to minimize the
exposure to and the spread of any contamination.
(1) Contamination control. Contamination-control measures ensure
contamination is not transferred from an area that is already contaminated to an
uncontaminated area through the orderly processing of personnel, equipment, and vehicles
entering and leaving the contaminated area. The actual amounts of material used for
contamination control depend on conditions at the incident site.
(2) Equipment decontamination. Military-specification equipment should be
decontaminated according to pertinent military technical publications; however, similar
guidelines may not exist for other equipment. Some equipment used by the response force
in the contaminated area may remain there for future use and will not require immediate
monitoring or decontamination. Some equipment may not be salvageable and will require
proper disposal. If civilians in the contaminated area are sent or go to processing points
using their own vehicles, the vehicles should be monitored before moving away from the
area. All outer surfaces and the air filters may have been contaminated by airborne
contamination. Wheel wells, tires, and the rear end may be contaminated from driving
across contaminated areas. Unless the windows were down or ventilators open, detectable
contamination of the interior is most likely on those surfaces contacted by vehicle occupants
(e.g., floorboards, seats).
e. Evacuation. Planners determine if personnel in downwind hazard areas were
directed to seek shelter in place or evacuate. This planning is coordinated with local, state,
and federal authorities. Specific planning factors include resourcing protective-equipment
requirements for large numbers of people and medical support. Personnel or equipment
evacuated from a hazard area are checked for the possibility of residual contamination.
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60 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Contaminated casualties are decontaminated before evacuation to avoid health-care-facility
contamination. For example, the presence of a contaminated casualty in a hospital and the
passage of chemical vapors throughout a building’s ventilation system could close the entire
hospital.
f. Medical Requirements. Medical planners need any available epidemiological and
diagnostic patterns resulting from the incident. Military medical units can provide either
specialized NBC advisory response capabilities or augmentation that can expand existing
medical capabilities. This process includes receiving input from first responders reporting
information on signs and symptoms from casualties or agent characteristics (i.e.,
smell/odor). Medical planning addresses preventive medicine (PVNTMED), laboratory
services, casualty evacuation, and decontamination, and treatment of casualties.
g. NBC Reconnaissance Measures. Military forces conduct sampling, surveying,
and surveillance. Typical military units generally have only basic sampling and detection
capabilities. Specialized military units, such as those listed in Appendix D, have more
specialized capabilities and may be required to conduct—
(1) Sampling. Units conducting sampling ensure that the chain of custody is
maintained, and samples are placed in sealed containers to eliminate the possible spread of
any contamination.
(2) Surveying. Surveys determine the presence or absence of contamination.
Surveys also determine the type of contamination (i.e., gamma; blood and blister; and etc.)
and level or type of contamination (i.e., centigrey [cGy]; persistent and nonpersistent; and
etc.) and its’ boundaries. Planning also identifies the need for a capability to conduct low-
level monitoring (e.g., chemical or radiological) to support CM actions. This type of
capability will likely come from specialized response teams including military and/or
civilian personnel.
(3) Surveillance. Surveillance supports early warning of a potential hazard
(e.g., chemical or biological aerosol). Response elements may be tasked to conduct
surveillance of the ambient air to determine the absence or presence of contaminants. The
information from the surveillance is used to influence protection and/or support medical-
treatment decisions.
h. Weapon Disposition. Determine what type of weapon is involved. If the military
is tasked, units are prepared to dispose of the weapon or provide assistance as required to
the agency with the task. Planners determine what type of unit is best capable of
accomplishing the task.
i.
Transition and Disengagement. The termination of military support to civil
authorities during a CM operation is a politically sensitive phase requiring detailed
planning. The “end state” defining the point at which military forces disengage from the
CM operation is based on the policy that the DOD will withdraw from the operation after
eliminating the immediate danger of weapon/agent effects, saving lives, and restoring
critical services. DOD will generally not remain to conduct site-recovery operations. When
it is agreed that local authorities are capable of assuming responsibilities for the remainder
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62 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | of the operation, DOD forces will disengage. This could be phased either by function or
area. Development of an exit strategy should begin as soon as possible during the response.
j.
Force Protection. FP is a top priority during CM operations; it begins from the
time units are alerted to move, involves impacted personnel and evacuees, and does not end
until redeployment is complete. The following FP considerations are provided as a guide:
(1) Protection from potential threats. Ensure that proper protective equipment
is available to response personnel.
(2) Safety. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful
operations. On-scene command authorities and response personnel must implement
requirements established by the appropriate site safety and health plans.
(3) Security. Security elements protect against all acts designed to, or which
may, impair the effectiveness of the military forces. This includes guarding equipment and
supplies from loss or damage.
(4)
Individual Awareness. Commanders and supervisors stress the
significance of hazards and the importance of being aware of what is going on around them.
(5) Health. Take measures to protect personnel from contaminants. This will
require avoiding contaminated areas and observing their boundaries. Protection of the
response personnel includes proper PVNTMED and mental health considerations.
4.
Information Management
a. Civilian and Political Considerations. Operations associated with CM are very
sensitive to civilian and political considerations. Planners modify and tailor information
activities to meet the unique challenges presented in each operation. Information resources
at every echelon are structured to provide support that is proactive, predictive, and flexible.
The commander ensures all sources of information are considered and fully involved.
b. Legal Considerations. Support to missions such as DSO is limited to those
actions that do not violate existing EXORDs and DOD Service regulations and policies
prohibiting intelligence collection on US citizens. Before a plan that uses various
information assets and personnel in the DSO arena can be implemented, it must receive
thorough legal review and approval from the staff judge advocate (SJA). Imagery, if
approved, can provide information concerning the extent of damages and could be useful for
operational planning.
c.
Information Gathering. Support to CM requires a multidisciplined approach. A
single-source approach cannot support all requirements.
(1) EEIs that drive the collection-management process require an
understanding of all aspects of the area and its cultures, politics, religion, economics,
environment, technology, and other related factors.
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64 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (2) CM will likely involve in-depth coordination or interaction with civil
authorities and NGOs. The term “information gathering” should be used rather than the
term “intelligence.” Nonmilitary organizations may resent being considered a source of
intelligence. By using the term “information gathering,” military forces may be able to
foster better communications with other agencies and thereby benefit from their valuable
knowledge.
(3) The importance of mapping, charting, and geodesy should not be
overlooked. It is essential that maps, charts, and support data (to include datum and
coordinate systems) are coordinated in advance.
d.
Information Support. Successful support during CM relies on continuous
information collection and analysis. The commander’s information needs in CM are in
some ways more complex than operations in war. Peace operations often require
augmentation of the staff, and the supporting commander (e.g., the CINC) normally
provides detailed analytical support to the deploying commander through split-based
operations. This includes anticipating and initiating collection against long lead-time
requirements, synthesizing available information on the AOs, and orchestrating the
collection efforts of existing organizations. The degree of support needed depends on the
size and sophistication of the deploying unit’s staff and should be tailored as the operation
develops to ensure seamless support.
(1) Technical Information Support. The provision of technical information
about possible agents and weaponized materials, the methods of dissemination, and the
impact on targets are essential to planning. This information is required during the
conduct of an operation. A responder at an incident site should be able to provide
information to technical and scientific agencies and receive further information about the
type of device or material found on site.
(2) Remote Information Support. A remote (“reach back”) information-
collection capability is needed. The JTF must be able to access assets such as national-level
scientific support, which could be at a fixed or mobile analytical facility.
e.
Information Requirements (IR).
(1) During the initial response phase (that includes predeployment and
deployment), IR will be tracked and briefed to the commander. This information provides
input to support the commander’s situational awareness and to support the decision-
making process. IR also focus the staff’s efforts, assist in the resource allocation, and assist
the staff in making recommendations. Liaison and effective coordination with local, state,
and federal agencies assist the commander in gaining required information. The intent of
IR is for the commander to have the best available information on activities within the AO.
(2)
IR that are significant to emergency-response operations during an NBC or
radiological incident include, but are not limited to the following:
• Threat conditions/situations/capabilities.
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66 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | • Determination of FP status and shortfalls.
• Detailed knowledge of the area.
• Detailed information on the type of material used. Consider worst and
best case scenarios for options. The types of protection possible against such weapon(s),
materials, or vectors; their size, weight, description, and capability; and the methods that
could neutralize them.
• Medical facilities or equipment available and shortages of such
equipment that could impact on any attempt to neutralize the threat or lessen the
consequences. The number of people they can handle and the emergency transportation
methods available.
• Number and location of victims and/or other damage.
• Description and status of lines of communication (LOC) including major
roads, railroads, waterways, ports, and airports.
• Weather conditions. Refer to meteorological conditions including
precipitation, fog, cloud conditions, temperature, relative humidity, prevailing winds, and
sunrise/sunset data.
• Characteristics of physical damage in the specific disaster area.
• Population of areas such as trailer parks, apartments, and subdivisions.
School buildings and warehouses in these areas are excellent candidates for shelter,
feeding, and life-support sites.
• Status of sanitation systems.
• Relief and drainage systems.
• Surface materials. Identify the type and the distribution of soils and
subsoils in the area and soil trafficability.
• Sources of all classes of supply needed for critical restoration of normal
activities.
• Availability of civilian engineer equipment and personnel.
5. Toxic Industrial Materials
a. TIM Release. The accidental or deliberate release of TIM could also necessitate a
request for support from DOD assets. For example, 40 tons of methyl isocyanate was
accidentally released from the Union Carbide Plant at Bhopal, India. According to the
BPHDC, 8,000 people were killed in its aftermath and over 500,000 people suffered from
injuries. This incident was the result of the release of TIM. TIM are often available in
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67 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | enormous quantities, do not require extensive research, and can be mass-produced. TIM
could be released from industrial plants or storage depots through accidental or deliberate
damage as a consequence of a strike against a particular facility or as a desperation
measure. TIM could also be attractive as improvised weapons and have the potential for
inclusion in clandestine weapons programs or contingency plans.
b. Planning for TIM Operations. Before any operation, the response element
develops an understanding of the potential hazard from TIM in the area of concern.
Note: See Appendix G for further information on TIM response procedures.
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68 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter IV
RESPONSE
1. Background
a.
Incidents involving NBC materials may occur without warning and at a time of
day and location that will produce chaos, confusion, and casualties. In a no-notice incident,
local emergency service and possibly state and federal agency personnel will be the initial
responders. Local emergency-response assets are likely to be overwhelmed by the effects or
the threat of an incident. On the other hand, local or state responders may have quickly
organized at or near the incident using a response-management system that is typically
called an ICS. The ICS is used to coordinate actions among various federal, state, and local
responders. The ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and
communications operating within a common organizational structure and is used to
manage assigned resources to accomplish the stated objectives. The domestic challenge to
the JFC is to coordinate the merging of DOD support into the ICS. Significant incidents
may warrant multijurisdictional responses and the formation of a UC structure within the
ICS. A civilian UC system would include all individuals or agencies that have jurisdictional
responsibility (i.e., city, county, state officials). This organization would help coordinate
federal, state, local, and private resources together in a response-management system to
mitigate the consequences of an incident.
b. The President will issue a proclamation to activate a federal response (to include
DOD support) to an incident. The response could involve DOD elements responding to an
event at their own installation (foreign/domestic) or to an incident that may have occurred
within the civilian community (see Figure IV-1). This chapter addresses the general
process flow and potential DOD-asset involvement in response support should an incident
occur in an area such as an adjacent community or a joint AO. The USJFCOM provides
forces for an incident response within the US and its territories. The USCINCSO (Puerto
Rico and the US Virgin Islands) or the USPACOM (Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, American
Samoa, etc.) would request support from the USJFCOM for forces to support an incident
response in their AOR. For responses in other areas, the appropriate military unified
commander may establish a JFC for support to the DOS.
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69 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | c.
The initial actions taken in the early minutes and hours of a WMD response can
determine the outcome of an incident—success or failure.
WMD
Incident
No
No DOD
Response
Required
Exceeds
Local
Response
Capability?
Yes
Stafford Act
Immediate Response
From Nearby DOD
Yes
Organization
Continuing
Threat To
Life And
Property?
No
DOD Response
May Not Be
Required On
RFA
Yes
State/HN
Capabilities
Yes
State/HN
Capabilities
Exceeded?
Yes
State/HN
Request
DOD
Support?
No
DOD Response
May Not Be
Required
No
No DOD
Response
Domestic
JTF-CS Initial
Response Begins
Foreign
JFC Response
Begins
WMD CST
Deployment
Domestic Only
LFA Submits
RFA
Yes
RFA
Approved?
Yes
No
No DOD
Response
Figure IV-1. Graduated-Response Overview
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70 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | 2. Notification
Notification begins when an incident report is submitted. Notification of the event
triggers a potential immediate response under the Stafford Act. Subsequent notification of
an approved FEMA RFA triggers the domestic response provided by DOD. Furthermore,
unit-level or national notification could occur.
a. Unit-Level Notification. All DOD personnel should be trained to notify the chain
of command and proper authorities of a suspected incident. Typically, units would use an
emergency net to notify fire and medical personnel, security forces, and response elements.
b. National Notification. According to applicable directives, commanders submit
reports and follow-up reports (as required) (where national-level interest has been
determined) directly to the National Military Command Center (NMCC).
3. Common Responsibilities
General on-scene tasks include detection, assessment, and containment. These tasks
must be accomplished deliberately, but with caution and safety. The senior on-scene official
would assume control of the incident site and ensure the safety of the responders.
Responders will—
a. Approach the incident area with care from upwind or crosswind, maintaining a
safe distance from the site. If NBC materials are suspected, detected, or identified, ensure
that the appropriate notification and reporting requirements are met. Treat the incident
site and area as a crime scene.
b. Be aware of warning signs indicating the presence of lethal agents or potential
hazards.
c. Be aware that incidents may be masked by a hostage situation, a disgruntled
employee, protests, or accidents.
d. Notify the FBI for domestic incidents or the DOS for foreign incidents. While the
FBI or the DOS assumes jurisdiction for the investigation, the installation commander
provides the initial and immediate response to any incident occurring on an installation in
order to isolate and contain the incident. In all cases, the command of military elements
remains within military channels.
e. Begin determining the nature of the incident. If no detection capability exists,
the first responders continue response operations safely. They observe signs and symptoms
to further define the hazard until a follow-on team with detection capability (or other
coordinated support) arrives. If follow-on forces are required, the first responders remain
on site to alert follow-on forces to the extent and the characteristics of the incident.
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71 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | 4.
Immediate Response
a. The DOD policy for an “immediate response” authorizes military commanders to
respond to civil authorities’ requests for emergency military support. It gives the
commander the authority—
•
To support an incident response without formal activation or direction
when immediate serious conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from
higher HQ.
•
To save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage
under immediate serious conditions where there has not been a Presidential declaration of
a catastrophe, a major disaster, or an emergency. The policy is based on the Stafford Act.
b. While the policy allows for an immediate response, it requires commanders to
advise the DOD executive secretary through command channels by the most expeditious
means available and seek approval or additional authorizations as needed. Although an
immediate response can be provided on a reimbursable basis (if possible), it will not be
delayed or denied because of the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a
commitment to reimburse the DOD. Commanders must exercise extreme caution if electing
to deploy under the auspices of an immediate response. While this policy allows for great
flexibility, commanders ensure that immediate-response deployment authority is used as a
last resort. The SECDEF’s approval is required for DOD forces to respond to terrorist or
WMD events.
c.
The OSC will exercise C2 of the immediate-incident scene, unless responding to
an off-installation event where the civilian incident commander will accomplish C2. DOD
forces responding to an off-installation event are generally in a supporting role and will not
take control of the situation from the LFA or the incident commander. Based on the
severity of the incident, first responders may require follow-on response elements from
other locations. The OSC may request follow-on elements from the various functional and
technical areas, depending on the situation.
d. Follow-on response elements stage at an assembly area. The initial assembly
point is a safe distance from the incident site to prevent interference and to protect
personnel. If needed, the unit coordinates for follow-on resources. Response-force elements
review both their individual and functional-area responder checklists.
5. Critical Response Tasks
Responders will be working with other agencies and must be aware of the protection
measures being used at the incident site. Critical response tasks could include the
following:
a.
Initiating Protective Measures. Responders will use the appropriate level of
protective gear. Only those personnel trained and qualified in using the selected level of
protective equipment will be allowed within the hot zone.
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73 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | b.
Initiating Detection/Assessment. If the OSC does not have appropriate detection
capabilities, he will develop incident information using signs and symptoms, as well as
personal observations and interviews of casualties or personnel within the immediate area.
Until adequate detection and identification capabilities are on scene, the OSC uses worst-
case risk assessments. Included in the risk assessment should be consideration for the
potential of secondary devices, to include chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive
devices. When the threat data is known, analysis of the geographic extent of the risk and
its consequences can be calculated locally or at a remote analysis center and conveyed to
local command/management authorities.
c. Containing the Threat. Before any rescuers enter the hot zone, the senior on-
scene official determines the safety zones based on hazard risk assessment. The security
forces establish a perimeter and control access to the site by establishing an entry control
point (ECP), which will serve as the sole entrance and exit from the incident site. Only
personnel with verified authorization are permitted to enter the incident site. To contain
the threat, critical requirements include—
• Response elements (if capable) to establish decontamination lanes (for both
victims and responders); the lanes must be properly equipped and staffed by adequate
numbers of qualified personnel.
• Medical personnel to ensure that personnel donning entry suits receive
preentry physical screening.
• Civil authorities and personnel to operate and protect critical civilian
infrastructures and systems (e.g., public utilities and medical facilities).
• Security forces to institute a personnel accountability system using
identification such as badges, hats, armbands, and vests.
• The OSC to establish and maintain communications between the incident
site and site installation CP.
• Responders to begin stabilizing the incident and limiting its impact.
6.
Initial Response
a. Domestic. DOD resources would likely be requested in support of a federal
response to a domestic WMD incident. Requests for DOD support originate from civilian
authorities in the aftermath of a WMD detonation or release. An approved RFA from
FEMA is required to trigger a response from the JTF-CS (refer to JP 5-00.2). When
requested through appropriate channels, the DOD makes resources available to assist local,
state, or federal authorities in response to a WMD incident.
(1) Upon appropriate notification, a JTF HQ deploys to support the LFA that is
tasked with managing the coordinated federal response to a WMD incident. The JFC is
normally delegated OPCON of DOD forces assigned to the mission. The JTF commander is
the DOD operational commander on scene for CM actions in support of the LFA.
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75 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (2) Upon activation, the JTF provides a response capability, establishes liaison
with military elements, supports crisis-management and CM operations associated with a
WMD incident, and conducts requisite predeployment and deployment actions.
(a) Predeployment. During crisis-action planning, the JTF advance
survey party moves to the vicinity of the incident to coordinate with the LFA, the state’s
EOC, and the on-scene response element. In addition to providing liaison officers, the JTF,
with the DCO and the DCE, begins to plan and coordinate military support with FEMA.
The advance survey party identifies mission requirements, as coordinated with the LFA.
Based on mission requirements, the advance survey party establishes the main-body
reception center/base.
(b) Deployment. Once established, the JTF is normally delegated and
maintains OPCON of designated DOD forces responding to the WMD incident. The DCO
and the DCE function as part of the JTF and lend expertise to CM planning and
coordination. Once staged, the JTF executes the mission in support of the LFA.
b. Foreign. In a foreign scenario, the HN may request assistance through the DOS,
which becomes the LFA responsible for requesting DOD support. To support a foreign
scenario, a JTAC may be deployed.
(1) The JTAC Concept. A number of geographic combatant-commander
assigned forces, service assets, and defense agencies exist to respond to various aspects of
WMD CM. However, no single organization possesses the comprehensive CM capabilities
required to address the spectrum of issues of a WMD incident.
(2) The USJFCOM as a Joint Force Provider. Based on the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01, the USJFCOM is tasked to identify, coordinate,
exercise, and—upon NCA directive deploy a joint cadre of technical experts—advise and
assist geographic combatant commanders to conduct CM operations. The JTAC provides a
single-source mechanism, which is dedicated to the needs of the supported geographic
combatant commander. The USJFCOM defines the joint cadre through an implementation
plan describing organization, C2 relationships, forces, notification sequence, deployment
timing, and exercise support. The cadre is composed of CONUS-based unified commander
and service assets. When directed by the NCA, the USCINCJFCOM deploys specialized
CONUS-based assets to augment the geographic combatant command’s organic assets.
(3) The JTAC Initial-Reaction/Deployment Process. After an incident or when
a credible threat exists of an NBC-related event, the geographic combatant commander
identifies the need for technical expertise to augment his staff to assist in planning for CM
operations in support of the HN. The supported geographic combatant commander
requests through the SECDEF that the JTAC be deployed. Upon NCA approval, the
SECDEF directs the USJFCOM to deploy the JTAC. The USJFCOM JOC receives
notification of a deployment order and notifies the various members of the JTAC. The
USJFCOM assists in coordinating transportation for the members of the JTAC to the
supported geographic combatant commander’s HQ.
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77 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (4) The JTAC’s Composition. The JTAC’s composition could include SMEs and
response assets from several organizations. The organizations that could be tasked to
provide personnel might include the following. (For more information on JTAC support
elements, see Appendix D.)
• USMC’s CBIRF.
• US Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Command’s (USASBCCOM’s)
CB-RRT.
• Defense Threat-Reduction Agency (DTRA).
7. Response-Execution Considerations
The JTF’s objectives are safeguarding lives, preserving health and safety, securing
and eliminating the hazard, protecting property, preventing further damage to the
environment, and maintaining public confidence in the government’s ability to respond to a
WMD incident. Responding forces initiate actions to restore conditions at and in the
vicinity of the incident site. During this stage, the JTF develops a transition plan and a
redeployment plan. The DOD response phase ends when civil authorities or other
designated agencies are self-supporting and approve the release of the JTF. Additionally,
to support the primary objectives of the JTF, key areas such as information management,
logistics, technical support, public affairs, communications, safety, medical support, and
public works are addressed.
a.
Information Management. During the initial response phase (that includes
predeployment and deployment), IM is critical to maintaining effective C2 and coordination.
IM tools provide the commander with the input needed to support incident visualization
and decisions making.
b. Logistics. The logistics process facilitates the obtaining, maintaining, storing,
moving, and replenishing of resources used in responding to a WMD incident. For example,
transportation support is required to move assets, both human and materiel, in response to
a WMD incident. This includes the ability to protect the transportation means and the
operators during the response support. Elements of the sustainment process used to
support an incident include contracting, negotiated support, military support, or support
from other federal agencies.
(1) Contracting. Contracting, purchasing, renting, or leasing supplies or
services from nonfederal sources are effective and efficient ways to provide support in a
crisis. Included are all classes of supply or maintenance used in a WMD response situation.
During the initial stages of an operation, contracting officers are required to procure
supplies and services.
(2) Negotiated Support. In some cases, civil authorities have enough logistical
resources to support not only themselves but also the military providing assistance. For
example, civil authorities may provide housing, food, and fuel to JTF assets. Such support
is negotiated on a case-by-case basis with the civil authorities.
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79 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | (3) Military Support. Installations continue habitual relationships with units.
Installations may also have to support personnel with whom they have no established
support relationship. These personnel include civil authorities and elements from other
services. If an installation or other sources discussed below cannot provide the required
support directly, planners tailor a support force.
(4) Support From Other Federal Agencies. Federal agencies such as the
General Services Administration (GSA) provide support to civil authorities. GSA provides
general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the federal
government. While GSA can provide an extensive amount of support to the DOD, other
federal agencies and organizations provide assistance depending on the nature, scope, and
duration of the operation.
(5) Other. Special events package (SEP) containing caches such as
decontamination, detection, and medical equipment may be pre-positioned as part of a
preparedness program. This equipment can be transported by air and ground on a short
notice and is available for use by both civilian responders and JTF elements.
c.
Technical Support. The JTF staff conducts liaison and coordination and receives
reports to remain updated on key operational, personnel, and logistical information. The
JTF staff uses this information to support several tasks. These tasks include—
(1) Preparing reports, assessments, vulnerability analyses, and hazard
predictions.
(2) Monitoring the augmentation of civilian and military NBC response
elements.
(3) Maintaining incident information boards that include the following: event
situation, event casualty and damage summary, weather and evacuation status, area
closing and shelter facility status, resources status, hospital-bed availability, contracts and
agreements, and incident logs.
(4) Collecting, processing, and disseminating information about the WMD
incident to other elements.
(5) Preparing employment strategies for the separate WMD response elements.
d. Public Affairs. The principal PA objectives are to ensure that accurate
information is provided to the joint information center (JIC) and communicates a calm,
measured, and reasonable reaction to the ongoing incident. The PAO prepares draft media
releases and conducts briefings (as required). The PAO stays fully apprised of the situation
as it develops. Experience has shown that by bringing in media early under reasonable
conditions, credibility is maintained and freedom of information is preserved.
e. Communications. C2 communications systems must incorporate
telecommunications, data-transfer, cell phone, and simultaneous phone-line capabilities
and be secure and satellite based. In addition, communications systems should be
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81 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | independent of military switching and stand-alone systems so that competing
communications requirements (e.g., civilian systems and military systems) will not
interfere with incident communications requirements. A crucial aspect of the response plan
is establishing and controlling communications among the forces in the incident area, the
operations center, and the various response elements. Communications elements respond
to changing needs during the incident and maintain over a period, control of all incoming
and outgoing communications as well as the communications channels. The commander
ensures that adequate warning means, response and management means, nets,
frequencies, equipment, and redundancies are available to link the efforts of all (internal
and external) incident response elements. Separate nets are established for the command
net and the security net. Nonoperational traffic communicates via landlines or cellular
telephones.
f.
Safety. The JTF staff and its assets support the incident commander with
continuous updates. For example, tools such as the site safety plan are kept updated to
ensure the safety of responders and citizens. Site safety considerations that the JTF staff
monitor include—
(1) Analyzing the hazards at the incident site and conducting a risk analysis of
those hazards.
(2) Maintaining and updating the site map or sketches.
(3) Updating the site work zones (hot, warm, and cold).
(4) Monitoring decontamination-area operations.
(5) Ensuring that the site communications diagrams remain updated.
(6) Updating information on the location of CP(s) or command centers.
(7) Maintaining and updating hazard-monitoring overlays and results.
g. Medical Support. Following an incident, health-services support includes
providing selected health and medical care, as required, and augmenting local support
capabilities. Large numbers of casualties in short periods of time can compromise both the
quality and quantity of health care and constrain mobility and evacuation. Coordination by
the JTF staff with HN, state, and/or local medical facilities is necessary to ensure that
medical plans include procedures to treat and care for contaminated or infected personnel
(see Figure IV-2). PVNTMED specialists and pathologists need a database of naturally
occurring diseases and procedures to quickly assess and identify suspicious illnesses and
diseases. Medical teams require special training in the identification, treatment, and
handling of contaminated casualties and remains. Medical facilities have areas designated
to treat and segregate contaminated patients. While decontamination of nonambulatory
casualties is performed before evacuation, many casualties, during a terrorist incident, will
self-evacuate, arriving at the hospital still contaminated. Hospitals should have the
capability to detect contamination and to decontaminate. Antidotes and treatments for
potential agents from commercial or industrial sources are considered in the casualty-
management plan and stockpiled based on threats. Contaminated-patient transport and
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83 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | contamination-control measures are incorporated into litter and ambulance operations.
Planners coordinate the establishment of the on-site medical-treatment area.
h. Public Works. DOD CM assets support the local public works to ensure that
facilities remain operational or critical infrastructure damage is remedied or mitigated.
Selected support measures that assist public works personnel may include—
(1) Helping to establish plans for the hazard area and disposal of hazardous
waste.
(2) Supporting the production, transportation, maintenance, and medical
monitoring of potable water supply.
(3) Deploying damage assessment teams.
(4) Providing power sources and water for on-site decontamination.
(5) Providing backup power to the incident site.
(6) Assisting with hazard containment.
(7) Providing environmental expertise and technical assistance.
(8) Providing emergency clearance of debris for passage of emergency
personnel and equipment.
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84 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | CHEMICAL-CONTAMINATED PATIENTS
INTRODUCTION. Hospital medical-emergency-department (ED) staff caring for patients
contaminated with toxic chemicals are at risk for developing toxicity from secondary
contamination.
SITUATION. On April 11, 2000, a 40 year-old man intentionally ingested approximately 110
grams of a veterinary insecticide concentrate. On clinical examination at a local hospital
ED (approximately 20 minutes after the ingestion), the patient had profuse secretions,
vomiting, and respiratory distress. He was intubated for airway management and
ventilation. To control secretions, he received pralidoxime and atropine.
The patient was brought to the ED by a friend, not by emergency medical services, and
the friend also developed symptoms that required treatment. ED personnel exposed to
the patient had symptoms within an hour of his arrival. The staff noted a chemical odor in
the ED and contacted the regional poison center, which recommended decontaminating
the patient’s skin and placing the gastric contents in a sealed container to minimize
evaporation; however, no decontamination was performed.
During this incident, health-care workers were exposed to a patient contaminated with an
organophosphate insecticide. These health-care workers were not wearing appropriate
respiratory or skin protective equipment while caring for the patient. As a result, three
health-care workers developed symptoms consistent with organophosphate intoxication
and required treatment.
For example, one health-care worker providing care to the patient developed respiratory
distress, profuse secretions, emesis, diaphoresis, and weakness. She had contact with
the patient’s skin, respiratory secretions, and emesis. She was admitted to the hospital
and required intubation for 24 hours to support respiration. After medical management
and serial doses of atropine and pralidoxime for 7 days, her respiratory function
improved, and she was discharged after 9 days of hospitalization.
SUMMARY. Depending on the extent of the contamination, health-care workers for
chemically contaminated patients should use level C protection (i.e., a full-face mask and
a powered/nonpowered canister-/cartridge-filtration respirator) or level B protection (i.e., a
supplied-air respirator or a self-contained breathing apparatus). To prevent dermal
absorption, chemical-barrier protection appropriate to the contaminant is needed; latex
medical gloves are of little protection against many chemicals. In addition to the need for
surface decontamination of patients, body fluids also must be contained to prevent
dermal and inhalation exposure. To limit the distant spread of the contaminant, the EDs
ventilation exhaust should also be directed away from the hospital’s main ventilation
system.
Figure IV-2. Emergency-Department Treatment
of Contaminated Patients
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86 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter V
RECOVERY, TRANSITION, AND REDEPLOYMENT
1. Background
Recovery, transition, and redeployment operations start when civil authorities or
other designated agencies relieve the JTF commander of selected CM tasks. The
operational duration of the response mission is determined by the requirements established
by the appropriate authority (the LFA for domestic operations or the HN/DOS for foreign
operations). There is not an established timetable. A transition plan is implemented and
CM tasks are transferred from the JTF commander to the appropriate civil authorities (i.e.,
the DOS, FEMA) commensurate with their ability to continue to conduct operations. NGOs
and/or contracted services may augment these civil authorities. Upon completion of the
required recovery support, the JTF commander executes transition and redeploys.
2. Recovery Operations
a.
Start the Recovery Phase. The recovery phase begins when the immediate
hazards are contained or controlled to the point that military assets are replaced or are no
longer needed. During the recovery phase, emergency-response elements initiate the action
to restore conditions at and in the vicinity of the incident site to a technically feasible and
acceptable state. During the recovery phase, the response commander will facilitate the
orderly transition of C2 and conduct the withdrawal of military forces from the incident site
when the capabilities and services of the response elements are no longer required.
b. Develop and Implement a Mission-Recovery Plan. This plan must be coordinated
with civil authorities to determine the requirements. Clearly defined goals and objectives
ensure that tasks between civil authorities and JTF commanders are understood and
completed. Top priorities are reestablishing mission capability, developing a plan to cover
short- and long-term recovery requirements, and returning to normal operations. Special
consideration is given to minimizing and mitigating environmental damage. The mission-
recovery plan can address the following areas:
(1) Logistical support and resupply.
(2) Force protection.
(3) Documentation and reporting requirements, to include resource
expenditures, losses, and environmental-exposure data that is necessary to estimate
exposure (to determine long-term and short-term health effects).
(4) Decontamination.
(5) Environmental considerations to prevent pollution and restore the area.
(6) Medical issues to include:
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87 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | •
•
Personal protection.
Casualty-handling operations.
• Medical screening and documentation and critical-incident stress
management.
•
•
3. Transition
PA activities.
Liaison with federal, state, local, and HN officials as required.
a. Transition in CM operations involves the transfer of responsibilities and
functions to other organizations. Transition occurs between units, to the civil authorities,
or to local or HN agencies. Transition and/or termination is initiated once objectives are
met and authority is given from national decision makers.
b.
If DOD forces are transitioning functions between units, then the transition
requirements follow standard military handover procedures. If transition involves the
transfer of DOD forces’ functions or areas to the civil authorities or to local or HN agencies,
then the mechanics of the transition will reflect operational procedures and existing
agreements.
c. A transition plan helps the staff identify transition issues in relation to the
desired or projected end state. It is especially important to identify those parties or
agencies that will receive functional responsibilities from the JTF commander.
Considerations include which staff sections will write annexes, based on what the
transitioning organization will do. The transition plan should identify organization,
operating procedures, and transition recommendations and considerations. When
implementing the transition plan, the transitioning parties should discuss criteria for
transferring operations. The plan should be unclassified, clear, and concise—using
terminology appropriate to all parties.
(1) Transitioning may be by function or by specific areas of the incident site.
The transition process should be event-driven and not tied to calendar dates. Functions or
areas transfer only when a similar capability becomes available or is no longer needed.
Procedures for the transfer of equipment or supplies—either between DOD units, to civil
authorities, or to local or HN agencies—must be established according to regulation and
command guidance.
(2) Planners identify other key transition factors within functional areas that
may include logistics, medical services, communications, security, and technical services.
Planners should develop a series of transition criteria to monitor progress; the important
part of choosing indicators is to have a consistent method by which to measure progress
during the transition.
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88 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | 4. Redeployment
a.
Simultaneous with deployment, the JTF commander begins planning
redeployment. Redeployment decisions are based on civil and military considerations.
Redeployment begins as soon as objectives are accomplished or the need for military forces
diminishes. Redeployment planning should follow normal guidelines and protocols.
Careful consideration should be given to what physical assets can be safely removed from
the incident and which should be contained or controlled and whether or not it should be
left at the incident site.
b. Redeployment includes the use of the AAR process to help evaluate mission and
task performance. The AAR addresses the following:
(1) What was the original mission? How was it stated, and how was it
interpreted at the various levels of command?
(2) What should have happened (e.g., the mission or plan)? What actually
happened (e.g., a description of the event)?
(3) How it happened (e.g., key facts that led up to the event)?
(4) Why it happened (e.g., inferences about probable causes)?
(5) How to improve performance next time (e.g., alternative courses of action)?
5. Documentation
During a response, incoming/outgoing data (questions and responses) should be
captured and archived so that when personnel review the data later, they can be confident
that it is complete and accurate.
a. After conducting a response mission, the JTF addresses two areas: documenting
lessons learned and identifying what can be termed as after-operation follow-up. Key areas
of documentation include personnel and equipment expenditures or costs, incident event
logs, and medical documentation for response personnel.
b. Lessons learned should be collected and then consolidated in the Joint Universal
Lessons Learned System (JULLS) format, if possible, or through individual service systems
such as the US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).
c.
It is in the postemergency period that documentation of the incident occurs.
Actions that occurred during the notification, response, and recovery phases will be critical
to providing answers to the questions that will be asked (i.e., in areas such as
fiscal/resource management, medical surveillance, medical treatment, mortuary).
d. Accurate record keeping also addresses the monitoring of DOD response-element
personnel for long-term health problems that could be incident related.
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90 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Chapter VI
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
1. Overview
JP 3-07 outlines a two-pronged approach of general professional military education for
all officers and noncommissioned officers. Education and training should encompass
general awareness and specific functional AORs. Competency is developed through
institutional education, training, practical exercises, and simulations. Training should be
conducted with other organizations and civilian agencies that would be involved in CM
operations.
2. Education
CM operations need to be emphasized in appropriate programs of instruction. For
those military units without experience in civilian CM exercises on a local, state, regional,
or national basis, limited opportunities exist to incorporate lessons learned from these
events into the training environment such as institutional education, simulations, and
exercises. Commanders should educate all personnel in basic CM awareness, with more
specific operational instruction for personnel assigned CM tasks and responsibilities.
Numerous courses and training opportunities are available from various government and
private sources. A compendium of these resources is available from FEMA. Some of the
educational opportunities available are in the following areas:
a. General Awareness.
(1) Force Protection/Antiterrorism. One component of combating terrorism
includes defensive measures against terrorist attacks. All personnel train on the
fundamentals necessary to defend installations, units, and individuals against terrorist
attacks. AT is a FP measure and is the responsibility of commanders at every level.
(2) Overview of CM Operations. Based on the roles and responsibilities of the
audience, this may include the fundamentals of the FRP, the ICS, and service-specific
issues.
b.
Specific Operational Education.
(1) Command and Staff.
• The role of the action agency and LFAs.
• Legal authorities, constraints, and limitations.
• Logistics and support requirements, including fiscal reimbursement
issues.
• C2 structures.
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91 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | • The role and function of the DCO and other DOD liaisons.
NOTE: An example of this type of training is the DOD Emergency Preparedness
Course. This course prepares emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs),
DCOs, and staffs to plan and execute joint military operations that support civil
authorities responding to domestic emergencies and disasters. The US Forces
Command offers the course eight times a year at the FEMA Mount Weather
Emergency Assistance Center, Berryville, Virginia, and conducts mobile training
teams within the USPACOM’s and the US Southern Command’s
(USSOUTHCOM’s) AORs each year. This training is authorized by DODD 3025.1.
(2) Technical and functional areas.
• HAZMAT operations.
• Reconnaissance and survey.
• Decontamination.
• Casualty handling.
• Medical operations.
• Communications.
NOTE: Examples of functional-area courses are the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) Emergency Response to HAZMAT Incidents; the National Fire
Academy (NFA) HAZMAT Operating Site Practices; and US Army Medical
Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD)/US Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) Field Management of Chemical and
Biological Casualties and the Medical Management of Chemical and Biological
Casualties.
(3) Disaster Assistance. FEMA and other government agencies provide
numerous resident and nonresident training courses related to disaster-assistance
operations. Personnel assigned duties such as EPLOs or SCOs benefit from familiarity with
such training.
3. Training
Training opportunities exist both internally and externally and should include—
a. Individual, collective, and unit training.
b. Initial and sustainment training.
c. Intraagency and Interagency training.
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92 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | 4. Exercises
Exercises provide the opportunity to interact with other units or services and federal,
state, or local agencies. Exercises developed by non-DOD agencies provide an opportunity
to improve military capabilities for support of CM operations with minimal resources.
These exercises emphasize interoperability requirements and stress staff coordination.
They also serve to identify shortfalls in communications or other capabilities that must be
corrected.
5. Simulation and Modeling
Distributed simulations provide training technology that permits multiple
organizations or agencies to participate in the same simulation exercise from remote
locations. JTFs and other units involved with CM operations can use simulations such as
the hazard prediction and assessment capability (HPAC) to help portray various scenarios.
This includes training in the organization and processes of supported civilian agencies.
6. Rules of Engagement
Situational-training exercises provide deploying forces with training on events and
circumstances they can expect to encounter during CM operations. By reviewing lessons
learned and AARs of similar operations, leaders can identify likely situations that their
units can expect. Unit leaders prepare the proper response based on the rules of
engagement (ROE), applicable lessons learned, policy directives, instructions, regulations,
doctrine, tactics, and legal advice for each situation and train personnel accordingly. This
response becomes an immediate action drill and should be published and well rehearsed by
members of the deploying force. Standing ROE should be published as part of the CM
training process.
7. Public Affairs
Personnel in units conducting CM operations benefit from familiarity with PA
principles and procedures. CM operations are of great interest to the news media, and
units are aware that PA releases are conducted through the JIC. Commanders accomplish
their mission under close scrutiny of the media. They have to react rapidly to developing
issues and changing perceptions while simultaneously fulfilling the information needs of
their troops. An additional training resource is the National Response Team (NRT) JIC
Manual. The NRT JIC Manual provides guidance for establishing and organizing a JIC.
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93 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | Appendix A
CONTAMINATION-AVOIDANCE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
1. Background
This appendix addresses preparedness (i.e., understanding the IMS) and response
measures such as detection, marking, and contamination control that could support a
possible military response to an NBC incident.
2. Preparedness
During peacetime, units and installations undertake measures (i.e., contamination-
avoidance measures, drills and exercises to support crisis-management and CM
preparation) to decrease vulnerability. This is part of an integrated approach to an overall
unit/installation AT/FP program/plan; a key element in developing an integrated AT/FP
plan includes understanding the civilian IMS and being aware of where and how the IMS
process may influence response actions by military units.
a. Key information about the IMS’s command and staff structure (i.e., incident
commander; operations, plans, logistics, and administration sections; IC special officers;
and safety, liaison, and PA) is important as a preparedness measure in understanding the
responsibilities and functions at an incident site.
(1)
Incident Commander. The incident commander is responsible for
managing incident operations. His decisions (i.e., establishing a protection level) can
directly impact military response elements. His directives support accomplishing major
tasks such as—
resources.
•
•
•
•
•
Establishing control of the incident scene.
Ensuring the safe approach and positioning of emergency-response
Establishing staging as a method of controlling arriving resources.
Establishing a security perimeter.
Establishing hazard-control zones to ensure a safe work area. Factors
that influence the size of hazard-control areas and the establishment of protective levels
include considering whether an oxygen-deficient atmosphere exists (i.e., an atmosphere
immediately dangerous to life and health [IDLH] contains 19.5 percent oxygen or lower);
flammability (i.e., if dealing with an open-air release, the initial action level can be 20
percent of the lower explosive limit); radioactivity; and toxicity (i.e., guidance may indicate
to use an estimated IDLH of 10 times the threshold-limit value/time-weighted average if
there is no published IDLH or to use IDLH or short-term exposure-limit values).
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94 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | •
Assessing the need for immediate rescue and implementing public
protective actions.
(2) Operations Section. The operations section manages and controls all on-
scene tactical operations. This control will generally include the responsibility for
supervising HAZMAT branch operations. Specific HAZMAT branch-related tasks can
directly impact the where and when of military unit support. Functions can include the
following:
•
Site-control operations. Establish control zones and monitor access
routes at the incident site.
•
Decontamination operations. Develop, setup, and operate a
decontamination area.
•
Entry operations. Perform entry and backup operations within the
hot zone to include reconnaissance, monitoring, sampling, and mitigation.
• Medical operations. Perform preentry and postentry medical
monitoring and evaluation of all entry personnel and provide technical medical guidance.
(3) Plans Section. The plans section is a critical element for support of the IMS
process. An effective flow of information is critical at an incident site for all parties.
Responsibilities include—
•
Collecting, evaluating, and disseminating incident information.
• Maintaining information on the current and forecasted situation.
• Maintaining information on the status of resources assigned to an
incident.
•
Preparing and documenting action plans.
(4) Logistics Section. The logistics section is another critical coordination point
for military units. Military units may rely on local resources for site-support services, and
the logistics section may coordinate service, communications, food, and facility support.
(5) Administration/Finance Section. The administration/finance section
supports the IMS process by getting funds where they are needed and ensuring that
financial controls are in place.
(6) Command and Staff Officers. The following officers are appointed by and
report directly to the incident commander. These include the safety officer, liaison officer,
and public information officer. Supporting military units must also understand the roles
and responsibilities of these personnel to help ensure effective and efficient
communications.
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95 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | •
Safety Officer. The safety officer is responsible for monitoring and
assessing safety hazards and unsafe situations and developing measures for ensuring
personnel safety. Assistant safety officers, such as the HAZMAT safety officer, may also be
designated and have the authority to stop any activity that poses an imminent danger.
•
Liaison Officer. The liaison officer serves as a coordination point
between the incident commander and any assisting or coordinating agencies not involved in
the UC structure that have responded to the emergency. The liaison officer is the point of
contact for all assisting and coordinating external representatives who are not represented
within the UC structure.
•
Public Information Officer. The public information officer coordinates
all media contact and activities during an emergency, assembles and prepares all news
information and press releases, and establishes communications with all representatives and
agencies.
b. Other preparedness actions can take many forms. Possible measures could
include:
(1) Conduct of NBC threat-vulnerability assessment.
(2)
Integration of efforts with other USG agencies, including applicable law
enforcement and intelligence organizations. Commanders also assess the criticality of key
infrastructure essential to functions such as staging and deploying operations.
(3) Coordination of commanders with civilian authorities and agencies to
ensure that applicable measures such as Mutual Aid Agreements are in place to ensure a
fully coordinated response.
(4) Actions to further reduce vulnerability may include—
•
Enforcing operational security.
• Maintaining emergency NBC-response plans.
•
Identifying FP capabilities and capability redundancy.
• Monitoring and analyzing public health information.
• Maintaining NBC defense equipment, to include medical supplies.
•
FEMA and DOS).
Conducting joint and interagency planning (i.e., coordinating with
•
Assessing response elements’ (active and reserve) certification for
crisis-management or CM operations.
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96 | ./input/US Military Manuals/MCRP 3-37.2C Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Aspects of Concequence Management.pdf | c. Constraints that confront overall preparation include the following:
(1) Military operating base and civilian community (foreign and/or domestic)
populations often lack the training and equipment necessary to survive should an incident
occur. First-responder elements (i.e., medical, law enforcement, fire fighters, HAZMAT,
emergency planners, etc.) require training to ensure they do not become casualties when
responding to an incident. Responder elements need the required level of realistic,
integrated training (awareness, HAZMAT technician, etc.) to protect themselves so that
they are able to contain an incident. For example, awareness-level first responders need an
individual protection capability, and HAZMAT response teams need an immediate response
capability to be able to conduct actions such as saving lives. Tactical plans on how to deal
with these challenges also need to be developed and exercised.
(2) Much of the infrastructure that is a potential target is not hardened. Most
of the structures in key facilities are not designed to withstand blast damage or the
pervasive nature of a lethal CB-agent aerosol cloud.
3. Response Measures
Response measures include those actions needed to detect, assess, and contain an
incident. These actions help avoid, control, or mitigate NBC hazards.
a. Detection. Detection includes both preincident defensive actions and incident
actions. Preincident measures could include defensive measures taken by an installation to
help reduce the probability of an incident. Detection primarily involves incident-related
actions. Initial response begins with incident reporting by an observer and provides the
commander/incident commander with information on contamination hazards and clean
areas. Responders should be aware that standard military NBC detection equipment will
not detect the presence of many toxic agents. Reliance on reported information and visual
indicators (both positive and negative) from the site may be the sole indication that a toxic
environment exists.
b. Assessment. Assessment is a continuing process throughout any incident. The
situation must be quickly evaluated to determine the response objectives based on available
incident-response capability. Information such as the type of incident, probable size of the
affected area, and physical or environmental conditions must be reported. Using available
emergency communications, notify concerned personnel of the hazard. Actions besides
warning and reporting (and associated alarms and signals) include contamination marking
and hazard prediction.
(1)
Initial information on the type of incident and actual on-the-ground
conditions must be received, analyzed, and disseminated. This information is crucial to
support many key functions. Among these is deciding what areas should receive
instructions on whether to evacuate or to seek shelter in place.
(2) Assessment-decision support tools may also help to identify possible
locations of hazards at an incident site or locate populations within a community
potentially affected by hazards. This information is intended to give an estimate of the
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"Author": "b'Jennifer Evans'",
"CreationDate": "b'D:20011120084654Z'",
"Creator": "b'Microsoft Word 9.0'",
"Title": null,
"Keywords": null,
"Subject": null,
"Company": null,
"SourceModified": null
} | null |
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